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W o l f g a n g  M u e l l e r
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989: AN INTRODUCTION
In the May 1988 issue of Szkola, a Wrocław underground paper, an anonymous 
commentator wrote: “I think the end of our era is already close at hand.”1 The 
unknown author with the pseudonym Nobelek Rusz-Czkash turned out to be 
among the few who correctly predicted the life expectancy of communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe. While since the 1920s there had been announcements of the 
end of Soviet communism,2 neither the most prominent Eastern nor Western 
prophets had foreseen the sudden and momentous events that within weeks would 
wash away seemingly unshakable regimes in a number of countries and with them 
the postwar international order in Europe, thus bringing to a close what soon 
would be called the “short” twentieth century.3 
This is not to say that there were no analysts who perceived the signs of the 
impending unrest. Among those who saw it coming was Georgii Shakhnazarov, 
Gorbachev’s advisor, who in October 1988 predicted a serious crisis in Eastern 
Europe caused “by concrete factors rooted in the underlying economic and po-
litical model of socialism that was first developed in our country.”4 To be sure, 
in early 1988 US intelligence also forecasted “a moderate chance” for popular 
upheaval in Poland, Romania, and Hungary; however, “in extremis,” the intelli-
gence estimate saw “no reason to doubt” Gorbachev’s willingness to “intervene to 
preserve party rule and decisive Soviet influence in the region.”5
Perhaps the younger generation of dissidents (to which the commentator No-
belek Rusz-Czkash supposedly belonged), those who distributed leaflets and 
1 The author would like to thank Maximilian Graf and Arnold Suppan for their comments.
  Quoted in Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2002), 213. 
2 Among the authors who predicted the downfall of Soviet communism, be it for political, eco-
nomic, national, or demographic reasons, are thinkers as diverse as Ludwig von Mises, George 
Orwell, Andrei Amalrik, Marian Dziewanowski, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, Zbigniew Brzez-
inski, and Emmanuel Todd. Cf. Seymour Martin Lipset and Gyorgy Bence, “Anticipations of the 
Failure of Communism,” Theory and Society 23, no. 2 (April 1994): 169–210, 177–81. 
3 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (New York: 
Vintage, 1994). 
4 Quoted in Mark Kramer, “The Demise of the Soviet Bloc,” Journal of Modern History 83, no. 4 
(December 2011): 788–854, 811. 
5 Director of National Intelligence, “Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev,” 
National Intelligence Estimate 11/12-9-88, May 1988, in Benjamin B. Fischer, ed., At Cold 
War’s End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989–1991 ([Washington, 
DC]: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 151–77, 155, 171. 
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staged demonstrations, got it right by sheer luck. Perhaps they wanted to believe 
that their seemingly absurd and hopeless oppositional activities were not in vain. 
Perhaps people on the ground were more sensitive to societal dynamics and the 
shifts of popular sentiment than some of the more prominent dissidents—a phe-
nomenon that became clear with regard to the East German oppositional elite’s 
attitude toward German unity in early 1990. Historian Charles Maier was certain-
ly correct in analyzing that the failure of many to predict the revolutions of 1989 
and the collapse of state communism was, in some way, a “failure of democratic 
faith,” a failure to believe that democracy was, in the long run, strong enough to 
topple a coercive system.6 
There is no consensus among historians and social scientists about whether 
revolutions are per se predictable or not. Unpredictability and a sudden rupture 
in normal or familiar practices of politics and society are often quoted as fea-
tures of revolutions. Whether the East European revolutions of 1989 qualify as 
such, depends, as Charles Tilly remarked, upon how broadly the term is defined.7 
More recent revolutionary theory defines a revolution as “an effort to transform 
the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in society, 
accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized 
actions that undermine authorities.”8 In this sense, the East European upheavals 
of 1989 are acknowledged by political scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu as a “series 
of political revolutions that led to the decisive and irreversible transformation of 
the existing order. Instead of autocratic, one-party systems, the revolutions creat-
ed emerging pluralist polities. The revolutions allowed the citizens of the former 
ideologically driven despotisms (closed societies) to recover their main human 
and civil rights and to engage in the building of open societies.”9
In the political and social sciences it is said that as soon as a closed society 
starts to open, its leaders begin to lose control. More than a century before 1989, 
Alexis de Tocqueville had concluded from his studies on L’Ancien Régime et la 
Révolution: “Experience teaches that the most critical moment for bad govern-
ments is the one which witnesses their first steps toward reform.”10 As the con-
6 Charles S. Maier, “What Have We Learned since 1989?,” Contemporary European History 18, 
no. 3 (2009): 253–69, 253. 
7 Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 4, 233–37. Tilly 
concluded that while the situation in 1989 and the resulting events were revolutionary almost 
everywhere in Eastern Europe, the events can be considered revolutions in only certain coun-
tries (in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, the USSR, and Yugoslavia). For a thoughtful analysis of 
predictability and history, see Arnold Suppan, “Prognose und Vorhersehbarkeit in Geschichte 
und Geschichtswissenschaft,” lecture at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, 15 November 2013. 
I am grateful to Arnold Suppan for sharing his manuscript. 
8 Jack Goldstone, “Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001): 139–87. 
9 Vladimir Tismaneanu, “The Revolutions of 1989: Causes, Meanings, Consequences,” Contem-
porary European History 18, no. 3 (2009): 271–88, 277. 
10 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (New York: Harper & Bros., 1856), 214.
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tributions to this volume underscore, the unrest caught the communist bloc in a 
state of flux, with the struggle between reformers, anti-reformers, and dissidents 
still undecided. The upheavals of 1989 have, therefore, been aptly described as a 
“partnership of revolution from above and revolution from below.”11 In the vari-
ous countries, the revolutions followed different patterns: national reaffirmation 
of the 1956 uprising combined with reforms from above in Hungary; long-term 
opposition and gradually eroding communism in Poland; unrest of the masses 
leading to the implosion of the rigid regimes of East Germany and Czechoslova-
kia; demonstrations met by palace revolts in Bulgaria and Romania. Most of them 
were peaceful and “self-limiting”, with a negotiated transition of power. Still, 
popular participation and legitimacy was considered large enough to make them a 
“popular, genuine” revolution.12 While some of the upheavals were interpreted af-
terward as steps toward political normalization after a successful modernization, 
others are seen by many as just another failed attempt to modernize.
The regimes that were toppled in 1989 had similar features: Their rule was 
autocratic, based on communist ideology, state-ownership of the economy, sub-
ordination of society under one political party, and tight control over political 
activity.13 As they matured, these regimes reduced mass coercion and repression 
in favor of using nationalism and an implicit social contract. Many factors explain 
their downfall: economic stagnation, reducing their maneuvering space vis-à-vis 
their own population; the resulting crisis of legitimacy, with the regimes being 
less and less able to deliver the material improvements they had promised in re-
turn for their populations’ political aquiescence; ideological bankruptcy, with the 
ideas of social equality increasingly pushed aside by human rights; the effects 
of reform-communist political and economic liberalization, culminating with and 
personified by Mikhail Gorbachev, which increased people’s maneuvering space 
and information sources, but reduced the regimes’ ability and resolution to bribe 
or coerce their people into submission; and courageous action by non-conform-
ists. As in the case of the communist regimes’ installation after World War I and II, 
intentionalist interpretations of their demise are pitted against structuralist ones. 
While intentionalists will stress the role of Lech Wałęsa, Pope John Paul II, and 
Mikhail Gorbachev, structuralists point to inherent flaws that were inscribed in the 
communist regimes from their beginning, societal disintegration, and economic 
imbalances.14 Depending upon whether one chooses a systemic, society-based or 
11 Karol Edward Sołtan, “Purposes of the Past,” in Vladimir Tismaneanu and Bogdan C. Iacob, 
eds., The End and the Beginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History (Bu-
dapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 69–108, 80–88. 
12 Kevin McDermott and Mattew Stibbe, eds., The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope: From Communism to Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 3.
13 Stephen E. Smith, “Towards a Global History of Communism,” in idem, ed., The Oxford Hand-
book of the History of Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1–34, 3.
14 Ibid., 11–16. 
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regime-centered approach, 1989 can thus be told as a story of systemic failure, 
popular unrest, revolution from above or great-power politics. 
Since 1990, historians and political scientists have told this story from a 
comparative and/or entangled perspective.15 As archival materials were released 
they helped us to better understand events, backgrounds and interactions.16 Bot-
tom-up17 and top-down18 perspectives, intentionalist and structuralist explanations 
struggled against one another and, in the end, will perhaps complement one anoth-
er. The more detailed the new insights are, the greater is the need to periodically 
synthesize new findings and reflect upon the larger picture.19 
It is the aim of this book to give an overview over the various national rev-
olutions of 1989 and the external reactions, thus combining both domestic and 
international perspectives. It is not concerned with postcommunist transition, al-
though it includes some of the consequences of the revolutions into the spec-
15 Among the “first generation” of writings on 1989, cf. Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: 
The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague (New York: Random 
House, 1990); Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Eastern Europe (New York: 
Random House, 1990); William Echikson, Lighting in the Night: Revolution in Eastern Europe 
(New York: W. Morrow, 1990); J.F. Brown, Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in 
Eastern Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); Roger East, Revolution in Eastern Eu-
rope (London, New York: Pinter Publishers, 1992); Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolu-
tion (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1992); J. Elvert and M. Salewski, Der Umbruch 
in Osteuropa (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: 
The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
16 Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997); Charles S. Maier, Disso-
lution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997); Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., The Revolutions of 1989 (London, New York: Rout-
ledge, 1999); Steven Saxonberg, The Fall: A Comparative Study of the End of Communism in 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland (London: Routledge, repr. 2003); Svetlana 
Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful 
End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010).
17 Jiří Přibáň, Disidenti práva: O revolucích roku 1989, fikcích legality a soudobé verzi společenské 
smlouvy (Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2001); Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolu-
tion: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
18 Stephen Kotkin with Jan T. Gross, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist 
Establishment (New York: Modern Library, 2009).
19 Mary E. Sarotte, 1989. The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009); Vladimir Tismaneanu and Bogdan C. Iacob, eds., The End and the 
Beginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History (Budapest: Central Europe-
an University Press, 2009); Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2009); Bernd Florath, ed., Das Revolutionsjahr 1989: Die 
demokratische Revolution in Osteuropa als eine transnationale Zäsur (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2011); K.V. Nikiforov et al., eds., Revolyutsii i reform v stranah Tsentral’noi i yu-
go-vostochnoi Evropy: 20 let spustya (Moscow: Rosspen, 2011); Kevin McDermott and Mattew 
Stibbe, eds., The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism to Plu-
ralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana, eds., 
Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain (Lanham: Lexington, 2014). 
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trum of issues. The volume has three parts: the first examines the revolutionary 
events—from above and from below—in Eastern Europe and Beijing, starting 
with Gorbachev’s perestroika and continuing with country studies from Poland 
to Romania. The second part deals with Soviet and Western perceptions of and 
responses to the 1989 crisis in a similar fashion by treating various countries’ 
leaders’ political responses to the challenges of 1989–90. The last part of this vol-
ume focuses on the aftermath of the momentous events, on societal transforma-
tions that followed, the acceptance of the new Central European democracies to 
NATO and the EU, and on the larger context of these changes. These chapters are 
complemented by country studies on the post-1989 “archival revolution” and the 
memory of 1989. The remainder of this chapter attempts to contextualize and link 
the various chapters of this volume by addressing transnational links and topics. It 
reflects the structure of this volume, albeit in a modified way.
The Revolutions
In his groundbreaking study of The Gorbachev Factor, political scientist Archie 
Brown stated that the sudden collapse of 1989 “requires no elaborate explana-
tion.”20 The communist regimes in Eastern Europe “existed because the Soviet 
Union had put them in place—by force of arms or threat of force—and had been 
ready to intervene to sustain them in power.” While most authors would agree that 
while communism had been rejected by most East Europeans as a Soviet imposi-
tion21 and that national communism was a double-edged sword with regard to bloc 
consistency, there remains disagreement about the share that long- and short-term 
factors such as the actions of individuals had in bringing down state communism. 
Stephen Kotkin has concluded that state communism’s internal crisis was the main 
reason for the revolutions, and he has gone as far as to claim that the role of the 
civil society in 1989 is a myth.22 Even if this is true, and there are many who doubt 
it, we need to ask (a) what made this crisis a successful revolution and (b) why it 
brought collapse in 1989 and not, say, in 1956, 1968 or 2050. Christoph Boyer 
has endeavored to develop a model to explain these questions by combining the 
birth defects of communism such as the absence of economic incentives, political 
20 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 247. 
21 Cf. Brown, Kramer, Sebestyen. An exception seems to be Constantine Pleshakov, who claims 
the following: “If in 1945 communism hadn’t exactly arrived at the point of a gun, 1989 was 
not really about throwing off Moscow […] Eastern Europeans were, naturally, very happy to 
see the Soviets go, but they were fighting not the empire […] but their own rulers.” There Is No 
Freedom Without Bread! 1989 and the Civil War That Brought Down Communism (New York: 
Picador, 2009), 5–6, 236. Nonetheless, the experience of 1953, 1956 and 1968 shows that East 
Europeans had indeed fought the Soviet empire.
22 Stephen Kotkin with Jan T. Gross, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist 
Establishment (New York: Modern Library, 2009).
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competition, and public correctives with later emerging flaws such as the suppres-
sion of reforms in Czechoslovakia and the GDR in 1968–70 and the inability to 
satisfy consumer demands or to implement the Third Industrial Revolution.23 With 
the Eastern economies and societies being increasingly entangled with their West-
ern counterparts,24 comparisons could be drawn whereby the flaws became ever 
more visible for the normal citizen. Since modernization and social as well as 
economic superiority loomed large among the self-legitimizing factors of the 
communist regimes, the inability to achieve these things to the same extent as the 
West fatally undermined the regimes’ prestige and legitimacy. 
In general, top-down approaches underline the role of perestroika among 
the preconditions and decisive factors of 1989. While a number of studies have 
emerged that stress the role of other factors, in particular bottom-up impulses, 
many will agree that among the preconditions for the revolutions, “the changes in 
the Soviet Union are overwhelmingly the most important part.”25 The importance 
of what was labeled the “Gorbachev factor” stems from perestroika and glasnost’, 
i.e. the attempt to dynamize the ailing Soviet economy and tackle corruption as 
well as lethargy. 26 This was to be achieved by stimulating political and economic 
participation and reducing the costs of the hypertrophic empire. This included, as 
a prerequisite, the relaxation of East-West tensions. As the economic crisis be-
came more apparent, steps intensified toward reducing Soviet interference in the 
East European states as well as subsidies for them. 
At the same time, the importance of Western partners for alleviating East Eu-
ropean problems increased. In parallel, Gorbachev’s calls for perestroika and his 
support for change in the non-Soviet member states of the Eastern bloc grew bold-
er. He “wanted East Europeans to emulate [perestroika] but hesitated to push them 
too hard since that went against the spirit of his politics.”27 Moreover, before spring 
1988, his calls did not include a public disavowal of the Brezhnev Doctrine.28
23 Christoph Boyer, “‘1989’ und die Wege dorthin,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 59, no. 1 
(2011): 101–18. 
24 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael Lutz, Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitge-
schichte seit 1970 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; 2008). 
25 Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2007), 222.
26 It was an irony that the leader, who “aimed to rejuvenate communism, ended up destroying it.” 
Peter Grieder, “‘When Your Neighbour Changes His Wallpaper’: The ‘Gorbachev Factor’ and 
the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic,” in Kevin McDermott and Mattew Stibbe, 
eds., The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism to Pluralism 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 73–92, 73.
27 Mary Buckley, “The Multifaceted External Soviet Role in Processes towards Unanticipated 
Revolutions,” in Kevin McDermott and Mattew Stibbe, eds., The 1989 Revolutions in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe: From Communism to Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2013), 33–72. 
28 Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the 
Soviet Union (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 178–256, 183. 
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In his chapter to this volume, Andrei Grachev stresses the “new political think-
ing” as a non-Leninist and non-confrontational approach to international policy. 
It was based on disarmament, non-violence, and reform. Although Gorbachev did 
not order it, he encouraged the Polish communists to re-legalize Solidarność, ac-
quiesced (in March 1989) to the subsequent (from May) Hungarian dismantling 
of the Iron Curtain, granted (in August) the opening of the Hungarian border for 
East German refugees (in September) and agreed (in January 1990) to Germany’s 
reunification. He did not veto the emergence of non-communist parties, the hold-
ing of (semi-) free elections or the subsequent emergence of non-communist-led 
governments in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Soviet leader 
had entirely abandoned the “outer empire” before 1991. When the first communist 
regimes began to collapse, the CPSU initially still considered immediate measures 
to provide their “fraternal parties” support, as Mikhail Prozumenshchikov shows. 
After the new non-communist governments were formed, steps were conceived 
for improving Soviet relations with them. In many instances, Gorbachev referred 
to the continuing Soviet responsibility as a primus inter pares, and even after the 
forming of a non-communist government in Poland, the Kremlin sought assuranc-
es that this country would remain in the Warsaw Pact.29 
The question of why communist leaders agreed to give up their monopoly of 
power can be explained in several ways: Some intended to stabilize their position 
by co-opting parts of the non-communist spectrum or, as Polish opposition mas-
termind Bronisław Geremek said about the communist leadership, “to corrupt us, 
divide us, compromise us.”30 Others counted on confirming their own position 
and humiliating their contenders at the ballot box. In the round table talks, Pol-
ish communists insisted on quick elections, hoping to wrong-foot the opposition, 
which clearly lacked an apparatus or resources. Not only Polish, but also East 
German communists and even Gorbachev “did not realize how much they would 
be repudiated,”31 overestimating their chances of winning the popular vote. In the 
end, it turned out that in 1989 state communism lacked not only popular support, 
but also the ability to readjust and, luckily, the resolution to fight for power. As 
an alternative explanation, historian Konrad Jarausch has pointed to the loss of 
utopian belief and self-confidence among the ruling communists32 and Charles 
Maier has argued that in 1989 the communist leaders “understood that they had 
29 Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 240.
30 Quoted in Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire (London: Weiden-
feld & Nicholson, 2009), 221. Cf. ibid., 287.
31 Maier, “What Have We Learned since 1989?,” 261. Cf. Kramer, “The Collapse (Part 1),” 195.
32 Konrad H. Jarausch, “Moderate Modernity and the Spirit of 1989,” in Vladimir Tismaneanu and 
Bogdan C. Iacob, eds., The End and the Beginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence 
of History (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 109–26, 112. Cf. Tismaneanu, 
“The Revolutions of 1989,” 279.
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arrived at a dead end in terms of their own aspirations and policies.”33 In Maier’s 
eyes, this disillusionment is part of what he calls “late communism,” an “ageing” 
regime’s era of growing complexity in which the central power loses control to 
its agents, the economy and official politics are less dynamic, and leaders are less 
prone to risk-taking. 
In Poland 1989 bottom-up initiatives were most prominent: nowhere else in the 
Eastern bloc was the opposition so powerful, nowhere else did so many different 
oppositional initiatives emerge, nowhere else did they establish such a widespread 
network of transnational contacts and activities supporting oppositional groups in 
other East European countries. In his path-breaking study of grassroots opposi-
tion, historian Padraic Kenney has stated: “The regime did not agree to negotiate 
because this or that opposition leader showed indefatigable determination (nor, of 
course, simply due to economic decline and Western pressure, both of which had 
been the case for a long time). The catalyst to dialogue was the broad social unrest 
on dozens of stages.”34 As in Kenney’s study, bottom-up approaches stress the im-
portance of East European dissidents and opposition groups for bringing about the 
revolutions of 1989. While Stephen Kotkin as well as historian Tony Judt35 have 
doubted the impact of dissidents, Kenney and Timothy Garton Ash argue that 
the “reassessment of the notion of citizenship” was launched by the example of 
intellectuals and their ideas.36 Vladimir Tismaneanu has stated that the revolutions 
cannot be understood without an emphasis on the significance of civil society as a set of funda-
mental ideas, a political math, and a real, historical movement [...] those who took to the streets, 
the thousands and thousands who were ready to die because they wanted to be free, did not act 
as the puppets of uncivil society. They believed in civility, decency and humanity, and they suc-
ceeded in rehabilitating these values.37
Opposition comprised a wide range of interests and activities: While Solidar-
ność and a few dissidents had held a virtual monopoly of the opposition in the 
early 1970s, in 1989 the groups ranged from human rights committees, religious 
and social groups, peace movements and conscientious objectors (e.g. Charter 77; 
Freedom and Peace, the first major opposition group in Poland since the founding 
of Solidarność; the Peace Group for Dialogue in Hungary; the Initiative for Peace 
and Human Rights in the GDR), to cultural- and nature-protection as well as an-
ti-nuclear and ecological awareness groups. These included the Velehrad initiative 
33 Maier, “What Have We Learned since 1989?,” 259; 267. 
34 Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 300. 
35 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2005), 576. The author 
refers to “immediate” impact in the 1970s. 
36 Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern, 131–56. Garton Ash dismisses Kotkin’s interpretation. Timo-
thy Garton Ash, “1989!,” The New York Review of Books, 5 November 2009.
37 Vladimir Tismaneanu, “Rethinking 1989,” in idem and Bogdan C. Iacob, eds., The End and the 
Beginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2009), 15–32, 32.
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of 1985; János Várgha’s Danube Circle, which collected more than 10,000 signa-
tures against the creation of the gigantic Nagymaros dam; and Ekoglasnost, which 
became famous for its protests in Sofia in October 1989 and whose crushing con-
tributed to Todor Zhivkov’s downfall.38 Their activities comprised street theaters, 
summer camps, pilgrimages, student activism, raft expeditions, the collecting of 
signatures for petitions, street protests, hunger strikes, leaflet distribution, sit-ins 
and happenings, the cleaning and restoring of historical sites, the occupation of 
endangered natural sites, singing songs, forming human chains, the commemora-
tion of historical dates, and campaigns against pollution or homelessness. 
In many places, it was young people who were leading the protests. Since the 
nineteenth century (not in 1789), students had played a vanguard role in many, if 
not most, revolutions.39 In the Eastern bloc, communist propaganda had contrib-
uted to keeping ideas of “revolution,” “powerful demonstrations” and “meetings” 
popular.40 As Karsten Brüggemann shows in this chapter on the revolution in the 
Baltics, opposition was conducted mainly by representatives of a generation that 
only knew about massive state violence through hearsay or personal family his-
tory. They therefore believed in the “possibility” of change. Music played a large 
role, not only in the Baltics, where the singing of songs became a major means of 
protest. Rock or punk music had always been perceived by communist authorities 
as potentially subversive. Indeed, in 1976, the arrest of the rock band Plastic Peo-
ple of the Universe became the trigger for formulating Charter 77; twelve years 
later, a rally in Czechoslovakia in the memory of the death of John Lennon turned 
into a demonstration for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country.41
In Bulgaria and Romania, as Ulf Brunnbauer and Anneli Ute Gabanyi show, 
political dissent was less significant in comparison to Poland or Czechoslovakia. 
Here opposition groups of ethnic minorities were remarkable: the Turkish minori-
ty in Bulgaria, which opposed the forceful assimilation campaign to which it had 
38 For a transnational survey of the role of churches before and in 1989, see Christian Halbrock, 
“Kirche und Kirchen im Vorfeld sowie in den Revolutionen: Handlungsvoraussetzungen, 
Einübung und Praxis des Widersprechens,” in Bernd Florath, ed., Das Revolutionsjahr 1989: 
Die demokratische Revolution in Osteuropa als eine transnationale Zäsur (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 149–64.
39 Robin Okey, “Echoes and Precedents: 1989 in Historical Perspective,” in Kevin McDermott and 
Mattew Stibbe, eds., The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism 
to Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 33–52. Cf. idem, The Demise of 
Communist East Europe: 1989 in Context (London: Bloomsbury, 2004).
40 James Krapfl, “Afterword: The Discursive Constitution of Revolution and Revolution Envy,” 
in Kevin McDermott and Mattew Stibbe, eds., The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern 
Europe: From Communism to Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 
271–84.
41 Sebestyen, Revolution, 208. Cf. György Dalos, Lebt wohl, Genossen! Der Untergang des sow-
jetischen Imperiums (Munich: Beck 2011). On opposition in Czechoslovakia, cf. E.G. Zador-
ozhnyuk, Ot kruzhneniya Prazhskoi vesny k triumfu “barhatnoi” revolyutsii: Iz istorii oppozit-
sionnogo dvizeniya v Chehoslovakii (Avgust 1968–Noyabr’ 1989) (Moscow: Indrik, 2008). 
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been subjected and which was supported from 1988 by Bulgarian intellectuals; 
in Romania, the Hungarian minority, which resisted the forceful razing of their 
villages and was inspired by their spokesman Pastor László Tőkés of Timişoara 
(Temesvár), whose arrest helped trigger the uprising in 1989. 
Although created for collective action, most of these groups were “rooted in an 
individualistic concept of freedom, programmatically skeptical of all ideological 
blueprints for social engineering, […] liberal and non-utopian.”42 Jürgen Haber-
mas has therefore labeled 1989 the “rectifying revolutions,” revolutions that re-
stored Eastern Europe to the “normal” liberal democratic trajectory.43 By “living 
in truth,” as Václav Havel put it, they strove to reject a system which they per-
ceived as a lie.44 Ideas in general, the ones of human and civil rights in particular, 
loomed large among their foundations.45 They aimed at belonging to what they 
imagined as the free, independent, wealthy and happy mainstream of the West; 
“return to Europe,” be it to a functioning economy and/or to civil society, was 
one of their mottos.46 This may be one of the reasons why what political scientist 
Marie Elise Sarotte called “prefab” models prevailed in defining the post-1989 
international order.47
In the early 1980s, the image of West European society being wealthier and 
happier than communist ones seems to have been widespread in the East, both 
among the masses and in the higher echelons. In the wake of détente, perestroika, 
and the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, intensified East-West 
entanglement,48 the exchange of visitors, and the media had achieved a great deal 
in deconstructing enemy images and shaking ideological convictions. In his mem-
oirs, Gorbachev wrote that simply by the West being able to provide a higher stan-
dard of living for its citizens and legitimacy for its governments, his own “faith in 
the advantages of socialist over bourgeois democracy was shaken.”49 Détente and 
42 Vladimir Tismaneanu, “The Revolutions of 1989: Causes, Meanings, Consequences,” Contem-
porary European History 18, no. 3 (2009): 271–88, 272. 
43 Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Kleine Politische Schriften VII (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1990); idem, “What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution 
and the Need for New Thinking on the Left,” New Left Review I, no. 183 (September-October 
1990), http://newleftreview.org/I/183/jurgen-habermas-what-does-socialism-mean-today-the-
rectifying-revolution-and-the-need-for-new-thinking-on-the-left.
44 Václav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” in idem et al., The Power of the Powerless: Citi-
zens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (London: Hutchinson, 1985), 10–59, 20.
45 Wolfgang Eichwede, “Don Quichottes Sieg: Die Bürgerrechtler und die Revolutionen von 
1989,” Osteuropa 59, no. 2–3 (2009): 61–84.
46 Judt, Postwar, 630.
47 Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 1–10.
48 Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, eds., Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, 
Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum 
Press, 2010). 
49 M. Gorbachev, Zhisn’ i reformy 1 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), 169.
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Ostpolitik had contributed to the Western image improving greatly. As memories 
of the war faded and West Germany emerged as an economic partner, anti-Ger-
man propaganda which had been used for decades to keep the Eastern bloc togeth-
er was toned down. The picture of Willy Brandt kneeling in front of the Warsaw 
uprising memorial did more to deconstruct the communist enemy image of West 
Germany than decades of Western counterpropaganda: “After the Berlin and Ger-
man treaties were signed at the beginning of the 1970s only the most stubborn and 
hidebound state socialist leaders […] might still believe that a commonwealth of 
workers was menaced by an imperialist conspiracy.”50
While Poland is often cited as a case in point for the importance of bottom-up 
initiatives, Klaus Bachmann underlines the emergence and temporary toleration 
of semi-legal non-communist political actors in Poland as well as of liberalizing 
steps taken by the late-communist regime. All the more, the story of Hungary in 
1989 is often described as a top-down process, a “revolution from above,” whereby 
reform communists participated in dismantling the one-party system, as shown by 
Andreas Oplatka. As in the Polish case, pre-1989 liberalization as well as round 
table negotiations loom large. After multicandidate elections had been held in the 
USSR in April 1989, Gorbachev neither vetoed the holding of partially free elec-
tions in Poland nor the subsequent emergence of a noncommunist-led government. 
However, in March 1989 he did not welcome Hungarian Premier Miklos Németh’s 
proposal to hold multiparty elections in Hungary and he disapproved of the emerg-
ing Hungarian interpretation of 1956 as a popular uprising and not, as Soviet com-
munism had preached, a “counterrevolution.”51 But it was to Gorbachev’s credit 
that he stressed that such decisions were within the national responsibility and that 
he fulfilled Hungary’s demand for a quick Soviet withdrawal of forces. 
Doubtlessly, Gorbachev’s greatest achievement was non-violence as a conse-
quence of his and his East European colleagues’ restraint. In twentieth-century 
Europe in general, political violence had played a large role;52 in Eastern Europe 
and the communist bloc this role was particularly large.53 The revolutions of 1789 
50 Maier, “What Have We Learned since 1989?,” 261. Cf. Odd Arne Westad, “Beginnings of the 
End: How the Cold War Crumbled,” in Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, eds., Reinterpreting 
the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 
68–81, 69–71.
51 Kramer, “The Demise of the Soviet Bloc,” 818.
52 Donald Bloxham and Roberst Gerwarth, eds., Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds., 
Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the 
Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Martin Sabrow, ed., 1989 und die Rolle der 
Gewalt (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009); Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and 
Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Arnold Suppan, Hitler—Beneš—Tito: Konflikt, Krieg 
und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 2013).
53 Stephane Courtois,  Nicolas Werth, Jean–Louis Panné, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek and 
Jean–Louis Margolin, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge, 
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and 1848, both of which included large-scale violence, were followed by military 
interventions and wars. In contrast, many historians have pointed to the 1989 rev-
olutions’ surprisingly peaceful character. Timothy Garton Ash is certainly correct 
in assessing that “Where the guillotine is a symbol of 1789, the round table is 
a symbol of 1989.”54 In his groundbreaking study, Jacques Lévesque states that 
“the most surprising event of that fateful year was not, in itself, the collapse of 
the East European regimes […] The most remarkable and least expected event of 
1989 was, in fact, the Soviet attitude.”55 Indeed, other uprisings and upheavals 
in Eastern Europe in 1953, 1956, 1968 had started peacefully before they were 
violently suppressed by Soviet forces. Mark Kramer has argued that three crucial 
events helped shape Gorbachev’s rejection of force: the Afghanistan disaster, the 
Soviet crackdown on demonstrators in Tbilisi in April 1989 and the Chinese mas-
sacre of students on Tiananmen Square in June.56 Even more importantly, human-
itarian considerations spoke against the application of force. The Soviet leader 
was likely influenced by what historian James Sheehan has described as Europe’s 
postwar transformation into a pacifist mainstream consensus.57 In addition, from 
the cycle of liberalization, East European unrest, and Soviet hardline response as 
had emerged in 1953–56 and 1966–70, Gorbachev drew the conclusion that the 
use of force would not only discredit perestroika internationally but also wreck it 
domestically. In the end, the Soviet leader was remarkably successful in avoiding 
violence, as well as in safeguarding a peaceful but rapid transition to a new polit-
ical order. Since communism had not taken roots in Eastern Europe, a civil war 
could be avoided. 
Yet, when demonstrators took to the streets in 1989, none of them could know 
for sure what kind of response they might expect from the police, or even from the 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). Cf. Hermann Weber and Ulrich Mählert, eds., Terror: 
Stalinistische Parteisäuberungen 1936–1953 (Paderborn: Schöningh, rev. exp. ed. 2001); Nor-
man Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); David Svoboda 
and Coilin O’Connor, eds., Crimes of the Communist Regimes (Prague: Institute for the Study 
of Totalitarian Regimes, 2011); Kevin McDermott and Mattew Stibbe, eds., Stalinist Terror in 
Eastern Europe: Elite Purges and Mass Repression (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2011).
54 Timothy Garton Ash, “Conclusions,” in Sorin Antohi and Vladimir Tismaneanu, eds., Between 
Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and their Aftermath (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2000), 395–402, 398.
55 Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1.
56 Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the 
Soviet Union (Part 2),” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 3–64, 22–41; “The 
Collapse (Part 1),” 188, 191. Sergey Radchenko has argued that Gorbachev’s rejection of the 
application of force did not prevent him from “utiliz[ing] Tiananmen to expand relations with 
Beijing at US expense.” Sergey Radchenko, Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia 
at the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7.
57 James Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008). 
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Soviet forces. In earlier decades, the Kremlin had sent out seemingly arbitrarily 
freezes and thaws, and in 1989 nobody was able to tell when the next “climate 
change” was due. In contrast to earlier claims, no documentary evidence has hith-
erto emerged that Gorbachev had, prior to 1989, informed his East European com-
rades about his decision not to send troops should their people rise against them.58 
Except for public announcements of the freedom of choice, such as Gorbachev’s 
1988 address to the United Nations, the public knew very little about the leader’s 
intentions. 
Still, in 1989, thousands of people were intimidated, taken into custody, or 
beaten up by communist police. Force was never ruled out entirely. Padraic Ken-
ney has shown that in 1989, it was still risky to demonstrate in the streets. Even 
in the most liberal parts of Poland, uncertainty remained; in October 1989, Soviet 
police organized a “pogrom” against opposition demonstrators in Ukraine59 and in 
November demonstrating students in Prague were mercilessly beaten up by Czech 
police. Polish communist leaders seriously considered imposing martial law in 
August 1988 and after the elections of June 1989; Czechoslovak communists con-
sidered doing the same in November 1989.60 In the GDR police vans were deliber-
ately driven into the demonstrating crowd, Stasi boss Erich Mielke gave the order 
to “shoot troublemakers” and the East German Politburo discussed crushing the 
mass demonstrations. As the brief episode of Soviet force in the Baltics shows, 
until 1991 “no one could exclude the possibility of an attempted crackdown.”61
The fact that appalling bloodshed happened on Tiananmen Square, many ob-
servers claim, is one of the reasons it did not happen in Europe. But the opposite 
chain of causality may hold true as well, as Peter Vámos suggests. From the de-
velopments in Eastern Europe, Chinese leaders drew the conclusion that ruthless 
action was needed in Beijing. While Gorbachev had started to tolerate public dis-
sent, not the least in order to create momentum for his reforms, the Chinese party 
decided first to quell the student demonstrations on Tiananmen Square and then 
to return to their reforms. Afterward, again, fundamentally differing conclusions 
were drawn at the other end of the communist world: While members of the Polish 
58 Kramer, “The Demise of the Soviet Bloc,” 788–854. In a contribution to the conference “The 
Revolutions of 1989” at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, on 2 October 2009, Vadim Med-
vedev stated that abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine was “first announced at a working meeting 
of leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries in Sofia in October 1985.” Similarly, earlier literature 
claims that Gorbachev informed Eastern leaders in 1985 or 1986 about the abandoning of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine. In contrast, William Taubman and Svetlana Savranskaya argue that this hap-
pened at the July 1989 Warsaw Pact summit in Bucharest. However, this argument rests solely 
on memoirs. William Taubman and Svetlana Savranskaya, “If a Wall Fell in Berlin and Moscow 
Hardly Noticed, Would it Still Make a Noise?,” in Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., The Fall of the Berlin 
Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 69–95, 85. 
59 Kenney, A Carnival, 273. 
60 Kramer, “The Collapse (Part 1),” 195; Sebestyen, Revolution, 375. 
61 Steven Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000 (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, updated edition 2008), 92. 
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and Hungarian opposition were among the fiercest critics of the bloody crack-
down and in the Kremlin an appalled Gorbachev may have felt confirmed in his 
commitment to non-violence, in Bucharest and East Berlin, Nicolae Ceauşescu 
and Erich Honecker watched with interest how what their hardline advisors would 
soon recommend as “the Chinese solution” was being implemented.62 
However, as Anneli Ute Gabanyi argues, it is far from clear who is responsible 
for most of the about 1,000 dead in Romania, when a group of people around 
Ion Iliescu seized power in a coup d’état following popular unrest in Timişoara. 
Ceauşescu’s suppression of the uprising cost many lives, but many more people 
died in fighting after the dictator had been arrested. He was the only communist 
leader who was executed in 1989. 
Police brutality did not rescue the communist GDR either. After a brief climax 
in October, the violence was toned down and, soon thereafter, the SED state dis-
appeared. The mass exodus of East Germans through the recently opened Hun-
garian-Austrian border, ongoing demonstrations at home and quickly approach-
ing bankruptcy had caused so much confusion in East Berlin that it unwillingly 
opened the Wall and, later, consented with round table talks and free elections. 
Interestingly, even as the GDR increasingly resembled an air mattress with a hole, 
some of its most prominent dissidents continued to believe in the existence of a 
reformed communist state. Yet, this idea was rejected among the masses and the 
emerging drive for German unity prevailed.
Hans Hermann Hertle stresses the role West German television (which could be 
seen anywhere in the GDR except in the so-called Valley of the Clueless) played 
in East Germany’s “October Revolution” by reporting the opening, first, of the 
Hungarian Iron Curtain and, then, prematurely as it turned out, of the Berlin Wall. 
Indeed, the fall of the Wall is the first world-historic event to have become reality 
because it was announced by the media. When in the evening of 9 November 1989 
West German television declared that “the gates of the Wall are wide open” this 
was not yet the case.63 However it turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy, since it 
drew more and more crowds to the border. Even earlier, West German reports on 
the rigged GDR elections in May 1989 had helped spark demonstrations in the East. 
The transnational effects of the first “televised revolution in history” did not end 
here. Victor Sebestyen writes: “When people in Prague saw the Berlin Wall come 
down, they began to believe they too could overthrow their leaders. […] Nicolae 
Ceauşescu lost power the moment his face was seen on Romanian television looking 
first confused, then petrified and finally weak as crowds booed him at a Bucharest 
rally.”64 Similarly, media reports about the alleged death of student Martin Šmíd at 
the hands of Czechoslovak riot police on 17 November helped to swell the protest-
ing crowd in the “Velvet Revolution.” Further impulses for the uprising had been 
62 Cf. Radchenko, Unwanted Visionaries, 307; Kramer, “The Demise of the Soviet Bloc,” 826. 
63 Sarotte, 1989, 38–41. 
64 Sebestyen, Revolution 1989, xx (quote), 278.
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received by the presence of thousands of East German refugees in the West German 
embassy in Prague. After massive strikes and the emergence of opposition groups 
such as Václav Havel’s Civic Forum, a coalition government with a non-communist 
majority was formed and it was agreed to hold free elections. 
As Jiří Suk reminds us, many of the demonstrations of the “Velvet Revolu-
tion” were organized in commemoration of two crucial phases in Czechoslova-
kia’s recent history: Nazi suppression (as signified by the death of Jan Opletal in 
1939) and the Soviet and Warsaw Pact crackdown on the “Prague Spring” reform 
policies of 1968 (an invasion that was protested most tragically by the self-im-
molation of Jan Palach in 1969). Both historical events were understood as pow-
erful symbols in the fight for national sovereignty and resistance against foreign 
domination. By the same token, in 1989 events commemorating the Czechoslovak 
declaration of independence 1918, the 1848 revolution and the 1956 uprising in 
Hungary (both suppressed by Russian forces), Ukrainian independence 1919, and 
the 1939 signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact as the stab in the back of Baltic state-
hood, were organized to create a “national” consensus against what was increas-
ingly depicted and perceived as “foreign” (i.e. Soviet) communist regimes. These 
served as points of departure for the 1989 revolutions in these countries. It was no 
coincidence that the reburial of Hungary’s 1956 leader Imre Nagy was used by an 
opposition activist, Viktor Orbán, for voicing a public call for a Soviet withdrawal 
from his country. 
Gorbachev seems to have been aware of the risk that historical revelations 
might exacerbate national tensions. Until the final day of the USSR’s existence, 
the Soviet leadership continued to consider the Hungarian revolution of 1956 “an 
anti-communist fascist coup.” In the case of the Soviet massacre of the Polish elite 
near Katyń in 1940, Gorbachev continued to deny knowledge of the whereabouts 
of related documents about Stalin’s responsibility, although according to Mikhail 
Prozumenshchikov he had known about them since the beginning of 1989. 
In Yugoslavia, the “national” question emerged in a different way. Together 
with Albania, it was the only Eastern country that was never occupied by the So-
viet army for a longer period of time. Florian Bieber and Armina Galijaš demon-
strate that, at first glance, Yugoslavia’s trajectory away from communist rule does 
not appear particularly different from the other Eastern countries: The communist 
party collapsed in January 1990 and multiparty elections were held. However, 
in contrast to other countries the anger of the large protest movement of 1988 
was quickly channeled into ethnic conflict and the main cleavages within the rul-
ing party opened along ethnic lines. Thus elections led to different results: While 
non-communist governments came to power in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the successors to communists won in Montenegro and Serbia. This 
division of Yugoslavia65 reflects a larger division between two groups of countries: 
65 Cf. Norman M. Naimark and Holly Case, eds., Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding 
the Balkan Wars of the 1990s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
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In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR multiparty elections brought 
the victory of non-communist forces; in Bulgaria and Romania members of the 
(reform) communist elite took power in palace revolts and were then confirmed 
in elections.66 
Transnational links and external factors
Most authors agree that the revolutions of 1989 were not disconnected nation-
al phenomena, but were reinforced by inter- and transnational links and spillover 
effects. As can be seen by the American, French and Polish revolutions of 1776, 
1789 and 1791/94 with their transatlantic repercussions, the upheavals from Lat-
in America to the Mediterranean region and St. Petersburg from 1820 to 1825, 
the Russian and Central European revolutions in the aftermath of World War I as 
well as the de-Stalinization crises of 1953–56, this is certainly not a new phe-
nomenon. The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in particular were transnational 
events with far-reaching spillover effects ranging from Paris to Warsaw and from 
Palermo to Budapest.67 
Before and during 1989, ideas of reform and democratic participation spread 
from Western Europe to the East, from Eastern Europe to Russia and vice versa, 
and from Eastern Europe to China. Among the dissident groups of the late 1980s, 
a widespread network of transnational links and interactions existed at the grass-
roots level. Later this reached up to the top: Collaboration between Polish activists 
and their Czechoslovak and Hungarian as well as Baltic and Ukrainian colleagues 
included students’ contacts, the smuggling of hardware and know-how,68 and pro-
tests against the Tiananmen massacre in front of the Chinese embassy buildings in 
Warsaw and Budapest. When Czech authorities arrested Hungarian activists who 
had supported anti-regime demonstrations in Prague on 21 August 1989, the Hun-
garian opposition organized a hunger strike in front of the Czechoslovak embassy 
in Budapest. Solidarity was active in promoting liberalization and self-determina-
tion in the USSR: Wałęsa wrote a letter to Gorbachev urging him to grant Lithua-
nia the same right of choice as had been given Eastern Europe and later nominated 
the three Baltic republics for the Nobel Peace Prize.69 In the Baltic states, students 
from Ukraine experienced the feeling of seeing the banned national flag waved on 
the streets and were taught how to layout their samizdat gazette. Polish opposition 
leader Adam Michnik joined the inaugural congress of Ukraine’s Rukh move-
66 Michael Meyer, 1989: The Year that Changed the World: The Untold Story Behind the Fall of 
the Berlin Wall (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 190–91. 
67 Barbara Haider and Hans Peter Hye, eds., 1848: Ereignis und Erinnerung in den politischen 
Kulturen Mitteleuropas (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
2003). Cf. Hans Peter Hye, “Was blieb von 1848?,” ibid., 9–30, 12.
68 Kenney, A Carnival, 109; 268.
69 Kramer, “The Collapse (Part 1),” 211. 
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ment in September 1989. While Padraic Kenney has demonstrated that dissident 
cooperation among East Europeans was much more active than expected, he has 
stressed the reticence of West Europeans (in contrast to Americans) with regard 
to Eastern dissidents; here the dilemma of the 1970s of whether to establish and 
maintain contact with communist semi-official peace and human-rights organiza-
tions or of trying to collaborate with the opposition was visible. 
The transnational spillover of political reforms, as analyzed by Ella Za-
dorozhnyuk, ranged from round table negotiations, free multicandidate elections 
to the abolishment of the “leading role” of the communist party. Competitive 
multicandidate elections had been made mandatory in Poland and Hungary for 
the National Assembly and local councils from the early 1980s;70 the Hungarian 
Parliament was relieved step-by-step from party tutelage. The Hungarian commu-
nists were also first in giving up their monopoly of power in January 198971 and 
announcing the transition to a multiparty system. The regulations created for the 
election of the Congress of People’s Deputies in the USSR in March stipulated 
that candidates seek approval by local assemblies; many anti-establishment com-
munists and independent candidates won such tickets and, then, congress seats. 
From here they created a pro-reform caucus. Later, they were among the first dep-
uties to leave the CPSU. In the meantime, this new kind of election in the Soviet 
Union had made it easier to change the regulations for elections in Poland in June, 
with 35 percent of the Sejm and all seats of the Senate open for free contestation. 
Although Gorbachev had expressed his personal disapproval, Hungary was the 
first to introduce genuine multiparty elections, which were held shortly after sim-
ilar elections in the GDR in March and April 1990; Czechoslovakia followed in 
June. Further spillover effects were seen with regard to border controls: the decon-
struction of the Iron Curtain on the Hungarian-Soviet border was mirrored at the 
Hungarian-Austrian frontier and, subsequently, the opening of the border for East 
German refugees. While Hungary had joined the UN Convention on Refugees in 
order to accept Magyars fleeing from Romania, Budapest applied the stipulations 
to East Germans as well. 
Spillover effects triggered not only reforms, but also unrest: The Hungarian 
demonstrations in solidarity with the Transylvanian Hungarian minority contrib-
uted to the revolution in Budapest; in a similar fashion, the presence of East Ger-
man refugees in Czechoslovakia helped inspire the “Velvet Revolution” in Prague. 
Added to these triggers were the demonstration effect and copying the round table 
70 Multicandidate elections (with the list controlled by the Communist Party) had been permitted 
in countries like Poland and Hungary on the local level since the late 1950s–60s. Alex Pravda, 
“Elections in Communist Party States,” in Stephen White and Daniel Nelson, eds., Communist 
Politics: A Reader (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 27–54. On Hungary, Hans-
Georg Heinrich, Hungary: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Pinter, 1986), 65–72. 
71 Michael Gehler, “Die Umsturzbewegungen 1989 in Mittel- und Osteuropa,” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, no. 41–42 (2004): 36–46. Cf. Andreas Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer. 
September 1989—Ungarn öffnet die Grenze (Vienna: Paul Zsolnay, 2009). 
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model; Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria followed the Polish ex-
ample of negotiations between the communists and non-communist forces.72 The 
emerging transnational dynamic was reflected in assessments by people on the 
ground: When in September 1989, after state communism had ended in Poland, a 
Czechoslovak citizen went to a street festival there, she was greeted by a Pole with 
the words: “Oh, you are from Czechoslovakia! Don’t worry, communism will fall 
there too!”73 Mark Kramer has discovered that transnational spillovers were facil-
itated by the intensity of relations within the Eastern bloc.74 While in 1986–88 re-
form impulses mainly came from the USSR (the Hungarian example still had not 
experienced any visible consequences), in 1989 the direction of spillovers started 
to change. From then they were mainly oriented from Central Europe toward the 
Soviet Union. After East European “fraternal” parties had given up their monopo-
ly, the CPSU followed suit in 1990.
While the Soviet role before and in 1989 cannot be overestimated and Gor-
bachev became the “hero of retreat” (Hans Magnus Enzensberger),75 Western be-
havior has been much less in the limelight. The peak of the Cold War in the early 
1980s had contributed to differentiating between Western leaders who advocated 
continuing cooperation with communist governments and those who felt it nec-
essary to increase support for opposition groups and demand the observation of 
human rights.76 With regard to Western action and reaction, historians have not 
yet concurred whether this was conducive to the dismantling of communism at all 
and, if so, how and to what extent. 
Many will agree that among Western leaders, “no person [did] more for the 1989 
revolutions than the pope.”77 The election of a Polish pontiff had certainly galva-
nized Catholics in his homeland. To obtain permission to visit Poland, John Paul II, 
who had been identified by the KGB as a “danger” to Soviet rule, had been forced 
to agree not to criticize communism. This dovetailed with pleas by the Curia and the 
Polish primate, who had advocated moderation so that the status quo of Polish Cath-
olics would not be endangered. In the final address of his 1979 trip to Poland, Karol 
Wojtyła told the largest public gathering ever held in this country: “I have come to 
72 Jerzy Holzer, “Der Runde Tisch: Internationale Geschichte eines politischen Möbels,” in Bernd 
Florath, ed., Das Revolutionsjahr 1989: Die demokratische Revolution in Osteuropa als eine 
transnationale Zäsur (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 225–232.
73 Quoted in Kenney, A Carnival, 286. 
74 Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the 
Soviet Union (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 178–256, in particular 
180; (Part 2), 6, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 3–64, in particular 48–57; and (Part 3), 7, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 
3–96, in particular 69. 
75 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “Die Helden des Rückzugs. Brouillon zu einer politischen Moral 
der Macht,” Sinn und Form, no. 3 (1990): 579–84. 
76 Cf. Leopoldo Nuti, ed., The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–
1985 (London: Routledge, 2009). 
77 Pleshakov, There is no Freedom, 237. Some might add that this holds true for the democratiza-
tion of Latin America as well. 
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you to talk about the dignity of man.”78 By addressing not only human rights but also 
values such as honesty, solidarity and empathy, the pope inspired people who were 
appalled by widespread dishonesty, corruption and oppression.79 
While the pope had the advantage of being allowed to speak to the masses, 
even if in philosophical language, other measures in support of oppositional 
groups behind the Iron Curtain had to be implemented covertly. Under the Car-
ter administration, the CIA had started secretly to support Solidarność. However, 
when the Agency discovered communist preparations for the implementation of 
martial law, it did nothing to warn the opposition.80 
The Western responses to perestroika were ambivalent: While many agreed 
with Margaret Thatcher’s assessment that “We are not in a Cold War now,” Sec-
retary of Defense Richard Cheney was no less correct in stating that Gorbachev’s 
“new thinking” “may be a temporary aberration” in Soviet behavior only.81 US 
presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush walked a middle line in wel-
coming perestroika and striking disarmament deals, at the same time taking the 
“new thinking” at its word by calling on Gorbachev to “tear down” the Berlin 
Wall (1987) and to allow a “Europe whole and free” (1989). 
The Cold War had emerged, for the most part, as a struggle over the fate of 
Eastern Europe, whose Sovietization at the hands of Stalin would be one of the 
foremost triggers for this global conflict. It was thus logical that it would be 
brought to an end over this part of the continent as well. As of today, the end 
of the Cold War82 has eclipsed the issue of Western involvement in the revo-
lutions of 198983—with the exception of the post-November developments in 
78 Sebestyen, Revolution, 22–27, 46–47.
79 Agostino Giovanogli, “Karol Wojtyla and the End of the Cold War,” in Silvio Pons and Federico 
Romero, eds., Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations 
(London: Frank Cass, 2005), 82–89; Bernd Schäfer, “The Catholic Church and the Cold War’s 
End in Europe: Vatican Ostpolitik and Pope John Paul II, 1985–1989,” in Frédéric Bozo, Ma-
rie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., Europe and the End of the Cold War: 
A Reappraisal (London: Routledge, 2008), 64–77.
80 Sebestyen, Revolution, 53, 100–2.
81 Jeffrey A. Engel, “1989: An Introduction to an International History,” in idem ed., The Fall of the 
Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1–35, 2.
82 See, e.g., Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End 
of the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Inst., 1994); Olav Njølstad, ed., The Last Decade 
of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2004); Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, eds., Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, 
Interpretations, Periodizations (London: Frank Cass, 2005); Kiron Skinner, ed., Turning Points 
in Ending the Cold War (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008). 
83 See, e.g. Gregory F. Domber, “Rumblings in Eastern Europe: Western Pressure on Poland’s 
Moves Towards Democratic Transformation,” in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers 
Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 51–63; Andrzej Paczkowski, “Playground of Superpowers, Poland, 1980–89: 
A View From Inside,” in Olav Njølstad, ed., The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict 
Escalation to Conflict Transformation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 372–401.
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the GDR. While many analysts have explained this with an underestimation of 
Eastern unrest by Western observers, noninterference may also be seen as having 
been a deliberate strategy to make the changes easier to swallow for the USSR. 
Whether “Washington got it right because it got it wrong”84 or because it as-
sessed the situation correctly will continue to be debated. It seems that both long-
term strategic aims, as they are analyzed by Philip Zelikow, as well as President 
Bush’s short-term reaction “not to jump on the Wall” once it had been opened 
contributed to the peaceful yet fundamental changes. Norman M. Naimark sup-
poses that the superpowers’ main achievements in 1989 are “what they did not 
do rather than what they did.” This may certainly be true, given the outcome 
a more heavy-handed Soviet or US reaction might have triggered. While Gor-
bachev struggled to combine liberalization in Central Europe with upholding the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization (at least until 1995 when his advisors expected the 
“elimination of the military structures of the two blocs”85 and their merger in a 
security system comprising Europe, the USSR, and Northern America), he stuck 
to his policy of noninterference and nonviolence. The Reagan and Bush admin-
istrations, which were anxious to keep him in power, showed restraint while not 
forgetting long-term goals of dismantling communism and fostering Western de-
mocracy. Neither was a “superpower condominium” over Eastern Europe agreed 
upon, nor were the non-communist groups and new governments abandoned. 
In the face of the communist crisis, both sides earned respect for displaying 
remarkable ability to handle potentially explosive situations in a sensitive and 
responsible way. 
Facing the upheavals of 1989, the smaller Western states shared the US goal 
of not destabilizing Gorbachev’s position. Since her first meeting with the Soviet 
leader, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher had advocated “doing business” 
with him and had done a lot to convince the US president of her approach. In a 
conversation with Gorbachev on 23 September 1989, the “Iron Lady” character-
ized the Soviet leader’s position as being “in favor of each country’s choosing 
its own road of development so long as the Warsaw Treaty is intact.”86 Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, the former US security advisor, in 1989 even went as far as advocating 
Poland and Hungary remaining within the Warsaw Treaty Organization.87 This 
was a widespread position among Western leaders, whose highest priority was not 
84 Timothy Garton Ash, “1989!,” The New York Review of Books, 5 November 2009.
85 William Taubman and Svetlana Savranskaya, “If a Wall Fell in Berlin and Moscow Hardly No-
ticed, Would it Still Make a Noise?,” in Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The 
Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 69–95, 80. 
86 Conversation Gorbachev with Thatcher, Soviet protocol, 23 September 1989, in Svetlana 
Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History: The Peace-
ful End of the Cold War in Europe 1989 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 
530–32, 531. 
87 Conversation Yakovlev with Brzezinski, Soviet protocol, 31 October 1989, in Savranskaya, 
Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 563–68, 567.
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to rock Gorbachev’s boat or endanger the negotiations on the reduction of con-
ventional forces in Europe. The tendency of many Western leaders toward at least 
temporarily upholding the international status quo was also visible with regard 
to the Baltic struggle for independence.88 In contrast, even reform communists in 
1989, and still more so the newly elected non-communist leaders of the Central 
European countries in 1990 voiced their interest in having the Soviet troops and 
nuclear weapons withdrawn from their soil, and, in 1991, in burying the Warsaw 
Pact altogether. 
In international politics, the East European revolutions were soon overshad-
owed by the German Question, which rapidly gained urgency after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. While West German chancellor Helmut Kohl embraced the oppor-
tunity for achieving the goal of two generations of Germans and President Bush 
told Gorbachev that no one could “expect us [i.e. the United States] not to approve 
of German reunification,”89 Margaret Thatcher and, to a lesser extent, François 
Mitterrand feared the consequences of a possible German reunification. Howev-
er, in contrast to the British prime minister, who furiously raised her handbag 
against that solution, the French president expected the Kremlin to do everything 
necessary for blocking it.90 Historian Jeffrey Engel has stressed how much per-
sonality mattered in shaping the various international responses to 1989. This co-
incides with the conclusions of Klaus Larres who, in explaining Thatcher’s rigid 
anti-German attitude, draws attention to her experiences as a child during the Ger-
man air attacks on Britain in World War II. As a consequence of her intransigence, 
the prime minister was increasingly isolated from the more balanced approach of 
the Foreign Office.91 In contrast the French president and the prime minister of 
Italy were, as Georges Saunier and Antonio Varsori underline, flexible enough to 
use their acquiescence with German reunification for tying it to European inte-
gration. It remains to be seen whether Mitterrand’s earlier signals for upholding 
the GDR and blocking a quick unification process represented his true intentions, 
initiatives for sounding out the situation, or for appeasing Gorbachev.92 In read-
ing Gorbachev’s conversations it appears that many European leaders shared the 
88 Kristina Spohr Readman, Germany and the Baltic Problem after the Cold War: The Develop-
ment of a new Ostpolitik, 1989–2000 (London: Routledge, 2004).
89 Conversation Gorbachev with Bush, Malta, Soviet protocol, 2–3 December 1989, in Aleksandr 
Galkin and Anatolii Chernyaev, eds., Mikhail Gorbachev i Germanskii vopros (Moscow: Ves’ 
mir, 2006), 268–72. For an English translation, see Masterpieces, 619–46, 634, 640.
90 Jeffrey A. Engel, “1989: An Introduction to an International History,” in idem ed., The Fall of 
the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
1–35, 6. 
91 Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, Stephen Robert Twigge, eds., Documents on British Policy 
Overseas III, vol. 7: German Unification 1989–1990 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009).
92 Cf. Maurice Vaïsse and Christian Wenkel, La diplomatie française face à l’unification alle-
mande (Paris: Tallandier, 2011), 29. The editors state that “the idea of François Mitterrand being 
hostile or at least very reluctant vis-à-vis German unification is well established, while the ar-
chives, now open, do not confirm that.” 
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intention of finding common ground with him—even at the cost of disavowing 
their own declarations in support of German unification. Yet, since Italian public 
opinion seemed to embrace reunification, the Italian government gave up resis-
tance even quicker than did the French. The Austrian government, which had, as 
Arnold Suppan notes, intensified its relations with the East European states since 
the 1950s and closely monitored the dissident movement, was nevertheless taken 
by surprise in 1989. Michael Gehler stresses that, due to contradictions between 
the ruling parties, the governing coalition took a long time to make up its mind 
about how to react to the challenges of 1989.93 
It was the Soviet leader who had to travel the longest road to make the reuni-
fication possible, taking the hurdles of approving the opening of the Berlin Wall, 
then consenting with self-determination regarding possible unification and final-
ly, with a free choice of alliances. Wolfgang Mueller’s chapter demonstrates that 
the Soviet leadership communicated acceptance of German reunification earlier 
than hitherto thought, namely on 20 January 1990, in a conversation between 
the Soviet and the East German foreign ministers. The 1989 revolution and the 
German reunification process merged into a highly complex situation, depicted 
by Alexander von Plato, that was characterized by the interaction of the upheaval 
and power struggle within the GDR, West German offers to help if the SED gave 
up its political monopoly, and external interference from the four powers as well 
as neighboring states.94 The dynamic of the unrest in and exodus from the “Ger-
man Demonstrating Republic” as well as this country’s approaching bankruptcy 
increased the time pressure for the actors involved, a time pressure that was used 
by the West German government to capture the initiative for reunification. To 
make things even more complicated, the Soviet leader’s attention was increasing-
ly distracted by the worsening economic crisis in his own country and the Baltic 
struggle for independence. 
Context and aftermath
The East European revolutions of 1989 and their peaceful resolution were 
facilitated by a geopolitical sea change between the East and West that led to 
substantial changes in the global political architecture. Archie Brown has con-
93 Prior to the forming of the coalition government in 1986, contradictions between the two parties 
had mainly emerged over the question how to deal with humanitarian issues and dissidents. In 
general, the respective opposition party was much more ready to openly criticize communist 
governments (and the government for being too soft on them) than the party in power. 
94 Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hoffmann, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche 
Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998); 
Andreas Hilger, ed., Diplomatie für die Deutsche Einheit: Dokumente des Auswärtigen Amtes 
zu den deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen 1989/1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011).
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vincingly argued that the East European revolutions were not part of what Sam-
uel Huntington has labeled the global “third wave” of democratization, which 
started with the end of the military dictatorship in Portugal in 1974 and continued 
on to Greece, Spain, Latin America and East Asia.95 As interconnections between 
these revolutions on one hand and the end of state communism in Eastern Europe 
on the other are “marginal” or even “non-existent,” Brown sees the latter rather 
as a distinct phenomenon, a fourth wave.96 In contrast, all East European revolu-
tions constituted an interconnected whole, which was affected by the changes in 
the Soviet Union. While the longing for “Europeanization” (be it a “normal” way 
of life in a liberal consumer society or, more concretely, the perspective of join-
ing the European Community) loomed large in the East European states, the el-
ement of “marketization” was virtually absent in the southern countries where 
market economies already existed. 
The years 1989–92 saw the collapse of not only a dozen communist and cli-
ent regimes worldwide from East Berlin to Ulan Bator, Kabul, and Addis Ababa. 
Fred Halliday has also pointed to 1989’s repercussions in “over a dozen other 
countries, located mainly in Southern Africa and Latin America, that had, with 
varying degrees of plausibility, justified their authoritarian systems by reference 
to the threat of ‘international’ communism.”97 With regard to the end of apartheid 
in South Africa, this relationship is often stressed. As Arne Westad reminds us, 
neither the Cold War nor the revolution of 1989 was simply a European affair. 
While, however, the Cold War had emerged primarily on this continent, it is less 
clear what the legacy of 1989 for the rest of the world will be.98 Recent volumes by 
Steven Saxonberg and Martin Dimitrov try to explain why the communist regimes 
only collapsed in Soviet client states, but not in the People’s Republic of China, 
Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and Cuba—if they can be called communist at all.99 
They have pointed to the latter regimes’ avoidance of combining economic with 
95 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Nor-
man: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); the first wave having taken place from 1826–1926, 
the second from 1943–62. For the events in Latin America and Eastern Europe in parallel, see 
Erhard Stackl, 1989: Sturz der Diktaturen (Vienna: Czernin, 2009). 
96 Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2007), 216–22, quote on 217.
97 Fred Halliday, “Third World Socialism: 1989 and After,” in George Lawson, Chris Armbruster, 
and Michael Cox, eds., The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2010), 112– 34, 113. 
98 Odd Arne Westad, “Conclusion: Was there a Global 1989?,” in George Lawson, Chris Armbrust-
er, and Michael Cox, eds., The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 271–81; idem, The Global Cold War: Third World 
Intervention and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
99 Martin K. Dimitrov, ed., Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Re-
gime Resilience in Asia and Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Cf. Ste-
ven Saxonberg, Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism: Regime Survival in China, 
Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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political reforms, their preservation of central tenets of their ideological claims 
and their reliance on nationalism and repression as stabilizing tools.100 
Historian Pierre Grosser is certainly correct in stating that 1989 was unique not 
only in the geographical range of “world historical” events, but also with regard 
to the spectrum of developments it brought to the fore. These comprise the end 
of the Cold War, victories of freedom and pluralism in certain parts of the world 
and their suppression in others, the triumph of economic liberalism, and the re-
emergence of nationalism and Islamism.101 The end of the Cold War opened many 
eyes for challenges that had hitherto been dwarfed by the East-West conflict; after 
a brief euphoria, concern about growing unpredictability appeared.102 However, 
although 1989 changed many things, continuity with the pre-1989 world (e.g. 
with regard to elites) and in some cases even the return to pre-1914 patterns (in 
international and economic thinking) are significant.103 In contrast to widespread 
talk in the 1980s about the near end of the nation-state in Western Europe, a reaf-
firmation of national sovereignty in East-Central Europe was seen after forty years 
of Soviet control following1989.104
Whereas the revolutions of 1989 succeeded in reaching their most important 
aim of disbanding state communism and permitting citizens to try to shape their 
own destinies, the success of the following transition to democracy, stability and 
prosperity is not yet entirely clear. Charles Maier has argued that the disappoint-
ment marking many judgements about the developments in the decade after 1989 
was, for the most part, unmerited and mostly stimulated by exaggerated expecta-
tions.105 Some authors were optimistic that a quick world-wide transition to de-
mocracy and its sustaining could be achieved. This hope, as was aptly reflected in 
political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s expectation of the End of History,106 turned 
out to be elusive. At the other end of the spectrum stands Ralf Dahrendorf, who 
warned of a return of ethnic hatred and fascism, which he considered the greatest 
100 Cf. Peter Nolan, China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall: Politics, Economics, and Planning in the Transition 
from Stalinism (London: Palgrave, 1995). 
101 Pierre Grosser, 1989. L’année où le monde a basculé (Paris: Perrin, 2009). 
102 John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”, The Atlantic Monthly (August 
1990), http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/foreign/mearsh.htm; Robert D. Kaplan, “The 
Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly (February 1994), http://www.theatlantic.com/ maga-
zine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civili-
zations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). For a critical 
account of the US Cold-War discourse, see Jon Wiener, How We Forgot the Cold War: A Histor-
ical Journey across America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). 
103 George Lawson, Chris Armbruster, and Michael Cox, eds., The Global 1989: Continuity and 
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010).
104 Matthias Middell “1989,” in Stephen E. Smith, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),  171–84, 176. 
105 Maier, “What Have We Learned since 1989?,” 254.
106 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
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risk after the revolutions.107 The war in Yugoslavia confirmed some of these ex-
pectations. Former dissident Adam Michnik belonged to those who tried to mod-
erate these fears by arguing that achieving democratic normalcy was already a 
great success: “Democracy is gray […] That is why we say gray is beautiful.”108 
Democracy still is, and will perhaps always be, endangered—not only in for-
merly communist countries, but globally and also in the “old” West. It needs 
to be regained every day. While in Central Asia, Russia and Belarus authori-
tarian regimes have emerged with old or new faces, in Western societies, as a 
consequence of economic neo-liberalism, unequal distribution of wealth and 
the economic precariousness of many citizens’ lives are described by many as 
threatening the essence of democratic participation and decision making.109 That 
consumption serves as the main factor of political legitimization is perhaps one 
of the most visible continuities between late communist and postcommunist po-
litical discourses.110 De-politization, consumerization and entertainmentalization 
of public life are mirrored by sinking political participation. The dogma of in-
dividualism has contributed not only to personal lives becoming less predict-
able, but also to social and political disintegration.111 The same holds true for the 
emergence of parallel societies that harbor preferences at variance with Western 
political and social principles. In the former communist countries, the post-1989 
recession, growing unemployment, inflation and changes in the welfare systems 
have contributed to disappointment and rising inequality, as analyzed by Dieter 
Segert. Liberal reforms were followed by an economic meltdown; by 1992, the 
GDP of Central Europe had shrunk to 77 percent from that of 1989. Between 
1989 and 1995, the percentage of people living in relative poverty (earning less 
than 35–45 percent of the average) rose, e.g., from 14 to 54 percent in Bulgaria, 
from 4 to 35 percent in the Czech Republic, 10 to 30 percent in Hungary, 25 to 
44 percent in Poland, and 34 to 52 percent in Romania.112 In 2005 a recovery was 
107 Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Eastern Europe (New York: Random House, 
1990), 111–12. 
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Perspectives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 317–328, 326–27. 
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cent,” Le Monde Diplomatique, no. 5 (2013), http://mondediplo.com/2013/05/01tyranny (ac-
cessed 25 October 2013).
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ginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History (Budapest: Central European 
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noted, with growth rates of about 4 percent in the Central European countries, 
which, in terms of their average citizens’ standard of living still lag behind West-
ern Europe. 
Voters have reacted with disappointment, volatility and, after a brief high, de-
creasing political participation. In Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Lithuania the 
former (reformed) communist parties were elected back into power in 1993–94. 
As the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Russia illustrate, con-
spiracy theories with regard to what happened in and after the revolutions of 1989 
loom large in public discourse. The West European Left came out of 1989–90 with 
its subsequent triumph of market liberalism certainly equally disoriented, with 
many of central tenets shattered.113 The rise of nationalism, as reflected in the wars 
in Yugoslavia, Horst Möller reminds us, has added to insecurity.
Despite these flaws of the 1990s and 2000s, most of which are rather global 
than specific postcommunist phenomena, in 2009 Ann Applebaum has drawn the 
following balance: 
Some truly awful things did happen: In Yugoslavia there was a bitter war. In Russia, revanchism 
has returned. Authoritarian dictators run several of the former Soviet republics. But the heart of 
Central Europe—Germany, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, 
Romania and Bulgaria—is peaceful and democratic. More than that: The inhabitants of Central 
Europe are healthier, more prosperous and more integrated with the rest of the continent than 
they have been for centuries.114 
One might add that their countries are more observant of human rights and 
transparency than other former parts of the Soviet empire. However, political 
instability and the rise of populist or authoritarian tendencies bedevil some of 
their states as well. 
While only a few countries resorted to juridical means for dealing with their 
communist past, most of them, even Russia, the focus of Mikhail Prozumensh-
chikov’s case study, opened their communist-era archives at least partially. What 
started as part of the political struggle over glasnost and perestroika has since 
enabled historians and social scientist to better understand communism. 
Indeed, the transformations were—given the systematic violation of social 
processes in the state communist societies—remarkably smooth. European and 
transatlantic integration, as analyzed by Stanley R. Sloan and John O’Brennan, 
have certainly contributed to safeguarding this development.115 Sloan stresses that 
113 Patrick Outhwaite, “What is Left After 1989?,” in George Lawson, Chris Armbruster, and Mi-
chael Cox, eds., The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 2010), 76–93.
114 Ann Applebaum, “After the Wall fell,” Washington Post, 9 November 2009, http://articles.
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(accessed 25 October 2013).
115 Cf. Vojtech Mastny, “Eastern Europe and the Early Prospects for EC/EU and NATO Member-
ship,” in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., Europe 
and the End of the Cold War: A Reapprisal (London: Routledge, 2008), 235–45.
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the Central European states’ integration into NATO happened primarily because 
of their own, and not Western, initiative. Recent research and Gorbachev himself 
have refuted that Western non-enlargement pledges with regard to Central Europe 
ever existed.116 Although the main instruments of Soviet control over Eastern Eu-
rope, the Warsaw Pact, and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance were dis-
solved in 1991 as was the USSR, and although the Russian Army was withdrawn 
by 1994, protection against Russian pressure––as reflected by imperialist rum-
blings from Russia, the political use of economic dependence on Russian energy, 
and Russian involvement in the disintegration of neighboring states such as Geor-
gia, Ukraine, and Moldova—is still an overwhelming reason for legitimization of 
the alliance among newcomers,. The West had no justification for denying them 
entry into Western organizations and was interested in stabilizing these countries. 
The “Europeanization” of the former “people’s democracies,” one of the goals of 
1989, seems to have been achieved. Almost overnight, Eastern Europe, which for 
forty years had been “excluded from West European developments but […] not 
fully incorporated in the USSR,”117 became East-Central Europe.118 Yet, the con-
sequences for Europe as a whole are at hand: Peter Graf Kielmansegg has argued 
that 1989 was, albeit limited to the East, a truly European revolution insofar as it 
reconstituted the continent.119
The revolutions of 1989 played an important part in making all this possible. 
The vast majority of the involved actors—from opposition groups and external 
actors to many communist leaders, above all Mikhail Gorbachev—managed to 
avoid widespread violence. Despite the flaws of the transition, their success in 
spreading Western political and economic structures and lifestyle as well as cre-
ating more open and freer societies is unquestionable. The “colored revolutions” 
of the early 2000s from Ukraine (where the opposition chose the same color as 
Polish dissident groups of 1989) to Central Asia and back to Ukraine demonstrate 
that their legacy lives on.120 
116 Gorbachev stresses that negotiating NATO (non-) enlargement into Eastern Europe while the 
Warsaw Pact still existed would have been “absolute stupidity.” Michail Gorbatschow, Wie es 
war: Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung (Berlin: Ullstein, 1999), 103. Cf. Mark Kramer, “The 
Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement-Pledge to Russia,” Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009): 
39–61 and Kristina Spohr, “Precluded or Precedent-Setting? The ‘NATO Enlargement Question’ 
in the Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990–1991,” Journal of Cold War 
Studies 14, no. 4 (2012): 4–54. 
117 R.J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century—and After, 2nd edition (London: 
Routledge, 1997), xi.
118 Charles Gati, “East-Central Europe: The Morning After,” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 5 (1990): 129–
45.
119 Peter Graf Kielmansegg, “Die zweite Oktoberrevolution,” Osteuropa 59, no. 11 (2009): 5–13.
120 Peter Voitsekhovsky, “In the Footsteps of 1989: Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as a Carnival of 
Anti-Politics,” in Vladimir Tismaneanu and Bogdan C. Iacob, eds., The End and the Beginning: 
The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2009), 543–58. 
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Nonetheless, in many postcommunist societies, the memory of the revolutions 
is still contested between political parties and groups, as Liliana Deyanova il-
lustrates with the example of Bulgaria. This is a general phenomenon: The rev-
olutions of 1989 still mean different things to different people.121 To some they 
signify the end of a “good old age” of modest economic security, a plot for under-
mining a powerful empire, the “greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century,” or 
the beginning of a new and in fact strange type of “(n)ostalgia.”122 In some cases, 
they will be considered missed opportunities for achieving something better than 
was in the end implemented. To many others the revolutions of 1989 are and will 
always remain a “triumph of civic dignity and political morality over ideological 
monism, bureaucratic cynicism and police dictatorship.”123 It will be the task of 
future generations not to let them fall under the “veil of moral ambiguity.”124
121 Jeffrey Isaac, “Conclusion: Shades of Gray: Revisiting the Meanings of 1989,” in Vladimir 
Tismaneanu and Bogdan C. Iacob, eds., The End and the Beginning: The Revolutions of 1989 
and the Resurgence of History (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 559–78. 
Cf. Volkhard Knigge, ed., Kommunismusforschung und Erinnerungskulturen in Ostmittel- und 
Westeuropa (Vienna: Böhlau, 2013).
122 N. Ya. Laktionova, “Fenomen nostal’gii v stranah Tsentral’noi i Yugo-vostochnoi Evropy,” in 
K.V. Nikiforov et al., eds., Revolyutsii i reform v stranah Tsentral’noi i Yugo-vostochnoi Evropy: 
20 let spustya (Moscow: Rosspen, 2011), 163–73. For an in-depth study of the afterlife of com-
munism in Eastern Europe, see Marci Shore, The Taste of Ashes: The Afterlife of Totalitarianism 
in Eastern Europe (London: Crown, 2013). 
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GORBACHEV AND THE  
“NEW POLITICAL THINKING”
The radical shift of Soviet foreign policy at the end of the 1980s and the sub-
sequent chain of events that eventually led to the end of the Cold War are justly 
associated with the name Mikhail Gorbachev. Those who praise him (mostly 
abroad), like those who curse him (mostly in his own country), may disagree on 
many subjects, but nearly all recognize the significance of the changes he man-
aged to bring about in the international political arena. 
To explain the extraordinary results of his undertakings, one might cite his 
strategic vision, his tactical skill, his intellectual courage and his strong political 
will. And yet the principal lever which allowed him to “move the world” (to use 
as a metaphor the famous remark of Archimedes) was what he called the philos-
ophy of “new political thinking,” which became the foundation of his foreign 
policy achievements. 
To avoid simplification we should not interpret the concept of “new political 
thinking” as a ready-made set of rules and principles carved into tablets that 
Gorbachev brought with him when he entered the office of the general secretary 
in March 1985. Analysts still debate today: Was it a utopian project unconnected 
from the divisive realities of the world and established traditions of international 
and interstate relations, or was it just a cover-up for a mandatory strategic retreat 
of the over-stretched Soviet empire, which was facing the impending terminal 
crisis of the world communist project? Was the “new political thinking” of Gor-
bachev dictated by his vision of the controversial but promising reality of an 
interdependent world, or, as believed by Robert Gates, at the time director of the 
CIA, was it motivated by the Soviet leaders’ “need for breathing space”1to save 
the obsolete system? If seen in this light, the “new political thinking” was mere-
ly imposed on Gorbachev by the Soviet Union’s defeat in the historic competition 
with its historic rival—the West—which then would have been the true driving 
force and secret godfather of the new Soviet foreign policy.
At the same time two important aspects of the subject have been ignored. First, 
the perception that for Gorbachev, establishing cooperative relations between the 
USSR and the outside world represented an integral part of a much broader proj-
ect: the democratic transformation of the Soviet political system.2And second, the 
1 James A. Baker III and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and 
Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 157.
2 Author’s interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, 16 August 1999.
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evolution of both the future protagonist of the “new political thinking” and the 
real contents of this formula.
In contrast to Gates, the Soviet theorists and practitioners of the “new think-
ing” considered it a home-grown product, conditioned mostly by internal prob-
lems. If they referred to Western sources of influence and inspiration, they men-
tioned first of all ideas found in the Russell–Einstein Manifesto, the reports of 
the Palme Commission or the Club of Rome, or similar appeals calling for an end 
to the absurd logic of nuclear confrontation and demanding that the attention of 
world politics be turned to the global problems and challenges facing the human 
species. Moreover, if they admitted that the West was indeed effectively influ-
encing developments in Soviet policy, it was not a question of military threats or 
politics of “containment,” but rather the example of successful economic devel-
opment along with the attractiveness of ideas about political freedom, both fea-
tures that were becoming, in fact, important factors in the internal evolution of 
Soviet society. Gorbachev himself, when speaking about the roots of “new think-
ing,” did not hesitate to mention Albert Einstein or Bertrand Russell as being 
among those whose ideas influenced his intellectual evolution.3
The “old thinking” and the emergence of “new thinkers”
Before we analyze the factors that might explain the appearance of the “new 
political thinking” in the corridors of the Kremlin with the arrival of Gorbachev, I 
would like to say a few words about the “old political thinking,” which on a num-
ber of occasions at the beginning of the 1980s brought the confrontation between 
the Soviet Union and the West (above all the United States) to the brink of a third 
world conflict. Here again, if the Soviet leadership of the Brezhnev era had re-
mained hostage to anti-Western complexes, convinced by its own propaganda about 
the “aggressive nature of imperialism” and its intention to resort to military force 
to destroy the socialist community, the ideological wrapping was less an explanation 
than a cover. There were strong political and corporate internal motives for adopt-
ing this line, since the Soviet regime used the bugaboo of the “external threat” as 
an indispensable psychological tool to support the totalitarian system.
This perverse expression of the survival instinct by a dying system pushed the 
Soviet leadership to finance its “family” of clients in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, despite the tremendous cost of economic and military support already 
being provided to the other “socialist countries” and “progressive” regimes. The 
imperial foreign policy pursued by an ailing leadership that was totally cut off 
from the reality of the country inspired not only a rise in symbolic protest acts 
by political dissidents, but it also provoked concern and even resentment within 
the Soviet political elite. Seeing Soviet foreign policy evolving in an expansion-
3 Author’s interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, 28 April 1999.
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ist direction, a sort of “communist imperialism,” many regime members were 
troubled by its apparent drift toward neo-Stalinist positions in domestic policy. 
The deepening international isolation of the Soviet Union destroyed their last 
hopes for a modernization of the country’s economy, while the widening gap 
separating the country from the Western world meant the chance for a democrat-
ic renovation of the system would be postponed indefinitely.
Views of this kind, despite being shared by only a tiny fraction of the political 
elite, reflected the emergence of a kind of alternative political culture distinct 
from the official line. Although seldom overtly, a growing number of members 
of the Soviet political establishment were ready to question the traditional ideo-
logical approach to foreign policy.
After several assertive moves of the Soviet leadership on the world scene (the 
invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of the new Soviet SS-20 missiles, 
which provoked the arrival of the US Pershing II and cruise missiles to Western 
Europe), the representatives of this alternative thinking were joined by prominent 
figures from the official Soviet scientific nomenklatura—the directors and leading 
experts of prestigious academic institutes who had direct access to the highest 
levels of the political hierarchy. Some of them served as speechwriters for Brezh-
nev and Andropov and later formed the basis of Gorbachev’s intellectual reserve.
Without challenging the basic goal—consolidation of the Soviet state’s posi-
tion in its historic dispute with the capitalist world—at that time many experts, 
particularly those who were directly associated with the ruling elite, sincerely 
believed that Soviet socialism could become “competitive” on the international 
scene once it had been reformed, modernized and democratized. It would then, 
in order to assure its own survival, no longer be obliged to depend on coercion 
and repression inside the country, or need to use military threats as a tool in its 
foreign relations. Alongside the critical judgment of these professionals, such 
feelings of frustration were also reflected in the civic reaction of an important 
segment of the Soviet educated class. “The ranks of the (future) new thinkers,” 
rightly remarks Robert D. English in his study Russia and the Idea of the West, 
“were not limited to a narrow group of security specialists but comprised a broad 
cohort of social and natural scientists, students of culture and the humanities, 
ranging from academics to apparatchiki.”4
Despite the fact that they were classified, the practical effect of the position 
papers prepared by these institutes and submitted to senior political leaders was 
little. This situation reduced the role of academic advisers to the status of mar-
ginal lobbyists, who could only seek to limit the damage of decisions they con-
sidered counterproductive. The situation began to change only when Mikhail 
Gorbachev became a member of the Politburo in 1979. Gorbachev regularly 
started to invite academics to his office in the Central Committee to brief him on 
4 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of 
Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 5.
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matters related to foreign policy, the world economy or the Soviet strategic situ-
ation, trying to build a sort of informal intellectual “think-tank” which hypothet-
ically, in the future, could play the role of his “shadow” advisory cabinet.
By the beginning of the 1980s it had become clear for many that the course 
of superpower arrogance had left the USSR isolated and led its foreign policy 
into a blind alley. Yet it would be a serious exaggeration to describe most of the 
liberal-minded members of the Soviet elite as “Western-orientated.” Few of them 
were prepared to admit that the source of their daily problems lay in the general 
inefficiency of the prevailing system. For the majority, the only acceptable ex-
planation for the continuous deterioration of the economic situation of the coun-
try and of its evident backwardness in comparison to the prosperous Western 
world was the huge amount of Soviet defense spending. Without this, they be-
lieved, the system would be quite competitive on the international scene. Accord-
ing to Yevgenii Primakov, until 1985 director of the Institute of Oriental Studies 
of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, many of his colleagues shared his wish to 
put an end to the arms race, “not because they assumed it would be impossible 
for the Soviet economy to keep up with the United States in this competition, but 
simply in the hope of making better use of the national wealth.”5
Belonging, on the whole, to the new generation of the Party nomenklatura and 
too young to have taken part in the war, they did not suffer from the “1941 syn-
drome” and consequently did not share the complexes of older generations ob-
sessed with the fear of an invasion from without. For this reason, psychological-
ly they were not ready to pay any price whatsoever to protect their country against 
a threat they considered quite hypothetical.
Whatever their motivation, a considerable number of these foreign policy 
experts did not expect to witness any radical changes at the top political levels 
in their own lifetime. Yet although condemned to an existence of dormancy, they 
constituted a sort of professional political army awaiting its leader. “We could 
write a lot of memos and speeches for our leaders that stated all these [new 
thinking] points, but it didn’t matter until a leader appeared in the general secre-
tary’s chair who had come with these ideas beforehand,” noted Georgii Shakhnaza-
rov, a political scientist and, later, deputy head of the Central Committee’s Inter-
national Department and an advisor to Gorbachev.6
Gorbachev reaches power
When Mikhail Gorbachev reached the position of supreme power in the So-
viet Union, he was competent in dealing with domestic politics but virtually 
unprepared when it came to handling international affairs. Two specific areas of 
5 Author’s interview with Yevgenii Primakov, 17 February 2000.
6 Author’s interview with Georgii Shakhnazarov, 30 March 1998.
37Gorbachev and the “New Political Thinking”
international relations were part of Gorbachev’s daily concerns, both closely re-
lated to the internal situation of the country: the economic burden of the arms 
race and the war in Afghanistan. Both issues threatened to hold back the radical 
internal reforms he was planning. 
According to the recollections of Anatolii Chernyaev, in the hours following 
his election to the post of general secretary, Gorbachev noted several major for-
eign policy issues on a sheet of paper: “stop the arms race, withdraw troops from 
Afghanistan, change the spirit of the relationship with the US, restore cooperation 
with China.”7 In a later interview, Gorbachev confirmed this set of priorities, 
placing particular stress on the necessity of stopping the arms race: “without that, 
any plans for perestroika would have had to remain in the realm of fiction.”8
It is not at all surprising that Gorbachev’s first foreign policy agenda could be 
summed up in a few lines on a sheet of paper. At that time, Gorbachev’s vision 
of desired change in the Soviet Union’s relations with the West was limited to a 
general and vague set of intentions. The philosophy of the “new thinking” had 
not yet been drafted and even its vocabulary did not yet exist. 
The new general secretary was impatient to start reducing the burden of the 
arms race, to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and to draw 
Western capital into the Soviet economy in order to provide the necessary finan-
cial assistance for his political reforms. Yet he could not start moving ahead in 
any of these directions without a qualitative shift in his relations with his Western 
partners. In July 1985 Gorbachev managed to solve the delicate problem of re-
placing Andrei Gromyko, who had occupied the post of foreign minister since 
1957.  Gorbachev’s unexpected choice of Eduard Shevardnadze—someone os-
tensibly competent in any sphere of party or state activities except diplomacy—
was proof of his determination to recruit a foreign minister who would undertake 
no policy other than that of the general secretary.
Next came the first trial for Gorbachev’s exercise in great power diplomacy—
his first meeting with Ronald Reagan during the US–Soviet summit in Geneva 
in November 1985. Despite the fact that the two leaders succeeded in establishing 
good personal relations, the final outcome of the Geneva summit did not live up 
to Gorbachev’s initial hopes: achieving a qualitative breakthrough in Moscow’s 
relations with the West. Nevertheless, it caused the Soviet leader to dismiss his 
illusion that ending the Cold War would be an easy enterprise, in which merely 
his statement of best intentions would be enough. He was also forced to accept 
the fact that exposing the absurdity of the arms race (as he did when talking to 
Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, in December 1984) was not enough 
to bring it to an end, and that the barrier of mistrust separating East and West was 
probably even more solid than the Iron Curtain dividing Europe. He began to 
7 Author’s interview with Anatolii Chernyaev, 10 September 1998.
8 Author’s interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, 28 April 1999.
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realize that a real breakthrough in the Soviet Union’s relations with its Western 
partners would demand a major, long-term strategy.
As a result of the Geneva summit, Gorbachev also reached another important 
conclusion: he understood that establishing a new type of East-West relations 
implied not only a new level in the exchange of information about the other side’s 
intentions, but also the need for internal political guarantees supporting official 
policy statements. It thus became clear for Gorbachev that there was an unavoid-
able interconnection between the new image he sought for Soviet foreign policy 
and the internal reforms he was planning to undertake within the country. This 
connection between the internal and external aspects of his reform plan could not 
be reduced merely to synchronizing his actions in the two spheres; rather it was 
a question of an organic political relationship that implied major revising of the 
established model of Soviet foreign policy.
The two key individuals who helped Gorbachev shape the new foreign policy 
line in the first months of 1986 were Aleksandr Yakovlev and Anatolii Chernyaev. 
The former was charged by Gorbachev to prepare the foreign policy section of 
his political report for the twenty-seventh party congress. The latter, who became 
Gorbachev’s foreign policy aide on 1 February, prepared the draft of Gorbachev’s 
speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1986—an event that Gorbachev 
himself characterized as “a meeting that became the starting point for the full-
scale implementation of the policy of ‘new political thinking.’”9
The part of the report presenting the contours of the new Soviet foreign pol-
icy, despite still being drafted in the jargon of Pravda editorials, represented a 
striking contrast to the classic Bolshevik vision of the relations between the USSR 
and its historic enemy—the capitalist world. For the first time since 1917, the 
supreme leader of the Communist Party and Soviet state abandoned the “class 
approach,” which condemned not only national societies but the entire world to 
antagonistic confrontation, declaring instead “the real dialectics” of modern de-
velopment to be a combination of “the competition and struggle between the two 
systems with a growing tendency for interdependence among the states forming 
the world community.”10 Another important innovation of the report was its aban-
doning of what until that time had been the cornerstone of all political statements 
made by the Soviet leaders from the tribune of the party congress: the promise 
to do away with world imperialism and send it to the “scrap heap of history.”
Having formally abandoned the official goal of constructing an alternative world 
model opposed to and hostile toward Western capitalist society, Gorbachev also 
renounced the ambition of his predecessors to mobilize and launch a heterogeneous 
army of the “progressive forces” against his Western rival. The new ideology of 
political pragmatism was obliged to sacrifice not only the “class approach” in the 
9 Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), 8.
10 Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVIIth Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), 24. Emphasis by the author.
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Soviet Union’s relations with the West, but also the presenting of conflicts in the 
Third World as an integral component of a world revolution. An apparent semantic 
change introduced in the report—the replacement of the term “national liberation 
movements” by the ideologically neutral “regional conflicts”—served to eliminate 
the antagonistic opposition between “progressive” and “reactionary” forces, and in 
this way released the Soviet Union from its historic bondage, including the obliga-
tion to support self-proclaimed “revolutionaries” across the globe. The new de-ide-
ologized presentation of conflicts in the Third World provided Soviet foreign pol-
icy with a salutary way out—inevitable setbacks in this area would no longer have 
to be interpreted as U-turns in the course of history.
An apparently low-profile approach toward the immediate tasks of practical 
foreign policy did not mean that the new Soviet leadership had renounced its 
grand ambitions. They were associated, this time, not with the prospect of an 
inevitable world revolution, but with world perestroika, which at times seems to 
have taken on a messianic quality. As Gorbachev wrote in his book Perestroika 
and New Political Thinking for Our Country and the World, first published in the 
autumn of 1987, he viewed perestroika as a kind of a universal lever capable of 
transforming not only Soviet reality but also the world situation in general. De-
claring that the “new thinking” was necessary to save the world, Gorbachev was 
still convinced that it also could save the Soviet version of socialism.
The evolution of the “new thinking”
Gorbachev’s speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1986, which 
was drafted by Chernyaev, went even further than the report. It was based on 
several apparently simple ideas. First, the revision of Soviet foreign policy was 
meant to become an efficient instrument of a major internal political project: a 
reform of the system that was necessary to assure its competitiveness on the in-
ternational scene. Second, the national security of the USSR preferably should 
be assured by political means rather than by concentrating its society’s military, 
economic and human resources on preparing for a highly improbable military 
conflict with a potential aggressor.
It so happened that another event that occurred in the spring of 1986 marked 
Gorbachev not only politically but psychologically, and influenced his evolution 
as a politician with a global vision of the world—Chernobyl. Before 26 April 
1986—the date of the explosion of the reactor at the nuclear power station—his 
intention to propose a curb on the arms race along with a radical reduction of 
nuclear weapons was mostly based on economic and security concerns. After 
Chernobyl his attitude toward nuclear weapons transformed into a psychological 
aversion, a moral rejection, bringing him, in this respect, closer to Reagan. The 
fight for a non-nuclear world became a personal challenge.
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This should explain how the idea of speeding up the whole process of nucle-
ar disarmament emerged, disarmament that remained hostage both to the still 
unsettled relations with the US administration (despite the warm handshakes and 
smiles in Geneva) and the rusty machine of superpower negotiations. Thus, the 
idea of the Reykjavik summit appeared. “The leitmotiv should be the liquidation 
of nuclear weapons, with a political approach and not an arithmetical one pre-
vailing. […] If Reagan does not make concessions, we shall make everything 
public.” These were the terms Gorbachev used to present the design to the Po-
litburo.11 If they failed to reach an agreement, Gorbachev planned publicly to 
put all responsibility for the lack of success on the United States, making max-
imum propaganda use of the impasse. It was in fact based on this condition that 
he managed to get his colleagues in the Politburo to agree to the package of 
proposals he was to bring to Reykjavik, proposals that until that time were un-
precedented.12
The Reykjavik summit is often qualified as a “failure.” After all, the two 
leaders departed without having reached a historic agreement, an agreement that 
at certain moments seemed to be within the distance of a stretched hand. And 
yet for Gorbachev it represented a real leap in practicing the “new thinking.” 
According to Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s true rupture with the legacy of the past 
came not only in his offering a true deal to the Americans, but also in his refus-
al to exploit their rejection politically, to use it for propaganda purposes, thus de 
facto disregarding the mandate he had brought from Moscow.
Chernyaev considers the “failed summit” to be the crucial turning point in 
the further evolution of Gorbachev’s approach not only to Soviet–American 
relations, but also to foreign policy issues in general. In his view, the main result 
of the Reykjavik summit was more a question of a psychological shift in the 
minds of the two superpower leaders than any concrete progress on agreements, 
including the strategic arms and “euro-missile” agreements that were then signed 
in the months that followed. This later progress would never have been possible 
without the new level of confidence and understanding reached in the Hofdi 
house. 
In practice, for Gorbachev this meant unilaterally starting to apply the declared 
principles of the “new thinking” in his own daily practical activity, even without 
guaranteed reciprocity from his Western partners. At one of the Politburo sessions 
before Reykjavik he said: 
We all—myself, the Politburo and the MID [the Foreign Ministry, ed.]—should realize: if our 
proposals lead to diminishing US security, we shall obtain nothing. The Americans will never 
11 “Ustanovki Gorbacheva gruppe po podgotovke Reik’yavika,” 4 October 1986, in A. Chernyaev, 
V. Medvedev, G. Shakhnazarov, eds., V Politbyuro TsK KPSS… Po zapisam Anatoliya Cherny-
aeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiya Shakhnazarova (1985–1991) (Moscow: Alpina Bizness 
Buks, 2006), 72–75.
12 Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i Reformy, vol. 2, 26.
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buy it. That is why our guiding principle should be: stronger security for all through an equal 
decrease of the armaments level.13
Under Gorbachev’s pressure, the Soviet General Staff reluctantly agreed to 
accept the total elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles, despite this 
being extremely asymmetrical. Not only did the quantitative imbalance of the 
INF Treaty signed in Washington in December 1987 arouse an allergic reaction 
within the military lobby (the Soviet Union agreed to destroy more than twice as 
many intermediate range missiles as the US),14 but also the extremely detailed 
character of various oversight measures, which included unprecedented possibil-
ities of access by the other side’s inspectors to supervise every stage of the mis-
siles’ destruction.
But in its conceptual form, the ideology of the “new thinking” was publicly 
presented by Gorbachev urbi et orbi a year later in his speech at the UN Gener-
al Assembly on 7 December 1988. While working on its text, Gorbachev thought 
of it as an “anti-Fulton speech,” an allusion to the occasion when Churchill first 
announced the existence of an “iron curtain.” He later wrote: “I wanted to show 
the international community that we are entering an entirely new period of his-
tory where the former traditional principles of relations between states based on 
competition and the balance of power should yield their place to cooperation and 
solidarity.”15
Gorbachev solemnly declared the Soviet leadership’s intention to respect the 
“freedom of choice” for all peoples to determine their own political and econom-
ic systems, and he appealed to all members of the international community to 
renounce the use of force in settling international disputes. This statement of the 
new principles that would govern his country’s relations with the outside world 
was accompanied by the announcement of concrete actions: deep unilateral troop 
cuts (half a million soldiers) and arms reductions, along with the withdrawal of 
six tank divisions from Eastern Europe. In this way Gorbachev publicly made it 
crystal clear that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead.
While this speech was headline news throughout the world, its key elements 
had already been formulated by Gorbachev and formally endorsed in the summer 
of 1988 at the nineteenth party conference in June–July. When addressing its 
participants he was even more explicit: “A key factor in the ‘new thinking’ is the 
13 “Ustanovki Gorbacheva gruppe po podgotovke Reik’yavika,” 4 October 1986, in Chernyaev, 
Medvedev, Shakhnazarov, eds., V Politburo TsK KPSS, 74.
14 Within three years, by 31 May 1991, the Soviet Union and the United States had eliminated 
2,692 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles with 4,000 warheads. Of these, 1,846 missiles 
were liquidated by the Soviet Union: 889 intermediate-range missiles, including 654 SS-20 
missiles, as well as 957 shorter-range missiles, including 239 SS-23 “Oka” missiles. During the 
same period, the United States liquidated 234 Pershing-II, 443 cruise missiles and 169 Persh-
ing-I missiles. V. Medvedev, “Uroki Dogovora o likvidatsii raket srednei i men’shei dal’nosti,” 
Yadernyi kontrol’ 6, no. 4 (July-August 2000): 67–74, 70. 
15 Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, vol. 2, 132.
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concept of freedom of choice. […] The imposition of a social system, a way of 
life or policies from outside by any means, let alone military force, are dangerous 
trappings of the past.”16 He later wrote, “Having set for ourselves the course of 
freedom, we could not deny it to the others.”17
During the party conference, sensing the subversive potential of the philoso-
phy of the “new thinking,” the conservatives launched an attack against one of 
its core propositions, an affirmation of the priority of “universal human values” 
over “class interests.” In the end, both terms were dropped from the final text of 
the “Theses” for the conference, which nevertheless kept a reference to “the 
primacy of law and common human morality.” This seemingly abstract debate 
over the postulates of “new thinking” barely concealed the deepening political 
conflict within the Soviet leadership with regard to the general orientation of the 
future reforms. Gorbachev’s speech at the UN did, in fact, become a “watershed,” 
although not exactly in the sense that he had intended.
The “new thinking” and 1989
From the beginning of 1989, public debates inside the Soviet Union on ques-
tions of foreign policy ceased to be merely formal or ceremonial; they began to 
acquire an importance of their own, since the new approach in foreign policy 
began to affect the real interests of the Soviet nomenklatura and the military 
establishment. The first signs of embarrassing new problems were related to the 
unforeseen development of the situation in Eastern Europe.
In these countries, Gorbachev’s speech at the United Nations was interpreted 
above all as an announcement of a historic opportunity to be seized, a confirmation 
that the new Soviet leadership was in fact ready to ease its grip on this region. The 
proof came not so much from Gorbachev’s formal confirmation of every people’s 
sovereign “right to choose” the path of its own development, but with his announce-
ment of a future unilateral withdrawal of troops stationed in Eastern Europe.
Already in one of the first debates inside the Politburo about Moscow’s rela-
tions with the East European countries in July 1986, Gorbachev stated: “It’s 
impossible to proceed as before. The methods that were applied with regard to 
Czechoslovakia [in 1968] and Hungary [in 1956] are unacceptable.”18 In Novem-
ber 1986, Gorbachev convened a secret “working meeting” in Moscow for all the 
leaders of the CMEA member countries, which included ten full members. The 
main message that the Soviet leader wanted to convey was an advance warning—
in the future each national party and its leadership would be totally accountable 
16 The All-Union 19th Party Conference, Documents and Materials (Moscow: Novosti, 1988), 37.
17 Mikhail Gorbachev, Razmyshleniya o proshlom i budushchem (Moscow: Terra, 1998), 48.




to its own population. There would no longer be the possibility of relying on the 
protection of the Soviet presence or military might in order to maintain power.
The famous “freedom of choice” proclaimed to be a basic tenet of the “new 
thinking” philosophy, if applied to the countries of Eastern Europe, could only 
mean that the “choice” of Soviet-type socialism by these countries in the after-
math of World War II was in fact reversible. Thus, the “choice” of socialism, 
which until then had been presented as the fulfillment of historical destiny, was 
downgraded to a conventional political question which, taken away from the 
hands of history, was to be entrusted to the decisions of ordinary people.
Does this mean that Gorbachev was already prepared at this point in time to 
accept all the eventual consequences this radical change of Soviet policy would 
bring in a region that did, after all, represent a sphere of vital strategic interest 
for the USSR? There is no definitive answer to this hypothetical question. What 
is nevertheless clear is that at the moment of real choice, faced with the unex-
pected chain reaction of political turmoil in Eastern Europe largely provoked by 
his own actions, Gorbachev behaved in accordance with the principles he had 
formulated at a time when he still believed that he would be able to control the 
course of events.
With hindsight one might remark that his quasi-religious belief in the omnipo-
tence of perestroika, a conviction that its triumph would transform not only the 
Soviet Union, but also the other East European countries, in the long run did him 
a disservice. It nourished a feeling of false security at the top of the Soviet polit-
ical leadership, based on the assumption that the East European allies of the USSR 
had no alternative other than to follow their leader, especially one who was 
pointing the way to freedom and democracy.
However, for anyone who had closely observed the internal evolution of the 
East European countries during the preceding months, it was evident that the 
practical implementation of the principle of “freedom of choice” in the absence 
of any vigorous Soviet counteraction would result in their political defection to 
the West. Whatever the explanations, the results were obvious: contrary to the 
hopes or, indeed, the political calculations of Gorbachev, the dramatic political 
upheaval in the East European countries, somewhat unexpectedly, marked a tran-
sition from the triumphant advance of Gorbachev’s diplomacy to a stage where 
he apparently was no longer the master of the processes he had unleashed.
By the second half of 1989, Gorbachev and his team were being carried along 
by the turbulent historic current they themselves had initiated. After more than 
forty years of imposed subsistence in the shadow of the Soviet big brother, East-
ern Europe was waking up and, unexpectedly for Gorbachev, this led both to a 
breach in his frontline facing the West and the emergence of dangerous cracks in 
the monolithic wall of the Soviet people’s “internationalist” unity.
But first the other Wall had to go – the one in Berlin. Some ask whether the 
Berlin Wall was torn down on 9 November following an order from Moscow or, 
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to the contrary, its fall took Gorbachev totally unprepared. Both statements are 
wrong. Gorbachev certainly did not choose the date “to tear down this wall,” in 
response to Ronald Reagan’s appeal of several years before. He had merely dug 
under its foundations, leaving it vulnerable, so that it would collapse at the first 
outburst of a political storm.
Once Gorbachev delivered his speech at the United Nations renouncing the 
use of force and, by implication, allowing people freely to choose their own social 
system, the Wall was already doomed. By the autumn of 1989, Gorbachev’s 
statement had passed convincing tests, first in Poland, with the installation in 
August of a non-communist government headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in 
accordance with the results of free elections, and after that in September in Hun-
gary, where the opening of the Austrian border with the silent consent of Moscow, 
despite the ire of Berlin, allowed thousands of GDR citizens to flee to the West. 
With the removal of Honecker, several days after Gorbachev’s hurried departure 
from Berlin before the end of the festivities on the occasion of the forty-year 
anniversary of the GDR, the fall of the Wall became just a matter of time.
Fleeing to Moscow from the German snow-slide that he had himself provoked, 
Gorbachev could not yet measure the scale of avalanche that was expecting him at 
home. The example of the Eastern Europe (even more than the prospect of German 
unity), which had transformed into an unexpected testing ground for the policies 
of “new thinking,” became a stimulus for the national elites of the Soviet republics. 
From the Karabakh enclave in the Caucasus to the national elites of the Baltic re-
publics, increasing numbers began to defiantly challenge the central power.
Gorbachev’s political opponents logically interpreted the eruption of an-
ti-Kremlin opposition at the periphery of the Soviet empire as the direct conse-
quence of replacing the Brezhnev Doctrine with the principles of “new thinking.” 
Quite naturally, most were concerned that the uncontrolled developments in 
Eastern Europe might be a forerunner of change that would threaten their own 
status; this troubled them even more than potential threats to the geo-strategic 
position of the world’s second superpower.
During the last two years of Gorbachev’s stay in power, the foreign policy of 
perestroika, no longer reflecting a consensus within the political class, suddenly 
intruded debates in the plenary sessions of the Central Committee. Not only 
Shevardnadze, but also the general secretary himself was subjected to increasing-
ly aggressive criticism by the other members of the party leadership. The sad 
irony of the situation was confirmed by the fact that when, on 10 December 1990, 
the Nobel Committee announced its decision to award the Peace Prize to Gor-
bachev, he felt obliged (as in the case of the two other outstanding Nobel laureates 
from the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, although obviously for very 
different reasons) to decline the invitation to go to Oslo.
With the evident breakdown of the initial consensus on foreign policy, Gor-
bachev and his foreign policy team remained determined not to swerve from their 
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avowed political course, or fail to fulfill the obligations they had undertaken with 
regard to their Western partners. Thus, they had to seek ways to bypass the bar-
rier of obtaining obligatory approval from the Politburo. “In 1989 when their 
commitment to the deeper democratic nexus of foreign policy was challenged in 
Eastern Europe the leaders of the new thinking chose principle over power. In 
1991 this challenge visited the USSR itself. Gorbachev fighting resurgent Soviet 
reactionaries as well as his own deep allegiance to the Union hesitated but again 
chose the path of the new thinking,” writes Robert English.19
At a certain stage, Gorbachev was faced with a paradoxical situation: because 
of the aggravation of internal tensions within Soviet society, the further applica-
tion of the principles of “new thinking,” instead of facilitating reforms, started to 
increase their political price. In this new political environment, the initial function 
of foreign policy was transformed: once Gorbachev’s political trump card and the 
efficient but auxiliary instrument of internal reforms, it increasingly had become 
perestroika’s last resort. At the same time, Gorbachev discovered that he could 
not count very much on the support of his foreign partners.
The London meeting of the G7 in July 1991 was a final chance for Gorbachev 
to strike a new strategic deal with the West. Gorbachev was then engaged in a 
much larger strategic proposal to the West as a whole, an appeal to invest in 
perestroika, not just politically but also economically and on a long-term basis. 
Yet it turned out that in the eyes of his Western partners, having wasted his trump 
cards and being overtaken by political crises at home, Gorbachev no longer pos-
sessed his previous value. In response to his request to set up a hard currency 
fund to stabilize the ruble through loans to purchase consumer goods when pric-
es were freed, he merely received good wishes for success and promises of 
technical assistance.
Perestroika appeared to be an exhausted project that no longer promised at-
tractive returns and therefore was no longer worth additional investment. Observ-
ing the accelerated weakening of Gorbachev’s position at home, his Western 
partners quickly abandoned the projects of “castles in the air” promised by his 
“new thinking,” rather than jointly answering the challenges of the future.
 It was only three years since the optimistic initiator of perestroika had pro-
claimed his inspiring vision of a new world order before the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, a world order based on rationality, cooperation and the 
supremacy of international law. In the meantime his policy of “new thinking” had 
contributed to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the Iron Curtain, 
but the boomerang of world perestroika launched by Gorbachev returned to the 
Soviet capital to crush the walls of the Kremlin. Gorbachev proved to be right: 
the “new political thinking” was indeed a formidable instrument for the transfor-
mation of world politics—East and West. But he had to pay for this triumph with 
his resignation.
19 English, Russia, 228.
Gorbachev and the “New Political Thinking”
46
Conclusion
In order to evaluate the footmark left by Gorbachev’s attempt to apply the 
“new political thinking” on the international scene, let us try to establish a balance 
sheet of his action in foreign policy. This may help answer a question that is 
often asked when his name is mentioned: was this unusual politician a dilettante 
statesman, an idealist, or a visionary? Or putting it in different words, was it naïve 
on his part to believe that by proposing new rules of the game and putting the 
accent on common interests in the face of common challenges, he would be able 
to transform enemies into partners?
His legacy remains impressive. After less than seven years in power, Gor-
bachev left behind him a peacefully dismantled totalitarian system in the biggest 
country on the planet, and a different Russia that had become reconciled with the 
rest of the world. In a way he launched the first successful “Velvet Revolution” 
of the East. He encouraged the opening of the Iron Curtain that had descended 
after World War II, and allowed the reunification of Germany and of Europe 
after more than forty years of division. He succeeded in initiating, together with 
his Western partners, a disarmament process that, for the first time in postwar 
history, not only slowed down, but even turned back the arms race.
In fact, as manifested during the Malta summit, Gorbachev’s “new political 
thinking” was not even very distant from President Bush’s vision of the emerging 
“new world order”; both seemed to share the conviction that that a new interna-
tional order should move from a “balance of forces” to a “balance of interests,” 
and that this would be achieved through the strengthening of international orga-
nizations and the gradual transfer of national sovereignty to the United Nations.
Without any doubt Gorbachev’s policies gave a powerful impetus to global-
ization. He did not hesitate to assist the birth of a new reality, however contro-
versial, with all its as yet unknown dilemmas and contradictions. And whenever 
it came to a conflict between interests (including his own political survival) and 
principles, he invariably chose principles. 
His extraordinary experience, with its historic achievements and dramatic 
setbacks, leaves us (in a world that is quite distant from his hopes) with an un-
answered question: does the concept of the “new political thinking” belong to the 
past? Indeed, it seems as though it could not successfully stand the test of con-
frontation with reality. Or is it still waiting for us in the future?
Andrei Grachev
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POLAND 1989: THE CONSTRAINED REVOLUTION
On the evening of 4 June 1989, the popular actress Joanna Szczepkowska 
responded to a TV reporter by saying that “communism has ended in Poland.”1 
She was commenting on Poland’s first free and open, albeit with restrictions, 
general elections after forty years of communism. In the eyes of many political-
ly engaged citizens, her words reflected the atmosphere of the day. Later the 
statement became one of the most famous quotes referring to Poland’s transition. 
While her statement was little more than a bonmot, the outcome of that election 
has been commonly regarded as a critical historical juncture, not only by political 
commentators and authors of memoirs2 and popular accounts3 of Poland’s transi-
tion, but also by most historians who have dealt with this period. Regardless of 
whether they regard Poland’s transition as a success or failure, they all agree that 
June 1989 was the decisive moment separating communist Poland from either 
“democratic Poland” (the affirmative version) or “postcommunist Poland” (the 
more critical version). 
There is a wide consensus that the round table talks and June elections were 
a cornerstone in the Polish transition to democracy, but there is much less con-
1 Her famous remark can still be watched: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgAiAKNfryg (ac-
cessed 9 July 2013).
2 Wiesław Górnicki, Teraz już można (Wrocław: Wydawn. Dolnośląskie, 1994); Zbigniew Mess-
ner, Aleksander Perczyński, and Andrzej Żor, Kuglarze i księgowi (Warsaw: Polska Oficyna 
Wydawnicza “BGW”, 1993); Mieczysław Rakowski, ed., Polska pod rządami PZPR (Warsaw: 
Profi, 2000); Mieczysław Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1987–1990 (Warsaw: Iskry, 2005); 
Lech Wałęsa and Arkadiusz Rybicki, Droga do wolności (Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1991).
3 In Poland it has become a tradition to publish the memoirs of politicians. These memoirs gen-
erally consist in (book-length) interviews conducted by a journalist or an intellectual who is 
supportive of the respondent. Questions are asked about the politician’s career, the decisions he 
made, and crucial moments in history upon which he or she left their imprint. This interview is 
usually recorded and then edited by the journalist. This convention, which eases a politician’s 
burden of writing his or her own memoirs and enables editors to publish books a few months af-
ter an important political event, is called a “wywiad-rzeka,” which can be imperfectly translated 
as “interview-stream” or “interview-river.” Such rivers of questions and answers are available 
for some of the key 1989 actors: Jarosław Kaczyński, Michał Bichniewicz, and Piotr M Rudnic-
ki, Czas na zmiany. Z Jarosławiem Kaczyńskim rozmawiają Michał Bichniewicz i Piotr M. Rud-
nicki (Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1992); Bronisław Geremek, and Jacek Żakowski, Rok 1989. 
Bronisław Geremek opowiada, Jacek Żakowski pyta (Warsaw: Plejada, 1990); Paweł Smoleńs-
ki, Szermierze Okrągłego Stołu. Zwątpienia i nadzieje (Paris: Editions Spotkania, 1989); Jan 
Olszewski and Ewa Polak-Pałkiewicz, Prosto w oczy (Warsaw: Inicjatywa Wydawnicza ad as-
tra, 1997). 
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sensus about when this transition actually started. According to the mainstream 
media’s interpretation, the transition started with the round table talks and ended 
with the first entirely open election in 1991. This interpretation is even reflected 
in the official account of the events of the Sejm, the Lower House of Poland’s 
parliament since 1989 (when the Senate was reintroduced as a second chamber). 
Here the June elections are counted as the last term of the People’s Republic’s 
parliament, whereas the new counting of the Third Republic starts with the 1991 
election. But it is often argued that democratization started long before, especial-
ly by authors whose biographies are linked to the political and intellectual estab-
lishment of the People’s Republic. Some of the authors linked to the anticommu-
nist opposition point to the years 1980–81, when Poland experienced the emerg-
ing of the Solidarity movement, the first independent trade union movement in 
the Soviet bloc. 
It is not a lack of sources, but rather the lack of competition of paradigms that 
is to blame for the blind spots in historical research on Poland’s transition.4 Some 
of these blind spots concern the international “embedding” of Poland’s transition 
in the wider context of the decline of communist ideology, the rise of the nation-
al question in the Soviet sphere of power and the interaction of Poland’s negoti-
ated transition with perestroika and developments in other countries.5 There is 
also a lack of recognition for how crucial actors in the transition process overcame 
their collective action dilemma and for the paradoxes that emerged in the process.6 
In the light of recently published documents, the timeframe for Poland’s negoti-
ated transition should also be given a much wider scale that it has received until 
now, since actual bargaining started already months before the round table talks 
began. The Church was involved in these talks from the beginning.7 Most of the 
4 Important and extensive editions of archival sources include (among others): Włodzimierz 
Borodziej and Andrzej Garlicki, Okrągły Stół: dokumenty i materiały, 5 vols. (Warsaw: Zapol, 
2004); Krzysztof Dubiński, Magdalenka—Transakcja epoki. notatki z poufnych spotkań 
Kiszczak-Wałęsa (Warsaw: Sylwa, 1990); John R. Davis, Gregory F. Domber, Mariusz Jastr-
ząb, and Paweł Sowiński, Ku zwycięstwu “Solidarności”: korespondencja Ambasady USA w 
Warszawie z Departamentem Stanu: styczeń - wrzesień 1989 (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2006); Inka 
Słodkowska, Magdalena Dołbakowska, and Ewa Wosik, Wybory 1989. Dokumenty strony soli-
darnościowo-opozycyjnej, vol. 1 (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2009). 
5 Exceptions to this rule can be found in: Bodgan Góralczyk, Wojciech Kostecki, and Katarzyna 
Żukrowska, ed., In Pursuit of Europe. Transformations of Post-Communist States (Warsaw: 
Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 1995); Jan Kofman, and Wojciech Roszkowski, Transformacja i 
postkomunizm (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 1999); Radosław Markowski, and Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński, 
ed., Transformative Paths in Central and Eastern Europe (Warsaw: ISP PAN, Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation, 2001); Jerzy J. Wiatr, Europa postkomunistyczna. Przemiany państw i społeczeństw 
po 1989 roku (Warsaw: Scholar, 2006). 
6 Timor Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 261–88.
7 Preparations for the negotiations were carried out long before they started. Surprisingly, many of 
the discussions on the government side were actually conducted in public, in small, but publicly 
available journals such as Materialy, Studia analyzy and in a newly created weekly called Kon-
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literature about Poland’s transition to democracy fails to put the events between 
1988 and 1992 into a broader framework of transition by comparing them to 
similar events in other parts of the world. There are of course comparisons to 
other former members of the Soviet block8 and there are theoretically informed 
articles and book chapters that situate the Polish transition within the wider 
framework of the third wave of democratization, but these are mostly political 
science approaches and do not refer to primary sources. This might improve once 
all the archives in Moscow, Washington, Bonn, Paris and London are open for 
historians, since this will render the possibility of more detailed comparisons.
The path to the 1989 election
The “self-limiting revolution,” as the emergence of the Solidarity movement 
is often referred to,9 ended with the imposition of martial law in December 1981 
by a military junta led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski. The introduction of mar-
tial law was accompanied by a multitude of activities lacking a legal basis as well 
as by many human rights violations.10 The actions of Jaruzelski and his comrades 
amounted to a coup d’état. But despite the imprisonment of political opponents 
(among them also former nomenklatura members), the use of the army for inter-
nal affairs, and the de facto replacement of the communist Polish United Workers’ 
Party (PUWP) by a military government, it was not a total break with the past. 
The new regime did not touch the basic structure of the economy, it did not (as 
demanded by some economically liberal intellectuals in and outside the PUWP) 
use its power to introduce a radically market-oriented reform of the economy, nor 
did it touch the existing hierarchies in the administration and the economy. In the 
next years, the workers councils (rady pracownicze) in the state companies re-
mained powerful and were occupied by worker representatives who officially 
appeared as non-partisan. Clandestinely, however, they remained loyal to the 
Solidarity structures in the political underground. The de-legalizing of the Soli-
frontacje, which printed long interviews with influential actors from both sides of the subsequent 
round table. For more details, see Borodziej and Garlicki, “Od redaktorów.”
8 Jerzy J. Wiatr, Europa pokomunistyczna: przemiany państw i społeczeństw po 1989 roku (War-
saw: Wydawn. Naukowe Scholar, 2006). 
9 Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984). “Self-limiting” describes the reluctance of Solidarity to strive for power and use violence, 
which, of course, was also a reaction to the permanently present, but often implicit threat of a 
Soviet intervention in case the movement went too far.
10 Among other things, Poland was not in a state of war, which could have justified the imposing 
of martial law. And a law facilitating the imposition of a state of emergency had not been passed 
by the Sejm. Many measures were carried out against the opposition that were without a legal 
basis and that violated legislation already in force (as for example the internment of dissidents 
without the consent of a judge and without any formal charges). Also the main decision body of 
the junta was entirely unconstitutional.  
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darity movement deprived the trade union of its main assets as well as access to 
the media, but it also created a strong, vibrant, clandestine and decentralized il-
legal opposition movement. This was much more difficult for the state to control 
than Solidarity had been. 
Confronted with an embargo by the Western world (the European Communi-
ty and the United States) and weaker support from the Soviet Union (whose 
ability to support its allies was in decline due to the pressure from the arms race 
with the United States and the war in Afghanistan), Jaruzelski’s generals faced a 
kind of state bankruptcy. Unable to serve even the interest payments on Poland’s 
foreign debt, the government on one hand had to keep prices down in order to 
prevent workers and townspeople from rioting and, on the other, to subsidy ag-
riculture in order to provide enough food to the population and prevent farmers 
from protesting. Caught between these constraints, the government increased the 
supply of money and caused hyperinflation. Every attempt to establish a new 
balance between demand and supply ended either with protests against higher 
prices or strikes against attempts to increase competitiveness. In 1987, the gov-
ernment even resorted to a referendum to discover whether the population pre-
ferred higher prices or the regulation of supply. But due to an exaggerated thresh-
old, the result of the referendum had no legal relevance.11 
During the years following the abolition of martial law (on 22 July 1983), 
Jaruzelski’s regime undertook a number of attempts to co-opt moderate opposi-
tion members into state structures. These attempts followed a double strategy. 
They were officially labeled “agreement and struggle” (porozumienie i walka) 
and aimed on one hand at dividing the opposition and, on the other, to gain more 
legitimacy for the regime’s inefficient reform policy. In 1986, all political pris-
oners were set free. In December of the same year, a Consultative Council at the 
President of the State Council (Rada Konsultacyjna przy Przewodniczącym Rady 
Państwa) was created, which aimed at including moderate members of the oppo-
sition and independent intellectuals. It was boycotted by almost all leading mem-
bers of the political underground and became a discussion body for academics 
and Catholic activists.
The creation of the Council was one of a series of institutional innovations 
that changed the institutional landscape of the People’s Republic. In the end, the 
institutions it created survived the later transition. In 1985 a constitutional court 
was founded and in 1988, the position of an ombudsman for citizens’ rights was 
11 The government actually received a relative majority of the votes for its reform agenda. But 
since the threshold that the government had set for the validity of the referendum had not been 
reached, the result was not legally binding. See: Włodzimierz Borodziej, Geschichte Polens im 
20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Beck, 2010); Antoni Dudek, Reglamentowana Rewolucja. Rozkład 
dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988–1990 (Cracow: Arcana, 2004); Dariusz T. Grala, Re-
formy gospodarcze w PRL (1982–1989): Próba uratowania socjalizmu (Warsaw: TRIO, 2005); 




created. In 1988, the elections to the so-called National Councils (Rady Naro-
dowe) were liberalized, allowing independent candidates to run. Nonetheless, all 
of these steps proved too hesitant to overcome the impasse between the opposition 
and the regime. The more the government and the Sejm liberalized the election 
procedures for the National Councils and (in 1985) for the Sejm, the fewer voters 
showed up at the ballot boxes. 
At the end of the decade, the regime was strong enough to prevent the oppo-
sition from overthrowing the government, but too weak to improve its legitimacy. 
On the other side, the opposition was strong enough to control every move of the 
regime, but too weak to take power. 
The international environment
The narrative concerning the “self-limiting revolution” and the strong inclina-
tion of the main strands of the opposition not to use violence are often presented 
as the result of normative considerations and were later presented as proof of the 
relative maturity of the opposition. In contrast to the tradition of armed uprising, 
which was frequent during the nineteenth century and led to the Warsaw Uprising 
in 1944, the stalemate in 1989 did not end in a violent confrontation between the 
regime and the opposition. But this was not only due to maturity on both sides 
of the conflict, but also a consequence of the international setting in which tran-
sition took place. By 1988, when a first wave of worker protests took place, the 
Soviet Union had engaged in a major endeavor of internal reform, which required 
the new leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev to concentrate resources within the 
country and to scale down the USSR’s foreign engagements. Neither side of the 
Cold War was interested in a violent conflict in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
efforts of all—the United States, NATO, the EC, and the USSR and its East Eu-
ropean allies—aimed at keeping the liberalization efforts in Poland peaceful. On 
different occasions, Gorbachev himself called upon Central and East European 
leaders to speed up their reforms, since the success of a reform policy in a bloc 
country could be used to strengthen the reform tendencies within the Soviet ad-
ministration, the government and the Party. In contrast to earlier times, supporters 
of system liberalization within the opposition as well as within the ruling estab-
lishment were able to arouse Gorbachev’s calls for reform. This mechanism 
strengthened the reform movement on one hand, and contained radical forces on 
the other. The messages from East and West that were sent to Poland during the 
late 1980s were extremely similar. Gorbachev paid a visit to Poland in July 1988 
and George Bush, Sr. to the Polish capital in July 1989. Their messages on those 
occasions could be reduced to a common denominator: Poland needs more mar-
ket-oriented reform and more democratization, and this should take place step by 
step, without any violent moves or revolutionary escalation. Both (!) stressed the 
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constructive role of General Jaruzelski during the transition and suggested that 
he run for president in the upcoming elections in the National Assembly.12
The round table and the elections
The round table talks finally started in February 1989, after another round of 
grassroots strikes, which proved detrimental to the economy, but also weakened 
the position of the Solidarity leadership, which in many cases had tried to prevent 
them.13 They had been prepared long before by certain Warsaw intellectuals con-
nected to the opposition (Bronisław Geremek played an important role) and 
party intellectuals who knew each other through academic contacts. Public opin-
ion had been prepared for the negotiations by a number of measures that were 
meant to demonstrate the government’s commitment to reform. Among these 
steps were licenses to publish new media outlets run by moderate opposition 
figures,14 a public debate in the mainstream media, decisions about who would 
or would not be a decent partner for the government to talk to about compromise 
and reform, the factual de-penalization of samizdat (whose products were sold 
openly on the streets of Warsaw) and of oppositional parties, which started to 
spread like mushrooms. However, due to the monopoly on information distribu-
tion that the government and the Polish United Workers’ Party maintained, these 
measures were unable to attract public attention beyond the opposition circles. 
The round table talks, in which the same number of participants from the 
PUWP, the government, and from the opposition took part (whose members were 
co-opted either by General Jaruzelski and his comrades or by Lech Wałęsa and 
12 Antoni Dudek, Reglementowana rewolucja. Rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988–
1990 (Cracow: Wydawn. Arcana, 2004), 363–64; Paweł Kowal, Koniec systemu władzy: polity-
ka ekipy gen. Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego w latach 1986–1989 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo TRIO, ISP 
PAN, 2012), 320.
13 Many of these strikes, including the most spectacular one in the Gdansk shipyard, had been 
organized against the will of the leadership, which had planned to organize a disciplined and 
targeted one-time strike wave in the autumn that was hoped to coerce the government into 
concessions. While Lech Wałęsa and his advisors were unable to prevent small and dispersed 
protests, they also could also not afford to reject them and abandon the protesting workers. 
14 One of these steps was the launching of the newspaper Konfrontacje by a Warsaw businessman 
with good contacts to both sides. It served as a platform for a debate about the limits and ram-
ifications of a so-called compromise. The first issue of Konfrontacje highlighted an interview 
with Geremek, who proposed an “anti-crisis pact” (pakt antykryzysowy) between the opposi-
tion and the government. The businessman who organized this new journal (together with the 
press-spokesman of the Ministry of the Interior, Wojciech Garstka, who regarded it as a private 
initiative) was Marek Goliszewski. He was not the only one who gained a concession to publish 
a new journal. Marcin Król, a professor at Warsaw University, was permitted to launch Res 
Publica (which, in contrast to Goliszewski’s paper, survived the transition and is still published 
today. Kowal, Koniec, 110–12. 
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his advisors), ended late at night on 5 April. In the lengthy documents that had 
been produced, of which many were contradictory and resembled protocols of 
discrepancies rather than joint conclusions, both sides had agreed to a constitu-
tional settlement aimed at giving the regime control over the legislative process 
and the state institutions while granting the opposition the power to control the 
government from the streets by reinstituting Solidarity as a mass movement and 
trade union independent from the government. This system of mutual checks and 
balances was refined by a complicated agreement concerning so-called non-con-
frontational elections to the parliament, which would guarantee the communists 
and their vassals, the “bloc parties,” at least 65 percent of the seats in the Lower 
House, the Sejm, and open the newly created Senate to unrestricted competition. 
As an additional safeguard against offensive, non-consensual moves by one side, 
the position of a president was created, who would be elected by the National 
Assembly, which would comprise all the members of both the Sejm and the 
Senate. 
There are strong indications that Jaruzelski and his aides thought they knew 
the outcome of the elections. According to opinion polls that were carried out 
during the weeks before the June elections (but were not published before the 
vote), the PUWP and her allies had every reason to believe that they would obtain 
about 25 percent of the mandates (Senate and Sejm) open to competition. Togeth-
er with the guaranteed mandates, this would have given them the necessary 
power to veto any major opposition bill in parliament. On the other hand, it would 
have given the opposition enough influence to prevent constitutional changes 
(which required a two-thirds majority). Nonetheless, for the opposition, it was no 
problem to give the government control over these governmental institutions. 
With a strong and legal mass movement outside the parliament, the opposition 
knew it would be able to block any major move by resorting to strikes and pop-
ular protests. Thus, at this point in time the institutional part of the round table 
compromise was not much more than the institutionalization of the status quo 
ante. 
As we now know, both sides underestimated the level of popular frustration 
with the status quo. Most probably, the media monopoly of the PUWP and the 
government had created a distorted picture of the population’s mood—a picture 
that not only the opposition and regime leaders had believed to be true, but also 
the respondents in the opinion polls used by the government. But when voters 
arrived at the ballot boxes and cast their votes, it turned out that the general mood 
about the PUWP and the government was much worse than the opinion polls had 
indicated.15 When the ballot boxes closed and the first exit poll results were shown 
15 More about the issue in Klaus Bachmann, “Pluralistic Ignorance in Action. The Puzzle of Un-
intended Consequences during Poland’s Transition to Democracy,” in Adriana Mica, Arkadi-
usz Peisert, and Jan Winczorek, eds., Sociology and the Unintended. Robert Merton Revisited 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), 219–36.
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on television, it appeared that almost all of the seats open to competition had gone 
to the opposition. The PUWP and her allies, which had ruled the country since 
the late 1940s, had been defeated in the first competitive elections the People’s 
Republic of Poland had seen since the war.16 
Tab. 1: The result of the 4 June Sejm elections in Poland17
Mandates reserved 

















ZSL 76 16.5 %
SD 27 5.9 %
PAX 10 2.1 %
UChS 8 1.7 %
PZKS 5 1 %
OKP 161 35 % 161 35 %
1 The PUWP had several smaller allies in the parliament, all of which had run in the elections 
prior to 1989 under a joint umbrella organization (whose name changed over time) and a joint 
election platform. These small parties, which recognized the PUWP’s “leading role” (as enshrined 
in the Constitution) assured the symbolic representation of specific social and religious groups. 
These were: the United Peasants’ Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL), the Democratic 
Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD), which was meant to represent bourgeois interests, PAX, 
an authoritarian nationalist party rooted in the prewar Falanga movement whose leadership had 
decided to break with the Catholic hierarchy and to support the rule of the PUWP during Stalinism 
and whose task it was to organize pro-regime Catholics, the Christian Social Union (Unia Chrz-
escijańsko-Społeczna, UChS), which assembled Orthodox Christians and members of the Belorus-
sian minority in Poland), the Polish Catholic-Social Union (Polski Związek Katolicko-Społeczny, 
PZKS, a small party of lay Catholics). The abbreviation OKP (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny 
or Civic Parliamentary Club) refers to the parliamentary representation of the Citizens’ Committees, 
the joint platform of those who gathered behind Lech Wałęsa during the election campaign and 
used the symbols of the Solidarity movement when campaigning.
The results of the Senate election were even more devastating for the regime: 
Here, regime candidates did not obtain a single mandate. Of the 100 seats, 99 
were won by candidates supported by the opposition, and one went to an inde-
pendent businessman who had outfought both, the local candidate of Lech Wałę-
16 Antoni Dudek, Reglamentowana Rewolucja. Rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988–
1990 (Cracow: Arcana, 2004); idem, Zmierzch dyktatury (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej 
- Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2009). 
17 Data retrieved from the website of the State Election Commission, which is responsible for or-




sa’s Citizen Committee (Komitet Obywatelski) and the candidate supported by 
the government and the local PUWP structures. The first session of the National 
Assembly demonstrated how unpredictable the situation had become for the 
PUWP and its allies. Instead of a stable and solid majority for Jaruzelski (who 
ran for president without a competitor), when he was elected by the Polish Par-
liament on 19 July 1989 this was by the narrowest majority possible.
The landslide victory for the opposition was so huge that it shoved aside many 
of the previous calculations concerning checks and balances, mutual control and 
consensus-based legislation. After an unsuccessful attempt by General Czesław 
Kiszczak to form a government without the opposition (whose representatives 
had gathered in the Civic Parliamentary Club) in the summer of 1989, the lead-
ership of the opposition managed to form an all-party government under the first 
non-communist Polish prime minister since the communist takeover in 1946, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. It formally included all the former PUWP allies and con-
fined the PUWP fraction (which dissolved some months later) to the opposition, 
although three high ranking PUWP leaders (among them two generals) kept 
control of the Ministry of the Interior (General Czesław Kiszczak, who thus 
controlled the secret services and the police), the Ministry of Defense (General 
Florian Siwicki), and Marcin Święcicki (a member of the PUWP Central Com-
mittee), who became minister of foreign commerce and therefore kept control of 
the crucial sectors of the economy that dealt with external trade and foreign 
currency flows. 
In parliament, the PUWP faced strong centrifugal tendencies—the leadership 
was less and less able to control the agenda of its members of parliament, who 
had often been elected against the will of the local party leadership and demon-
strated strong social democratic tendencies and anti-establishment attitudes. Jan-
uary 1990 saw the PUWP’s last party congress: one opposition fraction left the 
congress on the first day, others tried to assemble the remaining protesters who 
wanted to get rid of the old leadership. In the end the congress decided to abolish 
the PUWP, whereupon a new party was immediately created, the Social Democ-
racy of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
SdRP), whose new leader was the former president of the Polish Olympic Com-
mittee, Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The members of the former communist trade 
union umbrella organization18 and the officers of the army, who, during the Peo-
ple’s Republic, had almost automatically been party members, stayed away from 
the new party. The PUWP ministers in Mazowiecki’s government and General 
Jaruzelski stepped down a few months later, which facilitated new presidential 
(25 November and 9 December 1990) and parliamentary (27 October 1991) 
18 The umbrella organization’s name was All-Polish Federation of Trade Unions (Ogólnopolskie 
Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ), which comprised all of the officially recognized 
trade unions in the different branches of the economy, which, in return, recognized the “leading 
role” of the PUWP in politics. 
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elections, elections that were now fully competitive. On 19 September 1990 
Jaruzelski had initiated the legislation of a bill concerning the direct election of 
the president, which at the same time cut his presidential term short. The bill was 
accepted by parliament and new elections were held. Jaruzelski no longer partic-
ipated as a candidate. After Lech Wałęsa had been sworn in, Jaruzelski’s term 
expired automatically. 
The dispute about the causes and reasons of Poland’s transition
From today’s perspective, the round table talks and the June elections were 
only two of a number of important steps in the transition process from a mo-
no-party system with a centrally planned economy to a liberal democratic market 
economy. Other important events had preceded it and others would follow, in-
cluding Poland’s radical economic reforms, which shifted the focus of Poland’s 
economy from huge state-owned firms to small trade and services, and from its 
dependence on the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, 
the Soviet version of a common market) to incremental integration into the Eu-
ropean Community. Nevertheless, 4 June has been regarded as the most important 
break between the old and the new, comparable only to the significance of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall for Germans or the release of Nelson Mandela for South 
Africans. 
This interpretation of history, which highlights 1989 as the end of communism 
in Poland, was never entirely uncontested however. Certain political scientists 
whose biographies are closely linked to the pre-transitional political establish-
ment, as well as a number of economists from the liberal left have always point-
ed to those elements of continuity that one can identify when looking at the 
economic and social history of Poland during the period between the emergence 
of the Solidarity movement in 1981, the imposing of martial law, and the second 
half of the 1980s.19 As Dariusz Rosati has shown, many elements of the econom-
ic and social reforms that were introduced between 1980 and 1981 were not 
abolished (although they often turned out to be quite problematic and uncomfort-
able for the governments after 1981). Indeed, in many cases these reforms were 
even reinforced by similar measures that the subsequent governments tried to 
implement during and after martial law.20 Rosati has identified a number of mea-
sures that strengthened political and economic decentralization, and he points to 
19 Jerzy J. Wiatr, “Polska droga do demokracji,” in idem, Jacek Raciborski, Jerzy Bartkowiak, 
Barbara Frątczak-Rudnicka, and Jarosław Kilias, eds., Demokracja Polska 1989–2003 (War-
saw: Scholar, 2003), 13–56; idem, Europa postkomunistyczna. Przemiany państw i społec-
zeństw po 1989 roku (Warsaw: Scholar, 2006); Mieczysław Rakowski, ed., Polska pod rządami 
PZPR (Warsaw: Profi, 2000); Andrzej Antoszewski, ed., Demokratyzacja w III Rzeczypospolitej 
(Wrocław: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000).
20 Dariusz K. Rosati, Polska droga do rynku (Warsaw: Polskie Wydaw. Ekonomiczne, 1998).
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the slow, half-hearted democratization that makes the wave of social unrest, the 
round table talks and the elections of 1989 appear to be the culmination of a 
transition that actually started much earlier. 
As widely found in popular accounts as well as in respected textbooks on 
Poland’s recent history, the period following December 1981 is often described 
as one of political stagnation, economic crisis and general hopelessness that could 
not be overcome by either the subsequent governments or the attempts of the 
political opposition to coerce these governments into political liberalization.21 The 
general deadlock was slowly removed by two mutually reinforcing factors. With-
in a relatively small sector of Polish society, one can detect a rise in political 
interest and readiness to engage in politics. This bottom-up trend coincided with 
the start of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform policy in the USSR that later became 
known as perestroika. Both—Gorbachev’s top-down measures and the prudently 
developing trend toward more engagement in the politically interested segments 
of Polish society (whose precise characteristics still need a deeper analysis)—put 
increasing pressure on the Polish political system and its political establishment. 
The then-leadership of the Polish People’s Republic responded to this challenge 
by introducing half-hearted, step-by-step reforms. While they failed to solve the 
basic problems of the country, they later facilitated the radical measures intro-
duced by the governments after 1989. 
Recent research, based on unpublished opinion polls carried out on behalf of 
the government, shows an increasing readiness of citizens for protest and politi-
cal engagement during the second half of the 1980s.22 The ruling political estab-
lishment responded to this tendency by increasing the scope of participation: At 
the election of (the rather powerless) municipal councilors in June 1988, citizens’ 
committees were given the right to nominate their own candidates and voters were 
allowed to eliminate candidates from the lists of the Patriotic Front of National 
Recovery (PRON)23, which was the joint election platform of the PUWP and her 
minor allies. Already during the elections to the Sejm before 1989,24 when no 
competition to the PRON lists was possible, voters still had a choice between 
voting for or against it, or they could stay at home. As opinion polls show, only 
21 Borodziej, Geschichte Polens, 360–82. 
22 Klaus Bachmann, Repression, Protest, Toleranz. Wertewandel und Vergangenheitsbewältigung 
in Polen nach 1956 (Dresden: Neisse Verlag, 2010). For a contemporary account of the polling 
during the reign of General Jaruzelski, see Stanisław Kwiatkowski, “Aneks: PZPR w sondażach 
w latach 80,” in Mieczysław Rakowski, ed., Polska pod rządami PZPR (Warsaw: Profi, 2000), 
518–42.
23 The Patriotic Front of National Recovery (Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego, PRON) 
was the overarching organization that united the PUWP and its allies and provided one list of 
candidates for the elections. Due to this, until the second half of the 1980s alliance voters could 
only vote for candidates from this list.
24 Until the constitutional reform that was hammered out at the round table talks, the Sejm was the 
only chamber of the Polish parliament. The Senate, the Polish Upper House, which had existed 
during the Second Republic, had been abolished after a referendum in 1946. 
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a marginal percentage of respondents felt coerced to participate in the elections.25 
But the opinion surveys also show that many people regarded these steps of slow 
and reluctant democratization as insufficient.  The consequence was paradoxi-
cal—the more options voters were given, the less they actually used them. Voter 
turnout decreased during the 1980s and finally plummeted, when voting no lon-
ger had any aspect of coercion or control. In 1989, when voters had the broadest 
choice they had ever had in the People’s Republic of Poland, there was no pres-
sure to vote, and the poll was free and secret, only slightly more than 40 percent 
of the eligible voters decided to cast their vote.
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None of the historians dealing with the events of 1989 denies these facts. But in 
Poland’s post-1989 mainstream historiography, they show up not as elements of a 
gradual evolution between 1980 and 1989, but as half-hearted and unsuccessful at-
tempts of “the authorities,” “the party” or “the communists” to secure their power 
through tactical and symbolic concessions to “the nation,” “society” or “the peo-
ple.”27 According to this interpretation of Poland’s recent past, the period between 
1980 and 1989 was just the final phase of a process that had started with the 
de-Stalinization of the late 1950s, after which “the nation” incrementally extorted 
more and more concessions from “the communists” until the latter’s collapse.28 
Among historians sympathizing with the democratic opposition in the late 1970s and 
the 1980s, 1989 was the last link in a kind of chain reaction that connected August 
1944 (the Warsaw uprising), June 1956 (the workers’ riots in Poznań), March 1968 
25 Krzysztof Jasiński, and Adam Przeworski, “1996. The Structure of Partisan Conflict in Poland.” 
In: Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania, and Jacek Raciborski, ed., Naród, władza, społeczeństwo. Księ-
ga dedykowana Jerzemu J. Wiatrowi (Warsaw: Scholar, 1996), 185-206.
26 Retrieved from www.sejm.gov.pl and www.pkw.org.pl.
27 See, e.g., Andrzej Garlicki, 1815–2004: Historia Polska i Swiat (Warsaw: Scholar, 2005), 650–60.
28 Ibid., 649, Garlicki writes that protests were not organized by the opposition or clandestine 
organizations of the Solidarity trade union, but by “society.” 
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(the protests of intellectuals and students), December 1970 (when the army crushed 
the strike movement in the coastal towns and shipyards), June 1976 (worker protests 
in Radom and Ursus) and 1980–81 (the emergence of the Solidarity movement). 
According to this popular narrative, various social groups had stood up against 
communism during all of these dramatic events, but prior to 1981 they had nev-
er joined their efforts. In 1956 and 1970 workers had protested but the intellec-
tuals remained silent. In 1968 intellectuals and students had raised their voices 
and then were silenced, while workers had either remained passive or even helped 
crush the protest. This changed only in 1976, when intellectuals from Warsaw 
organized legal and financial support for oppressed workers29 whose demonstra-
tions against increases in food prices had met a fierce reaction from anti-riot 
squads and the secret police. From then on, according to this narrative, workers 
and intellectuals stayed together and thus enabled the creation of the Solidarity 
movement a few years later.30 In 1989 the communist establishment, deprived of 
any legitimacy, faced a united front of workers and intellectuals and thus finally 
surrendered. This chronology comprises all the elements of a great narrative 
whose aim is to create national self-affirmation and attribute meaning to a difficult 
and intricate past. It reduces complexity and channels contradictory, ambiguous 
events as well as scattered and often incomprehensible facts into a coherent sto-
ry with a clear divide between good and bad, a narrative that leads from a bad 
past to a good present. Unsurprisingly, among historians, politicians and political 
commentators of the patriotic and conservative right, this narrative long remained 
very popular, even after 1989. The notion of an alleged conflict between a small 
and alienated group of communist oppressors and the overwhelming majority of 
the population, often described as “the nation” or “the society,” who despised 
these oppressors, stems from a famous monograph by Jerzy Holzer about the 
Solidarity trade union.31 Paradoxically, Holzer cannot be considered as belonging 
to the conservative patriotic strand of Polish historiography. 
For historians who adhere to the patriotic strand of the discipline, it is no 
problem to regard the gradual liberalization of the late 1980s as another chapter 
29 These intellectuals created the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (Komitet Obrony 
Robotników, KOR), which later split up into a conservative and a liberal leftist part. The con-
servative anticommunist members mostly organized the Movement for the Defense of Human 
and Citizen Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, ROPCiO), whereas the liberal 
left wing members renamed themselves KOR, the Committee for Social Self Defense (Komitet 
Samoobrony Społecznej KOR). For more details, see: Jan Józef Lipski, Komitet Samoobrony 
Społecznej (London: Aneks, 1983). The complicated relationship between the KSS, KOR and 
ROPCiO is explained in Andrzej Friszke, Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945–1980 (London: 
Aneks, 1994), 338–489. 
30 Adam Michnik, “Verteidigung der Freiheit. Reflexionen über 1989.” Osteuropa 59, no. 2 (2009): 
9–19. 
31 Jerzy Holzer, Solidarność 1980–1981. Geneza i Historia (Warsaw: Rytm, 1986). Cf. also his 
reflections on the divide from the perspective of 2009: idem, “Abschied von einer Illusion. Sol-
idarność und die konfliktfreie Gesellschaft.” Osteuropa 59, no. 2 (2009): 151–66.
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in the everlasting fight between a good nation and a bad regime. From this point 
of view, there was no top-down decentralization, liberalization or democratiza-
tion. All of these processes were merely episodes in the nation’s fight for sover-
eignty, during which the regime made a few half-hearted and belated concessions. 
These only encouraged the politically conscious part of the nation, the democrat-
ic opposition, to increase its demands. Critics of this approach toward Poland’s 
recent history may realize how much this dichotomist or even Manichean view 
of the past resembles its Marxist-Leninist counterpart: History is made by op-
pressed yet politically conscious workers, who are led by a small, enlightened 
intellectual elite of revolutionaries. At the beginning of the twenty-first century 
this narrative then bifurcates and Poland’s right-wing populist milieu starts to 
reinterpret it in terms of an alleged betrayal of the righteous workers by arrogant 
and cosmopolitan (in other words, “alienated from the nation”) elites, who “took 
power on the shoulders of the workers.”32 This is the origin of the counter-narra-
tive to the optimistic version of Poland’s transition. 
The divide between followers of the “top-down” and of the “bottom-up” 
concepts of transition is rooted in dissenting interpretations of the intentions of 
both sides. Even if we leave aside the problem of how Polish society (or accord-
ing to the popular narrative, “the nation”) overcame its collective dilemmas 
concerning the events that occurred during the years between 1988 and 1992, 
we must nevertheless deal with the fact that the main actors in Poland at the time 
were the political leadership of the PUWP and the leadership of the clandestine 
Solidarity movement,33 which had originally been a trade union. In most publi-
cations, both sides are described according to the labels they actually used during 
the conflict. There is the “Solidarity movement,” the “Solidarity trade union” or 
“the opposition” on one side,34 and “the regime,” “the party” or “the commu-
32 Many elements of this legend can be found in a famous sample of interviews with critics of the 
Mazowiecki government, of whom many also became (or had always been) critics of the round 
table talks. Jacek Kurski and Piotr Semka, Lewy Czerwcowy (Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1992. 
33 The Solidarity trade union had emerged from the various worker committees created during 
the big protest waves of 1980. In 1981 Solidarity was formally registered as a legal trade union 
(making Poland the only Soviet bloc country with two competing trade unions). However, it was 
then de-legalized in January 1982 as a consequence of martial law. After that, many of its lead-
ers and activists who had escaped incarceration founded clandestine trade union cells, often as 
members of (legal) workers committees (rady pracownicze), which were entitled to participate 
in the management of state enterprises. 
34 For outsiders and readers not familiar with the internal Polish discussion, the absence of a “dem-
ocratic vs. non-democratic” divide may come as a surprise. Actually it seems there is not a single 
publication in which the supporters of democracy during the 1980s are actually described as 
“democrats,” despite the fact that the outcome of the transition process actually brought about 
democracy. In some Western media and popular accounts, the political opposition in Poland 
has been described as “democratic opposition.” In Poland, labels pertaining to sovereignty and 
national independence actually prevail over political notions. According to them, the opposition 
fought for sovereignty and independence against a regime that had been imposed from outside. 
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nists”35 on the other. Very few authors deviate from this scheme. One who does 
is Jerzy J. Wiatr, a party intellectual and member of the PUWP’s Central Com-
mittee, who, during the 1980s, was a close associate of General Jaruzelski and 
defended the introduction of martial law and after 1989, became one of the 
leading figures of the postcommunist Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD). 
For him, the political regime of the 1980s was a military junta, not a one-party 
system and an ideological dictatorship.36
Wiatr’s notion has not gained much popularity among Polish historians, de-
spite increasing evidence supporting his claim that has come to the fore during 
recent years. It now seems as if the center of state power was indeed situated 
outside the official bodies of the government, namely, the state institutions and 
the PUWP. When, for example, in 1989 the Central Committee of the PUWP was 
deciding on the re-legalization of the Solidarity trade union, strategic decisions 
were taken by a core group of generals around Wojciech Jaruzelski, namely, 
Florian Siwicki (the then minister of defense) and Czesław Kiszczak (the minis-
ter of the interior, who effectively controlled the state security complex). These 
decisions were not made by the Central Committee’s Politburo nor by the gov-
ernment, the State Council (Rada Państwa). These decision channels had been 
established in December 1981, when the generals had marginalized the PUWP’s 
central organs, its Political Bureau, the State Council and even the newly estab-
lished Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), all of which were only 
asked to give their assent to decisions that had been previously taken by the 
generals. During the second part of the decade, the generals even established a 
special task force whose job was to monitor and analyze the situation in Poland 
as well as to elaborate possible strategies to overcome the deadlock. This task 
force, which was never formalized, authored a number of risky and unorthodox 
proposals, all of which were kept confidential. They were transmitted to General 
Kiszczak, who forwarded them to Jaruzelski. Most of these proposals were nev-
er applied in practice. Astonishingly the members of this informal task force were 
people whom the generals trusted strongly but who came from outside the party 
and government hierarchy. One of them, Jerzy Urban, who became the govern-
ment’s spokesperson, was even outside the ranks of the PUWP.37
For more about the “national” character (as opposed to political, social or pluralist notions) of 
Poland’s transition, see Marcin Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymizacji, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalisty-
czna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce (Warsaw: Trio, 2005); Marcin Kula, Naro-
dowe i rewolucyjne (London: Aneks, 1992); for a broader perspective, see Martin Mevius, ed., 
The Communist Quest for National Legitimacy 1918–1989 (London: Routledge, 2010). 
35 Andrzej Garlicki, Karuzela: Rzecz o Okrągłym Stole (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2003). 
36 Jerzy J.Wiatr, “Polska droga do demokracji,” in idem, Jacek Raciborski, Jerzy Bartkowiak, Bar-
bara Frątczak-Rudnicka, and Jarosław Kilias, Demokracja Polska 1989–2003 (Warsaw: Schol-
ar, 2003), 13–56.
37 He joined the PUWP shortly before it dissolved in 1990. For more information about the task 
force, see Włodzimierz Borodziej, and Andrzej Garlicki, “Od redaktorów,” in Włodzimierz 
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One of the most ardent supporters of top-down reform was Mieczysław Rakow-
ski, the former head of Poland’s famous weekly Polityka, who served as prime 
minister from September 1988 until August 1989. He had never belonged to the 
military’s core group of rulers. Recently discovered sources, as well as his own 
memoirs and interviews with members of his entourage, confirm that his role in 
advocating power sharing with Solidarity was actually much more active than it 
was perceived by political commentators and opposition members at the time.38 
They mostly remembered his support for Jaruzelski’s coup d’état in 1981.  His 
promotion of economic reform and top-down changes as well as his contemptible 
remarks about the round table had aroused suspicion in opposition circles, who 
suspected him of trying to replace a compromise with the political opposition by 
symbolic concessions and superficial gestures, which would allow the PUWP to 
maintain control over the transition process. Some of these concessions, whose 
details have been elucidated in recent research, comprised the creation of a Con-
sultative Committee (promoted by General Jaruzelski). Membership in this com-
mittee was rejected by almost all members of the political opposition, as was the 
invitation of non-party members from moderate opposition circles (not directly 
connected to Solidarity structures) to the cabinet. The latter attempt had been ini-
tiated by Rakowski himself. 
Due to the opening of state archives and a flood of memoirs and interviews 
after 1989, every step of the preparations for the round table talks can now be traced. 
From this perspective, even the results of the secret talks with key actors of the 
round table negotiations in Magdalenka are no longer surprising. As Kowal has 
pointed out, the idea of a power sharing deal in the Sejm as a result of partially 
competitive elections had been discussed in oppositional circles and within Jaru-
zelski’s entourage long before, as had the concept of resuscitating the Senate as a 
body that would allow the opposition to control a part of the legislative process. 
This concept can even be found in a document of the PUWP’s Central Committee 
that was prepared prior to Gorbachev’s visit to Poland.39
Most authors limit their analysis to these two sides of the round table talks—the 
opposition and what in Polish is usually called władza, which can be translated as 
power, authority, the authorities, the government (in a broader sense than only the 
cabinet) or the ruling elite. However, at least during the final phase of the negoti-
ations, it is highly disputable whether there were only two sides. The official and—
at that time only legal—OPZZ trade unions, which had a strong leverage over the 
Central Committee and about seven million members across the country, were 
Borodziej, and Andrzej Garlicki, Okrągły Stół: dokumenty i materiały, vol. 2. (Warsaw: Zapol, 
2004), 6–40.
38 For examples of Rakowski’s active role in promoting power sharing with the opposition and advo-
cating the legalization of the Solidarity trade union, see Garlicki, Karuzela, and Rakowski’s own 
political diary: Mieczysław Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1987–1990 (Warsaw: Iskry, 2005).
39 Kowal, Koniec, 394–95. 
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strongly disinclined to accept the crucial point of the talks—the introduction of 
“trade union pluralism,” a euphemism used for the legalization of Solidarity. The 
OPZZ, headed by a choleric and self-confident Alfred Miodowicz, felt threatened 
by the potential emergence of another strong trade union in the factories, but it also 
regarded (rightly, as it would later turn out) the legalization of  Solidarity as a ma-
terial threat against its possessions. After the imposing of martial law and the 
subsequent de-legalization of Solidarity, all its assets (with the exception of cash, 
which some activists managed to withdraw from the trade union’s bank accounts) 
had been handed over to the OPZZ. Under the conditions of “trade union pluralism” 
and a general trend toward the rule of law, the OPZZ could expect huge compen-
sation claims from Solidarity. The role that the OPZZ played during the round table 
talks provided a good illustration of how “trade union pluralism” would later affect 
the economy. On more than one occasion, the OPZZ tried to sideline Solidarity by 
forwarding more radical requests than the opposition had presented.40 Some mem-
bers of the government delegation were aware of the risk that the competition be-
tween the two rival trade unions might bury radical economic reform and most 
likely to lead to a radicalization of the whole trade union movement. But for the 
two sides at the round table, the stake was much higher than that. 
Authors sympathizing with the opposition tend to present the OPZZ merely as 
a sort of puppet that the government used to extort concessions from the opposition. 
Some authors even suspect Kiszczak and Jaruzelski of having manipulated the trade 
union in order to increase their bargaining power during the negotiations. Howev-
er, until now no evidence for such a plot has been found. Nonetheless, under the 
pressure of a violent conflict, increasing pluralism within political camps that had 
until then been unified is a phenomenon well known from other transitions as well. 
Tracing back the key actors’ intentions
At a large conference of historians, former political and opposition activists, 
and contemporary witnesses that was brought together in 1999 in a palace near 
40 When Solidarity requested an 80 percent wage compensation for inflation, the OPZZ demand-
ed 100 percent. When the talks started, the OPZZ demanded the immediate abolition of press 
censorship, something that the opposition had not requested because opposition representatives 
were well aware of the consequences this might have for Polish–Soviet relations. During the fi-
nal public closing ceremony, Alfred Miodowicz demanded to speak right after General Kiszczak 
and Lech Wałęsa, and threatened to leave the ceremony in protest if not granted this right. Piotr 
Osęka, “Okrągły Stół. Taktyki negocjacyjne władzy i opozycji,” in Włodzimierz Borodziej, and 
Andrzej Garlicki, eds., Okrągły Stół: dokumenty i materiały, vol. 1 (Warsaw: Zapol, 2004), 
5–22. There is more inside information to be found in Paweł Kowals impressive oral history 
project, which is based on material collected at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: Paw-
el Kowal, “Dlaczego doszło do Okrągłego Stołu? Przyczyny zmian politycznych w Polsce w 
latach 1989–1990 w opiniach polityków, aktywnych uczestników tego okresu,” in Tomasz Sza-
rota, ed., Komunizm: ideologia, system, ludzie (Warsaw: Neriton, PAN 2001), 156–73. 
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Warsaw to examine these issues, no authoritative answers were found.41 The 
perception of both sides is still biased by their most recent interests as well as by 
their ex-post perspective, which drives them to conceive past events in the light 
of today’s knowledge about them. Therefore, members of the former political 
establishment tend to emphasize (and sometimes exaggerate) their own willing-
ness to “overcome the system,” their preference for further democratization and 
for the “social-democratization” of the PUWP, whereas former opposition mem-
bers describe their counterparts’ actions as half-hearted and driven by the intent 
to “preserve the core of the system” by making “tactical concessions.” Former 
opponents of the communist leadership tend to overestimate their own clarity of 
mind in a situation in which no one could actually have known exactly where 
history was heading, not even the most influential and powerful actors, as for 
example Mikhail Gorbachev. In many of their presentations, Poland’s history 
seems to have been written by strongly determined activists who fought for a 
liberal, pro-Western democracy, a capitalist market economy, and the full sover-
eignty of the country—despite the fact that many less well-known and less high-
lighted documents and quotes from 1989 and the preceding years contain little 
proof of the leading dissidents’ alleged resolve to bring the system down. While 
the transition was still underway, the emphasis of both sides lay on compromise 
rather than fight and victory. This, however, may have been due to the “civilizing 
power of hypocrisy”42 as much as to tactical considerations. Recent monographs 
and editions of sources have revealed strong incentives for a peaceful rather than 
revolutionary change. It was the absolute stalemate that not only prevented the 
opposition from openly confronting the regime but also stopped the regime from 
taking radical military options. By the second half of the 1980s, both sides were 
exhausted.43 The breakdown of the strikes in May 1988 had shown the inability 
of the opposition to mount a decisive attack against the ruling establishment 
(protesters on the coast remained isolated and finally abandoned the strike with-
out engaging in any negotiations); the outcome of the referendum in 1987 demon-
strated the inability of the regime to obtain any legitimacy for economic reforms 
without political concessions. Without a politically legitimized reform agenda that 
41 Paweł Machcewicz, Andrzej Paczkowski, Antoni Dudek, and Andrzej Friszke, Polska 1986–
1989. Koniec systemu. Materiały międzynarodowej konferencji. Miedzeszyn, 21–23 październi-
ka 1999 (Warsaw: Trio, 2002).
42 The “civilizing power of hypocrisy” describes the mechanism of moderating one’s opinion, 
whereby a person is compelled (or feels it is fitting) to publicly declare opinions that he or 
she does not share in order to reduce cognitive dissonance, and subsequently adopts opinions 
that are closer to the publicly uttered ones, displacing the ones initially held privately. On this 
concept see: Jon Elster, “Strategic Uses of Argument,” in Kenneth Joseph Arrow et al., eds., 
Barriers to Conflict Resolution (New York: Norton, 1995), 237–57; Jon Elster, “Deliberation 
and Constitution making,” in idem, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998), 97–122.
43 Borodziej and Garlicki, “Od redaktorów.” 
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could be carried out without the threat of boycotts and strikes, the regime was 
unable to deliver an improvement in living standards, although this is something 
that might have strengthened its support among the population. 
This vicious cycle probably would have embroiled the country in a spiral of 
protests, hyperinflation and economic decay had the internal balance of power 
not been altered by external influences. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev took power 
as the general secretary of the CPSU and launched perestroika, which encouraged 
both Poland’s opposition and the reform-minded sections of the ruling establish-
ment to embrace reforms. From this point in time onward, contrary to the condi-
tions under Brezhnev and Andropov, the conservative opposition within the 
PUWP and the state administration could no longer mobilize support in Moscow 
to prevent changes in Poland. Both sides of the future transition negotiations, the 
opposition and the ruling leadership, could now count on Gorbachev’s support 
and were able to marginalize the antagonists within their own ranks. At the same 
time, uncertainty about a possible Soviet reaction to radical measures, riots or 
civil war tamed the radicals in both camps and contributed to moderation and a 
sense of unity between the ruling elite and the opposition. Mutual trust as well 
as uncertainty about the consequences of radical measures drove both sides to-
ward each other, incrementally isolating them from their radical edges. When in 
January 1990 the PUWP dissolved and its former leadership, new and now much 
younger, founded a new party, the climate of the congress was dominated by 
radical social democrats, reform-minded socialists and supporters of pluralism, 
market economy, democracy and human rights, rather than representatives of a 
conservative and revengeful party bureaucracy. On the other hand, the round 
table talks and the election campaign had also considerably weakened the radical 
ranks of the opposition who had sought revenge on Poland’s ancien regime rath-
er than compromise.
Internal constraints and external influence
Seen against the background of the violent transitions in parts of the Soviet 
Union and in former Yugoslavia, Poland’s power-sharing deal and democratiza-
tion are often described as a kind of political miracle, facilitated by wise leaders 
on both sides and the moderation of a strong and temperate Catholic Church 
supported by the Polish pope (John Paul II) and Vatican diplomacy. Indeed—and 
in contrast to the Soviet transitions—no television towers were stormed by para-
troopers (as 1990 in Lithuania) and no ethnic minorities were incited to fight 
each other (as between 1992 and 1994 in Nagornyi Karabakh). The Soviet lead-
ership (and later Russian) as well as the United States and West European gov-
ernments supported a peaceful transition, as did the Vatican. The pope and 
Vatican diplomacy were eager to stress their opposition to bloodshed and revo-
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lution, even making this explicit during the round table talks.44 Dubiński rightly 
states that the Catholic Church was far from being only a victim of the commu-
nist system. It acted as a moderator mainly (but not only) by means of its hier-
archy. However, a factor that is often overlooked is that the Catholic hierarchy 
was also a party in the conflict. Until the trial of the Popieluszko assassins in 
1985, the Catholic Church had been regarded as a moderator and a kind of neu-
tral referee between the clandestine Solidarity movement and the state authori-
ties.45 The trial, which was used by the authorities to accuse the Church of po-
litical engagement, destabilization and hate propaganda, changed this perception, 
pushing the Church into the camp of the political opposition and weakening its 
ability to moderate. It was only during the first huge waves of protests in 1988 
that the Church was pulled back into the limelight. In contrast to an ardently 
anti-communist pope, who had time and again publically denounced the alleged 
oppression of Catholics and Catholicism in Poland, the Polish episcopate was 
much more moderate and prudent in everyday politics and more than once out-
raged dissidents and radical priests, who pushed for more action against the 
authorities.46
The Catholic Church was not the only actor to contain revolutionary tenden-
cies that opposed a peaceful transition. There were two external factors that 
strongly constrained the change of regime and prevented radical solutions and 
retributive measures after June 1989. The first was the Soviet Union, whose 
leadership was not interested in destabilization since such a course of events 
would have endangered perestroika and necessitated interference from Moscow. 
The second was the West, which feared any type of escalation along the frontlines 
of the Cold War as well as large scale migration in the event of a violent regime 
change. The governments in Washington and Bonn were also anxious to prevent 
any radical change that might threaten a peaceful and negotiated transition in the 
GDR and the planned merger of the two German states. Last but not least, after 
the GDR had acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany, negotiations about 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany started, creating a dangerous 
situation for Poland, which was also host to large garrisons of the Soviet army. 
The new Polish government was also eager to start negotiations on a withdrawal 
of these troops, but more specifically wanted to avoid a situation in which the 
withdrawing troops from Eastern Germany would station themselves in Poland 
and increase the number of soldiers in the garrisons on Polish soil. The last thing 
44 Krzysztof Dubiński, Wokół Okrągłego Stołu (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Promocyjna, 1999), 32. 
45 Jerzy Popieluszko was an oppositional and quite outspoken priest with close links to the clan-
destine Solidarity movement. In October 1984, he was abducted and killed by a death squad of 
overzealous officers of the Ministry of the Interior. Public outrage about the murder induced the 
government to order an investigation and to prosecute the perpetrators in a public trial in 1985. 
All were sentenced to relatively long prison terms. 
46 On the role of the Catholic Church in Poland’s transition see: Peter Raina, Droga do “Okrągłego 
Stołu”. Zakulisowe rozmowy przygotowawcze (Warsaw: von Borowiecky, 1999). 
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the Polish government (or anyone interested in Poland’s sovereignty) wished in 
a situation like this was destabilization and internal turmoil, because it would 
only delay the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
After the Soviet Union had lost its leadership role and pulled out as a con-
straining factor for radical regime change, the European Union and (to a lesser 
extent) NATO stepped in, promoting new values of stability, political compro-
mise, human rights and the rule of law.47 It is striking that—in contrast to the 
EU’s policy concerning the Balkans—its human rights and rule-of-law discourse 
preferred forgiveness, unity and reconciliation over retribution, punishment and 
“dealing with the past.” Hardly any research has been done about the link between 
EU policies and the preferences of its member states, or how the communist past 
was dealt with in Central and Eastern Europe. Only a few years later, after the 
violent breakup of Yugoslavia the EU favored punishment for the perpetrators 
there over reconciliation and unity, in the name of the human rights of the victims. 
In contrast, in the CEE countries after 1989, it was human rights that were usu-
ally invoked to prevent the punishment (in the form of vetting, screening and 
large-scale de-communization measures) and to guarantee fair (and therefore, 
under transitional conditions, lengthy and complicated) trials for former commu-
nist perpetrators. There, the concept of human rights was rarely used by victims 
to confront their torturers and reveal the truth about the past.48 
All of these constraining elements also contributed strongly to the absence of 
any important retributive measures. Lustration as an issue of state policy was only 
introduced when the new order was stable and could no longer be threatened by 
proponents of the ancien régime.
The fact that Poland’s transition was a peacefully negotiated compromise, 
moderated by the Catholic Church and closely monitored from outside, without 
any retributive measures against members of the old regime, had wide conse-
quences. These consequences can be divided into those that were short term and 
others that were long term. 
47 In 1988 Poland had begun negotiations on a trade agreement with the European Community. It 
was signed in September 1989. Almost immediately, Poland requested the start of negotiations 
for an Association Agreement (which would contain a full membership perspective). The request 
granted, Poland and the EC negotiated for another two years, and then ratified the Agreement 
despite strong opposition in the Polish Sejm. Poland then filed a request to start negotiations for 
full membership in the European Union (which had emerged after the ratification of the Treaty 
of Maastricht). For details, see Renata Duda, Integracja Polski z Unią Europejską: Wybrane 
aspekty polityki integracyjnej w latach 1991–2004 (Wroclaw: Oficyna Wydawn. Arboretum, 
2004), 5–16.
48 The majority of the research dealing with this nexus comes from the disciplines of political 
science and law and is found in a new strand of literature called “Transitional Justice” (research 
that is almost non-existent in Poland): Lavinia Stan, ed., Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union. Reckoning with the Communist Past (London: Routledge, 2009); 
Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet. Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Countries 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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Short-term consequences
During the months following the June 1989 parliamentary elections, many of 
the deputies of the former government proved their autonomy by demonstrating 
that they were far from being satellites or puppets of the PUWP leadership. The 
parties of the ancien régime began to come under huge pressure from Poland’s 
blossoming pluralism. Party members contested their leadership, with PUWP 
members of parliament voting down proposals from their leaders and instead 
supporting motions from the Mazowiecki government. The striving for legitima-
cy that the elections had triggered brushed away the remnants of “democratic 
centralism” with which the PUWP had so long been associated. 
The opposition’s landslide victory on 4 June provided the transitional govern-
ment of Tadeusz Mazowiecki a huge amount of public trust, which he was able 
to use for a radical economic reform program. This was supported by a strong 
majority in parliament, which included many PUWP members, who tried their 
best to obfuscate their political past through radical commitments to reform, 
democracy, a market economy and the rule of law. During the autumn of 1989 
the government pushed an enormous number of highly sensitive and socially 
costly reform bills through the Sejm, whose members voted in endless night 
sessions and extraordinary procedures in order to make these bills law by 1 Jan-
uary 1990. Many of these laws were highly detrimental to the aging state indus-
tries, to the highly subsidized agricultural sector, and to the bureaucratic state 
banks. They all dominated an extremely consumer-unfriendly market that was 
driven by supply rather than demand.49 Within a year, this had changed radically: 
Inflation fell from several hundred percent a year to a two-digit level, and the 
fixed currency exchange rate (sustained by a stabilization reserve, funded by 
Western creditors) caused a huge external trade deficit and put extreme pressure 
on Polish suppliers, forcing them to cut costs. 
Poland’s economy quickly became competitive, but the social cost was high: 
unemployment rates rose from 0 to 10 percent, charities started to offer free meals 
to homeless and unemployed people, and populist parties and politicians gained 
increasing support. Under the influence of the austerity measures of Finance 
Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, the parliamentary club of the Citizens’ Committee 
disintegrated into a plethora of rival parties. After the elections in 1993 a coalition 
of the postcommunist Alliance of the Democratic Left and the United Peasants’ 
Party, a former ally of the PUWP now refurbished as the Polish Peasants’ Party, 
was able to form a cabinet.50 Poland became a multiparty democracy with a very 
strong emphasis on “multiparty.” 
49 Hartmut Kühn, Das Jahrzehnt der Solidarność. Die politische Geschichte Polens 1980–1990 
(Berlin: Basisdruck, 1999). 
50 For a criticism of economic policy, elite approaches to reform and the social consequences of 
transition, see: David Ost, “Dlaczego polskie elity nie są zainteresowane resztą społeczeństwa?” 
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During the early 1990s, due to party fragmentation and a low threshold for 
entering the parliament, more than thirty parties held seats in the Sejm, and some 
of the short-lived multiparty coalitions consisted of up to eight different parties. 
At that time, the cleavage between supporters of national reconciliation and the 
partisans of “reckoning with communism” was already prominent, but the basic 
narrative of Poland’s march from communism to the round table and then to 
freedom and sovereignty still remained largely uncontested. Mazowiecki’s gov-
ernment was criticized for its reluctance to hold leading members of the ancien 
régime accountable for atrocities, for ruining the economy, and for depriving the 
country of sovereignty and dignity.51 It was at the end of the 1990s when some-
thing new emerged, namely, “the black legend” of the round table talks. It had 
never been a secret that deadlocks at the relatively crowded and heterogeneous 
round table had been overcome by a smaller “core group” of representatives from 
both sides (as well as representatives of the Catholic episcopate, who acted as 
mediators). They met at a resort owned by the Ministry of the Interior in the 
village of Magdalenka on the outskirts of Warsaw. At these talks, leading figures 
of the opposition, including some trade unionists from Solidarity, met General 
Kiszczak and other members of the PUWP’s Politburo.  Kiszczak had taken care 
that the negotiations were filmed, including some potentially discrediting scenes 
showing opposition members drinking vodka with him. When these details were 
published during subsequent election campaigns, they quickly reinforced the 
rumors of an alleged “plot of the elites” and a “Magdalenka conspiracy.” By then, 
the positive associations in the narrative about the round table had been gradual-
ly replaced by a negatively loaded “Magdalenka narrative,” which involved se-
cretive bargains between “communists and their former friends” who were “sell-
ing out national interests.” According to this “black legend” about the round table 
talks in Magdalenka, the opposition leadership, in exchange for political power 
and control over the security forces, had granted the top level perpetrators of the 
old regime impunity as well as access to key sectors of the economy. “Magda-
lenka” became the codename for the cause of Poland’s numerous transition 
problems, from corruption to political fragmentation, government instability and 
even organized crime. 
Newsweek, 6 January 2010, http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/dlaczego-polskie-elity-nie-sa-zain-
teresowane-reszta-spoleczenstwa,51248,5,1.html (accessed 8 July 2013); Stephen Crowley and 
David Ost, Workers After Workers’ States (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); David Ost 
and Hanna Jankowska, Klęska ‘Solidarności’. Gniew i polityka w postkomunistycznej Europie 
(Warsaw: Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza, 2007).
51 Jan Olszewski and Ewa Polak-Pałkiewicz, Prosto w oczy (Warsaw: Inicjatywa Wydawnicza “ad 
astra,” 1997); Jarosław Kaczyński, Michał Bichniewicz, and Piotr M. Rudnicki, Czas na zmiany 
(Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1992). In the summer of 2010, 31 percent of the respondents polled 
by the pollster firm CBOS (Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej) regarded the Magdalenka talks 
as “a conspiracy of the elites.” http://biznes.onet.pl/polacy_o_magdalence_okraglym_stole_i_
poczuciu_zdrady,18515,3779648,1,onet-wiadomosci-detal and www.cbos.org/archiwum.
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In the intervening years, all of the sources about the round table talks and the 
Magdalenka negotiations have been published, including the minutes taken by 
Kiszczak’s assistant Krzysztof Dubiński, who published several books on the 
topic.52 None of these sources allows such far-reaching conclusions to be drawn, 
but paradoxically this has only reinforced the vigor of the “black legend.” Where-
as political anthropologists point to the lack of symbolic closure and catharsis in 
Poland’s transition, a number of popular sociologists and political scientists go 
much further and interpret the Magdalenka talks as the trigger that led to the 
(alleged) emergence of secretive networks between former members of the secu-
rity forces, Party members, members of the communist nomenklatura, organized 
crime and foreign secret services. These clandestine networks are suspected of 
having undermined Poland’s transition, threatened the transparency of political 
decision making, and contributed to a specific kind of political system,53 which 
Warsaw sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis labels “postcommunism.” Postcommu-
nism—a term whose popularity goes far beyond sociological analysis—is con-
sidered a compromised form of façade democracy, where all important decisions 
are made behind a curtain and then formally confirmed by official institutions.54
Long-term consequences
As evidence from other transition countries shows, “reckoning with the past” 
in penal terms and punishing perpetrators of past atrocities often does not help 
root out the political legacy their rule has left behind. In many cases, it prompts 
supporters of the fallen regime to create their own parties and pressure groups 
and to seek rehabilitation, amnesty or even revenge. Meting out justice to former 
communists meets popular demands, but it also raises the costs of reconstruction 
and economic development and creates new and often lasting political splits that 
complicate democratic decision making. 
In Poland’s case, three distinct factors can be identified that contributed to a 
swift and ultimately successful political and economic transition. First, the rela-
52 Krzysztof Dubiński, Wokół Okrągłego Stołu (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Promocyjna, 1999), 31 
(on his own role during the round table talks); idem, Magdalenka. Transakcja Epoki. Notatki z 
poufnych rozmów Kiszczak-Wałęsa (Warsaw: Sylwa, 1990). In 2000 the Hoover Institution Ar-
chives acquired 23 manuscript boxes of Krzysztof Dubiński: http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/
ark:/13030/kt3n39r64j/ (accessed 8 July 2013).
53 Andrzej Zybertowicz, W uścisku tajnych służb: upadek komunizmu i układ postnomenklaturowy 
(Komorow: Antyk, 1993); Andrzej Zybertowicz, and Radosław Sojak, eds., Transformacja 
podszyta przemocą: o nieformalnych mechanizmach przemian instytucjonalnych (Torun: Wy-
dawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2008).
54 Jadwiga Staniszki, Postkomunizm: próba (Gdansk: Słowo, Obraz Terytoria, 2001); idem, 
Post-communism: the emerging enigma (Warsaw: IPS PAS, 1999); idem, Postkomunistyczne 
państwo: w poszukiwaniu tożsamości. Instytut Spraw Publicznych (Warsaw: ISP 2000).
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tively early prospect of becoming an associate of the EC and then full EU and 
NATO membership helped prevent radical policy changes.55 Second, the actual 
lack of retribution for members of the former establishment prevented them from 
creating any kind of “revenge” pressure group or party, and their political repre-
sentation, the Alliance of the Democratic Left, quickly became a social demo-
cratic party that adopted a platform that was pro-Western, democratic, pluralistic 
and even pro-capitalist. After regaining power (together with the smaller Peasants’ 
Party) in 1993, it never attempted to change the political system or reverse the 
transition process. Due to the introduction of radical pro-market reforms in 1990, 
many members of the former elite who had lost power were able to use their 
resources and social capital to make money and form new careers in business. 
This contributed to the social support of anti-communists, who demanded the 
imposition of retroactive punishment or wanted the government to confiscate 
“immorally” achieved wealth of former nomenklatura members, and at the same 
time prevented any radical left wing movement from gaining support. Anti-West-
ern, anti-market and sometimes even anti-democratic and populist sentiments 
were mobilized by the radical right, whereas the left end of the political specter 
remained pro-capitalist, moderate and democratic.56  
The third factor contributing to the success of transition was the strategic 
decision of the postcommunist left to base their legitimacy on former social 
democratic tendencies (from prewar times, emigration and internal PUWP oppo-
sition) and from their government record between 1993 and 1997 rather than on 
an ideological defense of the People’s Republic and its alleged achievements. 
This decision was partly driven by the aforementioned lack of retribution and the 
new opportunities that the transition had provided for the former nomenklatura.
The lack of catharsis and the impossibility of holding the former leadership 
of the PUWP and of Jaruzelski’s junta legally accountable have certainly contrib-
uted to the rise of populist tendencies in Poland at the beginning of the new 
century.57 They are, however, not the only causes of these tendencies. The lack 
of a strong symbolic cut with the past has led to the emergence of several sub-
stitutes. An incremental inclusiveness of Poland’s collective memory about the 
communist times, which has begun to see both communists and anti-communists 
55 Such a perspective was lacking in parts of Europe and the post-Soviet space, where violent eth-
nic conflicts interrupted transition. Jerzy Wiatr, Europa postkomunistyczna. Przemiany państw i 
społeczeństw po 1989 roku (Warsaw: Scholar, 2006), 82–108.
56 Klaus Bachmann, Polens Uhren gehen anders. Warschau vor der Osterweiterung der EU (Stutt-
gart: Hohenheim Verlag, 2001), 25–59.
57 See David Ost, and Hanna Jankowska, Klęska „Solidarności“: gniew i polityka w postkomu-
nistycznej Europie (Warsaw: Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza, 2007); Jan Kubik, 
The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State 
Socialism of Poland (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994). Ost identifies 
the lack of politicization of economic transition as the main source of populism, not the lack of 
retribution. 
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as “good patriots,”58 is accompanied by an ever more exclusive historical policy, 
which idealizes the radical anti-communist opposition and individual extremists 
who favored armed fight over civil protest. At the same time, the legalist oppo-
sition of the late 1940s, such as the anti-communist part of the Peasants’ Party 
and the moderate Catholic opposition has been overlooked. 
The attractiveness this patriotic narrative still has in Poland can be explained 
by the relative ease with which it can be used in political fights as well as for 
patriotic education. It is additionally reinforced by the historical policies of the 
Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), a huge and influential state institution 
that was created with clear and unambiguous political intentions. However, due to 
the complexities of the democratic process, the IPN is now largely insulated from 
direct party influence. The IPN was initially established to archive, administrate 
and analyze Poland’s secret police files, which survived the transition process and 
their mass destruction that was initiated by Poland’s last communist minister of 
the interior, General Czeslaw Kiszczak, who resigned in the summer of 1990. Due 
to extensive government funding, the IPN dominates large parts of Polish histo-
riography concerning the postwar period, communism and the history of the 
democratic opposition. IPN publications include extensive editions of sources, 
monographs, edited volumes and many periodical series. These all share some 
common features. First, they advance the above-mentioned patriotic narrative by 
reducing the scope of their research to three actors: the anti-communist opposition, 
the regime, and the Catholic Church. Second, they rely largely on the secret service 
files, and either ignore other sources or deliberately refuse to compare them to the 
secret police archives. This results in historical accounts that are either anecdotal 
or strongly biased because of their focus on the relatively small minority of actors 
who actually took sides in the conflicts that tormented Poland under communist 
rule—the politically active part of the anti-communist opposition, priests and 
bishops, and the regime’s leaders and its security sector. 59 Despite a huge amount 
58 Actually General Jaruzelski became extremely popular after imposing martial law, and retained 
this popularity until the early 1990s. During the decades following 1989 a higher percentage of 
respondents have seen martial law as a “necessary measure” to avoid Soviet intervention than 
was the case when martial law was introduced—and this despite a huge amount of archival evi-
dence that points to the contrary. This evidence shows that it was Jaruzelski in 1981 who asked 
his interlocutors in Moscow to increase public pressure on Poland in order to intimidate the op-
position and reinforce his own position. The Soviet leadership refused to intervene militarily and 
made it clear, that “the Poles had to sort it out between themselves.” Andrzej Paczkowski, Droga 
do “mniejszego zła”. Strategia i taktyka obozu władzy lipiec 1980–styczeń 1982 (Cracow: Wyd. 
Literackie, 2002), 206–10, 246–68. 
59 In 2010 the IPN organized a conference and invited its critics. The goal of the conference was to 
assess the quality and overall tendency of IPN public relations and book production. A summary 
can be found in Adam Leszczyński, “IPN bez taryfy ulgowej.” Gazeta Wyborcza. 9 Dec. 2010, 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,8790004,IPN_bez_taryfy_ulgowej.html; idem, “Czy IPN może być 




of edited sources and despite the accessibility of all government archives concern-
ing state-church relations, the role of the Catholic Church is still one of the big 
enigmas in historical research on 1989. This is due to a lack of access to the Church 
archives, which are not subject to the regulations pertaining to the state and PUWP 
archives.60 Another reason is the specific paradigm that most historians apply when 
delving into Church documents.61 They treat the Church as a part of the opposition, 
an actor who, with a certain degree of independence, followed the same agenda 
as the opposition. In some cases, the Church hierarchy (the level of local priests 
is seldom a research topic) is presented as a kind of “honest broker” between “the 
authorities” and the opposition. But the Church is never regarded as an autonomous 
actor with own potentially “selfish” interests that may have differed from the 
objectives of the opposition.62 According to this perspective, bishops intervened in 
order to accelerate the transition process, eliminate obstacles and ease tensions, 
but never in order to forward their own agenda. 
The IPN’s focus on the State Security police and the political opposition ne-
glects the attitudes and activities of the majority of the population, which at all 
times refrained from direct political engagement. Actually, the IPN’s narrative is 
much less a history of Poland or the Poles than a history of those who fought to 
support Poland and the Poles, and who claimed at the same time to represent 
either the majority or even “the whole nation.” To the same extent, leading intel-
lectuals of the political opposition during and after martial law also pretended to 
fight for the interests of the Polish nation as a whole, as was the claim of the 
protagonists of the PUWP, whose governments after 1981 declared that they 
represented the interest of “the nation” more than they claimed to fight for class 
interests, a world revolution or against reactionaries. 
60 Except for the documents that were either burnt in 1990 by the Ministry of the Interior or were 
later handed over to the new secret services (because they contained information about infor-
mants who were still operational), all state archives relevant for research about 1989 are today 
publicly accessible. This is true for the government documents and the PUWP archives, which 
are stored at the Archiwum Akt Nowych, as well as for the secret police archives, held by the 
IPN. 
61 Many documents in the state archives have been published by Peter Raina and others. Peter 
K. Raina, Droga do “Okrągłego Stołu”: zakulisowe rozmowy przygotowawcze (Warsaw: von 
Borowiecky, 1999); idem, Kościół katolicki a państwo w świetle dokumentów 1945–1989, vol. 
3: 1975–1989 (Poznan: Pelplin, 1996); idem, Rozmowy z władzami PRL. Arcybiskup Dąbrows-
ki w służbie Kościoła i narodu (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo “Książka Polska,” 1995). In the last 
monograph, the archbishop Dąbrowski acts “in the service of the Church and the nation,” which 
suggests congruence between the interests of both. 
62 The title of Dudek’s and Gryz’ book is paradigmatic for this approach, where one finds “the 
communists” (non-capitalized) against “the Church” (capitalized). Antoni Dudek and Ryszard 
Gryz, komuniści i Kościół w Polsce 1945–1989 (Cracow: Znak, 2003). Elsewhere Dudek is 
much more critical about the policies of the Church hierarchy: idem, Reglamentowana rewo-
lucja: rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988–1990 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Arcana, 
2004), 79–90.
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In a fine, clearly structured and compelling analysis, Zaremba has shown why 
and how Poland’s ruling elite during the People’s Republic shifted from its failed 
internationalist strategy during the Stalinist period to a more and more national 
and even nationalist and chauvinist strategy during the following decades.63 His 
book reveals how, in the end, the leadership of the ruling establishment, on one 
hand, and the political opposition, on the other, competed for national (rather than 
social) legitimacy.  General Jaruzelski’s speeches refer just as often to notions of 
“national salvation,” “national unity” and patriotism as those of Lech Wałęsa 
when he addressed his supporters. Poland’s post-transition discourse was domi-
nated by notions of sovereignty, independence, national pride and honor, rather 
than by references to democracy, pluralism or human rights. 
Neither the intentions of the protagonists nor the activities of the secret police 
decided the outcome of this struggle. It was rather the attitudes, convictions and 
the readiness for engagement of the largely undecided and hesitating bystanders, 
all factors that remain outside the popular patriotic narrative and the view of IPN 
researchers and their perpetrator/victim/hero paradigm. It must be mentioned that 
due to the specific materials and the methods applied by sociologists, this para-
digm never prevailed in the sociological analyses of the People’s Republic’s 
everyday life. Even under censorship, sociological accounts of Poland’s society 
during and after 1989 depict a much more nuanced and complex picture than the 
concept of an alleged conflict of “the regime against the nation” has ever sug-
gested.64
It is probably not accidental that today younger authors are applying socio-
logical viewpoints and methods as well as tools from social psychology and social 
history when beginning to delve more deeply into societal moods and fashions, 
everyday life, as well as the dreams and conflicts, convictions and attitudes of 
the “ordinary citizen.”65 Some examples include the economy of queuing66 or the 
mechanisms governing the black market.67 Alltagsgeschichte, the history of ev-
eryday life, has a long tradition in Polish historiography, as exemplified by the 
books of Tomasz Szarota about everyday life in occupied Warsaw68 or even much 
63 Marcin Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm: nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja 
władzy komunistycznej w Polsce (Warsaw: Wydawn. Trio, ISP PAN, 2001), 383–96.
64 Władysław Adamski, Krzysztof Jasiewicz, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Andrzej Rychard, and Ed-
ward Wnuk-Lipiński, eds., Polacy 88. Dynamika konfliktu a szanse reform. Raport z badania 
“Sprawy Polaków ‘87” (Warsaw: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii. Polska Akademia Nauk, 1989). 
65 Barbara Klich-Kluczewska, Przez dziurkę od klucza. Życie prywatne w Krakowie (1945–1989) 
(Warsaw: Trio, 2005).
66 Małgorzata Mazurek, Społeczeństwo kolejki. O doświadczeniach niedoboru 1945–1989 (War-
saw: Trio, 2010). 
67 Jerzy Kochanowski, Tylnymi drzwiami. “Czarny rynek” w Polsce 1944–1989 (Warsaw: Neri-
ton, 2010).
68 Tomasz Szarota, Okupowanej Warszawy dzien powszedni (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2010); idem, Ży-
cie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy. Szkice historyczne i kronika (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 
1995). 
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earlier monographs dealing with peasants’ life in interwar Poland. Not the ap-
proach itself is new, but the material on which it is based. The new wave of this 
strand of social history does not ignore the party archives and the secret police 
files, all of which are now accessible to the public, but also examines unpublished 
diaries, personal interviews, newspaper archives and archives of institutions that 
have been much less penetrated by historians than the party archives, the secret 
police files or the cellars of the army, the Ministry of the Interior, or Poland’s 
Foreign Office.69 Recent publications have been based on the archives of the 
Television and Radio Committee,70 the Agency for the Control of Publications 
and Public Performances (which was responsible for the carrying out censor-
ship)71 and private documents in local archives. 
Historians have always had an interest in debating the means and aims of 
censorship, but still today, Poland lacks a comprehensive theoretical and empir-
ical account of its censorship mechanisms. Most articles and books on the subject 
are purely descriptive and often normative, seeing censorship as just another tool 
for regimes to oppress societies. The same is true regarding the media in the 
People’s Republic. Romek’s most recent book on censorship provides detailed 
stories about specific cases, including extensive quotes from the sources which 
show that censorship can also be regarded from a different perspective—as a 
place where compromises about interpretations of the past were negotiated.72 
During these negotiations, the state institution had initially more leverage than 
the other side—usually the author, who was often supported by his editor. Later, 
after the emergence of a strong and competitive second market that was beyond 
the scope of the censors’ influence, the bargaining power of authors increased 
considerably. This point shows that at least in this respect, liberalization was 
actually imposed on the government from the bottom up, rather than granted by 
reform-minded rulers who had recognized the wind of change and adapted to it. 
This case contradicts the top-down version of gradually applied liberalization 
during and after martial law, but it is also not a case for the “society against the 
regime” paradigm, since the actors in the clandestine book market, the authors 
and their readers, constituted only a marginal section of the overall population. 
69 Krzysztof Dąbek, PZPR. Retrospektywny portret własny (Warsaw: Trio, 2006).
70 Klaus Bachmann, Repression, Protest, Toleranz Wertewandel und Vergangenheitsbewältigung 
in Polen nach 1956 (Dresden: Neisse Verlag, 2010); Patryk Pleskot, Wielki mały ekran. Telewiz-
ja a codzienność Polaków w Latach sześćdziesiątych (Warsaw: Trio, 2007); and (for later peri-
ods) Lechosław Gawlikowski, and Yvette Meisser Moreno, “Audience to Western Broadcasts 
to Poland during the Cold War,” in A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta, ed., Cold War Broad-
casting. Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A collection of studies and documents 
(Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2010), 121–41. 




a n d r e a s  o P l aT K a
HUNGARY 1989: RENUNCIATION OF  
POWER AND POWER-SHARING
To some degree the course taken by the events in Hungary in 1989 was similar 
to that in the other communist countries, but it was also different. The similari-
ties need no explanation. The differences do. They were based on two elements. 
First, Hungary was the only country in the Eastern bloc where self-liberation, as 
a major factor, included an important historical feature: rehabilitating the 1956 
Hungarian revolution.1 Second, Hungary made a significant contribution to the 
unification of Germany by dismantling the Iron Curtain and opening its bor-
der for citizens of the German Democratic Republic. This Hungarian decision 
marked the beginning of the GDR’s collapse and helped end the Cold War.
The latter difference, the opening of the border, was made possible only with-
in the framework of the political events in 1989 and was only one part of the 
process of transformation that took place in Hungary that year. In contrast, the 
impact of the 1956 Hungarian revolution had already left a profound mark on the 
country for four decades and thus, indeed, the history of 1989 started in Hungary 
in 1956. Therefore, before dealing with the period of transformation we must 
take a short look at the revolution and, specifically, at its aftermath. 
The experience of the revolution was in many respects characteristic of a 
number of moments in Hungarian history. Resistance against foreign rulers, the 
use of force even in desperate situations and against mighty enemies, and the 
fight for independence are all components of the Hungarian historical heritage. 
In this respect, the movement in 1956 stood in a direct line with the revolution 
of 1848–49.
The popular uprising of 1956 is indisputably well documented. The Budapest 
Institute for the Study of the History of the Revolution has done the most thor-
ough work in this area. Above all, the Institute’s yearbooks should be mentioned, 
which contain articles about relevant new releases as well as the general research 
situation. A summit in this research was undoubtedly reached in 1996 on the oc-
1 Czechoslovakia also had to rehabilitate a historic event, the “Prague Spring.” But in contrast to 
Hungary’s reassessment of its popular uprising, this rehabilitation did not occur at the beginning 
of the “Velvet Revolution”; unlike in Hungary, it was not a catalyst for the events nor did it even 
speed them up. In 1989 Prague, the ideas of 1968, again in contrast to the case in Hungary, were 
no longer popular, just as in 1989 Alexander Dubček played only a minor role. In other words: 
the “Prague Spring” was not a constituent part of the “Velvet Revolution.” In contrast, in 1989 
Hungary consciously referred to the 1956 rebellion and its ideas: the earlier demands for inde-
pendence, rule of law and a multiparty system.
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casion of the fortieth anniversary of the uprising. A number of Soviet documents 
that had become available as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union five 
years earlier enabled new insights to be gained. These findings were present-
ed at a multi-day conference held by the Institute, in which Russian historians 
also participated. The corresponding contributions can be found in the Yearbook 
1996–97.
The scholarly output on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary was much 
more modest, which implies that research on this topic had reached a certain sat-
uration point. This probably also explains why several researchers at the Institute 
have focused on the Kádár era as their object of study.2 
In addition to political, sociological and economic aspects, studies in Hunga-
ry on the Kádár era have mainly focused on the person János Kádár. This is not 
surprising, since Kádár stood at the tip of the power pyramid for over thirty years 
and shaped an epoch. Above all, his transformation is startling: from a hated pup-
pet and the cruel executor of Moscow at the beginning of his career, to becoming 
the respected and sometimes even popular puritanical father of his country. Giv-
en this development, it can be said that in the twentieth century Kádár was one of 
Hungary’s most enigmatic figures.3 
Most of the works mentioned in this study are entirely or partly devoted to 
the change of system in 1989–90. They will not be mentioned individually here, 
but it should nonetheless be noted that their bibliographies also contain relevant 
2 The director of the Institute, historian János M. Rainer, has published a biography of Imre 
Nagy, also available in German, and a collection of essays on various aspects of the period until 
1989, including work on the development of the conditions that led to the events of 1989: János 
M. Rainer, Ötvenhat után (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 2003). In a book published in 2008, 
Rainer has also examined the early Kádár era. By examining intelligence archival materials he 
traces the spying conducted from 1957 to 1989 on József Antall, the first freely elected prime 
minister after 1989: János M. Rainer, Jelentések hálójában (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2008). 
Another researcher at the Institute who is particularly interested in the international context has 
published a collection of studies dealing with the postwar period, from the rise and seizure of 
power of the communist party until the collapse of single-party state: Csaba Békés, Európából 
Európába. Magyarország konfliktusok kereszttüzében, 1945–1990 (Budapest: Gondolat, 2004). 
The last essay in the volume examines the international background of the 1989 changes in 
East-Central Europe. Békés’ bibliography contains a long list of references to thematically 
related works in Hungarian, Russian and English.
3 There is also no lack of popular scholarly literature. Noteworthy, however, is the two-volume 
biography by Tibor Huszár, Kádár János politikai életrajza (Budapest: Szabadtér Kiadó and 
Kossuth Kiadó, 2001–03). A picture of Kádár that is scarcely known by the general population 
is found in László Varga, Kádár János bírái előtt (Budapest: Napvilág, 2006). With the help of 
a large number of contemporary documents contained in an appendix to this volume, the pro-
gression through the years 1949–56 of the ruthless, power-hungry Kádár can be seen: playing 
an evil role at the show trial of László Rajk, then he himself being sentenced in a court farce 
to life imprisonment by his comrades, and then after his early release from prison his prompt 
return to the party to continue his march to the top.
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material.4 The memoirs of some of the politicians who played a role in the system 
changes in 1989 have been published.5 
Material about the recent past in Hungary and documents relating to the com-
munist state period and its end are currently—not exclusively, but mainly—ac-
cessible in two places: at the National Archives and the Historical Archives of the 
State Security Services, both in Budapest. The law that governs these archives 
obliges public authorities and institutions to transfer their records to the relevant 
archives after no more than fifteen years. In the last two decades the law has often 
remained unobserved. For example, when in 2005–07 the author of this study 
was doing research on the political and diplomatic circumstances under which 
the western border of Hungary was opened for East German refugees in Septem-
ber 1989, he received special permission from the prime minister’s office to see 
the minutes of the 1989 ministerial meetings. These documents should have been 
stored at the National Archives by the end of 2004.
In 2012, all of the applicable files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
available at the National Archives. But since some stocks are still closed, not 
everything is accessible. Nonetheless, at least in recent years there have been a 
number of cases in which ministerial experts have been granted access to mate-
rial before the stipulated opening date. The same is true of the documents in the 
prime minister’s office. Also the minutes of the Council of Ministers from 1989 
are now available. With a few exceptions, for which access is expected soon, the 
entire inventory of the existing files of the ruling communist party up to 1989 is 
accessible. 
In 1993 the National Archives published in two large volumes containing the 
minutes of the meetings held in 1989 by the Party’s Central Committee. Anoth-
er useful volume contains the minutes of the discussions between Hungarian 
4 In addition to those listed, two more books deal with the process leading to the dissolution 
of the single-party state: Zoltán Ripp, Rendszerváltás Magyarországon 1987-1990 (Budapest: 
Napvilág, 2006) and Ignác Romsics: Volt egyszer egy rendszerváltás (Budapest: Rubicon-Ház, 
2003); German: Es war einmal: Ungarns Aufbruch zur Demokratie (Herne: Gabriele Schäfer, 
2006). The first volume (2006) is primarily analytical; the second, published in 2003, contains 
a chronological presentation of the facts together with a brief commentary.
5 Gyula Horn, Cölöpök (Budapest: Zenit Könyvek, 1991), German: Freiheit, die ich meine 
(Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1991). From a scholarly-historical perspective, particularly 
Horn’s remarks about the year 1989 must carry a number of question marks. In addition to 
the volume already mentioned, Imre Pozsgay published a second book of memoirs: Korona-
tanú és tettestárs (Budapest: Korona Kaidó, 1998).  Political memoirs focusing on the 1989 
upheaval were published in 1994 by the then minister of justice: Kálmán Kulcsár, Két világ 
között. Rendszerváltás Magyarországon 1988-1990 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994), Ger-
man: Systemwechsel in Ungarn 1988–1990 (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1997). Rezső 
Nyers was member of the leadership of the communist party, and in 1968 was considered one 
of the creators of the Hungarian economic reform. His memoirs were published in interview 
form in 2004: Huszár Tibor, Beszélgetések Nyers Rezsővel ([Budapest]: Kossuth, [2004]).
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officials and the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, found in the Soviet and 
Hungarian Party archives.6
Finally, there is a problem concerning the documents of the Ministry of the 
Interior from the period before 1989. In Hungarian professional circles, there is 
proof that during the transition period from late 1989 to early 1990, this ministry 
destroyed large numbers of files; it is thus today not possible to aim for complete-
ness. In addition to this, until today only one part—and that, a very modest part—
of the files of the communist secret services in Hungary are accessible, especially 
due to the rigid refusal of the post-1990 political elite. Twenty-two years after the 
democratic fresh start, a complete disclosure of the lists of agents and informants 
of the former State Security is still an unresolved issue. This puts a burden on pub-
lic life and leads to many unproven suspicions. But individual historians continue 
to meticulously examine material held in the Historical Archives of the Secret 
Police and spectacular revelations appear regularly in the media.7
In view of this situation, if we ask what is needed in connection with the topic 
at hand, the answer is easy. And the need is very modest, at least from the schol-
arly point of view. Here we do not need several new works, a single one will do. 
Of course for this—and this is not such modest request—the government would 
have to release all of the records from the last years of the single-party state. On 
this basis, a comprehensive study could then be written with a title along the lines 
of: The Role of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior and its Executors at the 
Turn of 1989–90.
Defeat and compromise
After fierce battles, the occupation power—Soviet troops—crushed the 1956 
uprising, with about 2,500 Hungarians and 700 Soviet soldiers losing their lives. 
By 1958, more than 14,000 people had been imprisoned and 229 executed.8 The 
Soviet victory was absolute. The ruling communist Hungarian Socialist Worker’s 
Party, now under the leadership of János Kádár, could be re-established in pow-
6 László Soós, ed., A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt Központi Bizottságának 1989. évi 
jegyzőkönyvei, 2 vols. (Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 1993); Magdolna Baráth and 
János M. Rainer, eds., Gorbacsov tárgyalásai magyar vezetőkkel : dokumentumok az egykori 
SZKP és MSZMP archívumaiból 1985–1991 (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2000).
7 Quite a lot of attention has been given to a comprehensive study written by two such specialists, 
despite the fact that of necessity it only presents examples: Gábor Tabajdi and Krisztián Ungváry, 
Elhallgatott múlt. A pártállam és a belügy 1956-1990 (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2008). In a 
similar manner a stir was recently caused by the two-volume work: Tamás Szőnyei, Titkos irás—
Állambiztonsági szolgálat és irodalmi élet, 1956–1990 (Budapest: Noran Könyvesház, 2012).
8 For the Hungarian revolution in figures, see András B. Hegedűs, Tibor Beck, Pál Germuska, 
eds., 1956 kézikönyve, vol. 3: Péter Kende and Attila Szakolczai, Megtorlás és emlékezés (Bu-
dapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1996), 303–12.
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er, and any reference to the events in the autumn of 1956 henceforth had to use 
the term “counterrevolution.” Nonetheless, the Hungarian experience also had a 
positive aspect. From the late 1960s it became evident that the resistance had paid 
a political dividend. The desperate use of force had made an impression on the 
Soviet side. After 1956 the Kremlin treated Hungary noticeably more carefully 
than it did its other satellite countries. In these circumstances, economic reforms 
became possible; small private enterprises in the services field and private entre-
preneurship in agriculture were slowly introduced, despite this going against the 
communist dogma.9 With a sort of dry humor, Hungarians gave this period the 
later well-known name “goulash communism.”
Perhaps of greater importance than Hungary’s relative economic wellbeing 
(albeit at the cost of a rapidly growing foreign debt, as will be examined below) 
was the easing of the political atmosphere. From the late 1960s the Kádár era, 
which lasted from 1956 to 1988–89, remains in the memory of the majority of 
the population in Hungary as a relatively tolerable, paternalistic dictatorship. And 
though it offered little, the minimalist welfare state nonetheless guaranteed a basic 
social security. Half a century later, the memory is rather faded of the first phase 
of Kádár’s consolidation rule, whose terrorist methods only ended in 1962–63, 
especially with the comprehensive (but not absolute) amnesty for the convicted 
participants of the uprising. After this, political trials were gradually discontinued, 
and the party leadership stopped requiring celebrations and loud confessions of 
loyalty. The first passports for travelling to the West were issued in the spring of 
1961, although the procedure was long associated with lengthy and often humili-
ating inspections. Trips to the West for whole families then became generally pos-
sible in the 1970s, and from 1 January 1988 Hungarian citizens were entitled to 
permanently possess a passport valid for all countries. Cultural life became richer 
from the late 1960s. The borders were gradually opened for Western books, artists 
and scientists. While the party continued to keep everyday life under control, it 
was now a sort of soft dictatorship, a silent compromise between the regime and 
the populace, not true totalitarian rule. Again with the same dry humor touched 
with bitterness, Hungarians described their country as “the most joyful barrack in 
the camp.”10
The party, however, failed in its attempts to annihilate the revolution in every-
body’s memory. The country was silent, but the events of October and November 
1956 remained an unsettled matter between the leadership and the people. Kádár, 
who was a mild dictator, might have acquired a certain popularity had it not been 
clear that the specific Hungarian situation in the 1970s and 80s was not due to 
9 Endre Antal, “Land- und Forstwirtschaft,” in Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, ed., Südosteuropa-Hand-
buch: Ungarn (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 355–82.
10 On “goulash communism” and the “socialist consumer society,” see Roger Gough, A Good 
Comrade: János Kádár. Communism and Hungary (London: Tauris, 2006), 150–61; Árpád von 
Klimó: Ungarn seit 1945 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 152–57.
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any unexpected humanitarian kindness of his regime. A better explanation for the 
“liberal” way Hungary was treated could be found in the anxiety of the Hungarian 
communists: They remembered 1956 and had learned their lesson during the rev-
olution. They were convinced that a repetition of the revolution should be avoided 
at all costs.
Transition through negotiation
This reform period—roughly seen, the last twenty years of communist rule 
before its collapse in 1989—gave Hungary a better starting position for recon-
structing a pluralistic democracy and a market economy. The changes that Hunga-
ry underwent did not happen as brutally and suddenly, from one day to the next, 
as they did in the other Soviet satellite states. The contrast was especially striking 
between the behavior of the party leaders in those countries and the Hungarian 
politicians. Gustav Husák and Miloš Jakeš in Prague and Erich Honecker in East 
Berlin tried to maintain orthodox forms of communist power until the last minute, 
as did, clearly, the Stalinist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu in Bucharest. The majority 
of the Hungarian post-Kádárian leadership acted differently. While the transition 
to a pluralistic democracy in Hungary was a result of the general circumstances in 
Europe, the economic failure of the regime and, within this framework, popular 
pressure and the activities of the newly organized opposition, to an important ex-
tent, transformation also occurred with the collaboration of reform-minded com-
munists. Many were wise enough to realize that their time was over. Thus they 
gave way, accepted negotiations about the instating of democratic institutions, and 
stepped down peacefully when their party lost the first free elections in the spring 
of 1990.11
It was thus the ruling elite who opened the Hungarian-Austrian border. The 
decision in February 1989 to create a crack in the Iron Curtain was taken by the 
Politburo of the party. In the following weeks, power gradually moved from the 
Politburo into the hands of the government. Consequently, it was Prime Minister 
Miklós Németh who accepted responsibility for the Hungarian authorities giving 
permission, in late August, to East German refugees on Hungarian soil to leave for 
Austria, thus enabling them to continue on to the Federal Republic.12
Which significant events preceded the big shift of 1989? One might look any-
where in the chronology, for instance 1985. This was the year that Mikhail Gor-
bachev came to power in Moscow. In the same year parliamentary und communal 
elections took place in Hungary. For the first time since 1947 and according to a 
11 Rudolf L. Tőkés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Po-
litical Succession, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. 305–56.
12 Andreas Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer. September 1989—Ungarn öffnet die Grenze 
(Vienna: Paul Zsolnay, 2009), esp. 170–84.
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law passed by the Hungarian Parliament in 1983, the nomination of more than 
one candidate was obligatory. True, the attempts of oppositional groups to present 
their own candidates were prevented by the powers of the state. But despite of this 
sabotage, 10.5 percent of all candidates elected in June 1985 were supposedly in-
dependent. In the same month, a first general meeting of the various oppositional 
organizations took place. The delegates from these groups, at that time still unit-
ed, debated the economic decline and presented their propositions for correction. 
State authorities did not prosecute the participants.
A year later, in 1986, the behavior of the authorities had changed. On 15 
March, the anniversary of the outbreak of the liberal revolution in 1848, police in 
Budapest brutally attacked a demonstration of oppositional groups trying to con-
duct private celebrations. In the same year, the cultural journal Tiszatáj was not 
allowed to publish for six months. The reason was a reference that had been made 
to the “revolution” of 1956. However, in October the association of Hungarian 
writers revolted against this decision after a vote taken at its general assembly: All 
Stalinist figures were expelled from the association’s presiding committee. 
In 1987 several articles on economic reform appeared, some in official jour-
nals and others in illegal yet tolerated publications. Their authors—reform-mind-
ed economists—criticized the communist system severely and presented count-
er-propositions. Nonetheless, in the political sections of their analyses, even the 
most radical opponents of communism still declared that changes had to take 
place within the framework of the existing balance of power. For them, as they 
supposed in their “sober and realistic” manner, pluralistic democracy was but a 
dream.
Facts and actions, however, did not correspond to this pessimistic attitude. 
The Hungarian Democratic Forum was founded already in September 1987, and 
the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SZDSZ) followed a year later, as did the resurrection of the traditional Party of 
Smallholders. These political parties were finally granted a legal basis only after 
1989. When they were founded, still under the communist-ruled state, they were 
considered movements. For their founding they used a strange loophole that exist-
ed due to negligence on the part of the state powers: Paragraph 65 of the Hungari-
an Constitution guaranteed the right to form organizations, adding that this would 
be regulated by law. This law was however never adopted. 
Kádár steps down
The long-term rule of János Kádár came to an end in May 1988. He lost his 
position, or rather was overthrown, within the communist party itself. In Budapest 
a month later, the first mass demonstration of the opposition that had the blessing of 
the authorities took place: a protest rally against Ceauşescu’s plans to destroy six to 
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seven thousand villages in Romania, which presented a particular risk to the Hun-
garian minority and their still-cohesive settlements. This was the largest demon-
stration that had taken place in Budapest since the days of the revolution of 1956.
Politically, the year 1989 was introduced by Imre Pozsgay, who belonged to 
the Politburo of the ruling party. Since the mid-1980s he had distinguished himself 
as the leading reformist politician of the country. In an interview on Hungarian 
radio at the end of January, Pozsgay referred to the opinion of a commission of 
historians and stated that it was not a counterrevolution that had taken place in 
1956, but a popular uprising. The legitimacy of communist rule was thus openly 
questioned.  Two weeks later, the Central Committee of the communist party ac-
cepted the introduction of pluralistic democracy. Of course this meant the recogni-
tion of other political parties. It remained, however, uncertain when elections were 
to be held. Indeed, we have good reason to believe that many functionaries, above 
all Károly Grósz, the leader of the communist party at the time, still had strong 
mental reservations. In their minds, an arrangement had to be found that allowed 
the communist party to remain in power.13
On 15 March 1989—again the day commemorating the 1848 revolution—more 
than 100,000 people demonstrated in Budapest for political rights. Three months 
later, on 16 June, more than 200,000 persons gathered on Budapest’s Heroes’ Square 
to attend a funeral celebration. The mortal remains of Imre Nagy, the prime minis-
ter in the revolutionary government of 1956 who had been executed in 1958, were 
reburied. From 13 June until 18 September, following the example of Poland, round 
table negotiations were held between the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party and 
the oppositional parties. The subjects that were discussed included power sharing, 
preparation for elections, and the modification of the constitution. On 10 September, 
the government of Németh, as already mentioned, opened Hungary’s western border 
for citizens of the German Democratic Republic to pass. On 23 October—the day 
the uprising of 1956 had started—Hungary was proclaimed a republic, replacing the 
Soviet term “people’s republic.” At the end of the same month, a new election law 
took effect. And on 1 January 1990, the newly created Constitutional Court began 
its activities. The elections in April 1990, which were entirely free, were won by 
József Antall’s Democratic Forum. Antall formed a coalition government in which 
the former communists, now the Socialist Party, did not participate.
Economic decline and debt
This brief overview of the main events taking place in the years leading up to 
198914 needs to be augmented with some remarks on particular background ele-
ments. Today, it is common for Hungarian politicians from all parties to declare that 
13 Tőkés, Negotiated revolution, 301–3.
14 Ignác Romsics, Magyarország története a XX. században (Budapest: Osiris, 1999), 361–98.
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the 1956 revolution found its perfect fulfillment in 1989. Indeed, there is more truth 
to this statement than most speakers realize. Despite its defeat, the revolution, as we 
have seen, never ceased to influence the fate of the country. In the late 1960s and in 
the 1970s, Hungarians had to thank the street-fighters of 1956 for the better treat-
ment given to the entire country. Indeed, in 1956 the Hungarian communists had 
learned their lesson—respect for their own people. Also the Kremlin recognized that 
in this country they could not expect the same material and political conditions to 
be accepted as did the population of the Soviet Union. As described above, in these 
years there was an easing of the planned economy and a petit bourgeoisie was es-
tablished, which while modest had a certain degree of well-being. Kádár’s policies 
were directed by the conviction that the living standards of the “working people,” 
as low as they may have been, had to improve from year to year. The deep social 
dissatisfaction of the early 1950s was not to return and lead to a similar outburst 
of violence. However from the late 1970s, when the prices for crude oil and raw 
materials rose steeply and the terms of trade worsened for the communist countries, 
Hungary was no longer able to maintain Kádár’s political guidelines.
The solution chosen by the Hungarian authorities consisted in borrowing mon-
ey on the Western market. Living standards were henceforth maintained through 
foreign loans, but the country’s debt grew dramatically. State bankruptcy could 
only be avoided in 1982 by Hungary joining the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Indeed, this was a courageous step, since Moscow disliked the IMF and 
called it an instrument of Western imperialists. The conditions imposed on Hun-
gary by the IMF seemed to bring some improvement, but already two years later, 
in the spring of 1984, Kádár spoke out against the measures being enforced to 
cut expenses. In spite of continued borrowing, the regime was unable to stem the 
worsening of living conditions. Németh, who became prime minister in Novem-
ber 1988 and was therefore one of the leading figures during the transition period 
of 1989–90, was at this time a young economist. He describes his reaction to 
Kádár’s interference in the following way: The moment the party leader vetoed 
economic reason, he realized that the system could not be reformed and was con-
demned to failure.15 The late 1980s then saw the decline of Kádár, who, old and 
sick, had become an opponent of further reforms altogether.
There were numerous signs, particularly from the beginning of 1987, indicat-
ing that the Kremlin was no longer able or willing to keep his satellites under the 
same strict control as it had in the previous decades. The weakening of Soviet 
influence and the decline of Hungary’s internal economic situation had a twofold 
effect, one supporting the other. Oppositional organizations grew stronger and 
could present their views more and more freely. In their journals, which were 
widely distributed, the names and addresses of the editors were printed openly, 
and the police practically ceased any persecution. The policy of human rights, 
emphasized above all by the United States, the effects of the Helsinki conference, 
15 Oplatka, Der erste Riss, 40.
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and the consequences of Hungary’s debt reduced the communist regime’s room 
to move. As Kádár himself recognized most reluctantly, it was no longer possible 
to use “administrative measures” against the opposition, since the Western coun-
tries, which were Hungary’s creditors, were carefully watching the developments 
in Hungary’s domestic political scene. To sum up, one might say that communist 
Hungary had become dependent on the West.16
In the same years, a power struggle started at the top of the ruling party. At 
stake was the position of Kádár’s successor, although the old party leader himself 
did not seem inclined to withdraw. Of the candidates taking part in the succession 
struggle, the majority represented the next younger generation. The main dividing 
line, however, was that separating orthodox functionaries from reform-minded pol-
iticians. Many of these reformers had both personal and political links to members 
of the opposition.
The success and failure of a reform politician
The role played by Imre Pozsgay in this respect was of special importance. 
According to Kádár’s suspicious judgment, Pozsgay was too liberal and therefore 
dangerous. Consequently, he had been banned from the party’s first line and the 
government. In 1983 he was given the Patriotic Front to lead. This was a purely 
decorative body that structured and united the mass organizations. Yet, in the mid-
1980s Pozsgay succeeded in making the Front a very active political force. Indeed, 
the group even took on the character of an independent political party. In partic-
ular, Pozsgay and the Front provided official authority and defense for radically 
reform-minded intellectuals. This enabled such intellectuals to publish critical arti-
cles or to write about sensitive political and economic topics.
One of these publications was titled Fordulat és reform (Shift and reform), writ-
ten by several open-minded economists. It appeared in June 1987 and produced 
a political sensation.17 The excitement was understandable. Among other things, 
the authors put up the question for discussion whether the concepts of planned 
economy and market economy should continue to be treated as contradictory. In 
the same publication, the opinion was expressed that the only chance for the coun-
try’s economy to recover was under radically changed political conditions, with the 
government controlled by a pluralistic parliament representing all segments of the 
population. It is clear that ideas like this went against the basic communist dogma.
By this time, Pozsgay had become one of the most popular politicians in the 
country. With his assistance, the Hungarian Democratic Forum was established 
on 27 September 1987. Pozsgay accepted the invitation to the founding ceremo-
ny—a gathering of about two hundred opposition figures—and had the courage to 
16 Romsics, Magyarország története, 527.
17 “Fordulat és reform”, Közgazdasági Szemle 34 (June 1987): 642–708.
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make the decisions taken by the Forum public in an interview with the Hungarian 
daily Magyar Nemzet. Nonetheless, his political career practically ended in au-
tumn 1989, when the former communist party split. Pozsgay was abandoned by 
the opposition, even by the Democratic Forum, and became, so to speak, politically 
homeless. When at the end of November 1989 a referendum was held to determine 
how to organize the future presidential elections, Pozsgay suffered a very narrow 
defeat. Unlike Pozsgay, the Democratic Forum, despite its support for him, did 
not want a popular election for the head of state but an indirect election through 
the parliament, and thus the Forum advised Pozsgay’s followers not to vote. The 
other major party in 1989, the Alliance of Free Democrats, campaigned against 
Pozsgay—officially on the grounds that the country did not need a president with 
a communist past, but also with the strong motivation (not openly mentioned) that 
Pozsgay stood too close to the Democratic Forum. While this example confirms the 
popular adage that gratefulness has no place in politics, it also shows that in the first 
half of 1989, even Pozsgay, one of the best-informed public figures, did not expect 
the collapse of communist rule and the transition to liberal democracy to take place 
in the remarkably short time that it actually happened.18 Surprisingly, it seems that 
as late as the summer of 1989, Hungary’s most important politicians still believed 
that the road to supreme power and through that, to the possibility of renewing the 
country, led through the position of the general secretary of the communist party. 
Had Pozsgay made up his mind earlier and left the party to join the Democratic 
Forum, he would have no doubt been elected president of the Hungarian Republic, 
exactly as he had wished. 
The most remarkable success of the Hungarian opposition in the late 1980s, in 
its progress toward the changes that were to take place, was the rehabilitation of 
the popular uprising of 1956. Pozsgay, as already mentioned, had a part to play in 
this respect, but interestingly, also contributing to this process were Hungarians in 
exile in the United States. Kádár’s successor, Károly Grósz, who at that time also 
occupied the post of prime minister, was to visit the United States in July 1988. As 
part of the visit, he also planned to meet Hungarians in American exile, although he 
was aware that this would certainly lead to a public confrontation over the problem 
of Imre Nagy. He knew that his countrymen would ask when the Hungarian lead-
ership was planning to give permission for Nagy and the other executed victims of 
the 1956 revolution to be finally buried in a humane and dignified manner. In order 
to forestall sharp criticism in the United States, Grósz and his delegation, very much 
in need of Western help, yielded and allowed the opposition to organize a memorial 
for Imre Nagy and his friends. The party, however, insisted that the re-burial was to 
be seen as an act of piety, not as a political revision of the court sentence.19
18 Imre Pozsgay, 1989. Politikus pálya a pártállamban és a rendszerváltásban (Budapest: Püski, 
1993), 184–89
19 Andrienne Molnár, „88 egy furcsa év volt“, Oral History Archive 14 (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 
2008), 239–78.
88
However, it turned out that this insistence was only wishful thinking. 
The huge crowd showing up on Budapest’s Heroes’ Square on 16 June 1989 
transformed the celebration into an impressive political demonstration. In the 
speeches of oppositional politicians the democratic revolution of the year 1956 
was praised, and the president of the Fidesz party, Viktor Orbán, who at the 
time was 26 years old, demanded the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungar-
ian soil. There was no interference by the police. Instead, the celebration was 
broadcast on Hungarian radio and television. This made it clear to the entire 
country that a turning point had been reached; the legitimacy of the communist 
party had been shaken in an irreversible way. After all, Kádár and his comrades 
had received their power in November 1956 from the Soviet Army, and they 
had claimed for more than three decades that they had saved the country threat-
ened by a “counterrevolution.” If now, after thirty-three years, the uprising was 
suddenly legitimized as a democratic revolution of the Hungarian people, then 
there could be only one conclusion: the power of the ruling communist party 
was illegitimate.
Silence from Moscow 
How did the Soviet Union react? What was the perception from the Hungar-
ian side? What did Hungarian politicians know with regard to Moscow’s real or 
possible behavior? To answer I will first relate a personal experience: In Mid-
March of 1989 I had the opportunity to meet Pozsgay in Budapest. I asked him 
whether the Hungarians had received any signals from Moscow and Pozsgay’s 
answer was: “There are none. They remain silent. It’s a complete black-out.” 
In the late 1980s, Western statesmen had tried to convince radical reformers 
in the Eastern bloc to avoid irritating Moscow by not proceeding too quickly. 
It was generally feared that Polish and Hungarian radicalism might undermine 
Gorbachev’s position and bring hardliners back into power in the Kremlin. But 
Pozsgay and other Hungarian reform-politicians, due to their national interests, 
had a completely different point of view. The Soviet weakness, Pozsgay stated, 
must be used for quick changes; Hungary should move forward and go as far as 
possible to create a fait accompli before the Soviet Union recovered.
Soviet leadership, in fact, remained silent. Gorbachev assured Prime Minis-
ter Németh on 3 March 1989 that there would be “no new 1956” again as long 
as he held his post. Moscow agreed to negotiations concerning the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Hungary and removed the nuclear warheads on Hungar-
ian soil at the end of November 1989. No critical Soviet comment was heard 
with regard to the rehabilitation of the Hungarian revolution and the round table 
talks. The Soviet Union also refrained from criticizing the Hungarian decision 
to remove the Iron Curtain and open the western border for East German refu-
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gees. While Gorbachev opposed the introduction of a multi-party system by the 
Hungarians, he did not take any measures against it.20
Controversial questions 
There are several important details in the Hungarian history of 1989 that re-
main unclear and disputed, and since today’s discourse is highly political, this 
makes some of the answers extremely difficult. Who created the turn, the big po-
litical changes in 1989? Who acted, who fought in the first line: the reform-com-
munists or the dissidents, the opposition? Did a revolution take place, or was it 
rather an evolutionary development and transformation? Did the attitude of the 
population play a role and thus, did the government act under popular pressure, or 
did it ignore the masses since they remained passive? Would not the term “revolu-
tion from above” be more appropriate when characterizing the events in Hungary 
in 1989?
It is unclear when exactly Hungary’s communist rulers recognized and ac-
cepted the fact that giving up communism and transitioning to a Western-type 
democratic system and market economy were inevitable. While the former for-
eign minister Gyula Horn professed in a private conversation that he had seen the 
coming changes “in the second half of the 1980s,”21 at the latest in 1989, some of 
the so-called reformers, for instance Prime Minister Németh, no longer were aim-
ing at reforms or the transformation and improvement of the existing system, but 
at its abolishment and replacement. They considered their main task to be assur-
ing a peaceful transition. This, however, was not everybody’s aim. Károly Grósz, 
who had followed Kádár as the leader of the communist party, still believed at 
the beginning of 1989 that his party was facing a long-term struggle against the 
opposition and that the fight would last until the mid-1990s. In the spring of 1989, 
Grósz even deliberated whether he should opt for a military coup in order to save 
the communist system.22
What can be said about the attitude of the population and the role played by 
the opposition? Unpublished opinion polls that the ruling party used to gain infor-
mation about the mood of the population show that in 1981, and to some extent 
still in 1986, the majority of Hungarians basically had accepted Kádár’s “goulash 
communism.” More did not seem possible. While freedom remained restricted, 
living conditions, though modest, were satisfactory. The economic decline in the 
second half of the 1980s, however, is reflected in a rapid change in opinion polls 
1988. The numbers speak for themselves: the regime had been rejected.23 Con-
20 Oplatka, Der erste Riss, 53–70.
21 Ibid., 83.
22 Tőkés, Negotiated revolution, 297–98.
23 Romsics, Magyarország története, 2nd ed. (Budapest: Osiris, 2005), 520–22.
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sequently, there can be no doubt: A large majority of the population wished the 
system to be replaced. Later, it is clear that the opposition succeeded in mobiliz-
ing the masses. Hundreds of thousands took part in demonstrations, responding 
to political key-words like the fate of the Hungarian minority in Romania, or the 
rehabilitation of the Hungarian revolution of 1956.
The oppositional groups, formed above all by critical intellectuals, had begun 
to be active in the 1970s. For a long time they remained outsiders. While their 
activities irritated the regime and from time to time it reacted harshly, generally 
the party leadership believed that it could live with small groups of ineffective 
adversaries. In the second half of the 1980s, however, the opponents ceased to be 
outsiders. Without their insistence and pressure, the reburial of Imre Nagy and the 
other victims of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 would never have taken place. 
The same can be said about the round table negotiations, at which the representa-
tives of the new parties were able to pass most of their political propositions. In 
these negotiations, which ended in September 1989, the basis of the constitutional 
state was laid down. The participants agreed on a legal framework that assured the 
transition to new democratic institutions.24
However, these round table negotiations did not deal with the transformation 
of the economic system. The lack of regulations in this area resulted in the so-
called spontaneous privatization. This meant that in many cases, party function-
aries, being the best informed, having the best access to credit, and using their 
still-existing positions, were able to acquire enterprises and other assets. The 
metamorphosis of certain communists into capitalist entrepreneurs, quickly and 
shamelessly, produced a conflict that marks Hungary’s political life even today. 
At least some of the population remains convinced that the former leaders simply 
converted their political power into economic privileges. 
Finally, some remarks need to be made about the foreign political context. The 
first is commonplace: As in every Soviet satellite country in Central Europe, the 
changes that took place in Hungary were only possible because of the new cir-
cumstances in Moscow. It is clear that Gorbachev was looking for reform-minded 
allies. He sought to establish new leaders and to bring the more orthodox countries 
like the GDR and Romania onto the road of his perestroika. Nonetheless, he did 
not have the creation of liberal-capitalist societies in mind.
Discomfort in the West
More surprising is the fact that even the Western powers did not unanimous-
ly wish the communist countries to regain their independence and to introduce 
democracy. In the interim, quite a number of verbal and written statements have 
24 Andreas Schmidt-Schweizer, Politische Geschichte Ungarns von 1985 bis 2002 (Munich: Old-
enbourg, 2007), 156–68.
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been found that confirm this attitude. This was not only due to anxiety about Gor-
bachev’s position suffering because of Polish or Hungarian radicalism. As seen 
by certain Western politicians, maintaining the Warsaw Pact was still needed in 
1989 in order to preserve the European balance of power. In certain Western cap-
itals, the conviction also prevailed that reform-communists were better and more 
reliable partners than the uncertain and unknown newcomers in the ranks of the 
democratic opposition.
For instance, in mid-September 1989 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the foreign 
minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, a democrat and liberal, declared to 
the Hungarian ambassador István Horváth that his government, as well as those of 
Italy, France and the United States, desired the upcoming free elections in Hunga-
ry in the spring of 1990 to be won not by the opposition, but by the reform-wing 
of the former communist party.25 To answer the question why this was the attitude 
of Western leaders at the time, it is probably best to ask them directly. Of course, 
it is difficult some twenty years later to make them admit that in 1989–90 they 
preferred the continued rule of the reform communists in East Central Europe 
over a change of power favoring the democratic opposition. All told, however, it 
is probable that the main reason for their reaction was their fear that if the postwar 
order built by Moscow in 1945–48 were suddenly to collapse, Gorbachev’s posi-
tion would become untenable.
This finding is indeed strange, and from a historical point of view, even para-
doxical. In Hungarian historiography, a unité de doctrine exists which states that 
the country lost its independence at the beginning of the sixteenth century and 
since then—with some short exceptions—has always had to bear foreign rule and 
abide by foreign interests. The opposite happened in 1989. Hungary, despite still 
being a satellite, a member of the Warsaw Pact and occupied by Soviet forces, 
Hungary, despite being admonished by the Western states to show patience and 
a low profile, acted independently. In doing so, it is clear that it proceeded both 
against Soviet and Western interests, with the result—Hungary’s self-liberation—
being attained without assistance.
25 László Borhi, “Magyarország kötelessége a Varsói szerződésben maradni—az 1989-es átmenet 
nemzetközi összefüggései magyar források tükrében,” Külügyi Szemle, no. 2–3 (2007): 255–72; 
Oplatka, Der erste Riss, 236–37.

P é T e r  v á M o s 
THE TIANANMEN SQUARE “INCIDENT” IN 
CHINA AND THE EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN 
REVOLUTIONS1
Ever since the Chinese imperial court moved to the “Northern Capital” (Bei-
jing) in the early fifteenth century, the area in front of the southern gate of the 
palace has held special importance. Tiananmen, the “Gate of Heavenly Peace,” 
leads to the Temple of Heaven, the altar where the emperor, the son of heaven 
who ruled with heaven’s mandate, prayed to heaven to maintain harmony between 
man and the universe. This was the place where imperial edicts were announced 
and the people could submit their complaints to the emperor.
The word an (安) does not only mean “peace” in Chinese, but it can also serve 
as a verb meaning “to pacify” or even “to subdue.” In China, peace also means 
subservience to power. 
The square south of the Forbidden City has witnessed much unrest, protest 
and violence. Throughout the last six centuries of the imperial period, it served 
as a site for public trials, tortures and executions. In 1900, during the Boxer 
Rebellion, the square became larger when the international forces of the eight 
allied nations damaged and burnt down the ministries located there. The first 
mass demonstration on the square took place on 4 May 1919, when Chinese 
students protested Japanese imperialism, official corruption and the Versailles 
Treaty, which planned to cede parts of China formerly under German control to 
Japan. The resulting political and cultural movement sought to create a Western-
ized culture as a solution to China’s political, economic and social problems. 
This was the first time that students made history on the square. In December 
1935, patriotic students demonstrated against Japanese imperialism and the weak 
policies of the Guomindang, which showed no willingness to resist the Japanese 
menace. Tiananmen gained new importance in 1949, when Mao Zedong an-
nounced the founding of the People’s Republic (PRC) from its rostrum. During 
the Cultural Revolution it hosted mass rallies, with millions of young Red 
Guards arriving here from around the country. Today Tiananmen is one of the 
national symbols of the PRC, and its image occupies a central position on the 
country’s national emblem. But for many Chinese families, this place represents 
1 Research for this paper was carried out with the support of the Hungarian Scientific Research 
Fund (OTKA), Project no. 78484: “The Soviet Bloc and China, 1949–1989.” The author would 
like to thank the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies, where he was an External Senior Fel-
low in 2010–11, for its support of research into relations between the Soviet Bloc and China.
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the site where on 4 June 1989 the government harshly suppressed peaceful stu-
dent demonstrations.2
*
On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the peaceful transition in East 
Central Europe, numerous festive events and scholarly conferences took place 
around the world, with this episode being labeled one of the most significant 
developments in the second half of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, in China, 
the Chinese student movement that was centered on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, 
the popular unrest in China’s cities, and the military crackdown on demonstrators 
remain banned topics. It is essentially only the media outside of China that has 
kept the memory of the events alive. The images of students sitting on the square 
wearing headbands, the white statue of the “Goddess of Democracy,” or the man 
in a white shirt who stopped the tanks rolling toward the square, before vanishing, 
never to be identified, are still fresh in our memories.
Similar to the changes in Europe, in China June Fourth (六四 liu si, the most 
common Chinese term for the events) also signifies a turning point. However, 
while the former led to the collapse of the “socialist world,” the latter convinced 
China’s leaders that political stability, even if achieved by dictatorial means, is 
essential for successful economic development. As a result, China’s communists 
have not only managed to remain in power, but have even generated rapid eco-
nomic growth while at the same time maintaining relative social stability.
Economic and political reforms in China in the 1980s
Before we recount what happened in Beijing in the spring months of 1989, it 
is necessary to summarize the profound changes that occurred in Chinese domes-
tic politics after the late 1970s. Following Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping opened 
China to the outside world, developing the Chinese model of a market economy 
presided over by an authoritarian government. Deng’s reform program, initiated 
in December 1978, resulted in Maoist radicalism being replaced by pragmatic 
moderation, and correspondingly, the government’s focal point shifted from pol-
itics to economics.
China’s leaders took on the task of transforming a command-planned, highly 
centralized system under public ownership into a market-oriented, decentralized, 
mixed ownership system, improving incentive systems in order to increase pro-
duction, and establishing an interrelated legal framework in order to reduce the 
2 On the history of Tiananmen Square, see Péter Polonyi, Mi történt? Tienanmen tér, ’89 (Buda-
pest: Hírlapkiadó Vállalat, 1990), 9.
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absolute dominance of the state over economic activity. In the 1980s, the overar-
ching concern of the central leadership was how to maintain stability and avoid 
domestic chaos while proceeding with modernization and reform.
Similar to the reform efforts in the European Soviet-type economies, the re-
forms in China also lacked a clear goal model and guiding theory. Beijing pro-
ceeded with reforms without a concrete plan—in the words of Deng Xiaoping, 
“crossing the river by feeling for stones” (摸着石头过河 mozhe shitou guo he). 
This tendency resulted in trial-and-error procedures and frequent improvisation 
of the reform process. The leadership had to cope with a constant cycle of reform 
and readjustment, whereby each set of reforms triggered both expected and un-
expected consequences. These, in turn, required readjustments and further re-
forms.3 American political scientist Richard Baum has described the ambivalent 
pattern of Chinese reforms in the 1980s as a constant cycle of relaxation and 
control, “characterized by an initial increase in the scope of economic or political 
reform (in the form, e.g., of price deregulation or intellectual liberalization), 
followed by a rapid release of pent-up social demand (e.g., panic buying or stu-
dent demonstrations); the resulting ‘disorder’ would set off a backlash among 
party traditionalists, who would then move to reassert control. A conservative 
retrenchment would follow, marked by an ideological assault on ‘liberal’ tenden-
cies and an attempt to halt (or even to reverse) the initial reform. The ensuing 
freeze would serve, in turn, to exacerbate existing internal contradictions and 
stresses, leading to the generation of renewed pressures for relaxation and re-
form—and so on.”4 In the second half of the 1980s, the periods of readjustment 
were longer than those of effective reform. The first such period came in 1985, 
only a year after the introduction of the enterprise reform, and lasted for two 
years. The next reform period also lasted for only one year and was similarly 
followed by a readjustment period, this one lasting for about two to three years.
In contrast to the reforms in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, China’s 
economic reform strategy was more gradual and, institutionally, more innovative. 
The leadership agreed on the gradual introduction of market mechanisms into the 
operations of the centralized command economy and on China’s integration into 
the global economy. Reformers both moderate and more radical found common 
ground in their shared conviction that the economy—especially the rural sector—
needed “room to breathe.”5
3 David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington D.C., 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and University of California 
Press, 2008), 4.
4 Richard Baum, “The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s,” in Roderick Mac-
Farquhar, ed., The Politics of China, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
340–471, 341.
5 Barry Naughton, “The Impact of the Tiananmen Crisis on China’s Economic Transition,” China 
Perspectives, no. 2 (2009): 63–78, 65.
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During the initial period, from 1979 to 1984, the reforms focused on restruc-
turing the farming system. People’s communes were replaced with household 
farming and more consumption of self-generated products was allowed. As a 
result, households not only managed their own farming operations but also could 
keep the fruits of their labors.
In 1984, following these rural reforms, new nationwide reforms were initiated, 
the so-called urban economic reform. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Cen-
tral Committee’s resolution adopted in October 1984 declared that “the law of 
value must be consciously followed and applied.”6 The system of centrally fixed 
prices was revised and a price reform was introduced. Although the new system 
was designed to reflect the shifts in supply and demand more freely, not all pric-
es were released to find their market level. While the prices of certain products 
were under strict government control, prices of most farm products were dereg-
ulated, and the prices of certain other goods were allowed to fluctuate within a 
certain range. Prices of raw materials under mandatory planning were fixed, 
whereas prices of extra-plan output could vary according to market conditions.7 
As part of the enterprise reform, a director responsibility system for state-owned 
enterprises was designed to separate ownership and management and reduce 
party and administrative intervention in enterprises. However, the reform failed 
to revitalize the enterprise system for several reasons, the most important being 
the lack of price reforms. The mixed price system and decentralization resulted 
in unprecedented inflation and corruption. Local authorities who controlled the 
supply and allocation of (inexpensive) fixed-price goods began investing in the 
more profitable light and consumer goods industries, and indulged in rounds of 
selling and reselling these goods at ever higher prices.8
In May 1988, the party leadership decided to push ahead with price reforms 
in the face of mounting inflation. This resulted in a wave of urban consumer 
panic, triggered by rumors of impending price decontrol and “rendered political-
ly volatile by deepening public resentment over flagrant official profiteering.”9 
As a consequence, in September of the same year, the central leadership reori-
ented its effort toward “improving the economic environment and rectifying the 
economic order,” meaning essentially curbing inflation and corruption. This 
meant that price reforms and other reform measures were postponed.10
6 Yanqi Tong, Transitions from State Socialism: Economic and Political Change in Hungary and 
China (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 77.
7 Kathleen Hartford, “The political economy behind the Beijing spring,” in Tony Saich, ed., The 
Chinese People’s Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 
50–83, 61–63; Keith Crane and K.C. Yeh, Economic Reform and the Military in Poland, Hun-
gary and China (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1991), 87–91.
8 Hartford, “Political economy,” 63.
9 Baum, “Road to Tiananmen,” 344.
10 Crane and Yeh, Economic Reform, 93.
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Parallel to the uneven process of economic development was a sharp increase 
in the consumer price index, estimated at 18 to 20 percent. In early 1989, unof-
ficial estimates mentioned an inflation rate that had become as high as 30 to 40 
percent.11 All this, particularly the sudden steep increase in food prices, further 
deteriorated living conditions and morale in the cities, especially among intellec-
tuals, students and public servants. “China continued to suffer from the worst 
distortions of the old system without enjoying the anticipated benefits of the 
new.”12 In May 1989, summarizing the causes of the emerging political and lead-
ership crisis in China, the report of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
referred to the inconsistency, discrepancy, and insufficiency of the reforms.13 In 
sum, the political crisis that climaxed at Tiananmen was heightened, if not actu-
ally caused, by what American political scientist Lowell Dittmer has described 
as a crisis of incomplete reform.14
“Reform and opening up” (改革开放 gaige kaifang) was only one aspect of 
Deng Xiaoping’s strategy. The other, equally important element of his plan to 
reform China was first formulated in his speech on 30 March 1979, in which 
Deng set the political limits of reform by establishing the “Four Cardinal Princi-
ples”: adherence to the socialist road, dictatorship of the proletariat, the leading 
role of the communist party, and the supremacy of Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Zedong thought. At the core of these four principles was to be the leadership of 
the CCP, because whoever controlled the party, by definition, also represented 
the people and thus had the right to exercise dictatorship on behalf of the prole-
tariat and the authority to interpret what Marxism really means.15 By setting out 
this political framework, Deng, “the man of development under dictatorship,” 
expressed his determination to take a firm stand against any political liberalization 
that might have challenged the ruling authority of the party.16 
Similar to the situation in the Soviet Union, China’s leaders understood that 
effective markets require a free flow of goods, people and information. They also 
saw their own version of glasnost spill over into the political sphere in the form 
of demands for political participation. However, the majority of Chinese leaders 
perceived these demands as a threat to the leadership role of the party, even to 
11 Report of the Fourth Territorial Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On the 
Domestic situation in China, Budapest, 26 May 1989, in Hungarian National Archives (HNA), 
XIX-J-1-j-Kína-2-001433/4-1989.
12 Baum, “Road to Tiananmen,” 344.
13 Report of the Fourth Territorial Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, On the Domestic situation in China, Budapest, 26 May 1989, in HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kí-
na-2-001433/4-1989.
14 Lowell Dittmer, “China in 1989: The Crisis of Incomplete Reform,” Asian Survey 30, no. 1 
(January 1990): 25–41.
15 Crane and Yeh, Economic Reform, 95.
16 Michel Bonnin, “The Chinese Communist Party and June 4th: Or how to get out of it and get 
away with it,” China Perspectives, no. 2 (2009): 52–61.
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the very existence of the system, and as a result they suppressed all forms of 
organized opposition.17
From the outset of reforms in China, the leadership attempted to transform the 
political power-holders’ style of wielding power, to control political interventions 
in economic management and the arbitrary use of power, and to separate econom-
ic management and political decision making. Separation of party and govern-
ment, supervision of political power through checks and balances and through 
law and institutions, and participation of the masses were also among the issues 
in the Chinese leadership’s discussions about political reform. There was only 
one point on which the leadership recognized no compromise: that all reforms 
had to strengthen the party’s leadership. The Chinese leaders firmly rejected the 
tendency toward what they called “bourgeois liberalization,” (资产阶级自由主
义 zichanjieji ziyouzhuyi), a term that the authorities never clearly defined, but 
which can be interpreted as “wanton expression of individual freedom (individ-
ualism) that poses a threat to the stability and unity of the country.”18
By 1987, the notion of pluralism also became a matter of consensus, in part 
because economic reform heightened socioeconomic differences. On the eve of 
the thirteenth party congress in 1987, reform-minded Acting General Secretary 
Zhao Ziyang argued before the Central Committee that in a socialist society 
“people of all kinds […] share common interests, but their special interests 
should not be overlooked. The conflicting interests should be reconciled.”19 As 
to the question of democratization, no agreement was made on how and how 
soon democracy should be achieved. Under the pressure of mounting social and 
political tensions generated by the economic reform, the majority of China’s 
leaders increasingly embraced the opinion that reform required authority, not 
democracy.20
Official tolerance of opposition movements was always limited in China. The 
Confucian tradition justifies criticism of the government on moral grounds, but 
it does not guarantee the legality of opposition. By the late 1950s, no independent 
political organization existed in China, since the CCP did not allow any political 
organization outside its control to survive. Whenever popular criticism exceeded 
the framework that was still acceptable for the central leadership, independently 
organized political activities were ruthlessly suppressed.21 
17 Andrew C. Janos, “Social Science, Communism, and the Dynamics of Political Change,” World 
Politics 44, no. 1 (October 1991): 81–112, 102.
18 Julia Kwong, “The 1986 Student Demonstrations in China: A Democratic Movement?” Asian 
Survey 28, no. 9 (September 1988): 970–85, 983.
19 Zhao Ziyang, “On Separating Party from Government,” Beijing Review, 14–20 December 1987, 
20.
20 Tong, Transitions, 157.
21 The same is true today. The authorities know no mercy when dealing with attempts to organize 
groups that oppose the existing order, either in the form of human rights activities (Charter 
2008), oppositional parties (the Democratic Party) or religious movements (Falun Gong).
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Parallel to the cycles of reform and readjustment in the area of the economy, 
the CCP’s policy towards intellectuals also “oscillated between periods of repres-
sion and […] periods of relative relaxation.”22 Encouraged by growing ideologi-
cal openness, intellectuals started to organize collective activities and groups to 
voice their political demands right after the announcement of the new reform 
course in 1978–79. Neither the Democracy Wall Movement23 nor the student 
demonstrations in 1986–87 confined themselves to the officially set boundaries.
In 1979, the term “democracy” (民主 minzhu) “primarily expressed a desire 
for rulers more prepared to listen to the people express their concerns.”24 The 
authorities tolerated the expressions of discontent in Beijing only to the point 
when Wei Jingsheng published his famous article entitled “Democracy: The 
Fifth Modernization.”25 Wei was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years in pris-
on, allegedly for revealing military secrets.26 Deng’s proclamation of the four 
cardinal principles upon which debate was not allowed within the PRC was a 
response to the challenge that the intellectuals of the country had posed to the 
leadership.
The political reforms of the government served as a mobilizing factor for the 
1986 student protests as well. Students of the Chinese University of Science and 
Technology in the eastern city of Hefei (Anhui Province) began to protest when 
authorities failed to implement direct elections as promised. Soon pro-democracy 
protests were held in several cities, including Shanghai and Beijing, there on 
Tiananmen Square. Compared to the Democracy Wall Movement, the student 
demonstrations in 1986–87 were significantly larger and better organized. In 
Shanghai, students even had opportunities to negotiate with local party and gov-
ernment officials, including Jiang Zemin, who was then serving as the mayor of 
the city. They demanded recognition of their movement as patriotic and correct, 
as well as no recrimination against students who participated. Contrary to official 
reports, the student movement was actually poorly organized. Although the stu-
dents also raised issues that went beyond their personal interests, namely, major 
22 Merle Goldman, China’s Intellectuals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 9.
23 The Democracy Wall Movement started during the winter months of 1978–79 with the posting 
of large character posters, complaints and protests about the ills of China on a long brick wall to 
the west of the former Forbidden City, at the intersection of Chang’an Avenue and Xidan Street 
in Beijing. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, “The Democracy Movement in China, 1978–1979: Opposi-
tion Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals,” Asian Survey 21, no. 7 
(July 1981): 747–74, esp. 759–70. 
24 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, China in the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 71.
25 Wei’s essay that he posted on the “Democracy Wall” in Beijing played on the official Chinese 
policy of “Four Modernizations” in the fields of agriculture, industry, technology, and defense. 
Published in William Theodore de Bary et al. eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 
Through the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 
497–500.
26 Wei Jingsheng (1950–) is one of the best-known Chinese political exiles. He now lives in the 
United States.
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social concerns affecting society at large, including democracy, freedom of the 
press, bureaucratism, nepotism and corruption, Canadian sociologist Julia Kwong 
argues that it is misleading to call the student demonstrations in 1986–87 a dem-
ocratic movement. This is because “most students were demonstrating primarily 
to show their concern over the social ills of the country and their impatience in 
resolving them,” but their demands did not threaten the government since they 
were not asking for changes that challenged the fundamental structure of the 
political and social systems.27 The term “democracy” was merely rhetorical, giv-
ing the movement the unity and flexibility to incorporate various grievances at 
the different university campuses. By complaining about campus facilities, inad-
equate dormitories and food services, as well as expressing their impatience with 
the slow pace of change, the students, in a way, affirmed their approval of the 
government’s policy direction. It was the non-threatening nature of their demands 
that put the government off guard and kept it from taking prompt action. Action 
was only taken when the demonstrations became so large and so widespread that 
they attracted the world’s attention.28
The official Chinese assessment of the 1986 demonstrations clearly mirrors 
the authorities’ fear of uncontrolled, organized forms of discontent. The official 
version of events asserts that students initially complained only about their liv-
ing conditions (the quality of food, the introduction of tuition fees, etc.). Later, 
however, allegedly under the influence of outside forces, the students took to the 
streets with exclusively political demands, especially in Beijing. They demand-
ed the withdrawal of the party and the government from the economy, and 
practically rejected the Four Cardinal Principles. The leadership has asserted that 
it felt an urgent need to calm down the protests for two reasons. First, the on-
going discussions about the issue of political reform set forces into motion that 
dismissed the party’s reform policy as being insufficient. These forces were 
subsequently attacked by the party leadership as “rightist.” Secondly, the process 
of polarization did not find acceptance among the country’s workers, who had 
been used to egalitarianism for decades. The Chinese authorities opined that 
street demonstrations were dangerous because they could have provided ground 
for these two forces, with their different motivations, to unite.29 
Soon after the outbreak of the demonstrations on Tiananmen Square, the 
authorities launched a counter-attack. The campaign against “bourgeois liberal-
ization,” which followed the demonstrations in January, lasted a few months, 
with students receiving intensified ideological education after the campuses had 
quieted down. However, the participants in the demonstrations did not suffer any 
sort of recrimination. 
27 Kwong, “1986,” 981.
28 Ibid., 985.
29 Conversation between Chinese diplomat Chen Zhiliu and Hungarian MFA head of department 
Bálint Gál, Budapest, 30 December 1986, in HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-13-004915/1-1986.
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The most significant consequence of the 1986–87 student demonstrations was 
the removal of Hu Yaobang from the post of Party General Secretary in January 
1987.30 According to Deng and the party elders, Hu’s mistake was that he favored 
the introduction of more “democratization” or plurality into the political system 
and that he had not taken prompt action to contain the movement. The official 
position was that Hu called for more political reform than the system could bear, 
and, in effect, had gone beyond the consensus reached within the leadership 
concerning the pace and content of the reform agenda.31 To the masses Hu be-
came the symbol of a “liberal” leader, sympathetic to the rightful demands of 
the people.32
The 1989 student democracy movement
In the spring of 1989, university students staged the largest anti-government 
demonstration since the founding of the PRC. The unexpected confluence of 
former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang’s death on 15 April, the seventieth 
anniversary of the 4 May 1919 student movement, and the summit meeting 
between Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev on 16 May resulted in the most 
serious political challenge faced by the CCP since it had come to power.
It was Hu Yaobang’s death that sparked the Tiananmen demonstrations. In a 
highly symbolic show of support for reformist ideas, with “the dead being used 
to exert pressure on the living,” (用死人压活人 yong si ren ya huo ren), mourn-
ers gathered on the square and commemorated the liberal leader who had been 
demoted for failing to crack down on the student protests of late 1986 and early 
1987. The mourners demanded freedom of the press and to demonstrate, as well 
as an end to corruption. At first the events seemed quite similar to the 1976 
Tiananmen Square Incident prompted by the death of Zhou Enlai, when the 
30 The army leadership resisted accepting Hu Yaobang as party leader and chairman of the Central 
Military Committee because of his allegedly weak character and lack of authority. This also 
contributed to his dismissal. See Hungarian ambassador’s cable, Beijing, 12 January 1987, in 
HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-25, 2-00210-1987.
31 The Hungarian embassy in Beijing did not consider the dismissal of the general secretary as a 
sign of crisis within the CCP leadership. Ambassador Iván Németh concluded that the “CCP 
leadership shows unity and works effectively,” and argued that the dismissal of Hu Yaobang 
was necessary in order “to prevent a crisis,” proving the leadership’s ability to renew its unity 
through compromises in the case of emergency. The Hungarian embassy’s opinion on the Chi-
nese domestic situation, Beijing, 17 April 1987, in HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-200-001292/5-1987.
32 After his dismissal as general secretary, Hu was allowed to retain his membership in the Polit-
buro. This step shows the self-confidence of the new leadership toward conservatives at home 
and was meant as a gesture toward those foreign countries that were concerned about the future 
of Chinese reforms. Discussion with leading diplomats of the Chinese embassy in Budapest, 30 
October 1987, in Historical Archive of the Hungarian State Security (Állambiztonsági Szolgála-
tok Történeti Levéltára, ÁBTL), 1. 11. 4. S-II/2/87, 245.
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memorial ceremony turned into a mass demonstration, the first large scale spon-
taneous movement in the capital since the establishment of the PRC. Paradoxi-
cally, that event was a demonstration in support of Deng Xiaoping, the person 
who thirteen years later, in 1989, was the key person who ordered the army units 
to crush the demonstrations.33
Hu Yaobang’s funeral was scheduled for 22 April. Although demonstrators 
had been prohibited from entering the square when the memorial service was 
held, students arrived at Tiananmen Square in large numbers during the previous 
night and remained there despite the ban. A few party leaders attempted to per-
suade Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang to convene a Politburo meeting and 
discuss the situation before departing for Pyongyang on 23 April, but Zhao did 
not feel the necessity for such a meeting. Before his departure, Zhao suggested 
to his colleagues in the Politburo that while the authorities “should firmly pre-
vent the students from demonstrating and should get them to return to classes 
immediately” and “should use legal procedures to punish severely all who en-
gage in beating, smashing and robbing,” “the main approach to students should 
be one of persuasion.”34 
On the next day, in the wake of renewed student demonstrations, the decla-
ration of a boycott of classes, and the establishment of a national students’ 
federation, Premier Li Peng convened a meeting of the Standing Committee of 
the Politburo.35 The hard-liners, with Deng Xiaoping’s support, decided that the 
country was facing “planned and organized political anti-Party and anti-socialist 
turmoil” and called on the people to “fight hard to rapidly quell the unrest.” On 
26 April, People’s Daily, the party’s central organ, published an editorial entitled 
33 The events of 1976 were not entirely free of violence. On the afternoon of 5 April, five vehicles 
and a small building at the southeast corner of the square, where the joint command post of the 
armed forces was located, were set on fire. After some hesitation, the authorities emptied the 
square. Ironically, the events in 1976 led to the renewed sidelining of Deng Xiaoping. Zhang 
Chunqiao, who followed the developments from the window of the Great Hall of the People, 
compared the events on the square to the 1956 Hungarian uprising, and called Deng Xiaop-
ing China’s Imre Nagy. On 7 April, Mao endorsed Zhang Chunqiao’s evaluation, and agreed 
“to throw him [Deng] out.” On the same day, the Politburo accepted the appointment of Hua 
Guofeng to first vice-chairman of the CC and premier, and the dismissal of Deng from all his 
posts. On the 1976 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, see Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael 
Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 424–28.
34 Zhang Liang, Andrew J. Nathan, and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers (New York: Pub-
lic Affairs, 2001), 50.
35 One of the aims of Zhao’s visit was to act as a mediator between Tokyo and Pyongyang. The 
Japanese had requested China to play such a role during Premier Li Peng’s visit to Japan a few 
days earlier. The detailed proposals were carried to North Korea by Zhao Ziyang. Still in Febru-
ary, President Bush, during his visit to China, expressed his gratitude to the Chinese for their role 
as mediators, and the Americans expressed their hope that Zhao might persuade Kim Il-sung to 
soften its position toward American and Japanese proposals for negotiations. Ciphered telegram, 
Beijing, 5 May 1989, no. 168, Jász, in ÁBTL, 1. 11. 4. S—II/2/1989, 132.
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“Take a Clear-cut Stand Against Turmoil” and condemned the student movement 
for seeking to “poison people’s minds, create national turmoil, and sabotage the 
nation’s stability and unity.”36 When in response tens of thousands of students 
marched through Beijing’s streets into the square, huge crowds of Beijing resi-
dents cheered the peaceful demonstrations. The hard-liners issued a clear warn-
ing that “troops will be dispatched if necessary,” but in the General Secretary’s 
absence, they refrained from using military force to restore order.
The leadership had become polarized between hard-liners urging a crack-
down and those favoring dialogue with the demonstrators. On 4 May, the stu-
dents’ march to commemorate the 4 May 1919 Movement attracted the growing 
participation of the city’s population from all walks of life; even journalists from 
People’s Daily and other state-run media joined the protest. While the students 
rallied in the square, Zhao Ziyang made a speech to delegates from the Asian 
Development Bank in which he set forth a soft line, calling the students well 
intentioned and patriotic, and declaring that “reasonable demands from the stu-
dents should be met through democratic and legal means.”37 
During the following two weeks, Zhao’s soft line stayed in effect. As a result 
of the General Secretary’s permission for the official Chinese media to cover the 
protests, the press initially reported on the anti-government activities with sig-
nificant accuracy and even sympathy.38 As Mike Chinoy, CNN’s Beijing bureau 
chief in 1989 observed, “an unprecedented wave of openness was sweeping 
through the Chinese media. CCTV [China Central Television] began to broadcast 
regular, balanced reports on the protest, while the People’s Daily and other of-
ficial newspapers ran sympathetic articles about the students, as well as photo-
graphs of the huge crowds in Tiananmen.”39 
It was Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s visit to China that ultimately changed the 
course of events and led to the bloody crackdown on demonstrators. Before the 
visit, the Chinese authorities made an extraordinary move: they allowed repre-
sentatives of the international media to cover the event. Originally, the summit 
meeting between Deng and Gorbachev was planned to be presented as one of 
the most important diplomatic achievements of the chief architect of China’s 
foreign policy. However, as international television crews began their live cov-
erage from Beijing, the students realized that the media gave them leverage. 
They intended to use it. As Chinoy noted, by mid-May the students “were far 
more sophisticated in handling the media than they had been just a few weeks 
36 必须旗帜鲜明地反对动乱 [Bixu qizhi xianming de fandui dongluan] People’s Daily, 26 April 
1989, 1.
37 “Students’ Reasonable Demands to Be Met through Democratic, Legal Channels: Zhao,” Xin-
hua, 4 May 1989, in Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, eds., Beijing 
Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1990), 254, Document 31. 
38 Dittmer, “China in 1989,” 32.
39 Mike Chinoy, China Live (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 213.
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earlier,” preparing their signs and banners in English and in Russian for the 
cameras.40 
Radical students decided to escalate tactics and start a hunger strike on the 
square. Their announcement and commitment (“Farewell moms and dads, please 
forgive us. Your children cannot have loyalty to our country and filial piety to 
you at the same time.”41) stirred powerful emotions and attracted more wide-
spread support from the public. The protest gathered momentum and an alliance 
between intellectuals, students, workers and ordinary citizens began to take 
shape. Even independent organizations such as the Beijing Workers’ Autono-
mous Union appeared and had an organized presence on the Square. American 
political scientist Andrew Walder argues that “the workers’ unprecedented polit-
ical response helped transform a vibrant student movement into the most severe 
popular challenge to Communist Party rule since 1949.”42
The events surrounding Gorbachev’s visit embarrassed the regime before the 
world and strengthened the position of hard-liners at home.43 On 16 May, Yang 
Shangkun, one of the hard-line party elders argued that as a result of Zhao’s 
strategy, “these last few days Beijing’s been in something like anarchy.”44 As a 
consequence, the leadership finally decided to crack down hard on the protesters. 
On the morning of 17 May, an extended Politburo Standing Committee meet-
ing was held at Deng Xiaoping’s residence. After a heated debate, Deng’s con-
clusion was that “we should bring in the People’s Liberation Army and declare 
martial law in Beijing” with the aim “to suppress the turmoil once and for all 
and to return things quickly to normal.”45 Although Zhao Ziyang expressed his 
40 Ibid., 207.
41 Hunger Strike Announcement, Originally Printed at Tiananmen Square in Xinwen Daobao 
[News Express], 12 May 1989, in Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, Beijing Spring, 260, Doc-
ument 33. 
42 Andrew G. Walder, “Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis 
of 1989,” The China Quarterly, no. 127, Special Issue: The Individual and State in China (Sep-
tember 1991): 467–92, 467. In 1989 we cannot yet speak of an organized civil society in China. 
Béja and Goldman have noted that “an embryo of organized civil society appeared to be taking 
shape in Tiananmen Square” (p. 22), but added that terms such as “pro-democracy movement” 
or “opposition movement” referred only to “the scattered individuals and groups interested in 
political reforms who attempted to establish informal networks of like-minded counterparts.” 
Jean-Philippe Béja and Merle Goldman, “The Impact of the June 4th Massacre on the pro-De-
mocracy Movement,” China Perspectives, no. 2 (2009): 18–28, 25.
43 In March 1989, Chinese reformists hoped that the success of Gorbachev’s visit would result 
in the strengthening of Zhao’s position. See: Ciphered telegram, Beijing, 13 March 1989, 102, 
Jász, in ÁBTL, 1. 11. 4. S—II/2/1989, 87–86. In connection to the demonstrations in Beijing, 
the Japanese ambassador in Beijing noted that Gorbachev’s visit was successful at least in one 
aspect, namely that it proved that in China there was a great deal of support for Soviet-type de-
mocratization. Ambassador Iván Németh’s cable no. 132, Our Ambassador’s evaluation of the 
student demonstrations II, Beijing, 18 May 1989, in HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-24-002064/5-1989.




reserve concerning the use of military force, finally he too submitted to party 
discipline.46 At dawn on 19 May, in a last desperate effort to persuade the stu-
dents to leave, Zhao went to the square, accompanied by then head of the CCP 
CC General Office, Wen Jiabao, to meet personally with the students. It was his 
last public appearance before he was stripped of all his posts and placed under 
lifelong house arrest for aiding and abetting the “counter-revolutionary rebel-
lion.”47
On 19 May, martial law was proclaimed in Beijing, but the leadership was 
too divided to resort to force until the night of 3–4 June.48 During that night, 
tanks and tens of thousands of armed soldiers moved through the square and its 
adjacent streets in Central Beijing, killing hundreds or thousands of civilians. 
The exact death toll is not known, and will probably never be known.49
Immediately after the massacre, the student movement was renamed a “count-
er-revolutionary rebellion” (反革命暴乱 fangeming baoluan).50 Deng Xiaoping 
formulated the official version of events five days after the massacre. In a speech 
to his officers justifying the suppression of the Beijing demonstrations, he ex-
plained that:
“they [the demonstrators] were attempting to subvert our state and overthrow the Communist 
Party, which is the essence of the issue. If we do not understand the fundamental problem, it 
means we are not clear about the nature of the issue […] It all became clear once the incident 
broke out. They [the demonstrators] had only two key goals: one was to overthrow the Commu-
nist Party, the other was to topple the socialist system. Their aim was to establish a bourgeois 
republic totally dependent on the West.”51
46 Ibid., 189–90.
47 Zhao’s name has been subject to official blackout since 1989. I experienced this effort to erase 
Zhao from public memory when I spent the 1989–90 academic year studying Chinese in Beijing. 
In one of our textbooks, which had been written and published in 1986, the language instructor 
blacked out Zhao’s name from the phrase “Premier Zhao Ziyang” each time it appeared.
48 It was the second time within three months that the government proclaimed martial law. Follow-
ing outbreaks of nationalist unrest in Lhasa, martial law had been declared in the Tibetan capital 
in early March.
49 Official sources claim that thirty-six people died on 3–4 June, but the unofficial death toll pro-
vided by survivors and international observers is several hundred or more. Chen Jian, “China 
and the Cold War After Mao,” in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), vol. 3, 181–200, 200. 
Ding Zilin, whose son was killed during the crackdown, recorded 92 deaths in her 4 June Death 
List. Ding Zilin, Liusi shounanzhe mingce (Hong Kong: The Nineties Monthly, 1994). Quot-
ed in: Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 
203–4.
50 Later on the events were gradually downgraded to “disturbance” (动乱 dongluan), “incident” 
(事件 shijian), and finally to “skirmish” (风波  fengbo, i.e., “wind and waves”).
51 “Address to Officers at the Rank of General and above in Command of the Troops Enforcing 
Martial Law in Beijing,” 9 June 1989, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 (1982–92) 
ed. by People’s Daily Online, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1990.html 
(accessed 26 September 2009).
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China and Eastern Europe after 4 June 
As a result of seven weeks of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and in 
cities throughout China, the party’s internal cohesion and legitimacy were seri-
ously undermined, just at a time when communism was in a state of turmoil in 
Eastern Europe and in the USSR.
It is a symbolic coincidence that on the same day the People’s Liberation Army 
opened fire on peaceful demonstrators in Beijing, in Europe the first communist 
regime lost power, smoothly and peacefully, through democratic means. In Po-
land, the first “semi-free” elections were held, in accordance with an agreement 
reached at the roundtable talks, which resulted in the victory of Solidarity, the 
first independent trade union within the Soviet bloc.52 It was probably the most 
pregnant manifestation of the rift within the socialist world between the orthodox 
hardliners and the reformists choosing the road of peaceful transition. British 
journalist and BBC Beijing Bureau Chief in 1989, James Miles, has noted that 
“if Tiananmen was a body blow to the Chinese communist structure, the elections 
in Poland and the rapid collapse of communism across the European continent in 
the months that followed were a series of debilitating follow-up punches.”53
In Hungary, the first plenary session of the roundtable talks was held on 13 
June, and three days later the system was symbolically buried at the reburial 
ceremony of Prime Minister Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs on Heroes’ Square 
in central Budapest. In November, the Hungarian ambassador concluded that “the 
contradiction between political changes in the majority of European socialist 
countries and the Chinese interpretation of ‘socialist renewal’ seems to be insu-
perable.”54
In late 1989, the Chinese leadership followed the unfolding drama in the 
countries of the former Soviet bloc with great concern. Beijing had every right 
to consider the systemic changes in Eastern Europe as a direct challenge to both 
its rule at home and its international position. The developments in Warsaw, Bu-
dapest, Berlin, Bucharest and Sofia posed a challenge to the domestic status quo 
in China, encouraging pro-democracy forces and alarming Chinese leaders. The 
systemic changes and the abandonment of the socialist system claimed by the 
Chinese communists to be superior to capitalism further undermined the internal 
and external legitimacy of the Chinese leadership. Domestically, it proved to the 
Chinese masses that socialism was not necessarily the ultimate goal of social 
52 The Polish elections were only partly free: the ruling Polish United Workers’ Party reserved a 
majority of seats in the main house of parliament and thus, Solidarity was able to win a majority 
of seats through free competition only in the senate.
53 James Miles, The Legacy of Tiananmen (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 
41.




development, and internationally, it further isolated Beijing, which could no lon-
ger count on the support of the region’s regimes.55
China classified foreign countries into four categories based on their reactions 
to the Chinese events. Those countries that condemned China and introduced 
economic and political sanctions belonged to the first group, China’s critics to 
the second, neutrals to the third, and China’s supporters to the fourth. Although 
East Central European countries did not announce any “sanctions” against China, 
all high-level visits with China were canceled and even some working exchang-
es were postponed.56 As a result, Beijing classified Hungary, Poland, and Yugo-
slavia to the second category and responded to dismissive Hungarian reactions 
with cutting back the number of economic and trade delegations.57 China did not 
criticize these countries openly, but according to Hungarian intelligence sources, 
these governments and especially their official media were subject to harsh inter-
nal criticism within the apparatus in Beijing.58 After 4 June, all news items con-
cerning Poland and Hungary had to undergo political examination before publi-
cation. A CCP CC instruction prohibited the Chinese mass media to publish 
commentaries on or analyses of the developments in these two countries. Only 
short, factual news items were allowed to be released. The official consideration 
behind this decision was that criticism would have meant interference into the 
others’ domestic affairs, and positively treating the events in these two countries 
might have resulted in undesired domestic consequences.59
When the East Central European regimes fell one after another, China’s lead-
ers were concerned over the possible consequences of the domino effect. Events 
in Romania, especially the execution of Ceauşescu and his wife, came closer to 
disturbing Beijing’s uneasy calm than any other upheaval in Eastern Europe. The 
lifting of martial law, which was originally planned for 24 December, was post-
poned until 10 January, ostensibly because of the outright alarm of the Chinese 
leadership.
Internationally, the East Central European changes attracted strong positive 
attention from the developed countries of the West and Japan, as well as from 
international financial institutions and businesses. The Tiananmen crackdown and 
the accompanying Chinese economic retrenchment alienated the political, busi-
ness and foreign assistance decision makers in non-communist developed coun-
tries and in international financial institutions, while the positive changes in East 
Central Europe offered the prospect of diverting their resources away from Chi-
55 Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Chinese Press Coverage of Political and Economic Restructuring of East 
Central Europe,” Asian Survey 37, no. 10 (October 1997): 927–43, 927–28.
56 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “China and Eastern Europe: A Judgement on the ‘Socialist Community’,” 
The Pacific Review 3, no. 3 (1990): 222–42, 234.
57 Ciphered telegram, New York, 12 September 1989, 367, Kozák, in ÁBTL, 1. 11. 4. S–II/2/1989, 198.
58 Ciphered telegram, Beijing, 13 July 1989, 254, Bokor, in ÁBTL, 1. 11. 4. S—II/2/1989, 175.
59 Ciphered telegram, Beijing, 12 September 1989, 308, Jász, in ÁBTL, 1. 11. 4. S–II/2/1989, 197.
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na. Chinese officials voiced their concern that this had come at the direct, or at 
least indirect, expense of China, since the amount of direct foreign investment in 
their economy was reduced.60 The changes in East Central Europe also acceler-
ated changes both in Sino-American relations and in the politics of Western 
governments, which pledged to reduce China’s relative influence in world af-
fairs.61
The Chinese were aware of the possible negative consequences of their deci-
sion to suppress the popular movement. But since the leadership of the CCP and 
the future of the whole system were at stake, they did not hesitate for a moment 
to proceed with the crackdown.
Developments in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union also provided 
positive opportunities for Chinese interests. The most important consequence was 
the marked decline of the perceived Soviet military threat to China.62 Among 
other things, the decline of Soviet power provided Beijing opportunities to exert 
greater influence in areas at the country’s periphery and sphere of interest, areas 
that historically had always been seen as extremely important to China’s security 
and national pride, including the Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia.
The response of the Soviet bloc countries to 4 June was not uniform. In the 
East Central European states, the official views concerning the events were po-
larized, divided into pro-reform and anti-reform camps.63 The Soviet Union de-
clared the events a domestic issue, and was against any foreign pressure.
The GDR, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, North Korea, Cuba and Viet-
nam supported the official Chinese “counter-revolutionary” version. The GDR 
published all relevant statements and declarations from the Chinese party and 
state leadership, “in order to make objective information available and counter 
Western horror stories.”64 On 5 June, the East German party newspaper Neues 
Deutschland labeled the demonstrations a “counter-revolutionary riot.”65 On 8 
June, the East German Volkskammer (Parliament) issued a declaration which, 
60 Hungarian Ambassador Iván Németh’s top secret cable: The Chinese evaluation of Eastern Eu-
ropean changes, Beijing, 18 January 1990, in HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-10-0021-1990.
61 Robert G. Sutter, “Changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: The effects on China,” 
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 33–45, 35.
62 Since the late 1960s, Beijing has considered the USSR its main strategic adversary. Trends in the 
1970s and 1980s prompted China to downgrade the immediate threat posed by the USSR, but 
Chinese military planners still saw a strong need for active military modernization and vigilance 
to prepare for threats from the north.
63 Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “1989 in Sino-East Central European Relations Revisited,” in Frank Co-
lumbus, ed., Central and Eastern Europe in Transition (Commack, NY: Nova Science, 1998), 
vol. 1, 145–61, 147.
64 Joachim Herrmann on the Need to Stand Firm, 22–23 June 1989, in Konrad H. Jarausch and 
Volker Gransow, eds., Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944–1993 (Providence, RI: 
Berghahn 1994), 35, Document 2.
65 “Volksbefreiungsarmee Chinas schlug konterrevolutionären Aufruhr nieder,” Neues Deutsch-
land, 5 June 1989, 1.
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while it did not mention “counter-revolution,” emphasized that the Chinese party 
and state leadership’s efforts to find a political solution to domestic problems 
“were hindered by violent, bloody incidents by anti-constitutional elements,” and 
that the popular government had therefore been “forced to restore order and se-
curity through the use of armed force.” According to the declaration, the Volks-
kammer “consider[ed] the events in Beijing exclusively the internal affair of the 
PRC and oppose[d] any foreign interference.”66 A few days later, the GDR foreign 
minister Fischer received his Chinese colleague Qian Qichen and expressed his 
solidarity with the PRC and the Chinese brother nation.67
Poland and Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union, declared the events a domestic 
issue and took a basically neutral position. Public opinion, however, was different; 
the events were condemned in the press and demonstrations were staged. The 
governments of neither Poland nor Yugoslavia wished the situation to become 
sharper, as they were eager to preserve their carefully forged links with China. A 
brief Polish statement expressed sympathy to the families of those killed and 
stressed that “what happened in Beijing is a great drama of a friendly country.” 
However, it added that “we treat this as an internal Chinese affair” and “believe 
that the conflicts which have arisen will be solved by the Chinese themselves by 
political means and that caution and realism [will] win.”68 The statement issued 
by the Yugoslav Party Presidium on 6 June expressed “great concern and regret.”69
It was only Hungary that condemned the bloodbath at the official level. The 
Hungarian government issued a statement on 7 June 1989 that expressed its 
deepest concern about the “tragic events” which had resulted in the loss of “a 
score of innocent lives,” and further declared that the repression of “fundamental 
human rights” could not be confined exclusively to the internal affairs of any 
single state.70 The Hungarian party general secretary, Károly Grósz, speaking “on 
behalf of the leadership and members of the HSWP [Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party] […] deeply condemned the violence and fratricidal war,” and added that 
“such methods have nothing to do with socialism.”71 In Poland and Hungary, the 
tragic events served as a point of reference for the reform-minded leaderships to 
strengthen their determination to continue with the reform process. The Polish 
authorities’ conclusion was that political reform and dialogue must go even deep-
66 “Erklärung der Volkskammer der DDR zu den aktuellen Ereignissen in der Volksrepublik Chi-
na,” Neues Deutschland, 9 June 1989, 1.
67 “Verbundenheit mit China,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 June 1989, 7.
68 Jeanne L. Wilson, “‘The Polish Lesson:’ China and Poland 1980–1990,” Studies in Comparative 
Communism 23, no. 3–4, (Autumn–Winter 1990): 259–79, 275.
69 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “China and Eastern Europe: A Judgement on the ‘Socialist Community,’” 
The Pacific Review 3, no. 3 (1990): 222–42, 234.
70 “A Magyar Népköztársaság kormányának nyilatkozata a Kínai Népköztársaság fővárosában 
lezajlott összecsapásokkal kapcsolatban,” Budapest, 7 June 1989, Külügyi Évkönyv (1989): 241.
71 “Grósz Károly: Az MSZMP mélységesen elítéli az erőszakot, a testvérháborút,” Népszabadság, 
8 June 1989, 1.
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er to keep up with economic change.72 The reform-minded minister of state and 
Politburo member Imre Pozsgay stated that “to throw people into a meat grinder 
and wade knee deep in blood cannot be justified by power considerations,” add-
ing that “the bloody events in Beijing will not discourage the Hungarian reform 
forces” and that “we have to do our best to preclude any power from using such 
tools in order to conserve its governing position and oligarchy.”73
Another domestic repercussion in East European countries of Tiananmen and 
the crackdown on student demonstrations was that it provided an opportunity for 
the opposition to launch a renewed anticommunist offensive. Referring to the ruth-
lessness of Chinese communists, the Hungarian opposition attempted to further 
destroy the prestige of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party by pointing out the 
inhuman nature of communism. The Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal 
Demokraták Szövetsége, FIDESZ) organized several events to express their soli-
darity with the Chinese youth demanding democracy. On 25 May, they staged a 
sit-in in front of the Chinese embassy in Budapest. Although the opposition round 
table did not issue a joint declaration in response to the Chinese events, all of the 
participating organizations condemned the bloodbath. Thousands participated in a 
demonstration in front of the Chinese embassy on 7 June, where representatives of 
FIDESZ handed over their memorandum to the ambassador. There were demon-
strations in Poland and even in the GDR, where demonstrators were arrested.
In foreign policy, the developments in Beijing provided an additional impetus 
for relations to be improved between the countries of the region and Taiwan. In 
the late 1980s, the Taiwanese government made repeated efforts to approach the 
Soviet Union and its European allies in order to break out of its diplomatic iso-
lation and to diversify its export markets. Taipei’s “flexible diplomacy,” which 
aimed at expanding Taiwan’s international space, was helped by the 4 June mas-
sacre and the strong anti-communist sentiments in Eastern Europe.74 Immediate-
ly after the massacre, the Hungarian ambassador in Beijing proposed that Hun-
gary accelerate its development of economic ties with Taiwan. Although he 
mentioned that “any kind of improvement in this respect would harm our rela-
tionship with the PRC,” he also added that “if the harm to our relationship is 
unavoidable in any case, it serves our interests to take this risk now, during the 
period of the present Chinese line.”75 As a result, Hungary was the first former 
72 Bailes, “China and Eastern Europe,” 234.
73 “A pekingi véres események nem bátortalanítják el a magyar reformerőket,” Népszabadság, 6 
June 1989, 1.
74 Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Breaking the Ice: The Origins of Taiwan’s Economic Diplomacy Towards 
the Soviet Union and its European Allies,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (September 2004): 
891–906, 903.
75 Hungarian ambassador Iván Németh’s cable, The proposals of our ambassador in Beijing on 
how we should conduct Hungarian-Chinese relations in the future, no. 170, Beijing, 13 June 
1989, in HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-20-001433/18-1989.
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Soviet bloc country to allow Taipei to open a trade office, which occurred on 1 
January 1990.
Conclusion
The year 1989 was critical for China and a turning point for Sino-East Central 
European relations. In the 1980s, the social and economic reform processes in 
China resembled those in East Central Europe, and as a result China and the 
European socialist states faced similar problems and dilemmas. Paradoxically, the 
same reform processes—which on both sides initially ran parallel, serving as a 
point of reference and contributing to the renormalization of relations—had, by 
1989, led to diametrically opposite political solutions. The former binding force 
turned into a source for difference and separation.
The events in China helped stir up anti-socialist activism in East Central Eu-
rope, while the developments in East Central Europe alarmed the Chinese lead-
ership to the extent that they did not hesitate to take action against any kind of 
organized opposition. Following the systemic changes in East Central Europe, 
the political foundations of bilateral relations collapsed. As a result of the domi-
nant Western orientation in the foreign and economic policy of Eastern Europe, 
relations with China became of secondary importance. In Poland and Hungary, 
the possibility of breaking relations with the PRC was even raised.
After 4 June, the communist leadership in China launched a renewed political 
offensive to achieve control over its populace and win legitimacy for its autocra-
tic regime. The policy of reform and opening to the outside world was reaffirmed 
at the fourth plenum of the thirteenth Central Committee, convened in late June 
1989. Nonetheless, it took China three years before the reform process got back 
on track. In the early 1990s, the regime brought inflation under control, resumed 
economic growth, restored and broadened its relations with the outside world, 
and strengthened its influence worldwide. In the past two decades China has 
experienced unprecedented economic growth; in 2010 it had become the second 
largest economy in the world. During this process, the Chinese leadership has 
successfully controlled the speed and scope of market reform implementation, 
maintained political supremacy and a critical level of stability, and generated 
sufficient regime legitimacy.76 Today, it does not seem possible for the system to 
change, either through revolution or through peaceful transition. Although the 
reform and modernization process has led to a capitalist transformation of the 
country’s economy, China, in words at least, still adheres to socialism “with a 
Chinese character.”
76 On the problem of regime legitimacy, see Thomas Heberer and Günter Schubert, eds., Regime 
Legitimacy in Contemporary China (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).
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THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION IN EAST GERMANY
From Mass Exodus and Mass Protests to the Fall of the Wall 
and German Unification
As late as January 1989, the general secretary of East Germany’s communist 
Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), Erich 
Honecker, stated: “The Wall will remain as long as the conditions that led to its 
building have not changed.” It would “still exist in fifty years and even in a hun-
dred.”1 Even Zbigniew Brzeziński, one of the few who predicted the fall of the 
Soviet empire, was also still convinced that, of all the countries in the Soviet bloc, 
the situation in the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria was not critical.2 
The GDR, he predicted, would remain a “communist Prussia” for some time to 
come, especially if “West Germany continued to give the East German economy 
such generous” support.3
It seems that both Honecker and Brzeziński were incapable of imagining not 
only how radically, and how quickly, East Germany’s foreign affairs and living 
conditions would change, but also, as a result, how radically its internal political 
situation would be transformed. The same was inconceivable for the CPSU gen-
eral secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, US president George H.W. Bush and the West 
German federal chancellor Helmut Kohl, not to mention British prime minister 
Margaret Thatcher or French president François Mitterrand. Only months before 
1 “Die Mauer wird [...] solange bleiben, wie die Bedingungen nicht geändert werden, die zu ihrer 
Errichtung geführt haben.” [Sie werde] “in 50 und auch in 100 Jahren noch bestehen bleiben.” 
Erich Honecker in Neues Deutschland, 20 January 1989. This statement of Honecker was an 
indirect dismissal of a remark made by Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been addressed by West 
German president Richard von Weizsäcker in Moscow on 7 July 1987 with regard to the unity 
of the German nation. Gorbachev responded by stressing that the double nation was the reality, 
but also added that history would decide what will be in a hundred years. This albeit vague 
acceptance of the structure of the German Question was later interpreted by the East German 
leadership as the beginning of the Soviet “betrayal of the GDR.” Cf. Michail Gorbatschow, 
Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 701, as well as Richard von Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten. Er-
innerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1997), 346.—The following article is based on: Hans-Hermann 
Hertle, Chronik des Mauerfalls, 12th ed. (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2009); idem, Der Fall der Mauer. 
Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates, 2nd ed. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1999).
2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Das gescheiterte Experiment. Der Untergang des kommunistischen Sys-
tems (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1989), 265.
3 Ibid., 283.
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its demise, the GDR was considered an island of stability by nearly all domestic 
and international observers, both political and in the scholarly community.4 
Twenty years after the fall of the GDR and the reunification of the two German 
states, the years 1989–90 have become one of the best-researched periods in 
modern German history.5 This is primarily due to the opening of East German 
archives: The records of the SED, of the GDR Council of Ministers, as well as 
the records of the East German secret police have been freely accessible since 
the early 1990s, as has a great deal of material from the East German civil rights 
and opposition movements.6 On the West German side, government files are 
usually subject to a thirty-year restricted access period before declassification, 
although critical documents have already been released in a special volume enti-
tled Deutsche Einheit.7 In addition, the authors of a four-volume history of Ger-
man unity, published in 1998, were granted privileged access to files.8 Russian, 
4 “Indeed, the 300 to 400 West German sociologists, political scientists, economists and educators 
who were spread all over the (old) Federal Republic working at 56 institutions did not foresee 
the revolutionary events of 1989. The specialists did not even notice signs of increasing discon-
tent and unrest, nor did they take small signs of change seriously, or consider them worthy of 
scholarly analysis.” Carola Becker, “Kläglich versagt,” Die Zeit 22, 24 May 1991. Since 1990, 
the scholarly community hasn’t given much thought to considering the reasons for the miscalcu-
lation of “hundreds of paid observers” from various disciplines. 
5 On the current state of research, see: Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ed., Revolution und Vereinigung 
1989/90 (Munich: DTV, 2009); Andreas Rödder, Deutschland, einig Vaterland. Die Geschichte 
der Wiedervereinigung (Munich: Beck, 2009); Mary E. Sarotte, 1989. The Struggle to Create 
Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, 
Endspiel. Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR (Munich: Beck, 2009); Ehrhart Neubert, Unsere 
Revolution. Die Geschichte der Jahre 1989/90 (Munich: Piper, 2008); Wolfgang Schuller, Die 
deutsche Revolution 1989 (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2009). A database of literature on the German re-
unification, with more than 53,000 entries (stand: December 2007), can be found on the internet 
under: http://www.wiedervereinigung.de (accessed 7 September 2012).
6 The records of the SED leadership and the East German government are accessible at the Feder-
al Archives (Bundesarchiv, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorgansationen der DDR and 
Abteilung DDR), the archives of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the Former State 
Security of the GDR (Archiv der Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des ehemaligen Staats-
sicherheitsdienstes der DDR) and the Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry (Politischen 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes); written documents of the GDR opposition can be found at the 
Matthias Domaschk Archives of the Robert Havemann Foundation, as well as in the Grünen-Ar-
chiv of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.
7 Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hoffmann, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche 
Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998).
8 Karl-Rudolf Korte, Geschichte der deutschen Einheit 1: Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls 
Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998); Dieter 
Grosser, Geschichte der deutschen Einheit 2: Das Wagnis der Wirtschafts-, Währungs- und 
Sozialunion. Politische Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998); 
Wolfgang Jäger, Geschichte der deutschen Einheit 3: Die Überwindung der Teilung. Der inner-
deutsche Prozess der Vereinigung 1989/90 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998); Werner Weidenfeld, with Pe-
ter Wagner and Elke Bruck, Geschichte der deutschen Einheit 4: Außenpolitik für die deutsche 
Einheit: Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998).
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American, British and French records have also contributed to clarifying the 
events, as have, on the American side, the early studies by Philip Zelikow and 
Condoleezza Rice, both based on government records as well as accounts of eye 
witnesses.9
The publication of official documents has been augmented by the biographies 
and memoirs of a large number of the leaders and diplomats who were directly 
involved, as well as by the many valuable interviews conducted with them by 
journalists, documentary filmmakers and historians.10 And finally, the media 
coverage at the time—press, radio and television—has been a major source of 
information about this period of history.11
Internal and external crisis factors 
In particular, analyzing East German archives has led to the general awareness 
that the symptoms of the internal structural crisis, which had gradually begun to 
undermine the GDR’s existence as early as the 1980s and which significantly 
influenced the actions of the SED leadership in the final crisis of the autumn of 
1989, were only slightly different than those in its “brother countries,” the other 
states of the Soviet bloc. The economic situation in all of these countries was 
disastrous. Technical advances lagged far behind those in the West, and labor 
productivity was less than half as high. Many manufacturing plants were dilapi-
dated, and in countless places, health, safety and environmental conditions were 
catastrophic. The infrastructure was derelict and urban areas were decaying. The 
9 Cf., for example: Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, and Stephen Robert Twigge, eds., Docu-
ments on British Policy Overseas III, vol. 7: German Unification 1989–1990 (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2009); Aleksandr Galkin and Anatolii Chernyaev, eds., Mikhail Gorbachev i German-
skii vopros (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2006); Philipp Zelikow/Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified 
and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).—The following 
works are based on privileged access to documents in Moscow (The Gorbachev Foundation) and 
in Paris: Alexander von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutschlands—ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel 
(Berlin: Ch. Links, 2002), and Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froid et l’unifica-
tion allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht (Paris: O. Jacob, 2005). See also: Svetlana Savranska-
ya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, ed., Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of 
the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 
2010).—To embed the German events into the international context of the end of the Cold War, 
see: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 
vol. III: Endings 1975–1991, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), as well as the 
three-part study by Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Reper-
cussions within the Soviet Union,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 178–256 
(Part 1); 6, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 3–64 (Part 2); and 7, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 3–96 (Part 3).
10 On this, see the bibliographies in Rödder, Deutschland, 452–84; Sarotte, 1989, 287–308.
11 Cf. the two series Deutschland 1989 and Deutschland 1990. Dokumentation zu der Berichter-
stattung über die Ereignisse in der DDR und die deutschlandpolitische Entwicklung, edited by 
the Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. 
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accumulation of Western debt had reached a dramatic level—particularly in Po-
land, Hungary and East Germany. Spending on the military and (secret) police 
apparatuses devoured huge portions of the state budgets of all the communist 
states—in the Soviet Union alone it stood at 40 percent.12
The ideological erosion was obvious: the promise of a communist society that 
by 1981 was supposed to provide abundant material and cultural goods, as well 
as the highest living standards in the world13—as had been announced in October 
1961 at the twenty-second CPSU party congress under party leader Nikita Khrush-
chev—had been quietly withdrawn. The twenty-fourth CPSU congress in April 
1971 under Khrushchev’s successor, Leonid Brezhnev, and subsequently the par-
ty congresses of all the “fraternal parties,” set its new “main task” as “increasing 
the material and cultural living standards of the people.”14 In the GDR, the expres-
sion “unity of economic and social policy” had emerged out of this welfare pro-
viso. The utopian communist society that was supposed to bring happiness to its 
citizens shriveled into the daily task of secular Socialist consumerism. Thus, the 
goal of socialism and fulfilling promises of prosperity became virtually the same 
thing—with the unavoidable result that breaches of these consumer promises could 
be held up to the communist leadership as proof of socialism’s total failure.
The alleged “driving force” of the communist parties was exhausted, and the 
belief in the historical and legitimate victory of socialism over capitalism was 
shaken. The party leadership was demoralized by years of crisis management, 
much of the party cadre was worn out, and the party’s nucleus, including the 
“armed forces,” was demoralized and disoriented.
But despite the common symptoms of structural crisis, the case of East Ger-
many differed considerably from its “brother countries.” The communist German 
part-state was, on one hand, a forced and artificial product of the global political 
interests and imperial claims of the Soviet Union. As the “satrapy of Soviet he-
gemony,”15 the existence of the East German state, from its founding in 1949 
until 1990, depended directly on the military, economic and political support of 
the Soviet Union, and thus in a special way was also subject to its favors. On the 
12 Manfred Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991. Entstehung und Niedergang des 
ersten sozialistischen Staates (Munich: Beck 1998), 1031; for an analysis of the fall of the So-
viet Union, cf. Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch. Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to 
Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).
13 See “Der Kommunismus ist die Hoffnung der Völker, die Garantie ihrer strahlenden Zukunft,” 
“Rede von N.S. Chruschtschow über das neue Programm der KPdSU,” as well as “Das Kom-
munistische Manifest der gegenwärtigen Epoche,” Neues Deutschland, 20 October 1961.
14 “Die Direktiven des XXIV. Parteitages der KPdSU zum Fünfjahrplan für die Entwicklung der 
Volkswirtschaft der UdSSR in den Jahren 1971–1975,” Neues Deutschland, 7 April 1971; in 
addition, see Peter Hübner and Jürgen Danyel, “Soziale Argumente im politischen Machtkampf. 
Prag, Warschau, Berlin 1968–1971,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 50, no. 9 (2002): 
804–32.
15 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol.5: Bundesrepublik und DDR 1949–
1990 (Munich: Beck 2008), 356.
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other hand, the GDR was in direct competition with the Federal Republic, the 
other German state. All attempts to create a “socialist German nation” or even a 
“national GDR identity” had failed miserably. For over forty years, the SED 
leadership had been confronted by the expectations of large portions of the pop-
ulation for democracy and prosperity based on the West German model, as well 
as by their orientation toward a unified Germany.
Indeed, the relations between the two German states had become nearly “nor-
mal” in the course of détente and after the signing of the East-West German 
Basic Treaty in 1972. The GDR received financial sustenance allowances from 
the West German government for granting so-called humanitarian relief (im-
proved travel opportunities, the opening of new border crossings, ransoming of 
prisoners, easement in postal, parcel and telephone communications, etc.), some-
thing envied by its “brother countries.” Beginning with 600 million deutsche mark 
(DM) in the second half of the 1970s, by the 1980s these payments had risen to 
approximately DM 1.5 billion annually.
The more destitute the GDR became—it stood on the brink of economic 
bankruptcy for the first time in 1981–8216—the more dependent it became on the 
economic assistance of the Federal Republic, and the greater the political conces-
sions it made (de-mining on the inner-German border in 1983–84, granting of 
more exit visas in 1984, allowing more Western travel for GDR citizens from 
1986).
But until the end, the West German government refused to recognize East 
German citizenship. According to its constitution, the “people of the GDR,” as 
they were called in the official rhetoric of the West, were also (potential) citizens 
of the Federal Republic, possessing the same rights to its social welfare. They 
merely had to manage to reach West German soil.
To keep more of the population from looking to the West, as well as to coun-
teract the exodus between 1946 and mid-1961 to West Germany of about 3.5 
million people from a total population of 18 million, the East German leadership 
did not know what to do other than sealing the inner-German border (May 1952) 
with mine fields, as well as constructing the Berlin Wall and installing military 
guards (August 1961). To prevent escape attempts, they even ended up accepting 
the killing of refugees. Hundreds of refugees lost their lives at the inner-German 
border, in the Baltic Sea, or during their flight via third countries. Alone at the 
Berlin Wall, from 1961 to 1989 at least 136 people were shot, died by accident, 
or committed suicide after failed escape attempts.17
And tens of thousands were arrested between 1961 and 1989 while in the 
process of planning their flight or on the way to the border. Statistics from the 
16 See Hans-Hermann Hertle, “Die DDR an die Sowjetunion verkaufen? Stasi-Analysen zum 
ökonomischen Niedergang der DDR,” Deutschland Archiv, no. 3 (2009): 476–95.
17 See Hans-Hermann Hertle and Maria Nooke, eds., The Victims at the Berlin Wall,  1961–1989: 
A Biographical Handbook (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2011).
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GDR General Attorney reveal about 110,000 cases of “escape from the Republic” 
or “illegal border crossing” from 1961 to 1988.18 According to a study of political 
prisoners based on random samples of GDR crime statistics, between 1960 and 
1988 imprisonment for “illegal emigration” was imposed across the GDR in more 
than 71,000 cases.19 As a rule, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, citizens of the 
GDR who applied for an exit visa were marginalized, discriminated against, or 
criminalized. Tens of thousands of them were sentenced to prison—merely be-
cause they had claimed the right of freedom of movement.
The management of the border was continually modernized and perfected; at 
no point in the twenty-eight years after the Wall was built did the SED leadership 
waste even a thought on dismantling the border installations or creating a politi-
cal system that would have made the Wall superfluous. Nonetheless, between the 
building of the Wall and its fall, a total of about 40,000 East Germans managed 
to escape through the barricades, taking daring paths and accepting risks that were 
life-threatening. About 5,000 of them escaped in Berlin. Mirroring Count Mira-
beau’s saying that Prussia was not a state with an army, but an army with a state, 
Stefan Wolle described the GDR in the following words: “This was not a state 
with a border, but a border with a state.”20 The segregation, detention, injury, or 
death of people who wanted to leave their country was part of a system that could 
not exist without walls.
In none of the Central and Eastern European states was it inevitable that the 
latent factors of their internal crises would lead to the upheavals and revolutions 
of 1989. For the GDR, the decisive impulse rather came from outside: from the 
changes in the Soviet Union and their military, political and economic repercus-
sions, as well as the reform processes that had been initiated in Poland and Hun-
gary at the time.
It must be emphasized that Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” had not 
started with glasnost or perestroika but rather with “uskorenie,” socio-economic 
acceleration. It was the economic plight of the Soviet Union that forced it to 
undertake reforms. In addition to the structural problems of the Soviet planned 
economy—low labor productivity, lack of innovative skills, declining investment 
rates, creeping deflation of capital assets, and inflated military spending—in the 
1970s and early 1980s new problems developed, such as the depletion of stocks 
of raw materials in the western parts of the USSR, greatly increased development 
18 See the statistical material of the GDR attorney general in Johannes Raschka, Justizpolitik im 
SED-Staat. Anpassung und Wandel des Strafrechts während der Amtszeit Honeckers (Cologne 
et al.: Böhlau 2000), 314.
19 Cf. Jürgen Wilke and Wilhelm Heinz Schröder, “Politische Gefangene in der DDR—eine 
quantitative Analyse: Wissenschaftliche Expertise für die Enquete-Kommission des Deutschen 
Bundestages ‘Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozess der deutschen Einheit’” 
(Cologne: 1997), 92.
20 Stefan Wolle, “Flucht als Widerstand?,” in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Peter Steinbach, Johannes 
Tuchel, eds., Widerstand und Opposition in der DDR (Cologne et al.: Böhlau, 1999), 309.
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costs in Siberia, and a series of poor harvests. The Soviet leadership under Gor-
bachev was thus faced with a serious financial and supply crisis. To overcome 
this crisis, contributions from the “brother countries” were expected: already in 
1987, the Soviet Union announced at the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CMEA) that from 1991, foreign trade prices were to be adjusted to world 
market prices. For the GDR this was to mean an additional expenditure of DM 
184 billion annually, a number that caused sheer horror for party economists.21
Many scholars tend to underestimate the economic causes in the decline of 
communism. At least for the GDR, one of the more surprising archival findings 
after 1989 was the extent to which the innermost circles of power in the SED 
spoke openly, already in the mid-1970s, about the increasing structural and debt 
problems, finally even speculating in 1988–89 on the prospect of bankruptcy.22 
Nonetheless, at the same time, SED propaganda outside the GDR continued 
endlessly to claim that the country ranked tenth among the largest industrial 
nations in the world and never tired of extolling its alleged “political stability 
and dynamically rising economic development.”23 Already in June 1988, Honeck-
er appealed to the Politburo that “we must prevent the collapse.”24 Günter Mittag, 
the Central Committee secretary responsible for economic affairs, expressed his 
gloomy prognosis for the future to a small group of financial experts in Novem-
ber 1988: “As it is now, we’re driving straight into a tree: we’ll be totaled!”25 
And in May 1989, Gerhard Schürer, Politburo candidate and chairman of the 
State Planning Commission, told the small group of members of the Politburo 
responsible for financial affairs that the GDR’s debts in the West were increasing 
monthly by DM 500 million and “if this development continues, the GDR will 
be insolvent by 1991.”26 It was urgent to connect the cuts that had already been 
made “to a series of economic measures taken in the area of spending.”27 But 
no one in the inner circle of the SED leadership wanted to face the task of lim-
21 “Volkswirtschaftliche Berechnungen zum Warenaustausch DDR/UdSSR,” n.d. [1986], in 
Bundesarchiv (BA), DE 1/56348, 3.
22 The crisis discussions at the Politburo during the 1970s and 80s are portrayed in Hertle, Der Fall 
der Mauer, 17–73. In addition, see: Maria Haendcke-Hoppe-Arndt, “Der ökonomische Nieder-
gang der DDR,” Deutschland Archiv, no. 6 (1995): 588–602; as well as André Steiner, Von Plan 
zu Plan, Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR (Munich: DVA, 2004), 165–226.
23 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XI. Parteitages der SED, 17. bis 21. April 1986 (Berlin: Dietz, 
1986), 739.
24 Quoted from Major Friedrich to Generalmajor Alfred Kleine, Information [about the Politburo 
session of 14 June 1988], 16 June 1988, in Archiv der Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen 
des ehemaligen Staatssicherheitsdienstes der DDR (BStU), MfS, HA XVIII Nr. 3376, 47.
25 Quote based on Heinz Klopfer, “Persönliche Notizen über ein Gespräch beim Mitglied des Po-
litbüros und Sekretär des ZK der SED, Genossen Dr. Günter Mittag,” 23 November 1988, in 
BStU, MfS, HA XVIII Nr. 3374, 118.
26 “Darlegungen Gerhard Schürers zur Zahlungsbilanz mit dem nichtsozialistischen Wirtschafts-
gebiet,” 16 May 1989, in BA, DE 1/56317.
27 Ibid.
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iting the population’s standard of living. “What can we say to the people? How 
shall we then face the nation?” asked the president of the Trade Union Federa-
tion, Harry Tisch.28 But Egon Krenz, responsible at the Politburo for security 
questions, declared the following motto for the future: “We should be looking 
forward now. For me, it is not a question whether the union of economic and 
social policies should be continued. It must be continued, since that is the GDR’s 
socialism!”29
It was not only the ongoing economic decline that demoralized the SED 
leadership in the summer of 1989. Powerless, they had watched the attempts that 
had been made since 1987 between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic 
to improve their relations; these led in June 1989 to the signing of a “joint dec-
laration” during a state visit of Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev to Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn. In this declaration, both sides 
recognized the right of every state “to freely choose its own political and social 
system,” and to consider the “respect of the self-determination of all nations” an 
incontestable principle.30 Just three weeks later, in July 1989, on the initiative of 
the Soviet leadership, an official document was signed at the congress of the 
Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest in which the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries broke with the superiority and hegemonic claims of the Soviet Union, 
whereby they also broke with the “tank philosophy” of the limited sovereignty 
of the member states (the Brezhnev Doctrine). In the meeting’s communiqué, 
the party and state leaders of the East bloc countries expressed that there is “no 
universal model of socialism whatsoever,” and “no one” possesses “a monopoly 
on the truth.” They stressed the need to develop relations with one another “on 
the basis of equality, independence and the right of each to formulate and devel-
op their own independent political line, strategy, and tactics without outside 
interference.”31 Unlike their neighbors, the leaders of the East German part-state 
had difficulties understanding the right to self-determination and independence 
that were being granted to the “fraternal parties” as a “basis for a democratic 
renewal on the basis of national struggles for independence.” Rather, just as they 
already saw the “joint Soviet-German declaration,”32 such rights were simply 
28 Heinz Klopfer, “Persönliche Notizen über die Beratung beim Generalsekretär des ZK der 
SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Erich Honecker, betreff Entwurf des Volks-
wirtschaftsplanes und des Staatshaushaltsplanes 1990,” Berlin, 16 May 1989, in BA, DE 
1/56317, 25.
29 Ibid., 42.
30 “Gemeinsame deutsch-sowjetische Erklärung,” 13 June 1989, Bulletin des Presse- und Informa-
tionsamtes der Bundesregierung, 15 June 1989, 543.
31 “Kommuniqué der Tagung des Politisch-Beratenden Ausschusses der Mitgliedsstaaten des War-
schauer Vertrags am 7. und 8. Juli 1989 in Bukarest,” Europa-Archiv, no. 20 (1989): 599.
32 Andreas Wirsching, “Die Mauer fällt. Das Ende des doppelten Deutschland,” in Udo Wengst 
and Hermann Wentker, ed., Das doppelte Deutschland. 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz (Berlin: Ch. 
Links, 2008), 357–74, 368.
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considered a threat to their existence. If the Soviet guarantee of the SED regime’s 
existence were suspended, then from now on the SED would be faced with the 
task of legitimizing their rule to “their people” themselves—and this in the face 
of a pending economic bankruptcy. The fact that SED chief Honecker suffered 
a gallstone colic during the Bucharest meeting and had to be flown to East Ber-
lin before the signing of the final document was highly symbolic.
And finally, Moscow’s foreign policy toward the United States had also 
shocked the SED leadership. In order to gain ground in disarmament negotiations 
with the United States, Gorbachev and the Soviet foreign minister Eduard She-
vardnadze declared the Soviet Union willing—without consulting its allies and, 
as the SED leadership saw it, primarily at their expense—to implement extensive 
concessions in human rights issues. In January 1989, the Soviet Union literally 
forced the East German government to sign the Vienna CSCE accords. The sign-
ing states pledged, among other things, to respect the right of all people “to leave 
any country, including their own, and to return to their country with no restric-
tions.”33  Similar international agreements had already been signed several times, 
even by the GDR, but they had never been implemented legally. But in Vienna 
it was the first time that the GDR committed itself to guaranteeing this right—that 
is, unrestricted freedom to travel—by law, and to allow its compliance with this 
requirement to be monitored.
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union thus imposed domestic commitments 
onto its allies, particularly East Berlin. But they were commitments whose im-
plementation not only threatened the political stability of the GDR, but also its 
existence: if the border became permeable, the state was endangered.
In Poland and Hungary, democratic reforms toward a multi-party system were 
introduced in the summer of 1989. While these reforms were forced from below, 
in contrast to the GDR, they were then pushed forward from above by party re-
formers. But the SED leadership stood with its back up against the wall, leading 
to its well-documented uncertainty as well as its resulting “speechlessness.” 
While displeasure with the leadership had grown among the party’s members, 
nonetheless, no significant pressure on the party leaders emerged, to say nothing 
of any sort of inner-party opposition.
In view of the later developments in 1989, one must look for conditions under 
which latent critical factors develop into governmental crises. And one must also 
examine how the symptoms of structural crisis can trigger a process that mobi-
lizes the masses to protest a regime. And finally, there is the question of how the 
role of the media should be understood in this context.
Fundamental crises in political systems emerge, as Pierre Bourdieu has at-
tempted to explain, through a “conjunction of independent causal chains” that 
33 “Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Abschließendes Dokument des 
Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffens. Wien, 15. Januar 1989,” Deutschland Archiv, no. 4 (1989): 467–
68.
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first develop parallel to one another, and then, at a particular moment, interact.34 
When the perception of the actors in such local crises is synchronized, where-
by these individual crises are driven to suddenly change into a general crisis or 
a revolution, is called a “critical moment” by Bourdieu.35 In turn, this synchro-
nization effect is generated by “critical events” that spread the latent crises to 
many different places, causing latent tensions to change abruptly into manifest 
acts.
The media, which Bourdieu does not include in his concept, can play an im-
portant role in this synchronization process by conveying what has happened, 
whereby it intensifies perceptions and creates a feedback effect—especially when 
the media intervenes directly in events and becomes an actor.36 This augmentation 
of the concept provides a framework of analysis that is capable of combining, on 
both macro and micro levels, the history of structures and the history of events 
(structure and agency).
The October Revolution
Until the autumn of 1989, the momentum for further developments in the GDR 
was less due to civil rights activists than due to people leaving the country—and 
the television coverage of them. This momentum was triggered by the more than 
100,000 people who applied to leave the GDR, especially those demanding exit 
visas in the summer of 1989 who occupied embassies in East Berlin or the West 
German embassies in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest.37
It is true that in East Germany the number of opposition groups critical of the 
system had increased, especially since the mid-1980s.38 Among the issues they 
focused on were peace and the environment, democracy, human rights, and es-
pecially the freedom to travel. Quite a few parish priests were involved; the 
34 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo academicus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 254–303.
35 Ibid., 274–92.
36 See Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, “‘Kritische Ereignisse’ und ‘kritischer Moment’. Pierre Bourdieus 
Modell der Vermittlung von Ereignis und Struktur,” in Andreas Suter and Manfred Hettling, ed., 
Struktur und Ereignis, Geschichte und Gesellschaft Sonderheft 19 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht), 120–37, 135; see also idem, “Die Nacht der Barrikaden. Eine Fallstudie zur Dynamik 
sozialen Protests,” in Friedhelm Neidhardt, ed., Öffentlichkeit, Öffentliche Meinung, Soziale 
Bewegunge, Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), 375–92.
37 For comprehensive portrayals of the GDR revolution, see: Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Endspiel 
(Munich: Beck, 2009), esp. 301–469; Ehrhart Neubert, Unsere Revolution (Munich: Piper, 
2008); Wolfgang Schuller, Die deutsche Revolution 1989 (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2009); another key 
work: Walter Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende. Warum es den Mächtigen nicht gelang 1989 eine 
Revolution zu verhindern (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1999).
38 See Ehrhart Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR, 1949–1989 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 
1998).
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Lutheran church gave shelter to many groups. It is possible to gain the impression 
that during 1989, the number of demonstrations organized by these independent 
and civil rights groups increased steadily: from protests against fraudulent local 
election results in May, to demonstrations against the violent suppression of the 
Chinese student uprising in June, the founding of the opposition movement New 
Forum (Neues Forum) on 9–10 September and then other groups, and finally the 
founding of the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei, SDP) at 
the beginning of October 1989.
But this impression is deceptive. These opposition groups were primarily 
involved with their own concerns, and for the most part failed to involve broad-
er sections of the populace.39 Until late summer 1989, it was rare if a public 
protest attracted more than a few hundred people—this happened only a few 
times. Only after the New Forum and other groups, such as Democratic Awak-
ening (Demokratischer Aufbruch) and Democracy Now (Demokratie Jetzt), were 
founded in September did they gain popular acceptance. Nonetheless, these 
newly organized civil rights groups also had little to do with the beginning of 
the protest movement; in the early stages, demonstrations were usually sponta-
neous and unplanned. The first time more than 1,000 people took part in a 
Leipzig Monday demonstration was on 18 September; on 25 September it was 
5,000, on 2 October, 15,000, and finally on 9 October, 70,000—always follow-
ing events at churches. The opening of the Hungarian-Austrian border for East 
Germans on 10–11 September was followed by a mass exodus. Only then, at the 
beginning of October, did open protest quickly begin to swell and move to many 
cities.40 
This was because the opening of the Iron Curtain in Hungary had shifted the 
balance of power between the government and the population in East Germany 
in a decisive way.41 The exodus generated expanding repercussions among peo-
ple who wanted to remain in the GDR. For the first time since the uprising of 
1953, they saw a chance to place demands on the regime: “We will stay, but only 
if things don’t stay the same,” was an early slogan at the Leipzig demonstrations. 
The new possibility of leaving via Hungary could be used as a means of pressure; 
in return for their remaining in the GDR, they could insist on a political price. 
No longer did fleeing or leaving the country weaken potential political resis-
tance, it gave it social justification. The mass exodus via Hungary undermined, 
39 See Detlef Pollack, “‘Wir sind das Volk!’ Sozialstrukturelle und ereignisgeschichtliche Bedin-
gungen des friedlichen Massenprotests,” in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ed., Revolution und Vereini-
gung 1989/90 (Munich: DTV, 2009), 178–97.
40 On the earlier history and background of the Hungarian opening of the border, see: Andreas 
Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer. September 1989—Ungarn öffnet die Grenze (Vienna: 
Zsolnay, 2009).
41 See Detlef Pollack, “Das Ende einer Organisationsgesellschaft; systemtheoretische Überlegun-
gen zum gesellschaftlichen Umbruch in der DDR,” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 19, no. 4 (1990): 
292–307, 300–1.
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in an unprecedented manner, the authority of the state and was a prerequisite for 
the mass protests that were then to unfold.42
For the SED leadership, the “Hungarian betrayal,” not to mention the Soviet 
Union’s passive attitude, was terribly humiliating. Reduced to relying on their 
own authority, the first point of discussion at the Politburo meeting of 12 Sep-
tember 1989 was how to “close the hole in Hungary,”43 since applications for 
travelling to Hungary had skyrocketed everywhere in the country. To avoid 
“heavy losses” in citizens, Mittag suggested that “leaving the country should not 
be carried out as globally as has been done until now. Why do the ambivalent 
candidates have to go? This internal regulation may not, however, affect our 
party or the majority of the population. We would upset them. The Stasi and the 
Ministry of the Interior should undertake these actions.”44 In this way, the SED 
leadership solved their own political dilemma by foisting it onto the employees 
of the security forces.
But the SED leadership still received some support from Prague. The Czecho-
slovak government tightened its controls for GDR citizens at its border with 
Hungary. As a result, by the end of September more than 10,000 East Germans 
were staying at the West German embassy in Prague in an attempt to force their 
exit to the Federal Republic. Honecker gave in on 30 September 1989, letting the 
embassy refugees travel in locked trains over GDR territory to the West. A com-
mentary edited by Honecker and published in Neue Deutschland on 2 October 
hurled after them: “No tears should be shed over their like.”45 The statement 
sparked outrage and anger in the families of the refugees, and even met with 
protest from members of the SED. “With its cynical inflexibility,” Pollack has 
commented, “the leadership of the SED itself contributed to the protests forming 
in the streets.”46
The SED leadership’s room for maneuvering shrank more and more, becom-
ing limited to either initiating political reforms—with an uncertain outcome—or 
building a “second wall” at the Czechoslovak and Polish borders and, possibly, 
having to quell demonstrations with military force. The closing of the East Ger-
man border to Czechoslovakia on 3 October 1989, and in some cases brute force 
being used against protesters during celebrations for the fortieth state anniversa-
ry of the GDR around 7 October, point to their having chosen the latter option—
the use of force. More than 3,000 protesters were temporarily arrested in the GDR 
42 Norman Naimark also emphasizes this causal link: “It is worth reiterating that those who left 
the country started the revolution, while those, who demonstrated maintained it.” See Norman 
Naimark, “‘Ich will hier raus.’ Emigration and the Collapse of the German Democratic Repub-
lic,” in Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
72–116.
43 SED-Politburo meeting on 12 September 1989, in BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/77, 27.
44 Ibid.
45 Neues Deutschland, 2 October 1989.
46 Pollack, “Wir sind das Volk!” 189.
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and over 700 investigation proceedings were initiated. On the evening of 9 Oc-
tober, there was a threat that the “Chinese solution” would be used in Leipzig. 
Honecker and Stasi Minister Mielke had given the order to prevent “rioting” and 
“riots.” But too many people had taken to the streets. In the end, the state power 
capitulated in the face of 70,000 peaceful demonstrators.47 Footage of the demon-
stration was smuggled to the West, and on the following days it was broadcast 
on television news, becoming a beacon for the demonstrating to spread. As Pol-
lack writes, “From 9 October, it was the people protesting in the streets who 
determined the pace and the direction of the political developments in the GDR.”48 
On 16 October, there were already 120,000 people in Leipzig chanting “We are 
the people!” and demanding free elections, freedom of expression and the press, 
and freedom to travel. Tens of thousands took part in demonstrations on the same 
evening in other places, including Dresden, Magdeburg, Halle and Berlin.
The protests on the street drove the SED leadership to frantic activity. On 17 
October 1989, SED general secretary Erich Honecker was toppled by an odd 
Politburo coalition consisting of both reformist and arch-conservative forces.49 
But instead of the expected stabilization of power under his successor, Egon 
Krenz, who announced a political “turning point,” the rapid collapse of the com-
munist dictatorship began. Increasingly, the main problem of the SED leadership 
was the economic situation. On 31 October 1989, an analysis of the economic 
situation in the GDR was presented to the Politburo. Its findings: production 
potential was exhausted, insolvency toward the West threatened, bankruptcy was 
imminent. An immediate reduction of living standards by 25 to 30 percent would 
be necessary, it stated. However, due to fears of an uprising, this was considered 
out of the question politically.
The proposed solution to save the GDR from bankruptcy was the following: 
in order to receive new loans to the sum of DM 12 to 13 billion, as well as im-
proved economic backing from the West German government, the permeability 
of the Wall—in plain terms, easier travel opportunities for GDR citizens—should 
be offered as a final means of exchange. Not surprisingly, on 1 November 1989, 
Egon Krenz was told by Mikhail Gorbachev that economic assistance was no 
longer to be expected from Moscow. On behalf of the SED general secretary, on 
6 November Alexander Schalck-Go lodkowski, as the GDR mediator, commenced 
secret negotiations in Bonn with Chancellery Minister Rudolf Seiters and Interi-
or Minister Wolfgang Schäuble.
47 On the developments of the protest movement in Leipzig, see Tobias Hollitzer and Reinhard 
Bohse, ed., Heute vor 10 Jahren. Leipzig auf dem Weg zur Friedlichen Revolution (Bonn and 
New York: InnoVatio, 2000).
48 Pollack, “Wir sind das Volk!” 194.
49 See Hans-Hermann Hertle, “Der Sturz Erich Honeckers. Zur Rekonstruktion eines innerpartei-
lichen Machtkampfes,” in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Peter Steinbach, Johannes Tuchel, eds., Wider-
stand und Opposition in der DDR (Cologne et al.: Böhlau, 1999), 327–46. On the references for 
the following section, see Hertle, Chronik, 92–202.
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Unfazed by the change of leadership at the top of the SED, the exodus from 
the GDR continued; from 18 October, up to 2,000 East Germans crossed the 
Austro-Hungarian border daily. The continuous coverage by the Western media 
of the refugees’ arrival in the West plainly exposed the SED regime’s lack of 
legitimacy to the world public. At the same time, about 1,000 people a day applied 
for emigration; on 29 October the total number had risen to 188,180.50 
Also the number of demonstrations had not waned. The protest movement did 
not regard Honecker’s removal from office as reflecting the willingness of the 
party leadership to implement reforms, but saw it as the regime’s running from the 
pressure on the streets, a victory that subsequently gave legitimacy and incentive 
to continue the demonstrations. As a result, pressure was intensified to push through 
even more demands. In the second half of October, the situation in the GDR had 
become explosive. Demonstrations against the SED spread across the country, 
reaching even small and mid-sized towns. While in the week from 16 to 22 Octo-
ber, the Stasi registered a total of 140,000 participants in 24 demonstrations, in the 
next week 540,000 people took part in 145 demonstrations, and from 30 October 
to 5 November there were 1.4 million participants in 210 demonstrations.51 Ever 
more emphatic were the demands for free elections, permission to form opposition 
groups, and— over and over, and everywhere—the freedom to travel.
At the same time, despite the new secretary general and his vague promises 
of reforms, the party’s members weren’t letting themselves be mobilized simply 
at the drop of a hat. Attempts to convert opposition demonstrations into re-
gime-friendly rallies failed, sometimes already in the planning stages. SED mem-
bers’ confidence that the party leadership could cope with the situation waned. 
The collapse of the SED regime’s control in the face of the people had now ex-
panded to the SED leadership losing authority and power over its own party base.
On 1 November, threatened by more demonstrations, the SED leadership 
lifted the ban on travel to Czechoslovakia. Prague immediately resembled a tran-
sit camp for East Germans wanting to emigrate. The Czechoslovak government 
registered a protest in East Berlin. The SED Politburo gave in, and from 4 No-
vember allowed East Germans to exit to West Germany via Czechoslovakia: after 
the one in Hungary, there was a second hole in the Curtain.
Within days, 50,000 East Germans had taken this new route. The Czechoslo-
vak government feared this would spread instability in their own country, and in 
East Berlin strongly protested against the mass migration. It formally requested 
the SED to allow the exit of East German citizens to West Germany “directly, 
not over Czechoslovakia’s territory.” If this did not happen, they would have to 
close their border to East Germany.52
50 Cf. “Wochenübersicht” no. 44/89, 30 October 1989, in BStU, MfS, ZAIG Nr. 4599, 142.
51 See Walter Süß, “Entmachtung und Verfall der Staatssicherheit,” BF informiert, no. 5 (1994): 10.
52 Cf. Telegram, Ziebart to Fischer, Ott and Schwiesau, 8 November 1989, in BStU, Sekretariat 
Neiber Nr. 553, 2.
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On 8 November, Chancellor Kohl made the demands of the East German 
protesters his own: if the SED renounced its monopoly on power, permitting 
independent parties and guaranteeing mandatory free elections, he would be 
ready, he bluntly told Krenz as a condition for the requested loan, “to speak in 
completely new dimensions about our economic aid.”53 The chancellor was quite 
sure that after free elections he would no longer need to discuss anything with 
the East German communists.
The fall of the Berlin Wall
In the first week of November, as SED Politburo member Günter Schabows-
ki summed up later, for the East German population that had been walled in for 
twenty-eight years, “the experience of respect or scorn for the individual” culmi-
nated in the issue of being allowed to travel.54 Under the pressure of the mass 
demonstrations and alarmed by the Czechoslovakian protests, on 7 November the 
Politburo gave the Council of Ministers instructions to produce regulations for 
short-term trips. On the morning of 9 November, an inter-ministerial team pro-
duced a draft in accordance with the responsible department of the SED Central 
Committee.55 The plan was to grant permanent departures—that is, moves to the 
Federal Republic—at GDR border crossings, although only after an appropriate 
application had been filed. Visits—also subject to application—would be ap-
proved up to thirty days a year, but were dependant on a visa being issued and 
holding a passport. Those who did not have a passport, as the plan went, would 
first have to apply for one and then wait again for at least four weeks. It was felt 
that in this way, the immediate departure of all citizens could be averted. The new 
travel regulations were to be revealed on 10 November at 4:00 a.m., in order to 
let the employees of the application authorities time overnight to prepare for the 
expected massive influx of people wanting to leave. Based on the application 
process and the passport requirement, it was calculated that the first wave of 
travel to the West would only occur in mid-December 1989.
The government draft, including a press release, was agreed upon at noon on 
9 November by the Security Department of the Central Committee and the rel-
evant ministries—the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of the Interior, and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Central Committee, the highest deci-
sion-making body of the SED, had begun their meeting the day before. During 
53 Deutscher Bundestag, 11. Wahlperiode, 173. Sitzung, 8. November 1989, Stenographischer Be-
richt, 13017.
54 Cf. Hans-Hermann Hertle, Theo Pirker, Rainer Weinert, eds., “Der Honecker muss weg!” Pro-
tokoll eines Gesprächs mit Günter Schabowski am 24. April 1990 in Berlin-West,” Berliner 
Arbeitshefte und Berichte zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung 35 (Berlin: Zentralinstitut für 
Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung, 1990), 39.
55 On the following, cf. Hertle, Chronik, 118–23.
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the meeting’s continuation, or more precisely, during a “smoking break,” a few 
members of the Politburo confirmed that the draft had been written.56 
In the afternoon, it was placed before the Council of Ministers for a resolution 
by circulation so that a quick decision could be guaranteed—namely, by 6:00 
p.m. A copy of the draft was given to Egon Krenz. At around 4:00 p.m., he read 
the proposed regulations to the 216 members of the Central Committee and 
explained its urgency as being due to pressure from the CSSR. The hopelessness 
into which the GDR felt itself forced was expressed by Krenz with the remark: 
“However we do it, we’ll do it wrong!” But the Central Committee saw no 
other way and gave its consent. At this time the travel regulations were—as 
emphasized by Krenz—only a “proposal,” a draft. A decision by the Council of 
Ministers had not yet been made.
Nevertheless, Krenz spontaneously commissioned the government spokes-
man to release it “at once,” thus lifting, almost casually, the news embargo.
This decision could have been corrected, since the government spokesman, 
Wolfgang Meyer, was aware of the holding period and its background. But 
Krenz’s next decision was irreversible: he handed the resolution together with 
the press release to Politburo member Günter Schabowski, who during these 
days was serving as the speaker of the party, and gave him the order to report 
on it at the international press conference already scheduled for 6:00 p.m. This 
interference of the party in the executive work of the government led to the 
unraveling of all the preparatory work that the Stasi and the Ministry of the 
Interior had done for the new travel regulations.
Schabowski hadn’t been there when the Politburo confirmed the travel reg-
ulations at midday. He had also not been in the hall when Krenz read travel 
regulations to the Central Committee. Thus, he knew neither the wording of the 
paper, nor anything about a holding period.
At the end of the press conference, which was broadcast live on East German 
television, he read the travel regulations from the piece of paper he had received 
from Krenz. According to the regulations, GDR citizens would not only be 
granted permanent departures, with permission being issued within a short pe-
riod of time, but also private trips would be approved. Permanent departures 
would be possible at all GDR border crossings to the Federal Republic and to 
West Berlin. “When does this take effect?” asked the journalists.57 Schabowski 
looked helpless, because “that question,” the Politburo member said later, “had 
not been discussed with me earlier.”58 He scratched his head and glanced at the 
paper.
56 The proposed resolution is held in the records of the SED Politburo: Willi Stoph, “Vorlage für 
das Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der SED, Betreff: Zeitweilige Übergangsregelung für Reisen 
und ständige Ausreise aus der DDR,” 9 November 1989, in BA, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3256, 9–10.
57 Cf. the transcript of the press conference text in Hertle, Chronik, 141–46.
58 Hertle, Pirker, Weinert, eds., “Der Honecker muss weg!”, 40.
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He overlooked the concluding sentence of the decision of the Council of Min-
isters, which stated that a press release would only be given on 10 November, and 
his eyes came to rest on the beginning section, on the words “immediately” and 
“without delay.” He thus formulated a terse response: “Straight away, with no 
delay!” A few minutes later, at 7:01 p.m., the press conference was over.
However, the storming of the border crossings was not a direct response to this 
press conference, as has often been incorrectly assumed, but it only began to occur 
on a massive scale—with a clear time gap—as a result of the subsequent press 
coverage, especially in the Western media. During the main evening news, which 
lasted until 8:15 p.m., Schabowski’s statement became the main topic under dis-
cussion. Lacking precise information, the Western media began to fill in what 
Schabowski had left open to interpretation, to condense the information in order 
to create a meaning and a context. Very quickly his contradictory statements had 
been interpreted as “the opening of the border.” Already at 7:05 p.m., the Associ-
ated Press headline was “GDR opens its border,” and at 7:41 p.m. the DPA spread 
the “sensational information:” “The East German border to West Germany and 
West Berlin is open.” At 8:00 p.m., the ARD “Tagesschau” made the travel regu-
lations its top news item, superimposing the words: “GDR opens border.”
The high point of the Western television coverage was the ARD show “Tages-
themen” (Issues of the Day), which began slightly late that evening, at 10:42 p.m. 
An introductory clip showed the nearly deserted western side of the Brandenburg 
Gate. The news anchorman, Hanns Joachim Friedrichs, proclaimed: “Tonight at 
the Brandenburg Gate. It has ended its service as a symbol of the division of Ber-
lin. So has the Wall, which for the last twenty-eight years has separated East and 
West. The GDR has yielded to the pressure of the people. They are now free to 
travel to the West.” 
Friedrichs then came into the picture and ended his introduction with these 
words: “When dealing with superlatives, caution should taken, since they wear 
out easily. But this evening, it is possible to risk one: The ninth of November is a 
historic day. The GDR has announced that its borders are now open to everyone. 
The Wall’s gates are wide open.” But Friedrichs’ announcement had jumped ahead 
of the events: contrary to his assertion, the introductory clip, which had been 
filmed at around 10:00 p.m. by the Berlin office, showed that, at least at the bor-
der crossings at Heinrich-Heine-Straße and Checkpoint Charlie, absolute silence 
reigned.
It was actually the reporting of the supposed “open border” in the Western 
media—especially on television and the radio—that triggered the onslaught of East 
and West Berliners at the border crossings and the Brandenburg Gate. The fall of 
the Berlin Wall is the first world-historic event to have attained reality because it 
was announced by the media.
With no information or orders from their military commanders, the East Ger-
man border guards on duty the evening of 9 November 1989 were apprehensive 
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about the growing masses of people, on both sides of the border crossings, who 
had come to see whether the news was true. Queries by border guards with their 
supervisors, asking how Schabowski’s statement was to be understood, remained 
unanswered, as was the same question at the next level up in the ministries. In 
the evening hours, only deputies, or deputies of deputies, could be reached at all 
levels—and nobody knew the answer. The lines of communication to the top were 
blocked: that day’s meeting of the Central Committee had been extended until 
8:45 p.m., and therefore no ministers could be reached by their deputies. Thus, 
the entire party and state leadership did not yet realize what had happened at the 
press conference, and did not know about the media response or about the begin-
ning rush of East and West to the checkpoints.
The run on the east side was strongest at the border crossing on Bornholmer 
Straße, located in the densely populated district of Prenzlauer Berg. At first the 
border guards reacted cautiously, telling people to come the next day. They then 
allowed individuals to leave, but stamped their identity cards as void. Without 
knowing it, the first East Berliners who ran across the Bornholm Bridge to West 
Berlin had been expatriated.
Finally the pressure behind the barrier bar became so strong that the passport 
inspectors and border guards began to fear for their lives. They made their own 
decision, and at around 11:30 p.m. stopped making any checks. “We’re opening 
the floodgates now! We’re opening everything!,” announced the senior passport 
control officer, and the barriers were opened.
Also at Checkpoint Charlie, the only way the border officers knew how to 
prevent the storming of the crossing was by opening all the gates at midnight. At 
the Invalidenstraße border crossing, the passport inspectors initially were deter-
mined keep the West and East Berliners at bay. They brought in reinforcements: 
forty-five men with machine guns. But as the situation escalated, they made a 
decision: “We won’t shoot at unarmed people.” The soldiers retreated and the 
supervisor ordered: “Let them go!”59
At midnight, all of the border crossings in Berlin were open; a short time 
later, East and West Berliners also celebrated the fall of the Wall under the Bran-
denburg Gate.
“We are one people!”—The path to German unity
The opening of the Wall on 9–10 November 1989 was more than an “opening 
of the border:” It was an act of self-liberation. The impact of the event, its form 
and symbolism, knocked the control of the borders out of the SED leadership’s 
hands—and at the same time, their power over citizens who were no longer walled 
59 Hans-Hermann Hertle and Kathrin Elsner, eds., Der Tag, an dem die Mauer fiel (Berlin: Nicolai, 
2009), 152.
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in. Without the Wall, the SED leadership and the newly formed government un-
der Prime Minister Hans Modrow also saw themselves stripped of their main 
collateral for negotiating about economic stabilization with West Germany; the 
GDR regime had lost its last creditworthy piece of property. “The people,” as 
laconically stated by Schalck ten years later, “virtually pre-empted the leader-
ship.”60
At the same time, the pressure on the party and state continued to increase 
after the Wall had fallen. On one hand, migration to the West increased again 
sharply: from 10 November 1989 until the end of the year, over 120,000 people 
left the GDR (the total in 1989 was 343,854); from January to March 1990 more 
than 180,000 more left. On the other hand, the mass demonstrations continued in 
the second half of November. The chants of “We are the people” quickly changed 
to “We are one people”; within a short time, everywhere in the GDR banners with 
the slogan “Germany–one fatherland” and black, red and gold flags without the 
GDR emblem defined the image of the rallies. Many civil rights activists, writers, 
artists and intellectuals, who until then had seen themselves as the spokespersons 
and the vanguard of the demonstrations, distanced themselves from the demands 
for Germany’s unification. Their attempts to stir up fears of a “sellout of our 
material and moral values” and to propagate the GDR’s independence as a “so-
cialist alternative” to the Federal Republic failed, and after the first free elections 
a few weeks later, they ended up being marginalized.61
But before this had happened, the new democratic movements and parties were 
able, based on the Polish model of a central “round table,” to limit the SED’s 
power, force the annulment in the GDR’s constitution of the SED claim to lead-
ership, and push through free elections.62 Within weeks, the central party struc-
tures crumbled; the Politburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the 
Central Committee itself disbanded. Without the party’s center of control, the 
state power structures crumbled; nearly imperceptibly, the National Defense 
Council simply ceased to exist due to lack of members. By mid-February 1990, 
the SED had lost 1.6 of their once 2.3 million members.63 At the beginning of 
December 1989, district citizen committees occupied the state security buildings 
and prevented the destruction of files. On 15 January 1990 the Stasi headquarters 
60 Conversation between Hans-Hermann Hertle and Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, 7 May 
1999.
61 Cf. the New Forum’s description of 12 November 1989: “Die Mauer ist gefallen,” in Die ersten 
Texte des Neuen Forum, hg. im Auftrag des Landessprecherrates des Neuen Forum (Berlin: 
Tribüne Druckerei, 1990), 20–21, as well as the proclamation “Für unser Land,” 26 November 
1989, Neues Deutschland, 29 November 1989.
62 Uwe Thaysen, ed., Der Zentrale Runde Tisch der DDR: Wortprotokoll und Dokumente, 5 vols. 
(Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000); idem, Der Runde Tisch. Oder: Wo blieb das Volk? 
Der Weg der DDR in die Demokratie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990).
63 Cf. Günter Fischbach, ed., DDR-Almanach ’90. Daten, Informationen, Zahlen (Stuttgart: Verlag 
Bonn Aktuell, 1990), 355.
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in Berlin were stormed. The round table finally forced the Modrow government 
to dissolve the Stasi, the East German secret police.
After the fall of the Wall and the end of the old SED, the Soviet Union was 
the only remaining guarantor of the GDR’s existence as a state. At first, the So-
viet leadership categorically opposed any tendencies toward a unification of the 
two German states. But its own internal problems—increasing national conflicts, 
the profound financial and supply crisis, the threat of insolvency toward the West, 
and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact—together with the unstoppable disso-
lution of the SED’s power in January 1990 hastened the realization at the Krem-
lin that the GDR could no longer be saved. On 10 February 1990, in Moscow, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl received Gorbachev’s basic acceptance of Germany’s 
reunification.64 The day before, the CPSU party boss had already discussed with 
US secretary of state James Baker that the external terms for German unity, in-
cluding the withdrawal of troops and the security of the neighboring countries, 
should be part of negotiations between the two German states and the four victors 
of World War II, later labeled Two Plus Four.65 At this point in time, all sides still 
assumed it was going to be a process that would take several years.
The vote at the first free parliamentary elections on 18 March 1990 was clear-
ly for a quick route to national unity. The election winner, with 48.1% of the vote, 
was the Alliance for Germany (Allianz für Deutschland), made up of the former 
bloc party CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands), the DSU (Deut-
sche Soziale Union), and the Democratic Awakening (Demokratischer Aufbruch). 
The SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) received 21.8% of the vote, 
the SED-PDS (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands–Partei des Demokra-
tischen Sozialismus) 16.3%, and the Liberals 5.3%. Alliance 90 (Bündnis 90), the 
electoral alliance of the civil rights movements New Forum, Democracy Now, 
and the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights received only 2.9% of the vote. 
Under Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière, the “Alliance for Germany” formed a 
coalition government with the Social Democrats and the Liberals. The clear elec-
toral mandate in this grand coalition was “the winding up of their own state and 
rapid union with the Federal Republic.”66 The East German and West German 
lower houses of parliament, the Volkskammer (People’s Chamber) and the 
Bundes tag, voted on 21 June 1990, with a two-thirds majority agreeing to a treaty 
for economic, monetary and social union. As a result, on 1 July, the West German 
mark was introduced as legal tender in the GDR. Financing the conversion costs 
was accomplished primarily through loans.
64 Cf. Niederschrift des Gespräches des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Generalsekretär Gorbatschow, 
Moskau, 10. Februar 1990 in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik. Deutsche Einheit, 795–807, 
esp. 801. On Soviet policy in Germany’s reunification, cf. Wolfgang Mueller, “The Soviet Union 
and the Reunification of Germany, 1989–90,” in this volume, 321–53.
65 On the discussions of US Secretary of State Baker in Moscow that began on 7 February 1990, 
see Sarotte, 1989, 110–11.
66 Rödder, Deutschland, 224.
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The negotiations on the external aspects of reunification were the subject of 
the Two Plus Four conferences between the two German states and the victorious 
powers of World War II, as well as numerous bilateral talks. These negotiations 
were brought to completion on 12 September 1990, with the signing of the “Trea-
ty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany.”  In this treaty, the occupy-
ing powers renounced their rights and responsibilities connected with World War 
II, both in Berlin and Germany as a whole. Germany received sovereign rights 
over its internal and external affairs, confirmed the final form of its borders, and 
pledged, among other things, to abstain from offensive wars and to reduce its 
army to 370,000 troops. In addition, it was agreed that the 350,000 soldiers of 
the Western Group of the Soviet military would be withdrawn by 1994.
The most important political milestones on the path to internal unity were the 
following: The decision of the People’s Chamber on 23 August to join, in accor-
dance with Article 23, the constitution of the Federal Republic, and the Unifica-
tion Treaty between the two German states, which created the legal basis for 
national reunification. When the two parliaments voted on 20 September 1990 
for the treaty, their aim was also to create, after forty years of separation, unified 
living conditions in Germany. On 3 October 1990, the political unity of Germany 
was complete.
Conclusion
The emergence, course and outcome of revolutions—and this applies to the 
radical changes that took place in all of the Central European countries—are 
unforeseeable due to contingent constellations of actions and series of events, 
even if there is an accumulation of structural crisis factors. Bourdieu’s analytical 
concept, especially if it is extended to include the effects of the media, is a meth-
odology that requires the combining of the history of structures and events. It is 
helpful for deciphering the “conjunction of independent causal series” and their 
moments of interaction. By using this methodology, a significant contribution can 
be made toward understanding the revolution in East Germany as well as in oth-
er places.
The opening of the Hungarian–Austrian border for East Germans on 10–11 
September 1989 can be seen, in Bourdieu’s sense, as a “critical event.” And the 
Leipzig Monday demonstration on 9 October 1989, which ignited the East Ger-
man October Revolution, can be interpreted as a “critical moment.” The aware-
ness of the two events was based largely on the media, whose reporting greatly 
enhanced the effect of both. Hungary’s “hole in the wall” laid bare the SED 
regime’s weaknesses and its loss of support from a formerly allied government 
and, in particular, the Soviet hegemon. Over and above the nucleus of the op-
position movement, the opening of the Hungarian border gave new options to 
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much of the East German population—both those who wanted to emigrate and 
those who wanted to stay—while it narrowed those of the regime. The exodus 
continued to grow, while at the same time, protests against the regime exploded 
in the streets.
The Leipzig Monday demonstration on 9 October 1989 and the inaction of 
the ready police and military forces against 70,000 protesters made 9 October a 
symbol of hope. The peaceful course of events emboldened many to take part 
in demonstrations; by 9 November 1989, several million people all over the GDR 
had taken part in more than 600 demonstrations and rallies, protesting for their 
democratic rights and against the regime. In this situation, the resignations of, 
first, the SED general secretary, and then the Council of Ministers and the Po-
litburo, as well as the announcement of reforms, were interpreted as a sign of 
weakness on the part of the country’s leaders. Instead of saving the system, these 
acts intensified the protest movements and accelerated the breakdown of the 
party’s rule.
The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989—not intended by the SED 
and caused largely by the media—did not end the revolution as is believed by 
some. It rather changed its course.67 The number of demonstrations in the three 
weeks after the Wall fell remained as high as in the three previous weeks.68 No 
longer walled in—a fact that made the communist regime finally lose its power 
and control over the “state inmates” (Joachim Gauck)—the majority of the pro-
testers unambiguously called for German unification and the end, not the reform, 
of the GDR.
One of the ironies of the October Revolution is that in the previous weeks, 
when faced by the state’s impending bankruptcy, some of the SED leadership 
had already abandoned their belief in the survival of the GDR without West 
German assistance, and thus were ahead of “their” people. And it is part of the 
tragedy of the opposition that even after the fall of the Wall, some of the civil 
rights groups—also because they were ignorant of the real economic situation—
dreamed of socialist reforms, distancing themselves from the demonstrations and 
the ever more energetically chanted slogan “Germany, united fatherland.” “They 
promoted the right of self-determination for the society, but refused to tolerate 
the self-determination as it was then practiced by the bulk of the population.”69 
Many civil rights activists marginalized themselves because of this contradic-
tion. Increasingly, the advocate for the mass movement of the GDR population 
was the West German conservative-liberal government under Chancellor Kohl, 
67 See, for example, Stefan Bollinger, 1989—eine abgebrochene Revolution : verbaute Wege nicht 
nur zu einer besseren DDR? (Berlin: Trafo, 1999).
68 Cf. Uwe Schwabe, “Der Herbst ’89 in Zahlen—Demonstrationen und Kundgebungen vom Au-
gust 1989 bis zum April 1990,” in Eberhard Kuhrt et al. eds., Opposition in der DDR von den 
70er Jahren bis zum Zusammenbruch der SED-Herrschaft (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1999), 
719–35, here 726–27.
69 Rödder, Deutschland, 124.
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who with his Ten-Point Plan of 28 November 1989 was already heading for 
German reunification.
Crucial for the success of the East German revolution was ultimately the po-
sition of the Soviet Union. “Our troops are with you,” CPSU general secretary 
Leonid Brezhnev had impressed upon Erich Honecker in August 1970 before the 
latter came to power. “Erich, I am telling you frankly, never forget: the GDR 
cannot exist without us, without the Soviet Union, its power and strength. With-
out us there is no GDR.”70 In January 1990, the dictum was the same as it had 
been nearly twenty years before, but the price of maintaining the GDR, econom-
ically or militarily, was too high for CPSU leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his 
closest advisers—and to pay it would have contradicted Gorbachev’s “new think-
ing.” When the Soviet Union released the way for German reunification after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the basis for the GDR’s existence was extinguished. It is 
this subsequent self-dissolution of the SED state after the collapse of its ruling 
system which characterizes the special path taken by Germany among the com-
munist systems in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Translated from the German original by Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek
70 Conversation Leonid I. Brezhnev with Erich Honecker, East German protocol, 28 July 1970, in 
BA, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3196.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1989: CAUSES, RESULTS, 
AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGES1
Conceptual changes in the “miracle year”
The crucial events of the year 1989 were actively influenced by the Czecho-
slovak people. In November and December they rose up against the hegemony 
of the ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Česko-
slovenska, KSČ) and, with their decisive actions, contributed to the fall of the 
communist dictatorship. The “Velvet Revolution” became the symbol of a peace-
ful takeover of power and the building of a democratic state on the basis of 
pragmatically conceived governmental and legal continuity. The grass-roots 
movement—represented in the Czech Republic by the Civic Forum (Občanské 
fórum, OF) and in the Slovak Republic by the Public Against Violence (Verejnost’ 
proti násiliu, VPN)—reached an understanding with representatives of the com-
munist elite to choose a conciliatory path toward a market economy and democ-
racy. This model of historical compromise was different from that which occurred 
in Hungary and Poland, because the Czech communists were unwilling to engage 
in any sort of dialogue with the opposition until the last moment. In the end, their 
so-called normalizing regime collapsed due to the wide-spread protests in East 
Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November. The Czech compromise 
is quite significant if compared to the frightful example of the bloody drama that 
occurred in Romania in December 1989. While the emergence of latent anti-com-
munism was nonetheless very energetic, the Czechs and Slovaks sobered up 
quickly from their revolutionary enthusiasm. The fact remains that they see their 
“peaceful,” “velvet,” or “gentle” revolution as a unique contribution to the histo-
ry of modern revolutions since 1789—in the sense of stopping a chain of violence 
and endless revenge for the past wrongs. The world’s ethos was represented by 
the dissident Václav Havel, who at the end of the “miracle year” was elected 
president of Czechoslovakia.
The fall of the communist dictatorships in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe has been perceived as a revolutionary change in the world order, but these 
revolutions (or coups), as such, have not been thought to have offered anything 
innovative or inspiring. Jürgen Habermas has called them the “catching up” revo-
1 This paper was written as part of a research project on the “Czechoslovak Federal Assembly 
1989–1992: The Emancipation of Legislative Power” that has been supported by a grant from 
the Czech Science Foundation (GACR P410/11/0423).
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lutions, revolutions that merely copied the ideas and methods of the modern period.2 
In a similar line, François Furet has argued that not a single original idea was born 
in the upheavals which took place in Eastern Europe in 1989.3 The source of these 
civil movements has been defined in different ways, including the awakening of 
citizens’ values or the longing for lost freedom.4 But most importantly, they have 
been considered motivated by materialistic or consumer factors. One of the first 
slogans of the OF and the VPN was a call for the “return to Europe.” This symbol-
ized their common effort to join the free and economically more developed West. 
This is the atmosphere in which Francis Fukuyama’s paradigmatic theory, the “end 
of history” concerning the historical victory of the liberal democratic order (and 
capitalism), was born.5 Another American political scholar, Samuel Huntington, has 
created an impressive global picture of the democratic phases in which authoritar-
ian regimes from South America to Eastern Europe have given way to democracies.6 
The last phase was initiated in 1974 with Portugal’s “Carnation Revolution,” which 
was followed by the people of the Soviet bloc fifteen years later. In this ideologi-
cal-theoretical context, the theory of transformation to democracy or transitology, 
which had already been around for a while, began to thrive and developed a func-
tional leveling typology.7 This is how, at the beginning of the 1990s, “paradigms of 
transformation” were conceived, which were the result of the attraction toward 
human rights policies, liberal democracy, and a capitalist market economy that 
followed the neoliberal model of the so-called Washington Consensus of democra-
cy and prosperity. This paradigm has been reinforced in liberal political debates and 
in specialized discourses in the social sciences, also in Czechoslovakia of the 1990s, 
where the view was held that liberal democracy had defeated “red totalitarianism.” 
After the transition period in Czechoslovakia, the prevailing concept was that of 
return: return not only to Europe, but also to an idealized form of the country’s own 
democratic and economic traditions. This created a new wave of historical opti-
mism, negating earlier viewpoints in which history was the centerpiece of commu-
nism. Czechoslovakia’s democracy was seen as predestined for prosperity. 
A wide range of comparative analyses and approaches have explored theories 
regarding the end of history and the phases of democracy. In the 1990s, a number 
of comparative studies were undertaken that examined the fall of the dictatorships 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “Die nachholende Revolution,” in Kleine Politische Schriften VII (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990).
3 Quoted in Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New York: Time Books, 
1990), 27.
4 Timothy Garton Ash, We the People: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, 
Berlin and Prague (London: Granta, 1990). 
5 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: An Avon Book, 1993).
6 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
7 Vladimíra Dvořáková and Jiří Kunc, O přechodech k demokracii (Prague: Sociologické nakla-
datelství, 1994), 157.
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in the Soviet bloc countries.8 For the most part, they have focused on the magnitude 
of the geo-political changes, the role of Gorbachev’s perestroika, and the specific 
major economic and political shifts in the satellite states. Naturally, these studies 
did not provide an in-depth analysis of specific events and their history. It was only 
in the next decade that scholars began to deal with these topics. But in connecting 
the forms of these crucial events, they also changed the view of them accordingly. 
Priority was given to detailed examinations of the modalities of political change. It 
was seen that liberal and democratic processes are marked by the opposition not 
being prepared to take over power, and problems emerging regarding legalities in 
its continuity as well as the broad political consensus.9 The French political scien-
tist Magdaléna Hadjiisky has provided a detailed analysis of the conflicting plural-
ist political systems originating from engaged citizens within the OF.10 
The American historian James Krapfl has dealt with the civic dimension of 
change and revolution from below, rejecting thereby the statements of Habermas 
and Furet concerning the non-originality of the Eastern European revolutions. He 
states that the “Velvet Revolution” was a unique example of a disciplined and goal 
orientated collective action, based on a special combination of modern and tradi-
tional values. According to him, democratic revolutions prefer a balanced combi-
nation of direct and representative elements.11 Padraic Kenney has examined the 
power of the people, presenting numerous examples of spontaneity and creativity. 
He has described revolution as a theater performance, as a jolly carnival.12 The 
Czech philosopher, sociologist and law specialist Jiří Přibáň has revealed a post-
modern dimension in the Eastern European revolutions—their movement toward 
pluralistic public forums, and their rejection of there being only one legitimate 
framework (as, for example, popular sovereignty) in favor of “diversity in living 
8 See, e.g., Roger East, Revolution in Eastern Europe (London, New York: Pinter Publishers, 
1992); Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 
1992); J. Elvert and M. Salewski, Der Umbruch in Osteuropa (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 
1993); Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997); Vladimir Tismaneanu, 
ed., The Revolutions of 1989 (London, New York: Routledge, 1999); Steven Saxonberg, The 
Fall: A Comparative Study of the End of Communism in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hunga-
ry and Poland (Uppsala, Virginia: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2001); Svetlana Savranskaya, 
Thomas Blanton, Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold 
War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2010).
9 Jiří Suk, Labyrintem revoluce: Aktéři, zápletky a křižovatky jedné politické krize. Od listopadu 
1989 do června 1990 (Prague: Prostor, 2003).
10 Magdaléna Hadjiisky, De la mobilisation citoyenne a la démocratie de partis: Participation et 
délégation politiques dans la nouvelle démocratie tcheque, 1989–1996 (Paris: Institut d´Etudes 
Politique de Paris, 2004).
11 James Krapfl, Revolúcia s ľudskou tvárou: Politika, kultúra a společenstvo v Československu po 
17. novembri 1989 (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2009).
12 Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2002).
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styles.”13 This diversity has often been connected to an identity anchored in the past. 
This identity sprang from historical memory and resulted in the dependence of the 
political actors on numerous personal, family and collective traditions of the past, 
traditions that had often been interrupted by the dramatic events of the twentieth 
century. The past, however, was not only a positive source of strength and identity; 
it was also a burden due to the legacy of the totalitarian regime.14 
In the Czech Republic, the “transformation paradigm” disintegrated not only 
because of different views of understanding as such, but also due to a gradual 
sobering regarding the “Czech path toward capitalism”15 and the “barbarizing of 
Czech politics,”16 especially during the political and economic crisis of 1996–97. 
Nevertheless, it took another decade before it was rejected as an ideological 
construct that gave unprecedented power to the expansion of global capitalism, 
thus threatening the plurality of cultures and values.17 Different age groups and 
programs expressed the need to criticize the foundations of the neoliberal para-
digm and to formulate a new concept of democracy. At the same time, anti-com-
munism was rejected as a political tool of the Czech right in its struggle with the 
liberal left as a political alternative. Renewed democratic and socialist traditions 
are closely connected to the above-mentioned plurality of memory.18
Part 1 of this chapter depicts the establishment of communism in Czechoslovakia 
and analyzes the reasons for its fall. Following the “Velvet Revolution” as delineated 
in Part 2, the interparty struggle, political and economic measures as well as lustration 
in 1990–98 are analyzed in Parts 3–5. At the end of the chapter, an attempt will be 
made to draw premlinary conclusions about the changes achieved in Czech society.
1. Reasons for the fall of the dictatorship in Czechoslovakia
The “Velvet Revolution,” the unexpected outburst of widespread discontent, 
was primarily caused by external influences—it was one of the last pieces in the 
13 Jiří Přibáň, Disidenti práva: O revolucích roku 1989, fikcích legality a soudobé verzi společenské 
smlouvy (Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2001).
14 Francoise Mayer, Les Tcheques et leur communisme: Mémoire et identités politiques (Paris: 
Éditions EHESS, 2003); Adéla Gjuričová, Michal Kopeček, Petr Roubal, Jiří Suk, Tomáš Zah-
radníček, Rozděleni minulostí: Vytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 1989 
(Prague: Knihovna Václava Havla, 2011).
15 Martin Myant, The Rise and the Fall of Czech Capitalism: Economic Development in the Czech 
Republic since 1989 (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003).
16 Lubomír Kopeček, Éra nevinnosti: Česká politika 1989–1997 (Brno: Barrister a Principal, 
2010), 324.
17 Václav Bělohradský, Společnost nevolnosti: Eseje z pozdější doby (Prague: Sociologické nakla-
datelství, 2007).
18 Pavel Barša, Václav Bělohradský, Michael Hauser, Václav Magid, Petr Schnur, Ondřej Slačálek, 
Tereza Stöckelová, Martin Škabraha, Mirek Vodrážka, Kritika depolitizovaného rozumu: Úvahy 
(nejen) o nové normalizaci (Prague: Grimmus, 2010).
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series of falling dominos of the regimes in Central Europe. A radical farewell to 
the past, it gave the impression of breaking continuity. However, while not evident 
on the surface, continuity with the “normalizing regime” was very deep. The key 
to understanding how the ancien régime fell is found in the character and the 
origins of the Czech communist dictatorship. Regretfully, not much research in 
this area has been done until now, and we thus can only draw a tentative and 
improvised picture. 
After seizing power in February 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslova-
kia became an overwhelming political force. It did away with its competitors, and 
until 1956 ruled with terror and triumphant propaganda. Thus, only limited op-
position could take place within the party and state structures. From time to time 
after 1956, a certain amount of criticism appeared from the cultural and intellec-
tual elite, who expressed the need for more artistic autonomy and creative free-
dom,19 for a different approach to reading Marx (and Marxist revisionism),20 as 
well as the need for economic reform. The party’s leadership eliminated such 
rebellious elements, a policy that was used both during periods of thaw and of 
repression. 
The most critical moment for the dictatorship took place in 1968–69.21 The 
“Prague Spring” of 1968, which started in December of the previous year as a 
“palace revolution,” turned into an attempt to reform and to create a more attrac-
tive “socialism with a human face” that was adapted to domestic needs. The 
aroused civic society succeeded in gaining complete freedom of speech, which 
in the course of a few weeks dismantled the authority and discourse of the KSČ. 
The terror of the 1950s was openly criticized in the media, a number of previ-
ously suppressed political “citizens’ groups” came to life, as did a number of 
different identities and traditions. However, the socialist structure as such was 
left untouched and not challenged; people wanted socialism without dictatorship, 
a better, non-authoritarian communist party that would rule thanks to its inherent 
authority. The reformed party’s leadership declared that this was their goal; in 
practice, however, the former structures and power aspirations remained.22 With 
approaching external threats from the USSR, hundreds of thousands citizens 
demanded independence and state sovereignty. But the awakened civil society 
was not given a chance to articulate its various emerging interests in discussions 
and debates. These spontaneous citizens’ movements, accompanied by the disin-
tegration of communist power, were interrupted by the Soviet-led invasion of 
19 Jan Mervart, Naděje a iluze: Čeští a slovenští spisovatelé v reformním hnutí šedesátých let 
(Brno: Host, 2010).
20 Michal Kopeček, Hledání ztraceného smyslu revoluce: Zrod a počátky marxistického revizion-
ismu ve střední Evropě, 1953–1956 (Prague: Argo, 2009).
21 Kieran Williams, Prague Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970 (Cam-
bridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
22 Jiří Hoppe, Opozice ́ 68: Sociální demokracie, Klub angažovaných nestraníků a K231– Sdružení 
bývalých politických vězňů (Prague: Prostor, 2009).
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Czechoslovakia.23 The leading communists who had supported reforms capitulat-
ed, and the overall result was a gradual resignation in the society and the striving 
for “consolidation” and “normalization” of relationships. 
The post-August dictatorship caused a political, mental and moral decline, 
because it buried hopes for change and democratic socialism. The reinstated 
dictatorship, without the freedom of expression, undertook a huge wave of 
“cleansing,” and in the 1970s, more than half a million party members who had 
expressed disagreement with the invasion were expelled from the KSČ ranks. 
This was followed by an active persecution of the revolutionary youth movement 
and the circles of independent socialists. The regime of the “restored order” made 
it clear that it would not tolerate any open opposition. Charter 77, which was 
established in 1977 as part of the Helsinki movement to defend human rights, 
considered itself a moral opposition. But the approximately two thousand people 
who joined Charter 77 were spied on until the fall of the regime by the secret 
police, and the group was unable to evolve into a political opposition. The Czech 
population was again forced to adapt itself to an authoritarian regime leaning 
toward the Soviet Union, the superpower in the east. 
Structural changes and unsolved problems under communism
After February 1948, the KSČ managed to destroy parliamentary democracy 
as well as the prewar economic order that, until World War II, had for centuries 
been developing in its own fashion. All private property was nationalized,24 in-
cluding the expropriation of small businesses from owners and farmers,25 and 
the free market was replaced by a system of central planning and an economy 
focused on heavy industry. The society underwent a complete structural change. 
Severed were the traditional ties and social hierarchy of the rural and civic so-
ciety. Communist egalitarianism veiled the real, or undeclared, inequality in 
economic status of the communist nomenklatura, which became a “new class” 
(Milovan Djilas). The citizens had to adapt themselves to the new conditions, 
make the best of the given situation, and find ways to realize their own vested 
interests.26 
Parallel to the repeating crises of communist authority, the system also lived 
through economic crises, with the regime in the 1950s and 60s repeatedly react-
23 Jan Pauer, Prag 1968: Der Einmarsch des Warschauer Paktes. Hintergründe, Planung, Durch-
führung (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1995).
24 Jan Kuklík, Znárodněné Československo: Od znárodnění k privatizaci—státní zásahy do vlast-
nických a dalších majetkových práv v Československu a jinde v Evropě (Prague: Auditorium, 
2010), 450.
25 Karel Jech, Kolektivizace a vyhánění sedláků z půdy (Prague: Vyšehrad, 2008), 336.
26 Jiří Kabele, Z kapitalismu do socialismu a zpět: Teoretické vyšetřování přerodů Československa 
a České republiky (Prague: Karolinum, 2005).
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ing to attempts to implement reforms. The regime was faced with the dilemma 
of how to incorporate elements of free market and competition (which would 
increase work productivity and motivation) into the rigid precepts of a central-
ized economic system, while at the same time holding on to the socialist sys-
tem.27
The socialist economy, in its consumer phase in the 1970s and 80s, was 
marked by persistent shortages of consumer goods. The saying circulated during 
this period that “in spite of the fact that you can buy nothing, you can get every-
thing.” One could get desired goods through unofficial distribution networks by 
providing favors or bribes. In practice, scarce goods were distributed at three 
levels. First at the state level; second, at regional warehouses accessible to the 
nomenklatura and their friends, namely, shop operators and those who gave them 
bribes. Third, what was left was distributed to sell in shops accessible to the 
public at large. Many citizens managed by doing extra work, including illegal 
activities and moonlighting without paying taxes. Small and large scale corruption 
reigned in this type of economy, with its shortage of goods. The folk proverb 
“he who does not steal is robbing his family” was an expression of the reality 
that stealing from the state was not unusual. The communist  state was gradually 
populated by nomenklatura and family clans who owned social and cultural 
capital, as this compensated for their lack of financial capital and property 
ownership. This was one of the key reasons and motivational factors for the later 
property ownership transformation, which began immediately after the regime’s 
fall, even before official restitution or privatization processes began in the spirit 
of a transformation law.28
In the second half of the 1980s, it became evident that the rigid system was 
failing, both economically and intellectually, and had to reform. The contrast to 
the effectiveness and prosperity of the capitalist system was overwhelming. Even 
communist leaders became aware of this fact. One of the most important reasons 
for the dictatorship’s fall, as seen by the Czech sociologist Ivo Možný, was that 
the system it defended no longer satisfied anyone except the party nomenklatura. 
It appealed neither to the managers of government enterprises, nor to the gener-
al economic elite. And the general populace was dissatisfied because of the 
shortage of goods, sinking salaries, as well as the shortage or lack of available 
housing. But despite all this frustration, the situation was not critical and there 
was no threat of social unrest.29 Furthermore, there was no realistic alternative 
to the existing system. The Czechs and Slovaks wanted to live in a more devel-
27 Zdislav Šulc, Stručné dějiny ekonomických reforem v Československu, České republice, 1945–
1995 (Brno: Doplněk, 1998).
28 Ivo Možný, Proč tak snadno…: Některé rodinné důvody sametové revoluce (Prague: Sociolog-
ické nakladatelství 1999).
29 Otakar Turek, Podíl ekonomiky na pádu komunismu v Československu (Prague: Ústav pro 
soudobé dějiny, 1995).
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oped and freer consumers’ society, but not necessarily in a capitalist system. 
While they had specific wishes, they had only a vague notion about what kind 
of regime would fulfill their desires.
Late communism
Soviet perestroika came too late; it was a futile attempt to make authoritari-
an communism an attractive alternative to liberal democratic capitalism.30 In 
Czechoslovakia, any will to reform was inevitably associated with 1968. Post-oc-
cupation party leadership was right to fear a new crisis. It openly joined pere-
stroika under the condition that the “reconstruction” would be carried out taking 
the local specificity into consideration. It made concessions, above all in the 
economic sphere (“reconstruction of economic mechanisms”),31 and avoided 
political and cultural liberalization. The average citizen associated the “recon-
struction” primarily with the idea of glasnost. However, the average citizen was 
still deprived of the freedom of speech. The communist authority waned, the 
Marxist-Leninist discourse of “real socialism” crumbled.32 From 1987, the bu-
reau of the KSČ Central Committee became increasingly more concerned about 
the development of the entire communist  bloc due to glasnost in the Soviet 
Union. 
The liberalization in the public and cultural domain did not satisfy the expec-
tations and the demands of the citizens, especially the younger generation, which 
did not accept the official cultural conception and dogmatic socialist realism, 
which in the “restored order” or “normalization” period of 1969–89 had soft-
ened. Young people were no longer impressed by communist propaganda, and 
they were put off by censorship and the existence of forbidden books and “spe-
cial films,” which by the end of the 1980s had become an incomprehensible 
anachronism, not to mention the difficulties to travel to Western countries. They 
expressed their dissatisfaction at university meetings and elsewhere.33 Another 
symptom of the decreasing authority of the KSČ manifested itself in an increase 
of violence among the people (football rowdies, bullying in student residences 
and the military, etc.). 
30 Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Logic of 1989: The Soviet Peaceful Withdrawal from Eastern Eu-
rope,” in Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of Histo-
ry: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest, New York: Central European 
University Press, 2010), 1–47.
31 Šulc, Stručné dějiny ekonomických reforem, 62–70.
32 Michal Pullmann, Konec experimentu: Přestavba a pád komunismu v Československu  (Prague: 
Scriptorium, 2011), 145–72.
33 Milan Otáhal and Miroslav Vaněk, eds., Sto studentských revolucí. Studenti v období pádu ko-
munismu—životopisná vyprávění (Prague: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny,1999).
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The imaginary divisions between the dissident ghetto and the rest of society 
became a “grey zone”; it was here that excluded artists and intellectuals met and 
had discussions with once conformist colleagues. Several independent initiatives 
were started that dealt with culture, pacifist movements, and politics. At the end 
of 1988, foreign radio broadcasts were no longer interrupted. Millions of Czechs 
and Slovaks began to listen to Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.34 The 
diminishing of the authority of the KSČ and its rigid official policies gave way 
to the activities of charismatic individuals who represented various values and 
traditions. Already in July 1985, during the traditional procession in Velehrad, 
many of the faithful openly demonstrated their discontent regarding the status 
of religious freedom. The churches were frequented by more and more young 
people. The regime felt threatened: In March 1988, the police in Bratislava used 
water cannons to disperse a peaceful “candle demonstration.” Cardinal František 
Tomášek was a symbol of defiance for believers who explicitly demanded the 
independence of the church from the state, respect for religious freedom, and 
more democracy.35 The symbol of 1968 was Alexander Dubček, who had become 
the hope of those who aspired to “democratic socialism.” It was hoped that 
Mikhail Gorbachev would appreciate Dubček’s merits and enable him to return 
to politics. Artistic freedom and civic courage was represented by Václav Havel, 
seen as the leading authority of Charter 77. In January 1989, he was arrested 
again and sentenced to nine months of imprisonment. After a huge wave of in-
ternational solidarity (and his being nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize), he 
was conditionally released mid-sentence. Several thousand until then conformist 
artists, scientists and other citizens gave Havel their unconditional support. 
However, there was no direct or simple connection between the first courageous 
acts of individual citizens and the massive collective act that would later shake 
the regime. A balance of fear ruled in the months before the unexpected fall of 
the regime: The population lived in terror of police violence, while at the same 
time the regime was afraid of compromises that would cause its downfall. 
The above-mentioned individuals, Havel, Dubček and Tomášek, had a certain 
amount of influence as a moral example, but they did not stand for a political 
movement. They represented the different identities and traditions that had been 
suppressed or interrupted in critical years—1938–39, 1948, 1968–69—which all 
culminated in 1988–89, with the anti-regime student demonstrations on 17 No-
vember 1989 in Prague. During the “Velvet Revolution,” the entire spectrum of 
national memory, with its emblems and symbols, flooded public spaces. Awak-
ened was the memory of the prosperous democratic “first republic” (1918–38), 
34 Vilém Prečan, “‘Vás lidé berou jakou hlavní svobodný, nezávislý sdělovací prostředek’: Vá-
clav Havel a RSE v červenci 1989,” in Marek Junek, ed., Svobodně! Rádio Svobodná Evropa 
1951–2011 (Prague: Radioservis, 2011), 207–47, 256. 
35 Stanislav Balík and Jiří Hanuš, Katolická církev v Československu 1945–1989 (Brno: Centrum 
pro demokracii a kulturu, 2007).
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of the citizens’ spontaneity and unfulfilled dreams during the “Prague Spring,” 
of modern humanistic and democratic values and human rights, as well as the 
memory of old religious and spiritual traditions.36
2. The “Velvet Revolution” (November and December 1989)
The brutal suppression by police forces of the peaceful student demonstrations 
on 17 November triggered an avalanche of developments. The university students 
contacted intellectuals, artists, and theater and film actors; together they created 
pockets of resistance. Strikes were declared. On 18 November almost all of the 
theaters in Prague went on strike; they were subsequently joined by artistic ensem-
bles in other cities. The protest movement was accelerated by a false rumor of a 
student’s death, Martin Šmíd.37 Theaters across the country became forums for 
heated discussions. On Monday, 20 November, all the universities went on strike, 
joined by various organizations. In Prague and Bratislava, meetings took place at 
which hundreds of thousands of people participated. They were joined by thousands 
of other demonstrators in the major cities of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia.38 
On Sunday, 19 November, the Civic Forum (OF) was born in the Prague 
Činoherni Club. The political movement was not only made up of dissident 
groups, but of disenchanted citizens, including some communists and members 
of the National Front.39 At the same time, Václav Havel became a celebrity re-
spected by large parts of society. In the Slovak capital of Bratislava, a similar 
movement was established, the Public Against Violence (VPN). The leaders of 
the VPN were the environmental activist Ján Budaj and the popular actor Milan 
Kňažko. The aim of both movements was to establish a dialogue with state au-
thorities about liberalization and a process of democratization. The pressure of 
these citizens’ movements culminated on 27 November, with a general strike that 
forced the communists, represented at that time by the federal prime minister, 
Ladislav Adamec, to initiate talks with the opposition. 
Adamec launched discussions with the opposition on 26 November, one week 
after the revolution had started. As a result of these political negotiations, politi-
cal prisoners were released, the constitutional articles giving the KSČ a leading 
36 Jiří Suk, “The Public—Space—Freedom”, in Filip Blažek, ed., Posters of Velvet Revolution: 
The Story of the Posters of November and December 1989 (Prague: XYZ, 2009), 105–28, 144.
37 Vladimír Hanzel and Alena Müllerová, Albertov 16:00: Příběhy sametové revoluce (Prague: 
Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2009), 45–57.
38 For a detailed overview of the political events surrounding the “Velvet Revolution” and the main 
related OF documents, see the website of the Institute of Contemporary History (www.89.usd.
cas.cz). The archives of the Coordination Center of the Civic Forum (November 1989—Febru-
ary 1991) are stored at the institute and are accessible there.
39 Ivana Koutská, Vojtěch Ripka, Pavel Žáček, eds., Občanské fórum: den první. Vznik OF v doku-
mentech a fotografiích (Prague: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, 2009), 25–83.
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role in society under the National Front political system were removed, and op-
position groups were legalized and granted access to the media. Both the OF and 
VPN demanded fundamental changes in the composition and focus of the gov-
ernment, although they were not yet interested in participating in it. Both move-
ments had only come into being after 17 November 1989 and needed time to 
organize themselves and formulate their programs. Prime Minister Adamec took 
advantage of this situation, and on 3 December he introduced a government 
dominated by communists, who kept fifteen positions of twenty.40 This govern-
ment was rejected by the people, but the renewed protests remained peaceful and 
did not become violent. After a few days, the OF (but not the VPN) realized that 
they would fail if they did not show their power and demand seats in the govern-
ment. Prime Minister Adamec had resigned and the “government of national 
understanding,” led by the communist Marián Čalfa, appointed seven ministers 
from the Civic Forum, excluding the minister of the interior and minister of de-
fense, which were key positions. The VPN was not represented by any minister.41 
On 10 December, the new federal government was appointed and the presi-
dent, Gustáv Husák, a communist, resigned. The objective of the OF and VPN 
was for Václav Havel to take over the presidency. The Federal Assembly—the 
supreme legislative body of the Czechoslovak federation—possessed a comfort-
able communist majority, and thus decided to call direct presidential elections, 
expecting the victory of its candidate, ex-Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec. The 
candidacy of Havel caused complications in Slovakia, where political parties and 
social organizations had nominated Alexander Dubček, a 1968 political symbol, 
for the presidency. The communists and most political forces except OF, VPN 
and the small Czech bloc parties demanded direct elections. However, direct 
elections would result in a competition between the Czech and Slovak candidates 
and could cause the separation between the two republics. Thus, the OF and VPN 
found themselves in a paradoxical situation. The revolutionaries insisted on ob-
serving the existing constitution and having the president elected by the Federal 
Assembly, which was dominated by the communists. In contrast, the KSČ put 
forward a constitutional amendment establishing a presidential system. Demo-
crats wanted to prevent direct elections, but during the “round table” debates 
which had started on 8 December, they failed to convince their opponents. A club 
of communist deputies in the Federal Assembly insisted on direct elections and 
appealed to the opinion of the general public. As the OF and VPN had no depu-
ties in parliament, they could only mobilize the public. They were concerned, 
however, that the massive pressure on the communist deputies to elect Havel as 
president would cause the disintegration of the highest legislative body, which 
would result in a constitutional crisis.42 
40 Suk, Labyrintem revoluce, 37–64.
41 Ibid., 110–54.
42 Suk, Labyrintem revoluce, 188–211.
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Čalfa offered a way out of the stalemate at a private meeting on 15 December 
in the office of the prime minister. Čalfa and Havel agreed on a coordinated 
process, aiming for Havel to be elected president. Čalfa intervened in parliament, 
and already at the next meeting of the Federal Assembly on 19 December, the 
communist deputies resigned their plans of having a direct election and support-
ed Havel’s candidacy.
At the time of the deputies’ discussions, students were demonstrating in sup-
port of Havel’s candidacy in front of the parliament building on a daily basis. The 
club of the KSČ was unable to resist the pressure from both sides, and gave up 
their fight to elect a president of their choice.43 It was imperative that Czech–Slo-
vak relations not break up during the presidential elections and thus, various 
measures were taken to lower the Czech and Slovak tensions regarding Havel 
and Dubček as candidates for the presidential post. The two men met a few times 
with this goal in mind. Complicated negotiations and subsequent round table 
meetings of the various political parties, organizations and movements culminat-
ed in an agreement on how to fill the highest state functions. On 29 December, 
Dubček was elected chairman of the Federal Assembly, and Václav Havel, a day 
later, became the president of Czechoslovakia. Both were unanimously elected. 
After the election ceremony at Prague Castle and a solemn Te Deum in St. Vitus’ 
Cathedral, the university students, the moving force and symbol of the protest, 
ended their strike.44
The end of the “miracle year” culminated in a genuine democratic revolution, 
characterized by James Krapfl as a “saintly society” symbolizing human values 
and a combination of direct and representative democracy.45 The fall of the com-
munist  dictatorships in Czechoslovakia was not preceded by political segrega-
tion, this having been hindered by the rigid Czechoslovak regime. In this sense 
it differed from the more liberal Polish and Hungarian regimes. The process of 
political and ideological differentiation began only in January 1990.
3. Division of power and political liberalization (December 1989–June 1990)
 
The elimination of the constitutional articles granting a leading role in the 
political system to the KSČ (29 November), the taking over of key ministries in 
the federal government by non-communists (10 December), and the election of 
Václav Havel as the president of the republic (29 December 1989) put an end to 
the KSČ’s dominant position in the bodies of executive power. In January and 
February, the KSČ ceased to be the main power in the highest legal bodies (al-
though it maintained its relatively strong position until the parliamentary elections 
43 Ibid., 212–29.
44 Ibid., 230–49.
45 Krapfl, Revolúcia s ľudskou tvárou, 55–100.
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on 8 and 9 June 1990). A concrete view of the new balance of power in the first 
half of 1990 is provided by the basic figures documenting the results of the 
co-optation of new members into the highest legislative bodies. The decisive 
political forces came to an agreement at a round table in January 1990.46 Small 
political groups had a relatively large amount of influence, although this did not 
match their social weight. The OF and VPN were forced to accept some compro-
mises (in the areas of legislation, election law, etc.), which caused disagreements 
in both movements and created potential political splits.
Between late December 1989 and early February 1990 many of the 350 mem-
bers of the Czechoslovakian Federal Assembly (FS) were removed or forced to 
resign. Of its 242 deputies, the KSČ was left with 136; the OF and VPN were 
given 129 seats (4 of them not occupied), non-party deputies were given 41 of 
their previous 64 seats, and the parties of the former National Front kept their 
previous number of mandates—the Czechoslovak People’s Party and the Czecho-
slovak National Socialist Party each 18, and the Democratic Party and the Free-
dom Party each 4. In early February 1990, the parliaments of the republics—the 
Czech National Council (CNR) and the Slovak National Council (SNR)—were 
changed in the same fashion. A significant anomaly was that in the SNR, the VPN 
had only 21 co-opted members from the total number of 150, whereas the com-
munists were left with 65 seats, despite the fact that one purpose of co-optation 
was to eliminate the absolute majority of the KSČ. In early February 1990, the 
political decision-making process shifted from round tables to reconstructed legal 
assemblies (and by the end of March, local and district councils were reinstated, 
as were national councils in the whole country). Thanks to these changes, parlia-
mentary democracy was formally restored in Czechoslovakia. The dual state ap-
paratus was based on three pillars, two republican and one federal, and represent-
ed democratic politics. These bodies, freshly liberated from an authoritarian sys-
tem, formed a complicated matrix, since the Czechoslovak federal state, from its 
inception in 1968, had been governed by the centralized dictatorship of the KSČ.47
At the beginning of 1990, the government was represented by 50 ministries 
in three governments (Czech, Slovak and federal) and 700 deputies in the three 
legal councils (FS, CNR and SNR). The constitutional system didn’t anticipate a 
systematic institutional cooperation between the national councils, or between the 
Czech, Slovak and federal governments. The status of the republics in the feder-
ation and the division of powers became a controversial issue. After twenty years 
of re-centralization, the historical demands of the Slovaks for national sovereign-
ty gained momentum.48 
46 Suk, Labyrintem revoluce, 155–66.
47 Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict—Constitutional Fissure—Negotiated Breakup 
(Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1997).
48 Jan Rychlík, Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vztahy 1989–1992 (Bratislava: Academ-
ic Elektronic Press, 2002), 91–130.
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The beginning of political fragmentation and conflicts 
over the communist past
The latent conflicts manifested themselves in the “Hyphen War,” which last-
ed from January to April 1990. The reason for this conflict between Czech and 
Slovak politicians and the public opinion in the two republics was the issue of 
the common state’s name. On 23 January 1990, in the federal assembly, Presi-
dent Havel suggested omitting the word “Socialist” from the name. This would 
mean returning to the original name of Czechoslovak Republic. In Slovakia, this 
suggestion provoked a public uproar. Slovaks refused to accept any name that 
resembled the first republic’s (1918–38) concept of a unified Czechoslovak 
nation. The Czech public considered the Hyphen War to be petty and minor. 
They were unable to understand that the Slovaks, after so many years of oppres-
sion, were looking for a name they considered appropriate, proposing names 
such as the Czech-Slovak’s Republic, etc. The Hyphen War was the beginning 
of conflicts concerning patriotism, identity and distinct nationalism. After dra-
matic negotiations, which were often influenced and linked to passionate dis-
plays of public opinion, on 19 April 1990 the Federal Assembly accepted a 
compromise that resulted in a complicated name: the Czech and Slovak Feder-
ative Republic (CSFR).49 The Hyphen War was a prelude to equally dramatic 
conflicts regarding competence in the second part of the year 1990, and subse-
quent discussions between representatives of the two nations about the meaning 
of federal legislation.50 
The OF and VPN respected the KSČ as an equal political entity. However, 
from the beginning of 1990 the ideals of reconciliation and harmonious rela-
tionships were pushed aside, and somewhat belatedly, the latent anti-commu-
nism that permeated the OF became an important disruptive factor and a key 
topic within the liberated public opinion. Crucial was the experience of the local 
and regional OF with “communist mafias” and “nomenklatura brotherhoods,” 
which had begun to transfer state property and financial assets to private busi-
nesses.51 In March 1990, the OF presented a request to nationalize all property 
belonging to the KSČ. The legislative procedure, however, was slow and laws 
were adopted only at the end of the year. “Wild privatization” took place, not 
49 Milan Šútovec, Semióza ako politikum alebo „Pomlčková vojna“: Niektoré historické, politické 
a iné súvislosti jedného sporu, ktorý bol na začiatku zániku česko-slovenského štátu (Bratislava: 
Kalligram, 1999), 360.
50 See below, page 157.
51 Krapfl, Revolúcia s ludskou tvárou, 197–231; Jiří Suk, “Politické hry s nedokončenou revo-
lucí: Účtování s komunismem v čase Občanského fóra a po jeho rozpadu,” in Adéla Gjuričová, 
Michal Kopeček, Petr Roubal, Jiří Suk, Tomáš Zahradníček, Rozdělení minulostí: Vytváření 
politických identit po roce 1989 (Prague: Knihovna Václava Havla, 2011), 17–60.
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only of the property owned by the KSČ, but also of state enterprises, offices, 
and other organizations.52 
In mid-April 1990, the taboo of the “Velvet Revolution” was broken. Prague 
city prosecutor Tomáš Sokol (OF) contemplated the possibility of banning the 
KSČ. This idea provoked strong tensions between the national center of the OF, 
which represented the policy of compromise, and the radical regional OF, which 
adopted the idea as their leitmotiv. Even parties that for many decades had col-
laborated with the National Front demanded that the KSČ be banned.53 Parallel 
to the demands of these parties, Czechoslovaks who had been political prisoners 
in the 1950s insisted on the KSČ being banned; they had not agreed with the 
policy of compromise from the beginning. On 22 April, the Federal Assembly 
adopted a law of extra-judiciary rehabilitation of these people, which resembled 
the spirit of 1968.54 This law abolished, across the board, unfairly rendered 
judgments, and enabled compensation to be given to victims of judicial tyranny. 
However, the communist regime was not characterized as non-democratic and 
was not punished for its crimes. It was clear that this kind of “reconciliation 
with the communist past” would not suffice.
A problem closely related to the call for “decommunization” was the com-
munist secret police or State Security. The OF and VPN did not control the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior. The new minister, Richard Sacher of the Czecho-
slovak People’s Party, promoted the concept of gradual and cautious restructur-
ing based on cooperation with certain ministers. This idea did not appeal to the 
OF, which demanded the immediate break up of “old structures” and the firing 
of all state secret agents.55 Behind the doors of registries and archives, the links 
between ordinary citizens and State Security were examined. This process was 
limited by the fact that 15,000 files had been destroyed in December 1989. 
Certain powerful groups took advantage of their access to confidential files of 
the secret police. Fear spread of the vanished secret police and its network of 
140,000 agents. This motivated an objective examination of political candidates 
and parties. The pre-election screening was nevertheless far from objective, as 
was revealed by scandals  that were created by accusing, without conclusive 
evidence, two election leaders and candidates, Ján Budaj (VPN) and Josef Bar-
tončik (People’s Party), of having worked as informants and attempting to use 
their knowledge and networks for manipulating the political process. It satisfied 
no one, which is why pressure grew for further and deeper examination of pub-
lic figures, resulting in the passage, in October 1991, of the screening law.56 
52 Suk, Labyrintem revoluce, 386–89.
53 Ibid., 389–400.
54 Joint Czech and Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library, Joint Session, Stenographic Protocol, 24 April 
1990, http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1986fs/slsn/stenprot/027schuz/s027051.htm (accessed 1 July 2013).
55 Suk, Labyrintem revoluce, 355–80.
56 Vladimír Ondruš, Atentát na nežnú revolúciu (Bratislava: Ikar, 2009), 87–186.
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Political liberalization and the democratic process
On 23 January 1990, the Federal Assembly adopted laws regarding political 
parties in order to facilitate the pluralistic political system.57 The established parties 
of the National Front that had existed before November (including the KSČ) found 
themselves in an advantageous position, because they became part of democratic 
politics. A new indefinite element was introduced, the fresh political parties, such 
as the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence. Along with these parliamen-
tary bodies, other political parties were forming. The Election Act, adopted on 27 
February,58 established a system of proportional representation in twelve constitu-
encies, with limiting clauses of 5 percent (in the Slovak National Council, 3 per-
cent); it also stipulated that the election term would be two years, and that the main 
task of politicians was to adopt a new constitution and initiate economic change.
The laws adopted by the parliament at the end of March 1990 cemented civil 
liberties, including the rights of association, assembly and freedom of speech.59 In 
the second half of April, the basic conditions for the upcoming changes in the 
economy were created, including laws on the equality of all kinds of property, joint 
stock companies, individual entrepreneurship, and state companies.60 In early May, 
the Federal Assembly abolished the death penalty, and adopted a new law on high-
er education, giving academic institutions extensive autonomy.61 
Czechoslovak foreign policy declared a “return to Europe.” President Havel was 
enthusiastically welcomed by the US Congress when he visited the United States 
on 19–23 February 1990. Three days later, on 26 February, a Czechoslovak dele-
gation reached an agreement in Moscow between the government of Czechoslova-
kia and the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of Soviet troops (in June 1991, the last 
soldier left).62 The foreign policy of Czechoslovakia ambitiously assumed that the 
two military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—would gradually disappear and 
be replaced by the system of collective security within the framework of the Con-
ference of Security and Cooperation in Europe. In Moscow, at a meeting on 6 June 
of the Warsaw Pact states, it was agreed that a gradual dissolution of the Soviet 
military alliance would take place. From the turn of 1990–91, however, Czechoslo-
vak diplomacy oriented itself toward Czechoslovakia joining NATO.63
57 Joint Czech and Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library, Joint Session, Stenographic Protocol, 23 January 
1990, http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1986fs/slsn/stenprot/022schuz/s022001.htm (accessed 1 July 2013).
58 Ibid., http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1986fs/slsn/stenprot/024schuz/ (accessed 6 July 2012).
59 Ibid., http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1986fs/slsn/stenprot/026schuz/ (accessed 6 July 2012).
60 Ibid., http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1986fs/slsn/stenprot/027schuz/ (accessed 6 July 2012).
61 Ibid., http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1986fs/slsn/stenprot/028schuz/ (accessed 6 July 2012).
62 Jindřich Pecka, Odsun sovětských vojsk z Československa, 1989–1991 (Prague: Ústav pro 
soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1996), 352.
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4. Democratic elections, anti-communism, and economic liberalization 
(June 1990–May 1992)
The electoral victory and the collapse of the OF and VPN
On 8 and 9 June 1990, 90 % of the Czechs and Slovaks participated in par-
liamentary elections. For the first time in more than half a century, they could 
vote freely from a large number of political parties and movements. The Civic 
Forum won 53 % in the Chamber of Deputies and 50 % in the House of Nations 
of the Federal Assembly and 49.5 % in the Czech National Council. The Public 
Against Violence won 32.5 % in the Chamber of Deputies and 37 % in the House 
of Nations of the Federal Assembly and 29.3 % in the Slovak National Council. 
The political movements that been spontaneously born in November 1989 in the 
squares of Czech and Slovak cities won convincingly, the OF with a spectacular 
triumph. Considering the pre-election wave of anti-communism, 14 % of votes 
in favor of the communists was for them a success; however, in comparison to 
the pre-election period, the KSČ had considerably fewer parliamentarians. This 
significant outcome was strengthened by the results of the municipal elections in 
November 1990, when 17% voted in favor of the KSČ. This meant that it was 
politically impossible to dissolve the party legally, as this would have put the 
principle of free elections into question. Legislature seats also went to the Chris-
tian Democratic Party (Czech, Slovak and Hungarian minorities in the Slovak 
Republic), the party representing the interests of Moravia, and the Slovak Nation-
al Party.64 The largest groups in the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia, the 
Czech National Council, and the Slovak National Council were politically not yet 
differentiated, but the potential differences that increased from the beginning of 
1990, above all regarding the very principles of these movements, moved to a 
higher political level after the election. The main political dividing line remained 
anti-communism and the operations of State Security agents within state struc-
tures. 
The OF, the election winner representing the politics of compromise, had 
managed to suppress the anti-communist position before the election. After the 
election, however, anti-communist sentiments grew stronger. In September 1990, 
the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council formed a strong Inter-par-
liamentary Club of the Democratic Right, representing radical economic reforms 
and more energetic dealing with the communist past. The pressure for decommu-
nization measures from regional Civic Forums became stronger. However, forced 
decommunization measures proved ineffective, as were the legal measures to get 
rid of the nomenklatura cadres in charge of enterprises and ministries which were 
adopted through the intermediary of the Assembly on 30 August, as well as the 
law on property restitution to the KSČ of November 1990. Property transfers—
64 Kopeček, Éra nevinnosti, 66–74.
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both legal and illegal (according to the newly adopted laws on enterprises and 
business)—were occurring in great numbers. The goal was to get rich quickly, 
not through long-term business plans. In this atmosphere, on 21 August President 
Havel delivered a speech in which he stated that the November revolution “had 
not ended.” From that moment, there was talk about the need of a “second rev-
olution.” The post-election anti-communist wave culminated in the autumn of 
1990. District Civic Forums were under constant pressure, and so they supported 
the leadership of the OF who suggested the idea of a “moral tribunal” over the 
KSČ and its period, from which a systematic effort to punish specific crimes of 
communism was to follow. However, new conflicts arose at this time concerning 
the structure of the Civic Forum and related economic reforms. While the newly 
elected leader of the Civic Forum, Václav Klaus, had decided to transform the 
movement into a conservative party, the out-going collective leadership wanted 
to keep it a political activist movement. In the midst of the political battles, the 
will to deal systematically with the communist past was lost. In February 1991, 
the OF split into Klaus’s right-of-center Civic Democratic Party (Občanská de-
mokratická strana, ODS) and the Civic Movement (Občanské Hnutí) represented 
by the minister of foreign affairs, Jiří Dienstbier.65 Shortly thereafter, the VPN 
also fell apart, becoming the liberal Civic Democratic Union (Občianska 
demokratická únia, ODÚ) and the populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(Ľudová strana—Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS) under the leadership 
of Vladimír Mečiar. In Slovakia, the main dividing line was the status of the 
Slovak Republic vis-à-vis the federation; in the Czech Republic, the main ques-
tion was decommunization.
Dealing with the communist past 
After the election, the parliament’s political forces regrouped and continued 
crystallizing their ideological platforms. In April 1992, the Federal Assembly 
consisted of eighteen political groups (from the original eight). In spite of the 
crumbling of the right (for example, while the necessity of radical economic re-
forms was shared by all, the concept of lustration was not), left-wing opposition 
was practically non-existent, because the KSČ was no longer considered a dem-
ocratic opposition, and the revived social democrats failed in the election.66 Fol-
lowing the breakup of the OF, anti-communism was roughly channeled into two 
strategies: (1) Since it was considered impossible to legally ban the KSČ and too 
complicated to forbid communist businesses and former state secret agents to 
participate in the privatization process, there was no other choice than for the 
65 Suk, “Politické hry s nedokončenou revolucí: Účtování s komunismem v čase Občanského fóra 
a po jeho rozpadu,” 30–48.
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party to purge its own ranks. This meant that pressure continued to increase to 
fire members of parliament, employees in government offices and institutions, as 
well as those people working for the State Security. (2) Economic transformation 
was seen as a way out of the political and economic chaos of the transition peri-
od, a means to end the critical interim “pre-privatization misery.” Restitution (the 
return to the original owners or their descendants of tangible property nationalized 
by the communists after February 1948), public auctions of small businesses 
(shops, pubs and other enterprises), as well as the privatization of large companies 
and industrial conglomerates were seen as the most important methods of settling 
accounts with the communist past, both its ideology and its politics. Private own-
ers for state assets were to be found as quickly as possible, the free market was 
to bring order concerning private ownership, and prosperous individuals were to 
be the foundation for the prosperity of all. 
Attempts at a straightforward condemnation of the entire communist era 
(1948–89) and the pressure of more thorough lustration processes formed the 
agenda of settling accounts with the communist past. By the autumn of 1990, the 
rhetoric of “national understanding” was definitely over. The relationship between 
the new right wing and the KSČ remained bitter and showed the verbal and sym-
bolic mobilization against everything communist. However, outlawing the KSČ 
was desired only by marginal extra-parliamentary parties and organizations. The 
communists moved away from the social democratic parties, fuelling their tradi-
tional anti-capitalist identity.67 Narrow-minded anti-communism was accompa-
nied by attempts to implement as many decommunization elements as possible 
into the legal system inherited from the communist era. 
The more difficult it became to ban the KSČ, the more pressure was applied 
from the right to rid governmental institutions of “the old structures.” Lustration 
continued in March 1991, with an official list being released with the names of 
ten members of the Federal Assembly whose names were in the registers of the 
State Security.68 In October, the Assembly adopted a controversial lustration law,69 
which stated that functionaries of the past regime (party cadres, secret police, or 
militia) would in the future be not allowed to hold the above-mentioned state 
offices. The law was disputed, however, due to conflicts regarding the role and 
impact of the 1968 reform communists in contemporary politics. Right-wing 
politicians defeated the politicians of the weak liberal center and the left. Accord-
ing to the law, lustration was not to be publically known. However, public pres-
sure for reckoning with the past was overwhelming, and thus it was entirely 
67 Kopeček, Éra nevinnosti, 83–88.
68 Jiří Suk, “Prezident Václav Havel a břemeno (komunistické) minulosti. Lustrace jako politický 
a morální problém (1989–1992),” in Adéla Gjuričová, Michal Kopeček, Petr Roubal, Jiří Suk, 
Tomáš Zahradníček, Rozděleni minulostí:Vytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 
1989 (Prague: Knihovna Václava Havla, 2011), 176–81.
69 Joint Czech and Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library, Joint Session, Stenographic Protocol, 
http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990fs/slsn/stenprot/017schuz/ (accessed 6 July 2012).
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logical in the post-November development when in June 1992 a list appeared in 
the radically anti-communist Necenzurované noviny (Uncensored News) of 
140,000 names of informants and potential informants of the State Security (an 
official registry of 75,000 agents appeared in 2003). From that moment, attention 
was shifted to these agents, who became the scapegoats for the sins of commu-
nism. At the same time, publicly it was said that the so-called big fish (KSČ and 
State Security functionaries, economic counter-intelligence, socialist foreign 
trade enterprises, etc.) had shifted their interests to the privatization process and 
big business.
The “Czech road to capitalism”
In September 1990, a “scenario of radical economic reform” was adopted by 
the federal minister of finance Václav Klaus.70 The fact that Klaus was elected 
chairman of the OF (and in April 1991, of the party’s successor, the ODS), shows 
the importance given in that political mobilization period to “radical economic 
reform.” This reform was designed, according to the so-called Washington Consen-
sus, as “shock therapy.” Restrictive macroeconomic politics were introduced and 
the Czech market was opened to the world. The devaluation of the Czechoslovak 
crown took place in three steps, in January, October and December of 1990, wiping 
out the savings of the population and devaluing the costs of labor and material 
capital by 54 percent. Reducing the exchange rate relative to its purchasing power 
parity favored domestic exporters, but also severely penalized domestic investors 
while preparing for privatization. From 1 January 1991, prices were deregulated. 
After these measures, consumer prices increased sharply. The government dealt 
with this inflation by strictly regulating wages and subsidies. This stalled develop-
ment above all in education, science and culture. The people accepted “belt tight-
ening,” because they were promised rapid and widespread prosperity. 
The belief in quick prosperity was embodied by the project of “voucher pri-
vatization,” which became a national hit. In the “first wave,” beginning on 1 
November 1991, the government offered shares in 998 companies based in the 
Czech Republic, totaling almost 350 billion crowns. Six million Czechs (77 per-
cent of the population), influenced by government propaganda and advertizing, 
purchased a “voucher’s booklet” for a thousand Czech crowns. Starting on 18 
May 1992, everyone could invest their thousand coupons directly into privatized 
businesses, or entrust it to investment funds. Three-fourths of the participants, 
hoping to become rich fast in the atmosphere of “popular capitalism,” entrusted 
their vouchers in funds. In the “second wave,” shares of 676 enterprises were 
distributed. This voucher privatization functioned as a widely spread mobilization 
of Klaus’s “Czech road to capitalism.” By 1997, 47 percent of the country’s assets 
70 Ibid., http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990fs/slsn/stenprot/006schuz/ (accessed 6 July 2012).
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had been privatized through vouchers, 13 percent had been transferred (especial-
ly through restitution), and 12 percent had been sold through privatization to 
specific persons. National property was left at 27 percent.71
5. The rise and fall of “Czech capitalism” (June 1992–98) 
The parliamentary elections in June 1992 resulted in a center-right coalition 
headed by Klaus’s ODS. In Slovakia, a populist-nationalist coalition was formed, 
led by Mečiar. The winners of both elections agreed to a quick and peaceful di-
vision of the state, which had existed (with a break from 1939 to 1945) since 
1918. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ceased to exist on 31 December 
1992.72 For Czech politics, this meant relief and a confirmation of the course of 
“the Czech path to capitalism,” supported by the widely held belief in the high 
level of Czech industry and its capability of being competitive on the global 
market. The coalition ruled until the elections of 1996, followed by a political 
and economic crisis which culminated in the fall of the Klaus’s second govern-
ment in December 1997. 
The voucher privatization caused a confusing and unproductive ownership 
structure. The government was aware of this, and began to promote business 
privatization, transferring property to Czech citizens who had ideas for business 
projects. Despite the initial impression that competitive capitalism involving 
Czech proprietors was experiencing great success, in the long run it failed to 
develop. Four large banks were capitalized, these becoming the major owners of 
industrial enterprises either through their own funds or through privatization 
funds. At the same time, they provided loans to businesses. These complicated 
ownership relationships prevented the formation of a healthy competitive and 
solvent environment. The result of the Czech version of capitalism was a crash 
in the mid-1990s of many companies and private banks. The “Czech path” lost 
its perspective and the total loss due to privatization came to around 600 billion 
crowns. Politics that was closely linked to business was often based on corruption 
and “tunneling” practices. The public discourse was full of expressions such as 
“clientelism” and “mafia capitalism,”73 which moved those healthy businesses 
71 Frank Fleischer, Kurt Hornschild, Martin Myant, Zdeněk Souček, Růžena Vintrová, Karel 
Zeman, Successful Transformations? The Creation of Market Economies in Eastern Germany 
and the Czech Republic (Cheltenham, Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1997), 140–47.
72 Rychlík, Rozpad Československa, 273–342.
73 Quentin Reed, “Politická korupce v postkomunistické společnosti” and “Korupce v privatizaci 
českou cestou”, in Pavol Frič, ed., Korupce na český způsob (Prague: G+G, 1999), 159–204, 
304. Cf. idem, “Political Corruption, Privatisation and Control in the Czech Republic,” PhD 
Thesis, Oxford University, 1996; idem, “Corruption in Czech Privatisation: The Dangers of 
‘Neo-liberal’ Privatisation”, in Steven Kotkin and András Sajó, eds., Political Corruption in 
Transition: A Sceptic’s Handbook (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002), 261–85, 493. 
Czechoslovakia in 1989: Causes, Results, and Conceptual Changes
158
that certainly existed to the background. Prosperous enterprises were mainly those 
that were foreign-owned, a model being Škoda in Mladá Boleslav, which was 
privatized and owned by the German Volkswagen concern.
After early elections in 1998, the Czech Social Democratic Party formed a 
government and then embarked on the privatization of all the remaining large 
banks and enterprises, selling them to foreign capital. Despite the neoliberal em-
bracing of privatization in the early 1990s, the social and legal framework pro-
tecting the employed and enabling collective bargaining remained in place. How-
ever, due to the increasing dependence on foreign ownership, such laws gradual-
ly began to lose their importance.74
A permanently unfinished revolution?
The question of “coming to terms” with the communist past maintained its 
ideological and political potential. The right made this its permanent mobilizing 
tool. In 1993, the Czech parliament passed a law making communism illegal and 
criminal, a confirmation of radical condemnation. However, the KSČ, which 
enjoyed the support of 10 percent or more of the voters, could not be outlawed. 
In 1995, an office for documenting and investigating communist crimes was 
created in order to document and investigate crimes that already at that time were 
considered crimes against humanity. However, the activities of this office did not 
meet original expectations; in the years from 1995 to 2008 thirty people were 
convicted, only eight of them unconditionally.75 
In 1995 the validity of the lustration law was extended for another five years, 
and in 2000, for an indefinite period. So far, of nearly 460,000 requests, lustration 
certificates have been issued for over 10,000 persons who were found to be in 
the registry books of the State Security.76 Some on the list, especially actors, 
singers and other celebrities, have denied their cooperation with State Security 
and the courts have usually believed their declarations. In connection with the 
corruption and patronage during the period of “wild privatization” and with “tun-
neling,” however, discussions haven’t stopped regarding the significant number 
of former communist cadres who created a corrupt business environment.
Since the year 2000, attention has focused on history and remembrance. The 
fight against communism has continued, particularly through rhetorical means. 
74 Martin Myant, “The Czech Republic—From ‘Czech’ Capitalism to ‘European’ Capitalism,” in 
David Lane and Martin Myant, eds., Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 105–23.
75 For an overview, see the website of the Office of Documentation and Investigation of Com-
munist Crimes: http://aplikace.mvcr.cz/archiv2008/policie/udv/pripady/index.html (accessed 6 
July 2012).
76 Data taken from Czech TV in October 2011. See: http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/ 
138390-lustrace-revolucni-norma-na-pet-let-plati-dodnes/ (accessed 6 July 2012).
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Communism has been presented as a continuing danger to a free, democratic 
society and something that must be faced through historical research and the 
memory of its victims. Interest has increasingly turned to archives as key sources 
for rhetorical and symbolic reconciliation. The archives of the State Security were 
completely opened in the years 2002–04, but this has not led to a deeper under-
standing of the context, and the specific examination of individual cases has 
reduced the communist past to its repressive aspects. This trend has resulted in 
the founding of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes in 2007, which 
was supported by the political right.77 In the second half of the decade, intellec-
tuals of the younger generation have begun more actively to protest such treat-
ment of the past. Their protest is related to opposition to global capitalism ac-
companied by searching for alternatives to the neoliberal status quo.78 The dream 
of the “end of history” has evaporated. Twenty years after the fall of the socialist 
dictatorship, the Czech society, in a time of economic crisis, is marked by con-
flicts, resentments and fears. 
 The Czech Republic as part of the “global village”
The Czech society has undergone a great social change.79 The geographic 
position of the Czech Republic in Central Europe holds undeniable benefits—it 
is not peripheral, but a transit country through which money, goods and labor 
pass. As a result it has become a postindustrial consumer country, despite the fact 
that the standard of living of an average Czech still lags behind that of an average 
German, Frenchman or Swede by a wide margin. It seems that this level will not 
be reached in the foreseeable future.80 Psychological changes are mainly based 
on the country having opened, allowing possibilities to travel, study, or work 
abroad. These changes are also based on the technological and information rev-
olution and the interconnection of the world.81 Personal computers connected to 
the internet and mobile phones belong to the basic equipment of the average 
Czech. The banking revolution has also created changes: almost all Czechs have 
77 See the official site at: http://www.ustrcr.cz.
78 See, for example, the websites of the following left-wing think tanks: Socialist Circle, Associ-
ation for Left-wing Theory (http://www.sok.bz); ProAlt: Initiative for criticism and reforms to 
promote alternatives (http://www.proalt.cz/); Internet Diary Referendum (http://www.denikref-
erendum.cz).
79 See, for example, the pre-socialism balance in: Jiří Večerník and Petr Matějů, Zpráva o vývoji 
české společnosti 1989–1998 (Prague: Academia, 1998), 365.
80 Martin Myant, “Podoby kapitalismu v České republice”, in Adéla Gjuričová and Michal Ko-
peček, eds., Kapitoly z dějin české demokracie po roce 1989 (Prague, Litomyšl: Paseka, 2008), 
265–87, 287.
81 Libor Prudký, Inventura hodnot: Výsledky sociologických výzkumů hodnot ve společnosti České 
republiky (Prague: Academia, 2009), 340.
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a personal bank account and many take out loans and mortgages. Living in debt 
has become a social reality. 
A revolutionary change has taken place in ownership structures. The state has 
ceased to have a decisive influence on ownership distribution or the control of 
property. There are large differences between the upper and the middle class; the 
situation of the latter is very unstable. The sectors of culture and education con-
tinue to be undervalued. The number of people educated at universities is increas-
ing, but quantity has been won at the expense of quality. Corrupt practices include 
the purchasing of college degrees, which are still highly valued by many Czechs. 
There is a substantial pay gap between educated professionals, as for example, 
between teachers, economists, or lawyers. Among the most significant social 
changes has been the disappearance of the working class due to the influx of 
cheap labor from eastern countries. This trend has been accompanied by a decline 
in trades and apprenticeships, for which there is little interest. In times of global 
economic crisis, it seems that long-term social stability, which in principle is a 
constitutive element of the egalitarian Czech society, is threatened.
Translated from the Czech original by Michael Werbowski 
Jiří Suk
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YUGOSLAVIA 1989:  
THE REVOLUTIONS THAT DID (NOT) HAPPEN
During the 1980s, Yugoslavia was marked by contradictions. On one side, the 
citizens enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than in any other communist coun-
try in Europe, including largely unrestricted freedom of travel, a modest consum-
er society1 and a vibrant cultural scene. On the other hand, of all the communist 
countries, Yugoslavia held the highest percentage of the population as political 
prisoners, the vast majority of them Kosovo Albanians accused of secessionism.2 
But instead of being dominated by the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was the only 
communist country other than Albania that retained its autonomy and it forged 
close ties with the United States and Western Europe, including a cooperation 
agreement with the European Community. 
Thus it seems a paradox not only that Yugoslavia dissolved violently in 1991—
leading to a brief armed conflict in Slovenia in 1991, longer wars in Croatia from 
1991 to 1995 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995, and finally to 
the war over Kosovo in 1998 and 1999—but also that there was a delay in fully 
democratic governments being established in a number of its successor states. At 
first glance, the trajectory away from single-party communist rule does not appear 
particularly different from the other communist countries: The League of Com-
munists of Yugoslavia held its last congress in January 1990, leading to a collapse 
of the party, and in the same year multiparty elections were held. But in funda-
mental contrast to the other countries that experienced the end of communist rule 
in 1989–90, Yugoslavia did not take only one path away from communism, but 
multiple ones. Non-communist governments came to power in Slovenia, Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The successors to the League of Communists won 
in Montenegro and Serbia. And in Macedonia the anti-communist opposition won 
the elections, but was unable to take power. Opposition emerged within the repub-
lics against local communist elites, but there was no successful Yugoslav-wide 
opposition and elections were never held at the state level. As a result, for the 
most part the end of communist rule did not reflect a move toward a democratic 
Yugoslavia, but toward competition and often mutually exclusive visions of the 
1 See Patrick Hyder Patterson, Bought and Sold. Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist 
Yugoslavia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor, eds., 
Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism (1950s–1980s) (Budapest: CEU 
Press, 2010).
2 Florian Bieber, Nationalismus in Serbien vom Tode Titos zum Ende der Ära Milošević (Münster: 
Lit Verlag, 2005).
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country. This accelerated the crisis Yugoslavia had begun experiencing during the 
1980s. The decentralized nature of the League of Communists and the federal 
state meant that political competition occurred less within the republics (and the 
provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina) but rather between them. The pluralization of 
politics in Yugoslavia was thus marked by disputes within each republic over how 
to reshape its role within Yugoslavia (or whether to leave the Yugoslav Federation 
altogether). 
Due to the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, this is what most scholarly at-
tention has focused upon, seeking to identify its causes.3 Also when the events in 
Yugoslavia are compared to the other transitions from communism, this has been 
the main focus: the large scale aggression.4 Fewer scholars have explored the link 
between the country’s dissolution and its democratization.5
While the crisis of the Yugoslav system coincided with the crisis of commu-
nism in Soviet-dominated areas of Europe, its causes were largely home-grown. In 
postwar Yugoslavia there had been no violent repression of the “Croatian Spring” 
democratic movement, as there had been in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and the 
absence of the Red Army or Soviet influence meant that opposition against com-
munist rule could not be (re-)directed toward external factors, namely the Soviet 
Union. There were various domestic sources of the crisis of communism. First was 
the inability of the system to allow for the liberal reforms that had been pursued by 
reformists in some of the republics in the early 1970s, before the repression of the 
“Croatian Spring.” Thus, while the Yugoslav system was more open than in other 
communist countries, it had failed to liberalize sufficiently. Second, the economic 
system did not suffer from excessive formal state planning, but rather a lack there-
of. A highly autonomous self-management economy had led to atomization and an 
excessively complicated system that made reform difficult. This type of economy 
was ill equipped to confront the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
broad decentralization of Yugoslavia, enshrined in the 1974 constitution, sought 
to “resolve” the national question and promote a Yugoslav approach to the “with-
ering away” of the state.6 Excessive centralization had undermined the legitimacy 
of the first Yugoslavia between the two world wars. The political fragmentation of 
3 For good overviews of the different theories on Yugoslavia’s dissolution, see Dejan Jović, “The 
Disintegration of Yugoslavia: A Critical Review of Explanatory Approaches,” European Journal 
of Social Theory 4, no. 1 (2001): 101–20; Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Why Did Yugoslavia Disinte-
grate? An Overview of Contending Explanations,” in Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragovic-Soso, 
eds., State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration 
(West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007), 1–39.
4 Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the 
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
5 V.P. (Chip) Gagnon Jr., “Yugoslavia in 1989 and after,” Nationalities Papers 38, no. 1 (2010): 
23–39.
6 See Dejan Jović, Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away (West Lafayette: Purdue University 
Press, 2008).
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the “late socialist” Yugoslavia responded to the two demands of the early 1970s 
for political reforms and decentralization by denying the former and granting the 
latter in a manner that facilitated political competition, first along republican and 
later, national lines.7
There are few archives in the region that allow access to information about 
the crucial years following the death of Tito in 1980 and leading to the country’s 
dissolution. However, due to the dispersion of the state and party archives to the 
various successor states and the division of the archives of the League of Com-
munists between state and party archives, some materials have become available. 
The two most comprehensive and accessible archives on this period are the Open 
Society Archives and the Archives of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). For the topic in question, the Open Society Archives 
in Budapest,8 some of whose holdings have begun to be available electronically, 
contain materials from Radio Free Europe, including catalogues, newspaper clip-
7 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991 (Bloomington: 
University of Indiana Press, 1992). Further literature about Yugoslavia and its disintegration: 
John Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia (London: Hurst, 2000); Aleksa Djilas, The Contested 
Country. Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919–1953 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1991); Dejan Djokic, ed., Yugoslavism. Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992 
(London: Hurst, 2003); John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a Country (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); John R. Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe: 
A Century of War and Transition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Norman Naimark and 
Holly Case,  eds., Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2002); Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984); Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias. State-Building and 
Legitimation, 1918–2005 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Laura Silber and Al-
lan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: BBC, 1996); Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, 
The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1999); Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Conse-
quences (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Laslo Sekelj, Yugoslavia: The Process 
of Disintegration (New York: East European Monographs, 1993); Susan L. Woodword, Balkan 
Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1995); Dunja Melcic, ed., Der Jugoslawien-Krieg. Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf 
und Konsequenzen (Opladen: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1999); Lenard J. Cohen, Broken 
Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1995); Sabrina Petra Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia. Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav 
Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); 
Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanić, The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995 (Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 2001); Ivo Žanić, Flag on the Mountain. A Political Anthropology of the War 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1990–1995 (London: Saqi, 2007); Marie-Janine Calic, Der 
Krieg in Bosnien-Hercegovina. Ursachen, Konfliktstrukturen, internationale Lösungsversuche 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995); Holm Sundhaussen, Jugoslawien und seine Nachfolge-
staaten 1943–2011. Eine ungewöhnliche Geschichte des Gewöhnlichen (Vienna: Böhlau, 2012).
8 http://www.osaarchivum.org/
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pings and RFE reports. The final location of the archives of the ICTY is yet to 
be decided, but the Court Records have been made available electronically.9 Al-
though they do not contain everything gathered by the prosecution in the various 
cases, they contain an impressive amount of relevant material. Although the court 
is only investigating crimes committed between 1991 and 2001 on the territory 
of Yugoslavia, the court records contain extensive and pertinent background ma-
terials, including excerpts from memoirs, records of party and state meetings, 
transcripts of witness statements, expert reports, as well as other sources that shed 
light on the years preceding the Yugoslav wars.
Alternatives of the 1980s
Following the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, who had been president for 
life since 1963, the leadership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) passed on to an eight-member Presidency comprised of representatives 
from the six republics and the two autonomous provinces.10 The chairmanship 
rotated annually according to an established sequence. This further weakened the 
state with each passing year.11 The mandate was too brief for programs or reforms 
to be implemented, and the changing Presidency chairs failed to share a uniform 
vision of Yugoslavia’s future. The north–south divide became evident within both 
the Presidency and the party, and led to the dissolution of the League of Com-
munists of Yugoslavia at its fourteenth congress in January of 1990 over rifts 
between Serbian and Slovenian communists. Lost were both the political and 
ideological dominance of the communist system and the cohesive function of the 
communist ideology that had held Yugoslavia and its governmental institutions 
together. In the political struggle for the future of Yugoslavia, the Serbian side in 
particular, under Slobodan Milošević, steered toward recentralization, while the 
Croatian and Slovenian representatives advocated liberalizing the political and 
economic system. Internationally, the country also lost its former strategic posi-
tion and significance for the West.
9 http://icr.icty.org/default.aspx
10 Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, as well the 
autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
11 After Tito’s death the mandate for the Presidency of Yugoslavia was held between 1980 and 
1991 by Macedonia: Lazar Koliševski, 4 May 1980–15 May 1980; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Cvijetin Mijatović, 15 May 1980–15 May 1981; Slovenia: Sergej Kraigher, 15 May 1981–15 
May 1982; Serbia: Petar Stambolić, 15 May 1982–15 May 1983; Croatia: Mika Špiljak, 15 May 
1983–15 May 1984, Montenegro: Veselin Đuranović, 15 May 1984–15 May 1985; Vojvodina: 
Radovan Vlajković, 15 May 1985–15 May 1986; Kosovo: Sinan Hasani, 15 May 1986–15 May 
1987; Macedonia: Lazar Mojsov, 15 May 1987–15 May 1988; Bosnia and Herzegovina: Raif 
Dizdarević, 15 May 1988–15 May 1989; Slovenia: Janez Drnovšek, 15 May 1989–15 May 
1990; Serbia: Borislav Jović, 15 May 1990–15 May 1991; Croatia: Stjepan Mesić, 1 July 1991–
October 1991.
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Domestically, the Yugoslav system was based on the principle of the national 
brotherhood and unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo) of all Yugoslav nations. Upon this 
foundation, Tito and the party leadership had built a state promising its citizens a 
peaceful and prosperous future in accordance with the ideology of communism.12 
While this created a society that was able to achieve a certain degree of economic 
prosperity, it was also a society which was politically lethargic. Postwar genera-
tions had it better than those of the past. Rapid economic growth, at least during 
the first postwar decades, and a relatively liberal communism allowed a modest 
consumer society to develop, and by 1960 Yugoslav citizens were able to leave 
the country either as tourists and shoppers or to seek employment abroad. These 
opportunities, liberal in comparison with other communist states in Europe, mit-
igated social conflicts but also hindered the development of political alternatives 
for postwar generations. This contributed to the lack of a significant dissident 
movement in Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, the 1960s were already marked by an economic and political cri-
sis, to which the state and party responded with the 1974 constitution proclaiming 
the “federalization of the federation.” The constitution devolved substantial power 
to Yugoslavia’s six republics, giving each a central bank as well as separate police, 
educational and judicial systems. The result was an intensified drifting apart of 
the regional elites.13 The relationship between the federation and its constituent 
republics became increasingly weakened by the extensive authority of the repub-
lics. The already precarious economic situation of the 1980s (north–south divide, 
unemployment, high inflation, currency devaluation, foreign debt)14 continued to 
deteriorate. The GDP increased only slowly in the 1980s and population growth in 
the period from 1980 to 1985 also lagged. The number of unemployed rose to over 
a million and inflation skyrocketed, as did the foreign debt.15 The question of how 
to share the economic burden between the poorer and richer republics left no side 
content. The unequal economic burden additionally heated the conflicts regarding 
distribution as well as the smoldering national question.16 
12 This ideology was the supporting column of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and 
touched all spheres. Especially following the tenth congress of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia from 27 to 30 May 1974, the party claimed leadership “in all areas and on all levels.” 
Holm Sundhaussen, Geschichte Jugoslawiens 1918–1980 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1982), 198.
13 Gradually the League’s authority became limited with respect to issues of foreign and security 
policy, uniformity of economic and social policy, and the legal system. Marie-Janine Calic, Der 
Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina. Ursachen—Konfliktstrukturen—Internationale Lösungsversu-
che (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 32; Monika Beckmann-Petey, Der jugoslawische 
Föderalismus (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990).
14 Here also Susan L. Woodward, Socialist Unemployment. The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 
1945–1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
15 Holm Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens: 19.–21. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Böhlau, 2007), 379; 
379; see also Dušan Bilandžić, Jugoslavija poslije Tita (1980–1985) (Zagreb: Globus, 1986).
16 For more on the economic aspects of the collapse of Yugoslavia, see Marijan Korošić, Jugo-
slavenska kriza (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1988).
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Dejan Jović has convincingly argued that the Yugoslav state, in the last phase 
of its existence, that is from the second half of the 1960s, was no longer based on 
the unity of the southern Slavs, but rather on a shared concept of communism. In 
other words, the idea of an ethnic “kinship” among the southern Slavic peoples 
was replaced by the idea of a “Yugoslavian exceptionalism” based on a “socialist 
market economy” and independence.17 Holm Sundhaussen defines this “Yugosla-
vian exceptionalism” as “the pillar of identity upon which the mutually support-
ive society was based.”18 Among the pillars of identity were also the founding 
myths of the second Yugoslavia, which was defined as a model of independence 
from Soviet influence and of self-management, non-alignment and, in comparison 
to other communist societies, relative prosperity.19 When these pillars of identity 
ceased to exist, the “Yugoslavs” lost the framework that had provided them with 
a firm structure, leading to the erosion of the state’s governmental institutions. In 
this context and without security, shaken by crisis-laden discourse and without a 
shared vision for a common state, the citizens of Yugoslavia set out on competing 
routes toward democracy and a market economy. The loss of legitimacy of both 
the state and party enabled the emergence of autonomous and mutually conflictual 
authoritarian nationalisms.20
The national-political elite of the late 1980s and early 1990s utilized this con-
text for ethnic mobilization, group cohesion and, accordingly, seizure of power. 
The old concept of community within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via, which had primarily been built upon social group identity, shifted to ethnici-
ty.21 Those who rose to power set themselves the task of forming a nation with a 
common will and national pride from the heterogeneous mass of “workers.” They 
created a collective identity based on the “commitment to a set of shared values, 
the memory of a shared history and the orientation toward shared goals. Participa-
tion in this identity and commitment to specific values is what makes people into 
citizens, and in the case of armed conflict, citizens into soldiers.”22 Thus, while the 
criticism against the “old” communist system focused on the unsolved national 
question, it failed to offer any alternatives in the direction of a democratization of 
society. 
17 Dejan Jović, Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla: uspon i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije (1974–
1990) (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003), 489.
18 Holm Sundhaussen, “Staatsbildung und ethnisch-nationale Gegensätze in Südosteuropa,” Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 10–11 (2003): 3–9, 8.
19 Ibid.
20 Laslo Sekelj, “Soziologie des Jugoslawismus und des serbischen Nationalismus,” in Eggert 
Hardten, André Stanisavljević, and Dimitris Tsakiris, eds., Der Balkan in Europa (Frankfurt am 
Main: P. Lang 1996), 3–14, 9.
21 Ivan Čolović, Bordell der Krieger: Folklore, Politik und Krieg (Osnabrück: Fibre, 1994), 140.
22 Aleida Assmann, “Zum Problem der Identität aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht,” in Rolf Lind-
ner, ed., Die Wiederkehr des Regionalen. Über neue Formen kultureller Identität (Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus-Verlag 1994), 13–35, 22–23.
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The journalist and political analyst Teofil Pančić has described postwar Yugo-
slav society as “tender totalitarianism” and the population as “spoiled slaves.”23 
In Pančić’s view, Yugoslav society longed for prosperity, security, freedom and its 
associated duties, yet at the same time was despised by the population. Yugoslav 
society had strong authoritarian tenants.24 The older generation did not possess a 
democratic political culture and could not conceive of democracy in any concrete 
terms. Younger citizens were apolitical, since they had been raised in the belief 
that politics was for “adults” and that their impact was limited.25 Both young peo-
ple and their parents thought communism would be for eternity. Most Yugoslavs 
believed that the system of their country was fairer than that of others, and as-
sured themselves that there was no need to strive toward alternatives or think 
independently, much less rebel against the established political system. When 
communism began to break apart, the youth expected their parents to resolve the 
situation. The parental generation however did not know how.26 In this void of 
political and ideological alternatives, nationalism emerged as a potent force. 
The large protest against the nationalist parties and “democratic” government 
which took place in Sarajevo on 4 April 1992 provides a good example for illus-
trating that, even three years after the overthrow of communist regimes elsewhere 
in Eastern Europe, there were still no alternatives to nationalism in the Yugoslav 
context. The protest was organized at a time when it was clear, even to the great-
est optimists, that the policies of the national parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
victorious in the 1990 elections, would lead to war. A large number of citizens as-
sembled in the center of Sarajevo in front of the parliament building and protested 
against the Presidency,27 the government, the national parties, the predominantly 
Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) with Alija Izetbegović at its head, the 
Serb Democratic Party (SDS) led by Radovan Karadžić, and Croat Democratic 
Union (HDZ). These three parties, which had come to power less than two years 
earlier, were taking the country to war. Examining photos of this protest in retro-
spect, one can recognize them as a sign of discontent and helplessness. The imag-
es of Tito, who had died in 1980, and the red flags that the protesters are waving 
signal their desire to return to the past. While this was an unrealistic path, there 
was no alternative offered. And since the protest movement was unable to present 
a different solution, it did not pose a serious threat to the national parties. Citizens 
were left without any formulated alternatives or a program that could have con-
fronted the rising nationalism.
23 Teofil Pančić, Urbani Bušmani (Belgrade: Biblioteka XX Vek, 2001), 92.
24 Ibid.
25 The ineffectiveness of participatory mechanisms of the self-management system contributed to 
the sense of disempowerment of citizens.
26 Slavenka Drakulić, “The Generation that Failed,” The Nation, 16 November 2009.
27 The members of the first “democratic” Bosnian Presidency were Alija Izetbegović, Fikret Abdić, 
Ejup Ganić, Nikola Koljević, Biljana Plavšić, Stjepan Kljuić and Franjo Boras.
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Protests and mass movements
 
The powerlessness to articulate disapproval with the communist system other 
than within a nationalist framework had already become apparent during the 
1980s. While there had been protests and strikes directed against the economic 
situation, the only clear alternative to the existing political system was national-
ism. During the 1980s, citizens had substantial grievances against the government 
of Yugoslavia as well as, more importantly, its republics and provinces, and they 
sought multiple avenues to express them. 
The most common form of dissatisfaction was linked to the aforementioned 
worsening economic situation, including a large national debt, high unemployment, 
sinking living standards, high inflation and material shortages.28 Strikes were not 
uncommon in “socialist” Yugoslavia, but due to the highly segmented economic 
system into decentralized “self-managed” enterprises, such strikes were often quite 
localized. Only in the late 1980s did countrywide strikes take place.29 A second type 
of protest against the status quo emphasized national issues, that is, they confront-
ed the status quo for disadvantaging particular ethnic communities. This included 
nationalist mass protests in Kosovo in 1968 and in Croatia during the “Croatian 
Spring” in the early 1970s. Student demonstrations in Belgrade in June 1968 spread 
to Kosovo in November of the same year and some of the students’ demands from 
Kosovo, such as greater inclusion of Albanians in both Serbian and Yugoslav state 
bodies, and a higher level of recognition of the Albanian language, were approved.
In the period 1966–1971, there were visible signs of dissatisfaction and at-
tempts to reform the communist society in Croatia. These did not come solely 
from non-communist lines, but were also articulated within the League of Com-
munists of Croatia (SKH). During this period demands emerged for strengthening 
Croatian national interests in the cultural sphere (i.e., through the Croatian Cultur-
al Centre Matica Hrvatska,30 and the Croatian Association of Writers with Petar 
Segedin), the economy (Hrvoje Šošić, Šime Đodan and Marko Veselica) and pol-
itics (The League of Communists of Croatia—Savka Dabčević-Kučar and Miko 
Tripalo). These demands were accompanied by student demonstrations. 
After Tito’s death, new nationalist protests took place in Prishtina in 1981. These 
were led by Kosovo Albanian students demanding the recognition of Kosovo as a 
republic, demands that later escalated into calls for secession. These protests were 
violently repressed by the police with support from other federal institutions and 
led to the aforementioned high number of political prisoners from Kosovo. Five 
28 See Woodward, Socialist Unemployment. 
29 Marko Grdesic, “Mapping the Paths of the Yugoslav Model: Labour Strength and Weakness 
in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 14, no. 2 (2008), 
133–51, 137–38.
30 About the role of Matica Hrvatska see more in Berislav Jandrić, “Uloga Matice hrvatske u 
dogođajima 1971. Godine,” in Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac, eds., Dijalog povjesničara—
istoričara, vol. 7 (Zagreb: Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 2003), 415–33.
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years later a second protest wave originated in Kosovo, this time among Kosovo 
Serbs who felt marginalized in the province after having lost their political and 
economic dominant status in the 1970s. At first the dissatisfaction exhausted itself 
in petitions addressed to Serbian and Yugoslav authorities, but later took the shape 
of mass protests, especially in Serbia, Vojvodina and Montenegro. These protests 
coincided and converged with social and economic protests in Serbia and Monte-
negro, whereby the public agenda shifted from economic to national demands. An 
observer would later note during one of the large protests in 1988, when partici-
pants changed their demands from economic to national issues during the protests, 
that the demonstrators had “come as workers and went home as Serbs.”31Although 
this movement was later co-opted by the Serbian party and the republican leader-
ship of Slobodan Milošević, it would be wrong to downplay the grassroots origins 
of this movement and its resonance throughout the country.32
The main other republic in which a strong social movement emerged was Slo-
venia. It articulated itself less through mass rallies but as a network of activists, 
particularly in the sphere of media and culture, who challenged the Yugoslav sys-
tem and the League of Communists. The art collective Neue Slowenische Kunst 
(New Slovenian Art), which included the iconoclastic band Laibach,33 and media 
such as the youth magazine Mladina systematically sought to break Yugoslav and 
communist taboos, from criticizing the personality cult of Tito, to pointing out 
the similarities between communism and fascism and totalitarian ideologies, to 
condemning the role of the army and the party. In February 1987 the journal Nova 
revija (New Review) published a new Slovenian national program. These “Con-
tributions to the Slovenian National Program” called for the closing of national 
ranks and argued that the Slovenes would be better off outside Yugoslavia. In the 
following years, many of the authors of these contributions became active in the 
anti-communist parties that formed the victorious DEMOS coalition after the first 
free nationwide elections in 1990.
Parallel to this, other media across Yugoslavia began in the 1980s to discuss 
topics that until then had been off limits, including placing religious communities 
into a more positive light and exposing some of the crimes committed during 
the early phase of communist Yugoslavia, in particular Goli Otok, the internment 
camp on the Adriatic island to which alleged supporters of Stalin were sent follow-
ing the Cominform conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948.34 
31 Jagoš Djuretić, cited from Slavoljub Djukić, Između slave i anateme. Politička biografija Slo-
bodana Miloševića (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić 1994), 106. This shift is also well documented in 
Čolović, Bordell, 138–42.
32 Nebojsa Vladisavljevic, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic, the Fall of Commu-
nism, and Nationalist Mobilization (London: Palgrave, 2008).
33 Alexei Monroe, Interrogation Machine. Laibach and NSK (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2005). The name Laibach is the German name for Slovenia’s capital city, Ljubljana.
34 Oskar Gruenwald, “Yugoslav Camp Literature: Rediscovering the Ghost of a Nation’s Past-Pres-
ent-Future,” Slavic Review 46, no. 3–4 (1987): 513–28. The prison remained a taboo topic in 
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These challenges to the system also revealed the degree to which demands for 
democratization quickly turned against Yugoslavia itself and thus provided little 
basis for a cross-republican and cross-national social movement against commu-
nist rule. The absence of a strong Yugoslav public sphere would become even 
more visible when the first elections were held across the country.
Elections 
The disparities among the communist Yugoslav elite and the political constel-
lation of Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s initially enabled the development 
of new ideological sources for legitimizing the state.
The parliaments of the republics of the SFRY passed new electoral laws and put 
a process toward “political pluralism” into motion. For example, in Bosnia-Herze-
govina the electoral law initially prohibited political parties along national lines. 
After lengthy parliamentary discussion, however, and despite public opinion polls 
suggesting that the majority of the population was against the formation of eth-
no-national parties,35 the republican Constitutional Court declared the law uncon-
stitutional.36 Once the amendments to the electoral law allowed the unrestricted 
establishing of national parties, so-called national parties, standing primarily for 
the “wellbeing of their nation,” were rapidly founded. The very founding of these 
national parties was celebrated as their first victory. This dynamic was mirrored 
elsewhere across Yugoslavia.
In the new political circumstances, the nation became increasingly the focal 
point of political discourse: political legitimation followed national lines. Nation-
alism served as a substitute for communism in Yugoslavia, since the state had not 
only lost its founding ideology, but also the basis for its existence with the disin-
tegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The infighting among the 
republican elites crippled the League of Communists as the pillar of the Yugoslav 
system, thereby putting an end to communism and threatening the very existence of 
Yugoslavia. In other words, communist rule collapsed not as the result of revolution 
or struggle by non-communist alternatives against it, but was rather the victim of 
diametrical conceptions of the future and wishes within the League of Communists 
itself. Non-communist parties and groups played only a marginal role in the collapse 
of the party. Thus grass-root nationalism was actually a consequence and not the 
cause of the changes that led to the state’s decline, since “the ruin of the Yugoslavian 
Yugoslavia until the 1980s and was only discussed after Tito’s death when the novel Tren (Mo-
ment) about Goli Otok by Antonije Isaković became an instant bestseller.
35 Krstan Malešević, Ljudski trag,  vol. 3 (Banja Luka: Media Center Prelom, 2005), 87. The re-
sults of this public opinion survey paint a picture of a Bosnian society that was living in fear. 
36 Suad Arnautović, Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini ’90: Analiza izbornih procesa (Sarajevo: Promo-
cult, 1996), 11.
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identity and state was not the result of a process inaugurated by the ‘nation,’ or rath-
er ‘nations.’ The deconstruction was induced and desired from above, by the elites 
[…].”37 At the same time, it is important not to underestimate the salience of eth-
no-national identity. Even though ethno-national affiliation did not play a major role 
and stayed in the background during the communist period, national identity mat-
tered and most citizens knew to which group they belonged. This fact, along with 
unresolved and competing national demands as well as the resurgence of religion 
and political participation, which had long been reduced to symbolic gestures, pro-
vided resources and potential for the ethno-national mobilization. The weakness of 
parties and groups that pursued a non-nationalist democratic agenda and the lack of 
a Yugoslav alternative facilitated the success of rival ethno-national parties in 1990, 
when multiparty elections took place for the first time in all Yugoslavian republics.38 
Increasingly nationalistic propaganda, based on fear and perceived threats by 
other nations, thus fell on fertile ground. This dynamic, the “vertical” interplay 
between elites and the population, was initiated from above. The liberalization of 
the public sphere that had occurred in the early 1980s was used by ethno-national 
elites, through the media and the public domain, for homogenizing as well as 
radicalizing social life.39 These processes were so dominant that there were only a 
few who were able, or wanted, to resist. At first people adapted to the new social 
structures and only as a second step did they influence one another. The rhetoric, 
37 Sundhaussen, “Staatsbildung,” 8.
38 The last congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990 marked the 
official end of communism in the SFRY. The first multiparty elections took place in April 1990 
in Slovenia (presidential, 8 and 22 April) and Croatia (parliamentary, 22 April and 6 May) and 
in the period between November and December in Bosnia-Herzegovina (general, 18 November 
and 2 December), Macedonia (parliamentary, 11 and 25 November), Montenegro and Serbia 
(general and presidential, 9 and 23 December). In Slovenia the united opposition movement 
DEMOS (Democratic Opposition of Slovenia) led by Jože Pučnik won and Milan Kučan was 
elected as the first president of Slovenia. In Croatia the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) 
emerged victorious and Franjo Tuđman was elected president of Croatia. Victors of the elections 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina were the three large ethno-national parties SDA (Party of Demo-
cratic Action) led by Alija Izetbegović,  the SDS (Serb Democratic Party) of Radovan Karadžić 
and the HDZ (Croat Democratic Union) headed by Stjepan Klujić. The first president of the 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina was Alija Izetbegović. In Macedonia the anti-commu-
nist VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for 
Macedonian National Unity) won the elections, but was unable form a government. The leading 
communist leader Kiro Gligorov was elected as new president. In Serbia and Montenegro the 
winners were the successors of the League of Communists. In Serbia Slobodan Milošević won 
the presidential elections and in Montenegro, Momir Bulatović.
39 The pages of the prominent Serbian daily Politika served the agenda of Slobodan Milošević. 
A telling example is a series of attacks again the last Yugoslav prime minister, Ante Marković, 
written by the Serbian member of the State Presidency Borisav Jović under a pseudonym to 
give the impression that the critique reflected the “voice of the people.” Borisav Jović, Poslednji 
Dani SFRJ (Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996), 173. This dynamic is presented in detail in Jack Snyder 
and Karen Ballentine, “Nationalism in the Marketplace of Ideas,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., 
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 61–96. 
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slogans, central ideas and tools of mobilization were very similar among the na-
tional parties; they differed only in their labeling of the respective ethnic groups in 
the parties’ names and public appearances. The characteristics of all the important 
political parties and coalitions corresponded more to the features of a movement 
than to political parties per se. This also includes Slobodan Milošević’s Socialist 
Party of Serbia, as he rose to power with nationalism and remained long in power 
by appealing to nationalist sentiments.
The election results in the individual republics only exacerbated an already 
tense political atmosphere. Political discourse was reduced to ethnic categoriza-
tion and agreement was a priori eliminated between political representatives, with 
their diametrically opposed aims and visions. Nationally oriented parties, barely 
capable of consensus by virtue of their incompatible positions, claimed victory 
in the elections, resulting in intensified efforts toward federalization and separat-
ism, thereby further weakening the federal state. As a consequence, no republican 
elites were interested in holding federal elections and the Yugoslav state was thus 
given no opportunity to legitimize itself through democratic elections. Despite 
multiparty elections, de facto single party systems continued to exist in most of 
the republics as well as in all parts of the newly-created Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
state. Instead of one single-party system, “multiple single-party systems” came 
into being on Yugoslavian territory. Although 43 parties registered for the No-
vember 1990 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina,40 there was no wealth of political 
ideas. The similarities between the new parties were significantly greater than 
their differences.41 The three large ethno-national parties SDA, SDS and HDZ, 
which together were able to win 84 percent of the seats in the Bosnian parliament, 
were the clear victors of the elections in that republic.
Thus, the “democratic elections” paradoxically contributed more to the elim-
ination of democracy, in the sense of pluralism and mutual respect, than to its 
establishment. Political factions and debates moved in the direction of ethnic au-
tism. Ethnic groups increasingly shut themselves off by refusing exchange of in-
formation, and consequently no new or collective perspectives developed within 
the political discourse.
The global context of Yugoslavia’s failed revolution 
While the primary sources of the Yugoslav shift from communism to ethno-na-
tionalist politics were domestic, the international setting did not facilitate the 
country’s democratization. In 1990, the US National Intelligence Estimate for 
40 Rajka Tomić, ed., BiH Izbori ’90. Izborni zakon s potrebnim tumačenjima (Sarajevo: Oslo-
bođenje, 1990), 141.
41 Arnautović, Izbori, 40; Tomić, ed., BiH Izbori, 45–141; and Izborni ABC (Sarajevo: Oslobođen-
je 1990), 44–57.
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Yugoslavia predicted that “Yugoslavia will cease to function as a Federal state 
within one year, and will probably dissolve within two” and “[t]here is little the 
United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity.”42 With 
the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 and the beginnings of perestroika and 
glasnost, the significance of Yugoslavia in the international system waned. It had 
played a pivotal role in the context of Cold War Europe by maintaining close ties 
yet also some distance to both blocs, best exemplified in its leading role in es-
tablishing the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. While Western governments paid 
at least lip service to democratization in communist countries in the Soviet sphere 
of influence and sought to weaken or at least contain the influence of the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia’s political system came under little scrutiny by Western gov-
ernments. 
With the end of the Cold War in 1989 Yugoslavia lost its strategic position, 
and the attention of the United States and the European Community focused on 
other countries of Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War also removed the 
primary external threat to Yugoslavia, namely an invasion by the Soviet Union, 
a threat particularly pertinent in shaping Yugoslav policy in the years after the 
suppression of the “Prague Spring” in 1968. The leadership in different republics 
sought alliances with different countries as the country moved toward its collapse. 
Slovenia and Croatia pursued closer ties to Austria and Western Europe, whereas 
the Serbian leadership sought backing from the conservative wing of the Soviet 
leadership. But while some tried to portray the dissolution of the country as the 
work of foreign actors,43 these tentative alliances had little impact on the trajectory 
of Yugoslavia before its dissolution in 1991. 
By mid-1991 tensions had escalated to such a degree that external intervention 
could achieve little, at least in the form it was offered at the time.44 Initially both 
the United States and the European Community supported a democratic and uni-
fied Yugoslavia. While this line made sense from an outsider perspective, there 
was no partner for such a project by 1991 except for the increasingly embattled 
prime minister Ante Marković.45 Instead of being sinister destroyers of Yugosla-
via, as some interpretations would have it, the countries of Western Europe and 
the United States were hapless bystanders whose primary role in the dissolution of 
the country and its flawed transition to democracy was their passivity.
42 National Intelligence Estimate, Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990, 656. http://www.
foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000254259.pdf (accessed 
2 July 2013). 
43 Most notoriously, the last Yugoslav minister of defense, Veljko Kadijević. See Veljko Kadijević, 
Moje viđenje raspada. Vojska bez države (Belgrade: Politika, 1993). He also notes his and the 
Serbian leadership’s efforts to secure Soviet support.
44 Josip Glaurdić, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Break-up of Yugoslavia (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 69.
45 Ibid., 97. Officially his title was the secretary of the Federal Executive Council.
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Conclusions
During the 1980s Yugoslavia lacked the close ties with the Soviet Union that 
strongly linked the other parts of Eastern Europe as communist rule declined. The 
Soviet experimentation with reform and its abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine had 
little direct impact on Yugoslavia other than reducing the country’s international 
significance. The domestic structural sources of the crisis resembled those of its 
northern and eastern neighbors: economic crisis coupled with declining legitimacy 
of communist rule and the inability of the system to successfully reform itself. The 
League of Communists had originally achieved greater legitimacy than other com-
munist parties in power in Eastern Europe due to its central role in the World War 
II partisan movement, its differences with the Soviet Union, and the lesser degree 
of repression it practiced, especially in everyday life of most citizens. This relative 
liberalism also created high expectations from the party as well as the political 
system it had created and refined, expectations that over the decades it proved 
unable to live up to. In particular, it had been unable to address economic under-
development and regional inequalities. In addition, the weak federal structure pro-
duced a system with little political loyalty toward the center once the war-time 
generation of communists had largely died out by the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
National grievances as well as demands for more democracy, economic re-
forms and job security were thus commonly directed toward the leadership of the 
republics or provinces, not the federal state. The republics became the main scene 
of political contestation, with the two main arenas of pluralism that emerged being 
within the republics and between the leadership of the republics (or the League 
of Communists). Political contestation did not occur within the Yugoslav public 
sphere at large, although scholars have argued that such a sphere began to emerge 
at this time. It was, however, often ignored by the political institutions and usually 
limited to culture.46 
The social movements that emerged in Yugoslavia were mostly confined to sin-
gle republics or to representing individual national groups. The few multinational 
groups to emerge were very late, after republican and national parties and groups 
had already largely monopolized the public discourse.47 Thus by the late 1980s 
46 Dusko Sekulic, Randy Hodson and Garth Massey, “Who were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources 
of a Common Identity in Former Yugoslavia,” American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (1994): 
83–97. 
47 One of the few groups was the Union of Reform Forces, founded in July 1990 by Yugoslav 
prime minister Ante Marković. However, the party was established very late and thus did not 
participate in the Slovene and Croat elections and was trumped by more nationalist parties in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The Association for Yugoslav 
Democratic Initiative brought together intellectuals from a number of republics, but it too was 
founded relatively late, in early 1989, and remained ineffective as a political actor. See Branko 
Horvat, “Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative,” in Dejan Djokić, ed., Yugoslavism. 
Histories of a Failed Idea (London: Hurst, 2003), 298–301.
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Yugoslav institutions had not only become structurally weak, they had been dele-
gitimized by the republics. When multiparty elections were scheduled in 1990, 
there was no interest in the republics to have these held at the Yugoslav level, nor 
was it possible for Yugoslav institutions to initiate such elections. As a result, the 
transition from single party rule—which had also varied among the republics—to 
a multiparty system differed from republic to republic.
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u l f  B r u n n B a u e r
THE END OF COMMUNIST RULE IN BULGARIA: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY AND  
POLITICAL CHANGE
On 15 February 1988, Tatiana Popova (name changed), a dentist in Sofia, sent 
a letter of complaint to the Fatherland Front (Otechestven front), the largest mass 
organization in communist Bulgaria.1 Mrs. Popova wrote that although she was a 
trained dentist, for almost a year she had been unemployed. She had two chil-
dren—one under the age of six—and as she was divorced, she received only 
75 levs monthly child support from her former husband. She further explained that 
she had approached many medical centers for a job, but all of her requests had 
been turned down, even though the Labor Code stipulated that mothers of two 
children had an explicit right to a job. Requests sent to various authorities had not 
had any effect either. Her parents were in no state to help her because, as retirees, 
they received only very small old-age pensions. Mrs. Popova continued:
To be honest, I sometimes ask myself how I could slide into such a situation in our socialist 
society. We show the whole world how proud we are of our constitution, which guarantees 
every citizen of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria the right to a job. We are proud of our Labor 
Code, of the decisions of the thirteenth party congress, of the July and November plenary 
sessions of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party […]. These most hand-
some documents and decisions by the party are, unfortunately, circumvented by some and 
therefore not executed.2
A day later, Mrs. Popova also wrote to the general secretary of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party (BCP), Todor Zhivkov, informing him about her fruitless efforts 
to find a job in her profession. She informed him about her recently rejected ap-
plication for a position at a clinic in Sofia, which had announced an open dentist 
post in the newspaper Zdraven front.3 When she spoke with a doctor at the clinic, 
she was told that the position had already been filled six months before the job 
was advertised. Mrs. Popova used this example to make some general comments:
All of the vacant jobs announced in the newspaper Zdraven front have actually been reserved 
for people whose appointment has been prearranged. These jobs are advertised in the papers 
only for formal reasons, with demagogic means, in order to invent and lie, to pretend that the 
jobs have been formally announced.
1 Petitioner to Fatherland Front, 15 February 1988, in Tsentralen Dărzhaven Arkhiv (TsDA), f. 28 




They feel bored by us; they hate us—stop with all these lies, demagoguery and deception!!!!!
You should know that you are facing a developed socialist society, not mummies, stones or 
chopped trees!!!!!
I am not a horse with blinkers so that I go and look only straight ahead, without seeing what 
happens in the country—I see the truth!!!! I have carried a heavy burden my whole life and I 
understood that what is reigning are lies, demagoguery and deception, but not truth!!!!4
This vignette, despite its personal nature, is illustrative of the process of the 
de-legitimization of communist rule in Bulgaria. On one hand, Mrs. Popova’s letters 
show that the citizens of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria had learnt the ideological 
language of the regime and knew the relevant official structures. Mrs. Popova judg-
es her immediate situation by referring to existing laws and uses official propagan-
da to substantiate her demands. Whether or not she truly believed the state’s prom-
ises, whether she had internalized its ideology or not, is irrelevant here; important is 
rather her tactic of instrumentalizing official state and party proclamations for her 
individual claims and criticism. The party-state had been successful in making its 
intentions and ideology generally accepted frames of reference. Thereby it put a 
“weapon” into the hands of the weak, who then used state ideology as a means for 
subaltern protest. A statement of John Scott comes into mind: “The ideology formu-
lated by the ruling class to justify its own rule provided much of the symbolic raw 
material from which the most damning critique could be derived and sustained.”5
Mrs. Popova’s plight, on the other hand, shows that the state had problems 
fulfilling its own promises. It could not live up to the constitutional guarantee of 
providing everyone a job, and it failed in many other important areas as well. The 
many thousand letters of complaint kept in the archives of the government and the 
Fatherland Front provide ample evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with the 
concrete shortcomings that affected everyday life—perennial lack of housing, ex-
periences of injustice in court, low wages, irregular public transport, dirty neigh-
borhoods, etc. “Real” life in communism emerges as significantly different than its 
ideological promises. Nonetheless, citizens took the assurances of the state literal-
ly and called on the authorities to come forward with solutions. At the same time, 
they realized through their experiences that the party and state would not do so.
A third feature is noteworthy in the dentist’s letters. She clearly articulates a 
deep dissatisfaction with what was going on in the country at that time (the late 
1980s). She links her individual fate of not finding a job to wider problems, es-
pecially clientelism. Hence, she finds three of the most important positions of the 
official ideology violated: the principles of equality, justice and meritocracy. In 
her eyes, the existing system could no longer claim moral superiority: it had lost 
its legitimacy. This chapter will argue that this loss of legitimacy was a central 
factor in the political revolutions of late 1989, when communist power also end-
4 Ibid.
5 John Scott, Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987), 339.
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ed in Bulgaria. This implies that we must not only seek explanations for the end 
of communist rule in the realms of “high” politics, but also in the “lows” of 
mundane, everyday activities. The interrelation between state and society is es-
pecially important here, because communist rule had also been based on its le-
gitimization within the social realm. Therefore, this chapter will argue that while 
structural forces, such as growing economic problems, provided the basis for 
revolutionary change, it was the loss of legitimacy that pushed the actors to per-
ceive the economic and other problems as systemic. This instilled in them a belief 
in the need, and also the viability, of regime change.
The political developments of late communist and early postcommunist Bul-
garia are well documented. The comprehensive overviews of modern Bulgarian 
history by Evgeniia Kalinova and Iskra Baeva6 and by Richard Crampton7 provide 
a quick navigation also through the important events and personalities of Bulgar-
ian political life in the 1980s and 1990s. While the history of the socialist period 
did not attract much interest by Bulgarian historians for some time after 1989, 
recently a number of important works have appeared. The foremost institution to 
edit such books is the non-governmental Institute for Studies of the Recent Past 
(Institut za izsledvane blizkoto minalo) in Sofia.8 It has published, for example, 
a study on the forced assimilation of the Muslims under communism9 and a vo-
luminous handbook on the People’s Republic of Bulgaria “From the Beginning 
to the End.”10 The main social trends since 1960 have been documented by 
Nikolai Genov and Ana Krasteva using a great deal of quantitative data.11
The study of state communism in Bulgaria is facilitated by the relatively lib-
eral access to archival documents. The archives of the Central Committee of the 
Bulgarian Communist Party and its many bodies, of the Fatherland Front (the 
largest mass-organization of communist Bulgaria), of the central government 
authorities (including the Council of Ministries) and of other important institu-
tions are stored in the Central State Archives (Tsentralen dărzhaven arhiv) in 
Sofia. Documents in these collections dated until the end of the 1980s are gen-
erally accessible.12 Since a law change in 2006, the Archives of the Ministry of 
6 Evgeniia Kalinova and Iskra Baeva, Bălgarskite prehodi 1939–2002 (Sofia: Paradigma, 2002); 
in an abbreviated German version: Bulgarien von Ost nach West: Zeitgeschichte ab 1939 (Vien-
na: Braumüller, 2009).
7 Richard Crampton, Bulgaria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
8 See their webpage at www.minaloto.org (accessed 18 September 2012).
9 Mihail Gruev and Aleksei Kalionski, Văzroditelniiat protses. Mjusjulmanskite obshtnosti i ko-
munisticheskijat rezhim: politiki, reaktsii i poslednici (Sofia: IIBM, 2008).
10 Ivan Znepolski, ed., NRB. Ot nachaloto do kraia (Sofia: IIBM, 2011).
11 Nikolai Genov and Ana Krasteva, eds., Bulgaria 1960–1995. Trends of Social Development 
(Sofia: National and Global Development, 1999).
12 For a helpful guide through Bulgarian archives and libraries see Iskra Baeva and Stefan Troebst, 
eds., Vademecum. Contemporary History Bulgaria (Berlin and Sofia: Stiftung Aufarbeitung der 
SED-Diktatur, 2007). Free download at www.stiftung-aufarbeitung.de/download.php?file= up-
loads/pdf_publikationen/vade_bul.pdf (accessed 18 September 2012).
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the Interior are also available to researchers, although the procedure for gaining 
access to its documents is time consuming.
The events and developments of 1989 and 1990 have been well explained by 
journals such as Südosteuropa and the Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwis-
senschaftliche und Internationale Studien, as well as through the broadcasts and 
newssheets of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Of course, one can also examine 
the extensive newspaper reporting of that time. In the early 1990s, a number of 
studies were published providing the first in-depth analyses of the changes in 
Bulgaria; the collection of essays Parteienlandschaften in Osteuropa is a case in 
point, in which the dynamics of party formation after the end of one-party rule 
are highlighted.13 A number of memoirs by communist and postcommunist poli-
ticians, such as Zheliu Zhelev, have also appeared.14
Many features of the postcommunist developments are well researched. A 
good introduction into the first decade of transformation is provided by Emil 
Giatzidis, who documents the political, social and economic changes.15 A volume 
edited by Hans Leo Krämer and Hristo Stojanov bringing together eminent Bul-
garian social scientists has a comparable scope.16 An original perspective on the 
transformations is provided by the ethnologist Milena Benovska-Săbkova, who 
analyses the manifold consequences that the political and economic changes had 
on everyday life.17 The important problem of minority policies—in a country in 
which about 15 percent of the population belongs to an ethnic minority—has been 
comprehensively analyzed by Bernd Rechel.18
The end of communist rule in Bulgaria: events
Before outlining the explanatory framework, this chapter will briefly recall 
the political events that mark the “change” in Bulgaria.19 The most important 
single date is 10 November 1989, when the Central Committee of the Bulgarian 
13 Magarditsch A. Hatschikjan and Peter Weilemann, eds., Parteienlandschaften in Osteuropa. 
Politik, Parteien und Transformation in Ungarn, Polen, der Tschecho-Slowakei und Bulgarien, 
1989–1992 (Paderborn and Munich: Schöningh, 1994).
14 Želju Želev, V goliamata politika (Sofia: Trud, 1998). Cf. Iliyana Marcheva, “Recollections as 
Alternative History,” in Maria Todorova, ed., Remembering Communism. Genres of Representa-
tion (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2010), 253–74.
15 Emil Giatzidis, An introduction to post-communist Bulgaria: political, economic and social 
transformations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
16 Hans Leo Krämer and Christo Stojanov, eds., Bulgarien im Übergang. Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Studien zur Transformation (Bergisch Gladbach: Ferger, 1999).
17 Milena Benovska-Săbkova, Politicheski prehod i vsekidnevna kultura (Sofia: Prof. M. Drinov, 2001).
18 Bernd Rechel, The long way back to Europe: minority protection in Bulgaria (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2008).
19 The following section is mainly based on: Evgeniia Kalinova and Iskra Baeva, Bălgarskite pre-
hodi 1939–2002 (Sofia: Paradigma, 2002), 242–79; Richard Crampton, Bulgaria (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2007), 381–94.
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Communist Party accepted the resignation of Todor Zhivkov, who had dominat-
ed Bulgarian politics for more than thirty years, first as the general secretary of 
the party (from 1954) and then as the head of state (from 1971). Zhivkov was 
followed, as state and party leader, by the reformer Petăr Mladenov, who in Oc-
tober had denounced Zhivkov’s methods of rule in an open letter to the Politbu-
ro and Central Committee and then had resigned as foreign minister.
After Zhivkov’s replacement, which had the approval of the Kremlin, the 
political dynamics increased dramatically, pushing the BCP towards rapid liber-
alization. On 18 November 1989, the first big oppositional rally took place in the 
centre of Sofia in front of the Aleksandăr-Nevski cathedral. It was attended by 
approximately 100,000 people, who demanded an end to communist rule. Dissi-
dents became more vocal, and “ordinary” citizens took to the streets to protest 
against the government. On 14 December, another mass rally near the parliament 
building demanded the immediate renunciation of the infamous first article in the 
constitution, which awarded the “leading role in society and politics,” i.e.  polit-
ical monopoly, to the BCP.
Under pressure from within and without, the BCP made a number of decisions 
in order to shed some of its dictatorial past. The leadership called an extraordinary 
party congress for January 1990, suggested abolishing the first article of the 
constitution, and condemned the so-called rebirth process, the campaign in the 
1980s of forced assimilation of the Turkish minority. The revocation of the force-
ful name changes of the Turkish minority at the end of 1989 had provoked na-
tionalist demonstrations in January 1990 in Sofia and other towns, mainly in 
regions with a minority population. However, the nationalist tension soon evap-
orated and gave way to the re-establishment of basic minority rights. The four-
teenth party congress from 30 January to 2 February 1990 accepted a manifesto 
for democratic socialism which denounced the Soviet model and voiced so-
cial-democratic ideas. The party congress also re-allocated the top positions in 
state and party: Andrei Lukanov became prime minister, Aleksandăr Lilov head 
of the party, while Mladenov remained head of the state. In April, the BCP 
changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The Politburo and Cen-
tral Committee were abolished and replaced by more inclusive bodies.
In the meantime, opposition parties emerged that demanded free elections. The 
most important of these was the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), founded on 
7 December 1989, which was headed by the best-known Bulgarian dissident, the 
philosopher Zheliu Zhelev. The UDF was a coalition of thirteen opposition groups, 
ranging from conservatives to social-democrats. Their union was primarily based 
on their opposition to the communists. The historical Bulgarian Agrarian Nation-
al Union (BANU), which had legally existed also during communism, broke with 
the communists and again became an independent party. Other “historical” par-
ties, such as the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party, the Radical-Democratic 
Party, and the Democratic Party, were re-established. Another new party that was 
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to play a significant political role was established on 4 January 1990: the Move-
ment for Rights and Freedoms, which was created effectively as the political 
representation of the Turkish minority under the leadership of Ahmed Dogan 
(who still presides over the party). In addition to these new political parties, the 
independent trade union Podkrepa (Support), which had been established in 1988 
in the town of Plovdiv, became a driving force of democratic change. On 26 
December 1989, Podkrepa called for a strike demanding free elections. Mass 
rallies in Sofia and other towns continued to put pressure on the government and 
provided momentum for rapid democratization.
An important next step to promote and, at the same time, channel political 
change was the establishment of round table negotiations on 3 January 1990. It 
was to meet until May 1990. At the round table, the BCP sat together with the 
main opposition parties and social organizations in order to work out a road map 
for Bulgaria’s first free elections after World War II. The proceedings of the debates 
were broadcast live on radio and television, which had a huge impact on political 
consciousness in the country. The broadcasts made the UDF widely known in the 
country as the main challenger of communist (socialist) rule, also due to their 
reluctance to join the communists in a national unity government. The most im-
portant decisions of the round table concerned the de-ideologicalization of the 
constitution, the dissolution of BCP party cells in enterprises, the “de-partization” 
of state institutions, an agreement on democratic transformation, the abolition of 
the political police, the observance of the rule of law and human rights, and the 
holding of free elections, which were scheduled for mid-1990. The parties agreed, 
in a compromise, on a mixed election system of direct and representative vote, 
and on a 4 percent threshold for entering parliament. Elections were to be hold for 
a so-called Grand National Assembly, which would pass a new constitution.
The elections took place on 10 and 17 June 1990. In the election campaign, 
the BSP focused on the civic achievements of socialism, while the UDF de-
nounced all aspects of communist rule and highlighted communist crimes. The 
UDF enjoyed the support of the West (especially the United States), but it was 
disadvantaged by its lack of a functioning party apparatus outside big towns. In 
contrast, the BSP was able to make use of its broad base. In the end, the socialists 
were more successful, gaining 47.25 percent of the vote and 211 (of 400) seats 
in the constituent assembly. The UDF won 36 percent of the vote and 144 seats. 
As the third largest faction in parliament, the “Turkish” party, Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms (MRF), emerged with 23 deputies. The socialist victory was 
not only due to the better organization of their party, but also due to strong sup-
port in small towns and rural areas, where the populace was fearful of the privat-
ization of land and had also been less exposed to political mobilization in the 
winter of 1989–90.20 The UDF strongholds were Sofia and other large towns. The 
20 See Gerald Creed, “The politics of agriculture: identity and socialist sentiment in Bulgaria,” 
Slavic Review 54, no. 4 (1995): 843–68.
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victorious BSP, under Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov, attempted to create a 
coalition government with the UDF, but this proved impossible and thus, they 
formed their own government in September 1990. The UDF resorted to radical 
rhetoric in parliament to fuel public protests, which took place in Sofia and oth-
er large towns after the elections. Nevertheless, the BSP and UDF eventually 
agreed to select the opposition leader Zheliu Zhelev for the office of president (1 
August 1990), after Mladenov had been forced to step down. Public protests, 
however, continued on the streets, escalating in the night from 26 to 27 August 
1990, when protesters set the Socialist Party headquarters in the center of Sofia 
on fire and looted the building. After these events, the public mood became more 
sober and political contestation continued mainly within parliament.
The debates in the parliament were especially intense with regard to two 
problems: the new constitution and economic policy. Regarding the latter, the 
land issue was probably most fiercely contested, that is, what to do with the 
collective farms. The main disagreement was the question to whom the collec-
tivized land should be restituted: its former owners or those who were currently 
farming it. The UDF was able to push through the first option; the socialists only 
managed to include a passage that the restituted land should not be parceled out. 
The “Law on the Land” of 22 February 1991 was the start of a protracted and 
economically disastrous agricultural transformation, which resulted in the disso-
lution of collective farms and the reestablishment of the pre-communist pattern 
of small-scale farming. In general, economic policies were much contested until 
the big economic crash of 1996–97, when the neo-liberal consensus finally pre-
vailed. 
Lukanov’s government failed to stop a rapid economic decline through the 
year 1990, and it was eventually forced to resign by a wave of strikes in Novem-
ber 1990, when the population was plagued by food shortages. In September 
1990, food coupons even had to be introduced. Prices were finally liberalized in 
February 1991, which eased the shortages but led to sky-rocketing inflation, 
further impoverishing the population. In 1991 annual inflation reached almost 
480 percent while the gross domestic product declined by more than 22 percent. 
Bulgaria’s joining the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Sep-
tember 1990 had yet to bring dividends.
After Lukanov’s downfall, in December 1990 the leading parties agreed on a 
care-taker government headed by the non-party expert Dimităr Popov. The UDF 
joined the government and controlled the economic ministries. However, the UDF 
soon split into warring factions, when a group of its deputies left parliament in 
protest of the draft constitution and went on hunger-strike. The larger part of the 
UDF remained in parliament, but was split between a moderate and a more rad-
ical camp. The former took part in the elaboration of the constitution, which was 
passed on 12 July 1991 by 309 of the 400 members of parliament. The new 
constitution proclaimed Bulgaria a “democratic, constitutional and social state” 
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with a parliamentary democracy. It guaranteed democratic rights and freedoms, 
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the separation of powers. 
The economy was declared to be based on “free market initiative,” and by law 
every citizen and juristic person was guaranteed the right to entrepreneurship. 
The constitution also prohibited the establishment of “autonomous territorial 
units” and declared “the defense of the national and state unity” to be a principle 
of state policy.21
After the constitution was passed, the way was cleared for new elections to 
be held for an ordinary parliament. These took place on 13 October 1991. The 
elections were distinguished by fierce controversy about the legality of the MRF. 
The new Bulgarian constitution prohibited the establishment of parties on “eth-
nic” or “religious” grounds. The MRF charter actually did not describe the party 
as representing a minority population, but rather emphasized human rights and 
liberal values; to most Bulgarians, however, the MRF was the “Turkish” party. 
The constitutional court eventually declared the MRF to be in accordance with 
the constitution by the narrowest of margins. Its parliamentary presence safe-
guarded, the MRF was to tip the scales after the elections resulted in a hung 
parliament: the UDF won the most votes (34.36 percent) but not an absolute 
majority (110 of 240 seats in parliament). The socialists (BSP) came a close 
second, with 33.14 percent of the vote and 106 deputies. The MRF achieved 7.55 
percent and 24 seats, and thus its support was crucial for the forming of an UDF 
government under the new prime minister, Filip Dimitrov, who since December 
1990 had been the leader of the UDF. However, the MRF did not join the gov-
ernment and a year later withdrew its support, because Dimitrov’s economic 
policies negatively affected the MRF’s constituency, the Turkish minority. Dim-
itrov’s confrontational style and his zealous anti-communism also became a 
burden for the UDF, which consequently lost the next elections to the BSP, who 
won an absolute majority in 1994. Nevertheless, the first UDF government can 
be said to have represented the successful democratization of Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s 
joining the Council of Europe in Mai 1992 and its application for association with 
the European Community were foreign policies that demonstrated the direction 
of the new democracy. And if the functioning of a democracy is judged by the 
ability to vote a government out of office, Bulgaria is unmatched, because no 
government was to be reelected in any election following 1990.
The economic record of transformation was less convincing, however.22 After 
Dimitrov’s government was overturned by a vote of non-confidence in October 
1992 and especially after the socialists returned to power in 1994, the speed of 
economic reforms slowed down. Successive governments shied away from radi-
cal steps, such as the privatization or liquidation of loss-making state companies, 
21 Konstitutsija na Republika Bălgarija (Sofia: Sofija Press, 1991), preamble and article 2(1).
22 See Ulf Brunnbauer, “Surviving Post-Socialism. The First Decade of Transformation in Bulgar-
ia,” Sociologija 43, no. 1 (2001): 1–26.
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and rather pursued a policy of “soft budgetary constraints,” which increased the 
state’s burden of debt. The population paid the price, with the economy coming 
to the brink of catastrophe in the winter of 1996–97. Hyperinflation and severe 
shortages of basic consumer goods pushed the majority of the population into 
poverty. Only radical policy changes, together with international support, rescued 
Bulgaria from the abyss and led the country onto a path of sustained economic 
growth. Due to the influx of billions of US dollars in foreign investments, liber-
al economic policies and fiscal discipline, living standards have slowly risen 
(whether the new economic foundations are sound enough to weather the outfall 
of the 2009 global economic crisis remains to be seen). Bulgaria’s membership 
in the European Union in 2007 can be considered its reward for transforming the 
country into a market economy and a functioning democracy.
Legitimacy and revolution
The above-described chain of political events was the outcome of the loss of 
the regime’s legitimacy, on one hand, and the path to creating legitimacy for a 
new political order on the other. It was the loss of legitimacy experienced by the 
communists that made the political change in 1989 not merely possible, but in-
evitable. Legitimacy, thus, provides the missing link between structural crisis and 
system-changing political mobilization.
Since Max Weber, legitimacy has been considered the salient aspect of polit-
ical rule, because without it, citizens (or subjects) do not accept the political order. 
Weber’s main point is that a legitimate political system is founded, at least in 
part, on its moral validity in the eyes of the citizens (subjects), and not only on 
their egoistic calculations, customs or traditions. Legitimacy should not be con-
founded with democracy, as also in the modern era, non-democratic regimes can 
become legitimate, although it tends to be more likely for democratic regimes to 
be legitimate than authoritarian ones.23 Authoritarian systems can also success-
fully appeal to culturally embedded values and moralities. But their legitimacy is 
predicated mainly on their capacity to meet certain expectations of vital segments 
of the population and to fulfill their own promises. In exchange, the population 
is ready to forfeit democratic rights. The fact that authoritarian regimes are aware 
of the need to show their legitimacy is evinced by their great efforts to stage 
popular approval (as for example, by mass rallies or “elections”). However, the 
legitimacy of authoritarian regimes is less solid than that of a participatory sys-
tem: if such a regime does not meet expectations, the population may no longer 
be ready to forgo its democratic rights.
23 See Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2009). 
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It is, of course, difficult to establish the level of legitimacy enjoyed by the 
communist rule in Bulgaria. However, there are some indicators that the Bulgar-
ian communists were considered legitimate—at least among vital social groups—
until the late 1970s or early 1980s. One indicator is the absence of a dissident 
movement. From oral history interviews, we know that many people accepted 
central aspects of the official ideology and credited the communists with welfare 
achievements. The repeated victories of the Socialist Party after 1989 might also 
be taken as an indicator for the popular support of certain core values of socialism. 
It should also be noted that communism in Bulgaria was not only a Soviet impo-
sition, but had strong native roots: after World War I the “narrow” socialists—the 
predecessors of the communist party—were the second most successful party in 
the first elections.24 When the communists took power in 1944, the political mood 
in the country was decidedly left-wing following the moral and political bank-
ruptcy of the authoritarian war-time regime. Important ideological claims of the 
communists were also well connected with culturally embedded values, such as 
egalitarianism, the urge for education, and morality. 
A further source of consent was the significant increase in living standards ex-
perienced in Bulgaria, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Under communist guid-
ance, Bulgaria became an industrial society with relatively decent levels of public 
welfare, and hundred of thousands of former smallholders experienced upward 
social mobility. The communist regime, furthermore, showed a certain amount of 
flexibility in dealing with social practices that did not conform to its political in-
tentions. Collectivized peasants were granted small private plots and the regime 
often turned a blind eye to “ordinary” citizens’ strategy of appropriating state prop-
erty. These informal arrangements not only gave citizens a sense of autonomy and 
agency, but also led to what anthropologist Gerald Creed calls the “domestication 
of revolution.”25 People accommodated the system and modified it in their everyday 
actions to make it more tolerable. The downside, from the regime’s point of view, 
of its accepting informal—and often illicit—arrangements was the emergence of 
citizens holding a rather cynical attitude toward the state. People feared the state to 
some extent, but also tried to trick it to their own benefit.
These ambiguous results of far-reaching informality qualify also Bulgaria for 
the paradox formulated by Alexei Yurchak regarding the end of communism in 
the Soviet Union: “Everything was forever, until it was no more.”26 Yurchak’s 
telling phrase alludes to the fact that even a few years before communist rule 
came to an end, most citizens of the Soviet Union considered the communist 
24 On the emergence of the Bulgarian Communist Party, see Joseph Rothschild, The Communist 
Party of Bulgaria. Origins and Development 1883–1936 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959).
25 Gerald W. Creed, Domesticating Revolution. From Socialist Reform to Ambivalent Transition in 
a Bulgarian Village (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania University Press, 1998). 
26 Alexei Yurchak, “Soviet Hegemony of Form: Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 3 (2003): 480–510.
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Soviet system as ever lasting and without alternative. Not only a few believed 
seriously in the core values of communism and its superiority. However, after the 
communist system and even the Soviet Union had been rapidly dismantled, al-
most no one was surprised. Hence, according to Yurchak, while there had been 
legitimacy, to some extent it was illusory and not real political capital that could 
be spent by the regime. A similar model can be applied to Bulgaria as well: until 
the 1980s, most people seem to have taken communist rule for granted and even 
subscribed to some of its ideological underpinnings. One-party rule, nevertheless, 
imploded rapidly: “real socialism” as a configuration of power left the stage al-
most noiselessly. The reason for this was the multi-dimensional loss of legitima-
cy, which culminated in the 1980s. This loss made the potential of revolution a 
real possibility upon which people could act.
Bruce Gilley has shown that legitimacy is the central variable to explain rev-
olutions.27 For a revolutionary movement to gain ground, the old regime must 
first experience “legitimation failure,” wherein the state loses its raison d’être in 
the eyes of its population. If the political system is no longer considered legiti-
mate, crisis phenomena—such as economic problems—can tip the public mood 
towards changing the regime. In such a situation, crisis is increasingly seen as 
the typical outcome of the existing system and thus, the elite loses faith in this 
system. Relevant social actors, based on such perceptions of reality, then look for 
political solutions outside the existing structures of power, because they believe 
incremental reforms will not be enough to salvage their own interests. In a rev-
olutionary situation, oppositional groups provide alternative interpretations of the 
current situation and connect with the disaffected population. If legitimacy is lost 
and a certain revolutionary threshold is reached, change can come very quick-
ly—if it is not stopped by violence (as what happened on Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing in 1989). The initial protesters participating in anti-regime activities are 
swiftly joined by an increasing number of fellow citizens. This creates, as has 
been noted by Stathis N. Kalyvas, the “dynamics of increasingly large and fre-
quent mass demonstrations and the simultaneous process of fragmentation, de-
fection, and loss of confidence within the regime.”28 The speed of revolutionary 
changes, therefore, is the result of a twofold negative feedback mechanism caused 
by the loss of legitimacy. On the one hand, the citizens demand change, criticize 
the government and support the opposition, which makes even more people doubt 
the morality of the current regime. On the other hand, the erosion of legitimacy 
undermines the state’s capacities, which in turn increases popular dissatisfaction 
because of growing economic and social problems. It can be argued that the 
economic problems experienced by Bulgaria in the 1980s were, to some extent, 
not only the cause but also the consequence of a loss of legitimacy.
27 Gilley, The right to rule, 164–68.
28 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Decay and Breakdown of Communist One-Party Systems,” Annual 
Review of Political Science, no. 2 (1999): 323–43, 336.
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Culminating legitimacy crises in the 1980s
In his book on the history of modern Bulgaria, Richard Crampton observes 
that “by the middle of the 1980s, few people regarded Zhivkov’s regime as legit-
imate.”29 The dynamics of this loss of legitimacy can be illustrated by Sabrina 
Ramet’s threefold model of increasing regime opposition that she developed to 
describe the case of the GDR: “dissatisfaction,” “disaffection,” and “dissent.”30 
Dissatisfaction means the “discontent with certain ways in which certain parts of 
the system operate or with certain policies of the regime, without necessarily 
calling into question the legitimacy or optimality of the system.”31 Disaffection 
is defined “as discontent with the system itself without necessarily entailing a 
belief in one’s ability to change the system, but possibly being expressed in social 
nonconformism or deviance.”32 Dissent goes a step further, being “discontent with 
the system, charged by belief in one’s ability to effect change […] and implying 
an external standard by which the system’s performance is evaluated.”33 Hence, 
there is not only a growth in political consciousness, but also a shift in the frame 
of reference, from within the system to without.
The Communist Party in Bulgaria considered all three forms of regime dis-
content as potentially dangerous. In the 1980s, party leaders seem to have been 
aware that one of their most important sources of power, legitimacy, was waning. 
At this time external changes were also negatively affecting their rule: Gor-
bachev’s reform policies put pressure on the Bulgarian comrades from at least 
two angles. First, the Soviet Union began to charge higher prices for oil and 
other natural resources that were vital for the Bulgarian industry. The Soviets also 
became less tolerant of the poor quality of imports from Bulgaria. Second, pere-
stroika and glasnost made Bulgarian old-style communism look increasingly 
awkward. It was quite obvious that the new Soviet leadership considered the 
Bulgarian party leader an “unwelcome survival of the brezhnevite ‘years of stag-
nation’.”34 Zhivkov’s differences with Gorbachev became a major embarrassment 
for the Bulgarian leader, who in the past had stressed his success in establishing 
cordial relations with the earlier Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The 
changes in the Soviet Union thus are also part of the regime’s loss of legitimacy. 
The unwillingness of Gorbachev to intervene militarily in order to keep the com-
munists in the Warsaw Pact countries in power created the political space for 
change in the first place. And yet, the most important processes leading to the 
loss of legitimacy, which opened the gates for revolutionary change, must be seen 
29 Crampton, Bulgaria, 384.
30 Sabrina Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe. The Sources and Consequences of the Great 
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in domestic developments. These were, however, also linked to external condi-
tions. Four main areas in which legitimacy evaporated can be defined: 1) every-
day life, whose over-politicization led to alienation; 2) economic problems; 3) 
alienated youth; 4) dissent and political opposition.
1. Over-politicization and alienation
The over-politicization of everyday life and the omnipresence of ideology 
was a structural reason for the crisis of legitimacy. The Bulgarian Communist 
Party fell victim to its own agenda of gaining total control: the party pretended 
to be in charge of everything (as can be seen by the notorious article 1 of the 
constitution) and developed ideological instructions for even the most mundane 
actions. Hence, for everything there was a clear template of the correct, “com-
munist” way to act, which led to the political and ideological over-determination 
of everyday life. The Bulgarian communists, largely un-thwarted by any politi-
cal opposition in the country, devoted particular effort to make life “socialist.”35 
The envisioned “socialist way of life” would result in the internalization of the 
values of communism, so that people would act correctly in any situation with-
out even thinking; individual aspirations and needs should conform appropriate-
ly to the system. The extensive propaganda about the “socialist way of life” thus 
made clear to everyone what the party-state considered the correct norm of le-
gitimate behavior.36
The result of this policy was twofold: On one hand, the citizens held the par-
ty-state responsible for all difficulties and offensive behavior, such as shortages 
of housing and consumer goods, noisy taverns and smoke-filled hospitals, drunk-
en drivers and humdrum cultural programs—to mention just some of the tribula-
tions of daily life. These were some of the problems to which the party and 
public organizations (above all the Fatherland Front) paid significant attention.37 
But ironically, the party-state, through its propaganda and actions to address such 
problems, in the first place made them widely known and then showed the pub-
lic that it was unable to solve them. On the other hand, the party-state’s self-de-
clared responsibility for everything and its concern for ideological purity created 
an exaggerated aversion to “deviant” behavior. Even if absolutely non-political 
and insignificant acts did not conform to the ideological instructions, they were 
seen by the party-state as a potential threat. There was no officially recognized 
space for social behavior outside socialism. An example of this is the nearly 
35 See Ulf Brunnbauer, Die sozialistische Lebensweise. Ideologie, Politik und Alltag in Bulgarien, 
1944–1989 (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar: Böhlau, 2007).
36 Cf. Gilley, The Right to Rule, 80.
37 Ulf Brunnbauer, “Making Bulgarians Socialist. The Fatherland Front in Communist Bulgaria, 
1944–89,” East European Politics and Societies 22, no. 1 (2008): 44–79.
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paranoid concern about the “bad” influence of Western pop music, which at times 
led to attempts to repress its consumption, which in turn only alienated the youth. 
The interventionist disposition of the party and its obsession with ideological 
deviations ensured that, in the long run, social discontent became focused and 
politicized, turning against the party. Anthropologist Katherine Verdery, in an 
analysis of labor relations in communist Romania, observed,
The very form of Party rule in the workplace, then, tended to focus, politicize, and turn against 
it the popular discontent that capitalist societies more successfully disperse, depoliticize, and 
deflect. In this way, socialism produced a split between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ workers and Party 
leaders, founded on a lively consciousness that ‘they’ are exploiting ‘us.’ This consciousness 
was yet another thing that undermined socialist regimes. To phrase it in Gramscian terms, the 
lived experience of people in socialism precluded its utopian discourse from becoming hege-
monic—precluded, that is, the softening of coercion with consent.38
“Socialism” as it actually existed thus produced a consciousness of a divide 
between “us” (the people) and “them” (the party-state); “they” were exploiting 
us, so “we” have the right to trick “them.” Dissidents could build their count-
er-ideology on this sentiment, which became deeply rooted in the popular con-
sciousness.
In Bulgaria, there is interesting empirical evidence for the growing alienation 
of the workers in the one-party state. This was particularly significant, first be-
cause the BCP ruled in their name, and secondly, the party’s welfare policies 
addressed the working class in particular. In the 1980s, the Scientific Research 
Institute for Trade Union Problems (Nauchno-izsledovatelski institut po profsă-
juzni problemi), which was part of the trade unions, organized annual polls of 
approximately two thousand workers across the country. These polls asked about 
the workers’ general mood, their attitudes towards the trade unions, and their 
opinions about current affairs. These reports were confidential and only for in-
ternal use. The results were disheartening for the trade unions and the party. 
Workers did not have a particularly high opinion of the trade unions: “There are 
no trade unions, they are parasites.” “The trade unions in Bulgaria should be 
called ‘Independence’ because nothing at all depends on them.”39 In the 1987 poll 
28 percent of the workers said they were a member of a trade union only because 
it was effectively obligatory, 14 percent were members because “everyone else” 
was, and 6 percent because of the vouchers that the trade unions distributed for 
vacation homes. The report stated that many trade union members took part in 
union activities “without enthusiasm” and “only to have their presence counted.” 
Workers did not expect much help from their trade union: two thirds had never 
38 Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1996), 23.
39 Quoted in Petăr Petrov, “Lebenszufriedenheit bulgarischer Arbeitnehmer: Aussagen aus den 
1980er Jahren und heutiges Erinnern,” in Klaus Roth, ed., Arbeitswelt—Lebenswelt. Facetten 
einer spannungsreichen Beziehung im östlichen Europa (Berlin: LIT, 2006), 51–62, 52–53.
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approached the union organization of their place of work.40 The 1989 report pro-
duced even more sober results:
There is massive distrust, sharp criticism and a negative evaluation of the trade unions: ‘The 
trade unions exist external to and independent from the needs and interests of the people’; ‘they 
are part of the bureaucratic elite.’41
2. Economic problems
An important reason for the growth of discontent in the 1980s was increasing 
economic problems. Reliable data about economic growth in this period are hard 
to come by because of the irregularity of communist statistics and the use of the 
Net Material Product (NMP) to measure economic activity. According to calcu-
lations by John Bristow, the average annual growth rate of the NMP was about 
3.7 percent in the first half of the decade and 3.0 percent in the period from 1985 
to 1989 (which is close to the official figures).42 But other Western estimates, 
which are based on GDP calculations, are significantly lower. Industry, which 
until the 1970s had expanded quickly, grew in the 1981–88 period by an average 
annual rate of only 4.4 percent. A US study on Bulgaria notes that, “By the late 
1980s, Bulgarian industry had completely exhausted the advantages it had used 
in earlier decades to post impressive growth statistics.”43 The various reform at-
tempts of the previous decades, notably the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) 
initiated by the Central Committee in 1979 and set in place in 1982, had obvi-
ously not achieved the intended goals of raising efficiency and quality. The Bul-
garian economy did not succeed in shifting from extensive to intensive growth, 
while input factors (labor, natural resources, and capital) became increasingly 
scarce. Agriculture, which had always been neglected by the planners, fared even 
worse. Its output declined during the Eighth Five Year Plan (1981–85), mainly 
because of a severe drought in 1984 and 1985. The drought years also affected 
electricity production, and thus electricity had to be rationed. These “dark nights” 
had a strong effect on the public’s state of mind and played an important role in 
the demoralization of society and the fading faith in communism.44
Not only was the party leadership aware of the ensuing economic crisis, but 
also the population, which suffered from increasing shortages. In the above-men-
tioned trade union reports, the share of workers who were dissatisfied with the 
40 Lilia Dimova, “Obshtestvenoto mnenie za profsăjuzite v usloviiata na preustroistvoto” (unpu-
blished report, Nauchno-izsledovatelski institut po profsăjuzni problemi, Sofia, 1987), 10.
41 Nauchno-izsledovatelski institut po profsăjuzni problemi, “Profsăjuzite prez pogleda na 
trudeštite se” (unpublished report, Sofia, 1989), 3.
42 John A. Bristow, The Bulgarian Economy in Transition (Cheltenhem: Elgar, 1996), 19.
43 Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Bulgaria: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 
1992), http://countrystudies.us/bulgaria/38.htm (accessed 2 June 2010).
44 Kalinova and Baeva, Bălgarskite prehodi, 221–22.
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development of the economy grew constantly. In 1984, 15.7 percent of the polled 
workers said that the economy was developing “well.” In 1986, this had fallen to 
9.2 percent. The opposite opinion was shared by 9.9 percent of the workers in 
1984, and 29.2 percent in 1986.45 The economic problems reduced the state’s 
capacity to provide ample welfare benefits. This was also aggravated by the for-
eign debt (more than $ 4 billion at the beginning of the 1980s). In 1986, two-thirds 
of the workers expressed dissatisfaction with the slow solutions for vital social 
problems.46 The overwhelming majority of workers considered their wages insuf-
ficient, and complained about rising prices and increasing wage inequality, be-
cause of the party’s policy to provide material incentives to raise productivity. 
Hence, two central tenets of the social contract that were in exchange for the 
acceptance of communist rule were put into question: the provision of compre-
hensive welfare by the state and the official commitment to equality—tradition-
ally a highly cherished value in Bulgaria. It is not surprising that trade union 
reports and the many letters of complaint sent to the authorities reveal a growing 
frustration of the citizens due to various difficulties encountered in daily life that 
were a result of the economic crisis. 
The ailing economy undermined widely practiced accommodation strategies, 
such as the appropriation of social benefits and public property or the exploitation 
of informal economic resources, which had guaranteed a decent standard of living 
into the 1980s. The regime was also increasingly unable to furnish material privi-
leges to important social groups on whose loyalty it depended. The party-state had 
to realize the long-term consequences of its promise to increase the material stan-
dard of living. The Pandora box of consumerism, which had been opened in the 
1960s, could not be closed again.47 On the contrary, consumer needs were also 
rising because of the ideological rehabilitation of consumption. The dysfunctional 
economy, whose light industry regularly received less investment than its capital 
goods industry, was in no shape to produce enough consumer goods to meet ex-
pectations. Party propaganda extolling the virtues of “harmonic, socialist” con-
sumption in contrast to consumption that was “egoistic and capitalist” proved in-
effective in limiting the needs. The population’s horizon of expectations had wid-
ened and they were no longer satisfied with the existing system. People also began 
to judge their living standards by contemporaneous Western life styles—or what 
they believed life to be like in the West—rather than by the poverty of past gener-
ations. The increase in contacts with the West, on different levels and in different 
areas, as well as Western radio and TV broadcasts being jammed after the signing 
of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, proved to be a system-subverting force.
45 Nauchno-izsledovatelski institut po profsăjuzni problemi, “Rabotnicheskoto obshtestveno mne-
nie v nachaloto na 1987g.” (unpublished report, Sofia, 1987), 10.
46 Ibid., 3.
47 See Liliana Deianova, Ochertaniia na mălchanieto. Istoricheska sotsiologiia na kolektivnata 




Another factor of the de-legitimation of party rule can be found in one of the 
salient results of the socio-cultural transformation which the party had helped to 
trigger. Especially in the cities, a new cohort of well-educated young people had 
emerged. The various life styles they had developed were often at odds with 
party ideology. This youth was rarely oppositional and often even communist, 
but their behavior and tastes (for instance, for Western rock music) frightened the 
party gerontocracy, who sensed “ideological deviations” in anyone listening to 
the Rolling Stones.48 For these young people, the founding myths of communist 
rule were largely irrelevant; they had not experienced the terror of the 1940s. 
They compared their lives to their peers in the West, not to the generation of their 
grandparents or parents, who had experienced the poverty of the past. Sociolog-
ical studies on Bulgarian youth in the 1980s did not reveal an overt orientation 
towards the West, but highlighted the fact that young people defined communism 
mainly by their consumer possibilities.49 Young people generated new visions of 
individuality and autonomy that were at odds with the collectivist, ascetic moral-
ity preached—though often not practiced—by the party leadership. Attempts of 
the state to rein in the youth culture, such as the closing of discotheques in the 
1980s, could not but increase the young people’s estranged sentiments. The lead-
ing Bulgarian sociologist on youth at that time, Petăr-Emil Mitev, found a distinct 
alienation of the youth from politics.50
Alienation had grown not only out of new value systems, but also problems 
in the social stratification: young people often saw their chances of advancement 
limited by old communists who would not step down, or by people who had 
acquired good positions not due to qualifications but to their family or party 
networks. Sociological studies already in the 1970s revealed a decrease in social 
mobility; the social classes increasingly reproduced themselves. Especially the 
middle class, upon which the functioning of the system largely depended, devel-
oped strategies to barricade itself against worker and peasant upward movement. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, however, upward social mobility had been an important 
source of legitimacy, when hundreds of thousands of peasants moved to the towns 
and many workers were promoted to white collar jobs or rose in the party hier-
archy. Internal reports and individual complaints in the 1980s reveal the wide-
spread discontent of young people who could not find a job commensurate to 
their education. Citizens often criticized the allocation of jobs on the basis of 
nepotism and clientelism. Particularly worrying for the regime was the increasing 
frustration of the technical intelligentsia, as they were essential for managing the 
economy. Young technocrats were often faced by incompetent party-bureaucrats, 
48 Cf. Karin Taylor, Let’s Twist Again. Youth and Leisure in Socialist Bulgaria (Vienna: LIT, 2006).
49 Andrei Raichev, Mladata lichnost i malkata pravda (Sofia: Narodna mladezh, 1985), 81.
50 Quoted in Taylor, Let’s Twist Again, 58.
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which made them lose faith in the ability of the party to solve the problems of 
the country. In a confidential report of the trade unions in 1987, company direc-
tors were frank:
We must admit that what we have created is not socialism. We have created a bureaucratic state. 
How should we fight the daily grind, the good connections [vrăzki], nepotism [rodninstvoto], 
the ruined economy? […] I have no idea how the leaders in the most important echelons of 
power struggle against each other and against others, and whether they will ever admit that they 
have erred.51
A growing number of people, especially younger ones—those who were sup-
posed to “build communism”—were not only dissatisfied with the system, they 
also did not believe in the possibility of reform. This disaffected group rather 
looked towards system changes to fulfill their ambitions. Quite a number of young 
communists in the middle levels of the power hierarchy hoped that a radical 
transformation would allow them to translate political and symbolic capital into 
economic capital. It is therefore not surprising that a high percentage of the post-
1989 Bulgarian elite stem from the former communist youth organization Kom-
somol or other party bodies. But while these disaffected young people provided 
the social base for anti-regime mass mobilization, they were not the first to de-
mand an end to communist rule. This was carried out by the dissidents.
4. Political opposition and dissent
Political dissent in communist Bulgaria was long insignificant, especially if 
compared to countries such as Poland or Czechoslovakia.52 Nevertheless, active 
opposition played an important role in the end of communist rule in Bulgaria. 
The first to put up real resistance were members of the Turkish minority, who 
opposed—also by violent means—the forceful assimilation campaign that had 
started in 1984.53 It appears that this campaign, in which Turks were required to 
take Bulgarian names and all symbols of Turkish (Muslim) culture were outlawed, 
did not even appeal to the majority of the population, despite the fact that the 
communists had quite successfully played the nationalist card to create consent 
in the previous two decades. The forced assimilation of the Turkish population 
and their increasing resistance also led to protests among Bulgarian intellectuals 
in 1988, who demanded that human rights be observed. The mass emigration of 
Turks from May to August 1989, when some 350,000 people left to Turkey, 
51 Dimova, Obshtestvenoto mnenie za profsăjuzite, 7.
52 Nataliia Hristova, “Spetsifika na bălgarskoto ‘disidenstvo’,” Istoricheski pregled 60, no. 3–4 
(2004): 115–40.
53 For more on the so-called rebirth process, see Mihail Gruev and Aleksei Kaľonski, “Văzroditel-
niiat protses”: Miusiulmanskite obshtnosti i komunisticheskiiat rezhim: politiki, reaktsii i posle-
ditsi (Sofia: Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo, 2008).
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showed the entire Bulgarian population that something had seriously gone wrong. 
It also caused severe labor shortages in the affected areas.
In 1988–89 the regime faced increasingly vocal opposition in parts of the intel-
ligentsia. It began to lose the support of this crucial group, which for decades the 
party had incorporated into the system relatively successfully. It is very likely that 
the developments in the Soviet Union played an important role here, since Bulgar-
ian intellectuals traditionally followed Russian media. In November 1988, the 
dissident organization Club for the Support of Glasnost and Perestroika in Bulgar-
ia was founded by prominent intellectuals at the University of Sofia. Among its 
founding members were dissidents like the philosopher Zheliu Zhelev, but even 
more numerous were party members, who as a result were expelled from the party. 
Also in 1988, the first independent trade union, Podkrepa, was founded. As well, 
a number of other informal organizations for the protection of human rights were 
established in 1988, all of them very small and without much direct impact. Nev-
ertheless, they demonstrate the disappearing fear and the emerging civil society.
Even more forceful were ecology protests, which started in the town of Ruse on 
the Danube River. For years Ruse had suffered from suffocating pollution emitted 
by a Romanian chemical plant on the other side of the river. The pollution had 
caused a dramatic increase in various diseases among the population of Ruse, es-
pecially its children. From the autumn of 1987 regular demonstrations were held, 
organized mainly by mothers, and petitions were sent by the citizens of Ruse call-
ing on the authorities to act. Even a documentary film (Dishai! “Breath!”) was made 
about the ecological disaster in Ruse. On the occasion of its premiere on 8 March 
1988, the first Bulgarian dissident organization, the Social Committee for the En-
vironmental Protection of Ruse, was founded. The events in Ruse inspired environ-
mentalists in Sofia to establish the organization Ekoglasnost on 4 April 1989, which 
aimed at informing the public about environmental pollution in Bulgaria, much of 
it caused by industrial plants. Ekoglasnost became famous for its protests during 
the CSCE Meeting on the Protection of the Environment in Sofia from 16 October 
to 3 November 1989. The brutal suppression of this demonstration by the militia 
in the city center was a major embarrassment for Bulgaria, not only in front of the 
world media, but also domestically: it showed that the regime was ready to use 
violence against people who demonstrated for a goal that the party also propagated, 
that is, the protection of the environment. This made environmental protests even 
more dangerous in the eyes of the party, since these people could hardly be labeled 
“counterrevolutionaries,” “anti-social elements,” or “foreign agents.” Their protest 
illustrated the collapse of faith in the ability of the regime to solve immediate prob-
lems, as well as the rise of a civil society. The demonstrations in Sofia in October 
marked the beginning of an opposition mobilization that would play an important 
role in pushing the regime for real change after Todor Zhivkov’s exit on 10 No-
vember 1989. The “revolutionary threshold” in terms of the willingness to engage 
in anti-regime protests had been reached.
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Conclusion
The Bulgarian Communist Party was, of course, aware of the creeping loss of 
its legitimacy and what this meant for its claim to sole responsibility. The sociol-
ogist Evgenii Dainov expressed this succinctly:
It is something completely different to have total control in the moment when your opponents 
get more vocal; conditions no longer allow the application of mass terror, and society no longer 
accepts your legitimacy because of your failure in all areas.54
As a consequence, the party tried to decrease its visibility in order to extract 
itself from the criticism frontline. The “July conception” of 1987, adopted by the 
Central Committee, reduced the responsibility of basic party committees and gave 
more flexibility to state authorities and enterprises, on paper at least. Reforms in 
the labor code and the economic organization also sought to increase the autonomy 
of companies. The self-management of workers was also to be expanded. For a few 
years, decentralization was in vogue. The party hoped that these reforms would 
reduce the alienation of workers and increase their willingness to put an effort into 
raising productivity. But the reforms went nowhere. First of all, the party was not 
ready to really relinquish power, so many reform measures were not even imple-
mented, and others, especially those concerning decentralization, were revoked only 
a few years later. A last-minute attempt at economic liberalization in January 1989 
(ukaz no. 56) was also not really implemented (although it did prepare the ground 
for managers and influential party members to appropriate state capital).55 The only 
result of Bulgarian pseudo-perestroika was an increase in administrative chaos. The 
regime proved incapable of adapting to rapidly changing conditions.56
The reforms also failed because they met widespread skepticism among the 
people. Apathy and disillusionment had reached such proportions that only very 
few people were interested in getting actively involved in the party’s program for 
change. The 1987 trade unions report on workers opinions portrays a deeply 
alienated society:
Instances of the violation of labor discipline can be observed ever more frequently; there is a 
decrease in the labor effort by workers and an increase in labor turnover. Several information 
sources mention apathy and skepticism, the withdrawal into personal life and ‘doubts that the 
ideas would become reality.’ Among the working people—managers as well as workers—the 
standpoint of ‘listening and waiting,’ of ‘the curious occasional observer’ prevails. ‘Those above 
have brought us into this mess, they should get it right again’—one hears such opinions often, 
if the conversation turns to the execution of the reconstruction [preustrojstvo].57
54 Evgenii Dainov, “Reformirane na nereformiruemoto—Bălgarskata komunisticheska partiia i 
predizvikatelstva na 1980-te godini,” in: Evgenii Dainov and Deian Kiuranov, eds., Za prome-
nite… Sbornik (Sofia: Tsentur za liberalni strategii, 1997) 11–40, 25.
55 Kalinova and Baeva, Bălgarskite prehodi, 232.
56 Cf. Kalyvas, “The Decay and Breakdown of Communist One-Party Systems,” 331–32.
57 Dimova, Obshtestvenoto mnenie za profsăjuzite, 5.
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Workers were not enthusiastic about self-management either, as they sensed 
that this was mere rhetoric. In a representative survey in 1988, only 20 percent 
of the workers showed a “strong willingness” to become involved in workers’ 
self-management; 90 percent believed that they had no or only little influence on 
their company’s management.58 Even Todor Zhivkov complained in the Politbu-
ro about the party’s loss of trust among the population and that almost no one 
was willing to get involved in the proclaimed changes.
The party’s half-baked reform attempts made the inherent contradictions of 
the system only more obvious. Zhivkov’s slogans—“individual initiative, 
self-management, rule of law, democracy, human rights”—revealed the shortcom-
ings of “real socialism,” which for more than four decades had propagated, but 
obviously not achieved, these goals. His slogans even pointed to a different order. 
The more the party imitated democracy and a market economy, the more citizens’ 
expectations increased, but the party could not meet these expectations if they 
did not surrender their power, so frustration grew. In a way, the reforms—as 
limited as they were—undermined the party’s dominant role. The party had lost 
both its monopoly on the interpretation of reality and the population’s belief in 
its problem-solving capacity. The gulf between ideology and lived realities had 
become too wide to be bridged by policy adaptations, informal arrangements and 
concessions to the population. It had become clear to everyone that much of what 
happened did so not according to the party’s plan, but rather despite it, or even 
against it.
At the end of the 1980s, the question was no longer whether communist rule 
would end, but when and how. Had the Bulgarian communists really read Marx, 
they would have seen the writing on the wall: the relations of production had 
clearly obstructed the development of the productive forces, and from the fold of 
“real socialism,” its own negation had come into existence.
58 Derek C. Jones and Mieke Meurs, “Worker Participation and Worker Self Management in Bul-
garia,” Comparative Economic Studies 33, no. 4 (1991): 47–82.
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THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION
More than twenty years after the events that led to the violent fall of the com-
munist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu on 22 December 1989, the Romanian revolu-
tion is still something of an enigma and shrouded in mystery and mystification. 
Although more than four hundred books1 and innumerable articles have been 
written on this topic—by the actors involved, contemporary witnesses, as well as 
by Romanian and foreign historians—there are still profound disagreements be-
tween them about the actual events and how to interpret them. A major issue in 
the debate is whether what occurred in Romania was a revolution at all, and if 
so, what kind of revolution. Other divisive questions concern how or why vio-
lence was used during the various stages of the revolution, the goals pursued by 
the protagonists of the revolution, and last but not least, the role—if any—played 
by external actors in the process. A major divide continues to persist between the 
protagonists of the anti-communist protest movement and the anti-Ceauşescu 
dissidents who took power after the dictator’s fall. The scholarly community 
examining the topic is split between researchers who question the reliability of 
Romanian sources and those who are principally not opposed to them.
Today, there is a broad archival basis available in Romania for research on the 
1989 revolution. The results of the inquiries into the revolutionary events pro-
duced by two special committees of the Romanian Senate between 1990–92 and 
1 Here is a necessarily incomplete selection of books on the Romanian revolution: Michel Castex, 
Un mensonge gros comme le siècle (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Ruxandra Cesereanu, De-
cembrie ’89. Deconstructia unei revolutii. (Bucharest: Polirom, 2009); Emil Constantinescu, 
Adevărul despre România (1989–2004) (Bucharest: Editura Universalia, 2004); Dennis Dele-
tant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate. Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–1989 (London: 
C. Hurst and Co., 1995); Daniela Veronica Guşă de Drăgan, Condamnat la adevăr—General 
Ştefan Guşă (Bucharest: RAO International Publishing Company, 2004); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, 
Die unvollendete Revolution. Rumänien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Piper, 
1990); idem, Systemwechsel in Rumänien. Von der Revolution zur Transformation (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1998); Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d’ètat roumain: au pays du mensonge 
triomphant (Paris: Kalman Lévy, 1990); Dumitru Preda and Mihai Retegan, 1989. Principiul 
Dominoului. Prăbusirea regimurilor comuniste europene (Bucharest: Editura Fundatiei Cultur-
ale Române, 2000); Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2005); Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Istoria loviturilor de stat 
în România, vol. 4, Revolutia din decembrie 1989—o tragedie românească (Bucharest: RAO 
International Publishing Company, 2005); Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Cronologia evenimentelor din 
decembrie 1989 (Bucharest: RAO International Publishing House, 2009); Vladimir Tismănea-
nu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2003).
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1992–96 have been published, as have a considerable number of documents from 
the archives of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Secret Services and the Ministry of Defense. The Institute of the 
Romanian Revolution of December 1989, set up in 2005, is conducting system-
atic research on the topic.2 
Collective memories of previous uprisings
Romania’s history under communist rule is not marked by “eruptive” upris-
ings, but by a sort of societal “magma” involving a fundamental rejection of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology coupled with a historically based mistrust of the Sovi-
et Union, whose armies had imposed the communist system in the country. Sev-
eral factors account for this. One is language and culture—Romania is the only 
country of the former Soviet bloc where a Romanic language is spoken and whose 
culture is closely connected to the culture of Western Europe. During the first 
years of Soviet occupation, a partisan movement existed in the mountain areas 
of Romania; its final defeat came only after the suppression of the Hungarian 
uprising of 1956. There is, however, a tradition of socially motivated uprisings 
in communist Romania. These include the miners’ strike of the Jiu Valley in 1977 
and the 1987 workers’ demonstration in Braşov, both put down without blood-
shed. The Braşov demonstration in particular is thought to have served as a kind 
of dress rehearsal for the Timişoara uprising, which marked the beginning of the 
1989 revolution. Whereas in November 1987,3 the massive workers’ protests in 
Braşov were quelled by the regime through a show of force and subsequent ar-
rests, the Timişoara protests developed into a violent uprising after the first pro-
testers were killed or wounded. And the Romanian collective memory recalls a 
number of historical coups d’état. Among the best known in a series of conspir-
acies is the coup that led to the deposition in 1866 of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, the 
architect of the unification of the Romanian principalities, and the coup d’état of 
23 August 1944, through which King Michael, supported by several political 
leaders, overthrew the head of state, Marshall Ion Antonescu. 
But interestingly, the protagonists of the 1989 revolutionary coup did not call 
on this aspect of Romania’s political tradition. Instead, they looked even further 
back, explicitly and insistently referring to the French revolution of 1789 in order 
to accredit the idea of the Romanian revolution of 1989 as being a classical pop-
ular uprising, and to support the political myth of the allegedly spontaneous 
“emanation” of its leaders from the “chaos” following Ceauşescu’s arrest.
2 For an excellent overview, see Ioan Scurtu, La Révolution roumaine de 1989, dans le contexte 
international de l’époque (Bucharest: Institut de la Révolution Roumaine, 2008), 7–22.
3 Marius Oprea and Stejărel Olaru, Ziua care nu se uită. 15 noiembrie 1987, Braşov (Bukarest: 
Polirom, 2002), with a list of those taken into custody. 
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The structural and long-term causes of the Romanian revolution
The East European revolutions of 1989 were revolutions of a historically new 
type. Their most exceptional feature was that they did not represent individual 
national phenomena, but they were links in a chain of processes that revolution-
ized the Soviet-dominated system in Eastern Europe. The revolution of the Sovi-
et bloc, caused by a general crisis in the communist system, was part and parcel 
of a geopolitical revolution facilitated by the rapprochement between the United 
States and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, which had led to substantial chang-
es in the political architecture of the entire world.4
Despite a number of common features in the 1989 East European revolutions, 
their specific course was marked by historically, politically and socially deter-
mined differences. Whereas the transition of power in Poland and Hungary was 
negotiated between representatives of the communist rulers and the opposition in 
a manner reminiscent of the Spanish model of the so-called Moncloa Pact of 
1978, or was a non-violent coup de parti, as in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and 
Bulgaria, the—in the end violent—overthrow of the Ceauşescu regime, which 
was originally envisaged to follow the non-violent example of the 1974 Portu-
guese revolution, makes it a singular case.5 Only in Romania did a violent military 
coup d’état take place during which the communist head of state was executed. 
In more than one respect, the unique mode of the transition of power in Ro-
mania was a direct consequence of the “Romanian deviation” in its relations with 
the Soviet Union, as had been pursued by Romania since the 1960s. The Soviet 
leadership became increasingly aware of the danger represented by Romania’s 
autonomous course in economic and foreign policy, not only for the stability of 
the communist regime within Romania itself, but also for the coherence of the 
Soviet bloc as a whole. After having successfully negotiated the withdrawal of 
the Soviet troops in 1958, the Romanian communist leadership, at that time 
headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, began to oppose Soviet pressure for a larg-
er degree of integration and specialization of the CMEA countries, and attempted 
to create closer economic ties to the developed Western countries. At the same 
time, Romania also embarked on a more autonomous policy in its foreign and 
security policy, trying to distance itself from the Soviet imperial power. 
In an internal power struggle following the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965, 
the supporters of Romania’s autonomous course headed by Nicolae Ceauşescu 
gained the upper hand over those who supported a return to the Soviet fold. While 
4 See an excellent detailed analysis of these worldwide changes in: Pierre Grosser, 1989. L’année 
où le monde a basculé (Paris: Perrin, 2009).
5 In an interview with Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Victor Stănculescu pointed out that “the main sce-
nario was patterned on the Portuguese model: i.e. a short-term military regime followed by a 
democratic regime supported by the army.” Alex Mihai Stoenescu, In sfârsit, Adevărul… Gen-
eralul Victor Atanasie Stănculescu în dialog cu Alex Mihai Stoenescu (Bucharest: RAO Interna-
tional Publishing Company, 2009), 73.
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trying to remove his pro-Soviet opponents from powerful party and state posi-
tions, Ceauşescu accelerated the independent foreign policy course inaugurated 
by his predecessor. In order to strengthen his hold on political power, Ceauşescu 
allowed a certain degree of de-Stalinization and de-Sovietization in the cultural 
field and liberalized contacts with the West. He also took steps to co-opt the young 
technocratic and cultural intelligentsia and to reconcile the old national-minded 
elites who had been imprisoned or discriminated against in the 1950s. With a 
speech held at a mass rally in Bucharest on 21 August 1968 criticizing the War-
saw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which Romanian troops had not taken 
part, Ceauşescu achieved a degree of unanimity between the party, intellectuals 
and the population that was unknown in the other bloc countries, where de-So-
vietization started only after 1989.
There are four main elements that led to the downfall of the Ceauşescu regime: 
the impact of the crisis of Soviet-style communism on Romania, the effects of 
the world economic crisis, Romania’s loss of Western support, and the emergence 
of domestic opposition.
The restructuring of the Soviet bloc
From the mid-1970s, the communist system, which had been imposed on the 
peoples of the Soviet Union and exported to the countries in Eastern Europe that 
had been occupied by the Red Army at the end of World War II, went through a 
deep crisis. The Soviet and East European economies were clearly unable to keep 
pace with the technological progress registered in the West. Moreover, they were 
deeply affected by the worldwide crisis in raw materials and on the financial 
markets. East European leaders expected the Soviet Union to help them overcome 
the economic and financial crises, whereby they asked for more deliveries of oil, 
gas and raw materials in exchange for products they were unable to sell on West-
ern markets. The Soviet Union, however, was no longer able or willing to con-
tinue this traditional CMEA policy, and requested its partners to pay for such 
deliveries in hard currency and on the basis of world market prices. Because of 
the economic crisis, these regimes could thus no longer live up to their vigorous 
promises of economic welfare, and failed to honor the social contract that had 
been tacitly concluded with the populations of their respective countries. The 
Marxist-Leninist ideology had lost legitimacy and the grasp of the communist 
parties in power was no longer left unchallenged.
Yurii Andropov, a former KGB chief and CC secretary in charge of relations 
with the “fraternal” East European parties, who followed Leonid Brezhnev at the 
helm of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was well aware of the specter 
of a three-pronged revolt looming in the member countries of the Soviet econom-
ic and military bloc: revolts directed against the communist system, against the 
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respective political regimes, and against the Soviet imperial power. In order to 
prevent an outbreak of revolts or a systemic breakdown of the communist system 
in these countries, Andropov and Gorbachev were determined to implement a 
coordinated policy of restructuring the economies of the Soviet bloc in accordance 
with Soviet strategies, without, however, doing anything that would endanger the 
communist system.6 
After his advent to power in 1985, Gorbachev pursued what was described as 
the “Gorbachev doctrine”: politically supporting reformist forces in those coun-
tries where the communist rulers opposed Moscow’s intra-bloc and domestic 
policies.7 According to recently discovered Soviet documents, Gorbachev held a 
speech at the 6 October 1988 Politburo meeting in which he stated that socialism 
was in a profound crisis and thus that all the communist regimes had to introduce 
perestroika-style reforms in order to survive: 
A number of countries have followed our example, or even preceded us on the road of deep 
reforms. Others, such as the GDR, Romania or North Korea, still fail to recognize the need for 
such reforms—but the reasons for that are rather political, since the present leadership is unwill-
ing to change anything. In reality, all these countries need change. We don’t say this publicly, 
lest we are accused of an attempt to impose perestroika on friends, but the fact is: there are clear 
signs of a forthcoming crisis, and thus radical reforms are required all over the socialist world. 
In this sense, the factor of personalities becomes one of huge significance. [...] Those who stub-
bornly refuse to follow the call of the times only push the illness deep inside and greatly aggra-
vate its future course. That concerns us very directly. We may have abandoned the rights of the 
“Big Brother” of the socialist world, but we cannot abandon our role as its leader. Objectively, it 
shall always belong to the Soviet Union, as the strongest country of socialism and the birthplace 
of the October Revolution.8 
6 In a conversation in March 1989 with Károly Grósz, the secretary general of the Hungarian So-
cialist Workers’ Party, the Soviet leader emphasized that “we clearly have to draw boundaries, 
thinking about others and ourselves at the same time. Democracy is much needed, and interests 
have to be harmonized. The limit, however, is the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of 
stability.” See the Report for the members of the Political Committee, 29 March 1989, MOL 
M-KS-288-11/4458o.e., in Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, Melinda Kalmár, Zoltán Ripp, Miklós 
Vörös, eds., Political Transition in Hungary, 1989–1990: A Compendium of Declassified Doc-
uments and Chronology of Events (Washington and Budapest: National Security Archive, Cold 
War History Research Center, and 1956 Institute, 1999), 6.
7 “Le nouveau leader du Kremlin visait à l’élimination des vieux dirigeants des pays socialistes 
et à leur remplacement par des personnes jeunes, prêtes à appliquer la perestroika. […]  Le 
remplacement des leaders conservateurs, souhaité par Gorbachev, a été soutenu par les mé-
dias occidentaux.” Ioan Scurtu, La Révolution roumaine de 1989, dans le contexte internatio-
nal de l’époque (Bucharest: Institut de la Révolution Roumaine, 2008), 6, 8. See also Anneli 
Ute Gabanyi, “Gorbačev in Bukarest: Rumänisch-sowjetische Differenzen treten offen zutage,” 
Südosteuropa 36, no. 5 (1987): 267–75; idem, “Rumänien und Gorbačev,” in Walter Althammer, 
ed., Südosteuropa in der Ära Gorbačev. Auswirkungen der sowjetischen Reformpolitik auf die 
südosteuropäischen Länder (Munich: Sagner, 1987), 75–82.
8 Cf. Jamie Glazov, “Symposium: Secrets of Communism’s “Collapse”, 23 September 2010, http://
frontpagemag.com/2010/jamie-glazov/symposium-secrets-of-communism%E2%80%99s- 
%E2%80%9Ccollapse%E2%80%9D/ (accessed 12 September 2013). 
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Two days before Ceauşescu’s fall, Radio Moscow broadcast a statement in 
Romanian made by the Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, stating that 
“the internal processes in Romania are beginning to bear consequences for inter-
state relations,” bringing the potential of “tarnishing the socialist ideals.”9 On 21 
December, the same radio station aired interviews of three deputies of the Soviet 
Supreme Soviet (in session at the time) charging Ceauşescu of “no longer being 
a socialist (having shot at his people) and of being an opponent of Soviet pere-
stroika and of the inexorable process of democratization in Eastern Europe.”10 At 
a press conference during his visit early in January, just a few days after the new 
leaders had taken power in Bucharest, Shevardnadze referred to past Soviet-Ro-
manian disagreements in the area of foreign policy and the Soviet reform process. 
Ceauşescu, he said, had isolated Romania from the East-European reform process, 
and in the end he had resorted to openly criticizing it. However, now that the last 
non-conformist regime in Eastern Europe had collapsed, Shevardnadze was hope-
ful “that the reconstruction and modernization of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact 
could start.”
Already in 1983, Romania had been perceived as the weakest link in the So-
viet imperial chain. It was the country where social revolt would most likely be 
directed against the communist system as such; indeed, it seemed possible for the 
country to leave the Soviet bloc and turn to the West.11 In February 1989, an 
investigation under the aegis of the social scientist Oleg Bogomolov painted a 
pessimistic scenario for Romania. As stated in the report submitted by Gor-
bachev’s advisor, if the financial means set free after the repayment of Romania’s 
debts were not used to raise the living standards of the population, a 
social explosion cannot be excluded. At a moment when the renovating processes going on in 
the other socialist countries have not yet proved the feasibility of the reform policies, there is a 
danger that there will be a decisive turn toward the West (which also means its leaving the War-
saw Treaty) in this country, whose population has liberated itself from socialist values and been 
traditionally educated in the spirit of having a common fate with the Latin world.12 
Even worse from the Soviet point of view, the Bogomolov commission did 
not exclude the possibility of an anti-Ceauşescu revolt of “the leading class” that 
would result in “changes from the top,” a revolt, one is left to understand, which 
would lead to the same results.
9 Radio Moscow in Romanian, 20 December 1989. Cf. Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 
121.
10 Radio Moscow in Romanian, 21 December 1989. Cf. Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 
122.
11 See Oleg Gordiewsky and Christopher Andrew, KGB. Die Geschichte seiner Auslandsopera-
tionen von Lenin bis Gorbatschow (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1990), 824.
12 See Dumitru Preda and Mihai Retegan, 1989. Principiul Dominoului: Prăbusirea regimurilor 
comuniste europene (Bucharest: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Române, 2000), 18–20.
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The impact of the world economic crisis
The crisis that rocked the world economy in the 1970s was another determin-
ing factor. Under its impact, the three fundamental pillars of Romania’s econom-
ic and trade policy—avoidance of dependency on the Soviet Union, reliance on 
raw materials imported from Third World countries and financial support from 
developed Western countries—collapsed. The Romanian economy, which needed 
massive imports of crude oil for its oversized refinery capacities that had been 
built with Western loans, encountered difficulties after deliveries from its main 
providers stopped as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. The country could not expect 
to get Soviet support, since it had distanced itself from the CMEA mechanism of 
energy deliveries at sub-market prices in exchange for non-competitive goods. 
Last but not least, Romania could no longer consolidate its debts at Western 
banks, which had panicked as a result of the Polish crisis in 1980. After its West-
ern creditors stopped granting or guaranteeing further loans, and after the condi-
tions set by the International Monetary Fund for further loans had been rejected 
as unacceptable by the Romanian government, Romania—unlike other East Eu-
ropean countries with considerably higher per capita indebtedness such as Hun-
gary or Poland—was forced to repay its foreign debts. 
The drastic cuts in crude oil and raw material imports led to a severe reduction 
of industrial production and hence in energy exports to Western countries. In 
order to procure the hard currency needed to repay its debt, Romania increased 
its exports of food to the detriment of domestic consumption, and reduced the 
imports of consumer goods, policies that severely affected the living standards of 
the population. The harsh austerity program imposed by the regime included food 
rationing, radical cuts in the private consumption of energy, and wage reductions. 
When Ceauşescu triumphantly announced the successful repayment of its hard 
currency debt in March 1989, the Romanian population had reached a degree of 
economic need, social misery and depression unknown anywhere else in the bloc. 
Any earlier support for Ceauşescu was gone, and the Romanian society as a whole 
wanted a change.
The loss of Western support
The Soviet policy of reshaping its relations inside the Soviet bloc and imple-
menting perestroika-style reforms in the East European states was possible only in 
the context of a redefinition of the relationship between the great powers in the East 
and the West. After having successfully negotiated a treaty in 1987 with Mikhail 
Gorbachev that would eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the United 
States signaled willingness to back the new Soviet leader and to respect Moscow’s 
security interests as did other Western states such as Britain and France.
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The repercussions of this Western policy change dealt a major blow to the 
Ceauşescu regime. During the Cold War era, Romania’s foreign policy, which 
had obstructed the deeper integration of the Warsaw Pact, had been attributed a 
kind of “nuisance value” by the NATO countries. But in the light of Gorbachev’s 
“new political thinking,” Ceauşescu’s deviations from the political and ideolog-
ical positions of the Soviet Union were no longer relevant. Instead, Romania was 
increasingly perceived as a factor that disturbed the process of rapprochement 
between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Western governments and 
financial institutions were no longer ready to grant Romania the trade privileges 
it had enjoyed earlier, and the European Community stalled negotiations with 
Romania on a new trade agreement. In 1989, Romania, once a forerunner in re-
lations between the CMEA countries and the European Community, was now the 
only European CMEA state that had not yet applied to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with this body. Similarly, the US government was no longer ready to extend 
the Most Favored Nation’s Clause to Romania’s “repressive regime.” In order to 
preempt the US decision, Romania unilaterally renounced the clause in 1988. 
Western media turned their focus on the low living standards of the population, 
the violation of human and nationality rights, and the treatment of regime oppo-
nents in the country. In the CSCE and at the United Nations, Romania’s human 
rights and minority record came increasingly under fire from both East and West. 
The loss of Western support for Ceauşescu’s policies dealt another heavy blow 
to his image at home.
The emergence of domestic opposition
Ceauşescu’s nationalist anti-Soviet rhetoric was the main reason why a dis-
sident movement was late in developing in Romania, and also why so many 
dissident figures were connected to the pro-Soviet communist elites who had 
been removed from the center of power in the 1960s. Following Romania’s 1968 
criticism of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union 
set in motion all the levers at its disposal to destabilize the restive Romanian 
leadership internally. In 1969, Moscow initiated the “Operation Dniester,” whose 
goal was to win over Romanian officers to engage in an attempt to topple 
Ceauşescu, and “in case this coup was not successful by itself, to find a pretext 
for the Soviets to get involved.”13 Not surprisingly, the first signs of organized 
opposition against the Ceauşescu regime appeared in the armed forces. Although 
Romania had discontinued sending its leading party, military and security offi-
cials for training to the Soviet Union in the early 1960s—a common practice 
that the rest of the Warsaw Pact member states observed until 1990—there were 
13 Ion Mihai Pacepa, a high ranking defector from the Romanian Department of External Informa-
tion, in a television interview on Hungarian Duna Television. Jurnalul National, 3 March 2004.
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still a large number of senior officers in Romania who had studied in the Sovi-
et Union. In order to counteract the perceived threat to the country’s foreign 
policy as well as to his own power, Ceauşescu undertook a thorough restructur-
ing of Romania’s defense system. After a first military coup attempt led by 
General Ioan Şerb had failed in 1971, a new defense law was adopted in 1972. 
In 1974, the new Romanian Constitution transferred the supreme command over 
the national armed forces to the newly created position of state president, i.e. to 
Ceauşescu. A new Romanian military doctrine based on the concept of the peo-
ple’s war marked another step in Romania distancing itself further from the 
Warsaw Pact. In the course of the army’s reorganization, officers detected or 
suspected of conspiring against Ceauşescu, including those who were of Russian, 
Jewish or Hungarian origin, who had studied in the Soviet Union, or were mar-
ried to Soviet wives, were removed from leadership positions in the army. De-
spite these precautionary measures, military coup attempts are reported to have 
taken place in 1971, 1976, 1983, 1984 and 1985. All, however, could be pre-
vented. The officers involved in these attempts were removed from active service 
and dispatched for civil work.
With the onset of the debt crisis in Romania in the early 1980s, opposition to 
Ceauşescu’s policies began to be voiced also by national-minded officers. They 
were antagonized by the regime’s preferential treatment of the state police (Se-
curitate) over the military, cuts in defense spending, and reductions in the higher 
technology needed for the national defense industry, and were against the massive 
use of army manpower in agriculture and infrastructure construction projects.14
Despite their preferential treatment, dissatisfaction was also brewing in the 
secret services, the external information services in particular. Following the 
defection to the United States in 1978 of Mihai Pacepa, a Soviet-trained old-stand-
ing Securitate official and deputy head of the Department for External Informa-
tion (Directia de Informatii a Armatei), this department was reduced to complete 
disarray from which it never recovered. It is presumed that a considerable number 
of leading officials in this department were won over by foreign, mainly Western 
intelligence services. In the final phase of the Ceauşescu regime, when its collapse 
seemed unavoidable, even members of the internal Securitate service, well aware 
of the surge in dissatisfaction in the country, began distancing themselves from 
the regime.
Support for Ceauşescu was also dwindling within the Romanian Communist 
Party. Party activists were increasingly upset by reductions in their material priv-
ileges and by his policy of cadre rotation, which led to an unprecedented concen-
tration of power in the hands of the “Ceauşescu clan,” made up of Nicolae, his 
14 This author analyzed the conflict between Ceauşescu and the military at an early stage. Ro-
manian Situation Report 5, Radio Free Europe research, 17 March 1983, reprinted in Anneli 
Ute Gabanyi, The Ceauşescu Cult (Bucharest: The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing 
House, 2000), 391–96.
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wife Elena, their son Nicu and a small group of loyalists. As a result, the ranks 
of the old, pro-Soviet party cadres who had been marginalized by Ceauşescu were 
strengthened by dissatisfied members of the younger, technocratic party elites. A 
growing number of intellectuals and creative artists who had been won over by 
Ceauşescu’s anti-Sovietism during the 1960s now raised their voice against the 
ideological hardening, the recourse to nationalist manipulation, and the excessive 
personality cult of Ceauşescu designed in the wake of his so-called cultural 
mini-revolution. A rapprochement took place between frustrated technocratic and 
cultural elites and disgruntled anti-Ceauşescu party activists, as well as army and 
secret service officers. Even a member of the CC Political Executive Committee 
and vice-chairman of the State Council, Gheorghe “Gogu” Rădulescu, supported 
a group of prominent dissident writers, who met regularly at his country house 
in Comana, south of Bucharest.15
Chronology of events
The first attempt to begin a popular revolt occurred on 14 December 1989, 
but it ended in failure. Organized by an underground group called Romanian 
Popular Front (Frontul Popular Roman) in the north-eastern city of Iaşi, its lead-
ers were immediately arrested.
The next day, 15 December, a Reformist pastor belonging to the Hungarian 
minority, László Tőkés,16 who had gained quite a bit of notoriety after protesting, 
in a secret interview granted to a Canadian television station in August 1989, 
Ceauşescu’s policies and plans of razing villages inhabited by mostly Hungarian- 
and German-speaking citizens, was to be evicted from his home in Timişoara. He 
called on his parishioners to demonstrate against his eviction on the square in 
front of his house. In order to defuse the situation, the Timişoara mayor assured 
Tőkés that the official order for his eviction had been revoked.
The next day, Tőkés tried to calm the people who had gathered in front of his 
house. However, when the number of persons on the square grew after some 
young demonstrators blocked a nearby streetcar line, the protests escalated and 
slogans against Ceauşescu’s dictatorship could be heard. First acts of vandalism 
occurred, culminating in an attack on the county party headquarters.
15 According to Virgil Măgureanu, the first head of the post-1989 Romanian Information Service, 
Gogu Rădulescu was a high-ranking KGB spy who had been infiltrated into Romania to assist 
the so-called cultural dissidence, which supported regime change in Romania. See “Măgureanu 
si agentii KGB,” Ziua, 30 October 2006.
16 László Tökés, born in 1952 to a family of ethnic Hungarians and a pastor of the Reformed 
Church, was known from the early 1980s as a dissident in the Ceauşescu regime. In his sermons 
and in interviews with Western media, he protested the official Romanian program of rural de-
velopment and planning projects. Cf. Marius Mioc, Revoluţia fără mistere. Ȋnceputul revoluţiei 
romȃne; cazul László Tökés (Timisoara: Editura Almanahul Banatului 2002).
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On 17 December, Ceauşescu ordered the local party leaders to proceed with 
the eviction of Pastor Tőkés, illegally proclaimed a state of emergency in Timişo-
ara, and dispatched the generals Stefan Guşă,17 from the Ministry of Defense, and 
Emil Macri, from Securitate, to Timişoara to restore order in the city. On the same 
day, a meeting of the Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist 
Party took place in Bucharest. Party Secretary General Ceauşescu announced he 
was going to take over the command of the army himself. He accused Minister 
of Defense Vasile Milea, Minister of the Interior Tudor Postelnicu, and the com-
mander of the Securitate troops of having disregarded his order to shoot the 
demonstrators, and threatened to put the three before a firing squad. When sev-
eral members of the Committee voiced their disagreement with these drastic 
measures, Ceauşescu offered his resignation (“Elect another secretary general!”), 
but he was persuaded to stay. In the course of the violent clashes between dem-
onstrators and the army in Timişoara, between 16 and 20 December, 72 persons 
died in Timişoara and 253 were wounded.18
The next day, 18 December, convinced that the situation in Timişoara was 
under control, Ceauşescu left for an official visit to Iran where he planned to sign 
an important economic contract on the delivery of a considerable quantity of 
crude oil to Romania. However, the popular uprising in Timişoara took a new 
turn, with workers from the large industrial plants19 joining the protesters. In 
order to cover up the previous day’s killings, Ceauşescu’s wife Elena, together 
with Minister of the Interior Postelnicu and Party Secretary Emil Bobu, ordered 
most corpses to be flown to Bucharest, where they were cremated. Despite the 
nearly total isolation of Timişoara and the closing of the borders with Hungary 
and Yugoslavia, there were reports in international media that the clashes had 
resulted in thousands of victims. In contrast, the Romanian media kept silent 
about the events.
On 19 December, the protesting workers requested the military to withdraw from 
Timişoara’s streets. Party officials as well as General Guşă attempted to persuade 
them to return to work. Confronted with a massive turnout of workers joining the 
17 General lieutenant Stefan Guşă, 1940–94, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the gen-
eral staff 1986–89. His role in the suppression of the Timişoara uprising is still unclear, although 
available evidence shows that he tried to prevent bloodshed there and ordered the withdrawal of 
the army into the barracks. Members of the pro-Soviet coalition suspect him of having tried to 
stage a countercoup of national-minded officers, which they prevented.
18 Curtea Supremă de Justiţie (Ȋnalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie), Procesele Revoluţiei din 
Timişoara (1989) documente istorice, adunate şi commentate de Marius Mioc (Timişoara: ART-
PRESS, 1992), 42. More recently, official figures have set the number of dead in Timişoara at 
73 and the number of wounded at 296. http://www.ziare.com/stiri/eveniment/timisoara-primul-
oras-liber-sirenele-au-sunat-la-23-de-ani-de-la-revolutie-1208385 (accessed 12 September 
2013).
19 Until 1989, Timişoara was one of Romania’s most important industrial centers, with big plants 
for machine building, electronics, chemical and petrochemical manufacturing and food indus-
tries.
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protesters in the streets, on 20 December, Guşă decided to withdraw the army to 
the barracks. A Democratic Forum was established in this city, which requested the 
resignation of the government and of Ceauşescu as party secretary, the release of 
those detained during the uprising, the opening of the borders and freedom of the 
press. Ceauşescu, who had returned from Iran, addressed the issue publicly for the 
first time in a speech broadcast live on state television. Far from giving in to the 
demands of Timişoara’s Democratic Forum, he accused so-called terrorist anti-na-
tional groups of having joined hands with “reactionary, imperialistic and chauvin-
istic circles, as well as with secret services from various foreign states,” who were 
waging an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Romanian state.20
Western governments and the leaders of the Soviet Union as well as of the 
other Warsaw Pact countries, with the exception of the GDR, condemned the 
violent reprisals. Ceauşescu protested against what he alleged was “an action 
previously planned in the context of the Warsaw Pact,” and charged the Soviet 
leadership with intending “to intervene militarily in Romania.”21
Convinced that he could once more appeal to the patriotic feelings of the 
Romanian people, the next day, 21 December, Ceauşescu decided to hold a meet-
ing on the same Bucharest square where he had protested the Warsaw Pact inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. However, he had hardly started to speak 
when he was interrupted by loud shouts, clamor and yelling. After a short inter-
ruption, during which television broadcasts showed a panicking head of state, 
Ceauşescu resumed his speech by announcing that measures would be taken to 
raise the living standards of the population. After a few minutes, another outbreak 
of noise emerged from the audience, whereupon the meeting was broken off and 
the participants were dispersed. During that night, savage fighting broke out in 
Bucharest between demonstrators and the army, the Securitate and militia forces, 
and the Patriotic Guards, leaving many people dead or injured. Rioting also broke 
out in other cities in western and central Romania.
On the morning of 22 December, Ceauşescu pronounced a state of emergency 
in the entire country. Minister of Defense Milea was found dead after Ceauşescu 
had reprimanded him for not having brought troops to Bucharest from the prov-
inces quickly enough. First Deputy Minister of Defense General Victor Atanasie 
Stănculescu22 was then ordered to take over the command of the army. Contrary 
to Ceauşescu’s orders to use force against the demonstrators, Stănculescu ordered 
the troops that were en route to Bucharest to return to their barracks. General 
Iulian Vlad, head of the Securitate, later reported to the Senate’s investigative 
commission that early in the morning he had withdrawn the Securitate and mili-
tia troops defending the Central Committee building. The Ministry of Defense 
20 Scurtu, La Révolution, 188–90.
21 Preda and Retegan, 1989. Principiul Dominoului, 477.
22 He acknowledged having been in contact prior to 1989 not only with Western, above all British 
secret services, but also with KGB officers via Hungary. 
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and the Ministry of the Interior dispatched orders to the troops across the country 
to stop firing at demonstrators.23
When the demonstrators reached the Central Committee building without 
meeting any resistance, Ceauşescu, his wife and two of their closest aides were 
persuaded by Stănculescu to leave Bucharest by helicopter. However, their hur-
ried departure did not result in their rescue. They were held in a garrison in the 
city of Tîrgovişte, northwest of Bucharest.
After Ceauşescu’s flight, Romanian television, renamed Free Romanian Televi-
sion, proclaimed the victory of the revolution. While various political figures from 
the Ceauşescu party apparatus competed for the scraps of political power, the vac-
uum of power was filled by actors who had been associated for years in clandestine 
endeavors to topple Ceauşescu. The preordained political leader of this conspirato-
rial group was Ion Iliescu,24 who had won for himself the image of a regime dissi-
dent and proponent of Gorbachev-style reforms in Romania. He presented General 
Nicolae Militaru on television as the future minister of defense.25 The same day, 22 
December, Iliescu also announced the setting up of a new provisional power struc-
ture called the Front of National Salvation (Frontul Salvării Naţionale, FSN) and 
appointed a Council of the Front to govern the country until democratic elections 
could be held. The 39 members of the Council were selected from older an-
ti-Ceauşescu groups, including members of the party, the military and the Securi-
tate, as well as younger technocrats whose careers had been blocked during the 
Ceauşescu era, representatives of the Hungarian minority who had protested the 
previous regime’s nationality policies and, last but not least, a number of intellec-
tuals and writers. Iliescu was appointed chairman of this council.
As soon as demonstrators in Bucharest realized that the new leaders who had 
presented their program on television were in fact Soviet-loyal dissidents to the 
Ceauşescu regime and not opponents of the communist system, their attitude 
turned from anti-Ceauşescu to anti-communist. “Whereas the demonstrators in 
the street were shouting ‘Down with Communism,’ Ion Iliescu spoke about the 
23 Şerban Săndulescu, Decembrie ’89. Lovitura de stat a confiscat revoluţia romȃnă (Bucharest: 
Omega Ziua Press, 1996), 195–98; Constantin Sava, Constantin Monac, Adevăr despre De-
cembrie 1989. Conspiraţie, diversiune, revoluţie. Documente din Arhivele armatei (Bucharest: 
Editura Forum 1999), 114–15.
24 Born in 1930, Iliescu was an engineer by profession and had studied in Bucharest and Moscow. 
The son of an illegal communist party member, Iliescu joined the party in 1953 and quickly rose 
in the party nomenklatura, becoming a member of the RCP Central Committee in 1965, then 
a minister of youth and the head of the CC propaganda department. In 1971, the presumptive 
heir apparent to Ceauşescu fell from the leader’s grace, most probably because of his suspected 
anti-Ceausescu position. He was progressively downgraded and released from the Central Com-
mittee, finally becoming the director of the Technical Publishing House. In the 1980s, there were 
rumors that he would become the new Romanian leader in a pro-Gorbachev Romania.
25 Nicolae Militaru, 1925–94, was an army officer who had studied in Bucharest and Moscow. He 
was sent into the reserves in 1978 and appointed deputy minister of industrial constructions. He 
retired in 1986.
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‘noble ideas of communism’ in his first speech on television. […] It is clear and 
obvious that Iliescu did not then conceive the fall of communism, something that 
was in flagrant contradiction with the demands of the people in the streets.”26 In 
his addresses to the demonstrators on 22 December whom he called “comrades,” 
Iliescu eschewed the word “revolution,” speaking of “change and transformation” 
instead.27 In their “Timişoara Proclamation” issued on 11 March 1990, partici-
pants of the Timişoara uprising made it clear that the 1989 revolution “was cat-
egorically an anti-communist and not only an anti-Ceauşescu revolution.”28 They 
had not risked their lives, they wrote, “to help a group of anti-Ceauşescu dissi-
dents inside the Romanian Communist Party accede to political power.” 
The particularities of the Romanian revolution
Three major differences can be seen between the revolutionary course of 
events in Romania and the peaceful transition of power as it occurred elsewhere 
in the Warsaw Pact countries:
1. the use of force;
2. the execution of the communist head of party and state;
3. the active involvement of external actors in the process.
The use of force
It should be noted that the use of force is neither a characteristic of Romanian 
political culture nor a defining trait in Romania’s historical tradition. 
Two questions have not been fully clarified to this day: why the initially 
peaceful uprising that started on 16 December 1989 in Timişoara and then in 
Bucharest turned violent and who is responsible for the outbreak of violence 
after 22 December. 
One widespread interpretation claims that violence in the initial stage of the 
revolution was due exclusively to pro-Ceauşescu forces, whereas the violence 
that broke out after 22 December was due mainly if not exclusively to forces 
aiming, first, to suppress the uprising and, later, to liberate the dictator and start 
a counterrevolution.29
26 Mălin Bot, “Crimele nepedepsite ale lui Iliescu,” Evenimentul Zilei, 15 June 2013, http://www.
evz.ro/detalii/stiri/crimele-nepedepsite-ale-lui-ion-iliescu-1042664.html (accessed 13 Septem-
ber 2013). 
27 Cf. Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Ithaca and London: Cor-
nell University Press, 2005), 109, 112–14.
28 For the text of the Proclamation, see: http://proclamatia.wordpress.com (accessed 17 Oct. 2013).
29 Ceauşescus’s press secretary Eugen Florescu has reported a conversation he overheard between 
Nicolae Ceauşescu and his brother Ilie, the head of the Political Council of the army, which took 
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A second model claims that the outbreak of violence in the initial stages of 
the uprising was the result of covert operations by the Soviet Union30 and possi-
bly also other Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia, as well as Romanian expa-
triates. According to this model, this was done in order to provoke the Romanian 
army and security forces to become aggressive. Later, a “terrorist diversion” after 
Ceauşescu’s capture is thought to have been started by pro-Soviet forces centered 
around General Militaru. By 25 December, when the violence stopped after the 
execution of the dictator and his wife had been shown on Romanian television, 
967 people had died and 2,587 injured.31
While there is no doubt that the army and security forces obeying Ceauşescu’s 
orders tried to suppress the uprising by the use of force, there continues to be 
disagreement about the responsibility for the second wave of violence that start-
ed on 22 December after Ceauşescu had fled from Bucharest, becoming a de 
facto prisoner of the new leaders. The new leaders used television broadcasts, 
which they had monopolized, to charge so-called terrorists with attempting to 
liberate Ceauşescu and to restore the pre-revolutionary regime.32 According to 
Stănculescu, 1,015 “terrorists,” most of them Soviet citizens, were arrested by 
the Romanian army, but they were subsequently released by General Militaru.33 
This was accompanied by “a torrent of destabilizing actions, diversion and elec-
tronic war” on the entire territory of Romania, blocking military telecommunica-
tion channels and feeding false information into the Romanian army’s radio-elec-
tronic reconnaissance systems.34 The new leaders handed over an unknown num-
ber of weapons to civilians, which contributed to the ensuing chaos. 
According to the second interpretation model, several goals may have prompt-
ed the use of force by the provisional new leadership in the period following 
Ceauşescu’s imprisonment, the first and foremost being creating a pretext for 
eliminating Nicolae Ceauşescu.35 His execution, they declared, was necessary in 
place at 6 a.m. on 22 December in the CC building. Ilie Ceauşescu had drawn Nicolae’s attention 
to the great number of workers marching towards central Bucharest from industrial sites outside 
the capital, and Nicolae is quoted as saying: “Come on, there were a million people on Tianan-
men Square and they let them have it.” Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Cronologia evenimentelor din 
decembrie 1989 (Bucharest: RAO International Publishing Company, 2009), 162–63.
30 The model does not provide evidence as to who ordered these operations. 
31 Cartianu, Cartea Revoluţiei, 980.
32 After he took over as minister of defense, Stănculescu even called what had happened “psycho-
logical warfare.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 February 1990.
33 For more details, see Gabanyi, Systemwechsel, 192–93.
34 Sergiu Nicolaescu, Cartea revoluţiei romȃne decembrie ‘89 (Bucharest: Editura Ion Cristoiu, 
1999), 477–78; Săndulescu, Decembrie, 73. Cf. Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le 
siècle. Roumanie: histoire d’une manipulation (Paris: Michel Albin, 1990).
35 “‘Tensions were stirred up at the time to create reason to kill Ceauşescu,’ says former General 
Stanculescu. By whom? ‘You’d have to ask Iliescu.’” Iliescu admitted that “the widespread 
chaos in December 1989 was aggravated by made-up reports from the television headquarters 
controlled by the National Salvation Front leaders—reports that the drinking water had been 
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order to end the bloody turmoil created by the “terrorists.” The terrorist attacks 
ended as soon as this goal had been attained on 25 December.  As a second mo-
tive according to this line of interpretation, the pro-Soviet forces were intent on 
preventing nationalist minded army generals from taking power.36 At the time of 
the revolution, rumors made their way into the Western press reporting that the 
Timişoara uprising had, in fact, gotten ahead of a revolt of a nationally minded 
segment of the army, which had planned to depose Ceauşescu due to the damage 
he had caused in Romania. They did not, however, plan to bring Romania back 
into the Warsaw Pact fold, but rather were determined to continue the autonomous 
course of Romania’s foreign policy.37 As early as 22 December, calls were heard 
for the “traitor Guşa” to be arrested.38 On 29 December, Guşa was ousted as chief 
of staff of the Romanian army on the grounds of alleged incompetence, and was 
replaced by another pro-Soviet general. Three days before Guşa’s release, the 
Soviet Pravda had pointed out that the regular army was obviously incapable of 
putting an end to the terrorist attacks.39 A third goal, according to this interpreta-
tion, was to use the chaos and panic within the population as a pretext for calling 
on the Soviet Union for help in case their plans for takeover were in danger. In 
the end, it was possible to avert the outbreak of a civil war in Romania because 
the overwhelming majority of the army (and security) forces did not react to 
provocations.
Ceauşescu’s execution
The execution of the ruling head of state is perhaps the most striking feature 
of the Romanian revolution and a singular event in the context of the other former 
communist East European countries. Whereas elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the 
decisive military power lay with the (Soviet) commander of the Warsaw Pact in 
the respective capitals, in Romania was the president the supreme commander of 
poisoned, the army was on its last legs and unknown ‘terrorists’ were in the pay of the coun-
ter-revolution.” Walter Mayr, “‘A Mission of Honor’: Key Players Recall Romania’s Bloody 
Revolution,” Der Spiegel International, 20 October 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/ 
europe/a-mission-of-honor-key-players-recall-romania-s-bloody-revolution-a-655557-2.html 
(accessed 5 September 2013).
36 Cf. Săndulescu, Decembrie, 167. Western media at the time wrote about a civil war having bro-
ken out in Romania between army units loyal to the new provisional leadership on one hand and 
Securitate fighters together with Arab mercenaries on the other. ARD Tagesschau, 23 December 
1989, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcPQlMNX_y4 (accessed 5 September 2013).
37 Mircea Dinescu, a Romanian dissident close to Gorbachev, has pointed out that Ion Iliescu was 
“the only alternative to a military coup” and “the only chance” to prevent it. Frankfurter Rund-
schau, 11 January 1990. See Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 108; and Systemwechsel, 
183–85.
38 Radio Bucharest, 22 December 1989. 
39 See: Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 114–15. 
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the national army and the members of the secret police. And only by having the 
supreme commander of the Romanian army executed—with the act shown on 
television—could the organizers of the coup expect loyal Romanian army and 
Securitate forces to change sides.
The decision to have Ceauşescu executed as soon as possible was made by 
the inner circle of the Front of National Salvation.40 Only Iliescu insisted on the 
need to organize a brief, obviously bogus trial, before actually killing him. The 
exceptional military court of justice set up in Tîrgovişte organized a sort of rev-
olutionary show tribunal, in which Ceauşescu was deposed politically before 
being hastily shot on 25 December. A videotape of the execution was broadcast 
on Romanian television on the evening of 26 December. 
After the Front of National Salvation government had been founded,41 Minis-
ter of Defense Militaru recalled eighteen generals who had been removed by 
Ceauşescu from the active service because of their cooperation with the Soviet 
secret services. One of these generals, Vasile Ionel, replaced General Guşă, who 
had as the head of the General Staff only days before refused the entry of Soviet 
troops into Romania. In addition, the first ordinance adopted by the newly con-
stituted Council of the Front of National Salvation was to abolish the law con-
cerning the functions of the Romanian Defense Council, which had been adopted 
in 1969 in reaction to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was 
this act that had laid the basis for Romania’s political and military autonomy 
within the Warsaw Pact.42 And last but not least, Iliescu, the chairman of the 
council, went to see the Soviet ambassador in Romania to tell him that Romania 
was planning to remain within the Soviet sphere of influence.43
External involvement
Another distinctive feature of the Romanian revolution concerns the external 
support from—and direct involvement of—foreign countries in Romania’s pro-
cess of power transition. The problem with external support is that it cannot be 
40 Constantin Mitea, Ceauşescu’s counselor who participated in the last meeting between Gor-
bachev and Ceauşescu held in Moscow on 4–5 December in the wake of the Bush–Gorbachev 
meeting in Malta, reported that Gorbachev took leave from Ceauşescu wishing him happy 
Christmas and a good New Year, adding the words, “if you live as long as that.” Quoted by 
Ceauşescu’s press secretary Eugen Florescu in Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Interviuri despre revo-
lutie (Bucharest: Editura RAO, 2004), 81–82.
41 Militaru was presented on TV as the future minister of defense as early as 23 December, and the 
high command of the Soviet army was informed about Militaru’s “nomination” the same day. 
Săndulescu, Decembrie, 322.
42 See Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 117–18.
43 Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Din culisele luptei pentru putere. Prima guvernare Petre Roman (Bucha-
rest: Editura RAO, 2006), 547, Annex 1.
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precisely quantified due to the secret nature of many operations. Moreover, after 
events have occurred, external support is often denied both by those who granted 
it and those who received it. This is for reasons of political respectability on one 
side, and of legitimacy on the other. 
The question of a Romanian call for Soviet and/or Warsaw Pact military aid to 
the provisional leadership and the Soviet response to this call is still one of the most 
controversial issues of the Romanian 1989 events. To this day, Ion Iliescu insists 
that he never called for Soviet help and that he contacted the Soviets no earlier than 
on 27 December.44 However, according to Cornel Dinu, Iliescu’s bodyguard, in the 
night from 22 to 23 December Iliescu spoke with a representative of the Soviet 
embassy and asked for the intervention of Soviet troops. The embassy official is 
quoted as having told Iliescu that the Soviets were not ready to use the OMON 
troops that had already landed in Romania.45 By that time, Soviet ground troops 
stood at the Romanian-Soviet border ready to cross the frontier.46 In a recently 
declassified message from the Polish embassy in Bucharest to the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs in Warsaw, a Soviet diplomat is quoted as having said that Ion Iliescu 
and Silviu Brucan had asked for military aid and been promised any kind of support 
other than a military invasion. In the meantime, the Front of National Salvation 
announced on TV that the embassy had promised military aid.47 
Talks between the new leadership and the Soviet military were confirmed in 
a report of the chief of the Special Office of the General Staff in the Operations 
Directorate given to the members of the parliamentary commission investigating 
the 1989 events.  According to Dumitru Mircea, on 22 December, a message was 
received by the Romanian military leadership from Mikhail Moiseyev, head of 
the Soviet General Staff, and from the deputy chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact 
forces. They were “ready to grant support in any area.”48 This was confirmed by 
Romanian radio and TV on 23 December.49  
By noon of 23 December, Mircea was ordered by the deputy chief of the Roma-
nian General Staff, Nicolae Eftimescu, to call General Moiseyev to ask him “wheth-
44 Adam Burakowski, “O intervenţie armată ar fi fost un dezastru,” Adevărul, 7 March 2010, http://
adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/adam-burakowski-o-interventie-armata-fost-dezastru-1_50ad20f-
e7c42d5a6638f3561/index.html (accessed 13 September 2013). 
45 “Cornel Dinu, Discuţiile purtate cu consilierul sovietic au avut loc în biroul de la etajul 11 al Tele-
viziunii Române, în noaptea zilei de 22 spre 23 decembrie 1989, undeva în jurul orelor 3–4. El a 
spus că în încăpere se aflau mai multe persoane, dintre care i-a enumerat pe Petre Roman, Ion Ili-
escu, Silviu Brucan, Mihai Bujor, Petre Constantin (directorul Televiziunii la acel moment) şi Nina 
Iliescu ‘Iliescu a cerut intervenţia ruşilor.’ Şi-un tanc pentru Nina,” http://stirea.wordpress.com/tag/
cornel-dinu/ (accessed 9 September 2013). See also: Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution, 186. 
46 Cf. Săndulescu, Decembrie, 327.
47 Adam Burakowski, “Ȋn Decembrie 1989, Iliescu şi Brucan au cerut ajutor militar de la sovi-
etici,” Revista 22, 21 February 2013, http://www.revista22.ro/n-decembrie-1989-iliescu-si-bru-
can-au-cerut-ajutor-militar-de-la-sovietici-7557.html (accessed 9 September 2013).
48 Cf. Săndulescu, Decembrie, 321.
49 Reuters, 23 December 1989. See also: Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 123–24.
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er it would be possible to count on Soviet military aid against the terrorists.” Moi-
seyev referred him to the governmental level.50 After the death of the minister of 
defense and in the absence of the head of state, the chief of staff of the Romanian 
army, General Ştefan Guşă, was the only person legally entitled to launch a call for 
foreign aid. When he arrived at the Ministry of Defense, he vetoed this initiative and 
ordered Romanian border guards not to permit the entry of Soviet army units into 
Romanian territory. He called his Soviet counterpart to tell him that “we did not ask 
for Soviet military aid and we will not ask for it.”51 The attitude of the Soviet Union 
was marked by ambivalence. On one hand, Gorbachev insisted that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was no longer applicable. On the other hand, there is evidence that the 
Soviet military was prepared to send ground or airborne troops to Romania. While 
it is understandable that Gorbachev did not want to be seen as supporting an open 
Soviet military intervention in Romania, it is, however, quite improbable that he was 
not informed about such actions. Talking to the Congress of the People’s Deputies 
of the Soviet Union on 23 December, Gorbachev confirmed that a call for help had 
been dispatched to Moscow by the Romanian Front of National Salvation. The Ro-
manian chief of staff had, however, rejected help. Gorbachev announced that the 
Soviet leadership was going to get in contact with other Warsaw Pact member states 
“to cooperate and coordinate activities to support the Romanian people.”52 One of 
the measures he proposed was to set up a group of Warsaw Pact observers to mon-
itor the events in Romania. The creation of this group was confirmed by Hungary’s 
foreign minister Gyula Horn on Hungarian television. Although strong Warsaw Pact 
troops were in place on Hungarian territory close to the Romanian border, the Hun-
garian defense minister, Ferenc Kárpáti, ruled out an “immediate” intervention in the 
neighboring county.53 Soviet commentators made it clear, however, that the decision 
to desist from an intervention in Romania was only provisional. If the page turned 
in favor of the Ceauşescu-friendly forces, “the Warsaw Pact could not and should 
not” desist from intervening. They even favored a military intervention that went 
beyond the Warsaw Pact, also including forces from other countries. In a meeting 
with the Soviet ambassador, Evgenii Tyazhelnikov, on 27 December, Iliescu said that 
an agreement had been made with Gorbachev that “this was not necessary because 
there would be unwanted interpretations that would coincide with Ceauşescu’s state-
ment at his trial that this was a coup d’état with foreign military support.”54
The United States had signaled to the Soviet Union that it would not object to 
a Warsaw Pact or other intervention “if it becomes necessary to put down heavy 
50 Cf. Săndulescu, Decembrie, 317.
51 Săndulescu, Decembrie, 317–18. See also: Guşă de Drăgan, Condamnat, 62–63; 350.
52 TASS, 23 December 1989. Cf. Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 124.
53 The Independent, 24 December 1989. Cf. Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 126.
54 See the full text of the discussion with Tyazhelnikov http://stirea.wordpress.com/2010/03/09/
ion-iliescu-catre-evgheni-tiajelnikov-noi-ne-am-bucurat-de-simpatia-acestor-mase-n-a-fost-o-
campanie-anticomunista-avem-nevoie-de-sprijin-ca-aceasta-este-cea-mai-importanta-proble-
ma-acum/ (accessed 9 September 2013). 
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fighting by Romanian security troops still loyal [to Ceauşescu].”55 France declared 
its readiness to join such an operation, either in conjunction with the Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact forces, or in the form of an international brigade. 
There is only scanty evidence, and even less solid documentary proof, about covert 
actions undertaken by the West in the revolutionary process. However, a number of 
now-retired officials from France and the United States have acknowledged involve-
ment in disinformation activities, the establishment of contacts with Ceauşescu op-
ponents, the selection of and support for dissidents, as well as the training of refugees 
from Romania who, after their return, were used as agents provocateurs.56 
More than the other East European revolutions of 1989, the Romanian revolution 
is difficult to imagine without the support of electronic media in the form of West-
ern radio stations broadcasting to Romania, above all Radio Free Europe located 
in Munich. RFE broadcasts were extremely popular in Romania and were decisive 
in the anti-regime mobilization of the population, the de-legitimizing of the Ceauşes-
cu leadership, and for “accrediting” and popularizing regime dissidents in the 1980s. 
From the mid-1980s, Radio Free Europe began to include former party and Secu-
ritate activists with questionable democratic credentials among their list of praise-
worthy dissidents. In addition, with the broadcasting time of the local radio and TV 
stations sharply reduced due to electricity shortages, Romanian listeners and view-
ers increasingly turned to radio and TV stations located in the Soviet Union and in 
other neighboring communist countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 
Immediately after the departure of Ceauşescu on 22 December from Bucharest, the 
national television station took over the role of Western broadcasting and became 
the stage for a “tele-revolution” that was unique in the history of the medium.57
The transformation: The long-term consequences of the revolution
The Romanian revolution took a heavy toll of human lives. In total, 1,116 
people—civilians, officers and army conscripts—were killed and 4,069 injured. 
Whereas the popular uprising against Ceauşescu had cost the lives of 159 people 
55 The Washington Post, 25 December 1989. Cf. Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 129. See also 
Thomas Blanton, “When did the Cold War End?” Cold War International History Project Bulle-
tin 10 (1998): 183–91, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin10_p5.pdf 
(accessed 9 September 2013); Thomas L. Friedman, “US would favor use of Soviet troops in 
Romania, Baker says,” New York Times, 25 December 1989. Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott 
have explained the attitude of the US administration as being guided by its desire to secure Soviet 
support for the intervention that the United States had just started in Panama to depose leader 
Manuel Antonio Noriega. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 240.
56 See the interviews in the documentary film Schachmatt—Strategie einer Revolution by Susanne 
Brandstätter, first shown on German and Austrian state television in 2003.
57 See Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution, 7–11.
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and caused injuries to another 1,502, a much higher number of victims (957 dead 
and 2,587 injured) were recorded after December 22, the day Ceauşescu was 
flown out of Bucharest and arrested.58 There is the widespread belief among 
Romanians that these victims died in vain, because the anti-communist uprising 
of the people had been “stolen” and “diverted.” This has left a deep imprint on 
the Romanian collective memory and is considered “the original sin” of the Ro-
manian transition. It continues to impact the country’s course of political, social 
and economic transformation to this day. Moreover, it is felt that those who seized 
power in 1989 did everything they could to obstruct the criminal investigation, 
prosecution and condemnation of the true culprits for the bloodshed.
After December 1989, more than 5,000 people were investigated with regard 
to their responsibility for the crimes committed both before and after the fall of 
Ceauşescu. In total, 245 persons were put on trial, of them 18 generals from the 
armed forces and the Securitate troops, as well as 24 members of the highest 
party nomenklatura.59 Most of those investigated were released at the beginning 
of 1990 or pardoned. However, due to the fact that the group around Iliescu, 
which had seized power in the military coup d’état following the popular uprising 
in Timişoara, succeeded in staying in power for so long, most of those who are 
thought responsible for the bloodshed have escaped condemnation. Despite the 
fact that organizations representing the victims of the revolution have pressured 
that they be prosecuted, the judiciary, acting on political orders, has done every-
thing it can to delay prosecution in high-level cases. Documents have been con-
fiscated (such as the files on the Ceauşescu trial), destroyed, forged, or are still 
being withheld by military or civilian prosecutors offices. 
Investigations have also been hampered by the fact that many of the key fig-
ures from the Ceauşescu family, the military, the secret services, counter-espio-
nage and the militia who were involved in the events committed suicide or died 
under mysterious circumstances, some of them in prison.60 Together with Gener-
al Mihai Chitac, in 1989, the head of the chemical arms division, General Stăn-
culescu was the only major figure of the revolution to be tried and sentenced 
after 1989. Stănculescu is also the only major actor of the coup who still remains, 
in prison in 2013, where he has been held since October 2008 with a sentence of 
15 years on charges of having executed Ceauşescu’s repressive orders against the 
participants in the Timişoara uprising. This is why Stănculescu is the only 
high-level revolutionary figure who has chosen to break the ominous silence 
about some if not all of the riddles surrounding the still mysterious 1989 events, 
58 Cartianu, Cartea Revoluţiei, 980. 
59 “Greii dosarului ‘Revolutiei’, protejati de neglijenta lui Voinea,” Evenimentul Zilei, 21 Decem-
ber 2009.




especially concerning the roles played by other top players as well as foreign 
involvement—both Eastern and Western—in the process.
In contrast to Stănculescu, Iliescu had a formidable political career in post-rev-
olutionary Romania, despite being the target of persistent criticism. Some of the 
post-1989 electorate was won over by the populist measures he introduced im-
mediately after the fall of Ceauşescu, and thus he was voted into presidential 
office in 1990, followed by reelection for two full terms, 1992–96 and 2000–04. 
However, another part of the population would like to see him put on trial, not 
only for the role he played during the revolution, but also during the incidents of 
violence by miners Iliescu had allegedly sent against anti-communist demonstra-
tors in Bucharest in 1990, the so-called “mineriads.” Iliescu is also seen as the 
main culprit for the misguided policy course followed in Romania in the early 
1990s, which obstructed the genuine democratization of the society, the introduc-
tion of market-type reforms, as well as the country’s progress toward membership 
in NATO and the EU. Only after Emil Constantinescu, a representative of the 
civil society, was elected president in 1996 was the country’s foreign policy to-
ward the West vigorously redirected and real, albeit painful, economic reforms 
were launched. Iliescu continued this path during his final term from 2000 to 
2004. During these years Romania became a member of NATO and concluded 
accession negotiations with the EU.
Due to its violent character and the human lives lost in the process, the 1989 
revolution left distinct traces on the collective memory as well as the mentality 
of the Romanians. The society is still strongly divided on the question of wheth-
er what happened in 1989 was a revolution or coup d’état, and whether the events 
were home-grown or engineered by forces from abroad. Despite the generational 
shift that has occurred over the past twenty years, demands for the criminal pros-
ecution of the crimes committed in 1989 and the lustration of former regime 
activists are still high in the public interests. 
Anneli Ute Gabanyi
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 “ONE DAY WE WILL WIN ANYWAY”:  
THE “SINGING REVOLUTION” IN THE SOVIET 
BALTIC REPUBLICS
In 1989, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did not experience revolutions 
comparable to the events in East Central Europe. At the end of this annus 
mirabilis, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius were still the capitals of Soviet socialist 
republics bound in “eternal friendship” to the other twelve “brother republics” of 
the USSR, at least in the eyes of Moscow. The Kremlin leadership had made it 
perfectly clear that it had no intention of treating the non-Russian republics 
according to the principles of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking.” The new rules 
of Soviet foreign policy had nothing to do with the realm of inter-republican 
relations at home. Yet mentally, if compared to the situation only a few years 
earlier, nothing was the same in the Soviet Baltic republics. The notion of a 
“Singing Revolution,” coined by the Estonian artist Heinz Valk in 1988 to describe 
a peaceful path of political change, had made its way into the hearts of many 
people, not only in these three republics, but also in other parts of the USSR. But 
in the Baltic region, mass demonstrations of hitherto unknown scale had fostered 
a sense of being different. Despite this area’s having been annexed as a result of 
the Hitler-Stalin Pact and World War II, it had never become truly “Sovietized.”1 
1 This article was supported by the Estonian state with the targeted financed program 
SF0130038s09. The author would like to express his gratitude to Silke Berndsen (Berlin) for her 
bibliographical advice.
 Literature on the process of annexation and Sovetization in the Baltic republics includes: Elena 
Yu. Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’ 1940–1953 (Moscow: ROSSPĖN, 2008); Olaf Mertelsmann, 
ed., The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956 (Tartu: Kleio, 2003); Mikhail I. Mel’tyu-
khov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina. Sovetskii Soyuz i bor’ba za Evropu 1939–1941gg. (Doku-
menty, fakty, suzhdeniya) (Moscow: Veche, 2001); Arvydas Anušauskas, ed., The Anti-Soviet 
Resistance in the Baltic States (Vilnius: DuKa, 1999); John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, eds., 
The Baltic Nations and Europe. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century (Lon-
don: Longman, 1994); Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States. Years of 
Dependence, 1940–1990 (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 1993); John Hiden and 
Thomas Lane, eds., The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992); Walter C. Clemens, Baltic Independence and Russian Empire 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991); Boris Meissner, ed., Die baltischen Nationen. Estland, Let-
tland, Litauen (Cologne: Markus, 1991); Georg von Rauch, Geschichte der baltischen Staaten 
(Munich: dtv, 1977). Cf. Olaf Mertelsmann, ed., The Baltic States under Stalinist Rule (Cologne: 
Böhlau, forthcoming).
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The fall of the Berlin Wall gave the three republics reason to pose their question 
even more insistently: When will it be our turn?
Although a political revolution did not occur in the Baltic republics in 1989, 
one might speak of a mental revolution. This could even be seen on the streets: 
the old national colors of the pre-war independent republics, formerly banned by 
the authorities, had become a nearly everyday sight. The constitutionally 
guaranteed domination of the communist party became contested by various 
alternative organizations such as the Popular Fronts. These were initially founded 
by the Baltic communists themselves to support Gorbachev’s perestroika, first in 
Estonia, and then in October 1988 in Latvia and Lithuania as well. Soviet cadres 
and Soviet security organs seemed to be retreating, despite the fact that this may 
have been a mere tactic. Local political power gradually shifted to reform 
communists or activists from the Popular Fronts. At the end of 1989, it had 
become clear that there was no way back to the years of “stagnation” under 
Leonid Brezhnev unless violence was used. All three countries had passed 
declarations of sovereignty, and in December the Lithuanian Communist Party 
(LiCP) split into two, on one side a large pro-independence fraction, and on the 
other, a tiny group of orthodox supporters of the hardliners in the Kremlin. Thus 
1989 was a phase of transition, although no one could foresee where it would 
lead.
At the same time, conflict with Moscow was increasing. Nobody could be sure 
what the consequences might be of the Soviet loss of its satellite states in Eastern 
Europe. It was conceivable that in compensation, the grip around the necks of the 
non-Russian Soviet republics might become tightened. The increasingly aggressive 
tone of the Kremlin, criticizing the independence movements in the Baltic 
republics, signaled that the use of violence, at least rhetorically, was still an option 
for guaranteeing obedience. Even worse, Moscow’s hardening position in regard 
to the Baltic question had not yet been challenged by the Western powers, which 
were interested first and foremost in Gorbachev remaining stable at home. The 
political aspirations of the Baltic republics would only harm the general secretary’s 
position vis-à-vis his opponents in the party leadership. With the Baltic question 
considered an interior matter of the USSR, in a sense Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania were hostages. No one was prepared to grant them the same right of 
self-determination that the Central European states had achieved.2 Thus, if one is 
to make an adequate appraisal of the situation in the three republics in 1989, the 
fundamental difference between them and the countries of the Warsaw Pact must 
be taken into account. There was no Soviet round table in sight regarding the 
Baltic question, a fact that is only too easily forgotten if one thinks of the later 
2 Kristina Spohr-Readman, “Between Political Rhetoric and ‘Realpolitik’ Calculations. Western 
Diplomacy and the Baltic Independence in the Cold War Endgame,” Cold War History 6, no. 1 
(2006): 1–42; cf. John Hiden, Vahur Made, and David Smith, eds., The Baltic Question during 
the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2008).
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smooth integration of these former Soviet republics into NATO and the EU in 
2004. Back in 1989, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were still regarded 
internationally, at least de facto, as parts of the USSR, whose dissolution was 
simply not on the agenda. The fate of the perestroika project and peaceful change 
in Central Europe depended on the integrity of the Soviet state. Especially for 
West Germany, in late 1989 this was considered a real danger: without Gorbachev, 
the “German question” might be left unresolved.3
Unfortunately, research on the topic of the “Singing Revolution” in the Baltic 
states is still fragmentary. As a rule, historians in the three countries still have not 
taken their neighbors’ fate into consideration.4 Memoirs of the leading figures in 
this revolution appeared quite soon (and keep appearing), and a wave of life 
stories continues to enrich the shelves of bookshops in all three countries.5 
Nonetheless, not least due to language problems, international scholarship has 
3 Kristina Spohr-Readman, Germany and the Baltic Problem after the Cold War. The Develop-
ment of a New Ostpolitik 1989–2000 (London: Routledge, 2004); Helge Dauchert, “Anwalt der 
Balten” oder Anwalt in eigener Sache? Die deutsche Baltikumpolitik 1991–2004 (Berlin: BWV, 
2008). For the interesting perspective of a German diplomat, cf. Henning von Wistinghausen, Im 
freien Estland. Erinnerungen des ersten deutschen Botschafters 1991–1995 (Cologne: Böhlau, 
2004).
4 An exception to this rule can be found in Mindaugas Jurkynas, How Deep is your Love? The 
Baltic Brotherhood Re-examined (Vilnius: Institute of International Relations and Political Sci-
ence, 2007). The author deals primarily with the first stages of independent statehood after 1991. 
See also Jānis Škapars, Baltijas brīvības ceļš. Baltijas valstu nevardarbīgas cīņas pieredze pa-
saules kontekstā (Rīga: Zelta grauds, 2005). About the respective countries: Meldra Usenko, 
Sarežģītais gājums: veltījums Latvijas Republikas neatkarības atjaunošanai (Riga: Tautas Fron-
tes Muzejs, 2002); Arvydas Anušauskas and Česlovas Bauza, Lietuvos suvereniteto atkūrimas. 
1988–1991 metais (Vilnius: Diemedzio Leidykla, 2000); Valdis Blūzma, ed., Latvijas valsts 
atjaunošana. 1986–1993 (Rīga: LU žurnāla “Latvijas Vēsture” fonds, 1998); Jüri Ant, ed., 
Kaks algust. Eesti Vabariik, 1920 ja 1990 aastad. Eesti Vabariik—80 (Tallinn: Eesti Riigiarhiiv, 
1998).
5 Apart from memoirs, the following list also includes collections of documents: Kazimiera D. 
Prunskiene, Leben für Litauen. Auf dem Weg in die Unabhängigkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Ull-
stein, 1992); Algirdas Brazauskas, Scheidung vom Kreml (Vilnius: Danielius, 1993); Dainis 
Īvāns, Gadījuma karakalps (Riga: Vieda, 1995); Mart Laar, Urmas Ott, and Sirje Endre, Teine 
Eesti 1. Eesti iseseisvuse taassünd 1986–1991. Intervjuud, dokumendid, kõned, artiklid; Teine 
Eesti 2. Eeslava. Intervjuud, dokumendid, kõned, artiklid (Tallinn: SE&JS Meedia- ja Kirjas-
tuskompanii, 1996); Edgar Savisaar, Usun Eestisse (Tallinn: TEA, 1999); Vytautas Landsbergis 
and Anthony Packer, Lithuania, Independent again. The Autobiography of Vytautas Landsbergis 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000); Sandra Kalniete, Es lauzu, tu lauzi, mēs lauzām, 
viņi lūza (Riga: Jumava, 2000); Arnold Rüütel, Estonia: Future Returned (Tallinn: Ilo, 2003); 
Rafik Grigoryan and Igor Rosenfeld, eds., Iseseisvuse anatoomia / Anatomiya nezavisimosti / 
The Anatomy of Independence (Tartu: Kripta, St. Petersburg: Bazunov, 2004); Edgar Savisaar, 
Peaminister. Eesti lähiajalugu 1990–1992 (Tartu: Kleio, 2004); Virgilijus Čepaitis, Su Sąjūdžiu 
už Lietuvą. Nuo 1988.06.03. iki 1990.03.11. (Vilnius: Tvermė, 2007); Marju Lauristin, Punane 
ja sinine. Peatükke kirjutamata elulooraamatust. Valik artikleid ja intervjuud 1970–2009 (Tal-
linn: AS Eesti Ajalehed, 2010); Heinz Valk, Pääsemine helgest tulevikust (Tallinn: Kunst, 2010).
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rarely considered all three countries evenly.6 The best overviews are found in 
general publications from the 1990s.7 Since this time, Baltic historians have 
mainly been concerned with describing and assessing the horrors of deportation 
and Sovietization.8 Mentally, the present statehood of these countries is still 
closely connected to the story of regaining independence and thus, this story often 
provides a background for current political conflicts. Many of the (mainly young) 
leading protagonists of the late 1980s are still active politicians in their respective 
states today, and even now there are personal conflicts rooted in those years that 
have not been forgotten.9
From the Russian perspective, too, the topic of the Baltic states is very 
sensitive and still too politicized to be easily the subject of in-depth research. 
Primary sources concerning the Baltic role in the dissolution of the USSR have 
not been sufficiently examined.10 It is thus fair to agree with the recent claim of 
Alexander von Plato that the Baltic share in this process has been “mostly 
underestimated.”11 In fact, in many respects the Baltic republics were, as 
6 The author of the present article is no exception. This explains the predominance in this chapter 
of Estonian examples and sources.
7 See the general works by Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
the Path to Independence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993); Kristian Ger-
ner and Stefan Hedlund, The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire (London: Routledge, 
1997); the edited volumes Jan A. Trapans, ed., Toward Independence. The Baltic Popular Move-
ments (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Andrejs Urdze, ed., Das Ende des Sowjetkolonialismus. 
Der baltische Weg (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991). On the respective three countries, cf. Rein Taage-
pera, Estonia. Return to Independence (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993); Juris Dreifelds, 
Latvia in Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); V. Stanley Vardys and 
Judith B. Sedaitis, Lithuania—The Rebel Nation (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997); Janis J. 
Penikis and Andrejs Penikis, Latvia—Independence Renewed (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 
1997); David J. Smith, Estonia. Independence and European Integration (London: Routledge, 
2001); Artis Pabriks and Aldis Purs, Latvia. The Challenges of Change (London: Routledge, 
2001); Thomas Lane, Lithuania. Stepping Westward (London: Routledge, 2001).
8 See the respective articles by Alvydas Nikžentaitis (Lithuania), Ulrike von Hirschhausen (Lat-
via), and Karsten Brüggemann (Estonia) in Helmut Altrichter, ed., GegenErinnerung. Ges-
chichte als politisches Argument im Transformationsprozeß Ost-, Ostmittel- und Südosteuropas 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006). 
9 Mikko Lagerspetz and Henri Vogt, “Estonia,” in Sten Berglund, Tomas Hellén, and Frank Aare-
brot, eds., Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), 
57–93.
10 See the early account on Estonia by Michael Brettin, Das Scheitern eines unfreiwilligen Exper-
iments. Die sowjetische Nationalitätenpolitik in der „Perestrojka“ (1985/87–1991) dargestellt 
am Beispiel Estlands (Hamburg: Dr. Kovač, 1996), and a broader study that repeatedly refers to 
the Baltic republics: Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet 
State. A Tidal Approach to the Study of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002).
11 Alexander von Plato, “Einige internationale Voraussetzungen der Wiedervereinigung Deutsch-
lands,” in Tr@nsit online (2009), http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=167&Itemid=231 (accessed 17 June 2010).
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Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs, “the weakest link of the union”12 (and not the 
Islamic areas, as has been claimed by Hélène Carrère d’Encausse13), since here, 
in the “Soviet West,” the legitimacy of Soviet territorial expansion was contested 
not least in terms of historical morals.14 Nonetheless, in February 1987, while on 
visit to Latvia, the Soviet general secretary obviously did not yet consider the 
Baltic question particularly critical, since he claimed at that time that the events 
of June 1940 leading to annexation proved that nobody could “break the 
revolutionary will of the people.”15 But it was exactly this moral aspect of Stalin’s 
annexation politics that later made the year 1989 so crucial for the Baltic republics’ 
secession from the USSR because it marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Hitler-
Stalin Pact. Thus the circumstances of their original incorporation into the USSR 
were brought back onto the political agenda. The anniversary reminded capitals 
all over Europe of their own accountability in the fate of these three states, first 
due to the Hitler-Stalin Pact and later due to the Yalta conference. 
Why “Singing Revolution”?
In 1989, the Baltic republics’ vision of their “return to Europe” seemed to lie 
in the far future; this dream obviously contradicted Gorbachev’s vision of a 
“Common European Home.” While Gorbachev saw the Baltic republics under 
the Soviet roof, from the viewpoint of the republics themselves, “Europe” was 
“available” only outside the USSR. Our knowledge of the processes that led to 
the secession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the USSR is still quite 
superficial. The German weekly Die Zeit wrote in 2002 on the occasion of the 
Eurovision Song Contest, held that year in the Estonian capital Tallinn: “The year 
1991 came, the revolution; hundreds of thousands sang their folk songs, loudly 
and again and again, until the communists left.”16 It wasn’t that easy, though. The 
12 Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, vol. 1 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), 510.
13 Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, Risse im roten Imperium. Das Nationalitätenproblem in der Sowjet-
union (Vienna: Molden, 1979).
14 See the comprehensive article by Serhy Yekelchyk, “The western republics: Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, and the Baltics,” in Ronald Grigor Suny, ed., The Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 
III, The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 522–48.
15 Mikhail Gorbachev, “Tverdo idti dorogoi perestroiki i uglubleniya demokratii. Rech’ na vstre-
che s partiinym, sovetskim i khoziaistvennym aktivom Latviiskoi SSR 19 fevralya 1987 goda,” 
in idem, Izbrannye rechi i stati, t. 4: Iyul’ 1986 g.—apr. 1987 g. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 
393–409. On Gorbachev’s visit to Estonia, cf. Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 511–12; Peeter 
Kaasik, Kaarel Piirimäe, “Hirvepargi kõnekoosolek ja Eesti vabanemine,” in Tõnu Tannberg, 
ed., Hirvepark 1987. 20 aastat kodanikualgatusest, mis muutis Eesti lähiajalugu (Tallinn: MTÜ 
Kultuuriselts Hirvepark, 2007), 8–70, 25; Mati Graf, Kalevipoja kojutulek. 1978. aasta poliiti-
lisest pööripäevast 1988. aasta Suveräänsusdeklaratsioonini (Tallinn: Argo, 2008), 202–10.
16 Frank Lenze, “Hier spielt die Musik. Zwei Gesichter der europäischen Schlagerstadt Tallinn,” 
Die Zeit (Hamburg), no. 22, 23 May 2002, 65–66; similarly, this stereotypical idea is found in 
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“communists” did not leave simply because of the masses singing patriotic songs, 
as the idea of the “singing” revolution seems to suggest. Singing is a canonized 
part of national culture in the Baltic states, with an especially long tradition in 
Estonia and Latvia, where the first national singing festivals took place in 1869 
and 1873, respectively. This tradition was continued even under Soviet power. 
Singing thus became an important element of popular resistance against the new 
Soviet regime, although in part this “resistance” was camouflaged by the ideology 
of singing being “national in form” (and supposedly “socialist in content”). And 
yet, the old and new patriotic songs that, from the 1960s, were gradually 
reintegrated into the song festivals’ programs carried another vision of national 
reality. In the Soviet Baltic republics, a “national form” was (still) unthinkable 
without it having “national content,” despite the Soviet education in schools, party 
sub-organizations and the media. Thus one might argue that an unconscious 
“Singing Revolution” had already started in 1960, when at the end of the Estonian 
Song Festival in Tallinn the audience demanded to sing “Mu isamaa on minu 
arm” (My fatherland is my love, written by Lydia Koidula), a song whose words 
date back to the 1860s and that was sung at the first Song Festival in 1869. The 
Estonian composer Gustav Ernesaks had written a new melody to these lines for 
the first Soviet Song Festival in 1948, whereupon the song immediately became 
extremely popular. It was banned, however, from the next festivals in 1950 and 
1955, despite the fact that its composer, Ernesaks, had been awarded the Stalin 
Prize. In 1960 “Mu isamaa” was still banned, the idea of “fatherland” being 
substituted on the program with Isaak Dunaevskii’s classic Soviet patriotic hymn 
“Pesnya o Rodine” (Song of the Motherland). However, despite the official 
programming, the choirs started to sing “Mu isamaa” at the end of the festival 
and Ernesaks came to the conductor’s podium.17 From this point in time onwards, 
his song was always part of the program of the song festivals, and thus the narrow 
ethnic concept of Koidula’s “fatherland” superseded Dunaevskii’s broader idea 
of a Soviet “motherland.” In this way, “Mu isamaa” became a national alternative 
to the Soviet Estonian anthem, which incidentally was also composed by Ernesaks 
(with text by Johannes Semper).
The Baltic national past was difficult to assess for the Soviet authorities. While 
the independent republics and authoritarian regimes between the wars were 
condemned as having been “fascist,” the peoples’ existence under the thumb of 
Baltic German landlords and Russian authorities prior to 1917 fit the schemes of 
class struggle and anti-tsarist resistance very well. In at least one of its axioms, 
the Soviet version of history was easily compatible to the national narratives in 
the Baltic republics, especially in Estonia and Latvia: antagonism toward the 
the book of the Finnish rock musician Harri Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon. Eesti rockpõlvkona ime 
(Tallinn: Varrak, 2008), 8.




Germans.18 In this context, singing songs from the era of the so-called national 
awakening in the second half of the nineteenth century could be presented in the 
Soviet discourse as praising the Estonian and Latvian peasants’ fight against the 
Baltic German upper class. One had only to add the discursive element of the 
Russians’ “brotherly help” to these small peoples and the idyllic picture of 
traditional Soviet “friendship of the peoples” was reaffirmed. Historians in the 
three republics often used this approach for researching their individual nation’s 
past. Since every Soviet republic was charged with describing its own territory’s 
past, according of course to ideological demands, it was even possible to redefine 
basic elements of the pre-Soviet national identity. During perestroika and in the 
early years of regained independence, historians continued to build on these 
national traditions.19 
Thus, the cultural form of protest that was articulated during the perestroika 
years had its own decisively national tradition, but it was recreated and 
legitimatized anew in 1988. In the dialectic rhetoric of these years, singing 
patriotic songs meant supporting Gorbachev and the reformers’ agenda in the 
Kremlin (naturally, with the minimal goal of gaining more autonomy from the 
center always in mind). In 1988, Estonia became the avant-garde of this particular 
type of Baltic support for perestroika, and thus it was here that the notion of 
“Singing Revolution” was created. Of course, at the beginning this metaphor used 
the powerful semantics of “revolution” dialectically, in the Soviet context. This 
“revolution,” however, was socialist only in rhetoric; in form and content it was 
explicitly national. 
A series of summer music festivals in Estonia helped create this powerful 
metaphor. In May 1988, the still-banned Estonian national colors were widely 
displayed at a music festival and the first national heritage days held in the 
university town of Tartu. Already in 1987, the rock musician Alo Mattiisen had 
played his song “Ei ole üksi ükski maa” (No single land is alone) in this town, a 
song that subsequently became very popular during the “Phosphorite War,” as 
will be discussed below. The next year, he performed five “patriotic songs” based 
on poems written in the nineteenth century, among others “Eestlane olen ja 
eestlaseks jään” (I am and will be Estonian). But it was the Night Song Festivals 
in Tallinn in June that became the first significant event in this Estonian summer 
of music. These nights were initially a spontaneous continuation of the traditional 
Old Town Days, which were held in early June 1988. After the official program 
was over, people went to the song festival arena a few kilometers outside the 
18 Toivo U. Raun, “The Image of the Baltic German Elites in Twentieth-century Estonian Histo-
riography: The 1930s vs. the 1970s,” Journal of Baltic Studies 30, no. 4 (1999): 338–51, 348.
19 Cf. the reflections of Jüri Kivimäe, “Re-writing Estonian History?” and Leo Dribins, “The his-
toriography of Latvian nationalism in the twentieth century,” in Michael Branch, ed., National 
History and Identity. Approaches to the Writing of National History in the North-East Baltic Re-
gion. Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999), 205–12, 
245–55.
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center to continue playing music during the “white nights.” On 11 June, the final 
evening of the Old Town Days, more than 100,000 people took part in the night 
festival. Estonian flags were raised and Mattiisen’s “Patriotic Songs” were sung 
repeatedly. These mass meetings continued during the following nights and 
marked on 14 June the anniversary of the mass deportations of Baltic people in 
June 1941, when the Soviet regime removed approximately 10,000 people from 
Estonia, 15,000 from Latvia and 18,000 from Lithuania.20 A few days later, 
inspired by these singing nights, Heinz Valk wrote an article for the cultural 
weekly Sirp ja vasar (Sickle and hammer) under the headline “Laulev revolutsioon” 
(Singing revolution).21 The movement now had a name, and it was a revolution, 
although Valk made it clear that its mission was above all to remain peaceful. 
During these nights of singing, a feeling of national unity was encountered by 
the masses, and after them, there was hardly any way to return to the Soviet past. 
Valk wrote that being part of these festivals “was worth suffering humiliation and 
self-denial for decades.” He described the singing masses moving to the rhythms, 
waving dozens and dozens of national flags: “People were laughing and smiling, 
unanimous, with no malice, no hate, only one word in their hearts: Estonia!”22 
The national “Singing Revolution” was born.
Political perestroika in the Soviet Baltic republics
 
In mid-June 1988 in Estonia, Soviet power gave in to the political demands 
being increasingly articulated in the media and supported by the singing masses. 
This was of utmost importance for the Baltic independence movement as a whole. 
Still in December 1987, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union had harshly criticized, in a secret note, the Baltic republics’ 
leaderships because they had not prevented “nationalist manifestations” like the 
demonstrations in all three capitals held on 23 August, the anniversary of the 
Hitler-Stalin Pact.23 But a mere half year later, Estonia had become the avant-
garde of perestroika in all of the USSR. On 16 June, the first secretary of the 
Estonian Communist Party (ECP), the Russian-born Estonian Karl Vaino, was 
replaced by the reform-minded Väino Väljas, who due to his ideas on national 
development under Soviet rule had been removed from the Central Committee 
of the ECP in 1980 and sent to Central America as a Soviet ambassador.24
20 Andres Kasekamp, A History of the Baltic States (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), 130–31; An-
drejs Plakans, A Concise History of the Baltic States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 347–48. 
21 Heinz Valk, “Laulev revolutsioon,” Sirp ja Vasar, 17 June 1988, 3.
22 Ibid.




However, singing patriotic songs was only one factor that led to this decision. 
More decisive was the initiative in April of a group of Estonian communists to 
found the Popular Front in Support of Perestroika (Rahvarinne Perestroika 
Toetuseks). The Popular Front was supported enthusiastically in Estonia and the 
idea of forming such a front quickly spread to the neighboring republics. One of 
the initiators was Edgar Savisaar, who together with Siim Kallas, Tiit Made, and 
Mikk Titma, already in September 1987, had published a program for the economic 
autonomy of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.25 This still-informal 
movement had announced a demonstration to be held in the Song Festival Arena 
on 17 June 1988 in order to remind the Estonian delegates to the nineteenth party 
conference in Moscow of their responsibility for their republic’s fate.26 Obviously, 
the ECP feared the agitation of the Popular Front activists, and by removing Vaino 
they wanted to appease the critics in their own ranks who supported the Popular 
Front initiative.27 The first step taken by the new First Secretary Väljas was to 
meet the national demands of the nascent Popular Front. On 23 June, the Supreme 
Soviet officially legalized the traditional national colors and the old anthem of 
the state, although it did not replace the Soviet Estonian symbols. The Estonian 
Popular Front held its official founding congress on 1 and 2 October.
In Latvia and Lithuania, changes in the leadership were only possible after a 
visit by Gorbachev’s “troubleshooter” Aleksandr Yakovlev in August 1988, 
although in Latvia, despite the orthodox Communist leadership, a local Helsinki 
human rights group had already been founded in 1986. But in October 1988, 
following Aleksandr Yakovlev’s visit, the hardliner Boris Pugo was removed as 
first secretary and the reform-Communist Anatoliis Gorbunovs became chairman 
of the Supreme Soviet.28 Among the new leadership’s first decisions was the re-
legalization of Latvia’s national symbols, just a few days before the Latvian 
Popular Front (Latvijas Tautas Fronte) held its founding congress on 8 and 9 
October.29 In this initial period, it seemed that the Popular Fronts founded to 
25 In Estonian, this program was called Isemajandav Eesti, abbreviated as IME, which forms the 
Estonian word for “wonder.” It was published in the daily Edasi on 26 September 1987.
26 According to Heinz Valk, Vaino together with the Soviet minister of defense, Dmitrii Yazov, 
organized a military action to crush the meeting on 17 June. Reportedly, Gorbachev did not want 
to risk a possible bloodbath in Tallinn, not the least because of his reputation in the West. Valk, 
Pääsemine, 298–99.
27 Seppo Zetterberg, Eesti ajalugu (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2009), 580; Sulev Vahtre, ed., Eesti ajalugu 
VI. Vabadussõjast taasiseseisvumiseni (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 2005), 379–81.
28 According to Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 511, Yakovlev confirmed that most Balts were sup-
porters of the reforms and the union. The Soviet leader claimed to have been concerned for the 
first time about the danger for the USSR coming from the Baltic republics at just this time. Cf. 
Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 317.
29 Jānis Škapars, ed., Latvijas Tautas fronte 1988–1991. Veltījums Trešajai Atmodai un Latvijas 
tautas frontes dibināšanas desmitgadei (Riga: Apgāds Jāņa sēta, 1998); Andrejs Penikis, “The 
Third Awakening Begins: The Birth of the Latvian Popular Front, June 1988 to August 1988,” 
Journal of Baltic Studies 27, no. 4 (1996): 261–90.
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support Gorbachev were receiving assistance from the “center,” i.e. Moscow, and 
thus the local parties were forced to make concessions. In Lithuania, the reform-
communist Algirdas Brazauskas became the first secretary of the LiCP on 20 
October. On 22 and 23 October, the Lithuanian Popular Front (Lietuvos 
Persitvarkymo Sąjūdis, literally “Reform Movement of Lithuania”) was officially 
founded, and in mid-November the Supreme Soviet declared the old flag and 
anthem to be the symbols of the republic. On 25 November Sąjūdis elected 
Vytautas Landsbergis as its chairman.30 In all three republics, the “bourgeois” 
national holidays again became official.
To borrow from revolutionary history, we might call the Popular Fronts the 
“Soviets” of the “Singing Revolution,” because they established a sort of “double 
power” as had been done in Russia in 1917. This time, however, the “Soviets” 
effectively paved the way for a multiparty system. It is difficult to say whether, 
from the outset, the initiative to establish independent societal organizations 
outside the party was meant to destroy the one-party system. At least according 
to their early rhetoric, the Popular Fronts aimed at providing independent support 
for Gorbachev’s reforms and not necessarily at becoming an alternative to the 
Communist Party.31 Initially, many members of the Popular Fronts remained party 
members. In the long run, however, the close cooperation between parts of the 
republican communist parties with the Popular Fronts, at least initially supported 
by Gorbachev, paved the way for the split of the parties into reformist and 
orthodox wings. Simultaneously, the new political center of the Popular Fronts 
encouraged more radical groups to emerge. These included nationalist opposition 
groups, which contested the legitimacy of all Soviet institutions and rejected any 
compromises with the communists, and orthodox communist opposition, which 
above all articulated the concerns of the non-indigenous population of 
predominantly Russian origin.
While in Lithuania and Latvia the first conflicts were carried out basically 
within the framework of the Popular Fronts,32 in Estonia, nationalists and dissidents 
founded in August 1988 the Estonian National Independence Party (Eesti 
Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei, ERSP). This party later organized so-called 
Citizen Committees and in 1990 became the strongest group in the alternative 
parliament, the Estonian Congress. This body was designed to be the democratic 
30 Roman Batūra, ed., Siekiant nepriklausomybės. Lietuvos sąjūdžio spauda. 1988–1991 m. (Vilni-
us: “Valstybės Žinios”, 2005).
31 This has been confirmed by one of the leading figures of Rahvarinne, Edgar Savisaar, “Kalender 
1988,” in Edgar Savisaar, Rein Ruutsoo, Kadri Simson et al., Rahvarinne 1988. (Kakskümmend 
aastat hiljem) (Tallinn: Tallinna linnavalitsus, 2008), 162–210, 209, and by Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i 
reformy, 510.
32 In Lithuania, the “Lithuanian Liberty League,” founded already in the late 1970s as an under-
ground organization, was the bearer of this conflict. Cf. Gintaras Šidlauskas, ed., Lietuvos Lais-
vės Lyga. Nuo “Laisvės šauklio” iki nepriklausomybės. Dokumentai, konferencijos medžiaga, 
kalbos, straipsniai, bibliografija (Vilnius: Leidykla “Naujoji Matrica”, 2004).
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bearer of continued Estonian statehood, with voting rights only being given to 
those registered for the Committees who could prove that they or their forebears 
had been citizens of the Estonian Republic in 1940 (including non-Estonians and 
exiles).33 When on 24 February 1989 the Estonian tricolor officially replaced the 
flag of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) with a ceremony carried 
out on Tallinn’s castle tower “Tall Hermann,” the national opposition did not take 
part, arguing that it was a humiliation of the Estonians’ urge to freedom to show 
these colors on occupied territory; the opposition, therefore, had its own event on 
the Town Hall square.34 However, this was a conflict of political tactics; by 
February 1990, 790,000 provisional citizens had been registered and the Popular 
Front became one of the parties represented in the Estonian Congress. 
On the other extreme of the political spectrum, the national minorities in the 
Baltic republics, mostly Russian speakers, became increasingly concerned. In 
Estonia and Latvia they created local orthodox centrist movements known as 
Interfront (in Lithuania: Edinstvo), which supposedly were under the control of 
the Kremlin through the local trade unionist organizations. Any policy of fostering 
autonomous rights on a republican basis challenged the status of these non-
indigenous populations, which had often been sent to the region as the working-
force for centrally governed enterprises. Their migration to the Soviet Baltic 
republics had been a major concern for Estonians and Latvians, who in 1979 made 
up only 64 percent and 53 percent, respectively, of their republics’ populations, 
and to a lesser extent for Lithuanians (80 percent). The pro-Soviet “internationalist” 
pressure groups undeniably introduced an ethnic aspect into the struggle, an 
aspect that the Popular Fronts had initially tried to avoid. In claiming to be the 
voice of the traditional Soviet “friendship of peoples,” they blamed the national 
majorities of supporting ethnic separatism. In this respect, the Popular Fronts 
integrated reform-minded people not only from the ethnic majorities and the 
communist parties, but initially also from the local Russian-speaking communities.35
Thus, as always occurs during revolutions, radical fractions came to the surface 
that challenged pragmatic reformists. But during the aforementioned “summer of 
music” in Estonia, people became self-assured enough to think the hitherto 
unthinkable. The festival “Eestimaa laul” (Estonian Song) on 11 September 1988 
was attended by an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 people in the presence of 
communist party leader Väljas. At this event, Trivimi Velliste, an activist from 
the Estonian Heritage Society founded in late 1987, openly demanded the re-
establishment of Estonian independence for the first time. This was a bold step 
33 Eve Pärnaste, ed., Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei. ERSP aeg. Kogumik (Tallinn: MTÜ Ma-
gna Memoria, 2008); Eve Pärnaste, ed., Eesti Kongress. Siis ja praegu (Tallinn: Eesti Vabariigi 
Riigikantselei, 2000).
34 Mati Graf, Impeeriumi lõpp ja Eesti taasiseseisvumine 1988–1991 (Tallinn: Argo, 2012), 62–63.
35 The ethnic question is another aspect of the Singing Revolution that has not been subject of 
serious research. Cf. Grigorjan and Rosenfeld, Iseseisvuse anatoomia.
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that was instantly criticized by leading members of the Popular Front initiative, 
such as Edgar Savisaar, since no one could foresee the reaction of the Kremlin. 
Nevertheless, on the same day Valk formulated his acclaimed sentence in front 
of the crowd: “One day we will win anyway,” which instantly became the credo 
of the Estonian “Singing Revolution.”36 Even for the most hardnosed politicians 
among the crowd, it became clear that in time, autonomy would be not enough. 
At the end of the festival, the 80-year-old Ernesaks conducted the majestic choir 
singing his “Mu isamaa.” This time, there was no recollection of a “Soviet 
homeland” left. The mental secession from the USSR was already on its way.
When a few weeks later the founding congress of the Estonian Popular Front 
was held in Tallinn, the people demonstrated national unity with a torchlight 
procession through the Old Town, accompanied by patriotic songs. And again, 
the government gave in, with the Supreme Soviet declaring the republic’s 
sovereignty on 16 November 1988.37 After this decision, which effectively placed 
republican law above union law, the nascent political change in the Soviet Baltic 
republics met fierce resistance in Moscow. It was the first time in Soviet history 
that a SSR had demanded its right of sovereignty, as granted by article 72 in the 
Soviet constitution.38
Political stalemate in 1989
In late 1988, the Kremlin had to face the fact that “support for perestroika” in 
the Baltic republics did not necessarily mean unconditional loyalty to the union, 
but quite the opposite. Nonetheless, Estonia’s boldness in declaring sovereignty 
led to fruitless juridical debates with Moscow in the months to come, while 
Estonia was waiting for the other Baltic republics to follow. To some extent, the 
confrontation with radical groups like the ERSP was responsible for this stalemate 
in Estonian relations with the center. Lithuania eventually took the lead in the 
political movement while Latvia remained rather passive. Despite the wish of the 
Lithuanian Sąjūdis to support Estonia, in November 1988 the newly elected 
communist leadership in Vilnius, with Algirdas Brazauskas at the top, was not 
yet ready to pass a draft declaration of sovereignty. Lithuania finally took on the 
political movement on 16 February 1989, the anniversary of Lithuania’s 
independence in 1918, when Sąjūdis declared full independence as its goal. This 
was followed by an official declaration of sovereignty in May.39 Latvia followed 
36 Valk, Pääsemine, 304–8.
37 Toivo U. Raun, “The Re-establishment of Estonian Independence,” Journal of Baltic Studies 22, 
no. 3 (1991): 251–58; Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 512.
38 Brettin, Das Scheitern, 241–55; Graf, Kalevipoja kojutulek, 355–403.
39 Zigmantas Kiaupa, The History of Lithuania (Vilnius: baltos lankos, 2004) 320; Misiunas and 
Taagepera, The Baltic States, 317, 321.
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only in late July. By then, this step did not stir up any trouble in Moscow. This 
was thanks to the Estonian leadership in the person of Arnold Rüütel, the chairman 
of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, having withstood challenging verbal 
pressure in the Kremlin, where he had been summoned on 18 November 1988, 
two days after the declaration of sovereignty was approved in Tallinn. In March 
1989, the Popular Fronts of all three republics had won a majority of the Baltic 
republics’ delegates elected to the USSR Congress of Peoples’ Deputies, and by 
May, all three had passed laws declaring their indigenous languages as state 
languages.40 In Lithuania, this led to a final split of the LiCP. An extraordinary 
party congress held in late December 1989 voted overwhelmingly for independence, 
whereupon the orthodox minority formed a LiCP leadership within the CPSU. 
Finally on 11 March 1990, the Lithuanian Supreme Council re-established 
independent statehood and abolished the Soviet Constitution.41 
This represented the Baltic fall from grace in orthodox Soviet eyes. Newly 
elected President Gorbachev declared an economic blockade on Lithuania in April, 
while simultaneously offering Latvia and Estonia special status within the union. 
This approach, however, remained unsuccessful.42 By then, multiparty elections in 
Estonia and Latvia to the local Supreme Soviets (soon to be renamed Supreme 
Councils) had given pro-independence parties a majority. In Lithuania, elections 
had been held in late February with a second ballot in early March. Sąjūdis gained 
around 100 seats out of 141, but on its list there were candidates from other newly 
founded parties such as the Social Democrats or Christian Democrats represented 
as well. The reform communists were represented by 40 deputies, 17 of them from 
the Sąjūdis list. The orthodox communists got only 5 seats in the Supreme Soviet. 
This was the body that declared independence on 11 March.43 In Estonia and Latvia, 
where elections were held on 18 March, the pro-independence results were somewhat 
lower than in Lithuania due to these republics’ large immigrant populations. In 
Estonia, the Rahvarinne got 40 seats out of 105, supporters of Moscow almost 30, 
and others, among them a group of reform communists called Free Estonia, more 
than 30 seats.44 In Latvia, after run-off elections Tautas Fronte got more than 130 
seats out of 201.45 A period of transition to the restoration of independence was 
established in Tallinn on 30 March and in Riga on 4 May.
40 Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 323; Rein Taagepera, “A Note on the March 1989 
Elections in Estonia,” Soviet Studies 42, no. 2 (1990): 329–39.
41 Alfred Erich Senn, “Lithuania’s Path to Independence,” Journal of Baltic Studies 22, no. 3 
(1991): 245–50.
42 Kiaupa, The History of Lithuania, 322–24.
43 Kiaupa, The History of Lithuania, 324; V. Stanley Vardys, “Litauen unter der Sowjetherrschaft 
und auf dem Wege zur Unabhängigkeit,” in Boris Meissner, ed., Die baltischen Nationen. Est-
land. Lettland. Litauen (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1991), 223–68, 240–41.
44 Vahtre, ed., Eesti ajalugu, 286.
45 Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 331, claim that the “supporters of independence 
elected exceeded the necessary two-thirds (134) for control of the Latvian Supreme Soviet“.
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Nevertheless, in contrast to the Central European states, Soviet power in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania did not end despite unilaterally declared independence. Moscow 
tried to come to terms with the constitutional requirements for a Soviet republic to 
withdraw from the USSR. New rules, however, would have made the task “virtually 
impossible.”46 The resulting impasse could not hide the fact that, ultimately, the real 
power remained in Moscow’s hand. In January 1991, first Vilnius and later Riga 
witnessed violent attempts to restore the old order. In Vilnius, after Prime Minister 
Kazimiera Prunskiene had decided to raise food prices substantially, the government 
had to resign. Obviously using this moment of weakness in the Lithuanian Soviet 
Republic, on 10 January Gorbachev demanded the restoration of the Soviet 
constitution from the Supreme Council and refused to guarantee to refrain from using 
violence. On 11 January the Soviet army and internal troops of the Ministry of the 
Interior (OMON) stormed strategic places in Vilnius, including the Press House 
building and the railway station. Two days later, when in the early morning the 
special military unit “Alpha” along with the OMON troops attacked, among other 
facilities, the Vilnius TV tower, fourteen people died and over a hundred were 
injured. The following days, a parallel scenario developed in Riga, although Boris 
Yeltsin, the president of the RSFSR, in reaction to the events in Vilnius had come 
to Tallinn to sign agreements with Estonia and Latvia, thus establishing bilateral 
relations. As had been done in Vilnius, barricades were erected in Riga to protect 
strategic buildings. Nevertheless, on 20 January, when in Moscow a crowd of 
100,000 people demonstrated its support for the Baltic republics, OMON troops 
stormed the Ministry of Interior in Riga, killing five people and injuring nine.47 
As a result, not least thanks to international media coverage, Soviet power in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was finally discredited, although Moscow was only 
ready to negotiate a Union Treaty. By March 1991, all three Baltic republics had 
carried out referenda resulting in significant majorities for independence, which 
demonstrated the backing by large portions of the non-native populations as 
well.48 Nevertheless, Soviet power collapsed only in August 1991, when the old 
nomenklatura of the regime dug their own graves with the ragged coup d’état of 
the State Committee of the State of Emergency. When in reaction, Estonia and 
Latvia finally followed Lithuania in declaring full independence, all other Soviet 
republics except Russia (which had, among others, issued a declaration of 
sovereignty in 1990) followed suit. The Soviet super power imploded and the 
State Committee eased the rebirth of the Baltic states, which were recognized 
almost immediately on the international arena.49
46 Plakans, A Concise History of the Baltic States, 396.
47 Ainius Lasas, “Bloody Sunday. What did Gorbachev know about the January 1991 events in 
Vilnius and Riga?,” Journal of Baltic Studies 38, no. 2 (2007): 179–94, 185–86.
48 90.5% in Lithuania (turnout of 84.7%), 73.7% in Latvia (87.5%), and 77.8% in Estonia (82.9%). 
Meissner, ed., Die baltischen Nationen, 405; slightly different numbers in Ruutsoo, “Tagasivaat-
ed ‘vabaduse teele’,” 304.     
49 Plakans, A Concise History of the Baltic States, 398–99.
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It should be remembered that Soviet power was still present on Baltic territory 
even after the (re-)admission of the three states to the UN on 17 September 1991. 
The final units of the then Russian army left Estonia and Latvia only three years 
after the putsch, on 31 August 1994, exactly one year later than in Lithuania. 
Thus, the pathos of the day was revived, with World War II actually ending only 
in August 1994 on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea.
The meaning of 1989 for the Baltic states
In this context, 1989 bears primarily symbolic relevance for the three Baltic 
states. For one triumphant moment, their independence movement became part 
of the European annus mirabilis, since a calendar of 1989 events is not complete 
without the “Baltic Chain” (also called the “Baltic Way”), a mass demonstration 
that took place just a few days after the famous Pan-European Picnic on the 
Austrian-Hungarian border. On 23 August, the fiftieth anniversary of the Hitler-
Stalin Pact, the People’s Fronts of the three Baltic republics organized a human 
chain connecting the three capitals Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, in order to peacefully 
remember the murderous consequences that this pact had held for them. It is 
estimated that between 1.2 and more than 2 million people joined the almost 600 
kilometer long chain to protest Soviet domination. This powerful example of 
peaceful resistance not only caught the attention of the international media, it was 
also an almost singular demonstration of Baltic mutual consensus.50 Thus, the 
political significance of 1989 for the Baltic countries was the fact that from then 
onward, neither Moscow nor the Western powers could completely ignore the 
political urgency of the Baltic question. Whoever wanted to end the Cold War 
had to provide a solution for this problem as well.
The West did not instantly support the goals of the Baltic republics, but 
nonetheless, the reaction of the Central Committee on 26 August 1989 felt 
disproportionately aggressive, revealing the Kremlin’s helplessness in this regard. 
In the eyes of Moscow, the “Baltic Chain” had been nothing more than “nationalist 
hysteria.” The pronouncement of the CC, read in the news program “Vremya,” 
50 Shortly before the 20th anniversary of this event the “Baltic Chain” has been registered in the 
UNESCO-list “Memory of the World”: ttp://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-in-
formation/flagship-project-activities/memory-of-the-world/register/full-list-of-registered-her-
itage/registered-heritage-page-8/the-baltic-way-human-chain-linking-three-states-in-their-
drive-for-freedom/ (accessed 25 September 2012); http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/474728 (accessed 
9 August 2012). Cf. Vytautas Visockas, Baltijos kelias. The Baltic way (Vilnius: Mintis, 2000); 
Lembit Koik, 23. august 1989. Balti kett (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 2004); Kalev 
Vilgats, “Külo Arjakas: Balti tee ehk Balti keti korraldamine otsustati kolmepoolse komisjoni 
kohtumisel Pärnus,” Pärnu Postimees, 22 August 2009, http://www.parnupostimees.ee/ 154982/
kullo-arjakas-balti-tee-ehk-balti-keti-korraldamine-otsustati-kolmepoolse-komisjoni-kohtumis-
el-parnus/ (accessed 25 September 2012).
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even claimed: “Matters have gone too far. There is a serious threat to the fate of 
the Baltic peoples. People should know the abyss into which they are being 
pushed by their nationalistic leaders. Should they achieve their goals, the possible 
consequences could be catastrophic to these nations. A question could arise as to 
their very existence.” According to this statement, the Popular Fronts were aiming 
at the destruction of the union and they “terrorized” those still loyal to socialism.51 
At this time, Soviet dominance was already history in Central Europe. However, 
the violent events in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991 proved that these words 
were not empty threats.
For the time being, the only victory won by the “Baltic Chain” for the Popular 
Fronts was a moral one, although at the diplomatic level, as Spohr-Readman has 
shown, the Baltic question became important from this point in time, not least 
thanks to the Chain’s impressive impact. Nonetheless, the Western powers continued 
anxiously to avoid open support of the Baltic case, despite the Kremlin’s aggressive 
tone. Especially West Germany was far from committing itself to a solution for the 
situation of the three countries, despite its historical responsibility. While claiming 
peaceful self-determination for the Germans, Chancellor Helmut Kohl simultaneously 
rejected this very right for the Baltic peoples, losing thereby a balanced European 
perspective. Germany only recognized the independence of the Baltic countries in 
the late summer of 1991, even later than Gorbachev had. And it is quite symbolic 
that Kohl paid his first visit to the three countries only in 1998, when he went to 
Riga to meet the prime minister of the Russian Federation, Viktor Chernomyrdin.52
The mobilizing potential of historical memory
The significant event of the August 1989 “Baltic Chain” became a focal point 
for glasnost in the Soviet Baltic republics. At the same time, it reminded the rest 
of Europe of the forgotten victims of the allied victory in Eastern Europe, a victory 
that had been possible thanks to a dictator no less despicable than the common 
enemy Hitler. Despite the decision of the EU to commemorate 23 August as 
European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, the 
Hitler-Stalin Pact was never a central European lieu de mémoire.53 Nonetheless, 
51 Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 328; Rein Ruutsoo, “Tagasivaated ‘vabaduse 
teele’—Rahvarinde roll Eesti ajaloos 1988-1993,” Rahvarinne (1988): 234–321, 284; Seraina 
Gilly, Der Nationalstaat im Wandel. Estland im 20. Jahrhundert (Bern: Peter Lang, 2002) 341; 
Brettin, Das Scheitern, 192–201; Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 517.
52 Cf. Spohr-Readman, Germany and the Baltic Problem after the Cold War, passim.
53 Stefan Troebst, “Der 23. August 1939—Ein europäischer lieu de mémoire?,” Osteuropa 59, no. 
7–8 (2009): 249–56, see URL: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-08-11-troebst-de.html 
(accessed 12 July 2010). For the EU parliament’s resolution, see http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0439+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
(accessed 25 September 2012).
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the Western part of the anti-Hitler coalition, despite the US government’s policy 
not to recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, de facto accepted the 
Pact’s consequences and never actually questioned Stalin’s territorial gains.54 The 
feeling of having been abandoned and sacrificed by the Western democracies was 
very vivid in the Baltic republics during the early postwar years, and this was a 
crucial aspect that gave moral fuel to the Baltic opposition movements in the late 
1980s. No doubt the mobilization of dissent based on historical legitimacy was 
above all an act of anti-Soviet sentiment. Between the lines, however, these 
common efforts in the Baltic independence movement were also an appeal to 
Western historical responsibility. The three countries were not only claiming their 
secession from the Kremlin, but were simultaneously demanding their moral right 
to “return to Europe” as approved by the West. 
The date 23 August was always a focal point of Baltic dissent, as were the 
traditional independence days of the three interwar republics. While the former 
stood for the Baltic victimhood, the latter represented the continuation of an ideal 
mode of independent existence (something the people’s democracies of Central 
Europe did not need to the same extent). Therefore, throughout the Soviet period 
“calendar demonstrations” expressed this national protest, although they were 
generally quite modest in form, such as wearing clothes or small arm ribbons of 
the national colors, or simply graffiti being written on the walls.55 On 23 August 
1979, forty-five Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians signed the “Baltic Appeal” 
to the general secretary of the UN, which demanded the public disclosure of the 
pact and its protocols, annulment of its consequences and restoration of the 
independent republics.56 In the late 1980s, these anniversaries became popular to 
a much greater degree. With every year, people were less afraid of taking part in 
displaying non-Soviet identities. In less than three years, small local demonstrations 
of a few hundred people had transformed into large-scale political events that 
attracted the attention of a world-wide audience, the culmination being the “Baltic 
Chain.” While on one hand, this demonstrated the decline of the central authority 
in the Soviet Baltic republics, on the other hand, it proved how effective history 
can be for mobilizing the masses.
The first protest meetings that attracted a significant number of people in all 
three capitals occurred on 23 August 1987. Sources speak of more than 5,000 people 
in Riga, in Tallinn of more than 2,000, and in Vilnius 200 to 300.57 Displaying the 
54 Jonathan d’Hommedieu, “Roosevelt and the dictators: the origin of the US non-recognition pol-
icy of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states,” in: Hiden and Made, eds., The Baltic Question 
during Cold War, 33–44. 
55 Basic information provided by Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 250–71.
56 Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 270.
57 Estimates vary. The numbers given here are from Ruutsoo, “Tagasivaated ‘vabaduse teele’,” 
255. Cf. Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 308: Riga: “over 10,000”; Tallinn: “at least 
5,000”; Vilnius: “over 1,000”. For Tallinn, cf. Kaasik and Piirimäe, “Hirvepargi kõnekoosolek 
ja Eesti vabanemine”; Graf, Kalevipoja kojutulek, 216–28.
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national colors was still a legal offence, and a number of people were later arrested. 
Just one year later, during the first summer of the “Singing Revolution,” the 
situation had changed completely: Hundreds of thousands took part in the 
demonstrations on 23 August, and showing the national colors had become legal, 
at least in Estonia. The authorities limited their activities to close observation. By 
1989, millions of people took part in the “Baltic Chain.” The Baltic question had 
become decisively important for the fate of perestroika, since it gave the conservative 
Soviet opposition reason to be concerned about the integrity of the entire country.
In the international arena, it became increasingly hollow to declare the Baltic 
question simply an internal matter of the USSR. The Popular Fronts were clever 
to concentrate their propaganda on the secret protocols of the Hitler-Stalin Pact 
instead of the entire complex of occupation and annexation from June 1940. If 
they had emphasized the latter, they would never have been able to create the 
international commitment they received, not least because this would have annoyed 
the Kremlin even more. Moscow still held true to the Stalinist legend of the 
spontaneous “socialist revolutions” simultaneously occurring in all three countries 
in the summer of 1940.58 In contrast to this orthodox Soviet view, according to 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian historical memory, there was only one common 
experience after 1940: occupation, annexation and deportation. Most decisively 
in this respect, the living memory of these crucial years still existed in many 
families, since many people who were allowed to return from Siberian exile after 
Stalin’s death were still alive in the late 1980s. In these families, the younger 
generation was quite naturally acquainted with the differences between the history 
taught at school and private remembrance.59 However, it was not only Stalinist 
terror that was remembered in the late 1980s and increasingly discussed in local 
media: The societies in all three countries still had a pre-Soviet memory of the 
independent republics, although this was unavoidably idealized. Almost half a 
century of Soviet indoctrination had not been able to extract these memories. 
Although the region became increasingly adapted to Soviet realities, at least on 
the surface, after open terror was no longer used in the USSR from the late 1950s, 
remembering the 23 August was a question of historical justice.
In the Soviet Baltic republics, history thus became the most important source 
of legitimacy of anti-Soviet protest. It is quite noteworthy that these anti-Soviet 
convictions were very powerful, especially among the younger generation. 
Politburo documents concerning the Baltic republics are full of discussions of 
anti-Soviet youth protests, and even record some cases of violence committed on 
58 Lauri Mälksoo, Ilegal Annexation and State Continuity. Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic 
States by the USSR. A Study of the Tension between Normativity and Power in International Law 
(Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003); Jan Lipinsky, Das geheime Zusatzprotokoll zum deutsch-sow-
jetischen Nichtangriffsvertrag vom 23. August 1939 und seine Entstehungs- und Rezeptionsge-
schichte von 1939 bis 1999 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004).
59 Peeter Tulviste, “History Taught at School Versus History Discovered at Home: The Case of 
Estonia,” European Journal of Psychology of Education 9, no. 2 (1994): 121–26.
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ethnic grounds against Slavic “occupants.”60 According to Elena Zubkova, it was 
especially irritating for the regime that the youth were leading the protest in the 
Baltic republics.61 Indeed, it had nothing to do with the Soviet historical narrative 
that history was a very popular subject at the University of Tartu.62 It was history 
that legitimized the belief in an independent future, and it seemed to prove the 
three nation’s roles as victims of dictators. Additionally, history during the years 
of perestroika provided motivation for establishing an active civil society in the 
three republics, a civil society that today is missed by certain veterans of the 
Popular Front.63 Quite naturally, these successful years of political activity become 
idealized, especially by those whose personal reading of the past did not correspond 
to the hitherto established national narratives of the “fight for independence.” At 
that time, history was used for “popular” vengeance as well: On 25 March 1988, 
the anniversary of mass deportations from the Baltic Soviet republics in March 
1949, the Estonian Heritage Society demanded the names of all those deported 
to the interior of the USSR to be documented and published. It was thought that 
this select historical documentation, based on a victim narrative, would unite the 
ethnic community and could be used as a weapon against the foreign power.64
These initiatives for historical glasnost wanted to push the Soviet leadership 
into acknowledging that Stalin had been Hitler’s accomplice in dividing Eastern 
Europe. How far would perestroika legally go? Shortly before the demonstrations 
in August 1987, a group was formed in Estonia with a single goal: The Estonian 
Group for the Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Molotov-Ribbentropi 
Pakti Avalikustamise Eesti Grupp). This group (which formed the core of the 
ERSP) organized a meeting in Tallinn’s Hirve Park on 23 August.65 One year later, 
on 10 August 1988, the Estonian historian Heino Arumäe published, for the first 
time in the USSR, the entire text of the pact, including the protocols in Estonian, 
in the daily Rahva Hääl (Voice of the People). The text was based on copies from 
German archives. A few days later, the Russian-language daily Sovet skaya 
Estoniya followed suit and published the text in Russian as well. Latvian and 
Lithuanian periodicals subsequently made the text available in their languages.66
60 Here the author relies on his own work in the RGANI. He is currently preparing a study based 
on these sources.
61 Elena Yu. Zubkova, “Vlast’ i razvitie ėtnokonfliktnoi situatsii v SSSR 1953–1985 gody,” 
Otechestvennaya istoriya, no. 4 (2004): 3–32, esp. 23–27; Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 42–43. 
According to Graf, Kalevipoja kojutulek, 240, still in late 1987 the official media asked why the 
youth was so eager to participate in anti-Soviet demonstrations.
62 Cf. Anu Raudsepp, Ajaloo õpetamise korraldus Eesti NSV eesti õppekeelega üldhariduskoolides 
1944–1985 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2005).
63 Ester Šank, “Valusad küsimused. Kuhu on kadunud kodanikuühiskond,” Rahvarinne 1988, 323–26.
64 Ruutsoo, “Tagasivaated ‘vabaduse teele’,” 259.
65 Tannberg, Hirvepark 1987.
66 The Latvian teacher’s journal Skolotāju Avīze published part of the text already on 23 July 1988. 
Cf. Gert von Pistohlkors, “Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt und die Baltischen Staaten,” and the transla-
tion of Heino Arumäe’s article in Rahva hääl, “Noch einmal zum sowjetisch-deutschen Nicht-
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On 18 May 1989, the Estonian Supreme Soviet was the first administrative body 
of the USSR to declare the clauses of the Hitler-Stalin Pact null and void. Supported 
by Sąjūdis, it demanded the newly elected Congress of Peoples’ Deputies to do the 
same. In Moscow, the Baltic deputies, mostly candidates supported by the Popular 
Fronts, sought tight cooperation with the “Interregional Group” established by 
reform-minded communists around Yurii Afanas’yev, Gavriil Popov and Boris 
Yeltsin.67 On 2 June, they managed to be represented in a Commission for the Legal 
Assessment of the Pact, led by Gorbachev’s close advisor Yakovlev and by Savisaar 
(among the members: Marju Lauristin from Estonia, Landsbergis and Kazimir 
Motieka from Lithuania, and Mavriks Vulfsons from Latvia).68
The decision of the congress of 24 December to recognize the existence of 
the secret protocols and to declare their clauses “legally unjustified and invalid 
from the moment of signing” is significant for the relationship between the Union 
and the Baltic Soviet Republics.69 However, this decision had no practical 
consequences, since the annexation as such was not condemned. As late as 2010, 
this issue was still not resolved at an official level. And as mentioned above, the 
former status of the Baltic republics as parts of the Russian empire and the USSR 
sets them apart from the former people’s democracies of Central Europe.70
The Culture of the “Singing Revolution”
In assessing the “Singing Revolution,” historians and political scientists have 
concentrated on official statements, elections and plebiscites, the conflict with the 
angriffspakt,” in Erwin Oberländer, ed., Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939. Das Ende Ostmitteleu-
ropas? (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1989), 75–97, 114–24. The text was published in Latvian 
(“Literatūra un māksla”; “Padomju jaunate”) and in Lithuanian (“Sąjūdžio žinios”; “Literatūra 
ir menas”). Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 319.
67 Denis M. Ablaev, Mezhregional’naya deputatskaya gruppa: stanovlenie, razvitie i itogi 
(Moskva: Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi oblastnoi universitet, 2008).
68 Heiki Lindpere, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Challenging Soviet History (Tallinn: Estonian For-
eign Policy Institute, 2009). Cf. also the DVD by Toomas Lepp, “Dokumentaarfilm: Eestlased 
Kremlis” (Tallinn: Eesti Kultuurfilm, 2006), which quite convincingly follows the narrative that 
it was the Baltic delegates who were responsible for the collapse of the USSR.
69 Translation of the Resolution of 24 December signed by Gorbachev, in Lindpere, Molotov-Rib-
bentrop Pact, 173–75.
70 Influential Russian commentators like the historian Nataliya Narochnitskaya, who is in charge 
of the Parisian branch of the governmental “Institute for Democracy and Cooperation,” call the 
decision of December 1989 a “mistake” because they made it impossible for the Russian Feder-
ation to take a clear position in a future process of reparations with the Baltic republics. See “Re-
komendatsii rossiiskikh istorikov: Rossiya i Pribaltika: kompetentnye otvety na istoricheskie 
pretenzii limitrofov,” Sootechestvennik. Informatsionnyi portal, http://compatriot.su/ estonia/
news/51807.html (accessed 10 August 2007). For a general account, see Karsten Brüggemann, 
“Russia and the Baltic Countries: Recent Russian-language literature (Review Essay),” Kritika. 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 10, no. 4 (2009): 935–56.
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center, and the Baltic countries’ relations with the West. Historians of the USSR, 
looking traditionally from the center, refer first and foremost to the decline of the 
central power.71 One of the main topics is the astonishing fact that, in general, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union was a quite peaceful process, even in the Baltic 
region, despite the bloody events of January 1991. Concerning Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania, Walter C. Clemens has taken an unorthodox approach to the 
secession. According to him, the factor “culture,” in a wider sense, is decisive for 
explaining the behavioral differences between the Soviet and national “cultures,” 
whereby for him, a “societal fitness” of the peoples in the Baltic region was 
created not least by the long tradition of Protestant cultures of reading.72 Heiko 
Pääbo has observed that the potential for violence based on ethnicity was rather 
low in Estonia in the crucial years 1988–90.73 
In fact, there was indeed a moment of tension. On 15 May 1990, Interfront 
organized a meeting on Toompea Hill in the center of Tallinn to protest the recent 
decisions concerning a “transition period” towards independence (30 March) as 
well as the final abolition of the name “Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic” in favor 
of the traditional “Republic of Estonia” (8 May); this decision was preceded by a 
similar step in Latvia four days earlier, in reaction to Lithuania’s declaration of 
independence in March. During the Interfront meeting, some of the demonstrators 
tried to break into government buildings in the castle on Toompea Hill. In reaction 
to the new prime minister Savisaar’s call for help via radio, masses of Estonian 
supporters of the government came to Castle Square, pushing the mostly Russian 
demonstrators into the small area of the castle, with the Estonians outside the 
complex. Violence seemed to be at hand, since the Russians sat in a trap with no 
way out. According to then foreign minister and later president Lennart Meri, the 
situation was saved first by a Russian general and member of the Supreme Council, 
who managed to calm down the masses, and second by the Estonians on Castle 
Square, who slowly opened a narrow path for the demonstrators to leave the site.74 
71 From the central perspective, see Robert Service, A History of Modern Russia. From Nicholas II 
to Putin (London: Penguin, 2003), 485–507; Manfred Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 
1917–1991: Entstehung und Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
1998), 1052–60.
72 Walter C. Clemens, “Culture and Symbols as Tools of Resistance,” Journal of Baltic Studies 
40, no. 2 (2009): 169–77, 172. See Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed. Complexity 
Theory and European Security (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). Cf. Guntis Smidchens, 
“National Heroic Narratives in the Baltics as a Source for Nonviolent Political Action,” Slavic 
Review 66, no. 3 (2007): 484–508.
73 Heiko Pääbo, “The Role of Non-Violent Resistance in Proclaiming Independence in Estonia,” 
in Talavs Jundzis, ed., Development of Democracy. Experience in the Baltic States and Taiwan 
(Riga: Latvian Academy of Sciences, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2006), 126–36. Ac-
cording to him, opinion polls in 1988–89 “showed that the support of the Intermovement varied 
from 35–43% within non-Estonians.”
74 Andreas Oplatka, Lennart Meri. Ein Leben für Estland. Dialog mit dem Präsidenten (Zürich: 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1999), 321–23; Graf, Impeeriumi lõpp, 163–65.
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There is another major factor with regard to the culture of the “Singing 
Revolution,” however, that is open for further research. Although many scholars 
often refer to the “mass movements” that reshaped the political landscapes in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we do not know very much about the people 
who took part in these movements. We do not know, for instance, exactly who 
went out into the streets. Social scientists like Henri Vogt have chosen to collect 
individual stories to give a portrait of the “revolutionary” generation, but even 
the limited number of respondents in his case only reveals how open the situation 
in 1989 was.  According to Vogt, “collective utopias” mobilized individuals to go 
to the streets. His quite general claim about these common goals—one could 
“become more ‘European’ but simultaneously also more ‘national’”—can hardly 
be disputed.75 These public dispositions were so important because for half a 
century the communist dictatorship had been trying to suppress them with the 
single socialist utopia, which propagated quite a different form of collectivity. 
The year 1989 brought the individual note back into social consciousness. In the 
Baltic case, however, the “collective utopia” that mobilized the masses, regardless 
of generational differences, was merely a return to the cultural patterns that had 
been developed during the first half of the twentieth century.76 
Apart from this general approach to these mass movements, I would like to 
examine the issue of youth participation here, which was of utmost importance 
for the “Singing Revolution,” not the least because of the motivation music 
offered. Vogt discusses the memories of those born from 1964 to 1973, whereby 
he consciously concentrates on the generation of those who actively took part in 
the 1989 protests from the early stages onwards. However, if Zubkova is correct 
in stating that already in the 1960s, Moscow was alarmed by the predominance 
of the participation of the younger generation in smaller protest activities 
(especially at universities),77 then perestroika in the Baltic republics was a logical 
continuation of this protest culture. From the beginning, the “Singing Revolution” 
was a youth movement in terms of activity on the streets. As has been stated 
above, the dissent did not only involve people singing traditional songs from the 
late nineteenth-century “national awakening” period. In all three Baltic republics, 
rock music played a decisive role in displaying anti-regime protest. Since the 
1970s, local rock music that was “Western” in form but “national” in content 
motivated especially younger people, who thus were involved in a sort of 
continuous passive anti-regime protest, since the Kremlin always tried to fight 
the most recent waves of “decadent” Western culture. In this sense, the influence 
75 Henri Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment. A Narrative of the Political Transformation in 
Eastern Europe (New York: Berghahn, 2005), 240.
76 Cf. for instance Toivo U. Raun, “National Identity in Finland and Estonia, 1905–1917,” in Nor-
bert Angermann, Michael Garleff, and Wilhelm Lenz, eds., Ostseeprovinzen, Baltische Staaten 
und das Nationale. Festschrift für Gert von Pistohlkors zum 70. Geburtstag (Münster: LIT, 
2005), 343–56.
77 Zubkova, “Vlast’ i razvitie,” 24–25.
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that jazz had had on the informal movements of the 1960s was carried into the 
1980s by rock and punk. Whereas in 1967, the concert of the Charles Lloyd Trio 
(featuring Keith Jarrett) during the “Tallinn-67” jazz festival fostered the image 
of Estonia as the Soviet Union’s “window to Europe,”78 the performance of John 
Lyndon’s band Public Image Ltd. during the Tallinn “Rock Summer” in August 
1988 prepared the Estonian capital for their “return to Europe.”79 Punk had been 
the trigger for protest already in 1980, the year Tallinn hosted the sailing 
competitions of the Moscow Olympic games. On 22 September 1980, the 
anniversary of Tallinn’s “liberation” in 1944, a concert of the punk band Propeller, 
organized for the special occasion of a soccer match celebrating the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of Estonian Television, was abruptly interrupted by officials, 
whereupon hundreds of young people marched toward the city center shouting 
anti-Russian slogans calling for the resignation of Brezhnev and the ESSR’s 
minister of education, Elza Grechkina.80 Since punk was an authentic anti-Soviet 
protest, it was punks who were among the first to display openly the old Estonian 
tricolor. Thus it came as no surprise when in 1988 a punk song figured among 
the iconic (and ironic) hits of the “Singing Revolution”: J.M.K.E.’s “Tere 
Perestroika” (Hello Perestroika).81
However music was not the only medium for youth protest. The first mass 
demonstrations in all three republics were organized around the issue of 
environmental hazards. This issue had the advantage of being intrinsically 
apolitical, although in the Baltic republics, protest against pollution caused by 
state-run industrial plants also meant fighting against the immigration of more 
workers from the Soviet interior,82 an issue that had already been openly addressed 
in 1979 by the aforementioned “Baltic Appeal.” With a “green” agenda, the new 
possibilities for intense criticism under Gorbachev were tested. Environmental 
issues first came to the surface in autumn 1986 in Latvia, where the young 
78 Valter Ojakäär, Sirp ja saksofoon. Eesti levimuusika ajaloost 3 (Tallinn: Ilo, 2008), 352–69; 
Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, 56–57.
79 Tony Blackplait and Cat Bloomfield, Eesti punk 1976–1990. Anarhia ENSV-s (Tallinn: Varrak, 
2009), 282–91, 300–7, 310–15.
80 Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, 35–40, 65–73; Blackplait and Bloomfield, Eesti punk, 36–44; Mis-
iunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 253.
81 About J.M.K.E. see Blackplait and Bloomfield, Eesti punk, passim; for a video of “Tere Per-
estroika,” see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBt8qBdz0gA&feature=related (accessed 18 
July 2010). The text reads: “The sky’s cloudless, the sea’s blue / Everybody’s breathing free 
and deep / Hammer and sickle are no longer a threat / Now they symbolize joyful work / Hello 
perestroika, democracy / One country is becoming free of dictatorship / Hello perestroika, hello 
happiness / The red flag isn’t so horrible anymore […] The uniform of militia no longer sickens 
/ Now it’s nearly beautiful / You’ll see militia and punks / Shaking hands […] In Virumaa not 
a well remains dry / An airship lands in front of the mausoleum / Well what do you say? / The 
democracy is so great / That one can only wonder […].” Quoted from the CD “Külmale maale” 
(Helsinki: Stupido Twins, 1989).
82 See to the following Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 304–7.
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journalist Dainis Īvāns, later one of the organizers of the Popular Front, raised 
questions about a planned hydroelectric complex at Pļaviņas; later the planned 
construction of a subway in Riga came under the focus of critics as well. In the 
spring of 1987, the so-called Phosphorite War occurred in Estonia, during which 
especially the students in Tartu went onto the streets. Estonian specialists claimed 
that the planned expansion of open-pit phosphate mining in the north of the 
country would render the whole region infertile and possibly endanger the water 
supply of the entire republic. The Estonian environmentalists were also concerned 
about the development of the industrial port Maardu near Tallinn. But the 
phosphorus mining mobilized open protest: Accompanied by Mattiisen’s 
aforementioned rock-hymn “Ei ole üksi ükski maa,” on 1 May 1987 Tartu students 
“substituted green ecological banners for the standard red ones during the 
traditional May parade.”83 While ecology protests reached less industrialized 
Lithuania later—the first mass demonstration against the Chernobyl-style Ignalina 
nuclear power plant was held in autumn 1988—the success of the protest 
movements in Estonia and Latvia was decisive. First, in October 1987, the USSR 
Council of Ministers decided to stop phosphate mining projects in Estonia, and 
in November 1987 it also cancelled the building of the hydroelectric complex in 
Pļaviņas. In both cases, but especially crucial in Estonia, this demonstrated that 
the party was not omnipotent, and that even in the USSR, civic action could 
achieve something against bureaucratic resistance. Prominent members of the 
ECP, including Rüütel and Savisaar, joined the protests, and the republican 
Council of Ministers, led by Bruno Saul and Indrek Toome, promised not to 
sanction continued planning until all ecological concerns had been addressed. 
This showed that even the ECP leadership supported local concerns over central 
planning.
Still, the psychological aspect in 1987 of the gradual disappearance of fear 
may have been even more important. As one of Vogt’s Estonian respondents 
remembered, this “was the first experience […] that you can go to the streets, 
you can demonstrate, and nothing happens, no repression follows.”84 This positive 
“first experience” was primarily shared by students, artists and representatives of 
the intelligentsia (in Estonia and Latvia alike). Thus it is no surprise that these 
were the groups that went out onto the streets again in the summer of 1988. The 
entire culture of protest changed with them. It seemed that there was no longer 
any need for violence, since the state apparatus, at least tactically, had pulled back 
its troops. In September 1980, when protesting students in Tallinn pulled down 
Soviet flags and pushed over streetcars,85 violence seemed the appropriate 
expression of youth protest. Everyone who had seen the brilliant film “Vai viegli 
but jaunam?” (Is it easy to be young?), shot by the Lativan director Juris Podnieks 
83 Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 306.
84 Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment, 23.
85 Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, 68.
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and released in 1986, knew about the violent potential of the youth, a potential 
that had been fed by the social stagnation of the Brezhnev era. Podnieks’ film 
opens with a concert of the band Pērkons in Ogre in 1985, with the scenes spliced 
with coverage of the trial of several teenagers who were charged with demolishing 
two train compartments after the concert. Podnieks then empathetically looks at 
the personal life of these young people, presenting ideas of self-realization that 
for the most part were completely foreign to Soviet clichés.
During the “Singing Revolution,” the fact that intellectuals took the concerns 
of the youth seriously was important for the unity of the society. This already had 
a tradition: The issues raised indirectly by the youth riots in 1980 were supported 
by the famous “Letter of 40,” signed in October 1980 by Estonian writers, 
scientists and artists, as well as by representatives of official cultural institutions.86 
In Latvia, Podnieks’ acclaimed 1986 film had portrayed the needs and ideals of 
Latvian youth. This mutual understanding reached a new level after 1987, when 
the intelligentsia directed the vibrant protest energy of the youth into social 
activism. One aspect characterized both groups: they were relatively young. The 
reform movement was mainly conducted by representatives of a generation that 
only knew about massive state violence through hearsay or personal family 
history. As Vogt has stated, these people “were unaware of the ‘impossibility’ of 
a revolution,” by which he refers to the Czech experience in 1968, and thus, “it 
was possible for them to make one.”87
Conclusion
Much like the other revolutions of 1989, the “Singing Revolution” in the 
Soviet Baltic republics was characterized by an unusual level of youth engagement. 
Due to their commitment to issues of national development in terms of the 
environment and industrial production, due to their collective past and the way 
history was taught in schools, and due to independent cultural expression, the 
movement gained momentum and visibility on the streets. The Kremlin’s hands 
were tied: The new leadership did not want to risk damaging international relations 
by television footage covering violently suppressed demonstrations on the Baltic 
Sea coast. It is often claimed that the chain reaction leading to the dissolution of 
the USSR started in Gdańsk in September 1980 and ended in Moscow in August 
1991. However, as Elena Zubkova has pointed out, anyone who would like to 
know the reasons for the collapse of the world’s first socialist state must take into 
account what happened in the Soviet Baltic republics during the first ten years 
86 Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States, 269; Sirje Kiin, Rein Ruutsoo, and Andres Tarand, 
40 kirja lugu (Tallinn: Olion, 1990).
87 Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment, 24.
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after their annexation.88 According to Zubkova, the Soviet experiment never had 
a chance there, even after Moscow decided to turn the “dangerous borderland” 
into a “show case” (vitrina) of Soviet success.89 Thus the region played the role 
of a predetermined weak link in the construction of the Soviet Union, as expressed 
in the words of Valk: “One day we will win anyway.” One might see the Baltic 
republics as a case of particular “imperial overstretch,” if not in military and 
economic terms, then surely because the USSR extended itself beyond its abilities 
with respect to cultural needs.
The Estonian social scientists Peeter Vihalemm, Marju Lauristin and Ivar Tallo 
have insightfully suggested a differentiation for marking the various stages of 
social change during the “Singing Revolution.” According to them, the “revolution” 
reached a “mythological phase” in 1988, and passed into an “ideological stage” 
in 1989.90 The first period brought a historical rebirth and created an optimism 
that had hitherto been considered impossible in the near future. Today we might 
speak of a “Yes, we can” moment, a moment that produced the unity felt during 
those summer nights of music, a short period of euphoria all too easily 
mythologized today. The subsequent stage of ideological stalemates was then 
perceived as a time of outer tensions and internal conflicts concerning a single 
goal—independence.91 Thus, while 1989 was in some respects a year of 
disappointment, the summer of 1988 has been encapsulated in collective memory 
as the “Singing Revolution.” During the summer of 1988 a whole society changed, 
although the people in the Soviet Baltic republics had to wait another three years 
for this change to become political reality.
88 Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 7, 43; for comparison see Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 521.
89 Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’, 125, 337.
90 Peeter Vihalemm, Marju Lauristin and Ivar Tallo, “Development of Political Culture in Es-
tonia,” in Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm, eds., Return to the Western World. Cultural 
and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition (Tartu: Tartu University 
Press, 1997), 197–210.
91 Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment, 28, quotes the Estonian poet Jaan Kaplinski (Posti-
mees, 19 September 1991), who stated that in 1989, “those who kept on meeting joined different 




n o r M a n  M .  n a i M a r K
THE SUPERPOWERS AND 1989 IN  
EASTERN EUROPE
Given the sheer importance of the East European revolutions of 1989, there 
is understandably no shortage of scholarly and journalistic work on their history.1 
The many works that appeared in anticipation of the twentieth anniversary of the 
momentous events of that year compliment a rich literature of memoirs and anal-
yses that appeared in the 1990s, as observers sought to understand the origins, 
course, and consequences of the annus mirabilis. Some of these works focus on 
the end of communism in individual countries. Some seek to explain the larger 
forces at work in the region that set off the domino-like collapse of old regimes 
and the birth of the new. Some pay more attention to Gorbachev and his role in 
undermining the stability of the region and the will of communist elites to main-
tain their antiquated political and economic systems intact. Others emphasize the 
dynamics of the international system and how they encouraged (or, in some 
cases, discouraged) the changes that swept over Eastern and East Central Europe 
in that year. In this connection, numerous studies focus on the superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and their influence on the events of 1989 and 
the recasting of the late Cold War world as a result.
All of the work on the superpower context of 1989 builds on the first-hand 
memoirs of participants in the events. On the American side, the memoirs of 
George Herbert Walker Bush and Brent Scowcroft, of James Baker III, and of 
Robert Gates present a more or less official take on the contribution of Washing-
ton to the peaceful outcome of the East European revolutions.2 Particularly useful 
in understanding the thoughts and actions of American statesmen during this 
critical period are the memoirs/analyses of Robert Hutchings, who served in the 
1 I owe a special debt of gratitude to my research assistant, Valentin Bolotnyy, for his excellent 
work on this project. I would also like to thank Prof. Thomas W. Simons, Jr., for his helpful 
comments on the original draft.
 For the East European revolutions, see Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Col-
lapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Timothy 
Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: the Revolution of ’89 witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, 
and Prague (New York: Vintage, 1993).
2 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998); 
James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New 
York: GP Putnam’s Sons, 1995); Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996). For a critical assessment of the first months, especially, of Bush administration 
policy from the perspective of the previous administration of Ronald Reagan, see George Shultz, 
Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993).
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National Security Council, and Jack Matlock, US ambassador to Moscow.3 Con-
doleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow, both of whom were in the White House at the 
time, were able to use classified documents to construct the story of the fall of 
the Wall and the unification of Germany in a more scholarly fashion.4
Especially since the Soviet Union collapsed soon after the 1989 events, Sovi-
et officials were no less anxious than American ones to put their understanding 
of the events of 1989 in print, starting with Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard She-
vardnadze.5 Soviet policymaking in this period was confined to a small circle of 
advisors around Gorbachev, and their memoirs and diaries provide unusual insight 
into Moscow’s understanding of what was taking place in Eastern Europe. Cer-
tainly, the most impressive and revealing are Anatolii Chernyaev’s diaries, 
Sovmestnyi iskhod, which also appeared in abbreviated form in English.6 Many 
of Gorbachev’s advisors subsequently also gave long interviews and participated 
in conferences on 1989, where their interpretations of events were recorded and, 
in some cases, later published.7
The memoirs of Soviet and American leaders are complimented by those of 
Europeans who both participated in and observed the events of 1989 from the 
perspective of their own countries’ interests. Particularly impressive in this con-
3 Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account 
of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1997); Jack Matlock, 
Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Fall of the Soviet Empire 
(New York: Random House, 1995).
4 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
5 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996). See also Mikhail Gorbachev and 
Zdenek Mlynar, Conversations with Gorbachev: on Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the 
Crossroads of Socialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Eduard Shevardnadze, 
The Future Belongs to Freedom (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
6 A. Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod: Dnevnik duvkh epokh 1972–1991 goda (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 
2008). For briefer English language memoirs, see Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gor-
bachev (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000). Among others in English, 
see, for example, Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Wit-
nessed by His Chief of Staff (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with 
Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park: Pennsylvania 
University Press, 1997); Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End 
of the Cold War (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).  For notes on Politburo meetings, see A. Chernyaev, A. 
Veber, and V. Medvedev, eds., V Politbyuro TsK KPSS, 1985–91 (Moscow: Alpina, 2006).
7 See, especially, Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpiec-
es of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe 1989 (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2010). Similarly, the National Security Archive’s “End of the Cold War Col-
lection” holds numerous documents on the superpowers’ role in 1989. My thanks to Svetlana 
Savranskaya for sending me draft copies of these works and allowing me to cite them in the orig-
inal paper. See also the Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter HIA), Hoover Institution-Gor-
bachev Foundation Collection (hereafter HIGFC), for a series of interviews with prominent 
Soviet and American officials about this period. The archives of the Gorbachev Foundation in 
Moscow hold many similar documents.
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nection are the memoirs of Helmut Kohl and the diaries of his chief advisor, Horst 
Teltschik.8  The views of Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand are also 
important to understanding the international politics of the period.9
There is surprisingly no shortage of available archival material on 1989. Part 
of the reason is that the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union was put on 
trial by the Yeltsin government and its archives were seized and placed in the 
hands of the Russian State Archives Administration. As a result, Central Com-
mittee and Politburo materials from 1989 are readily accessible for research and 
even available in published form.10 The Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow and 
the Hoover Institution at Stanford University hold documents from and memoirs 
of the period that were in the personal hands of Gorbachev’s team of advisors. 
Some historians have successfully used East European archives to reconstruct 
great-power motives and actions during the crisis year of 1989.11 The East German 
archives are particularly useful for this purpose, since the East German state was 
dissolved as was the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), leaving their archives 
fully available for research.12 While Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Romanian, and 
Bulgarian successor states still protect some archives of the period, there is no 
GDR successor state to protect its former holdings. Its archives, including those 
of the SED and of the State Security Service (the Staatssicherheitsdienst, the 
Stasi), can be thought of as stored in a butcher shop, where various body parts 
are hung out for display and can be investigated pretty much at will. Of course, 
much was destroyed in the last months of the GDR, between the demonstrations 
8 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005); Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: 
Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991).
9 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993); David Bell, 
Francois Mitterrand (Cambridge: Polity 2005); Frederic Bozo, “Mitterrand’s France, the End 
of the Cold War, and German Unification: A Reappraisal,” Cold War History 7, no. 4 (2007): 
455–78, 457–59; John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher (London: Pimlico, 2004).
10 Interesting materials on 1989 are available on microfilm in fond 89 in the Hoover Institution Ar-
chives, as well as in other major repositories in the United States. Similarly, Central Committee 
materials are also available at Hoover in microfiche: “Plenumy Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kom-
munisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941–1990. Iz fonda Rossiiskogo Gosudarstvennogo 
Arkhiva Noveishei Istorii.” Politburo materials can be found in Chernyaev, Veber, Medvedev, 
eds., V Politbyuro.
11 See especially Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercus-
sions within the Soviet Union (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 
178–256. On Poland, see Gregory F. Domber, “Rumblings in Eastern Europe: Western Pressure 
on Poland’s Moves Towards Democratic Transformation,” in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, 
N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., Europe and the End of the Cold War (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008), 58–61.
12 For fruitful use of the East German archives, see Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to 
Create a Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), and Hans-Her-
mann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer: die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates, 2nd ed. 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999). See also Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland: 
Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung (Munich: Beck, 2009).
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of October 1989 and the election of a non-communist government in March 1990. 
Apparently, even Vladimir Putin, then a KGB operative in the GDR, was so hard 
at work burning documents in Dresden that his furnace broke down.13
Documentary material is also available on the policies of the US government 
in 1989, though with many restrictions. The National Security Archive in Wash-
ington, D.C. has done yeoman’s work in submitting Freedom of Information Act 
petitions to declassify US materials from 1989, in particular those documents 
used by Rice and Zelikow in the study mentioned above.14
Many scholarly studies touch on the problems of the superpower relationship 
and the revolutions of 1989 that are broached in this chapter. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive is Melvyn Leffler’s For the Soul of Mankind.15 Mary Elise Sarotte 
has written an intriguing account of the international dynamics behind the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany.16 There are a number of im-
portant scholarly books that tell the story of the fall of the Wall and the end of 
communism in Eastern Europe, including several interesting journalistic studies.17 
Several worthwhile collections of articles have appeared from conferences mark-
ing the twentieth anniversary of the fall of communist rule in Eastern Europe.18 
Focusing more on Gorbachev and his policies that led to the breakup of the So-
viet empire in Eastern Europe are Vladislav Zubok’s A Failed Empire, Hannes 
Adomeit’s Imperial Overstretch, and Archie Brown’s Seven Years that Changed 
the World.19 Stephen Kotkin and Jan Tomasz Gross have published a provocative 
13 Sarotte, 1989, 93.
14 NSA, George Washington University. The holdings include important CIA reports, Moscow 
summit files, ambassadorial cables, a “Solidarity” collection, and other things. See also the ref-
erences in footnote 8 above.
15 Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
16 Sarotte, 1989. See also Alexander von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutschlands: Ein weltpolitisches 
Machtspiel, 2nd ed. (Bonn: Links, 2003).
17 See György Dalos, Der Vorhang geht auf: Das Ende der Diktaturen in Osteuropa (Munich: Beck, 
2009); Michael Meyer, The Year that Changed the World: The Untold Story Behind the Fall of the 
Berlin Wall (New York: Scribner, 2009); Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet 
Empire (New York: Pantheon, 2009). I want to thank Timothy Garton Ash for referring me to these 
and other recent books. They are included in an insightful review essay by him about the literature 
on the revolutions of that year: “1989!” The New York Review of Books 56, no. 17 (2009).
18 See, in particular, Jeffrey Engel, ed., The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 
1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Olaf Njolstad, ed., The Last Decade of 
the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation (London: Frank Cass, 2004). 
See also the special issue John Connelly and Amir Weiner, eds. “Revisiting 1989,” Contempo-
rary European History 18, no. 3 (2009).
19 Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Over-
stretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998); Ar-
chie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
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study of 1989 that focuses on the weaknesses of Gorbachev and the communist 
elites in the East.20 Using a different tack, Mark Kramer has published a series of 
articles that emphasize the ways in which these elites were undermined by Gor-
bachev’s actions, as well as his policies.21 The secondary literature is remarkably 
strong, in part because the singular importance of the fall of communism to the 
international system makes its analysis central to understanding the past and fu-
ture of world politics.22
The basic argument of this paper is that the superpowers, the United States 
and the Soviet Union, were further behind the eight ball in 1989—the trajectory 
of events and their accurate analysis—and thus their potential influence on these 
events, than the scholarly literature and especially the memoirs lead us to believe. 
Both Moscow and Washington were attached to the post-World War II Cold War 
order, which had guaranteed their primacy in international affairs. The rapid 
changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 challenged their image of themselves and of 
their relationship with each other. The corollary of this argument is that the East 
Europeans were the primary initiators of the revolutions of 1989, both in the 
failures of their communist leaderships and the initiatives of civil society (and 
the crowds of demonstrators), while the superpowers tended to react to events 
rather than to lead them.23
I use the term “superpowers” here in both an ironic and heuristic way: ironic 
because the supposed freedom of action and ability to exert power at will that is 
inherent in the concept of a superpower was almost completely lacking on both 
the American and Soviet sides; heuristic because this very condition of helpless-
ness in face of the force of events is instructive in helping us understand what it 
really meant to be a superpower in the late Cold War world. It is certainly true 
that until the very end of the Cold War the Soviet Union and the United States 
were capable of destroying each other and a good part of the world, not to men-
tion Europe, in a full-scale military confrontation. But, at the same time, the 
superpowers were hamstrung by the East European crisis of 1989, in part unable, 
and in part unwilling to interfere in events beyond their control.
20 Stephen Kotkin, with a contribution from Jan T. Gross, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion 
of the Communist Establishment (New York: Random House, 2009).
21 Kramer, “The Collapse (Part 1),” 178–256; (Part 2), Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 4 
(Fall 2004): 3–64; (Part 3), ibid. 7, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 3–96. On this issue, see also Jacques 
Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997).
22 Saki Ruth Dockrill, The End of the Cold War Era: The Transformation of the Global Security 
Order (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005).
23 See Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down and Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: 
The Revolution of ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1990). For similar arguments focusing on the East Europeans, cf. Padraic Kenney, 
A Carnival of Revolutions: Central Europe in 1989 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002).
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In making this argument, it is important to note that there is plenty of evidence 
to support a different kind of picture of 1989, one that grants more foresight, un-
derstanding, and wisdom to both the Kremlin and the White House. Robert Hutch-
ings and Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow, for example, have written well-doc-
umented and convincing studies of American policy that underline its careful 
formulation and well-considered execution.24 In excellent studies of Gorbachev’s 
policies toward Eastern Europe, both Jacques Levesque and Mark Kramer empha-
size a history of deep and ongoing Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe that was 
highly influential and consequential in the events of 1989.25 Despite these con-
vincing renditions of events, there is much in the documents that lead one to dif-
ferent conclusions; the purpose of this paper is to explore some of that evidence.
Twenty years after the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe is an excellent junc-
ture to return to the annus mirabilis and to review the events of that year through 
the perspective of the documents and memoirs that have been made available 
since. Paradoxically, the sources for working on the superpowers and 1989 in 
Eastern Europe are much fuller and more detailed than those for working on 
similar questions regarding 1949, or, for that matter, 1939, certainly from the 
Soviet and East European side.
The major problem for any historian trying to deal with the revolutions of 
1989 is not sources, but rather narrative. How does one reconstruct these events, 
place them in orderly chronological progression and appropriate context without 
taking away the surprises, contingencies, and anxiety built into the situation in 
Eastern Europe at the time? The post-hoc reconstruction of events tends to make 
matters too logical and too comprehensible. But this is not just a matter of sub-
sequent historical accounts of 1989. If one reads the documents from the period, 
even those produced by the best of reporters, like Jack Matlock, US ambassador 
in Moscow, one is left with a genuinely bifurcated understanding of the percep-
tions of the day.26 There is an awareness of profound upheaval in the spring and 
summer of 1989, but the bottom line of most analyses from the time was that the 
crisis would pass, or, more often, would take years to resolve, when in fact com-
munism would fall to everyone’s surprise within the year. This is true for both 
the American and Soviet sides of the superpower equation.
The Americans
Given their superpower status, one might have thought that the Soviet Union 
and the United States at least knew what was going on in Eastern Europe through 
24 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified; Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 8. Hutchings argues, for 
example, that it was a “myth” that “the world was caught unprepared for 1989.” 
25 Kramer, “The Collapse (Part 1),” Levesque, The Enigma.
26 See Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire.
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their superannuated intelligence agencies. However, this does not appear to have 
been the case, at least not consistently so. The CIA, for example, routinely over-
estimated the economic strength of the GDR.27 On the Soviet side, there was 
clearly shock and incredulity in the Kremlin as first Egon Krenz and then Hans 
Modrow brought to Moscow the real story of the completely hopeless condition 
of the East German economy.28 While there was indeed a dissenting CIA report 
from September 1989 that predicted an imminent challenge to the stability of the 
Soviet Union, the National Intelligence Assessment of October 1989, a consensus 
intelligence document from the same period, predicted much more optimistically 
that Gorbachev would survive the coming economic crisis of 1990–91 and en-
couraged the Bush administration to embrace Gorbachev wholeheartedly at Mal-
ta in December 1989.29 Even former Secretary of State George Shultz mentions 
with disdain the inability of the CIA to come up with a reliable analysis of Sovi-
et strengths and weaknesses during the final years of the Reagan administration. 
“I think,” he states, “the U.S. intelligence about the Soviet Union was very poor. 
It misjudged the size and strength of the Soviet economy.”30
There is no reason for academics to gloat; many of their predictions and pre-
scriptions were as behind the pace of events as those of government analysts.31 
Of course, the inability to understand what was at stake in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe was not just about a failure in intelligence; on both sides, politi-
cians heard and understood what they wanted to from their respective intelligence 
agencies.32 One of Moscow’s most experienced foreign policy analysts, Valentin 
Falin, states that he warned Gorbachev repeatedly that the countries of the War-
saw Pact alliance, including the GDR, were on the brink of collapse. Yet Gor-
bachev went about business as usual. “There was no reaction. Absolutely none.”33
27 Sarotte, 1989, 36.
28 Kohl, Erinnerungen, 961. Cf. Charles Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the 
End of the East German Regime (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 223–24, 235–36.
29 Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 522–23. See also: Director of Intelligence, 
CIA, “Moscow’s 1989 Agenda for US-Soviet Relations,” February 1989, in NSA, a substantial 
document that does not mention Eastern Europe at all, at least in those parts that were not ex-
cised.
30 Shultz, in HIA, HIGFC, Box 3, 33. Shultz also felt that he had been “misled, lied to, and cut out” 
by the intelligence community, whose analysis, he concluded “was distorted by strong views 
about policy.” Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 864.
31 In a landmark volume edited by Arnold L. Horelick, intended to assess the impact of Gorbachev 
on world affairs, there is nary a word about Eastern Europe or the German Question. Arnold L. 
Horelick, ed., U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
32 Douglas J. MacEachin defends the CIA’s record in CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The 
Record Versus the Charges: An Intelligence Monograph, (Washington: Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, 1996), 99–101. Elsewhere, he notes how difficult it was to present “pure” intelli-
gence to Congress, in particular, where political agendas trumped attempts at objectivity. See 
“Dialogue: The Musgrove Conference, May 1–3, 1998,” in Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., 
Masterpieces, 99–214, 110–11. 
33 Falin, in HIA, HIGFC, Box 1, 29.
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The inability of American leaders to grasp the extent of the crisis and the 
immediacy of its effects, while claiming leadership of a superpower, is reflected 
in Robert Gates’s From the Shadows. As a career intelligence analyst and former 
member of the Bush White House staff as Deputy National Security Advisor in 
1989–91, Gates writes, quite appropriately, that the US government, including 
the CIA, “had no idea” in the beginning of 1989 “that the tidal wave of history 
was about to break upon us.” “I know of no one in or out of government who 
predicted early in 1989 [at the beginning of the Bush administration] that before 
the next presidential election Eastern Europe would be free, Germany unified, in 
NATO, and the Soviet Union an artifact of history.”34 One might add that they 
didn’t even come close. Yet Gates also talks about how Condoleezza Rice, Rob-
ert Blackwill, and Robert Zoellick—all in the Bush National Security Council—
provided “intellectual and political imagination guiding administration policy 
toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.” This, combined with 
Bush’s experience and instincts, Baker’s political savvy and negotiating skill, Scowcroft’s stra-
tegic and historical perspective, and my [Gates’s] management of interagency process, would 
allow the United States to play a sure-footed leadership role in the liberation of Eastern Europe, 
the unification of Germany, and the final collapse of the Soviet Union.35 
But then the image of sure-footed leadership disappears again when he writes: 
“From 1989 to 1991, we shot the rapids of history, and without a life jacket.”36
As a result of this ambivalence and the inherent conservatism in the Bush ad-
ministration’s style and approach, Bush, Baker, Scowcroft and others developed a 
hands-off, wait-and-see attitude toward Eastern Europe. This very much reflected 
the policy of the Reagan White House, which showed, wrote Robert Blackwill, “no 
willingness [...] to challenge in any fundamental way the status quo in Eastern 
Europe.”37 In a May 1988 meeting between Secretary of State George Shultz and 
Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze during the Reagan-Gorbachev Mos-
cow summit, Shultz said all one needed to say about regional issues was: “Persian 
Gulf, Afghanistan, Central America, Ethiopia, Cambodia and South Africa.”38
Even more than the Reagan administration, the Bush White House team em-
phasized the central watchword of “stability,” though this could not be publicly 
underlined, since, as Baker made clear to Shevardnadze in private discussions, 
“being for stability sounded too much like being for the status quo.”39 At the same 
34 Gates, From the Shadows, 449.
35 Ibid., 460–61.
36 Ibid., 483.
37 Robert D. Blackwill, “European Influences and Constraints on U. S. Policy toward the Soviet 
Union,” in Arnold Horelick, ed., U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1986), 127–52, 144.
38 The White House: Memorandum of Conversation, “Second Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting,” 31 
May 1988, in NSA, 1988 Moscow Summit Files.
39 Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 140.
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time, the dramatic arms-control initiatives and bilateral approaches to Gorbachev 
of Reagan and Shultz—the supposed genuine, conservative anti-communists—
were abandoned by the Bush administration. Shultz worried for good reason that 
the “real momentum” in Soviet-US relations that President Reagan and he had 
handed over to the Bush administration might be “squandered.”40 As Robert 
Hutchings, former member of the Bush National Security Council points out, 
there was “no such thing as a ‘Reagan-Bush’ foreign policy. Before 1989 there 
was Reagan; afterwards there was Bush.” He adds that an entirely new team was 
brought into the White House, “representing foreign policy approaches funda-
mentally at odds with those of the Reagan administration.”41 Indeed, the new 
White House initiated a lengthy series of policy reviews, the “pause,” which 
frustrated Gorbachev, the European allies, and East European progressives. These 
policy reviews produced little more than “mush,” wrote Baker, leading one to 
doubt whether they simply reflected a lack of direction about how to proceed.42
During the winter and spring of 1989, the White House grew increasingly 
anxious about the growing criticism in the American press about its passivity and 
lack of engagement. Meanwhile, splits within the administration—with some, like 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney, urging caution about Gorbachev’s motives and others, like Secretary of 
State James Baker, ready to be somewhat more exploratory—also made the White 
House seem inert. “There are those who want to declare the Cold War ended,” 
stated Cheney at the time of his appointment. “But I believe caution is in order 
[...] We must guard against gambling our nation’s security on what may be a 
temporary aberration in the behavior of our foremost adversary.”43
In the end, it is not at all clear that the Bush White House took some initiatives 
in the great events of 1989 because they had come up with policy objectives that 
they sought to implement or because they were worried that their superpower 
status would be diminished by their perceived inactivity. They were particularly 
worried that Gorbachev had seized the initiative in Europe and appeared to gain 
strikingly in popularity at the expense of President Bush and the United States.44 
In the zero-sum game logic of superpower relations Gorbachev’s burgeoning 
popularity in Europe meant that the president simply had to become more active 
and engaged on the continent. When US secretary of state James Baker came to 
Moscow in mid-May 1989, the Soviets took this as a sign that the Bush admin-
istration was at long last ready to renew Ronald Reagan’s efforts to move “be-
yond containment.”45 But even then, the message was off-key, according to 
40 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1138.
41 Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 6.
42 Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 68. Scowcroft also expressed his “disappointment” with the stra-
tegic review process. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 53.
43 Cited in Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 425.
44 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 43.
45 Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod, 818.
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Gorbachev. The Americans expressed worries that a stronger Soviet Union might 
be more ready to project military power, “which would cause concern in the 
United States.”46
A number of younger scholars of 1989—Gregory F. Domber and Mary Elise 
Sarotte among them—suggest that the problem with the Bush administration was 
that it did not care all that much about the Poles or the East Germans and instead 
focused primarily on its attachment to NATO and the preservation of the status 
quo.47 Neither taking Gorbachev’s renunciation of the use of force in Eastern 
Europe at his word nor understanding the depth of Gorbachev’s need for West-
ern economic and political support, the Bush White House worried inordinately 
about a 1956 scenario that would see the Poles or Hungarians take any US en-
couragement as a sign to rise against their communist rulers and then expect 
American protection if the Soviets invaded. Even more they were concerned 
about a scenario like 1981 in Poland, where communist parties would crush 
internal opposition using military force and the United States would be left with 
no options except to protest. Therefore, in the first free election in the socialist 
bloc, scheduled in Poland for 4 June 1989, the American embassy in Warsaw 
worried excessively about a total victory for Solidarity. 
A more modest—but nevertheless solid—victory for Solidarity would enhance prospects for 
a stable process of democratization. Total victory or something close to it, including possible 
rejection of the national list, will threaten a sharp defensive reaction from the regime. The po-
sition of the leading party reformers would be endangered. Sharper, and even possibly military 
responses cannot be ruled out.48 
At the least, the embassy sensed that “the historical force of a vast and pow-
erful current is about to transform Poland’s topography forever.”
President Bush’s much-heralded and long-awaited visit to Poland in July 
1989 did not leave much of an impression of US determination to support de-
mocratization and the rule of law. Even worse, the president did not deliver on 
implicit promises of large-scale US economic aid in reward for the concrete 
measures of reform that had been undertaken. The Poles had high hopes for a 
grand Marshall Plan-style initiative on the part of the United States; both Soli-
darity chief Lech Wałęsa and party leader and premier Mieczysław Rakowski 
mentioned the figure of 10 billion dollars as critical to the survival of the coun-
try’s economy. But Bush was only able to commit to the Polish Sejm a paltry 
15 million dollars for environmental initiatives, while promising to ask Congress 
for an additional 100 million dollars for other purposes.49 There would be some 
debt relief and support for IMF loans. To add insult to injury for the Poles, the 
46 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 501.
47 Domber, “Rumblings in Eastern Europe,” 58–61; Sarotte, 1989.
48 Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, 2 June 1989, in NSA, “Solidarity,” Doc. 2, (E 23).
49 Even Scowcroft admits that the financial package was “embarrassingly meager.” Bush and 
Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 114.
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president’s chief of staff, John Sununu, former governor of New Hampshire, 
touched a raw nerve when he talked about the dangers of providing generous 
credits; otherwise the Poles would behave like “a kid in a candy shop.”50
President Bush spent more of his time in Warsaw with General Jaruzelski 
than expected, trying to convince him to run for president as a way to insure 
stability in the country. In fact, Jaruzelski later noted that he decided to run in 
good measure because he felt he had the backing of the Americans.51 The US 
embassy was deeply fearful that “if Jaruzelski is not elected president, there is 
a genuine danger of civil war ending, in most scenarios, with a reluctant but 
brutal Soviet intervention.”52 Like Gorbachev, Bush was not interested in “pok-
ing a stick into an anthill” in Eastern Europe.53 In Bush’s words, “We followed 
closely but quietly, we could accomplish more by saying less.”54 No wonder his 
reception from the Polish people was less triumphant than he and Ambassador 
Davis had hoped.55 His inadvertent statement in Poland that the Soviets might 
think about pulling their troops out of Poland led to such nervousness on Gor-
bachev’s part that the American president (and his ambassador in Moscow) 
immediately tried to reassure Gorbachev that he really didn’t mean it.56
Bush’s visit to Budapest had a similar character, though his welcome there 
was much more enthusiastic than in Poland. Once again, he demonstrated his 
clear preference for the reformed communists in power than the dissidents who 
had struggled to bring about change. At a reception at Ambassador Mark Palm-
er’s residence, he expressed concern when told by Imre Pozsgay that the com-
munists would surely lose power in a free election. Palmer, who had cultivated 
good relations with dissidents and reform communists, was frustrated, he said, 
by “the extreme caution” of the president and secretary of state.  “Bush and 
Baker kept cautioning these people [...] in my living room [... ] not to go too far 
too fast.” Bush instructed the dissidents that the communist government “was 
moving in the right direction. Your country is taking things one step at a time. 
Surely that is prudent.” When Bush was introduced to Janos Kis, the quintes-
sential Central European intellectual and dissident, who enjoyed enormous re-
spect throughout the region, he later told his aides: “These really aren’t the right 
50 Dalos, Der Vorhang geht auf, 57.
51 Ibid., 56.
52 Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, 23 June 1989, in NSA, “Solidarity,” Doc. 4, (E378).
53 Conversation Gorbachev with Kohl, 12 June 1989, in Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Mas-
terpieces, 463–67, 465.
54 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 135.
55 In a 27 June 1989 cable intended for the White House, entitled “Poland Looks to President 
Bush,” Ambassador Davis writes: “[The president’s visit] may even be one of those events 
where the convergence of historic trends, of national interests and of decisive individuals can 
bring about a moment in time which changes the direction of history.” NSA, “Solidarity,” Doc. 
5, (E384).
56 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 198–99.             
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guys to be running the place. At least not yet. They’re just not ready.” He much 
preferred the rule of the communists in the government.57
Bush’s reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 left a 
similar impression of disinterest and lack of understanding. The Bush and Scow-
croft memoirs protest, perhaps too much, that the administration’s restraint re-
garding the Wall, Poland, and Eastern Europe as a whole was a matter of being 
“prudent”—their favorite word.58 Bush had promised Gorbachev that he would 
not “dance on the wall,” and he most assuredly did not. James Baker notes that 
the President did not want it to appear that “we were sticking our thumb in their 
eye.”59 At the same time, it is not at all clear that he understood the important 
implications of the fall of the Wall for Germany and Europe. Perhaps more im-
portantly, there seemed to be no recognition in his remarks of the role of the 
East German citizenry in bringing about one of the biggest moments in the 
collapse of communism. In mid-October, as the Leipzig demonstrations attract-
ed the attention of the world, the Bush administration talked about “normaliza-
tion” and “reconciliation,” but not “unification” or “reunification,” which were 
deemed too incendiary.60 “What was wrong with a divided Germany,” noted 
Brent Scowcroft, “as long as the situation was stable?”61 What the Bush admin-
istration defended as prudence, its critics call a lack of imagination.
Helmut Kohl understood the dangers and promises of the East German situ-
ation perfectly. Once East German citizens began to pour out of the country to 
the West through Hungary in summer and crowded into West German embassies 
in Prague and Warsaw in September to get entry into the Federal Republic, Kohl 
quickly concluded that Bonn’s long-time policies of propping up the East Ger-
man regime in exchange for concessions on human rights and visitations had 
proven bankrupt. The East German regime was unwilling to engage in genuine 
reforms, and the Federal Republic could not afford to support a situation in which 
the huge number of GDR citizens who threatened to leave would end up in the 
FRG. With the demonstrations in Leipzig in the early fall and the breaching of 
the Wall in November, Kohl began to move decisively toward unification.
Kohl readily acknowledges his friendship for and the backing of George H. 
W. Bush during the crisis. In his memoirs, he repeatedly gives credit to Bush for 
supporting him and his policies, particularly in light of the furious opposition to 
German developments by British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, the elusive 
57 Sebestyen, Revolution 1989, 304–5.
58 See for example, Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 40, 55. Baker is critical of Amer-
ican ambassador Vernon Walters’s forthright approach to unification as undermining the White 
House’s efforts for a “prudent evolution.” Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 165. Hutchings 
writes that “the very prudence” with which the president made his policies “cause many to miss 
just how ambitious the central vision was.” Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 38.
59 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 164.
60 Ibid., 162–63.
61 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 188–89.
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reticence of French president François Mitterrand, and the last-minute attempts 
by Gorbachev, especially in the winter of 1989, to put a full stop to Kohl’s 
plans.62 Melvyn Leffler writes that “their [Kohl’s and Bush’s] friendship grew 
as they labored to transform the landscape of Europe.”63 It is also true, as Tim-
othy Garton Ash points out, that the Germans needed the Americans, with Bush 
in the lead, to broker the “specific guarantees about united Germany’s military 
and security position which enable Gorbachev to accept NATO membership.”64 
Still, the leadership on the German Question during this period is unambiguous: 
Kohl managed the unification of Germany.
On the question of who was leading whom as a consequence of the fall of 
the Wall, there are telling passages in the Bush and Scowcroft memoirs com-
plaining about the fact the Kohl did not check out his famous “Ten Points” of 
28 November 1989 with the White House before actually presenting them to the 
Bundestag.65 (Kohl also did not pass them by his coalition partner, Foreign Min-
ister Hans Dietrich Genscher.) Kohl claims in his memoirs that he did indeed 
alert the president to what he was doing. He writes: 
I informed Bush of my intention to summarize the ideas of the West German government about 
the German Question in a kind of catalog [Katalog]. The American president assured me once 
again that the United States supported the demand of the Germans for self-determination and 
unity.66 
Kohl notes that he decided not to share the Ten Points with his allies (or 
coalition partners) because inevitably the impact of the document would get 
watered down with their input. The allies would all receive it from their ambas-
sadors in Bonn the morning of the presentation to the Bundestag, with one ex-
ception: “The American president, whom I had already earlier notified of the 
initiative, would receive the Ten Points personally.”67  However, the Germans 
intentionally sent the White House the Ten Points in the German original. By 
the time they could translate the document, Horst Teltschik noted in a recent 
talk, it would be too late for any potential intervention.68 “We achieved our goal,” 
he wrote in his diary for 29 November 1989: “the Bundeskanzler had taken over 
the opinion leadership [Meinungsführerschaft] of the German Question.”69
62 Kohl, Erinnerungen, 871–72.
63 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 439.
64 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1993), 349.
65 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 194–95. At least in his memoirs, Scowcroft express-
es more annoyance with Kohl’s move than does Bush.
66 Kohl, Erinnerungen, 989.
67 Ibid., 996.
68 Horst Teltschik, Plenary Session, Eyewitnesses, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Conference 
“The Revolutions of 1989,” 2 October 2009.
69 Teltschik, 329 Tage, 54–58.
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The Soviets
Bush’s restraint about Eastern Europe and the GDR and the changes going 
on there reflected those of Gorbachev, though the latter was clearly more agitat-
ed by and more garrulous regarding the remarkable events that were capturing 
the world’s attention. Gorbachev’s position and that of the Soviet Union was 
also more threatened by these changes than were Bush and the Americans, 
though it is not certain that he understood that fact. Almost from the very be-
ginning, Gorbachev’s attitude about the Soviets’ empire in Eastern Europe was 
complicated and churlish. Often one gets the feeling from the internal conver-
sations about developments in the region that he simply didn’t want to hear about 
them. To start with, “new thinking” in foreign policy was mostly about arms 
control, relations with the United States, and, increasingly over time, relations 
with Europe, meaning Western Europe. His ideas about a “Common European 
Home” were meant to appeal to the West Europeans in particular. Even in his 
conversations with the Americans and Europeans, the East Europeans were 
barely mentioned.70
Gorbachev wanted the East European communists to follow his lead, engage 
in their own form of perestroika, and gain the allegiance of their societies them-
selves. The respective communist parties and the peoples of the “fraternal” 
countries had the right and duty to determine their own “political course” and 
“model of development.”71 Still, sometimes, he passed on more than gentle hints 
to his East European “friends” to abandon their old ways. Gorbachev worried 
that the presence of Soviet troops in parts of Eastern Europe might provoke 
anti-Soviet attacks of one sort or another which might force action on his part.72 
But under no circumstances should the East European communist parties expect 
the Soviet Union to intervene on their behalf against their own people. Their job 
was to get their own houses in order by engaging in extensive reforms. Eventu-
ally, in Gorbachev’s words, “a synthesis of democracy and socialism” would 
take place.73 But he was not sanguine about the willingness of the East Europe-
an party bosses to follow his lead: “at first they did not take our intentions se-
riously but treated them with polite curiosity and even condescending irony.” 
Once they realized he was indeed serious, Gorbachev writes, “they began to 
make clear their refusal to accept perestroika, especially when it came to democ-
ratization and glasnost.”74
70 See Palazchenko, in HIA, HIGFC, Box 2, 23.
71 Vadim Medvedev, as cited in Svetlana Savranskaya, “In the Name of Europe: Soviet Withdrawal 
from Eastern Europe,” in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, 
eds., Europe and the End of the Cold War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 36–48, 38.
72 Kramer, “The Collapse (Part 1),” 189–92.
73 Gorbachev and Mlynar, Conversations with Gorbachev, 84.
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Gorbachev was pleased with the fact that Jaruzelski had taken decisive lead-
ership in the matter of reform in Poland, but he was annoyed with the rest of the 
East European party bosses.75 In a 29 January 1987 Politburo plenum, Gorbachev 
stated:
We notice the distancing from us of Honecker, Kadar, and Zhivkov. With Honecker we have 
differences of views [...] Our self-administration he equates with the Yugoslavs [...] He is dissat-
isfied with how we have proceeded with Sakharov [the lifting of his banishment in December 
1986]. We have to stick firmly to the principle: every ruling communist party must answer 
for that which goes on in their country. Kadar and Honecker don’t believe that the process [of 
perestroika] can no longer be reversed. Husák spreads compliments but comes out against ev-
erything new at home. Zhivkov talks about campaignism [kampaneishchine]: Your Khrushchev 
with his reforms started the 1956 [uprising] in Hungary. And now, supposedly, Gorbachev is 
destabilizing the socialist community.76
During his visit to Prague in April 1987, Gorbachev was thrilled as always by 
the wildly enthusiastic reception of the crowds, who looked to him as their savior. 
“The atmosphere reminded me of May 1945,” he told his Politburo comrades on 
16 April: “They shouted at me: ‘stay here for just one year.’” But he also noted 
grimly that the Czechs showed no enthusiasm at all for their communist leader, 
Gustáv Husák. At the end of the visit, he told Husák: “We will not carry out our 
policy of perestroika at your cost. But you should not count on living at our 
cost.”77 By December, Husák was out of office.
Despite his lack of enthusiasm for most of the East European leaders, Gor-
bachev consistently refused to become involved their internal politics. He was 
utterly disdainful of Romanian communist leader, Nicolae Ceauşescu, but chose 
silence when Romanian dissident communists asked for his support in removing 
the Romanian dictator. “We will not react [to this request],” Gorbachev told the 
Soviet ambassador, who had conveyed the appeal. “We do not mix into their 
affairs.”78 Contrary to the worries of the US government, Gorbachev took a benign 
view of the revolutionary changes that enveloped Poland in the summer of 1989. 
Ambassador Jack Matlock correctly assessed Moscow’s attitude toward the Pol-
ish events. They would have liked the communist party to remain a major player 
in Polish politics, Matlock wrote. 
But in the final analysis, although Solidarity may be a bitter pill to swallow, our best guess is that 
the Soviets will do so, if it comes to that, after much gagging and gulping. Their essential inter-
ests in Poland will be satisfied by any regime, Solidarity-led or not, that can promote domestic 
stability and avoid anti-Soviet outbursts.79 
75 Gorbachev writes: “He [Jaruzelski] and I had formed a very close and, I would say, amicable 
relationship.” Gorbachev, Memoirs, 485.
76 Chernyaev, Veber, Medvedev, eds., V Politbyuro, 141. 
77 Ibid., 166.
78 Medvedev, in HIA, HIGFC, Box 2, 35.
79 NSA, “Solidarity.”
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Mark Kramer concludes that the Soviets were more activist than that: “Rath-
er than trying to save the PZPR’s [the Polish party’s] ‘leading role’ in Polish 
society, the Soviet Union actively facilitated the demise of Communist rule in 
Poland.”80
During his fateful visit to East Berlin on 6–7 October for the celebration of 
the fortieth anniversary of the birth of the East German state, which he had tried 
very hard to avoid attending, Gorbachev again felt moved by the crowds. As they 
filed past him, even with Honecker at his side they cried out “Gorbachev, you 
are our hope!” “Perestroika! Gorbachev! Help us!” and “Gorby, Gorby!”81 
Honecker was a hopeless case, Gorbachev was convinced, but he would not 
himself intervene to remove him from his position. Still, he understood, as Egon 
Krenz had told Falin in Berlin, that if the SED did not remove “Erich,” “the 
matter would quickly come to a storming of the Wall.”82 After Gorbachev’s signals 
in Berlin that change would not be unwelcome in Moscow and some 70,000 
people engaged in the first of a series of huge demonstrations in Leipzig on 9 
October, Krenz and his allies in the SED leadership removed Honecker from 
power.83
Mirroring his superpower rivals in Washington, who focused on Soviet-Amer-
ican relations and arms control, Gorbachev did not seem to know or care much 
about what happened in the countries of Eastern Europe as long as they remained 
in the Warsaw Pact and NATO was confined to Western Europe. His closest 
confidant on policy matters, Anatolii Chernyaev, writes that: “He [Gorbachev] 
simply poorly understood the national situation in the allied states. Our policy 
towards them [...] was completely un-thought through. [...] We did not have a 
policy.”84
The Central Committee plenum transcripts for 1989 and 1990, not to mention 
the diaries and available Soviet foreign ministry materials from that period, bare-
ly mention Eastern Europe and the events that were dramatically transforming 
the region. Instead, the Soviet party leaders, Gorbachev at their head, seemed 
fully occupied with the economy, the fate of perestroika, keeping control of do-
mestic political opponents, and, eventually, the upheaval in the Caucasus and 
Baltic republics. Chernyaev notes that no more than 5–6 percent of their discus-
sions were about foreign policy, and these were dominated primarily by arms 
control and ending the Cold War, not Eastern Europe.85 Gorbachev’s chief of staff, 
80 Kramer, “The Collapse (Part 1),” 200.
81 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 524.
82 Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod, 806.
83 See A. James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Unification (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press), 197.
84 Chernyaev, in HIA, HIGFC, Box 1, 65–66.
85 Chernyaev in Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 146. “Foreign policy, even the 
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Valerii Boldin, goes so far as to claim that: “The major changes in the countries 
of the former Socialist commonwealth were never discussed in any forums what-
soever, large or small.”86 Meanwhile, in the Foreign Ministry, those officials who 
were in charge of Eastern Europe and the “fraternal” socialist countries were 
considered less interesting and less successful than the experts on US and West 
European affairs.87 Even the foreign minister himself was preoccupied with the 
fate of perestroika. “Shevardnadze’s role and attention,” wrote James Baker, in 
reference to a November 1989 Paris meeting with the Soviet foreign minister, 
“are being diverted increasingly to domestic issues.”88
Initially, Gorbachev felt that the changes taking place in Eastern Europe could 
only help the Soviet cause by building internal stability and political consensus 
in these countries.  He also did not think that Soviet security and internal stabil-
ity would be affected by changes in Eastern Europe. He and his advisors repeat-
edly noted in internal conversations that the Soviet Union had been responsible 
in the late 1940s for the transfer of an unworkable Stalinist system to Eastern 
Europe. Now was the time for that system to be replaced. But even as Hungary, 
Poland, and eventually the GDR were hit by political crises, Gorbachev was 
neither willing to intervene by force nor to guide the course of events. The use 
of force would sink perestroika and encourage the conservatives at home, while 
bringing an end to good relations with the West. In his important December 1988 
speech at the United Nations, Gorbachev assured the world that the Soviet Union 
would not interfere with the “radical and revolutionary changes that are taking 
place” and “that force and the threat of force can no longer be, and should not 
be instruments of foreign policy.”89
Even guidance implied responsibility, and he was not willing to take it on. 
Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl exchanged appropriate folk sayings in German and 
Russian for the delicate situation in Hungary. Kohl stated, “Let the church remain 
in the village [...] [meaning] the Hungarians should decide themselves what they 
want.” Gorbachev responded, “We have a similar proverb: do not go to another 
monastery with your own charter.”90 In early October 1989 Chernyaev noted in 
his diary: “In a word, as a world phenomenon, socialism is undergoing a complete 
dismantling. [...] And probably, this is inevitable and good.”91 By this point, Gor-
bachev himself says that he had become more of a social democrat than a Soviet 
86 Boldin, Ten Years, 144.
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89 Gorbachev’s Speech to the UN, 7 December 1988, CNN Cold War Series: Historical Docu-
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socialist of the old stripe.92 Some scholars have suggested that Gorbachev had 
begun to see the world through the eyes of European statesmen and political 
leaders.93
As superpower leaders, Bush repeatedly assured Gorbachev that he would not 
take advantage of the upheavals that were taking place in Eastern Europe one 
after the other, and Gorbachev assured Bush that he would not intervene militar-
ily or politically, and would allow “history” to take its course. Both appreciated 
the other’s demonstrations of restraint. Nevertheless, there were still powerful 
figures on both sides who continued to suspect the motivations of the other. No 
matter how often the end of the Cold War was pronounced by politicians and 
pundits in both countries, both sides sometimes continued to operate as if they 
were the superpowers of old locked in deadly competition. The KGB and CIA 
produced reports accusing the other, respectively, of trying to take advantage of 
the new situation for the purpose of undermining the other. As a KGB document 
from August 1989 put it: 
In the conditions of the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society, the spread of democracy and 
glasnost, the special services of the capitalist countries and the foreign, anti-Soviet centers tied 
with them [...] are transforming their underground activity against the USSR on a new strategic 
and tactical platform
with the goal of “forcibly overthrowing Soviet power.”94 Adam Ulam wrote 
nearly forty years ago: “For some time now, the United States and Russia have been 
struggling not so much against each other as against phantoms, their own fears of 
what each might become unless it scored points over the other or barred success to 
the other side.”95 This was as true of 1989 as it was earlier in the Cold War.
Gorbachev’s German gambit at the end of 1989, the Soviet idea of exchanging 
German unification for this country’s neutralization and demilitarization that 
surfaced periodically in the early postwar history of Soviet-German relations, 
worried the White House and encouraged the president to reinvigorate his close 
relationship with Kohl and Bonn. But Gorbachev had more important things on 
his mind. Already in 1986, he had told his advisors that the Federal Republic was 
key to the success of perestroika. As its major trading partner in the West and the 
most likely potential source of foreign capital, investment, and loans, the Soviet 
Union desperately needed a good relationship with Bonn. By the time the German 
unification issue became serious during the winter of 1989–90, it had become 
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93 James J. Sheehan, “The Transformation of Europe and the End of the Cold War,” in Jeffrey A. 
Engel, ed., The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 36–68. 
94 “O sozdanii v KGB SSSR Upravleniya po zashchite sovetskogo konstitutsionnovo stroya,” 
4 August 1989, in HIA, fond 89, op. 18, d. 127, l. 1.




increasingly clear that Gorbachev was the ruler of an extremely weak, if not 
failed, state. He urgently needed help. He reached out to the West Germans, 
hopeful that a close relationship with them would bring important political and, 
especially, economic gains. During Gorbachev’s discussions with Kohl in Bonn 
in June 1989, the German Chancellor made no bones about the potential econom-
ic benefits of Soviet concessions on the German Question. Closer relations were 
impossible “as long as the division of Germany stands between us. It is the de-
cisive impediment in our relationship.”96
In the fall of 1989, there was considerable opposition in the ranks of Gor-
bachev’s advisors, and especially among the “Germanisty” in the Foreign Minis-
try and Central Committee, to concessions on the German Question. Although 
some thought that the unification of Germany was inevitable and felt some 
sympathy for the Germans’ frustrations with the division of their country, most 
could not admit to themselves that they were “losing Germany,” and, as a result 
could not muster serious policy alternatives for Gorbachev, even if he would have 
entertained them.97 Others, like Falin, did not oppose unification of Germany on 
principle, but were concerned that “we should ‘sell’ it at a higher price.”98 Gor-
bachev had been able to confine the actual decision-making process to such a 
narrow group of insiders that even the Politburo did not raise objections to the 
possibility of unification.99 When the Politburo met on 9 November, the day of 
the breaching of the Wall, there was no discussion about the situation in Germa-
ny. Instead Gorbachev and the Soviet leaders were focused on the upheaval in 
the Baltic republics.100 Even the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin, Vyacheslav 
Kochemasov, and the local Soviet intelligence station were poorly informed about 
the events surrounding the fall of the Wall.101
In the wake of the fall of the Wall, the opposition of Mitterrand and especial-
ly of Thatcher to unification was more annoying for Kohl than helpful to Gor-
bachev. “Twice we have defeated the Germans! And now they are here again!” 
the “Iron Lady” railed at the Strasbourg meeting of the European Community in 
December 1989.102 Gorbachev had the uncomfortable feeling that Thatcher and 
Mitterrand (and even the Americans) were using him as way to hold up the pro-
cess of unification and serve as a lightning rod for Bonn’s ire. As he stated in a 
3 November session of the Politburo: “The West doesn’t want the unity of Ger-
96 Kohl, Erinnerungen, 888–89.
97 Adamishin, in HIA, HIGFC, Box 1, 23. See also Chernyaev, Box 1, 54.
98 Falin, in HIA, HIGFC, Box 1, 29.
99 G. M. Kornienko, in HIA, HIGFC, Box 2, 34. See also Chernyaev, Box 1, 60–61.
100 William Taubman and Svetlana Savranskaya, “If a Wall Fell in Berlin and Moscow Hardly 
Noticed, Would it Still Make a Noise?” in Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., Fall of the Berlin Wall: The 
Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 69–95, 70.
101 Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Eu-
rope (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 107.
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many, but wants us to deal with it, as a way to bring us into conflict with the 
FRG, as a way to prevent a deal between the USSR and Germany.”103 At the same 
time, he later admitted, he had no idea at the time what challenges the German 
Question would pose to Soviet foreign policy.104
As a result, by the beginning of 1990, despite intense opposition internally 
and from Mitterrand and especially Thatcher abroad, Gorbachev went so far to 
endorse the inevitability of German unification, something than even the wildest 
optimists in the White House about the German Question could not have predict-
ed. Baker and Kohl laid out the conditions under which unification would take 
place. Neither Shevardnadze nor Gorbachev had much of an argument to make. 
Oleg Grinevskii, who took part in the February 1990 discussions in Moscow with 
James Baker, stated: “We had no position [...] no concrete line.” As a result, 
given the united German-US position, Gorbachev conceded on the question of 
whether the new and united Germany could retain its ties with NATO.105
Conclusions
While Thatcher and Mitterrand wanted Gorbachev to stop German unifica-
tion, Gorbachev wanted them (and Kohl) to restrain the Americans from “inter-
fering” in Eastern Europe, when that was pretty much the last thing on Wash-
ington’s mind. In fact, the White House was anxious to keep Gorbachev in 
power and to maintain the balance in Europe, both of which could be disrupted 
by any upheaval in Eastern Europe.106 Meanwhile, the Americans continued to 
worry that Gorbachev would take advantage of them by scoring points in Europe 
with arms control initiatives and tempting Kohl into a special relationship. Yet 
for both superpowers, the status quo was preferable to any changes, because—in 
some important senses—change challenged the position of the superpowers 
themselves.
The wait-and-see attitude of the superpowers toward Eastern Europe and the 
concomitant attachment of both to a static European reality that was changing 
more quickly and more dynamically than they themselves could absorb gave the 
East Europeans and the Germans the chance to shape their own destinies in 1989. 
Shevardnadze’s answer to the Hungarians when they decided in May 1989 to 
pull down the barriers to East German flight to the West was typical: “This is 
an affair that concerns Hungary, the GDR, and the FRG.”107 When Kohl queried 
Gorbachev about the same issue, the general secretary simply answered: “The 
103 Dalos, Der Vorhang geht auf, 139.
104 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 516.
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Hungarians are a good people.”108 The Polish communists could make a deal 
with Solidarity about sharing power at the round table discussions of spring 
1989, which was the first step toward the dismantling of communism in Poland, 
without Soviet interference. East German demonstrators in Leipzig could take 
to the streets with the confidence, if not assurance that Soviet troops would not 
interfere with their strivings for control of their own destiny. Helmut Kohl and 
his deputy Horst Teltschik could take advantage of the upheaval in East Germa-
ny and the fall of the Wall to drive the process of unification. Neither the Sovi-
ets nor the Americans would stop them. The self-induced paralysis of the super-
powers helped Germans in the GDR and the FRG bring an end to the postwar 
order in Germany. Valentin Falin could have been speaking for both the Kremlin 
and White House when he noted: “We did not control the events, but the events 
controlled us.”109
Of course, Gorbachev and his actions were critical to the outcome of the 
revolutions of 1989. His determination that his East European “friends” stand 
on their own feet and take responsibility for their own countries, without being 
able to count on Soviet backing or even instructions, accelerated the pace of 
change from 1985 onwards. The very example of perestroika also encouraged 
East European oppositionists to press forward their demands and took the sails 
of their communist opponents, who no longer had the backing of Moscow.110 
Gorbachev’s repeated renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine—never explicit, 
but clear enough for all to understand—took away a crucial psychological, as 
well as real, undergirding for the communist regimes of Eastern Europe.
But the Soviet general secretary seemed no more focused on the German 
Question than he was on the Polish, where he naively thought Jaruzelski could 
forge a political alliance with the opposition that would keep Poland in the War-
saw Pact and as a Soviet strategic ally for a long time to come. Gorbachev’s 
repeated response to the Poles, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, and the others 
was that their political development was their business. They needed to deal with 
their problems and their crises. This answer was particularly inappropriate for 
the GDR, where there were nearly a half million Soviet troops and their depen-
dents stationed around the country. So much of the Soviet self-image was 
wrapped up in the victory over Nazi Germany, symbolized by their military 
presence in the east. But, like so much else, Gorbachev simply did not have an 
answer to the German Question. Gorbachev did not have a German policy, and 
those who did, including the Germanists in the Foreign Ministry, and Valentin 
Falin, head of the Central Committee’s International Department, were routine-
ly shunted aside because of their “conservatism.” As a result, with some twists 
and turns, Gorbachev was pulled along by Kohl. And Kohl’s vision was based 
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on an instinctive understanding of the East German population, those who sought 
to leave, those who demonstrated, and those who simply wanted to be done with 
the socialist experiment forever.
There is good reason for the superpowers to have congratulated themselves 
about 1989, but the story is mostly about what they did not do rather than what 
they did. There are also serious questions about what they understood and what 
they didn’t. But in their fascination with each other and their doctrinaire views 
of their own superpower influence they did not interfere with the revolutions of 
1989, something that cannot be said of the European powers and the French 
Revolution, the Revolutions of 1848, or the Bolshevik Revolution. With the su-
perpowers sitting on their hands, everything worked out reasonably well.
Norman M. Naimark
e l l a  Z a d o r o Z h n y u K
THE USSR AND THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989–90: 
QUESTIONS OF CAUSALITY
This chapter represents an attempt to provide an answer to a two-part question. 
Did Soviet perestroika stir revolutionary tendencies in the nations of the “Eastern 
bloc” at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, and to what extent 
did the intensity of these tendencies lead to the upheavals that occurred in the 
USSR? How did the interaction between these two phenomena twenty years ago 
result in the profound changes that have taken place in the political map of Eu-
rope?
Before answering these questions, a frame of reference must be established. 
Perestroika as it is commonly understood began in the USSR in June and July of 
1988 on the occasion of the debate and approval of a resolution by the nineteenth 
party conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Perestroika ended 
with the breakup of the USSR in December of 1991. Within this period of histo-
ry the fundamental revolutionary events in the European nations of the “socialist 
commonwealth” took place. The year of 1989 was pivotal and represents the 
transitional stage within the cited dates. This timeframe, during which revolution-
ary changes were taking place in Eastern Europe, coincides precisely with the 
period when analogous upheavals were taking place in the Soviet Union. To 
borrow a metaphor, these could be seen, as it were, as a smaller doll in a larger 
set of nesting (matryoshka) dolls.
Looking back it is clear that just as the processes of perestroika drove the 
revolutionary changes in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, at the same 
time these changes had an influence on the character of the processes taking place 
in the birthplace of perestroika: it was a situation of mutual conditionality. Hence 
the entire process of transition that was transpiring over the vast distance from 
Berlin to Vladivostok can be considered one of cause and effect.1 
Thus, with the support of extant sources, the concept of cause and effect is 
essential for accurately determining the direction and fundamental nature of the 
factors involved in the revolutions referred to above in the nations of the “Eastern 
bloc” or in the “socialist commonwealth” (in Soviet parlance, part of the “inter-
national socialist system” to which, as is generally understood, also belonged 
countries in Asia and the Americas).
1 It should be noted that the Russian expression used here for cause and effect, or causality, is 
“reciprocity” (retsiproknost’), a term rarely applied in Russian historiography and almost never 
used in scholarly Russian historical texts.
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It is important to place the parameters of the causality in question into a his-
torical context. Although it may be difficult to posit a single universal, unambig-
uous description of these factors, one can reasonably assume that two elements 
held a key role: the removal of the monopoly of one party, and the transformation 
(both as a process and an end result) of governmental and state structures. The 
most radical of these took place in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslo-
vakia. 
An important push behind the upheavals in the socialist-communist European 
countries came with the resolution of the first congress of the people’s deputies 
of the USSR on 25 May 1989. While this congress largely represented a contin-
uation of the policies formulated at the aforementioned nineteenth party confer-
ence one year earlier, it was at this May congress that irrevocable reforms of the 
political system of the USSR were acknowledged as being inevitable. In the 
course of executing these reforms, institutional structures opposed to the status 
quo were formed, leading ultimately to the dismantling of the leadership of the 
USSR.
At about the same time—beginning in the spring of 1989—in the nations of 
the “socialist commonwealth,” internal opposition was forming with the aim of 
grasping significant power from the current governments: in Hungary within the 
governing party and in Poland in the form of external opposition. At the same 
time the oppositional forces that were forming in the USSR were being influenced 
by the similar efforts in its neighboring countries. What is more, some members 
of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—most notably its 
head Mikhail S. Gorbachev—agreed with these reform movements, although they 
were unaware of the potential consequences they might have. 
Clearly the countenance of these political reforms (with the frigid Kremlin 
winds rapidly subsiding) led to a further sharp intensification of the activities of 
the oppositional forces in the socialist nations of Europe. This is in turn evidence 
of the causality of the dynamics involved in the developing processes in all of 
the European nations of the “socialist commonwealth” as well as of the clear 
direction they were taking.
It is important to note that on 26 March 1989, the first round of elections for 
the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies took place (with voter participation 
around 90 percent). A second round was held on 14 May. These secret-ballot 
elections were in part competitive. Yet the CPSU intended to retain its power, 
reserving one third of the seats for the party and its societal organizations. It 
was planned to merge the posts of the chairpersons of the soviets at all levels 
with those of the respective party secretaries, under the condition of their being 
elected into the soviets. In many ways the Soviet elections influenced the orga-
nization of the elections in Poland, although there, hopes were much lower than 
among the party elites in the USSR that the elections would be able to save 
socialism. 
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In June of 1989, as a result of the round table talks that had begun in April, 
elections under new precepts took place in Poland and brought the victory of 
“Solidarity.” These elections can be seen as the starting point for a wave of fun-
damental transformations that were then to take place in the countries of the re-
gion, basically proceeding from north to south. While the forms these transfor-
mations assumed were different, there was no question about the direction they 
were taking.
In Hungary, from 22 March to 18 September rounds of talks between the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and a united opposition discussed various 
possibilities for reforming the state authority. In the end, the pro-Soviet powers 
resigned and on 23 October, the Hungarian People’s Republic was renamed the 
Republic of Hungary. The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party became the Hun-
garian Socialist Party, with a clearly delineated social democratic agenda. The 
elimination of the modifiers “workers’” and “people’s” was a bold step, and a 
significant segment of the population did not let this go by unnoticed. 
Similar processes were taking place in the parties and regimes in many other 
countries of the region. On 9 November the Berlin Wall was breached, and with 
its fall the power structures of the German Democratic Republic also collapsed. 
In less than a year, on 3 October 1990, the two Germanys were united. It should 
be noted that today the complex issue of the transformation of the GDR is no 
longer a research focal point, at least among Russian experts: The dominating 
postulate of the inevitability of the GDR’s reunion with the Federal Republic of 
Germany has obscured many issues and given rise to a number of contradictions. 
For instance, the claims at the time in the discussions about the German Question 
that there would be a transformation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO after German 
reunification have been insufficiently analyzed. 
A similar idea was put forward, in fact, by Václav Havel, speaking during 
talks with Gorbachev on 26 February 1990 in Moscow:  
It is imperative to eliminate the schism in Europe and embrace a new security plan that will 
replace the present mutually competing structures, even if it requires finding successors to the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO […] This is the only basis for dealing with the fate of the Warsaw 
Pact. The Warsaw Pact and NATO as military alliances shall become political affiliations and 
ultimately represent a single system of general European security. In a word it is necessary to 
finally call an end to the Second World War and eliminate the situation in which Europe became 
a powerful arsenal of modern weaponry. This would be a victory for peace, not a setback for the 
USA or the USSR.2
On 17 November 1989 the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia began with 
vigorous student demonstrations. Its course and the outcome have been illumi-
nated with all due comprehensiveness. The English historian Timothy Garton Ash 
has referred to the “Velvet Revolution” as a “peaceful, theatrical, negotiated re-
2 Quoted in Grigorii Sevostyanov, Revolyutsii 1989 goda v stranakh Tzentralnoi Evropy. Vzglad 
cherez desyatiletie (Мoscow: Nauka, 2001), 66.
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gime change in a small Central European state.” The term itself was introduced 
by Ash’s Western colleagues, only to have the term adopted by Václav Havel. 
The oppositional Slovak leaders use the similar term “gentle.”3 While the expres-
sion “Velvet Revolution” is today usually used to refer to the ten days of events 
in November 1989 in former Czechoslovakia, it is possible to use the term in a 
broader context to characterize the changes that occurred during 1989 in the other 
countries in the East European region that can be defined as Central Europe.4
In Bulgaria, the process of removing Todor Zhivkov from all his posts and 
eventually ousting him began in November of the same year at the plenum of the 
Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. On 18 November a 
one-hundred-thousand strong demonstration of the opposition took place in the 
center of Sofia. After this event, most of the pre-World War II political parties 
were reestablished.
On 22 December 1989 the insurgent populace in Romania toppled the regime 
of Nicolae Ceauşescu. A party belonging to the Front for National Liberation 
advanced to power and on 29 December, the Socialist Republic of Romania be-
came simply Romania. This however was not achieved without bloodshed. In 
accordance with the last proclamation of the leader of the National Liberation 
Front at the time, ex-communist Ion Iliescu, it was unavoidable “to institute an 
emergency revolutionary court to try the Ceauşescu spouses. And, in fact, as soon 
as the death sentence was executed on 25 December, the guns fell silent.”5 Ac-
cording to a statement by the United States, “they had no opposition to a military 
intervention on the part of the USSR to restore order in Romania” or to support 
3 Timothy Garton Ash, “Velvet Revolution: The Prospects,” New York Times Review of Books, no. 
19 (3 December 2009), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/dec/03/velvet-revolu-
tion-the-prospects/ (accessed 30 June 2013). 
4 Тhe term “Central Europe” derives from a historical geographical metaphor that is based on 
a geopolitical perception. It encompasses a range of nations stretching from the Baltic to the 
Adriatic Sea that share similar historical characteristics and a convergence of common per-
spectives. At the end of the last decade of the twentieth century, Central Europe emerged as a 
certain geopolitical formation distinct from the western European region and the states of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (the former USSR), i.e. Eastern Europe. Among its main 
characteristics, a new regional identity has gradually developed which presumes that there is “a 
consciousness of belonging to a recognized entity as well as a similarity of common goals that 
form the basis of this identity of peoples and governments.” “Problemy regional’noi identichno-
sti tsentral’noevropeiskikh stran (“Kruglyi stol”)” Slavyanovedenie 3 (1997): 3–27; Yurii Novo-
pashin, Tsentral’naia Evropa v poiskakh novoj regional’noj identichnosti (Мoscow: Institut 
slavyanovedenya, 2000), 140–62; E. G. Zadorozhnyuk, “Lyubov’yu ili zhelezom dostigaetsya 
edinenie obshchestva?” Vestnik Rossiiskoj Akademii nauk 63, no. 12 (1993): 1103–8; idem, Sot-
sial-demokratiya v Tsentral’noj Evrope (Мoscow: Akademiya, 2000); “Politicheskie protsessy v 
Tsentral’noi Evrope i stanovlenie novoi regional’noi identichnosti,” Rossiya i sovremennyi mir, 
no. 3 (2000): 104–24.
5 Vremya novostei, 22 December 2009; Chicago Tribune, 25 December 1989, http://articles.chi-
cagotribune.com/1989-12-25/news/8903200733_1_warsaw-pact-soviet-troops-nicolae-ceaus-
escu (accessed 10 July 2013).
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pro-democracy forces in their struggle against troops loyal to Ceauşescu. As for 
the USSR, it adhered to its principal doctrine of not interfering in the affairs of 
a socialist nation. 
Finally, beginning in the spring of 1990 communists suffered continuing loss-
es at the polls in the republics of Yugoslavia, whereby here, to a lesser extent, 
there were similar waves of insurgency from north to south, from Slovenia and 
Croatia to Serbia and Macedonia.
An analysis of the progress of events in all of these countries is replete with 
speculation and questions that cannot be answered. Which resident of Prague was 
the first to take a bunch of keys out of his pocket and rattle them so loudly that 
his gesture caught the attention of more than 300,000 denizens of the city? Whose 
actions finally led to the shots in Bucharest? How was it possible that the con-
frontations with the law enforcement bodies in Leipzig in October 1989 and in 
Berlin in November remained peaceful, despite the fact that it seemed inevitable 
that they would become bloody?
Looking from “below” reveals a large number of riddles. But the view from 
“above” also leads to a great deal of ambiguity. Some twenty years down the 
road, these two perspectives yield insights only if they are both used to view the 
events, that is, when the events are not only seen on the basis of protocols of 
the political parties, of the governments or of the opposition, but also by means 
of other sources of information such as videos or first-hand accounts of partic-
ipants.
It must be emphasized that the phenomenon of the power of monopolistic 
communist parties being removed came about in the various countries through 
different means: 1) in Poland, Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent, in Bulgar-
ia, in the course of a dialog between the communist party and new political 
forces; 2) in Hungary, in the course of different leanings within the party itself, 
resulting in fractions that formed opposition parties; 3) in Yugoslavia, due to a 
general disaffection with the party; and finally 4) the active overthrow of party 
authority as occurred in Romania and to a lesser extent in the GDR.6 
In general—presuming the principle of causality—the following postulate 
obtains: After accommodating the principles of political renewal issuing from the 
6 Yurii Novopashin et al., eds., Vostochnaya Evropa na istoricheskom perelome (Ocherki revoly-
utsionnykh preobrazovanii 1989–1990) (Мoscow: Institut slavyanovedeniya, 1991); G. N. Se-
vostʼyanov et al., eds., Revolyutsii 1989 goda v stranakh Tsentral’noi i Yugo-Vostochnoi Evropy: 
Vzglyad cherez desyatiletie (Мoscow: Nauka, 2001); Е. Yu. Gus’kova, Istoriya yugoslavskogo 
krizisa (1990–2000) (Мoscow: Russkoe pravo, 2001); Strany Tsentral’no-Vostochnoi Evropy 
vo vtoroj polovone XX veka, vol. 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 2002); Vlast’—obshchestvo—reformy. 
Tsentral’naya i Yugo-Vostochnaya Evropa: Vtoraya polovina ХХ veka (Мoscow: Nauka, 2006); 
Yurii Novopashin et al., eds., Istoriya antikommunisticheskikh revolyutsii kontsa ХХ veka: Tsen-
tral’naya i Yugo-Vostochnaya Evropa (Мoscow: Nauka, 2007); Konstantin Nikiforov et al., eds., 
Revolyutsii i reformy v stranakh Tsentral’noi i Yugo-Vostochnoi Evropy: 20 let spustya (Mos-
cow: ROSSPEN, 2011).
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USSR, the countries in question were able to find various ways of resolving the 
issue of monopolistic communistic parties—both at home and in the USSR. In 
effect this is also how the process of reform proceeded under perestroika in the 
country where it was born.
Thus in many crucial ways, the change in the standing of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and the amendment to the sixth article of the constitu-
tion of the USSR at the third congress of the people’s deputies in March of 1990 
came about, at least to some degree, as a reaction to similar developments in the 
various countries of Central Europe. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged 
that the demise of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a result of pow-
erful forces from within. It was not patterned on any of the courses of action 
taken in the countries of the region to dissolve the single party monopoly. In fact, 
the Party gave up a significant part of its legitimacy to the Supreme Soviet by 
amending the respective section of the constitution of the USSR, which greatly 
weakened the Party’s position.
This decision in turn hastened the constitutional reforms in the Central Euro-
pean countries, each in its own way introducing new laws to reform their gov-
ernmental structures.  
In August 1991 an attempted return to the pre-perestroika power structures in 
the USSR ended in failure. By this time all of the former socialist countries west 
of Brest had divested themselves of their socialist moniker and—applying the 
principle of causality for fundamental political reforms—had rendered the disso-
lution of party monopoly a moot point. 
Already in the course of the manifestations of change a new phenomenon was 
emerging—the radical reform of state structures, including the downfall of so-
cialist federations. It must be noted that the many crises and the ultimate collapse 
of socialism were accompanied by a number of critical ethnic conflicts. The se-
vere consequences of such conflicts became most evident in the impact on the 
federal structures of Yugoslavia, which in the overview had been the weakest link 
in the “socialist commonwealth.” As the independence movements and the na-
tionalist forces in the various Yugoslavian republics were pursuing their agendas, 
the republican communist parties progressively distanced themselves from the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia. At the same time, in Serbia aggressive 
nationalist forces were forming under the banner of an “anti-bureaucratic revo-
lution” (remarkably similar to a campaign underway in the USSR) that aimed at 
rescinding the autonomy of not only of Kosovo and Vojvodina at the end of 1988, 
but even that of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Disintegrative processes in the USSR proceeded almost simultaneously: 
Among them, at the end of 1988 the People’s Front in the Baltic states began to 
raise the issue of independence from the USSR for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, 
and on 9 April 1989 the People’s Front of Georgia organized a mass demonstra-
tion that was broken up with military force. Earlier, bloody skirmishes had taken 
Ella Zadorozhnyuk
277The USSR and the Revolutions of 1989–90: Questions of Causality
place within individual republics (Fergana) and between them (Karabakh), but 
these could be subdued.
These kinds of conflicts were instigated by party structures that were capable 
of sustaining them. As a result, a “parade of sovereignty” began. At the beginning 
of September 1991 the USSR recognized the independence of Latvia, Lithuania 
and Estonia, and on 8 December the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, 
Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich, signed the Belavezha 
accords, which declared the USSR dissolved. In its place the Commonwealth of 
Independent States was established. Just as in the ethnic conflicts, these consti-
tutional reforms can be seen as causal links between the events in the USSR and 
in the countries of Central Europe.
Regarding a more fortunate outcome, namely that of the two federal socialis-
tic republics of Czechoslovakia, the years 1988 to 1989 saw the beginning of a 
similar process of secession, albeit as a result of a complex process of diverse 
breakups both within the federal party structure and the opposition movement.
In January 1990 the fourteenth extraordinary congress of the League of Yu-
goslavian Communists took place, which also turned out to be its last. First the 
Slovene delegation and then the Croatian left the congress because their call for 
a reorganization of the party on the basis of a confederation was denied. This 
event in Yugoslavia was one of the first incidences in a process of disintegration 
that was taking place over an area reaching from Prague to Vladivostok. In Yu-
goslavia it soon became clear that this was only the first step on the path to the 
breakup of the federal state, whereby ethnic factors did not merely figure in the 
agreements but actually hastened them. On 23 December 1990, 88.5 percent of 
the Slovenian populace voted for independence, Croatia followed. On 25 June 
1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared independence as sovereign states. On 17 
November 1991, Macedonia adopted a constitution that declared its full indepen-
dence, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina also declaring its independence on 
6 April 1992. On 27 April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro declared their continu-
ity with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and founded the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 
All of these steps were accompanied by declarations from the international 
community of nations that either supported or declined to acknowledge these 
states (as was also the case when Kosovo declared its independence in the new 
millennium). Understanding the evolution of these five national entities is a 
daunting task. Indeed, to appreciate some of conflicts in southeastern Europe, it 
might be important to remember that some people find it useful to have one or 
more boiling pots on their stove so that the soup can be poured onto the feet of 
their neighbors at an opportune moment.7 
7 E. G. Zadorozhnyuk, “Balkanskii “klin”: novye vyzovy ili rostki stabil’nosti,” Mirovaya ekono-
mika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, no. 10 (2008): 121–27.
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The independence of these and subsequently other states in the territory of 
Yugoslavia was generally sanctioned by practically all countries of Europe (in-
cluding Germany, despite the fact that there the opposite took place: its unification 
on 3 October 1990).
The breakup of these socialistic federations bore the following pattern: the 
emergence and rapid escalation of ethnic movements, the development of ruling 
parties with nationalist tendencies—focused on their “own” republics and the 
formation of a union or federation. The progression of events made it apparent 
that what had seemed at first secondary (the postulate of “all or nothing” regard-
ing the cultural autonomy of ethnic groups in Yugoslavia and of demagogical 
claims of inflated “investments” in this or that federal republic, similar to conflicts 
in the USSR, not to the mention the “battle of the hyphen” in Czecho-Slovakia) 
emerged as a first priority in the context of the rapidly spreading turmoil.
The next stage of events in the posited algorithm took place in the USSR. 
Applying the concept of causality, of cause and effect, might be considered 
self-evident with regard to the experience of Yugoslavia, which was characterized 
by bloody military conflicts, ethnic cleansing, efforts to erect totalitarian regimes 
and the creation of unrecognized republics.
This was taken into account on the territory of the former USSR, where it aimed 
at avoiding bloody conflicts—an aim that was not reached entirely. In many ways 
the conflicts that occurred were akin to a smoldering peat bog, where flames are 
not visible on the surface but sudden flashes appear unpredictably at completely 
different places. Monitoring the course of these events and evaluating the data in 
the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States is much more difficult 
than analyzing the events in the countries (republics) of the former Yugoslavia. 
Under the prevailing conditions in the USSR from 1989 to August of 1991, 
what caused the various conflicts to break out? Perplexing is that fact that con-
flicts emerged whose intensity was unpredictable. The ethnic massacres of Azeris 
against Armenians in Sumgait in February 1988 and of Uzbeks against Meskhe-
tian Turks in Fergana in June 1989 demonstrated that fierce outbursts of national 
protest cannot be predicted, nor are they subject to any form of regulation. At 
exactly the same time, sweeping government reform processes were developing 
in the Baltic republics.
In the given context it can be shown that the ethnic conflicts and the resulting 
destruction of established borders between republics and even within republics, 
following the pattern of the disintegration algorithm, each had their own unique 
dynamics. Even apparently analogous situations cannot serve as models. In Yu-
goslavia forces emerged that were focused on exploiting the breakup of the 
government to the maximum. In the USSR the crumbling of the government was 
accepted as a matter of course, however high the price.
Regarding Czechoslovakia, the “velvet” breakup of the country was essential-
ly the result of confrontational and manipulative actions on the part of a political 
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elite of Czechs and Slovaks rather than an expression of the reformative will of 
two nations. Even though the situation in Yugoslavia proceeded in a different 
direction, it still affected the chain of events in the USSR, and the example of 
these two countries directly determined the character of many aspects in the 
breakup of Czechoslovakia. In an attempt to avoid unnecessary conflict as far as 
possible, almost no blood was shed in a region stretching from Prague to Vladi-
vostok. In general it might be said that the circumstances of the breakup of the 
USSR represent a kind of halfway point between the circumstances that prevailed 
in Yugoslavia and in Czechoslovakia. The breakup of these three federations is 
testimony to the shared human desire of a people to actively form their own 
unique states—a desire that can only be thwarted by the formation of larger po-
litical entities. At least in the European Union it is somewhat easier to resist the 
demands of extremists.
If an attempt is made to formulate two parameters of the causality described 
at the beginning of this chapter, the following picture emerges: In north-central 
Europe the revolutionary processes usually took place against a backdrop of 
negotiations that avoided bloodshed. In the southern parts of the region it was 
necessary to resort to greater force to achieve the overthrow of their governments. 
In the course of the sweeping changes in the USSR the picture was similar: In 
the reform processes, negotiations were more actively pursued in the north than 
in the south.
There used to be a popularly held notion that a wave of stability had arrived 
on the European continent.8 In many analyses in Central Europe this notion pre-
vailed from the end of the 1980s, just as it did in Western Europe. The course of 
the revolutionary changes in Central Europe and their consequences tells us that 
this understanding of events also holds for Eastern Europe where the former re-
publics of the USSR are located. 
In 2002, I launched the hypothesis of this “wave of stability”: 
The wave of stability moved inevitably from the north to the south, to France after the loss of 
Algeria, Italy after the “Red Brigades,” the late-Franquist Spain, Salazar’s Portugal, where in 
1974 a democratic anti-Fascist revolution took place […], to Greece after the “Black Colonels”: 
they were islands of instability then, even if not to the same extent as the Balkans today. Yet, the 
wave of stability solved many of the most pressing problems in Western Europe. The next are 
Central Europe and the bleeding Balkans […].9 
The financial and economic crisis of the early twenty-first century showed that 
one must speak of “waves” rather than of one wave of stability. Stabilization 
processes follow various patterns: from economic confusion (e.g. Greece and 
8 E.G. Zadorozhnyuk, “Stanovlenie novykh regional’nykh identichnostei v Evrope: itogi per’vo-
go desyatiletiya 1989–1999 i perspektivy,” in Vladimir Bol’shakov, ed., Rossiya. Planetarnye 




Cyprus) to ethnic and confessional conflicts (e.g. the Kosovization, i.e. demands 
of political independence raised by small political entities). 
The beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century has been 
characterized by new developments. The entry of new members into the Euro-
pean Union (Croatia in 2013) has not solved all their problems. Moreover, some 
sort of curtain still exists between the “old” and “new” members, albeit not an 
“iron” one.  Within the former USSR, impulses for integration have increased 
through the creation of a customs union and, by 2015, of the Eurasian Econom-
ic Union. Ukraine is in a difficult situation, confronted with having to choose 
between European integration and the Eurasian Union.10 The intensification of 
integration impulses can be treated as part of the model of mutual conditionali-
ty or causality. 
In applying the concept of causality the question arises of whether the princi-
ple of such waves of stability can be applied to the countries of Eastern Europe? 
An unambiguous answer would have to be based on a series of complex phenom-
ena, especially if one considers that since the Baltic nations have become mem-
bers of NATO and the EU they are now part of Central Europe. 
For instance, the stability of Belarus is provided by a structure that is not 
considered democratic. Nevertheless the arrangement is accepted by a large ma-
jority of Belorussians and is even acceptable to a majority of citizens of Russia.
In this context, Ukraine has by any measure an extremely unstable government 
for two reasons: its declared intention to generate an image of democracy com-
peting with fierce internal struggles for ownership in formerly public enterprises.
While the secession of Kazakhstan from the USSR went relatively smoothly, 
from time to time other former Central Asian and Transcaucasian nations exhib-
it alarming levels of instability. 
The expression “revolutions of the year 1989” intuitively triggers a search for 
the causal nature and the influences between the events in the USSR and the 
European members of the “socialist commonwealth.” It can be argued that the 
revolutions could not have succeeded without the changes in the USSR, nor could 
the sequence of events in the USSR have remained uninfluenced by these revo-
lutions—a mutual series of causes and effects that ultimately led to the collapse 
of the Soviet model of socialism in an region reaching from Berlin to Vladivostok. 
This process was accompanied by a desire to preserve order in international 
relations across a huge area: from Brest (in France, not Belarus) to Vladivostok—
or even from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Expressions of hope, such as the vision 
of a “Common European Home” turned out in many ways to be utopian, but they 
have not been dispelled to this day. The ideas engendered by this twenty-year 
period of history have not lost their attractiveness. Moreover, the appeal to return 
to the basic tenants of socialist reform has taken on a new meaning as the world 
10 E.G. Zadorozhnyuk, “Ukraina 2013: Vybor novykh neopredelennostei,” http://russiancouncil.
ru/inner/?id_4=1396#top (accessed 30 July 2013). 
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searches for a means to mobilize the resources of all nations to master the crises 
affecting the globe. It is likely that such aspirations will reflect the principle of 
cause and effect as is already evidenced by thinkers searching for new solutions.
Conclusion
To conclude, when examining the political events that occurred from the end 
of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s in the USSR and the other the countries 
considered here, primary attention should be given to the causal interaction be-
tween these events, that is, the fact that one event was usually the consequence 
of another. Once the political winds of reform blowing in the USSR were felt, 
the countries under discussion began to contemplate possible solutions to their 
problems of single-party authority. In turn, these political trends carried over to 
the USSR. Over time they assumed common features. 
The final result was a transformation of all the European members of the so-
called “socialist commonwealth.” These former socialist entities returned, at least 
in some respects, to the fold of nations in the Central European region and not 
to the countries of Eastern Europe, especially Russia. This, however, is a topic 
for another discourse, one that will certainly require the principles of causality 
set forth here.
This chapter has attempted to provide an answer to a two-part question: Did 
Soviet perestroika stir revolutionary tendencies in the nations of the Eastern bloc 
in the years 1989 to 1990? And to what extent did the intensity of these tenden-
cies lead to the ultimate consequences of perestroika in the USSR? It is clear that 
the links between the given events were of a causal nature: After becoming aware 
of the political renewal stirring in the USSR, the countries in question were able 
to contemplate various ways of resolving the issue of monopolistic communistic 
parties. In turn many of these options were adopted in the USSR. In the end, all 
of the members of the “socialist commonwealth” in Europe underwent processes 
of transformation, processes that even included the breakup of some former fed-
erative systems contained within them.

P h i l i P  Z e l i K o W
US STRATEGIC PLANNING IN 1989–90
The generation of 1988
By the end of 1988, a generation of Americans (and Europeans) had grown 
up absorbing profound lessons from the collective experiences of the World Wars. 
The lessons were distilled to axioms. And these axioms were reduced to phrases, 
phrases that every US policymaker of the 1980s knew by heart: “NATO alliance,” 
“forward defense,” “flexible response.”
As the years went by, most allied leaders also internalized, and even wel-
comed, their participation in a new kind of confederation, an “Atlantic commu-
nity.” Transnational links grew between political parties, legislators, and sol-
diers. The allies became proficient at working within each other’s domestic 
political systems. German, British, and other European statesmen became espe-
cially adept at navigating the complex US political system, savvy to the concerns 
of congressional committee chairs or big-foot columnists. With all its fraternal 
quarrels and friendships, this confederation—“the alliance”—became a sort of 
extension of the American federal union itself. As the years passed, presidents 
knew and thought about other alliance leaders almost as much, and sometimes 
even more, than they knew or thought about their fellow political leaders in the 
United States.1
In the field, atop the watchtowers in Central Europe, several generations of 
soldiers, who over the years numbered in the millions, rotated in and out of the 
same casernes. A son might take up a duty station at the Fulda Gap, serving in 
the same armored cavalry regiment and manning the same observation post that 
his father had stood watch from.
Periodically, the sinews of the alliance came under strain. And, against this 
threat, generations of policymakers also stood watch. All of the men and women 
who led the US government in 1989 were conditioned to rebutting arguments 
against forward defense. They regarded such assaults as dangerously naïve iso-
lationism and were ever ready to man the political ramparts to defend the alliance.
These instincts and ingrained concepts have not vanished from American 
public life, but their salience has receded. They were part of my own profession-
al training, but I was part of the last generation of Americans in public life to be 
so trained and habituated.
1 See, e.g., Ernest May, “The American Commitment to Germany, 1949–55,” Diplomatic History 
13, no. 6 (Fall 1989): 431–60.
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In 1989 these assumptions and habits of thought were still fresh, especially for 
the men and women who directed US foreign policy. The new president in January 
1989, George H.W. Bush, had fought in World War II as a navy pilot in the Pacif-
ic. On one of his missions his plane was shot down. Bush was lucky to survive; his 
crewman did not. By 1989, whether as CIA director or as a presidential candidate 
or as Ronald Reagan’s vice president for the past eight years, he had spent the 
previous twenty years immersed in the process and politics of standing watch.
Bush’s key aides also felt they knew firsthand what terms like “forward defense” 
and “NATO” and “flexible response” meant. His national security adviser, Brent 
Scowcroft, was finishing the United States Military Academy at West Point during 
World War II and, trained as a pilot, was injured in a crash and spent the rest of his 
air force career at desk jobs, earning three stars and a prior tour as national securi-
ty adviser to President Gerald Ford before he returned to that office for President 
Bush. He had repeatedly worked on the management of nuclear weapons and spent 
years harmonizing US policies with NATO allies.
Bush’s secretary of state, James Baker, had been a lieutenant in the marines 
during the next war, in Korea. Though his part in forward defense was an assign-
ment in Europe working with comrades from NATO countries, some of his friends 
from basic training had gone to Korea, and some were killed there.
Bush’s secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, had not served in the military. The 
issues were nonetheless deeply familiar to him, whether from his service as chief 
of staff to President Ford or his later years as a congressman from Wyoming, when 
he was the ranking Republican on both the House Intelligence Committee and the 
Intelligence Subcommittee of the powerful Appropriations Committee.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1989 was a navy admiral, 
William Crowe. Crowe was a chairman more in the old mold, an envoy between 
the service chiefs and the rest of the government. In the first months of 1989, he 
would faithfully represent the received views of the army and air force. Crowe’s 
successor, Colin Powell, was the first to grasp fully the independent power of the 
chairman conferred by the Goldwater-Nichols law of 1986, as the military advisor 
to the President with his own “Joint Staff.” Powell had been part of forward defense 
on both sides of the world: two combat tours in Vietnam, a tour in Korea, and tours 
manning the frontlines in Germany.
As Bush took office in early 1989, the great question was whether the conflict 
and positions this group of men and women had known for their entire profession-
al lives had come to an end. The arguments in late 1988 and early 1989 about this 
were complex. And certain historical accounts have added to the confusion.
What did an “end” of the Cold War in Europe mean?
The historian Mary Sarotte argues that “At the beginning of 1989, the newly 
installed President Bush intentionally instituted a pause in the rapid dismantling 
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of Cold War weapons and attitudes.” She portrays the Reagan administration as 
wanting to drop old assumptions and treat the Cold War as over, but finds that 
these beliefs were pushed aside by the new Bush team. She quotes a career civil 
servant who later joined Bush’s National Security Council staff, Robert Hutch-
ings, as saying that “‘an entirely new team came in, representing foreign policy 
approaches fundamentally at odds with those of the Reagan administration.’”2
Sarotte quotes Hutchings accurately. But Hutchings, who summarizes this 
period quite ably in the book being quoted, does not think Bush “instituted a 
pause.” In fact, Hutchings spends the entire chapter from which the quote was 
drawn, his chapter on “American Grand Strategy,” making just the opposite 
point.3 If a conscientious historian like Sarotte can get this wrong, then it is worth 
taking a closer look not only at the rhetoric, but at what people meant by it and 
the concrete policies that went with it.
By the end of 1988 Ronald Reagan’s secretary of state, George Shultz, and 
Reagan’s philosophical comrade-in-arms, British prime minister Margaret Thatch-
er, believed—and said publicly—that the Cold War was over.4 They wanted the 
US government to declare victory and embrace Mikhail Gorbachev. Thatcher, like 
Shultz, considered the Cold War over with the status quo of 1988 in place. This 
is an essential point. It linked them with other European statesmen and American 
experts who believed the conditions of 1988 had ended the Cold War.
There were differences within this group. Some, like Thatcher, felt every as-
pect of that status quo should be carefully preserved—very much including its 
foundation in strong Western defenses. Others, like West German foreign minis-
ter Hans-Dietrich Genscher, felt that the end of the Cold War already afforded 
scope for more rapid progress on disarmament. Where people like Thatcher, 
Shultz, or Genscher could all agree was that if any concrete, new initiatives were 
needed, they were on subjects like strategic nuclear arms control (the START 
talks).
Thatcher, for instance, gave little attention to reducing the conventional arms 
massed in Europe, and had no use at all for schemes that would go from the 
treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles to new talks for reducing 
the shorter-range nuclear arms deployed in Europe as well. After all, these were 
the pillars of “forward defense,” of “flexible response,” and of NATO solidarity.
And none of the statesmen who believed the Cold War was over in 1988 were 
pushing ideas on how to help roll back communism in Eastern Europe. Neither 
2 Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 22.
3 Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), 6–47. Hutchings was detailed from the National Intelligence 
Council to the NSC staff early in 1989.
4 Don Oberdorfer, “Thatcher: Gorbachev Has Ended Cold War,” Boston Globe, 18 November 
1988, 7; George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 1131, 
1138.
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they, nor their key subordinates, favored any move to reopen the German Ques-
tion. From their perspective, pressing such issues would only jeopardize the 
successful ending of the Cold War.
Leaders like Thatcher and Shultz (it is harder to be sure of Reagan’s views at 
the end of 1988) had a plausible theory: The steadfastness in Western defense had 
proven its worth. Cold War had been replaced by a genuine relaxation of East-
West tensions, a real détente. This more stable, beneficial status quo should be 
preserved. Solidarity in forward defense, flexible response, and NATO should, 
therefore, be stoutly maintained. If Gorbachev wished to reduce Soviet arma-
ments, this was long overdue and good. But it was no reason for the West to 
abandon its position of strength by following suit.
An alternative view came to the same conclusions about not compromising 
Western defense, but with a somewhat different rationale. Both the new secretary 
of defense, Dick Cheney, and Scowcroft’s deputy, the veteran CIA Soviet-watch-
er Bob Gates, gave more weight to the possibility that Gorbachev was trying to 
revitalize the Soviet empire, as Yurii Andropov, the late Soviet leader and former 
KGB chief, had hoped he would (Andropov had been a key patron in Gorbachev’s 
rise to high office). Both Cheney and Gates, like some analysts of the Soviet 
Union at the time, also stressed the need to hedge against the imminent possibil-
ity that Gorbachev might be overthrown. Scowcroft’s views were more reserved 
than those of Cheney and Gates, but at that moment were not very much different.5
Where was Bush on all this? He told his advisers, “We should dream big 
dreams.” Bush himself is sometimes portrayed as a cautious, prudent “realist.” A 
less schematic but more accurate assessment would find something different.
Bush was an intelligent and almost peripatetically restless man, a competitive 
baseball player in his younger days now reduced to tennis, golf, fishing, horse-
shoes, or anything else that came to hand. Unlike Reagan, who was a self-taught 
intellectual who loved thinking and writing about political ideas, Bush was more 
action-oriented than reflective. His was a politics of personal chemistry, driven 
very strongly by emotion, filtered through a deeply ingrained screen of courtesy 
and obligation. Words like “honor” cut deeply for him. Though he was conversant 
on issues, Bush’s deeper judgments about basic direction tended to be instinctive, 
5 On Scowcroft, see George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 
1998), 12–13. These Americans were not the only ones to think Gorbachev was trying to revi-
talize Soviet power, not reduce it. Such hopes had animated some of Gorbachev’s key supporters 
within the Soviet military, like his security adviser, Sergei Akhromeyev. A leaner, reconfigured 
Soviet military—refocused and out of Afghanistan—made sense to some of these marshals in 
the mid-to-late 1980s. Gorbachev made choices that confronted the Soviet military more and 
more directly. This was becoming clearer only as Bush took office, when Gorbachev’s landmark 
speech before the United Nations in December 1988 (which some analogized to Khrushchev’s 
force cuts speech in 1960) was followed by other new steps, such as those in conventional arms 
control proposals I will discuss in the following, and the April 1989 purge from the Party’s Cen-
tral Committee of key military figures like former general staff chief Nikolai Ogarkov.
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guided by his sense of duty or trust. His conversation and his correspondence (he 
was a frequent and faithful note and letter writer) are full of expressions like—
explaining how he and Gorbachev came to be able to “go around the world on 
issues” —“I thought I had a feel for his heartbeat.”6
In his first weeks in office, as in his transition, Bush still wanted “to dream 
big dreams.” This turned into a belief that the status quo of 1988 was to be 
changed, not preserved. His “big dreams” would be a wave of further changes.
To make the picture still more complicated, advisers like Scowcroft were 
willing to countenance radical changes in Western defense posture. Scowcroft’s 
main concern at this time was to preserve nuclear deterrence. Scowcroft himself 
did not think the Cold War was over. That was a statement “you can only say 
once,” he would explain. And “the Reagan Administration’s willingness to declare 
an end to the Cold War, without taking into consideration what that would require, 
disturbed me.” Instead he thought “we should change our sights from managing 
the Cold War on the ground in Europe and stabilizing the situation to look beyond, 
to resolution of the basic issues.”7
The desire to get at “the basic issues” preoccupied Scowcroft’s staff. In early 
1989, that group included advisers like former ambassador Robert Blackwill, the 
Stanford Sovietologist Condoleezza Rice, and a relatively junior foreign service 
officer detailed to the White House (me). Hutchings, who also joined the staff, 
accurately recalls that the policies “departed sharply from the Reagan adminis-
tration, particularly in rebuilding support for nuclear deterrence and radically 
revising Soviet policy away from a narrow focus on arms control, toward a much 
more ambitious political agenda.”8
This included arms control, as Hutchings rightly points out: “Above all, it 
meant shifting the prevailing logic away from nuclear arms control for its own 
sake and focusing on the massive conventional imbalance in Europe.” The shift 
in focus to the conventional military dispositions was also very much a political 
agenda. The conventional arms talks with twenty-three participating states were 
“seen in political as much as military terms as a vehicle for relaxing Soviet pres-
sure on its Warsaw Pact allies and so facilitating political liberalization in Eu-
rope.”9 After all, as 1989 began, Europe remained divided. More than a million 
6 The Bush quote is from a transition memo, Ross to Baker, “Thoughts on the ‘Grand Design,’” 16 
December 1988. Unless otherwise noted, citations to any government documents from 1989–90 
are from my review of the originals in the early 1990s for Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza 
Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, 
rev. ed. 1997). Bush explains his commitment to personal diplomacy in Bush and Scowcroft, A 
World Transformed, 60–61; his comment on Gorbachev is on page 10.
7 Scowcroft’s comment on “say only once” is from my interview with him, Washington, DC, June 
1991; “disturbed me” from Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 12.
8 Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 27. See also his description of the conventional wisdom for 
the US-Soviet agenda as of the end of 1988, detailed on 34–35.
9 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 27; Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 28.
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soldiers confronted each other at its center. In February 1989 a young man trying 
to flee into West Berlin, Chris Gueffroy, was shot dead by East German border 
guards at close range at the Berlin Wall.
Scowcroft’s old boss and mentor, Henry Kissinger, had proposed a US-Soviet 
understanding on mutual restraint in Eastern Europe, to “give the Soviets security 
guarantees (widely defined) while permitting the peoples of Eastern Europe to 
choose their own political future” and “conceive a drastic reduction of all outside 
forces in Europe—including those of the US—that might revolutionize present 
concepts of security.” Kissinger discussed these ideas in Moscow and proposed 
creating a “back-channel” to work them some more. Beyond the process concerns 
that Kissinger’s role might usurp his own, which bothered Baker, the substance was 
also objectionable to Baker. Though the language Kissinger had developed seemed 
reasonable, the framework of arriving at a US-Soviet agreement about the fate of 
Eastern Europe struck some others, like Hutchings, as a “Yalta II.”10
In March 1989 Scowcroft’s staff, looking for ways to promote even faster po-
litical change in Central and Eastern Europe, put forward a proposal, which Scow-
croft endorsed to Bush, that the goal of US policy in Europe “should be to overcome 
the division of the continent through acceptance of common democratic values.” 
As an alternative to Gorbachev’s concept of a “Common European Home” divided 
into different rooms by social systems, alliance structures, and historical realities, 
the United States would propose a vision for a “commonwealth of free nations.”11
This faction, especially Blackwill and I, also wanted Bush to put German uni-
fication back on the international agenda. In the same March memo to Bush, 
Scowcroft signed off on language that said the United States should do more to 
highlight possibilities for movement on German unification, to “send a clear signal 
to the Germans that we are ready to do more if the political climate allows it.” 
This point of view clashed with the senior European advisors then still in office 
at the State Department. The assistant secretary for Europe, Rozanne Ridgway, 
had been a key adviser to Shultz and was a former ambassador to East Germany. 
Like many others deeply experienced in the Ostpolitik arguments of the 1970s and 
1980s, she was uneasy, even scornful, about ideas to roll back the Cold War status 
10 On the Kissinger episode, see James A. Baker III with Thomas DeFrank, The Politics of Diplo-
macy (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 40–41; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 27; 
Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 35–37. The “Yalta II” slur is itself a revealing misuse of histo-
ry, reflecting the widely held belief that Yalta was a superpower deal to divide Europe. Though 
some writers allege such a deal was made, it was not. Indeed some other writers (including some 
eminent historians) wish that such a deal had been made, either then or later.
11 Scowcroft to Bush, “The NATO Summit,” 20 March 1989. On 26 March, Bush noted to Scow-
croft that he had “read this with interest!” Bush marked up the memo, underscoring and check-
ing the paragraph about the priority to be attached to policy toward Germany. Bush eventually 
used the “commonwealth of free nations” phrase in his Mainz speech of 31 May and elaborated 
on it in a speech on US relations with Europe delivered in Leiden on 17 July. He used a similar 
phrase, simplified as a “commonwealth of freedom” in another speech delivered to the Czech 
Federal Assembly in Prague on 17 November 1990.
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quo. But Bush himself, as would later become even clearer, regarded himself (in 
his words) as “less of a Europeanist, not dominated by history.”12
At the top of the State Department, Secretary Baker and his chief aides, no-
tably Robert Zoellick and Dennis Ross (who acted as Baker’s key adviser on 
Soviet policy) devoted their first weeks to two goals. The first was rebuilding a 
bipartisan coalition at home. This was accomplished through painstaking work to 
defuse the Central America issue, a signature feature of the “Reagan Doctrine” 
but a lightning rod for partisan argument. Their second initial goal was to strength-
en alliance relationships with Europe.13
Meanwhile, as Baker and his people refocused hard on European issues and 
US-Soviet relations in the early spring of 1989 and encountered more formal 
policy reviews that had produced “mush,” they helped spur on a different ap-
proach, driven by the intense schedule of speeches and trips that the White House 
now planned in order to articulate the administration’s policies, especially toward 
Europe and the USSR. Baker regarded the arguments about Gorbachev’s pros-
pects as “mainly academic theology,” with good and bad arguments on all sides.
In his memoir, Baker adds a point that is totally characteristic of him. Real 
strategy is about what you do. “What mattered to me were what actions we could 
take in the face of these two different possibilities [for Gorbachev’s future], in 
order to maximize our diplomatic gains while minimizing risks.” Baker was tuned 
into the dynamic opportunities in Eastern Europe, pressing the point with Bush 
in a meeting on 8 March. At high-level meetings in late March and early April, 
discussions began concerning new approaches toward Europe.14
An agenda for Europe, an arms control move for Gorbachev
March and April 1989 were a catalytic period for the new Bush presidency. 
Only some of this had to do with the international situation. Much of the churn-
12 See Scowcroft to Bush, “The NATO Summit,” 20 March 1989; see also the description of inter-
agency differences in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 25–26. The Bush comment is from 
my interview with him in Houston, January 1995. 
13 The Central America work is often ignored in the standard accounts. Turning the page on this 
issue strengthened the domestic foundation for Baker’s policy work everywhere. On this hot 
subject, Baker put a Democrat (Bernard Aronson) in charge and painstakingly negotiated a deal 
that preserved some humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan resistance against the Soviet and Cu-
ban-backed Sandinista government, but got this with a full-court press to implement a regionally 
negotiated deal for elections in Nicaragua (the Esquipulas accord). See Baker, Politics of Diplo-
macy, 47–60. He won significant points with Moscow by working with the Soviets to make this 
process work; some of the notable irritants in US-Soviet relations during 1989 arose from Soviet 
or Cuban arms deliveries to Nicaragua. The gratifying result was the defeat of the Sandinista 
government led by Daniel Ortega when elections were finally held in February 1990.
14 For “mush,” see Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 67–70; for more on the high-level deliberations 
beginning at the end of March, see Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 42–45.
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ing was really about the new president deciding what he and his administration 
should become. 
Every new administration, especially a new White House team, carries with 
it some of the zeal, camaraderie, and confidence from a victorious campaign. The 
outward energy and confidence naturally masks some measure of very private 
insecurity. Officials ask themselves, in effect, “Can I/we really handle this?” In 
foreign policy, Gorbachev was the toast of the world. Bush had not yet been 
defined as a president or as a statesman.
But Bush had ambitious instincts. He also had effective advisers and a com-
petent staff. His chief national security aides, Scowcroft and Gates, hit the ground 
running. On European policy, Blackwill—who had spent formative years as a 
young diplomat working on Kissinger’s staff—was a one-man think tank. Black-
will could generate ideas and then map out a choreography of trips, speeches, and 
other actions to carry them forward.
For Bush, and for his administration, the varying views on Gorbachev had 
coalesced on one core issue: how the Soviet leader would handle the prospect of 
change in Eastern Europe. By the end of 1988, Gorbachev had signaled unprec-
edented tolerance, an end to the Brezhnev Doctrine. During the transition, Bush 
had told his team that, at that moment in history, he thought Eastern Europe was 
the most exciting place in the world.
In his first policy address on Eastern Europe, in April 1989, Bush promised 
that “Help from the West will come in concert with liberalization.” Arms, Bush 
added in a conscious echo of Czech dissident Vaclav Havel, “are a symptom, not 
a source of tension. The true source of tension is the imposed and unnatural di-
vision of Europe.” The West, he said, “can now be bold in proposing a vision of 
the European future.”15
In the same April 1989 address, Bush made it clear that Soviet tolerance of 
East European reforms was the litmus test for US attitudes toward Gorbachev. 
Quoting Timothy Garton Ash, Hutchings observes that: “At this crucial juncture, 
the United States linked the development of its relationship with the Soviet Union 
to Soviet conduct in East-Central Europe.” Hutchings adds his own view that this 
linkage may have been “the single most important contribution the United States 
made to the events of 1989.” Bush pressed this point in a delicate enough way 
15 Bush’s transition comment is recounted by Zoellick in an interview with me, Washington, DC, 
January 1995. For the speech, see Bush address, Hamtramck, Michigan, 17 April 1989, Pub-
lic Papers of the Presidents: George Bush, bk 1, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=16935 (accessed on 25 Nov. 2012). Raymond Garthoff asserted that the timing of 
Bush’s speech on the day Solidarity was legalized was a coincidence. Raymond Garthoff, The 
Great Transition (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 606. It was not. The roundta-
ble talks began in February 1989. Bush’s speech on this topic was planned in advance and timed 
to follow the Warsaw announcement of the roundtable outcome. See Baker’s notes from his 
meeting with Bush on Eastern Europe on 8 March. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 67; see also 
Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 39–40. 
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to avoid embarrassing Gorbachev or undermining him at home: “[T]he very 
prudence with which the president pursued these aims caused many to miss just 
how ambitious the central vision was.”16
In early 1989 Gorbachev’s professed tolerance was tested, concretely, in the 
Polish roundtable agreement to hold limited elections. Gorbachev had already 
opted to allow a version of highly limited but still significant elections in the 
Soviet Union itself, for the Congress of People’s Deputies, and so he let the Pol-
ish plans go forward for elections that would be held in the summer. Gorbachev’s 
endorsement of political reform evoked a strong positive response from Bush and 
Baker, especially after Baker returned home from an important, encouraging trip 
to Moscow in early May 1989.
On the Soviet Union, Bush signed a national security directive that bypassed 
and largely ignored the just-concluded formal review. The new directive said that 
containment had been a successful strategy, but was not an end in itself. On 12 
May, Bush announced that US policy toward the Soviet Union should go “beyond 
containment” and instead foster “the integration of the Soviet Union into the 
international system.” He tested Gorbachev’s new openness by reviving Eisen-
hower’s Open Skies plan that would open both American and Soviet airspace to 
the surveillance of military sites. Bush also made it clear through Baker (in the 
secretary’s visit to Moscow in early May) that he would bet on Gorbachev’s 
success. And—with Bush’s support—Baker stamped out an effort by Cheney to 
offer a seemingly different view. In October Baker would step even harder on 
what he perceived to be an analogous effort by Gates to voice a distinct view on 
US-Soviet policy.17
16 Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 38.
17 Bush address, College Station, Texas, 12 May 1989, in Public Papers, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17022 (accessed 22 Apr. 2013). The national security directive was crafted, 
as I remember it, mainly by Scowcroft, Gates, Blackwill and Rice at the White House, with 
some help from Ross at the State Department. On the conceptual move represented by Bush’s 
12 May speech, see Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 40–41. For a somewhat less generous 
appraisal, see Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 26–27. On Baker versus Cheney and Gates, 
see Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 70, 75, 156–58. Gates offers his own very useful perspective 
on these developments in From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 427–71. 
The Open Skies initiative led to negotiations that began in Ottawa in February 1990 (a meeting 
best known for the side discussions on Germany) and later produced a 1992 treaty. The treaty 
now has 35 signatories. It entered into force in 2002, when Russia and the United States began 
conducting their first overflights. No territory could be placed off limits. At the time it was an-
nounced, this initiative was widely derided, even by key insiders like Scowcroft, as just a rehash 
of an old idea that had been no more than a rhetorical gesture even in 1955. For others, including 
the NSC staffers (Blackwill and I) who had developed this idea, the idea had been important and 
ahead of its time in 1955 and remained highly relevant in 1989. Though it is widely believed 
that the advent of satellites makes military openness from aerial surveillance moot, satellite 
surveillance has many limitations, including coverage and flexibility. On the significance of the 
original 1955 proposal, see the interesting summary from one of its originators, Walt Rostow, 
Concept and Controversy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 137–71.
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Bush then delivered another address aimed at Western Europe. This time, the 
attainment of a single European market and prospects of creating a single Euro-
pean currency were the issues in the foreground. At that time, officials spoke of 
realizing such plans in 1992, and this date was the shorthand term researchers 
will find in the documents that discuss these aspirations. In the Reagan years, the 
United States had been ambivalent about whether this huge step forward in Eu-
ropean integration was a good thing.
Bush acknowledged the ambivalence, which was understandable since “the 
postwar order that began in 1945 is transforming into something very different.” 
But, in language that was heard loud and clear on the other side of the Atlantic, 
and which Bush repeated a few days later when he met with French president 
François Mitterrand, the American president declared that, whatever others may 
say, “this administration is of one mind. We believe a strong, united Europe means 
a strong America.”18 One reason the US government supported this momentum, 
Bush explained, was because he understood that European integration was a 
powerful magnetic force “drawing Eastern Europe closer toward the common-
wealth of free nations.” The term “commonwealth of free nations” was one Bush 
would use in a couple of other speeches, linked to a powerful phrase Bush used 
in early June, that the United States sought a “Europe whole and free.”
The same speech that declared US support for further European integration 
also emphasized the closeness of the United States with Germany, as “partners 
in leadership.” That new partnership was tested in May 1989, as secret envoys 
crisscrossed the Atlantic trying to work through an arcane but essential ingredient 
in the new approach.
In the spring of 1989, Gorbachev was not looking for economic help from the 
United States. What he sought were reciprocal moves, especially on convention-
al arms control. Such moves could help him make the case at home that military 
confrontation was a thing of the past, whereby he could reallocate major resourc-
es and political authority away from the military-industrial complex that so 
dominated the Soviet Union’s system of central economic planning. This was a 
pivotal issue for him at home and for the general direction of Soviet posture in 
Europe. At its core were issues of spending on the conventional, general purpose 
forces.
Military reformers in the USSR were not terribly troubled about the treaties 
limiting categories of nuclear arms. In both superpowers, nuclear weapons made 
up only a fraction of defense spending. In the Soviet Union as in the United States, 
though for different reasons, a large majority of defense spending was driven by 
conventional force requirements that required millions of men and tens of thou-
18 Bush address, Boston, Massachusetts, 21 May 1989, in Public Papers, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17046 (accessed 22 Apr. 2013). On this address, see also Hutchings, Ameri-
can Diplomacy, 41–42, who notes the relationship of Bush’s approach to what Baker would later 
outline as a “New Atlanticism.”
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sands of weapon systems. To take on these “requirements” meant a leader had to 
take on the core of the military establishment—whether in the Soviet Union or 
in the United States.
Meanwhile NATO was on track to consider a long-overdue modernization of 
its short-range nuclear forces, essential to the established notions of flexible re-
sponse. If overwhelmed by the more numerous armies of the Soviet Union and 
its allies, NATO relied on short-range nuclear forces to display a credible “flex-
ible response” capability to escalate to nuclear combat in Europe. In the spring 
of 1989, the alliance dispute over these plans bubbled into public view, as the 
British and Americans—leading the faction supporting modernization—encoun-
tered public West German calls not only to derail any update, but also to start 
negotiations to eliminate these nuclear systems altogether.
Confronting this sharp quarrel over short-range nuclear forces, Baker and 
Scowcroft arrived at a key insight. They fused two problems into one solution. 
They judged that a way to help Gorbachev, while also defusing this quarrel over 
the short-range nuclear force, was to push very hard for conventional arms con-
trol. Reductions in conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact from the 
Atlantic to the Urals were to be negotiated in a forum called CFE (for Conven-
tional armed Forces in Europe). The work on nuclear arms reductions would go 
on, but the more urgent priority was to help the momentum of Gorbachev’s re-
forms and ease the Soviet military withdrawal from Europe.
The core idea was to put off both modernizing and negotiating about the short-
range nuclear forces until the CFE treaty was done. These nuclear issues could be 
put aside, so the argument went, because the whole future of flexible response 
would look very different if the underlying imbalance of conventional forces could 
finally be addressed. Beliefs about such an imbalance of ground forces had funda-
mentally influenced every US and allied assessment of European security since 
1943. If the conventional imbalance could be erased, the requirements for main-
taining nuclear deterrence at the theater-level, in Europe, might then shrink too.
But that strategy meant the CFE treaty had to be concluded very soon. For 
this reason, a quick outcome would be promised. To make such a promise cred-
ible, the United States would agree to Gorbachev’s framework for the talks. The 
Soviets and their allies had offered to go along with reductions to common ceil-
ings in tanks, artillery, and armored fighting vehicles. But Moscow insisted that 
the NATO side reciprocate. The Soviets insisted on Western agreement to similar 
reductions in two categories of weaponry where the West had at least a qualitative 
edge: combat aircraft and helicopters. This Soviet proposal was quite controver-
sial in Western capitals.
Bush decided he would agree to include the proposed ceilings on aircraft and 
helicopters, as the Soviets had proposed. He would lead the NATO alliance to 
agree to offer such a deal. Further, Bush resolved he would throw in a readiness 
to reduce US troop numbers in Europe (by about 50,000) as the Soviets drew 
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down their forces, to reach an equal ceiling that would be about 15 percent below 
the existing US number.19
Months earlier Baker and Scowcroft had started out from a very different 
place, with very different ideas on how to advance bold ideas for adapting forward 
defense. Now the package synthesizing a new move on conventional arms control 
became an approach they both liked. It was put together in great secrecy by 
Scowcroft’s staff.20
The administration was split. Cheney and his Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, 
Admiral Crowe, argued strongly against making these concessions. Crowe was 
especially outspoken, describing these as just “PR” moves that would put “for-
ward defense” at risk.
President Bush sided with Baker and Scowcroft. Baker’s deputy, Lawrence 
Eagleburger, and Scowcroft’s deputy, Gates, were secretly dispatched to Europe 
to work on the issue with key allies, bracketed by presidential calls and more 
envoys exchanged with the Germans. Led by Thatcher, the British made no secret 
of their concerns about these moves, but they ultimately went along as Baker 
hammered out an agreed document at the NATO summit codifying the deal agreed 
to by sixteen allied presidents and prime ministers: a nuclear stall, linked to the 
new push to reduce and cap conventional forces.21
In effect, Bush was judging that, by showing that NATO and European insti-
tutions were supple enough to handle constructive change, the US could manage 
the risks from redefining the requirements for forward defense and flexible re-
19 To set the scene: “In late 1988 in many NATO capitals (Ankara, London, Rome, and Washington, 
for example) NATO forces were considered too thin to maintain a credible conventional deterrent. 
Thus NATO could not afford to reduce any of its own forces even if facing a leaner [Warsaw Pact] 
force.” Jane M.O. Sharp, Striving for Military Stability in Europe (London: Routledge, 2005), 
37 (for details on the aircraft and helicopters issue, see also 22, 52). On the insight about linking 
the conventional and nuclear arms control problems, in which the Dutch foreign minister and 
West German defense minister also played important roles, see Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 
82–83, 89–91; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 45–46, 71–73. For background on 
CFE issues as of the spring of 1989, see Barry Blechman, William Durch, and Kevin O’Prey, 
Regaining the High Ground (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Jonathan Dean, “Conventional 
Talks: A Good First Round,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 45, no. 8 (October 1989): 26–32, 26, 
28; Richard Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 29–48.
20 One reason the NSC staff role was so significant on these CFE issues was the backgrounds of 
the people involved. In 1985–86 Blackwill had been the ambassador to the long-running prede-
cessor negotiation, known as MBFR, that had been limited to central Europe. I had worked for 
Blackwill on the MBFR delegation and stayed, in 1987, to be the political adviser to the new 
CFE ambassador, Stephen Ledogar, during the new negotiation’s formative first year.
21 Looking back after the treaty was concluded in 1990, it seemed evident that “by May 1989 the 
essential structural elements of the CFE treaty had been defined.” Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s 
Military Order, 54. On the May 1989 debates in the US government, which were concentrated 
around the third week of that month, there are various illustrative but fragmentary accounts in 
the published literature. I have some notes from the time. See also Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 
93–94; Don Oberdorfer, The Turn (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), 347–51.
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sponse. As far as he or his aides could see, the outcome turned out to be everything 
they had wanted.
Another point should be clear: Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft thought, and often 
said, that their maneuvers were designed to preserve US engagement overseas. 
“Forward defense” was, for them, a kind of synonym for the old post-1950 axiom 
of overseas engagement as the way to protect the United States. They thought 
that taking the initiative to adapt forward defense to a transformed international 
system was the wisest way to preserve this engagement.
What about Gorbachev and his risky and even more important agenda for 
change in Europe?  The NATO moves helped him during the pivotal summer of 
1989 to make the necessary arguments at home and with communist allies in 
Eastern Europe.22 In a sense, both Bush and Gorbachev were now moving, in 
parallel and reciprocally, to tell their respective military leaders that they had to 
change the force posture they had followed for generations. All this, plus Baker’s 
personal diplomacy, also helped ease Gorbachev’s concerns about Bush’s calls 
for a “Europe whole and free” when Bush visited Germany in late May and 
traveled to Poland and Hungary in July 1989.
Yet it was still Europeans who would have the initiative to decide how Europe 
would change. The older Ostpolitik consensus accepted the Cold War status quo 
as the basis for rapprochement. In early 1989, West German foreign minister 
Genscher affirmed that understanding. Gorbachev elaborated on it with an ap-
proach that would preserve the fundamental status quo while allowing for political 
reform within those structures. He called for a “Common European Home” that 
would accept differing social systems and preserve the existing alliance systems.
So there was a notable contrast when, in a speech in Mainz at the end of May 
1989, Bush articulated the goal of a “Europe whole and free” (using a phrase 
coined by a speechwriter on Ross’s staff at the State Department). This goal 
plainly regarded the Cold War status quo as questionable: “The Cold War began 
with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole.” The Bush 
White House also planned to call attention to the German Question and the pos-
sibility of German unity. Separately, Baker and Zoellick had come to the same 
conclusion. Baker pressed the point directly with Bush, who was receptive. In 
late May 1989, Bush had told an interviewer that he would “love to see” Germa-
ny reunified. His explanation was from the heart: “Anybody who looks back over 
his shoulder and then looks at the present and sees a country ripped asunder by 
division, a people ripped asunder by political division, should say: ‘If you can 
get reunification on a proper basis, fine.’”23
22 As Bush saw it at the time, meeting with Italian prime minister Ciriaco De Mita, “Some say 
we’re cold warriors, that we don’t want Gorbachev to succeed. I’ve made clear that’s not the 
case.” Personal notes from the meeting, 27 May 1989.
23 Bush address, Mainz, Germany, 31 May 1989, in Public Papers, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=17085&st=&st1= (accessed 22 Apr. 2013). The “Europe whole and free” 
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Bush saw this German Question as a gut issue of trust. He had been deeply 
impressed when, as vice president, he had visited Germany during the height of 
the enormous protests over the NATO decision to deploy US intermediate-range 
missiles, the great alliance issue of the day. The then new chancellor, Helmut 
Kohl, had taken time to get to know his American visitor. Much later, Bush would 
still vividly recall demonstrators slinging rocks at his car without much security 
reaction (“Our Secret Service would have shot them!”) and sitting in a garage 
with Kohl waiting for a route to clear. This, it struck him, was a society willing 
to pay the price for free speech. Though he would readily acknowledge that, “I 
can’t claim to have understood everything that would happen in Europe from Day 
One,” Bush had come to a conclusion about West Germany and the Germans—
and their leader: “At some point you should let a guy up.”24
On Scowcroft’s staff, Blackwill and Zelikow wanted Bush to call out the 
unification issue in his Mainz speech and they put language to do this into the 
draft. Yet Scowcroft was uneasy about getting too far ahead of where the Germans 
themselves were on this issue. He worried about prematurely disturbing the Ost-
politik consensus. Finalizing the Mainz draft for Bush, Scowcroft muted the draft 
language to say only: “We seek self-determination for all of Germany and all of 
Eastern Europe.”25
But there was no doubt about Bush’s overall message. He was offering a clear 
objective of overcoming the division of Europe, one that contrasted sharply with 
the message Gorbachev offered a week later in Strasbourg. When Reagan had 
eloquently called on Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall, it was a speech-
writer’s phrase and there had been no serious follow-up. In a memoir of more 
than a thousand pages, Shultz does not even mention Reagan’s Berlin remarks.
Bush returned to Reagan’s theme. He hit it hard. “[T]here cannot be a common 
European home until all within it are free to move from room to room. […] Let 
Berlin be next.”26
phrase was in the initial State Department draft for the speech prepared by Harvey Sicherman, 
who had also worked for Shultz. See generally Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 28–29, 
31–32. On Baker and Zoellick’s views, see Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 159 (publishing notes 
from Baker’s meeting with Bush on 17 May). The May 1989 Bush interview was with Washing-
ton Times editor Arnaud de Borchgrave. De Borchgrave, “Bush ‘Would Love’ Reunited Germa-
ny,” Washington Times, 16 May 1989, A-1.
24 My interview with Bush, Houston, January 1995. In his memoir, Bush added additional anec-
dotes about a 1983 visit to the inter-German border. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 
182–83.
25 Earlier in May, Blackwill had sent Bush a memo pushing the unification issue again. Scowcroft 
sat on it for months, not sending it forward to Bush until August. Bush finally read it on 9 Sep-
tember. Ten days later, he found another chance to speak publicly about his support for unifica-
tion. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 380 n. 70. 
26 See Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 45–46. Hutchings concludes that: “At the beginning of 
1989, there had been three competing visions of Europe’s future—Gorbachev’s, Bush’s, and 
Genscher’s. By the time of the May 1989 NATO summit […] there was one.” After quoting the 
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Bush’s initiatives on arms control, adopted at a meeting of NATO heads of state 
in May 1989, and his stance toward Europe were extremely well received. The 
NATO summit success, followed immediately by the strikingly positive reception 
Bush received in Germany, seems to have bewildered the new president a bit. Bush 
felt he had to remind reporters that, “I’m the same guy I was four days ago.”27
A period of transition:  June–November 1989
Beyond the issues of the moment, which were soon forgotten outside of the 
professional community concerned with them, this early success had an effect on 
the president’s team, affecting the way they thought of themselves. It solidified 
habits of thought and habits of action. 
Historians sometimes do not pay enough attention to the inner rhythm, rou-
tines, and ways of doing things that mark leadership groups in all large institu-
tions.  Something is therefore often lost in describing their doings because the 
inhabitants of these little worlds are acutely aware of these characteristics.  In the 
case of the Bush administration, the successes of the spring of 1989 cemented 
several ways of doing business, some in the realm of high policy and some more 
mundane. Among these were:
-	 the basic policy directions on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Western 
Europe, NATO, and Germany;
-	 the readiness to consider bold moves (that might override Defense Department 
preferences);
-	 the habit of especially trusting coordination with the West Germans (especial-
ly the Chancellery);
-	 a comfort and confidence in managing complex coalition diplomacy;
-	 the decision-making style relying on an informal set of principles and an en-
trepreneurial role for the top aides; and
-	 a synergy between Baker and Scowcroft in the way they helped Bush.
Perhaps most important was the way this episode, and the subsequent trips to 
Poland and Hungary, built up Bush’s confidence in himself and his staff, his re-
liance on personal outreach to fellow leaders, and his trust in his own instincts.28
NATO summit agreement on the common goal, Hutchings adds: “With that, the United States 
had reversed the logic of the international agenda and offered a Western vision of Europe’s 
future that helped expose the limitations of Gorbachev’s ‘common European home’ even as it 
sought to extend the potential of Soviet ‘new thinking.’” Ibid., 46.
27 On the “enthusiastic welcome” for Bush’s initiatives from both the Bonn government and the 
opposition Social Democratic Party, see Dennis Bark and David Gress, A History of West Ger-
many, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 575–77. For the Bush quote, see Oberdorfer, The 
Turn, 351.
28 Bush remarked on the significance of the 1989 NATO summit for his presidency in 1993 discus-
sions with Condoleezza Rice as we were working on our book. For illustrative comments on the 
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For Eastern Europe, the US stance was to encourage self-determination and 
to intervene by promising support for countries that made a free choice about 
their destiny. That was Bush’s offer in his April speech about Eastern Europe. 
The United States did not want to intervene in a way that unduly alarmed the 
Soviets or encouraged a coup against Gorbachev. Yet it also did not want to do 
anything that would prop up the existing communist governments. Between April 
and August, the United States scrambled to assemble modestly useful but mainly 
symbolic gestures of encouragement to go with the euphoria that accompanied 
Bush’s visits to Warsaw and Budapest.
In August 1989 Poland put a non-communist-led coalition government in place 
for the first time since 1948, under Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Now Bush’s promise 
of support faced a sterner test. If communist governments chose to transform, the 
United States had promised to help. The Poles looked to see if the United States 
would keep that promise. The battle was over economic support to help Poland 
in particular, but also Hungary (and later others) make the transition to a post-com-
munist society. The most acute needs were for help in making their currencies 
convertible, access to credit for fiscal support and foreign exchange, and getting 
relief from the huge foreign debts the communist governments had barely been 
able to service.
From the start, even in April, the White House had encountered sharp resis-
tance to contemplating large-scale assistance to these countries from both the 
Treasury Department and the White House Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). Having made control of the federal deficit a major part of the domestic 
political agenda and already facing large costs from cleaning up the savings and 
loan crisis of the late 1980s, the OMB could not find the money without cutting 
something else.
The Treasury Department’s concern was different. Thanks in part to the hard 
money policies that cured endemic inflation in the developed countries, debt 
crises in developing countries had become a critical recurring problem since a 
near-default by Mexico in 1982. Having run for years from alarm to alarm, the 
US government had just fashioned (in March 1989) another major approach, 
named the “Brady plan” for Bush’s Treasury secretary. It promised significant 
debt forgiveness (usually around a third of the debt) and rescheduling of other 
debts, securitized in US Treasury bonds (“Brady bonds”) that were then bought 
by international institutions. All this was in exchange for domestic market-orient-
ed reform, including restraints on public sector spending. The Brady plan was 
working (and continued to work, eventually getting agreements from eighteen 
contrast in process between the “witches’ brew of intrigue” in the Reagan era, where “suspicion 
and mutual distrust was utterly out of control” and Bush’s (and others’) belief that the president 
had attained a process that worked “the way it was supposed to,” see Bush and Scowcroft, A 




countries).29 But it was not a good fit for socialist countries seeking debt relief. 
Bush and Brady understandably wanted to maintain the integrity of their global 
approach.
The policy challenge was novel. Though suggestive, analogies to the Marshall 
Plan and to reform plans in East Asia (as, for example, South Korea) were not 
terribly useful. More useful was the experience already accumulated in coping 
with developing country debt crises during the 1980s, since Western experts were 
developing a paradigm for thinking about the reform of state economies. But the 
new cases in Eastern Europe, led by Poland, presented this challenge in an ex-
treme form.
Poland broke through this policy logjam by presenting a plain choice to the 
West. The non-communist government developed (aided by Western advisers) a 
credible program for economic transition. Lacking any coherent alternative, it 
pioneered the development of a policy approach known, with good cause, as 
“shock therapy.” It involved an immediate transition to a convertible currency, 
with the prompt elimination of price controls and nearly balanced public budgets.
In exchange, the new Polish government asked (in September 1989) for help 
from outside governments in several forms: a billion dollar stabilization fund to 
sustain a convertible currency, credit lines from the IMF and the World Bank, 
suspension of debt servicing, and a program of debt relief that would write-down 
and reschedule loans without damage to Poland’s future access to credit markets. 
Poland also would need specific technical help and some targeted foreign money 
in working through structural adjustments.
The West, led by the United States, delivered on its part of the compact. As 
the Polish government adopted the internal plans by the end of 1989, the Stabi-
lization Fund was created (with contributions from seventeen countries, 20 per-
cent from the United States), the international financial institutions were playing 
their part, and the desired process of debt restructuring was underway. The Unit-
ed States helped organize new institutions, the G-24 and a European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, to provide more varied, longer-term support. 
The subsequent transition in Poland’s political economy was difficult, with very 
high inflation and great turmoil. But it was successful—at least measured against 
the original objectives of the Poles who led the program.30
29 See Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 49, 113–14. For positive contemporary assess-
ments of the Brady plan, see, e.g., William Cline, International Debt Reexamined (Washington: 
Institute for International Economics, 1995); and Riordan Roett, “The Debt Crisis and Econom-
ic Development in Latin America,” in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, eds., 
The United States and Latin America in the 1990s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1992), 131–51.
30 A good appraisal is Simon Johnson and Marzena Kowalska, “Poland: The Political Economy of 
Shock Therapy,” in Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb, eds., Voting for Reform (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, for the World Bank, 1994), 185–235, complemented by the brief material 
in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 138–40; and Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 
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The next formative period for development of a Bush administration approach 
on Germany, and policy toward the Soviet Union, came in the autumn of 1989, 
after the onset of the successive East German refugee crises in Hungary, then 
Czechoslovakia. As these crises reverberated back into East Germany itself, 
sparking large domestic demonstrations, forward-looking officials in all the major 
capitals began speculating about Germany’s future. 
Beginning in August 1989, the West German government led by Kohl began 
turning away from the spirit of Ostpolitik and instead, as the weeks passed, began 
actively undermining the East German regime. It did this by linking West German 
promises of aid with calls that the GDR must permit more political freedom.31
Beginning in September, Bush again announced his openness to German uni-
fication. “I think there has been a dramatic change in post-World War II Germa-
ny. And so, I don’t fear it […]. There is in some quarters a feeling—well, a re-
unified Germany would be detrimental to the peace of Europe, of Western Europe, 
some way; and I don’t accept that at all, simply don’t.”32 In October, as Kohl’s 
pressure on the East Germans was being widely criticized, Kohl reached out to 
Bush for help. Though Kohl only asked for Bush to find a way to say publicly 
that Western solidarity was the key to continued change in the East, Bush called 
in the top New York Times reporter and gave him his front-page lead: “I don’t 
share the concern that some European countries have about a reunified Germa-
ny.”33
At this point, opinion within his administration was still somewhat unsettled. 
Baker was leaning toward a fulsome endorsement, encouraged by Zoellick and 
Ross and by the new leadership of the State Department’s European bureau (Ray-
mond Seitz and James Dobbins). But there were other views within the State 
Department. The National Security Council staff was also split. Blackwill and I 
had been pressing to support moves toward unification since March. But Scow-
croft, as he himself recounts, “was skeptical about the wisdom of pursuing Ger-
man reunification and, in that sense, was probably closer to the [former] State 
72–76. Allusions to Marshall Plan analogies were common in 1989; Lech Wałęsa urged aid on 
this scale in his address to a joint session of Congress in late 1989. But much of this rhetoric was 
based on poor analogies to a Marshall Plan program that was (and is) not very widely understood 
and, as in Wałęsa’s case, there was no underlying proposal. The Mazowiecki government was 
working the plan that had been developed under the leadership of its economics chief, Leszek 
Balcerowicz. Among the most influential of the Western economic advisers to the Polish re-
formers in 1989 and 1990 were Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton. In addition to their substantive 
expertise, these experts and a few others played a vital bridging role between the Poles, the US 
government, and the international institutions. Thus some of the important strategic planning by 
the governments occurred in this nongovernmental space.
31 See Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 63–81; Sarotte, 1989, 28–33.
32 Quoted in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 81. The statement was made on 18 September.
33 The New York Times story, by R.W. “Johnny” Apple, was published on 25 October. For context, 
see Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 81, 94, 398–99 notes 94 and 98.
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position than that of my own staff.” For Scowcroft, “what was wrong with a 
divided Germany as long as the situation was stable?”34
Bush’s October statement settled the issue within his administration. The con-
flicting views among his advisers had an interesting effect. It freed Bush to feel 
he could just go ahead and vent his personal preferences. He had not been looking 
to force the issue. Indeed, he later wrote, “[i]f the NSC or State Department had 
argued it was a bad idea, I certainly would have been receptive. I was not about 
to impose my own view on this highly controversial matter.” But the advice Bush 
had been getting was alternately encouraging or, at worst, conflicting. So he felt 
able to follow “a comfort level with it [leaning forward on German unification] 
that others did not yet have, just as I was more comfortable with trying to do more 
in terms of arms control with the Soviet Union than, say, was the Defense De-
partment.” In these circumstances Bush could “probably set a different tone for 
the Administration on the issue than it might otherwise have had.”35
A period of rapid maneuver: November 1989–November 1990
On 9–10 November the Berlin Wall opened through an unplanned administra-
tive snafu by the newly formed “reform” communist government of the GDR. 
The popular ferment in East Germany bubbled over and swept away that govern-
ment, and, by the end of the year, every other remaining Warsaw Pact government 
in Eastern Europe. An intense period of diplomatic negotiations followed, on 
which there are now several reliable accounts.36
Though the Bush administration, like other involved governments, had not 
anticipated the immediacy and tempo of what followed, its strategic planning for 
this period of tumultuous change was substantially in place before 9 November. 
34 For details on the internal administration discussions about unification in September and Oc-
tober, which included the development of a suggestive draft national security directive (useful 
more for the thinking that went into it than for the product), see Zelikow and Rice, Germa-
ny Unified, 93–95, and especially 396–99 notes 90 and 93. For Scowcroft’s quotes, Bush and 
Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 188–89.
35 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 188. Blackwill, joined by Hutchings, actually wa-
vered about fomenting German unification for a short time, later in December 1989. At that 
particular moment they were worried about the mischief the Soviet government might make at a 
German peace conference and they asked Scowcroft to consider ways to slow down the process. 
This time it was Scowcroft’s turn to press the cause of going forward with unification. He knew 
Bush had already settled the issue. By January 1990 Blackwill was back to flooring the gas ped-
al. See Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 154–55, 159–60.
36 Two excellent recent works are Sarotte, 1989; and Frederic Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the 
Cold War, and German Unification (Providence: Berghahn, 2009). For a broad overview of how 
the domestic German factors interacted with the international situation, Sarotte is good. See also 
the thoughtful review essay by Noel Cary, “‘Farewell without Tears’: Diplomats, Dissidents, and 
the Demise of East Germany,” Journal of Modern History 73, no. 3 (September 2001): 617–51.
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Both in style and substance, the team worked through the whirl of issues along 
the lines laid out earlier in 1989. Rather than provide a lengthy recapitulation, I 
offer this list of key policy elements:
-	 The United States proceeded to facilitate the transition of East European states 
toward political independence and internal transformation.
-	 The United States strongly encouraged Gorbachev to restrain from using force, 
even when the issue became whether Moscow would hold together all the 
components of the Soviet Union itself. For those choices, the fulcrum turned 
out to be Soviet policy toward Lithuania—especially during May 1990 and 
January 1991.
-	 In November and December 1989, the United States joined Kohl in pushing 
ahead with unification as the goal, with the unified Germany embedded firm-
ly both in NATO and in the European Community.
-	 In early 1990, the United States joined Kohl in choosing to push German 
unification on the fastest possible timetable. This was done in order to gather 
the hay before the expected storm (the metaphor used by Kohl); in order to 
retain the initiative and keep the diplomacy of opponents off balance; and in 
order to build up the plausibility of a choice for unity on Western terms with-
in the East German electorate (looking to their March 1990 election). This 
policy preferred the rapid absorption of the GDR into the FRG, rather than 
opt for the lengthy and painstaking construction of a new kind of German 
republic.
-	 To reciprocate Soviet moves, but also to put a floor under planned cuts, the 
United States enlarged its plans to cut forces in Europe and remove more than 
a third of the US forces that had been stationed in Europe when 1989 began.
-	 In February 1990 the United States firmed up first its own, and then the allied, 
position on just how a unified Germany would remain part of NATO—intact 
and fully integrated into NATO’s military structure, with a special military 
status for eastern Germany.
-	 Also in February, the powers developed a process, the Two Plus Four, for 
negotiating the international aspects of German unification. The United States 
then led the way in choreographing how that process would work, allowing 
internal unification to rush ahead and subcontracting certain tasks—like the 
vital security negotiations and treatment of German troop limits—to the Con-
ventional Forces in Europe (CFE) process, which itself was moving toward 
agreement at a linked and astonishingly fast pace, given the enormity of the 
contemplated cuts in armed forces across all of Europe.
-	 In the spring and summer of 1990, the United States led a program to preserve 
NATO and extend its appeal by redefining the alliance approach to forward 
defense and flexible response. Also, NATO would receive ambassadors from 
all the former Warsaw Pact countries, thus laying the groundwork for an en-
larged vision of the alliance. All this culminated in another NATO summit 
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triumph for Bush, this one in July 1990.
-	 In late 1989, and again in the spring of 1990, the United States followed and 
welcomed moves, led by France and Germany, to complete the process of 
European monetary union and develop an agenda for European political union.
-	 In the spring and summer of 1990, the United States watched moves, led by 
Germany, to provide significant concessionary loans to the Soviet Union. 
These German loans were extended on a moderate scale in May 1990 and then 
the loans to the Soviets were made on a very large scale in September.
All these moves culminated in a set of three major international agreements 
(not counting the European Union moves). In September 1990, the two German 
states and the former four occupying powers signed the Final Settlement for 
Germany that was both the long-deferred peace treaty of World War II and a peace 
treaty for the Cold War. 
In November 1990, all the states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the 
CFE treaty. This erased the conventional military imbalance that had been a 
seemingly permanent feature of Europe’s political landscape since 1944.  The 
treaty led to the withdrawal and destruction of vast amounts of military equip-
ment, and introduced a control regime with thousands of on-site inspections of 
bases across Europe. 
Also in November 1990, all European states signed the Charter of Paris. They 
agreed on basic principles that would govern political and economic life, includ-
ing provisions for the conduct of free elections.
As foreseen in 1989, the elimination of the older conventional military imbal-
ance did transform the environment for considering the future of nuclear arms in 
Europe. With CFE being implemented, hoping to avoid another laborious arms 
control negotiation, in September 1991 Bush took the lead. He moved unilater-
ally to withdraw almost all US nuclear forces from Europe. Gorbachev promptly 
followed suit.
Evolution, revolution, or something in between?
Reviewing the options available to the United States as a strategic goal in 
1990, Sarotte observes that the United States consistently chose what she calls a 
“prefab” approach, relying on existing institutions. The notion of building on 
familiar, seemingly reassuring institutions is basically right. Bush and his team 
had not only developed a strong set of beliefs; they also felt comfortable with 
wielding known institutional settings for action. So when change became even 
more rapid, they felt prepared.
But the designs were not, in fact, prefabricated for the fall of communism. 
There was some innovation, especially for Eastern Europe. Even the established 
ideas and institutions had to be adapted and extended in various ways that excit-
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ed occasional controversies within the US government and with close allies. In 
all of this work, Bush and his advisers were experimenting with ingredients they 
thought they understood. But they could not just think of themselves. They had 
to work, wanted to work, with ingredients their partners understood and would 
find comforting.
Fidelity to the alliance and “forward defense” were at least as important, and 
reassuring, to their European colleagues. In some accounts, the tone is one of 
Americans pressing the importance of NATO or the need for a continued American 
presence. It is perfectly true that the Americans felt this. In December 1989, speak-
ing to European leaders, Bush solemnly pledged to keep US troops in Europe as 
long as their presence was desired and, he stated as bluntly as he could: “The 
United States will remain a European power.”37 The statement was released. His 
advisers who drafted this language wondered how Europeans and Americans would 
react to such a frank assertion. Yet there was no noticeable reaction at all, least of 
all from Europe. Most European leaders found reassurance in the same verities.
The “prefab” appearance of the 1990 settlements can make the strategic plans 
of the time seem conservative. Yet in the winter of 1989–90, the US approach on 
German unification and the associated issues hardly seemed to be conservative, 
in the sense of conserving a status quo. Nor was the US government following 
the conventional wisdom of leading commentators. Its position was more radical 
than almost any of the published ideas suggested by observers on either left or 
right, including such notable figures as Henry Kissinger or George Kennan.38 
Recalling one episode where Bush pushed through further US troop cuts over the 
objections of the rest of the government, Scowcroft remembered that Bush’s 
“approach could hardly have been further from his public image of caution.”39
By aiming so directly at the victory of its known and preferred concepts and 
institutions, the Bush administration deliberately courted high short-term risk in 
the hope of greatly reducing risk for the long haul. In one note to Scowcroft, Rice 
mused openly that if the proposed course was followed, “and this is a hunch,” 
she “would spend a lot of time in church praying that I was right.”40 No new 
experimentation with how to create a healthy German republic. No new experi-
mentation with how to keep Europe safe. If that meant a near-term confrontation 
with the Soviet Union, then so be it. And having a clear design put the burden 
on others to offer an alternative that was at least as plausible.
37 “Outline of Remarks, NATO Headquarters,” 4 December 1989, in Public Papers, http://bush-
library.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1297&year=1989&month=12 (accessed 23 
Apr. 2013). 
38 See, for example, the catalog of opinions in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 407 note 45. 
Note also the catalog of expert opinion at the time reviewed in William Wohlforth, “How Did the 
Experts Do?,” in Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro, eds., In Uncertain Times: American Foreign 
Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 163–78.
39 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 208.
40 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 160.
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In the period after the Berlin Wall fell, the US government faced a dilemma 
akin to that of a ship’s captain in the age of sail. The ship is sailing toward a 
harbor. Ominous storm clouds gather and the seas get rough. The channel into 
the harbor is narrow, with rocks on each side. Navigating it would be hazardous 
even on a fair day. The alternative is to put out to sea, to ride out the storm or 
seek some other harbor. Seeing the reassuring lights of a safe harbor he trusted, 
Bush chose to shoot through the channel.
Aftermath
Just as the European issues were coming together so well, on the evening of 
1 August 1990, Bush was resting some aching muscles after relaxing in his usu-
al hyperactive style, whacking too many golf balls on a practice range. That is 
when he learned that Iraq had just sent its tanks to overrun its practically unarmed 
neighbor, Kuwait. The president described his first reflection on what was at stake 
in this way: 
I was keenly aware that this would be the first post-Cold War test of the [UN] Security Council 
in crisis. I knew what had happened in the 1930s when a weak and leaderless League of Nations 
had failed to stand up to Japanese, Italian, and German aggression. The result was to encourage 
the ambitions of those regimes. The UN had been set up to correct the failings of the League, but 
the Cold War caused stalemate in the Security Council. Now, however our improving relations 
with Moscow and our satisfactory ones with China offered the possibility that we could get their 
cooperation for forging international unity to oppose Iraq.41
The next morning, having worked all night on immediate actions, Scowcroft 
was “frankly appalled” when many of the President’s advisers (Baker was in Asia) 
did not seem to grasp the situation. “There was a huge gap between those who 
saw what was happening as the major crisis of our time and those who treated it 
as the crisis du jour.” Bush and Scowcroft quickly reset the tone, with the help 
of others who supported them, like Eagleburger and Cheney.42
The positive developments in Europe strongly affected the way Bush saw the 
Iraq issue. He and Scowcroft felt they were at a moment when Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt’s unrealized dreams for the postwar world might at last be coming to 
fruition. For later generations who want to understand why Bush and some of his 
41 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 303. On American policy and the events immediate-
ly leading to the war, see ibid., 304–14; Zachary Karabell and Philip Zelikow with Ernest May, 
Kirsten Lundberg, and Robert Johnson, “Iraq, 1988–1990: Unexpectedly Heading toward War,” 
in Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, eds., Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy 
and Intelligence Analysis, 1945–1990 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 167–202; and Richard 
Haass, War of Necessity War of Choice (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 25–31, 44–59.
42 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 317–24 (quote from page 317). I accompanied Bush 
and Scowcroft on their 2 August trip to Aspen and had a little involvement in what followed. See 
also Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 222–38.
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aides reacted so strongly to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it is essential to sense— 
as they did—the startling juxtaposition of this moment of immense promise in 
the great European/global struggle with the kind of law of the jungle that seemed 
exemplified by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
Partly inchoate, people of Bush’s, Scowcroft’s, and Baker’s generation carried 
in their formative memories a conception and corollary hopes for a revitalized 
United Nations and a United States working with it, that echoed Roosevelt’s in-
fluential vision of great power “policemen” who would stand up to the occasion-
al rogue state in order to secure what Bush would later call a “new world order.”43 
By August 1990 Bush and Scowcroft saw a new world emerging, full of hopes 
that Roosevelt would instantly have understood.
43 FDR began using the “police” metaphor in envisioning a postwar world by August 1941, build-
ing it up by 1942 to a notion of four policemen (“the United States, England, and Russia and 
perhaps China”) which he adhered to for the rest of his life. Warren Kimball, The Juggler: 
Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 85–86. 
The “new world order” concept was mentioned in a November 1990 Bush address in Prague. 
The concept has antecedents, including Bush’s “commonwealth of free nations” phrase that, in 
the Prague speech, is pared down to “commonwealth of freedom.” It is no coincidence that Bush 
would choose newly liberated Prague as the venue for this policy address. For more on the elder 
Bush’s “new world order” concept, see Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 143–49.
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OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND BIG POLITICS 
IN THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY1
When Mikhail Gorbachev arrived for the celebrations of the fortieth anniver-
sary of the GDR on 6 October 1989, there was already some discord between the 
East German SED leadership under Erich Honecker and the Soviet leader. 
Honecker had criticized Gorbachev’s approach to perestroika, the clearest expres-
sion of this being the GDR’s ban in November 1988 on sales of the magazine 
Sputnik, a journal published by the Soviet news agency Novosti for foreign 
countries. But it was clear that the SED could not observe the state’s anniversary 
without the Soviet leader; if he were absent at such a celebration it would have 
been a political scandal. After landing at Schönefeld Airport, Gorbachev’s dele-
gation was driven into the city in a car, encountering people shouting “Gorby, 
Gorby!” and holding up pro-Gorbachev signs. Only one man, a single person, 
was holding up a different sign which read “Keep it up, Erich.” Gorbachev turned 
to his comrades: “There must be something we haven’t noticed.”2
Actually, with the intelligence apparatus of both the GDR and the Soviet Union, 
as well as the developments threatening in Poland, Hungary and above all the 
Baltic states,3 it seems hardly possible that Moscow was unaware of the profound 
significance of the opposition and the change of attitude in the population, both 
in those places and in the GDR. The number of Ausreiser, the GDR refugees 
1 This chapter is based on my book Die Vereinigung Deutschlands—ein weltpolitisches Macht-
spiel, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2009), which has also appeared in Russian and is planned to 
be published in English. During the last ten years, some of the state chancelleries and foreign 
ministries in different countries have published selections of their records concerning the re-
unification of Germany, as was already done by the German State Chancellery and Foreign 
Ministry. Publications of documents from British and French governmental institutions and the 
Gorbachev Foundation have followed. The most important statements of governments from the 
other involved countries have already appeared in these publications. These volumes of docu-
ments have essentially confirmed the picture as drawn in my book, which is based mainly on the 
records of the East and West German governments, the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, 
as well as on interviews with politicians in East and West. Concerning the dissidents and oppo-
sitional movements, see e.g., Alexander von Plato and Tomas Vilimek with Piotr Filipkowski 
and Joanna Wawrzyniak (eds.), Opposition als Lebensform. Lebensgeschichten von Dissidenten 
in der DDR, der ČSSR und in Polen (Münster: Lit, 2012).
2 On these events, cf. Plato, Die Vereinigung, 52–63.
3 The “Baltic Chain of Freedom and Independence” occurred on 23 August. On the revolution 
in the Baltic states, see Karsten Brüggemann, “‘One Day We Will Win Anyway’: The ‘Singing 
Revolution’ in the Soviet Baltic Republics,” in this volume, 221–46.
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taking refuge in West German embassies, had grown to such proportions that the 
Federal Republic’s missions in East Berlin (8 August 1989), Budapest (14 August), 
Prague (23 August) and later in Warsaw (19 September) had to be closed because 
of sheer overcrowding. As had happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1971 and 
Poland in the 1970s and 80s, the communist party in the GDR—the SED (Sozia-
listische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Socialist Unity Party of Germany)—had 
also seen large parts of the society distancing themselves from the party. During 
the 1980s, contacts, networks and structures had emerged that went far beyond 
those that had formed in the 1960s and 70s, both within the Lutheran Church, 
which had become a refuge for dissent, and without. Just a month before the for-
ty-year jubilee, the opposition movement New Forum (Neues Forum) had been 
established. In the group’s inaugural proclamation of 10 September 1989,4 a new 
direction was unmistakable: They wanted to emerge from the refuge of the church 
and its small opposition groups, and move into the mainstream of society—and 
with this, to fight for the legalization of free debate. This was one of the New 
Forum’s greatest achievements. Within a few weeks, over 100,000 people had 
signed its proclamation, and by late 1989, a few months later, it had become a 
million, as has been asserted by one of the founders, Rolf Henrich,5 although the 
number of supporters had become so many, he could no longer count them. He 
burned the lists, as he was still concerned for the signatories’ safety. Soon after 
the New Forum was founded, a number of other groups, such as the Democratic 
Awakening (Demokratischer Aufbruch), were also formally established. Gor-
bachev himself had become a beacon of hope to which one could appeal.
While these new developments were probably known to the CPSU’s general 
secretary, until then it did not appear they would shake the GDR to its foundations. 
At the anniversary celebrations, Erich Honecker did everything he could to pre-
sent the GDR as a haven of political and economic stability.
But during the evening festivities on 7 October, when the GDR’s official youth 
organization, the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend, FDJ), conducted a 
torchlight parade past the tribune of the guests of honor, shouts of “Gorby, Gorby” 
could be heard from the FDJ columns, as well as calls of “perestroika.” In his 
memoirs, Gorbachev recalled that Mieczysław Rakowski, Polish prime minister, 
even translated the words “Gorbachev, save us!” to him. Regarding these rows of 
FDJ members, Rakowski emphasized: “These are party activists. This is the end.”6 
After Honecker’s rather hostile reception, Gorbachev might well have been pleased 
to have become an inspiration to many people, but he was deeply troubled. 
It is possible to conclude from these reactions that the oppositional streams, 
which had even reached the party youth, alarmed those in power in the East 
deeply; they began to sense what could threaten their rule. This was the case, 
4 The original document is in the collection of the Haus der Geschichte Bonn, 1990/6/104.
5 Interview Alexander von Plato with Rolf Henrich, 9 August 2007. 
6 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 524. 
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despite the fact that they didn’t even know about the protests being held in Ber-
lin and other cities in the GDR, or the fact that they were being repressed.
Gorbachev’s concern grew “when, after Honecker was replaced, a real picture 
of the situation came to light.”7 The newly installed SED leader, Egon Krenz, took 
a trip to Moscow on 31 October 1989—three weeks after the jubilee and two weeks 
after Honecker had been removed from office—carrying a quite blunt account of 
the economic and political situation in the GDR in his luggage. The concern was 
even greater since the Soviet Union had extreme economic difficulties: A crisis-rid-
den GDR would become a millstone around the Soviet neck, both financially and 
politically.8 Gorbachev sent Krenz back to Berlin with this advice: He should be-
come more internationally involved with the Soviet Union, since this will “help 
your political relations with the FRG.” A little later, one of Gorbachev’s key policies 
became the “Soviet Union, East and West Germany triangle.”9 Krenz left knowing 
that no economic aid could be expected from the Soviet big brother.
What is more, Krenz had asked the general secretary whether the Soviet Union 
still stood by its “paternity” relationship with the GDR. After all, the GDR was 
a child of the Soviet Union and, as it reads in the Soviet protocol of the meeting, 
“decent people support their children; they certainly allow them to carry the fa-
ther’s name. (Lively).”10 Gorbachev is said to have replied: 
How can you even ask a question like that? Actually, I don’t know any reasonable politician 
who wants German unity, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl [...] You must know that all serious 
politicians, including Thatcher and Mitterrand, Andreotti and Jaruzelski, even the Americans, 
although new shades are visible in their position—no one wants a reunification.11
When interviewed, Krenz offered a different version of the discussion. Ac-
cording to him, Gorbachev remained silent after being asked about the Soviet 
paternity, spoke quietly with his interpreter, and then quoted a Russian proverb: 
“Even a very long thread has an end.”12 Thus, even Krenz became aware of what 
lay ahead. 
7 In a letter he wrote to me dated 6 March 2001. 
8 Gorbachev’s shock is also clear in the German transcript of his conversation with Krenz, where 
it reads: “Is it really that bad?” and “I didn’t think the situation was that precarious.” Conversa-
tion Krenz with Gorbachev, East German protocol, 1 November 1989, in Bundesarchiv (BA), 
SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319, 128–69, here 142. 
9 Only two days after the meeting with Krenz, Gorbachev used this expression. Politburo pro-
tocol, 3 November 1989, in A. Chernyaev, V. Medvedev, G. Shakhnazarov, eds., V Politbyuro 
TsK KPSS… Po zapisam Anatoliya Chernyaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiya Shakhnazarova 
(1985–1991) (Moscow: Alpina Bizness Buks, 2006), 448–51, 451. Later Gorbachev mentioned 
this triangle repeatedly.
10 Conversation Gorbachev with Krenz, Soviet protocol, 1 November 1989, in Gorbachev Founda-
tion (GF), 89NOV01. The word “lively” is also recorded.
11 Ibid.  
12 As based on an interview of Hans-Christoph Blumenberg with Egon Krenz 1999 as well as 
some of my interviews with international politicians. These interviews were made for Blumen-
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The existence of two German states, as Gorbachev declared in his talk with 
Krenz and then repeated again and again in the following months, was the result 
and a condition “of our successful politics.” Reunification was not on the agenda.
On 3 November 1989, shortly after Krenz’s visit, the Politburo of the CPSU 
Central Committee held a session. There, Gorbachev declared that “The GDR is 
living beyond its means by up to a third,”  and intelligence chief Vladimir Kryu-
chkov announced that the next day, 4 November 1989, one million protesters 
would go onto the streets in Berlin.13 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze remarked: 
“It would be better if they [the Germans] got rid of the ‘Wall’ themselves.” Per-
spicaciously, Gorbachev said: “They will sell out down to their guts. […] And 
when they step out onto the world market, their standard of living will drop 
immediately.”
All this reveals the pressure that the Soviet leadership felt from the opposition 
(and from the economic decline). And this was not only felt by the Soviet gov-
ernment, but also by all the other governments involved in the process. Up to and 
including November 1989—and this is my first basic thesis—the key players in 
the rush of events were the opposition movements.
International politics until December 1989
But international political protagonists, who until autumn 1989 had seemed 
only to be following the oppositional movements, were also active.
In March 1989, George H.W. Bush, the US president, who at that time was 
relatively fresh in office, urged that a new policy be followed by NATO and its 
member states in response to Gorbachev’s compelling motto “Common Europe-
an Home.” The national security advisor at the time, General Brent Scowcroft, 
together with his assistant Philip Zelikow, was significantly involved in drafting 
the new policy.
In the so-called Scowcroft Memorandum, which was also written by Zelikow, 
it reads: 
Today, the top priority for American foreign policy in Europe should be the fate of the Feder-
al Republic of Germany. […] Even if we make strides in overcoming the division of Europe 
through greater openness and pluralism, we cannot have a vision for Europe’s future that does 
not include an approach to the “German question.”14
berg’s TV documentary Deutschlandspiel, on German reunification. First broadcast on Zweites 
Deutsches Fernsehen on 29 September 2000.
13 Politburo protocol, 3 November 1989, 589ff, GF. Gorbachev’s remark on the deficit of the GDR 
is not mentioned in the published version and the following remark by Kryuchkov is reduced to 
500,000. Chernyaev, Medvedev, Shakhnazarov, V Politbyuro, 450. 
14 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 28. 
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As explained later by Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, the aim of this state-
ment, which was controversial even among American strategists, was to put the 
“German question” back onto the agenda, even if it was contrary to Gorbachev’s 
line.15 Shortly after the fortieth anniversary celebration of NATO in Brussels, in 
May, Bush visited West Germany and gave a speech at the Rheingold Hall in 
Mainz:
[L]et Europe be whole and free. To the founders of the Alliance, this aspiration was a distant 
dream, and now it’s the new mission of NATO. […] The Cold War began with the division of 
Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole. […] there cannot be a common European home 
until all within it are free to move from room to room. […] We seek self-determination for all of 
Germany and all of Eastern Europe. […] Let Berlin be next.16
According to Scowcroft, this speech was actually supposed to have been even 
more direct, but they did not want to compromise Chancellor Kohl.17
West Germany was now to become, because of the needed unification policy, 
a “partner in leadership”—a role that until then had been held by Great Britain.18 
Horst Teltschik, the official responsible for foreign and security policy in the West 
German chancellery, does not believe that the Americans were the actual inaugu-
rators of the new unification policy in Europe, but confirms that the German 
response to the US invitation in the direction of their being a “partner in leader-
ship” should have been clearer.19
Central to this policy was the role of NATO. As stated by Condoleezza Rice:
It is true that the United States had really only one concern—and that was that German unifica-
tion not destroy NATO. Because NATO was the force for peace in Germany, it was America’s 
anchor in Europe. And so the one concern was that German unification not destroy NATO. But 
there was absolutely no concern that somehow, by allowing Germany to unify—and the Ameri-
cans, by the way, insisted that it unify with no new constraints on its power—that somehow this 
was going to be a bad thing for Europe, this simply wasn’t in the American psyche.20
The United States, together with the Federal Republic of Germany, maintained 
this policy through the entire process. The policy met US and (West) German 
15 Scowcroft stated: “I think, fundamentally it was Gorbachev, who was speaking some wonderful 
words. But thus far in early ’89 the words were not matched by actions, and the structures of the 
Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe were still in place. So what we wanted to see were ac-
tions which would start to dismantle those structures. And, of course, crucial to it all was Berlin 
and German reunification. That would be a clear signal that the Cold War was over.” Interview 
Alexander von Plato with Brent Scowcroft, 14 September 1999.
16 For extracts from Bush’s speech at the Rheingold-Halle, see Zelikow and Rice, Germany, 31. 
17 Interview Alexander von Plato with Brent Scowcroft, 14 September 1999.
18 This formulation caused Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher “a bit of unintended disquiet […]. 
Thatcher took this as a challenge to the special relationship between the United States and Brit-
ain. In truth, she need not have worried.” George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Trans-
formed (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 83–84.
19 Plato, Die Vereinigung, 21.
20 Interview Alexander von Plato with Condoleezza Rice, Stanford University, 17 September 1999.
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interests, and these determined further diplomacy,21 especially Helmut Kohl’s 
Ten-Point Plan of 28 November 1989. Much of this plan was written by Teltsch-
ik after being visited by members of the International Department of the CPSU 
Central Committee22 and, just a day later, being presented Bush’s “four princi-
ples.” A week later, on 4 December 1989, the president repeated these principles 
at the NATO summit in Brussels: self-determination; commitment to NATO; 
“peaceful and gradual reunification”; and confirmation “of the existing borders 
in Europe.”23
From the end of November 1989—and this is my second basic thesis—the US 
State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
took the reins into their own hands, supported only in part by the GDR opposition. 
Although not always consistent, the opposition in the East did not initially support 
reunification and even less, it being under NATO’s umbrella.
For the United States, this American-German policy was to become its most 
successful program in Europe since the Marshall Plan of 1947.
On military non-interference
Under General Secretary Gorbachev, Soviet troops had already been brought 
back from the war in Afghanistan between May 1988 and February 1989. From 
then on, the Soviet Union basically followed a policy of military non-intervention, 
also with regard to the Soviet satellite states. On 7 and 8 July 1989, after quite a 
long prologue, a doctrine that had never formally existed was officially carried 
to the grave in Bucharest: the Brezhnev Doctrine.24 This doctrine had been un-
derstood as granting the option of interference and military intervention in other 
Warsaw Pact member states, as had been put into practice in Czechoslovakia in 
1968. The significance for Germany’s reunification of this shift to military non-in-
tervention cannot be overestimated. Gorbachev’s policies also aimed at disarma-
21 As nice as it is, there is little I can agree with in Norman Naimark’s picture of the Bush adminis-
tration sitting on its hands and oversleeping with regard to the situation: the Bush administration 
was surely one of the most proactive in eliminating the division of Europe and Germany, espe-
cially during the initial period in 1989. Cf. Norman M. Naimark, “The Superpowers and 1989 in 
Eastern Europe,” in this volume, 249–70.
22 See my interviews with Horst Teltschik, 27 September 1999; and Nikolai Portugalov, 1 Novem-
ber 1999. Cf. Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 
44; Plato, Die Vereinigung, 113–19.
23 Concerning Bush’s four principles, see Plato, Die Vereinigung, 145; Zelikow and Rice, Germa-
ny, 223.
24 The declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact of 7 July 1989 
stressed the principle of non-interference in internal affairs as well as each state’s right to 
self-determination and to choose its own path of social and political development. Tagung des 
Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages (Berlin: 
Dietz, 1989), 14–26.
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ment and reconciliation with the West, since defense costs were strangling the 
Soviet Union and the “military-industrial complex” dominated its politics.25 The 
deeper political meaning of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost can only be 
found if they are seen against the background of this head-on challenge, although 
from today’s perspective, the theory and its details do not seem especially revo-
lutionary.
It is particularly surprising that Gorbachev’s generals did not intervene in the 
GDR during the entire year of 1989, although according to Heinz Kessler, the 
GDR’s minister of defense, there was “not a single Soviet general” in the GDR 
who supported Gorbachev’s policies.26
Kessler’s deputy, army general Fritz Streletz, even reports that General Boris 
Snetkov, the supreme commander of the Soviet troops, gave him the following 
“offer”:  “Comrade Streletz, I stress again that if the National People’s Army [of 
the GDR] needs help or support, the group [of Soviet Forces in Germany] is ready 
to give any kind of assistance to their brothers-in-arms, the NPA.”27 But the So-
viet troops stayed in their barracks.
Gorbachev’s vacillating reactions
In early December 1989, a strategy emerged in Washington and Bonn: reuni-
fication under the umbrella of NATO. What remained unclear, however, was the 
question of time: How long was reunification expected to take? At that time, the 
government leaders Kohl and Bush also believed that reunification would be a 
long process taking years, if not decades. But the events developed their own 
dynamics, and these pushed for faster solutions.
How did Gorbachev’s government in Moscow respond to the subsequent ac-
tions of the United States and West Germany?
At first, Gorbachev and his foreign minister Shevardnadze were outraged. 
During his visit in early December 1989 to Moscow, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the 
West German foreign minister, was given a taste of this indignation: It was 
thought that Kohl wanted to exploit the plight of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. The Germans should remember where, in the past, a policy without rhyme 
or reason had led. And, according to the Soviet protocol of the meeting, Shevard-
nadze added: “Not even Hitler would have allowed such a thing.”28
25 This expression was used within the closest circle of advisors. Georgi Schachnasarow, Preis der 
Freiheit. Eine Bilanz von Gorbatschows Berater (Bonn: Bouvier, 1996). This is confirmed by 
Aleksandr Yakovlev, who was also one of Gorbachev’s advisors. Plato, Die Vereinigung, 206.
26 Interview Hans-Christoph Blumenberg with Heinz Keßler, 1999. Cf. Plato, Die Vereinigung, 70.
27 Interview Hans-Christoph Blumenberg with Fritz Streletz, 1999. Cf. Ibid.
28 Conversation Gorbachev with Genscher, Soviet protocol, 5 December 1989, in GF, 89DEC05. 
In his memoirs, Genscher does not mention this sentence or other pointed remarks. This is un-
derstandable, since at the time this defused the situation. But why he still does not mention it, 
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Next, Gorbachev stressed the need of two German states for peace in Europe, 
with the GDR a guarantor of this peace, just as the two alliances, the Warsaw 
Pact and NATO, were needed. He repeated this view through all of December 
1989 and until the end of January 1990, regardless of whether he was speaking 
to Bush, the Warsaw Pact, or at the 4 December 1989 meeting of the Political 
Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow.
This strategy was championed even during Mitterrand’s visit to Gorbachev in 
Kiev on 6 December 1989, despite the fact that the French president hinted at a 
different strategy of his own. Mitterrand stated while there:
The German question should not determine the European process, but vice versa. And: In the first 
place—I repeat—must stand European integration, East European development, the pan-Euro-
pean process, and the creation of a European peace order. If the United States participates, that 
would give us additional guarantees.29
This is one of the few moments in which Mitterrand’s early hopes of a new 
European security system can be seen. Gorbachev did not respond and Mitterrand 
was disappointed.30
The Soviet leadership continued to stress that the existence of the GDR guar-
anteed peace in Europe. Then, from December until the end of January 1990, they 
began to advocate a neutral Germany, as the advisor to Gorbachev and Politburo 
member Aleksandr Yakovlev did at an important meeting on 25 January, at which 
the Soviet leadership decided, in principle, to agree to German reunification.31 
Nobody opposed. A few days later, this neutrality strategy was presented to the 
new East German prime minister, Hans Modrow, who had himself developed a 
similar strategy.32
US secretary of state Baker, during a visit to Moscow in early February 1990, 
tried to convince Gorbachev that Russia and the Soviet Union, after being sub-
jected to Germany during two world wars, could not possibly be interested in 
leaving a united Germany neutral. He even guaranteed that NATO would not 
stretch “an inch” eastward.33 This guarantee lasted only a day, whereupon it was 
revoked by the US president. But the Soviet leadership did not know this, and 
ten years later, Russian protagonists called it a pledge not kept. Baker, however, 
does not mention this “guarantee” in his memoirs.
even years after reunification, is difficult to understand. It is possibly out of personal consider-
ation for Gorbachev and Shevardnadze.
29 Conversation Gorbachev with Mitterrand, Soviet protocol, 6 December 1989, in GF, 89DEC06.
30 Plato, Die Vereinigung, 138.
31 See the extended extracts of this meeting in Plato, Die Vereinigung, 187–99. However, in my 
opinion it was not precisely declared that the Soviet Union would accept German unification. 
Nonetheless it was discussed.
32 Conversation Gorbachev with Modrow, Soviet protocol, 30 January 1990, in GF, 90JAN30.
33 Conversation Gorbachev with Baker, Soviet protocol, 9 February 1990, in GF, 90Feb9b. Cf. 
Plato, Die Vereinigung, 240.
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In February 1990, Gorbachev argued for the two Germanys to be members in 
both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. And then he sounded out the idea, from March 
1990, of a new structure for security in Europe, whereby NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact would be dissolved. The first time this idea turned up on the Soviet side was 
after Mitterrand’s visit to Kiev on 6 December 1989, as Teltschik mentioned on 
22 February 1990 in a paper for Chancellor Kohl before his meeting with Presi-
dent Bush: Gorbachev and Shevardnadze would “try to use the German question 
as a lever for an all-European security system.”34 Teltschik also reported a con-
versation on 28 March 1990 he had with Nikolai Portugalov, a member of the 
International Department of the Central Committee, during which Teltschik was 
given the impression that the Soviet leadership had already held this position even 
earlier.35 This idea was again discussed during the first visit of the newly elected 
GDR prime minister Lothar de Maizière to Gorbachev on 28 April 1990,36 again 
at a visit by Teltschik and German bankers to Moscow in mid-May 1990,37 and 
during a conversation between Gorbachev and Mitterrand on 25 May 1990.38 
According to this new European security structure, the Warsaw Pact and NATO 
were to be dissolved in favor of a new European security system that included 
the United States and the Soviet Union.
After all this strategic maneuvering, it is all the more surprising that at the end 
of the Soviet-American summit in Washington in late May and early June, Gor-
bachev then agreed to the reunified Germany having a free choice of which alli-
ance it would join. After the reunification this was to mean unified Germany 
34 “Vorlage des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bonn 22. Februar 1990,” in 
Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hoffmann, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche 
Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998), 857–
59.
35 “Gespräch des Ministerialdirigenten Teltschik mit dem Berater der Abteilung für internatio-
nale Beziehungen des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU, Portugalow, Bonn, 28. März 1990,” ibid., 
981–83. This would mean that Portugalov still met Teltschik for talks, although at the confer-
ence in Vienna at which the present text was presented, a former member of the International 
Department of the Central Committee told me that Portugalov had been “withdrawn” after his 
appearance on 21 November 1989 in Bonn, and that he then was no longer allowed to participate 
in international meetings, and thus also not on 28 March 1990. But this does not seem correct; 
at least it does not match the protocol of the meeting. In addition, in his conversations with me 
Chernyaev confirmed the visit of Portugalov: The visits were arranged with his assent.
36 Conversation de Maizière with Gorbachev, Soviet protocol, 29 April 1990, in GF, 90APR29. Cf. 
my interview with de Maizière, 1 November 2000, and Plato, Die Vereinigung, 315.
37 On 14 May 1990, Teltschik and two important German bankers held negotiations in Moscow with 
nearly the entire Soviet leadership, mainly about German loans. Soviet protocol, in GF, 90May14; 
Teltschik, 329 Tage, 230; Plato, Die Vereinigung, 337. Teltschik tried to tie up a deal that was to 
include the loans as well as the membership of the future united Germany in NATO. Interview 
Alexander von Plato with Horst Teltschik, 27 September 2000. By then, Gorbachev preferred a 
new security architecture in Europe that included both the United States and the Soviet Union.
38 Conversation Gorbachev with Mitterrand, Soviet protocol, 25 May 1990, in GF, 90May25.
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being a member of NATO. Accordingly, this was acted upon at the Two Plus Four 
negotiations, which had begun on 11 February 1990.
With regard to Gorbachev’s approval, I have an open question and an unsat-
isfactory thesis. Was he still caught up in the belief that if given the choice of 
alliance, this could mean either NATO or a new security alliance in Europe, 
despite the fact that there was no talk of the latter in Washington? Leaving the 
option of the continued existence of the GDR and the Warsaw Pact open, and 
thus also the option of the future unified Germany joining the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization, would have been entirely unrealistic. It is more probable—and 
this is my unsatisfactory thesis—that Gorbachev realized the plan of a Europe-
an security system had been tossed into the negotiations too late and that, in 
fact, probably the only way to control this new united Germany had become its 
membership in NATO. But the question remains why the Soviet leaders were so 
late in introducing a new European alliance system into their strategic consid-
erations.
Some European reactions to the reunification support 
The British government under Margaret Thatcher responded by rejecting the 
possibility of reunification sharply, arguing that Gorbachev’s position would be 
jeopardized. The stance of French president Mitterrand was different: He feared, 
as mentioned, that the reunification of Germany would interfere with the process 
of European integration, and therefore desired an agreement that included at least 
a monetary union. Kohl agreed to this, despite the fact that economically, he 
considered it unfavorable for Germany.
At the first meeting of the Open Skies conference on 11 February 1990 in 
Ottawa, Baker and Genscher presented the international conditions for reunifica-
tion that had been worked out at the Two Plus Four negotiations. The fact that 
other Europeans were excluded from these negotiations angered especially the 
Italian and Dutch foreign ministers: The decisions being made did not only in-
volve the four victorious powers of World War II (including France) and the two 
German states, but involved all Europeans. Uncharacteristically, Genscher’s re-
sponse was startlingly sharp, and even quite arrogant: “You are out of the game!”39 
Strangely enough, this power statement had its effect; the Two Plus Four negoti-
ations clarifying the international framework of German reunification were con-
ducted more or less without the involvement of other European governments. The 
Two Plus Four Treaty was signed on 12 September 1990.
The role of Lithuania and the other Baltic states in this process has, for the 
most part, been underestimated. Lithuania’s declaration of independence on 11 
39 Interviews Alexander von Plato with James Baker, Houston, 19 September 1999, and with 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Lüdenscheid, 25 April 2001.
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March 1990 elicited startled reactions, not only in Moscow, but also from the 
Western powers. It was feared that Gorbachev’s position could be destabilized.
On 29 June, the French government under Mitterrand and the German gov-
ernment under Kohl convinced the Lithuanian government to temporarily rescind 
their declaration of independence,40 whereupon Gorbachev lifted the embargo 
against Lithuania that had been instated on 17 April 1990 and discontinued his 
military threats.41 Here, the Western governments acted against the interests of 
this Baltic government, although its objective, self-determination, was similar to 
what West Germany was claiming with regard to German unification. But at that 
time, the Baltic states were republics of the Soviet Union; the Gorbachev gov-
ernment and its military felt more threatened by their political independence than 
by the developments in the GDR, since their independence involved the consti-
tutional existence of the Soviet Union. In the accessible Politburo protocols, the 
Baltic or the Lithuanian Question was on the agenda more often than the GDR 
or the issue of German reunification. And for their part, Kohl and Mitterrand were 
worried that if the Baltic states were to push through their independence “too 
early,” Gorbachev’s position in the Soviet Union would be weakened and the 
unification of Germany derailed. 
A word needs to be said about the Oder–Neisse issue. Kohl vehemently op-
posed the Oder–Neisse line being fixed as the border prior to the possibility of 
an all-German parliament implementing this decision.42 A long passage in the 
Soviet protocol of Kohl’s meeting with Gorbachev on 10 February 1990 clearly 
shows his strong reservations about the Oder–Neisse line being recognized as the 
Polish–German border too soon.43 In the West German protocol of Horst Teltsch-
ik, there is only one sentence: “The chancellor explained his position on the 
Oder–Neisse line.”44 Kohl maintained these reservations also later. The Polish 
government was concerned that the GDR would adopt its own declaration in the 
Volkskammer. The US government considered Kohl’s attitude a “medium-sized 
PR disaster.”45
40 Protocol of the meeting between the prime minister of Lithuania, Kazimira Prunskiene, and 
Chancellor Kohl, 11 May 1990, in Küsters and Hoffmann, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: 
Deutsche Einheit, 1103–5. The letter of Kohl and Mitterrand to President Landsbergis of 26 
April 1990 is published in Tilo Schabert, “France and the Baltic States during the Presiden-
cy of Francois Mitterrand,” Baltic Worlds 4, no. 2 (2011): 8–14 and http://balticworlds.com/
during-the-presidency-of-francois-mitterrand (accessed 26 December 2012).
41 Plato, Die Vereinigung, 308–11 and 351–52.
42 Werner Weidenfeld, with Peter Wagner and Elke Bruck, Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit: 
Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90, Geschichte der deutschen Einheit 4 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998), 
496ff; Plato, Die Vereinigung, 362ff.
43 Soviet protocol, in GF, 90FEB10A and B. As one reason for his attitude, Kohl mentioned his 
considerations regarding the associations of persons who had been expelled from the former 
German territories following World War II. 
44 Küsters and Hoffmann, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 795–811.
45 Interview Alexander von Plato with Condoleezza Rice, Stanford, 17 September 1999. 
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A few open questions
Despite the many descriptions of the German reunification, there are a number 
of questions that have not yet been answered. The first has been prompted by the 
research I have done: Why did Gorbachev wait so long to introduce a plan to his 
governing councils about a possible new European security structure that dis-
solved NATO and the Warsaw Pact but included the Soviet Union and the Unit-
ed States? And why, only a week after his talk with Mitterrand on the subject, 
did he agree in Washington to letting united Germany freely choose its alliance—
an agreement that meant reunification under the umbrella of NATO?46 
For historians, questions that begin with “What if” are all but taboo, but nev-
ertheless they can be found in varying contexts, if only implicitly. What would 
have happened if the response of the Gorbachev government to the clear strategy 
of the US and West German governments—“reunification under the umbrella of 
NATO”—had been different than the fluctuations described above? What would 
have happened if the response had not been neutrality for the united Germany, 
but “reunification yes, but under the umbrella of a new European security system 
and the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact”? If Gorbachev had done this 
in December 1989 or January 1990, and not in March or April 1990 when he no 
longer had anything to negotiate—the Warsaw Pact, in effect, no longer existed 
and the GDR was on the road to reunification—it would have given the entire 
international negotiations a new angle to their deliberations and created new 
alignments.
I believe it is evident that Secretary of State Baker, in his conversation with 
Gorbachev in early February 1990, brought a guarantee into play, but this “guar-
antee” was not binding by international law and, moreover, was repealed by Bush 
a day later. Contrary to Baker’s statement of intent, today NATO has expanded 
to the borders of Belarus and Russia, which has been and is perceived by them 
as a threat. Why did NATO expand so rapidly?47 A superficial answer might be 
because this extension lay in the interests of the former Western Cold War adver-
saries. But on second glance, it is not so simple, because it would be more in the 
interests of at least the European Western powers to integrate. Also they were not 
interested in alienating Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
reunification of Germany, almost all Central European countries wanted to protect 
themselves against Russia as well as against Germany. And only NATO or the 
CSCE / OSCE with expanded competencies seemed able to do this. NATO was 
46 On Soviet policy in Germany’s reunification, cf. Wolfgang Mueller, “The USSR and the Reuni-
fication of Germany, 1989–90,” in this volume, 321–53.
47 In 2012, the former Canadian minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, noted that in the 
1990s he was afraid that this extension of NATO could cause “a smaller Cold War again” and 
argued against it or any of its forms. He could, however, not assert himself against Prime Min-
ister Jean Chrétien because of the mood in the country among its Eastern European immigrants. 
Interview Alexander von Plato with Lloyd Axworthy, 2 November 2012.
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quite successful politically and became the alliance of choice; it also remained 
the main anchor of the United States in Europe, although Mitterrand, for instance, 
had hoped that the process of European integration would reduce the influence 
in Europe of the United States and Russia, especially in military questions. More-
over, for some Central European governments, the United States seems to have 
been a major guarantor of security. 
In this context, another issue needs to be clarified. Did the Oder–Neisse ques-
tion or Kohl and Mitterrand’s intrusion into the Lithuanian move toward inde-
pendence fuel a distrust of Western Europe? Might this be a reason for the posi-
tive attitude of these Central and Eastern European governments toward the 
United States (even after the Iraq war)?
From the US and (West) German perspective, German reunification was an 
extraordinary political success: East Germany gained self-determination, freedom 
from Soviet and communist domination, Western-style democracy and a func-
tioning economy. This was done while preserving the structures of NATO and 
the EC, maintaining peace in Europe, and creating a working relationship with 
the USSR. Also the fears of Germany’s eastern neighbors were taken into account. 
European integration was boosted by the creation of the Euro, although the cur-
rency lacked, and still lacks in 2013, a universal economic and financial policy. 
From the Soviet perspective, the loss of its satellite GDR in its outer empire was 
often criticized, although not all of this criticism was entirely negative. And the 
alternative to Germany’s remaining in NATO, namely, a new European security 
system including, with limited powers, North America and the Soviet Union 
(respectively Russia) that Gorbachev and Mitterrand temporarily considered, 
came up too late to then be realized in 1990. 

W o l f g a n g  M u e l l e r
THE USSR AND THE REUNIFICATION  
OF GERMANY, 1989–90
It has been said that the reunification of Germany was achieved “so smoothly 
and amiably that it is easy to impute a kind of inevitability to the outcome.”1 But 
seeing the outcome as inevitable would be misleading. On the contrary, due to 
the particular interests of the numerous heads of state, governments and other 
political forces involved, it was a struggle to find a solution.  Without dismissing 
the efforts of anyone, it seems fair to state that of all the heads of state, it was 
the Soviet leader who had to travel the longest road to make the reunification 
possible.2 
It is the aim of this chapter, which is based on both Russian and Western 
edited sources, to analyze the crucial decisions that were made along this road 
and to point out the research lacunae that still exist. Although the state of research 
can be considered good, some questions still remain. By the mid-1990s, a few 
key documents3 had been published as well as the memoirs of the leaders, advi-
sors and experts who were most involved.4 A number of milestone analyses were 
1  Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 2.
2  Ekkehard Kuhn, Gorbatschow und die deutsche Einheit: Aussagen der wichtigsten russischen 
und deutschen Beteiligten (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993), 8. 
3  E.g., Michail S. Gorbatschow, Gipfelgespräche: Geheime Protokolle meiner Amtszeit (Berlin: 
Rowohlt, 1993); Wjatscheslaw Daschitschew, “Aus den Anfängen der Revision der sowjeti-
schen Deutschlandpolitik: Ein Dokument aus dem Jahre 1987,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 
44, no. 14 (1994): 36–46; idem, “Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik in den achtziger Jahren,” 
Deutschland Archiv 28, no. 1 (1995): 54–67.
4  Eduard Schewardnadse, Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991); Horst Telt-
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der Tisch mit scharfen Ecken: Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit (Baden: Nomos 
1993); Julij A. Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten (Berlin: Siedler, 
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Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995); Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 
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quick to follow. Among the first, Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice analyzed 
hitherto unpublished US records, Rafael Biermann East German sources, and 
Mikhail Narinskii and Alexander von Plato, Soviet protocols.5 Since the late 
1990s, volumes have appeared containing documents from the West German 
Chancellery, the Gorbachev administration and the CPSU Politburo, and most 
recently from the British and the German Foreign Offices. Collections of GDR, 
Soviet and US sources have also been published.6 Significant numbers of docu-
1996); Helmut Kohl with Kai Diekmann and Ralf Georg Reuth, „Ich wollte Deutschlands Ein-
heit.“ (Berlin: Propyläen, 1996); Georgi Schachnasarow, Der Preis der Freiheit: Bilanz von 
Gorbatschows Berater (Bonn: Bouvier, 1996); Valentin Falin, Konflikte im Kreml: zur Vorge-
schichte der deutschen Einheit und der Auflösung der Sowjetunion (Munich: Blessing, 1997); 
Pavel Palazhchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet 
Interpreter (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); George Bush and 
Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998); Michail Gorbatschow, Wie 
es war: Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung (Berlin: Ullstein, 1999). Among more recent publica-
tions, see Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005); A. Tschernjaew, 
Mein deutsches Tagebuch: Die deutsche Frage im ZK der KPdSU 1972–1991, ed. Rudi Meier 
(Klitschen: Elbe-Dnjepr-Verlag, 2005); A. Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod: Dnevnik dvukh epoch 
1972–1991 gody (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008); Igor’ Maksimychev, Padenie Berlinskoi steny: iz 
zapisok sovetnika-poslannika posol’stva SSSR v Berline (Moscow: Veche, 2011).
5   Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified; David H. Shumaker, Gorbachev and the German Questi-
on: Soviet-West German Relations, 1985–1990 (Westport: Praeger, 1995); Nikolai Pawlow, Die 
deutsche Vereinigung aus sowjetisch-russischer Perspektive (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
1996); Rafael Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt: Wie Moskau mit der deutschen Ein-
heit rang (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997); Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unificati-
on, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Tan-
ja Wagensohn, Von Gorbatschow zu Jelzin: Moskaus Deutschlandpolitik 1985–1995 im Wandel 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000); Alexander von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutschlands—ein welt-
politisches Machtspiel (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2002); M.M. Narinskii, “M.S. Gorbachev i ob”edine-
nie Germanii: Po novym materyalam,” Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, no. 1 (2004): 14–30; A.A. 
Akhtamzyan, Ob’edinenie Germanii: Obstoyatel’stva i posledstviya (Moscow: MGIMO, 2008); 
A.M. Filitov, Germaniya v Sovetskom vneshnepoliticheskom planirovanii, 1941–1990 (Mos-
cow: Nauka, 2009); Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Peter Grieder, “‘When your Neighbour Changes 
his Wallpaper’: The ‘Gorbachev Factor’ and the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic,” 
in Kevin McDermott and Mattew Stibbe, eds., The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope: From Communism to Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 73–92.
6   Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hoffmann, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deut-
sche Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
1998); Aleksandr Galkin and Anatolii Chernyaev, eds., Mikhail Gorbachev i Germanskii vopros 
(hereafter MGGV) (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2006); A. Chernyaev, A. Veber, and V. Medvedev, eds., 
V Politbyuro TsK KPSS, 1985–91 (Moscow: Alpina, 2006); Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, 
Stephen Robert Twigge, eds., Documents on British Policy Overseas III, vol. 7: German Uni-
fication 1989–1990 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009); M.S. Gorbachev, A.S. Chernyaev, A.B. 
Veber, eds., Otvechaya na vyzov vremeni: Vneshnyaya politika perestroiki: dokumental’nye svi-
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ments have been made available online by the Cold War International History 
Project and the National Security Archives in Washington as well as other web-
sites.7 Most of the former East German records in the party archives and the 
German Foreign Ministry are available. At the Gorbachev Foundation, the Rus-
sian Foreign Ministry’s Archive and the former CPSU archives some, albeit un-
systematic, access is allowed to records from the 1980s. In the Russian State 
Archives, the papers of Aleksandr Yakovlev have been declassified. Further 
documents are due to be declassified and/or published in 2019–20. 
Soviet-German relations, 1985–89
Until 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev had not officially questioned the status quo in 
Germany or the continued existence of the Berlin Wall. While he had pondered 
the partition of Germany during his trips to the communist (East) German Dem-
ocratic Republic (GDR) in 1966 and to the (Western) Federal Republic of Ger-
many in 1975, he had come to the conclusion that it was a natural consequence 
of World War II as well as Western Cold War policy8 and destined to last for 
several more decades until “history” resolved the issue. In 1984, he launched the 
project of a future “Common European Home,” which was expected to make it 
easier to move from one German room to the other.9 
With regard to East Germany, Gorbachev did not seem to share his predeces-
sors’ conviction that the GDR was “unable to exist without Soviet support.”10 In 
DDR 1989/1990: Eine dokumentierte Rekonstruktion (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010); Andreas 
Hilger, ed., Diplomatie für die Deutsche Einheit: Dokumente des Auswärtigen Amtes zu den 
deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen 1989/1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011).
7  http://www.2plus4.de; http://wiedervereinigung.de; http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold- 
war-international-history-project; http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/index.html (ac-
cessed December 2012). 
8   Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, 700–1; Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Pol-
icy and the End of the Cold War (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 131. In the 1990s, Gorbachev still 
depicted the West as being responsible for the partition of Germany. Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 
15–54.
9   The “Common European Home” had been mentioned by Brezhnev in 1981 and was re-launched 
by Gorbachev on his visit to London in December 1984, without making clear what was actually 
meant. Marie-Pierre Rey, “‘Europe is our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic 
Concept,” Cold War History 4, no. 2 (2004): 33–65. Based on US evaluations, Tom Blanton 
characterized Gorbachev’s vision as intended to stabilize the status quo in Europe by building 
a “semi-attached house, so to speak, with a wall down the middle, perhaps a common front 
porch for receiving visitors and a common back yard for barbeques and a garden, but you live 
on your side and we’ll live on ours.” Tom Blanton, “US Policy and the Revolutions of 1989,” in 
Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 49–98, 97. 
10   Cf. Brezhnev’s statement to Honecker 1970: “The GDR is […] our achievement […] Erich, I’m 
telling you openly, never forget this: the GDR can’t exist with its power and strength without us, 
without the Soviet Union. Without us, there is no GDR.” Jochen Staadt, ed., Auf höchster Stufe: 
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contrast, the leader expressed “an almost naïve belief in the GDR’s economic 
prowess.”11 Doubtlessly, the communist half-state could be seen as a jewel in the 
crown of the Soviet empire—a powerful symbol of the Soviet victory in World 
War II, the westernmost bulwark of the Soviet army in Europe, a model pupil in 
communist orthodoxy and rigidity, and the USSR’s most important ally, trading 
partner and producer of technology. Nonetheless, Gorbachev must have been 
aware of the inherent weakness of the East German state and its communist re-
gime. The CPSU’s International Department had informed him in February 1989 
that “the GDR was founded not on the national, but on the ideological—on a class 
basis; therefore, a rapid transition to democratization, openness, and free speech 
might be accompanied by special problems in this country.”12 Together with com-
munist suppression and economic paucity, this flaw had led to a mass exodus out 
of the GDR from the late 1940s, the erection of the Berlin Wall, and countless 
shootings of people trying to flee. These weaknesses did not, however, prevent 
Gorbachev from demanding some sort of perestroika to be introduced into this 
country as well. Still, Erich Honecker rejected any calls for liberalization, sup-
pressed publication of Soviet hints at perestroika in the GDR, and moved to 
correct Gorbachev, whom he privately regarded a “traitor.”13 The SED leader’s 
stubborn refusal placed further tension on the bilateral relationship, which had 
already been strained by the GDR’s rapprochement with West Germany. When 
from the 1970s Moscow had appeared less and less willing to subsidize the East 
German economy due to volatile energy prices and later due to its own econom-
ic troubles, Bonn had stepped in with large loans, which indirectly paid for im-
provements in the GDR authorities’ treatment of their citizens.14 This raised the 
suspicion in Moscow that its ally was becoming dependent on a capitalist country. 
Gespräche mit Erich Honecker (Berlin: Transit, 1995), 12–13. Honecker, in return, declared 
the GDR’s alliance with the USSR being “irrevocable.” Helga Haftendorn, “The Unification of 
Germany,” in Melvin Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War III: Endings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 333–55, 334.
11   Stent, Russia, 55. 
12   Memorandum CPSU International Department, “On a Strategy for Relations with the European 
Socialist Countries,” February 1989, in Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 353–
64, 356. Another report mentions “authoritarianism and harsh control” in the GDR and forecasts 
that the reforms “may trigger a change in the status quo in the center of Europe […] Only in the 
long term, if détente and the construction of a ‘common European home’ progress sufficiently, 
will the issue of a unified German confederate state be possibly be put on the agenda. From the 
international angle, this will most likely end up in the neutralization of both parts of Germany.” 
Ibid., 374–77. Cf. Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of 
Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 103–9. 
13   Grieder, “When Your Neighbour Changes His Wallpaper”, 76–81.
14   Hans Hermann Hertle, “Die Diskussion der ökonomischen Krisen in der Führungsspitze der 
SED,” in Theo Pirker et al. eds., Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion: Wirtschaftsführung in der 
DDR (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), 309–47, 319–22. Cf. André Steiner, Von Plan zu 
Plan: Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR (Munich: DVA, 2004), 191–203. 
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Regarding West Germany, Gorbachev, in his first two years at the helm of the 
CPSU, continued to steer the hard line inherited from his predecessors and aimed 
at weakening Bonn’s Christian Democratic chancellor, who had proved himself 
a steadfast supporter of Western Europe’s rearmament against Soviet SS-20 mis-
siles.15 In the Politburo, Gorbachev declared repeatedly that it was correct to 
“reduce the political dialogue” with Helmut Kohl and “teach him a lesson” about 
“what the USSR means for Germany.”16 In order not to give the chancellor any 
chance of exploiting an official visit during the German election campaigns, 
Gorbachev assured the oppositional social democrats that he would not travel to 
Bonn in 1986 and called on Honecker to do the same.17 It was the East German 
communist who warned Gorbachev against isolating the West German Christian 
democrat. When Kohl, in an interview with Newsweek in October 1986, retaliat-
ed by likening the charismatic Soviet leader to the Nazi propaganda chief Joseph 
Goebbels, a bad situation only became worse.18 
But during West German president Richard von Weizsäcker’s trip to Moscow 
in July 1987 and Kohl’s follow-up visit in October 1988, Soviet-West German 
relations began to thaw.19 Several factors may have convinced the Soviet leader 
to change his stance. First, until then the building of the “Common European 
Home” had made little progress. This was at least in part due to Gorbachev fo-
cusing on stopping the arms race with the United States during his first two years 
in power. As this goal took into account the European theater as well, it also 
seemed wise to foster détente in Europe and, in particular, to improve relations 
with West Germany. As Gorbachev later stated in his memoirs, he had had this 
insight in 1987.20 Indeed, at a Politburo session of July of that year, he declared 
15   Werner Weidenfeld, with Peter Wagner and Elke Bruck, Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit: 
Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90, Geschichte der deutschen Einheit 4 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998), 
46. When Helmut Kohl in March 1985 and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher in July 
1986 traveled to Moscow, they were confronted with Soviet attacks regarding the counter-de-
ployment of US missiles in West Germany. After Genscher’s visit, Gorbachev stated on 24 July 
1986 in the Politburo that “We taught the Germans a lesson.” MGGV, 16. 
16   Politburo protocols, 27 March, 26 May and 13 June 1986, in MGGV, 3; 5; 6. For an English ver-
sion, see Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 227. A similar statement was made 
by Gorbachev in the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on 11 June 1986. 
Text in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the 
Warsaw Pact (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 531–38, 534.
17   In addition, Gorbachev told the SPD chancellor candidate Johannes Rau that he would welcome 
his victory in the elections. Conversation Gorbachev with Rau, Soviet protocol, 25 June 1986, 
in MGGV, 7–14, 13; Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from 
Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 239–40. On Gorbachev’s contact with SPD 
chairman Willy Brandt, see Stefan Creuzberger, Willy Brandt und Michail Gorbatschow: Bemü-
hungen um eine zweite “neue Ostpolitik” (Berlin: BeBra, 2014). 
18   Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 245. 
19   Conversation Gorbachev with Weizsäcker, Soviet protocol, 7 July 1987; Politburo protocol, 16 
July 1987, in MGGV, 44–54; 55–58.
20   Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, 702. 
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his intention to use improvements in Soviet relations with West Germany, the 
“main country of Western Europe,” to create favorable conditions for his Euro-
pean policies.21 Another reason for unfreezing relations with West Germany was 
this country’s role as the USSR’s most important Western trading partner. West 
German economic potency had been underlined by the offers of Lothar Späth and 
Franz Josef Strauss, the provincial governors of Baden-Württemberg and Bavar-
ia, to foster bilateral economic cooperation with the USSR.22 Last, but not least, 
after Kohl’s reelection in March 1987, it was clear that Moscow would have to 
deal with him for another four years and therefore it seemed advisable to improve 
the personal relations between the two leaders.
Thus, perhaps as a consequence of or at least supported by internal expert 
advice,23 in 1987–88 a Soviet reevaluation of its relations with West Germany was 
initiated. Significant progress in relaxing relations was made during Gorbachev’s 
visit to Bonn on 12–15 June 1989. Kohl’s declaration in April favoring negotia-
tions on short-range missile disarmament and a postponement of the decision to 
modernize US missiles in Europe, which met Soviet proposals halfway, set the 
tone for warm talks, as did the enthusiastic reception of the Soviet leader in the 
West German capital.24 At the same time, two changes in the international envi-
ronment fostered a Soviet-West German rapprochement: The review of US foreign 
strategy, ordered by George H.W. Bush upon his inauguration,25 led to some in-
security in the Kremlin and increased the importance of Bonn as a source of 
second-hand information about the new president’s intentions. Also the deepening 
rift between Honecker and Gorbachev made Bonn ever more indispensable for 
the Kremlin in this triangular relationship. Gorbachev’s visit reflected these de-
velopments. The Soviet-West German Joint Declaration explicitly confirming that 
all people should be free to choose their political and economic system26 placed 
a time bomb under the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, including the GDR. 
Nonetheless, the Soviet refusal to accept the official German name of the FRG 
and the alleged Soviet “outrage” about a speech by Kohl in September 1989 at 
the CDU convention that dealt with the need to overcome Germany’s status quo 
indicated that Soviet-West German relations were still far from problem-free.27
21   Politburo protocol, 16 July 1987, in MGGV, 55–58, 56–57.
22   Conversation Gorbachev with Strauss, 29 December 1987; with Späth, 9 February 1988, in 
MGGV, 62–78; 81–82.
23   Daschitschew, “Aus den Anfängen.”
24   Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 104–41. Translations of the Soviet protocols can be 
found in Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 463–78.
25   On the “pause,” see Philip Zelikow, “US Strategic Planning in 1989–90,” in this volume, 283–
306.
26   Text in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Europe Transformed: Documents on the End of the Cold War 
(London: Tri-Service Press, 1990), 317–21.
27   West German report, “Antrittsbesuch Botschafter Dr. Blech bei 1. Stv. AM Kowaljow,” 15 Sep-
tember 1989, in Hilger, ed., Diplomatie, 24–26.
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None of these developments during the Soviet-West German thaw, however, 
brought a visible change in Gorbachev’s position regarding the division of Ger-
many. While a reunification was ruled out in his book Perestroika,28 Gorbachev 
evaded a clear statement during the Weizsäcker visit of 1987. In public the So-
viet leader philosophized that the partition of Germany was “reality,” but might 
be reevaluated by “history” in the far future—a formulation Gorbachev would 
resort to many more times.29 This future end is also what he seems to have meant 
when during his visit to Bonn he opined that the Berlin Wall had not been built 
“for eternity.”30 This was most likely formulated as a palliative to outwardly 
appease his West German trading partners. When Gorbachev’s advisor Anatolii 
Chernyaev internally criticized the Soviet censoring of the West German presi-
dent’s reference to German unity, he was rebuffed by Gorbachev with these 
words: “This is the way to deal with Germans. They like order.”31 During Kohl’s 
visit to Moscow in October 1988, Gorbachev cautioned against “saying that the 
question of [German] reunification is open.”32 
Despite such ambiguities, it would be premature to read a wish to get rid of 
the Wall or pave the way to German unity into any of the statements made by 
Gorbachev before the Wall’s fall. Most probably the leader did not share Ambas-
sador Yulii Kvitsinskii’s assessment that the GDR would not be able to survive 
without the Wall and thus that the creation of a confederation of the two German 
states should be actively promoted.33 Nor did he share the opinion voiced by 
Vyacheslav Dashichev, who in 1987–89 described the division of Germany as 
“abnormal,” dangerous” and an impediment to the creation of the “Common 
European Home.” This foreign-policy expert recommended that Soviet diploma-
cy actively tackle the problem of German reunification in order to remove this 
28   Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1987), 184–86.
29   Similar statements were made by Gorbachev “practically every time the issue of German unifi-
cation came up.” Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Logic of 1989: The Soviet Peaceful Withdrawal 
from Eastern Europe,” in idem, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 1–47, 32. In retrospect, 
Gorbachev characterized this as being “Gromyko’s position, yet with a philosophical perspec-
tive,” and as meant to reflect “that the partition was not normal” as well as to inspire hope among 
Germans. Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 64. For solving this problem, he gave history a hundred 
years. Gorbachev, Perestroika 186.
30   He added that “the Wall can disappear when the preconditions that produced it disappear.” Gor-
batschow, Wie es war, 82. Cf. Shevardnadze’s statement “The Wall will fall when the time 
is ripe.” Conversation Genscher with Shevardnadze, West German protocol, 12 June 1989, in 
Hilger, ed., Diplomatie, 15–21, 19. An almost identical formulation was used by Dashichev in 
1988. Daschitschew,“Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik,” 61.
31   Anatolii Cherniaev, “Gorbachev and the Reunification of Germany: Personal Recollections,” 
in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1991: A Retrospective (London: Cass, 
1994), 158–69, 160.
32   Conversation Gorbachev with Kohl, Soviet protocol, 24 October 1988, in MGGV, 131–34, 133.
33   Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 13. 
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source of instability in the center of the continent (and in so doing to eliminate 
the US presence in Germany and thus the main basis for the existence of NATO 
as well).34 Obviously these opinions did not reflect the assessment of the Soviet 
Ministry that the “existence of two German states was a basic precondition for 
security in Europe.”35 When on 3 November 1989, Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze mused in the Politburo that it would be better if the new SED 
leader, Egon Krenz, removed the Berlin Wall, KGB boss Vladimir Kryuchkov 
prophesied: “If they remove it, it will be difficult for the East Germans.”36 If this 
meant the SED leadership, his prophecy was soon to come true.
The opening of the Berlin Wall
Gorbachev’s road toward German unity can be divided into three steps: 1) the 
retrospective approval of the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989; 
2) his consent, expressed in January–February 1990, with the two Germanys’ right 
for self-determination regarding possible unification; 3) his acquiescence in May–
July 1990 with Germany’s right for self-determination regarding a free choice of 
alliances. The available documents lead to the conclusion that the Soviet leader 
made each of these decisions separately. Breaking down the entire complex into 
several steps made each step easier to accept and, thus, influenced a final outcome 
that at the beginning had hardly been thinkable. 
As of today, no evidence has become available which shows that the Soviet 
acceptance of the Hungarian decision to open its border with pro-Western but 
neutral Austria (a decision that increased the exodus from the GDR via Hungary) 
or of the Wall’s opening had been prepared in any way. Nevertheless, in both 
cases, the GDR and Hungarian communist governments had sounded out wheth-
er Moscow would object to the reduction of travel restrictions for GDR citizens. 
The Soviet foreign ministry declared that the Hungarian choice did not affect 
Soviet interests and later instructed the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin to accept 
the new GDR travel regulations,37 and thus Gorbachev’s reaction to the opening 
of the Wall was somehow predetermined.
34   Vyacheslav Dashichev, “On the Road to German Reunification: The View from Moscow,” in 
Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1991: A Retrospective (London: Cass, 
1994), 170–82, 172; Daschitschew, “Aus den Anfängen”; Stent, Russia, 72, 85; Lévesque, The 
Enigma, 145. 
35   Quoted in “Fernschreiben der Botschaft Moskau vom 5. Oktober 1989 über ein Gespräch mit 
dem amtierenden Leiter des Planungsstabes des sowjetischen Außenministeriums, Gvendzadze, 
am 4. Oktober 1989,” in Hilger, Diplomatie, 39–41, 40.
36   Chernyaev, Veber, Medvedev, eds., V Politbyuro, 450–51.
37   Michael R Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of 
the Cold War (Boston: Little Brown, 1993), 132; Kohl, Erinnerungen, 923; Stent, Russia, 94.
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The increase in public discontent in the GDR and anti-SED demonstrations in 
the summer and fall of 198938 convinced some Soviet generals and East German 
party hawks, including Honecker, to advocate the application of force. Indeed, most 
of the 350,000 Soviet soldiers in the GDR seem to have been prepared to comply 
with such orders.39 Yet it soon became clear that not only Gorbachev but also So-
viet diplomats preferred to avoid repeating the Soviet bloodshed in cracking down 
on the East German unrest of 16–17 June 1953 and the further shooting of civilians. 
In one of their meetings in June 1989 in Moscow, the Soviet leader is said to have 
told Honecker that no Soviet forces would intervene on behalf of the SED in a 
conflict with its people.40 When the demonstrations received increasing public 
support, the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin called on the commander of the 
Soviet troops in Germany to refrain from letting Soviet soldiers be involved in the 
events; in the following days, similar orders were received from Moscow.41 
Gorbachev was informed about the unrest before and during his visit to East 
Berlin on 6–7 October 1989 and, some days later, of the plans in the SED leadership 
to replace Honecker. He signaled tacit support for the impending palace coup. Once 
the East German leader was replaced by Egon Krenz on 17–18 October, the Sovi-
et strategy seemed to be aimed at creating and stabilizing a “Perestroika GDR” 
under the new Prime Minister Hans Modrow, who took over on 13 November. This 
was to be done with Soviet backing and West German funding.42
Regarding the Berlin Wall, while the Soviet side had been routinely informed 
about planned changes in the travel restrictions of GDR citizens, it learned of the 
Wall’s opening only after the fact. Later, Gorbachev and his aides declared that 
they had been prepared for such an event. The reaction came within a few hours, 
with the Soviet leader welcoming the event. On 11 November Pravda praised it 
as a “courageous and wise step.”43 Perhaps Gorbachev felt some relief that this 
problem had been solved quickly and non-violently.
This did not mean, however, that the Soviet government had changed its atti-
tude toward the fate of Germany. Although Gorbachev, in a brainstorming session 
with advisors, had warned the day before the Wall’s fall that Honecker’s remov-
al might put the “topic of German reunification on the agenda,”44 on 12 Novem-
38   Cf. the chapter by Hans Hermann Hertle, “The October Revolution in East Germany,” in this 
volume, 113–35. 
39   Frank Umbach, Das rote Bündnis: Entwicklung und Zerfall des Warschauer Paktes 1955 bis 
1991 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2005), 479, 496. 
40   Falin, Konflikte, 150. 
41   Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, 169, 185. 
42   Dashichev, “On the Road to German Reunification,” 173. 
43   Hans-Hermann Hertle, Chronik des Mauerfalls: Die dramatischen Ereignisse um den 9. Novem-
ber 1989 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1996), 232. Cf. Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the 
October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 388–89.
44   Quoted in Vladislav Zubok, “Die Krisen Gorbatschows und die Vereinigung Deutschlands,” in 
Hans Hermann Hertle, Konrad Jarausch, and Christoph Kleßmann, eds., Mauerbau und Mauer-
fall (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2002), 245–69, 256. 
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ber spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov made it clear that any discussion about the 
country’s unification was “idle” talk. The GDR was to remain a member of the 
Warsaw Pact as well as a deployment area for Soviet troops and nuclear weap-
ons.45 A day earlier, Gorbachev had urged Kohl in a phone call to calm the situ-
ation down,46 and a week later, he told Brian Mulroney, the Canadian prime 
minister, that the German issue was “not an issue to be solved today” and that 
the “new Europe […] would involve two German states.”47 This assessment did 
not appear unrealistic. One must keep in mind that at that time, neither Western 
leaders nor Eastern dissidents had expressed their favor of Germany’s unification 
in the near future; the only thing the West had stipulated was that the country be 
granted the right to reunify. Moreover, in 1989 Gorbachev was not yet prepared 
to accept self-determination rights with all of the attached consequences. This 
held true not only for Germany. The Kremlin had demanded that the newly es-
tablished democratic government of Poland promise to stay in the Warsaw Pact. 
With regard to the GDR, its freely choosing alliances seemed as far away as 
German unification itself.  
Gorbachev accepts Germany’s right to self-determination 
In the weeks following the opening of the Wall, the Gorbachev administration 
had four choices: They could (a) attempt to openly block the slowly emerging 
German inclination toward unification; (b) act in the background in order to slow 
it down; (c) do nothing; or (d) make the path to reunification free, perhaps using 
this as a concession to achieve other aims, such as the neutralization of Germany, 
the dismantling of NATO or economic benefits.48 For some time,49 Soviet foreign 
45   Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 240.
46   Telephone conversation between Kohl and Gorbachev, 11 November 1989, in Savranskaya, 
Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 590–92, 591.
47   Conversation Gorbachev with Mulroney, Soviet protocol, 21 November 1989, in Savranskaya, 
Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 598–601. The Soviet leader did not overlook the oppor-
tunity to peck at “the Americans” and their “itch to give everybody advice […] this is like an 
illness—AIDS. […] It is not an accident that they call the American ambassador in Hungary 
Gauleiter.” One wonders, then, what the Soviet ambassador was called. 
48   Cf. Fred Oldenburg, “Die Rekonstruktion sowjetischer Deutschlandpolitik,” in Heiner Timmer-
mann, ed., Die DDR: Analysen eines aufgegebenen Staates (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 
745–88, 759–61. Zubok stresses that Gorbachev’s list of options was much longer than is usu-
ally assumed, but does not elaborate what options he has in mind. Vladislav Zubok, “German 
Unification from the Soviet (Russian) Perspective,” in Kiron Skinner, ed., Turning Points in 
Ending the Cold War (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008), 255–72.
49   Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 329. The roots of the Soviet crisis pre-
dated Gorbachev’s leadership. Whether a “Chinese model” would have saved the USSR and its 
foreign empire is, due to the increasing de-legitimization of communist and Soviet rule, more 
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policy vacillated between options a and b, sending out contradictory, albeit most-
ly negative signals. In the end, accused by his critics of having chosen option c, 
the Soviet leader finally shifted to option d.
While many of these critics charged Gorbachev with having been too soft on 
Germany, it was one of his conservative diplomats whose track-two diplomacy 
accelerated Germany’s rush toward unification. An unauthorized message by the 
leader of the CPSU International Department, Valentin Falin, who was striving 
to discover the intentions of West Germany, was communicated via one of his 
aides, Nikolai Portugalov, to Kohl’s security advisor Horst Teltschik. The mes-
sage was mistaken in Bonn as a sign of Soviet consent to a possible unification 
of Germany50 and the chancellor was thus encouraged to compose his Ten-Point 
Plan, which was presented to the Bundestag on 28 November. The plan took up 
a suggestion Modrow had made in a recent governmental declaration regarding 
intensified cooperation between the two German states and the creation of a 
“contractual community.”51 The Ten Points developed this into a strategy envis-
aging first a confederation and then the unification of the FRG and GDR.52 The 
plan’s aim was to stop the exodus of citizens from the GDR and to inspire pub-
lic hopes for unity by capturing the unification initiative and presenting it as 
feasible.
While the GDR government, which hoped for further West German funding, 
criticized the Ten Points only mildly and declared them to be an “interesting 
than questionable. With regard to Zubok’s claims that “Liberals use violence for liberal aims” 
and that Gorbachev’s rejection of violence meant the loss of public order (ibid., 319), one must 
keep in mind that the rejection of violence is today a liberal principle as such, and massacres of 
peaceful civilians (e.g. Tbilisi 1989, Vilnius 1991) can never be justified as being necessary for 
upholding the public order.
50   Teltschik, 329 Tage, 43–44. Portugalov handed over two Soviet documents, among them Falin’s 
unofficial message that explicitly refers to “reunification,” with this option linked to leaving 
NATO and the EC. Soviet approval of some kind of “German confederation” was mentioned 
as being possible. These documents are published in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deut-
sche Einheit, 616–18; for an English translation, see http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB296/doc06.pdf (accessed 31 October 2012). Chernyaev, who had been incompletely 
briefed by Falin, authorized the mission. Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, 145–47. 
51   “Regierungserklärung des Ministerpräsidenten Hans Modrow vor der Volkskammer,” 17 No-
vember 1989, in Lehmann, Die Außenpolitik, 398–99.
52   The Ten Points proposed: 1) West German emergency aid for the GDR population; 2) intensified 
cooperation with the GDR; 3) in case of a fundamental change of the GDR’s political system, 
increased aid; 4) a positive response to Modrow’s proposal of a “contractual community” be-
tween the two German states; 5) as soon as a democratic government emerged in the GDR, the 
creation of confederative structures between the two states; 6) integration into the all-European 
process; respect for international law, self-determination, and human rights; 7) openness of the 
EC for all states of Central and Eastern Europe; 8) progress in the CSCE; 9) disarmament and 
arms control; 10) “the attainment of freedom in Europe, whereby the German people can, via 
free self-determination, restore their unity.” Text in Freedman, Europe, 376. 
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basis for negotiations,”53 Gorbachev, who had not yet been informed about Falin’s 
escapade, reacted furiously. In a conversation with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the 
West German minister of foreign affairs, he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
attacked the plan as a diktat that “not even Hitler” would have dared to proclaim.54 
The day before, the Soviet prime minister Nikolai Ryzhkov had ruled out a GDR-
FRG confederation and some days later, on 9 December, Gorbachev emphasized 
in front of the Central Committee “that we will see to it that no harm comes to 
the GDR.”55
The Soviet initiative to revive the four-power authority over Germany, an 
initiative that would capitalize on the traditional British and French mistrust of a 
quick transfer of power to Bonn, was considered a means for securing Soviet veto 
power against unwanted developments. This plan was implemented by the USSR 
convening a meeting of the Allied Control Council (ACC) on 11 December. At 
the meeting the Soviet representative denounced attempts at destabilizing the 
status quo in Europe and proposed reinstating regular sessions of this superviso-
ry body consisting of the four victors of World War II. After its intensive opera-
tions from 1945 to 1948, the ACC had met only irregularly. At the same time, 
Soviet diplomats and media embarked on a campaign aimed at discrediting the 
opposition in the GDR and linking the German right to self-determination to 
certain conditions. Members of the General Staff advocated a hard line with re-
gard to Germany.56 On the other hand, foreign-policy expert Dashichev and 
Ambassador Kvitsinskii forecast a growing leaning in the German population 
toward unification, which they declared not at variance with Soviet interests, but 
rather a precondition for the “Common European Home.” In internal memoranda 
in November, the advisors thus proposed that the GDR propose a scheme for 
creating a German confederation.57 
In a speech in Brussels on 19 December, Shevardnadze tried to walk a fine 
line between Gorbachev’s veto of unification and Kvitsinskii’s demand of a con-
federation. In an interview with CBS in 10 December, the foreign minister had 
characterized the German wish for a unified state as “logical” and in a conversa-
tion with his interpreter he described reunification as inevitable.58 As he was not 
inclined to modify the Soviet stance, he chose, after repeating Gorbachev’s de-
nouncement of unification, to pose questions that in his mind should be addressed 
53   Quoted in Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 337.
54   Genscher, Erinnerungen, 683; Conversation Gorbachev with Genscher, Soviet protocol, 5 De-
cember 1989, in MGGV, 276–77. In the West German protocol, the reference to Hitler is miss-
ing. Hilger, Diplomatie, 73–80. In a more moderate tone: Conversation Genscher with Shevard-
nadze, West German protocol, 5 December 1989, ibid., 61–73, 64, 69, 71–72. 
55   Text in Freedman, Europe, 384–91, 385; Conversation Ryzhkov with Modrow, 4 December 
1989, in Lehmann, Die Außenpolitik, 402–4. 
56   Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 375–78, 347–48.
57   Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 16–17; Daschitschew, “Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik,” 64.
58   Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 366; Palazchenko, My Years, 159.
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before German unity was restored.59 But the objective of demonstrating leadership 
was not reached, and Western politicians would later refer to this speech as “an 
expression of [his] understanding that unification is inevitable.”60
In the end, it took Gorbachev several more weeks to accept Germany’s right 
to self-determination. He continued to publicly insist, in contrast to his foreign 
minister, on the continued existence of two German states. It is not clear when 
the Soviet leader started to rethink his assessment or when he arrived at the po-
sition he communicated to Hans Modrow on 30 January and to Helmut Kohl on 
10 February, when the Soviet leader said that the question of whether or not to 
unify Germany was up to the Germans.61 Gorbachev has maneuvered around this 
question masterfully, obfuscating the answer to this day. It is a widely held opin-
ion that the right of self-determination was granted on these two occasions. 
However it can be shown in East German documents that Shevardnadze indicat-
ed this outcome already much earlier, namely on 20 January, when he stated to 
Oskar Fischer, the East German foreign minister, “that the Soviet Union does not 
deny the German right to self-determination […] Their wish for closer coopera-
tion and, if the Germans decide so, for national unity will be respected.”62  
In his memoirs, Gorbachev writes that during a conference with his advisors 
on 26 January, it was agreed that Germany’s reunification “should be regarded as 
inevitable.”63 While the available protocol does not make this as explicit as one 
would expect, no one present expressed any doubts about the future unification of 
Germany. The chief of the General Staff was ordered to prepare for the full with-
drawal of troops from the GDR. The conference was characterized by this calm 
approach as well as a critical assessment of the situation in the GDR. Gorbachev 
stated that there were “no real forces in the GDR,” and Ryzhkov concluded: “We 
cannot preserve the GDR.”64 As a consequence, Gorbachev felt that the Kremlin 
59   The issues he mentioned included guarantees that German unity would not threaten peace in Eu-
rope; whether Germany would recognize its borders; its place in military alliances; the presence 
of foreign troops on its soil; its relation to the Helsinki process; and its relation to the unification 
of Europe. Text in Europa Archiv 45 (1990): D 127–36. 
60   Conversation Gorbachev with Baker, Soviet protocol, 9 February 1990, in MGGV, 332–38, 333. 
61   Conversation Gorbachev with Kohl, Soviet protocol, 10 February 1990, in MGGV, 339–55, 348; 
West German protocol, in Küsters and Hofmann, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche 
Einheit, 795–807, 801. Kohl made this explicit in a press conference the same evening and 
TASS published it the next day. Texts in Freedman, Europe, 472–76.
62   Conversation Fischer with Shevardnadze, GDR protocol, 20 January 1990, in Lehmann, Außen-
politik, 441–43, 441. 
63   Gorbachev, Memoirs, 528. Some years later, he was more precise: “The question whether to 
agree with reunification was not raised.” Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 97. The date of the meeting 
is not entirely clear. 
64   Protocol of the discussion in the general secretary’s cabinet, 26 January 1990, in MGGV, 307–
11. While the protocol was published only in 2005, earlier memoirs hint at what was discussed, 
e.g. Tschernjaew, Mein deutsches Tagebuch, 248–55; Schachnasarow, Der Preis der Freiheit 
150; Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 95–97. 
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would have to “act through the FRG.” Kryuchkov, who later joined the putsch 
against Gorbachev, recommended “preparing our people for the unification,” and 
Gorbachev agreed to hold an interview to publicize this. This sober assessment 
was interspersed, however, by absurd statements such as “we are now in the pro-
cess of a second Brest[-Litovsk] treaty” (Gorbachev) or “[if we give Kohl every-
thing] Germany will unleash the third world war in 20–30 years” (Ryzhkov). 
Secondly, Gorbachev urged “procrastinating” the unification process, which 
would take at least “several years.” He considered this the “main thing” that 
needed to be done. The rights of the four control powers in Germany and the 
creation of an international forum consisting of the two Germanys and the four 
powers (later the “Two Plus Four”) would guarantee that the USSR retained its 
veto right over Germany’s future; France and Britain were to be recruited as 
tactical allies in this game. In the discussions, Shevardnadze voiced his (correct, 
as it turned out) expectation that in a group based on the four powers, the USSR 
would be in a minority position. Thus he warned against forming a Two Plus Four 
forum. He did not however convince Gorbachev.
Thirdly, the gathering discussed which political forces could be relied upon in 
Germany: Kohl was to be told that in the upcoming elections the SPD had better 
chances. Modrow was to be convinced to join the SPD and to advocate unifica-
tion, referring to Stalin’s “commitment” to German unity (sic). Aleksandr Yakov-
lev recommended that the USSR “win the sympathy of the German people” by 
supporting Modrow’s initiative for a confederation of the two Germanys. None-
theless, the SED should not be “written off” entirely.
Fourth, German unification was to be used for achieving several other goals: 
Gorbachev wanted to make sure that “we don’t just go home on the 50th anniver-
sary of victory” or that “unified Germany escapes into NATO.” According to him, 
Soviet forces “could be withdrawn if the Americans also withdraw their forces.” 
Although he did not mention that eliminating US troops in Germany and the 
country’s withdrawal from NATO would deal a heavy, perhaps fatal, blow to the 
Euro-Atlantic alliance, this was something Moscow had attempted to achieve 
since the Stalin era and perhaps in Gorbachev’s eyes was something for which it 
was worth giving up the GDR. In addition, unification was to be tightly linked 
to and “synchronized” with other international processes, such as the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) and the Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) negotiations. This was something that Kohl’s Ten Points had also signaled. 
From Gorbachev’s perspective, linking these processes would not only be useful 
for slowing down and controlling the emergence of a unified Germany, but also 
for accelerating the creation of the “Common European Home,” which he repeat-
edly proclaimed as one of his goals. 
In retrospect, the Soviet leader has claimed that with regard to the German 
Question, he was guided by three principles: a moral one, not to “condemn Ger-
mans to partition forever”; a political one, not to put détente at risk by using force; 
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and a strategic one, not to strain German relations with the USSR by suppressing 
a democratic wish for unification.65 Nonetheless, he was convinced that unifica-
tion was not yet the order of the day. While redefining the Soviet strategy, the 
leader seems to have struggled to unite several aims. These have been extrapo-
lated by Mikhail Narinskii as follows: to avoid violence and interference in the 
internal affairs of foreign countries; to keep the development in Germany under 
control; to avoid strain on Soviet-US and Soviet-German relations; and to pro-
mote the parallel dismantling of military alliances in Europe and the construction 
of the “Common European Home.”66 If one searches for the various factors mo-
tivating Gorbachev’s gradual acceptance of German unity between November 
1989 and January 1990, several steps can be recognized:
1) The project of building some sort of “Perestroika GDR,” a reasonable 
choice for a Soviet leader who wanted to promote perestroika, to safeguard So-
viet interests and who envisaged a “Common European Home” with two sym-
metrical German rooms in it, proved unfeasible. This was mainly for three rea-
sons. First, the GDR, be it reformed or unreformed, became increasingly unac-
ceptable for most East Germans. In contrast to many intellectuals and dissidents, 
the majority pinned their hopes not on a reform-socialist experiment, but on 
predictability and prosperity which they believed they would find by emigrating 
to the West or by supporting unification. This belief was confirmed for many 
citizens by the continued existence and machinations of Stasi, the infamous state 
security police, as well as the SED’s failure to distance itself from its past.67 
Modrow’s attempt to revitalize political surveillance and oppression and to turn 
them into a “stabilizing force in society” backfired. Thus, after the fall of the Wall 
the mass exodus continued and even grew. Those who remained at home demand-
ed unification ever more often. Historian Hanns Jürgen Küsters has argued that 
it was after the Stasi’s breakdown in January 1990 that Gorbachev recognized the 
impossibility of maintaining the GDR.68 Second, as Krenz confessed in a conver-
sation with Gorbachev, the GDR was in deep financial trouble, having accumu-
lated a foreign debt of 26.5 billion dollars and a deficit of 12.1 billion. It was 
spending 62 percent of its export revenues to service its foreign debt and was 
rapidly approaching bankruptcy.69 Its traditional sponsor, the FRG, proved un-
65   Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 84, 88. Cf. Anatolii Cherniaev, “The Unification of Germany: Polit-
ical Mechanisms and Psychological Stereotypes,” Russian Politics and Law 36, no. 4 (1998): 
23–38, 31.
66   Narinskii, “M.S. Gorbachev i ob”edinenie Germanii,” 17. 
67  Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland: Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung (Munich: 
Beck, 2009), 95–98, 120–24; Sarotte, 1989, 96 and 117. Modrow’s quote is from his conversa-
tion with Nikolai Ryzhkov on 10 January 1990. Ibid., 96.
68   Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” in idem and Hofmann, Doku-
mente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 21–236, 233, 
69   Conversation Gorbachev with Krenz, Soviet protocol, 1 November 1989, in MGGV, 232–245, 
237. 
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willing to grant additional financial support without fundamental political reforms 
being implemented in the GDR. Third, Modrow’s project of a “contractual com-
munity” of two states, which had been conceived to take the wind out of the 
“unificationists’” sails, and the Modrow Plan with its plans for creating a con-
federation that was subsequently launched, signaled that even the SED was not 
convinced in the continued existence of an independent East German state. In a 
conversation with Gorbachev on 30 January, the East German leader presented 
his draft for “Germany, United Fatherland” which read: “We strive for the unifi-
cation of the two German states.”70 This was to be achieved step by step in a 
process over years. It would include the neutralization of both states and the 
creation of a European Confederation. In the meantime, all the major political 
parties in the GDR had already voiced their demand for German unification. Once 
the entire political elite of the GDR, the SED prime minister included, was dis-
cussing unification schemes, the Soviet leader could not insist on blocking it 
without alienating the East Germans completely. In his talk with Modrow, Gor-
bachev approved the SED strategy, including, in his words, “in the long run, the 
merging [srastanie] of the two states into one.”71 Both the scheme and the Sovi-
et leader’s approval of it could be expected to improve the SED’s chances in the 
upcoming elections. Publicly, the Soviet leader declared that “nobody had ever 
doubted, in principle, the unification of the Germans.”72 In a letter to Kohl on 2 
February, Gorbachev described the emergence of a contractual community as 
realistic.73
2) In the international arena outside the GDR, Gorbachev, who had believed 
that most Western leaders opposed German unity, was gradually forced to accept 
the impossibility of forging a strong consensus against unity, as the failure of 
the ACC session in Berlin had indicated. The British prime minister had been 
most outspoken in her statements against German unity, statements that, due to 
the US-British “special relationship,” were perhaps mistaken by the Soviet lead-
er as reflecting US policy.74 When former US security advisor Zbigniew Brzez-
inski traveled to Moscow in October 1989, his statements had seemed to cor-
70   Conversation Gorbachev with Modrow, Soviet protocol, 30 January 1990, in MGGV, 312–26, 
324. Modrow had stated that “the idea of the existence of two German states is not supported by 
a growing part of the population of the GDR. Apparently it is not possible to uphold the idea.” 
Ibid., 315.
71   Ibid., 320. Gorbachev recalled that the conversation left the impression that Modrow was not the 
“master of the situation.” Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 100.
72   Quoted in Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 392.
73   Gorbachev to Kohl, 2 February 1990, in Küsters and Hofmann, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpo-
litik: Deutsche Einheit, 748.
74   “Britain and Western Europe are not interested in the unification of Germany. The words written 
in the NATO communiqué[s] may sound different, but disregard them. We do not want the uni-
fication of Germany.” Conversation Gorbachev with Thatcher, Soviet protocol, 23 September 
1989, in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 530–32. For Gorbachev’s mistak-
en conclusion that this represented the US stance, see Savranskaya, “The Logic of 1989,” 33. 
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roborate this impression.75 In the Politburo, on 3 November, Gorbachev had 
forecast that “the West does not want the unification of Germany, but wants to 
disrupt it with our hands, to set us against the FRG in order to preclude a pos-
sible ‘arrangement’ between the USSR and Germany.”76 However, as became 
visible for the Soviet leader in December and January 1989–90, Margaret 
Thatcher and François Mitterrand, despite their shared opposition against unifi-
cation, were not prepared to openly join a temporary alliance against German 
self-determination after it had been claimed by Kohl and endorsed by the Unit-
ed States.77 At their meeting on 6 December, the French president had joined 
Gorbachev in criticizing Kohl’s swiftness, and yet he had made it clear that he 
was not “afraid of Germany’s reunification.” Nonetheless it had to be preceded 
by European integration.78 Giulio Andreotti, the Italian prime minister, who in a 
conversation with Gorbachev had “absolutely agreed” with the Soviet leader’s 
claim that German unification was “not a current question,”79 was neither willing 
to stick his head out nor did he carry enough weight to create a substantial bar-
rier. On the contrary: Under the US aegis, a consensus grew among Western 
leaders not to block German unification. The US president not only repeated his 
endorsement of Germany’s right to self-determination in a conversation with 
Gorbachev on Malta on 2–3 December,80 but also endeavored to be considerate 
of the Soviet mood and to create incentives, including disarmament as well as 
reforms of NATO and the OSCE, to gain Gorbachev’s consent. At a summit in 
Strasbourg on 9 December, the heads of all EC member states confirmed that 
they were committed to seeking “the strengthening of the state of peace in Eu-
rope in which the German people will regain their unity through free self-deter-
mination.”81
75   “[O]ne Germany, united and strong. This does not correspond to either your or our interests.” 
Conversation Yakovlev with Brzezinski, Soviet protocol, 31 October 1989, in Savranskaya, 
Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 563–68, 567.
76   Chernyaev, Veber, Medvedev, eds., V Politbyuro, 450. The same formulation is used in Cherny-
aev’s diary entry of 9 October. Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 547.
77   Jacques Lévesque, “In the name of Europe’s future: Soviet, French, and British qualms about 
Kohl’s rush to German unification,” in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, Leo-
poldo Nuti, eds., Europe and the End of the Cold War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 95–106. 
Mitterrand was quoted with the words: “I don’t have to do anything to stop it; the Soviets will 
do it for me.” Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 
637.
78   Conversation Gorbachev with Mitterrand, Soviet protocol, 6 December 1989, in MGGV, 286–
91, 287–88. 
79   Conversation Gorbachev with Andreotti, Soviet protocol, 29 November 1989, in MGGV, 264–
66. 
80   Bush said that despite some ambivalence among US allies in NATO, “you cannot expect us 
[i.e. the United States] not to approve of German reunification.” Soviet protocol, in MGGV, 
268–72. For an English translation, see Masterpieces, 619–46, 634, 640. Cf. Gorbatschow, Gip-
felgespräche, 93–129. 
81   Quoted in Haftendorn, “The Unification,” 343. 
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3) Not only his relations with the United States, France, Britain and Italy, but 
also with West Germany may have convinced the Soviet leader to acquiesce to 
German unification. Confronted with the choice between a consensual solution 
and straining his relations with Kohl, Gorbachev opted for the first—as Mitter-
rand did in a similar dilemma. The French president was held in high esteem by 
Gorbachev, and French-German reconciliation, as personified by Mitterrand and 
Kohl, was perhaps a model for the Soviet-German reconciliation. In addition, the 
German economic capacity and its goodwill, which was impressively demonstrat-
ed by a West German program in January 1990 of express deliveries of food 
rations, sponsored by the federal government with 220 million marks, created a 
strong incentive for acquiescing to unification. 
4) When looking for Gorbachev’s motives in the German Question, an ideolog-
ical factor also needs to be taken into account. As an enlightened Marxist and 
guided by an idealist Weltanschauung, the Soviet leader aspired to turning theory 
into practice. Consenting with Germany’s self-determination enabled him to solve 
two grave contradictions between theory and reality: first, the contradiction between 
the Soviet endorsement, in theory, of the principle of national self-determination and 
the denial of it to the German people; and second, the divergence between the So-
viet claim of having advocated German unity and the Soviet two-state policy. By 
acquiescing to German unification, Gorbachev managed not only to resolve these 
two inconsistencies but also to legitimize this decision by referring to the Soviet 
tradition of propagating German self-determination and unity. In a well-considered 
distortion of the historical record, the Soviet leader claimed that “We never denied 
this right [of self-determination] to the Germans,”82 whereby it was not necessary 
to modify the official Soviet stance. Such outward consistency enabled Gorbachev 
to receive the approval of German unity by the majority of the Soviet population; 
in an opinion poll in March, 60 percent approved of German unification.83 
5) As Gorbachev’s statements indicate, the leader seems to have expected to 
be able to use German unification to realize his project of a “Common European 
Home.” This was to lead in the long run to some sort of security system involv-
ing the USSR and Europe and replacing NATO. Yet it soon became clear that it 
would not be easy to realize these expectations. 
Gorbachev accepts Germany’s right to choose an alliance
When the Soviet leader acquiesced to Germany’s self-determination with re-
gard to unification, Gorbachev still felt that the developments could be controlled. 
82   Gorbachev’s answers to questions posed by the Pravda correspondent, 21 February 1990 in 
MGGV, 371. Cf. Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 114. Stent, Russia, 109, calls Gorbachev a “prisoner 
of past pronouncements.” 
83   Plato, Die Vereinigung, 173. 
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This outlook was fundamentally changed by the SED’s defeat in the parliamen-
tary elections on 18 March, the landslide victory of Kohl’s Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) in the East, and the creation of a non-communist coalition govern-
ment under Lothar de Maizière (CDU). Not only was the election outcome per-
ceived as a referendum favoring unification. In addition, the GDR had become 
even less manageable by Moscow than it had been under Honecker and Modrow. 
Since a non-communist government in Berlin could be expected at some point to 
terminate its alliance with the USSR, the GDR was—from a Bolshevik point of 
view—already lost for the Kremlin. The Soviet loss of control on developments 
concerning German reunification was fostered by the West German strategy, 
supported by the US administration, of deliberately downgrading and decelerating 
the Two Plus Four process while creating facts by speeding up the process of 
“inner” and economic unification. Thus the economic union of both German 
states was signed on 18 May; two months after the GDR elections, but four 
months ahead of the Two Plus Four treaty.84
In his conversations with Bush and with Mitterrand in December 1989 and on 
other occasions, Gorbachev had raised the question of whether the unified Ger-
many was to be neutral, or a NATO or Warsaw Pact member. He did not propose 
an answer. In the brainstorming session with high officials and advisors on 26 
January, Gorbachev had explicitly ruled out NATO membership85 and repeated 
this statement in an interview with Pravda on 7 March and in the Politburo on 3 
May.86 In the same session, Shevardnadze’s draft instructions for the Two Plus 
Four negotiations, a draft that provided for “the tacit [Soviet] approval of Ger-
many remaining in NATO,” were voted down.87 Falin, who had proposed in 
several internal memos since December 1989 that the USSR bring forward its 
84   Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” in idem and Hofmann, Doku-
mente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 21–236, 79, 89, 119.
85   Protocol of a discussion in the general secretary’s cabinet, 26 January 1990, in MGGV, 307–11, 
308.
86   According to Chernyaev’s diary entry of 5 May, Gorbachev said in the Politburo session on 
3 May: “[Do] not let Germany into NATO, that’s it. I will risk bursting the Viennese negotia-
tions [on conventional forces in Europe] if that happens.” Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod, 855. 
Chernyaev criticized this stance in a memo to Gorbachev as contradicting the principles of the 
“new thinking” and having no chance of being maintained in practice. http://www.gwu.edu/~n-
sarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB317/chernyaev_1990.pdf (accessed 8 August 2012). The memo of 
4 May is published in Tschernjaew, Mein deutsches Tagebuch, 257–60; an abridged version is 
found in MGGV, 424–25.
87   Tschernjaew, Mein deutsches Tagebuch, 257–58. Shevardnadze seems to have accepted the 
NATO membership of the unified Germany much earlier than Gorbachev. In a conversation on 
10 February 1990, the same day Baker had left Moscow, Shevardnadze told Genscher: “The 
most complicated question is that of the unified Germany in NATO. What happens with the 
Soviet troops in the GDR? How should everything look in practice? Should the S[oviet] U[nion] 
withdraw all her forces from the GDR, while US forces remain in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many?” West German protocol, in Hilger, Diplomatie, 98–105, 102. 
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demands in exchange for granting unification, had severely attacked the softer 
strategy. Shevardnadze was ordered to maintain the tough position. According to 
Falin’s memoirs, some weeks later Gorbachev said that “we were both right not 
to listen to Eduard [Shevardnadze].”88
Shevardnadze duly repeated the mantra that the USSR wanted guarantees that 
the unified Germany would not become a NATO member in his conversation with 
Genscher and in his speech at the first ministerial meeting of the Two Plus Four 
in Bonn on 5 May.89 He referred to the Soviet people, of which 97 to 98 percent 
were allegedly against such an outcome. As a solution he proposed the transfor-
mation of both alliances and their final replacement through the “Common Eu-
ropean Home” of all CSCE states. Until this had been accomplished, Germany 
would be entitled to unify but not to regain full sovereignty. With regard to 
four-power control over Germany, Soviet diplomacy demanded postponing its 
dissolution until the end of a transition period of several years, during which 
foreign troops were to withdraw from Germany and a new security organization 
for Europe was to emerge.90 As Shevardnadze had used his visit to Bonn to ask 
for West German loans, his position was considerably weakened.91
In the meantime, from January till May, the West was confronted with what 
Kvitsinskii has called a “tangled surrealist mess of ideas.”92 The Soviet side aired 
several proposals, sometimes even more than one at the same time: 1) the disso-
lution of the two military alliances and the creation of an all-European security 
system (with or without the United States and Canada93); 2) the ongoing existence 
88   Falin, Konflikte, 179; the memos ibid., 153; 156–61; 165–78; 314–16. Falin’s conditions in-
cluded Germany’s neutralization and demilitarization. If Germany would not comply with these 
demands, Soviet troops should remain in the GDR, and the USSR would consider reunification 
as an aggression against the GDR, which was a member of the Warsaw Pact. Obviously the 
diplomat wasted no time on ideas of self-determination or on the possibility that the GDR might 
withdraw from the Soviet alliance.
89   Conversation Genscher with Shevardnadze, West German protocol, 4 May 1990, in Hilger, 
Diplomatie, 129–36, 131, 134; Shevardnadze’s speech at the Two Plus Four, 5 May, ibid., 136–
44. In the end, the Western partners of the Two Plus Four did not perceive the Soviet conditions 
as an obstacle. Entry, 7 May 1990, Chernyaev, Diary, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB317/chernyaev_1990.pdf (accessed 8 August 2012). On the Two Plus Four process, 
see Zelikow, Rice, Germany Unified, 243–63; Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 
420–767; Rödder, Deutschland, 233–35.
90   In contrast, Germany insisted on ending four-power control as soon as possible and granting a 
transition period only with regard to the Soviet military withdrawal from the GDR. Conversa-
tion Genscher with Shevardnadze, West German protocol, 18 June 1990, in Hilger, Diplomatie, 
194–211, 204–5 and footnote 32.
91   Teltschik, 329 Tage, 220–27. Küsters and Hofmann, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deut-
sche Einheit, 1087. 
92   Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 12. 
93   In his conversation with Bush, Gorbachev stated that US presence in Europe was “for the time 
being necessary.” Second conversation Gorbachev with Bush, Soviet protocol, 31 May 1990, in 
MGGV, 466–76, 469. Cf. Conversation Gorbachev with Bush, Soviet protocol, 2–3 December 
Wolfgang Mueller
341
of the two alliances plus Germany’s neutralization and demilitarization; 3) a 
double membership for Germany in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, either as a full 
or associated member, leading de facto to the same result as the country’s neu-
tralization; 4) the “French solution,” i.e. Germany’s membership in the political, 
but not military structures of NATO; 5) Germany’s full membership in NATO 
under the condition of the USSR’s entry into the Atlantic alliance, resulting de 
facto in the alliance’s neutralization and/or transformation into a European-Sovi-
et-North American security system; and 6) Germany’s membership in the Warsaw 
Pact.94 
The hectic creativity of the Soviet leadership aimed at circumventing Germa-
ny remaining a member of NATO—something that was, on top of the “loss of 
the GDR,” likely to be perceived as a Soviet diplomatic defeat. If, however, 
Germany were to preserve its NATO membership, Gorbachev wanted to use his 
acquiescence to either dismantle or transform the alliance into a structure that 
included the USSR and thus make it controllable by the Kremlin. In April, Gor-
bachev told the British foreign secretary that a new system of this sort (be it in-
stead of or superseding the two blocs95) was his favorite solution, and when 
Shevardnadze outlined various options to his West German colleague on 23 May, 
all of them envisaged this outcome in some form or another.96 In contrast, the 
option of Germany’s double membership in both alliances was quickly dismissed 
by the Soviet leader. 97 
The Soviet line of postponing German sovereignty and denying its self-deter-
mination with regard to security issues was maintained until the Soviet leader’s 
summit with the US president on 31 May. At this meeting Gorbachev demanded 
1989, in Savranskaya, Blanton, Zubok, eds., Masterpieces, 619–46, 640–41; Conversation Gor-
bachev with Baker, Soviet protocol, 18 May 1990, in MGGV, here 437 and 445. However in his 
conversation with the British foreign secretary, Gorbachev proposed a new security system for 
Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals,” i.e. excluding the United States and Canada. Conversa-
tion Gorbachev with Hurd, Soviet protocol, 10 April 1990, ibid.,391–93.
94   Conversation Gorbachev with Baker, Soviet protocol, 18 May 1990, in MGGV, 437–45, 442. 
Option 6) was proposed in Gorbachev’s conversation with Douglas Hurd on 10 April 1990, 
ibid., 391–93. Cf. Hannes Adomeit, “Gorbachev and German Unification,” in Alexander Dallin 
and Gail Lapidus, eds., The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse, rev. ed. (Boulder: Westview, 
1995), 465–92, 477. 
95   Shevardnadze said: “The Soviet Union is sympathetic to the proposal to liquidate the [existing] 
alliances; however, this has no chance of being accepted and is therefore irrational.” Conversa-
tion Genscher with Shevardnadze, West German protocol, 12 June 1989, in Hilger, ed., Diplo-
matie, 15–21, 17.
96   Conversation Gorbachev with Hurd, Soviet protocol, 10 April 1990, in MGGV, 391–93; Con-
versation Genscher with Shevardnadze, West German protocol, 23 May 1990, in Hilger, Diplo-
matie, 147–62, 153–54. The following options were mentioned: 1) Germany’s withdrawal from 
both alliances; 2) neutrality; 3) not-alignment in combination with an all-European security 
system; 4) the dissolution of the alliances in combination with an all-European security system. 
97   Conversation Kohl with Gorbachev, German protocol, 10 February 1990, in Küsters and Hof-
mann, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 795–807, 804.
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that a unified Germany be entitled to freely determine whether it be part of a 
military alliance. However, at the Two Plus Four session in Berlin on 22 June, 
Shevardnadze returned to the line of postponing German sovereignty and de-
manded that the four powers retain their rights for a five-year period after unifi-
cation, a period in which the united Germany was to remain in both alliances.98 
This posture changed again on 15 July when Gorbachev, now in a conversation 
with the West German chancellor, conceded that with certain restrictions unified 
Germany could be entitled to remain part of the Atlantic alliance. Again, several 
factors can be identified that determined Gorbachev’s rethinking of this issue, 
which had moved from outright rejection of unified Germany being a member of 
NATO to accepting this option.
1) From mid-February until mid-April, it became clear that not only Bonn 
advocated NATO membership, albeit under military restrictions for the GDR, the 
so-called Genscher Plan.99 From a telephone conversation with the US president 
on 28 February, the Soviet leader drew the conclusion that Bush, too, was sup-
portive of this idea.100 Also Thatcher, Mitterrand and most of the leaders recently 
elected in the Central European states supported this solution—not so much due 
to trust in a unified Germany’s self-restraint but rather out of the consideration 
that NATO should continue the mission it had had with regard to Germany from 
the beginning: to keep the Germans, if not “down,” then at least under control. 
At the Open Skies conference in Ottawa in February, the new non-communist 
foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia and Poland, Jiří Dienstbier and Krzystof 
Skubiszewski, argued against Germany’s neutralization; at the Warsaw Pact’s 
conference of foreign ministers in Prague in March, this was also the majority 
opinion among the non-Soviet participants.101 Within the GDR, resistance against 
NATO became weaker, while the discussion about the accession procedure ac-
cording to Article 23 of the FRG’s Basic Law (which did not envision the fusion 
of the two German states but merely the accession of the GDR’s provinces to the 
FRG) strengthened the fortunes of the Genscher Plan advocates.102 In a conver-
sation with Gorbachev on 25 May, Mitterrand explained that the FRG, a NATO 
member, was preparing to “swallow” the GDR, which is why a unified Germany 
98   “Zweites Treffen der Außenminister der Zwei plus Vier,” 22 June 1990, in Dokumente zur 
Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 1249–56. Interestingly, Soviet diplomacy sent out sig-
nals that these proposals were not meant seriously. Kiessler and Elbe, Ein runder Tisch, 160–63; 
Hilger, Diplomatie, 205. 
99   Text in Freedman, Europe, 436–45.
100  Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 119. 
101 Adomeit, “Gorbachev and German Unification,” 482; “Bericht über das Treffen der Außenmini-
ster der Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages,” 19 March 1990, in Lehmann, Außenpolitik, 527.
102 In a conversation with Gorbachev on 29 April, de Maizière said that in the election campaign, he 
had advocated the Article 23 procedure; hence, he saw his victory as a clear mandate to proceed 
in this direction. Soviet protocol, 29 April 1990, in MGGV, 409–23, 419. Cf. Jack F. Matlock, 
Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
(New York: Random House, 1995), 383.
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would remain in the Atlantic alliance.103 As the Soviet leader wrote in his mem-
oirs, this conversation, in which even the French president reacted unenthusias-
tically to Gorbachev’s suggestion of a “French solution,” i.e. political membership 
in the alliance without participation in its military structures, for Germany, made 
it clear that the USSR had no allies in its struggle against Germany’s NATO 
membership.104 Gorbachev’s assistants later concluded from this that the Soviet 
leader had prepared himself for this outcome.
2) With respect to the conditions of the European framework, Gorbachev 
launched several attempts to use German unification as a lever for creating a new 
security system for Europe. A Soviet non-paper in April had declared a new se-
curity system as “the solution” for the German problem and, in late May, the 
Soviet envoy to East Berlin handed over a proposal for an all-European security 
institution, comprising all 35 signatories of the CSCE final act and including a 
“Greater European Council,” a body of ambassadors, and a permanent secretari-
at.105 Some weeks later, Shevardnadze and GDR foreign minister Markus Meck-
el agreed to set up “in the narrowest circle, with utmost confidence and without 
delay, a working group for […] developing common ideas for a European secu-
rity structure.”106 While the Soviet leader was able to enlist a certain amount of 
support for his idea among East German leaders, including de Maizière, Meckel 
and Defense and Disarmament Minister Rainer Eppelmann,107 it remained unclear 
whether the new organization would become more than, as the US secretary of 
state stated in a conversation with the Soviet leader in May, “a beautiful dream.”108 
In this situation, three developments became relevant:
First, the Warsaw Pact’s military organization, which according to some Sovi-
et conceptions was envisaged as being one pillar of the new system, was showing 
signs of decay: Hungary and Czechoslovakia had demanded negotiations for a 
Soviet withdrawal from their territories, and in June 1990 the new non-communist 
Hungarian government declared that their country would not remain in the alliance 
under any circumstances.109 In order to rescue the organization, at the Moscow 
session of the alliance’s Political Consultative Committee, discussions were held 
concerning the possibility of transforming the Pact into a political alliance.
Secondly, under these conditions, it was promising for the Soviet side that the 
United States proposed transforming also NATO into a primarily political alliance 
103 Soviet protocol, in MGGV, 451, 461. 
104 Gorbatschow, Wie es war, 135–36; Tschernjaew, Mein deutsches Tagebuch, 268; Grachev, 
Gorbachev’s Gamble, 158–59.
105 Non-paper, Soviet government, 16 April 1990; “Notiz eines Besuchs des Gesandten der UdSSR,” 
25 May 1990, in Lehman, Außenpolitik, 542–45; 663–65.
106 Conversation Meckel with Shevardnadze, GDR protocol, 7 June 1990, in Lehman, Außenpolitik, 
696.
107 Sarotte, 1989, 152–53.
108 Soviet protocol, 18 May 1990, in MGGV, 437–45, 438.
109 Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle, 71. 
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and changed its strategy by declaring that the alliance would not consider the East 
European countries enemies. In February, Dashichev had proposed such a solu-
tion to the NATO leadership, and in Germany, historian Boris Meissner had 
launched a similar idea during a talk with Teltschik in April.110 Ideas for a reori-
entation of NATO were integrated into US secretary of state James Baker’s Nine 
Points, which were presented to Gorbachev on 18 May.111 Chernyaev later said 
that this plan helped the leader to accept Germany’s membership in the Atlantic 
alliance.112 NATO’s London declaration of 6 July (during the twenty-eighth ses-
sion of the CPSU congress) offered reconciliation, friendship, cooperation and a 
renunciation of the first use of force to the former Cold War adversary.113 She-
vardnadze recalled that he perceived these guarantees as proof that NATO was 
moving toward a less military posture, which let the question of Germany’s 
membership in the alliance appear “in an entirely different light.”114 From end of 
May, the media in the USSR began to depict NATO in less demonic colors than 
it had earlier done.115 Nonetheless, transforming the Atlantic alliance into a secu-
rity system for Europe by including the USSR (an idea that was repeatedly 
brought up by Gorbachev) turned out to be a goal that could not be reached. 
And thirdly, the FRG and the United States (in the Nine Points) offered the 
transformation of the CSCE. If it was not to become a new security system, then 
at least it was to be bolstered with new competencies and institutionalized as the 
OSCE, the first security institution comprising North America, Europe and the 
Soviet Union. As Soviet leaders had repeatedly demanded the creation of such 
an institution, the Western proposals could be regarded as a sort of compensation. 
3) In the area of arms reductions, further compensation and incentives were offered 
by the West. The Genscher Plan stipulated that no NATO structures were to be de-
ployed on former GDR territory. Baker’s Nine Points modified this pledge somewhat 
and reduced it to a limited transition period, during which Soviet forces would with-
draw from the former GDR; in Gorbachev’s meeting with Kohl on 15 July it was 
110  Dashichev, “On the Road to German Reunification,” 178; Teltschik, 329 Tage, 192. 
111 Conversation Gorbachev with Baker, Soviet protocol, 18 May 1990, in MGGV, 439–40. The 
proposals comprised (1) the quantitative reduction of Germany’s army in the CFE; (2) new 
negotiations on tactical arms reductions; (3) German abdication of ABC weapons; (4) no NATO 
troops on former GDR territory for a limited period; (5) the presence of Soviet forces on for-
mer GDR territory for a limited period; (6) the transformation of NATO into a more political 
organization; (7) a guarantee of Germany’s borders; (8) the transformation of the CSCE into a 
permanent organization; (9) “due consideration” of Soviet economic interests. Cf. Zelikow and 
Rice, Germany Unified, 263–64. 
112 Hannes Adomeit, “Gorbachev’s consent to united Germany’s membership of NATO,” in 
Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., Europe and the End 
of the Cold War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 107–18, 107–8, 111–12, 115. 
113 “Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” 5–6 July 1990,   http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23693.htm (accessed 8 August 2012).
114 Schewardnadse, Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit, 248, 251. 
115 Izvestiya (Moscow), 29 May 1990. 
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confirmed and agreed upon that no foreign NATO personnel would be deployed in 
the former GDR during this transition period. Unified Germany would renounce the 
possession and use of ABC weaponry and it was conceded that its armed forces would 
comprise less than half of the FRG’s and GDR’s military manpower taken together; 
this was offered as a voluntary acceptance of self-restriction in the CFE negotiations. 
The United States agreed to withdraw nuclear short-range weapons from Germany.116 
In addition, a rapprochement between the USSR and the United States in the prepa-
ration of START was achieved between Baker and Shevardnadze.117
4) On the bilateral level, the entire process was accompanied by a further inten-
sification of German-Soviet cooperation. One part of the German historian Meiss-
ner’s package, which was designed to help the Kremlin bite the bullet, was conclud-
ing a “Grand Treaty” on good-neighborly relations and the renunciation of force. 
This was intended to symbolize the historic reconciliation of the former adversaries 
and build a basis for their future cooperation. Ambassador Kvitsinskii reacted “eu-
phorically”118 when Helmut Kohl aired corresponding thoughts. It seems unlikely 
that German unity and its NATO membership could have been achieved without this 
reconciliation. During the chancellor’s and the Soviet president’s joint visit to Gor-
bachev’s native region of Stavropol in July 1990, this reconciliation was symboli-
cally approved by Soviet World War II veterans.119 The “Grand” Soviet-German 
Treaty on Neighborhood, Partnership and Cooperation of 9 November included a 
renouncement of force, and declared the two countries’ aim of intensifying their 
cooperation in bilateral and multilateral matters, including arms reduction. The eco-
nomic part of the new cooperation comprised compensation for former GDR obli-
gations toward the USSR plus a state-guaranteed 5 billion mark loan. This is what 
Kohl had promised Gorbachev the previous June.120 Later that month, Kohl had 
agreed to pay additional 1.25 billion marks in stationing costs for Soviet troops in 
the GDR in 1990; in July, he had proposed a German fund to compensate Soviet 
victims of Nazi slave labor and, after a meeting with Gorbachev, he was presented 
a Soviet bill for over 20 billion marks to support the Soviet troops in East Germany 
until 1994 as well as their housing and retraining upon their return to the USSR.121 
116 Weidenfeld, Außenpolitik, 554.
117 Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” 169.
118 Teltschik, 329 Tage, 192, 205. Cf. Conversation Kohl with Kvitsinskii, 23 April 1990, in Küsters 
and Hofmann, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 1026–30, 1028.
119 Statement Gorbachev, Soviet-German press conference, 16 July 1990, in MGGV, 533.
120 The USSR had demanded 11.5 to 17 billion. Already prior to this loan, the FRG was the USSR’s 
largest single foreign creditor, with 6 of a total debt of 24 billion marks. Teltschik, whom the 
chancellor had secretly sent to Moscow with the directors of the Deutsche and Dresdner banks, 
insisted that this loan was part of a Western reward for the Kremlin’s consent with the German 
solution. Teltschik, 329 Tage, 232, 234–35.
121 Sarotte, 1989, 170; 179; 187–93; Rödder, Deutschland, 250–51; 261–62. The total costs of Ger-
man payments and services to the USSR with regard to unification were calculated as amounting 
to 83.55 billion DM, of them about 50 billion in direct payments and credits. Oldenburg, “Die 
Rekonstruktion,” 775–76.
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After tough negotiations with Gorbachev threatening to abandon the reached agree-
ment, the latter sum was reduced to 12 billion plus an interest-free credit line of 3 
billion. In addition, the two sides reached the consensus that unified Germany would 
honor both the GDR’s economic agreements with the USSR, as well as the latter’s 
economic measures in the GDR.122
5) The minutes of many of Gorbachev’s conversations indicate, again, that 
when discussing the issue of NATO, the leader often referred to the political idea 
of self-determination. As James Baker outlined to Gorbachev in a crucial conver-
sation on 18 May, the United States argued that under international law and ac-
cording to the Helsinki final act, it was Germany’s right to choose which military 
alliance it wanted to adhere to. The secretary of state had been asked by Gorbachev 
whether the United States was prepared to tolerate united Germany’s membership 
in the Warsaw Pact. While the United States advocated Germany’s membership in 
NATO, it was also prepared to accept any other choice Germany would make, as 
long as it was taken in a free and sovereign manner.123 The day before, Baker had 
discussed the issue with his West German colleague when Genscher referred to 
the CSCE document.124 In his conversation with Gorbachev, Baker asked: “You 
say: if the USA trusts Germany, why include it in NATO? My answer is: if you 
trust [Germany], why not give the Germans the possibility of making their own 
choice?”125 Gorbachev was evasive and did not give a clear response. Two weeks 
later, however, at a summit with the US president on 31 May, he had embraced 
this point and, after first demanding Germany’s membership in both alliances, 
proactively insisted that Germany be given the freedom of choice.126 The sudden 
disquiet within the Soviet delegation shows that this initiative had not been gen-
erally agreed upon.127 In general, this part of the summit discussion repeats the 
122 Non-paper, Soviet government, 19 April 1990, in Küsters and Hofmann, Dokumente zur 
Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 1023–24. 
123 Conversation Gorbachev with Baker, Soviet protocol, 18 May 1990, in MGGV, 437–45, 443. 
124 Teltschik, 329 Tage, 239. 
125 Conversation Gorbachev with Baker, Soviet protocol, 18 May 1990, 438. Genscher raised this 
question again some days later in a conversation with Shevardnadze. He asked: “The first ques-
tion is whether unified Germany has equal rights or not. If Germany has equal rights, then this 
means, according to the Helsinki Final Act, the right to belong or not belong to an alliance.” 
Genscher offered the following assurances: peaceful intentions, no border changes, no extension 
of NATO with regard to the GDR, the acceptance of Soviet troops on GDR territory during a 
transition period, and no ABC weapons for Germany. Conversation Genscher with Shevard-
nadze, West German protocol, 23 May 1990, in Hilger, Diplomatie, 147–62, 158.
126 Conversation Gorbachev with Bush, Soviet protocol, 31 May 1990, in MGGV, 466–76, 474–75. 
127 Adomeit, “Gorbachev’s consent,” 113–14; Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 607–11. 
A week later, the Soviet foreign minister claimed that at the Washington summit, both “the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union had been anxious, in their exchange of opinions about Germany, 
not to decide on anything.”  At least for the US side, this cannot be corroborated from the summit 
protocol. Nonetheless, Shevardnadze accepted Germany’s right to choose an alliance and, thus, 
confirmed the main outcome of the summit with regard to Germany. Conversation Genscher 
with Shevardnadze, West German protocol, 7 June 1990, in Hilger, Diplomatie, 164–68, 164.
Wolfgang Mueller
347
conversation between Gorbachev and Baker on 18 May—with the decisive differ-
ence that on 31 May, the Soviet president was proactive about the issue he had 
earlier been evasive about. It therefore seems likely that the point of self-determi-
nation had influenced Gorbachev’s deliberations with regard to Germany’s NATO 
membership, and that his consent at the 31 May meeting in Washington was a 
well-reasoned decision consistent with his “new thinking.” As his closest advisor 
Chernyaev had stressed in a memorandum on 4 May, a permanent denial of the 
right to self-determination to Germany was inconsistent with these principles, had 
no real chance of success, and thus was unwise.128 The Soviet leader perhaps ex-
pected self-determination to include a public referendum in Germany,129 which 
seemed to be anything other than a safe bet for NATO membership. Indeed, on 25 
May the French president had reminded Gorbachev that the ideas of both neutral-
ity and a double membership in both blocs were highly popular among Germans.130
Instead of trumpeting that US-Soviet agreement had been reached about Ger-
many’s right to choose an alliance, on 31 May Bush shifted to the formulation 
that the United States preferred seeing Germany in NATO, yet was willing to 
accept if the Germans decided otherwise. Thus the US leader missed this oppor-
tunity for pocketing Gorbachev’s agreement with military self-determination. 
Gorbachev subsequently obfuscated this consensus. This can be explained with 
the leader not wanting to give his critics at the twenty-eighth party congress 
another reason for discontent.131 In addition, the Soviet government did not seem 
prepared to declare its full consent with Germany’s NATO membership without 
seeing Baker’s Nine Points implemented. In the weeks between the Washington 
and the Stavropol summits, Soviet diplomacy strove at postponing the issue by 
pushing that the GDR’s responsibilities with regard to the Warsaw Pact be upheld 
for the entire transition period.132 
The combination of the various decisions that had been reached by mid-July 
concerning reforms of NATO and the CSCE, arms reductions, German-Soviet co-
operation, as well as the conclusion of the CPSU congress most likely allowed 
Gorbachev to adapt to the line advocated by Chernyaev and Shevardnadze. He 
casually mentioned in a conversation with Helmut Kohl on 15 July, “Membership 
128 See above, footnote 86.
129 A referendum had been proposed in Falin’s April memo to Gorbachev. Falin, Konflikte, 173. Cf. Gor-
bachev’s own account of his conversation with Bush: “You claim to trust in Germany, yet you drag 
her into NATO […] Let us let Germany decide for itself.” Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, 722–23. 
130 Conversation Gorbachev with Mitterrand, Soviet protocol, 25 May 1990, in MGGV, 454–65, 
461. According to West German opinion polls, the acceptance of neutrality rose from 33 percent 
1978 to 55 in 1983. Daschitschew, “Aus den Anfängen,” 42. 
131 See Gorbachev’s speech at the Supreme Soviet on 12 June 1990, when he said: “I told President 
Bush: Instead of talking excessively about united Germany’s NATO membership, we should 
think about bringing Europe’s two dividing blocs together.” http://www.2plus4.de/chronik.
php3?date_value=12.06.90&sort=000-000 (accessed 31 December 2012).  
132 Conversation Genscher with Shevardnadze, West German protocol, 11 June 1990, in Hilger, 
Diplomatie, 172–88, 186. 
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in NATO will persist.”133 However, this statement cannot be found in the published 
Soviet protocol; officially, the Soviet leader did not mention this issue and merely 
repeated his opinion that NATO structures were not to extend eastward and Soviet 
troops would remain where they were during a transitional period. Kohl said that 
this meant NATO structures would not extend eastward while Soviet troops re-
mained there. The chancellor offered that no foreign or ABC troops were to be 
stationed in the former GDR after the Soviet withdrawal. Then he pressed for a 
clear public statement from Gorbachev but did not get one. It is presumable that 
the president, in order not to cause new uproar among his imperialist critics, asked 
the chancellor not to mention the Atlantic alliance explicitly in his public statement, 
but only Germany’s sovereignty and its right to freely choose an alliance.134 Kohl 
recalled that in a previous conversation Gorbachev had placed him before the option 
of either leaving the alliance or losing the opportunity for unity.135
The major points in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Ger-
many (the Two Plus Four Treaty) were: a declaration that the two Germanys’ 
external borders would be the definitive borders of the united Germany; the two 
German governments’ renouncement of ABC weapons; the reduction of Germa-
ny’s armed forces to 370,000; the withdrawal of Soviet troops136 by the end of 
1994; the right of the united Germany to belong to alliances; and the termination 
of the rights of the Four Powers with regard to Germany and the latter acquiring 
full sovereignty. The Treaty was signed by the two Germanys and the Four Pow-
ers on 12 September 1990 in Moscow and entered into force after the last ratifi-
cation document was deposited by the USSR on 15 March 1991, after contentious 
debates in the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet137 were resolved and the Soviets 
ratified the treaty on 4 March. 
Interpretation, outlook, desiderata 
In the German Question, Gorbachev had to move through several steps. Im-
mediately after the opening of the Berlin Wall, the event was publicly accepted 
133 Conversation Kohl with Gorbachev, West German protocol, 15 July 1990, in Küsters and Hoff-
mann, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 1346. Cf. the Soviet protocol, 
in MGGV, 501: “Regarding Germany’s membership in NATO, the issue is clear […] Under legal 
membership in NATO, its [Germany’s] eastern part will be, for the transition period, in the area 
of the Warsaw Pact [Bei juridischer Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands in der NATO wird sein Ostteil 
in Übergangszustand im Bereich des Warschauer Paktes sein].”
134 Teltschik, 329 Tage, 334; Sarotte, 1989, 179–84.
135 Küsters, “Entscheidung,” 191.
136 The details were outlined in a separate bilateral Soviet-German treaty of 12 October 1990, rati-
fied on 2 April 1991. 
137 Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the 
Soviet Union (Part 3),” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 3–96, 4– 67.
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by the Soviet leadership. After rejecting Kohl’s Ten Points, at the end of January 
1990 Gorbachev publicly agreed on the two Germanys’ right to self-determination 
with regard to a possible unification. It is possible that at that time the Soviet 
leadership still hoped to bolster the SED’s chances in the upcoming elections. In 
any case, Gorbachev seemed to expect that the reunification of Germany would 
be a long-term process taking about ten years. The process would be a chance to 
dismantle the two alliances and to create a “Common European Home” that in-
cluded the USSR. The control of the Four Powers over Germany, the ambivalence 
of Britain and France, and the linking of the reunification process with the de-
construction of the Cold War division of Europe appeared to offer means for 
controlling the developments. 
In particular this referred to the question of the united Germany’s future mem-
bership in an alliance. After the fall of the SED, this seemed to be the only stra-
tegic question of importance. Gorbachev, who in 1989 had accepted a non-com-
munist government in Poland but insisted on the country remaining in the Warsaw 
Pact, did not envisage a united Germany continuing the NATO membership of 
West Germany. He rather hoped to keep the issue in limbo until a new security 
system for Europe, including the USSR, was in place. However, the crumbling 
of the communist regime in the GDR, including the swelling exodus of its citizens 
to the FRG (according to projections in February 1990, estimated at becoming 
one million for the entire year), and the ambivalence of Britain and France turned 
the projected timetable upside down. In this situation, the West German govern-
ment, which was concerned with avoiding a collapse due to migration and inter-
ested in using the opportunity for unity as well as in stabilizing the perestroika 
in Moscow, offered the USSR a reliable partnership and relief for some of its 
towering economic problems. Additional German and US concessions (NATO 
and CSCE reform, disarmament), the principle of self-determination, and, last but 
not least, the prospect of the USSR’s reconciliation with its World War II adver-
sary convinced the Soviet leader to give his consent. 
In the beginning, Soviet options had ranged from preserving the GDR to using 
reunification for achieving Germany’s neutralization. In the end, however, the 
Soviet arsenal was reduced considerably by pressure from the streets, the opening 
of the Wall, the elections in the GDR, the economic crisis in both the GDR and 
the USSR, and both countries’ increasing reliance on West German money. Since 
force or threat of force was ruled out by Gorbachev, only a consensual solution 
seemed feasible. On the balance, Gorbachev achieved neither Germany’s neutral-
ization nor the dissolution of NATO. Nonetheless, economic aid for the USSR, 
the reform of NATO, and the partnership treaty were rewards of historic size. 
Declassified documents from the years before 1990 show that internally Gor-
bachev spoke much more critically about Kohl and the German Question than 
one would be led to expect by his allegedly pro-Western stance138 and his later 
138 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 318.
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policies. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the issues of the Berlin Wall, 
Germany’s reunification, and NATO membership caused a deep change from 
November 1989 to July 1990 in Gorbachev’s thinking, a change that was essen-
tial for Soviet policy in these matters. Rafael Biermann has written that “Reuni-
fication had not been possible without his [Gorbachev’s] change of mind,” and 
Angela Stent has stated that Gorbachev was not the motor, but an enabler of this 
process.139
Despite the newly available evidence, it is still not entirely clear when Gor-
bachev became convinced to take each step toward agreeing with the various 
phases of Germany’s reunification, nor is it clear what his motives were. This 
may be due, on one hand, to some sort of “notorious conceptlessness”140 and the 
deep divisions within the Soviet apparatus. It was an apparatus that understood 
the details but lacked vision, with a leader who had a vision, but did not care 
much for details. Deputy Foreign Minister Kvitsinskii, the ambassador to Bonn, 
recalled that “we needed a clear idea of our plan for solving the problem, which 
was to comprise all the main aspects of regulation and mainly take account of 
Soviet interests. But there was no such plan in Moscow even in May 1990.”141 
On the other hand, the available documents simply do not yet allow Gorbachev’s 
(or for that matter, Shevardnadze’s and Chernyaev’s) deliberations to be assessed 
more precisely. While many minutes of the president’s conversations with foreign 
leaders are accessible as are a number of internal drafts of advisors like Dashichev, 
the number of accessible administration, Politburo (whose significance was sink-
ing) and Foreign Ministry papers is still insufficient.
In addition, the role of Eduard Shevardnadze should be analyzed better (and 
honored more). The foreign minister did not follow a balancing act between the 
“new thinking” and the USSR’s imperialist residue, but apparently—even before 
the president did—seemed ready to radically implement the former and give up 
the latter. From the sparsely available documentation, his position seems to have 
been closer to that of Chernyaev, as became clear in May when they both favored 
a “realist” approach that did not veto the reunified Germany’s NATO member-
ship. As the delegation leader at the Two Plus Four negotiations, Shevardnadze 
had to press for the tougher position that had been adopted in the Politburo against 
his wishes. But after his failure to change the direction of the negotiations (and 
after further Western concessions, such as Baker’s Nine Points), the approach of 
Shevardnadze and Chernyaev was vindicated some weeks later. It is, however, 
not yet clear whether Gorbachev at the 3 May Politburo session refused Germa-
ny’s NATO membership (a) out of conviction, (b) in order to appease the anti-NA-
TO forces in his governmental apparatus and to win time, or (c) in order to gain 
further Western concessions. 
139 Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 41; Stent, Russia, 75. 
140 Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland, 260. Cf. Stent, Russia, 121; Hilger, ed., Diplomatie, 10.
141 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 11. 
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Nonetheless, it is clear that a correct assessment of Gorbachev’s (and Shevard-
nadze’s) motives can only be made within the context of a highly complex na-
tional and international environment framed by the goals of (1) ending the Cold 
War, (2) implementing perestroika and the “new thinking,” and (3) halting the 
disintegration of communist rule and Soviet control in the Eastern bloc, as well 
as an environment determined by an economic crisis, the fierce political struggle 
between the liberal and imperialist factions of the Soviet apparatus, and the be-
ginning national disintegration of the USSR. While the Baltic states’ striving for 
independence interfered with German unification and vice versa,142 the factional 
struggle seems to have increasingly influenced Gorbachev’s timetable: The lead-
er was clearly reluctant to announce any major agreements prior to the Central 
Committee Plenum held from 5 to 8 February 1990, which brought “for the first 
time sharp criticism” of Gorbachev’s foreign policy, or the CPSU congress in 
July.143 The ratification of the Two Plus Four Treaty in the Supreme Soviet became 
an opportunity for a witch hunt of Shevardnadze by communist hardliners. Under 
these conditions, Gorbachev tried to avoid premature announcements that would 
destabilize his own position. 
In this process, traditional imperialist claims (or “security interests,” as they 
are sometimes labeled) were gradually given up by the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, 
in return for Soviet acquiescence with unification and NATO membership, clear-
ly did not demand all that he could have from Germany. Some Russian critics 
and Western authors have wondered why the Kremlin neither “sold the Wall brick 
by brick”144 for political or economic concessions, nor “make the Germans ‘an 
offer they couldn’t refuse,’”145 such as German unification for the price of the 
country’s neutralization when this was still possible, namely, until January 1990. 
Disregarding the fact that a similar offer (whether genuine or not) had been re-
jected in 1952, this question seems to contradict the timetable of the Soviet de-
cision making. When Gorbachev decided to grant German self-determination, that 
is, in late January, he still believed it would be possible to tie this process to the 
creation of a new security system that included the USSR. When it became clear 
that this aim could not be achieved, in late May, it was too late to withdraw the 
earlier promises without upsetting the USSR’s Western partners or his perestroi-
ka at home. 
Russian critics of the “new thinking” claimed that this process involved a 
“sell-out of Soviet interests.”146 In contrast, Kvitsinskii perceived the solution as 
142 Kristina Spohr Readman, Germany and the Baltic Problem after the Cold War: The Develop-
ment of a new Ostpolitik, 1989–2000 (London: Routledge, 2004).
143 Conversation Genscher with Shevardnadze, 10 February 1990, in Hilger, Diplomatie, 98–108, 
101, 108; Conversation Genscher with Shevardnadze, 4 May 1990, ibid., 129–36, 134. 
144 Oldenburg, “Die Rekonstruktion,” 779. 
145 Stent, Russia, 121. See also Falin, Konflikte, and Alexander von Plato, “Opposition Movements 
and Big Politics in the Reunification of Germany,” in this volume, 307–19.
146 Akhtamzyan, Ob’edinenie Germanii, 127. 
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the “best way to safeguard our interests […] Combining the Treaty on the Final 
Settlement with Respect to Germany (Two Plus Four) with the signing of a com-
prehensive political agreement and a far-reaching economic agreement doubtless-
ly reflected the interests of the USSR as well as Germany.”147 Rice and Zelikow 
have stated: “One could argue that the amicable settlement of the partition of 
Germany was a farsighted choice for the Soviet Union.”148 Indeed, a consensual 
solution better reflected Soviet interests than a renewed Cold War or, at the very 
least, tension in Soviet relations with its main Western trading partner, Germany. 
In addition, the West fulfilled a number of Soviet wishes, such as changing NA-
TO’s posture, advancing the CSCE, and offering financial loans and disarma-
ment.149 Therefore it would seem unfair to accuse Gorbachev and Shevardnadze 
of having gained nothing in return for their consent. That the “Common Europe-
an Home” failed to be realized was a consequence of the Warsaw Pact’s and the 
Soviet Union’s demise. This did not happen because the West brought about their 
disintegration, but rather because Gorbachev’s adherence to principles of nonvi-
olence was stronger than his will to preserve Soviet domination abroad, centrif-
ugal forces in the former Soviet empire overturned the centripetal ones and the 
cost for maintaining the empire exceeded Soviet capabilities. While the first 
reason was clearly a consequence of the “new thinking,” the latter two processes 
had not been caused by it, as has been claimed by Gorbachev’s critics, but by the 
past political and economic mortgage of Soviet and communist rule as well as its 
de-legitimization both at the periphery and in the center.  
Second, the compromise that was achieved opened the way for a historical 
compromise with the West in general and with Germany in particular. It enabled 
the leader not only to reconcile theory (i.e. past Soviet lip-service to German 
self-determination and unity) with practice, as Marxism demanded, and thus to 
resolve one of the many “grand delusions” of Soviet policy. It also paved the way 
for reconciliation with Germany, which offered better conditions for the USSR’s 
security and economy and for the country’s relations with its most important 
Western trading partner than a continued Soviet blockade of German unity would 
have done. After the signing of the Two Plus Four Treaty, the Soviet media opined 
that the “time bomb” of the divided Germany had been “deactivated.”150 Andrei 
147 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 18, 20.
148 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, xi.
149 Without, however, pledging a non-enlargement of NATO in Eastern Europe. The respective 
offers were made with respect to the former GDR. Mark Kramer, “The Myth of a No-NA-
TO-Enlargement-Pledge to Russia,” Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009): 39–61 and Kristina 
Spohr, “Precluded or Precedent-Setting? The ‘NATO Enlargement Question’ in the Triangular 
Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990–1991,” Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 
4 (2012): 4–54. Gorbachev stresses that negotiating NATO (non-) enlargement into Eastern 
Europe while the Warsaw Pact still existed would have been “absolute stupidity.” Gorbatschow, 
Wie es war, 103.
150 Quoted in Biermann, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt, 754.
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Grachev likened German-Soviet reconciliation with the German-French one after 
World War II.151 Gorbachev stressed the new quality of relations with the “great 
[velikii] German people”152 and later wrote in his memoirs: “Thus we drew a final 
line under the past and recent history of our nations, opening, I hope, a new, 
lasting period in relations between Germany and Russia, when all the positive 
common heritage built up over the centuries in German-Russian relations will 
finally bear fruit.”153
151 Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, 224.
152 Gorbachev in a Soviet-German press conference, 16 July 1990, in MGGV, 533.
153 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 535. The unification of Germany has not had a negative influence on 
Russian opinions about Germany. Tatiana Timofeeva, “Russische Reaktion auf den deutschen 
Einigungsprozess im Spiegel damaliger und heutiger Umfragen,” Forum für osteuropäische 
Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte 14, no. 1 (2010): 85–98.
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K l a u s  l a r r e s
MARGARET THATCHER AND  
GERMAN UNIFICATION REVISITED 
The eventful years 1989–90 not only led to the breaching of the Berlin Wall 
in November 1989 and German unification in October 1990, but also to a great 
deal of concern among European politicians. In particular, the British prime min-
ister was greatly alarmed. While the United States supported the unification of 
the German nation, both Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French president 
François Mitterrand were strongly opposed. Thatcher was never able to overcome 
her deep personal dislike and suspicion of the developments which by late 1990 
had led to the end of the Cold War and a year later to the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. Although in early 1990 Mitterrand and, within a few weeks, also 
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev reluctantly and conditionally gave their 
agreement to the unification of Germany, Thatcher would never warm to the 
re-creation of a unified German nation.1 
In fact, the British prime minister, who had first entered Downing Street in 
May 1979, did not hesitate to make it repeatedly clear that for her, reunification 
was not on the agenda. Even after the fall of the Wall on 9 November and West 
German chancellor Helmut Kohl’s cautious Ten-Point scheme for reunification 
of 28 November 1989, Thatcher continued to believe that tinkering with Europe-
an frontiers was out of the question. Instead, she spoke in favor of maintaining 
the political independence of a democratized GDR.2 While Thatcher had always 
1 For the best personal accounts, see Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: 
HarperCollins, 1993); George R. Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion at the Court of Margaret 
Thatcher: An Insider’s View (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British 
Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London: 
John Murray, 1997).
2 See Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 793–94; and also for one of the best accounts of German 
unification, Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland. Die Geschichte der Wiederverei-
nigung (Munich: Beck, 2009), 158; Werner Weidenfeld with Peter Wagner and Elke Bruck, 
Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit: Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90, Geschichte der deut-
schen Einheit 4  (Stuttgart: dtv, 1998), 131–32; Alexander von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutsch-
lands—ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel: Bush, Kohl, Gorbachev und die geheimen Moskauer 
Protokolle (Berlin: Links, 2002). An excellent survey is also provided by Hanns Jürgen Küster’s 
introduction to the volume Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hoffmann, eds., Dokumente zur 
Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 
1989/90 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998), 21–236. See also the articles in Frederic Bozo et al., eds., 
Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal (London: Routledge, 2008). Other good 
accounts are Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification (Washington, 
D.C., 1993); Angela Fischer, Entscheidungsprozess zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung der au-
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shown a great deal of sympathy for the dissidents and liberation movements of 
Eastern Europe, she hardly ever mentioned their counterparts in the GDR. Instead, 
she publicly envisaged an extended period of transition of about ten to fifteen 
years and speculated on the difficulties of integrating the GDR into the European 
Community.3 Thatcher also supported Gorbachev’s November 1989 proposal for 
convening a second Helsinki summit conference. The cumbersome mechanism 
of the Helsinki process would have required the nigh-to-impossible consent of 
all thirty-five participating states. This had the advantage, as seen from London, 
of delaying reunification significantly, even though going down this road would 
have ignored the special responsibility of the four World War II victors for all 
questions concerning the whole of Germany and Berlin. During the entire postwar 
period Britain had been quite proud of this prerogative.4 
Throughout her premiership Thatcher took it for granted that Germany was to 
remain partitioned for a long time to come. She always held strong anti-German 
sentiments. For instance, in 1984 she told George Urban, an occasional advisor 
who at times was rather close to her, that it was entirely wrong to claim that the 
Germans were the paymasters of Europe. “The Germans have been simply paying 
reparations for all the things they did during the war; we couldn’t call it that, but 
that is what they have been doing.”5 Urban was alarmed. “The strength of the PM’s 
views about Europe and Germany came as a surprise. I found them disturbing.”6 
ßen- und deutschlandpolitische Entscheidungsprozeß der Koalitionsregierung Kohl/Genscher 
in den Schicksalsjahren 1989/90 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Land, 1996). Specifically focused 
on Britain are Norbert Himmler, Zwischen Macht und Mittelmaß. Großbritanniens Außenpolitik 
und das Ende des Kalten Krieges: Akteure, Interessen und Entscheidungsprozesse der britischen 
Regierung 1989/90 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001); Klaus-Rainer Jackisch, Eisern gegen 
die Einheit: Margaret Thatcher und die deutsche Wiedervereinigung (Frankfurt am Main: Socie-
tätsverlag, 2004). For an interesting MA thesis, see Sven Sochorik, Die Rolle Großbritanniens 
beim Wiedervereinigungsprozeß Deutschlands 1989/90 (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2003).
3 Mallaby (Bonn) to Hurd (London), 5 Jan. 1990, in Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, and Stephen 
Robert Twigge, eds., Documents on British Policy Overseas III, vol. 7: German Unification 
1989–1990 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009) (hereafter DBPO), 190. 
4 See George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 
236. For Thatcher’s attitude toward both the German “problem” and European integration, see 
her memoirs, Downing Street Years, chapters 24–26. For one of the best articles on this issue, 
see Lothar Kettenacker, “Britain and German Unification, 1989/90,” in Klaus Larres with Eliz-
abeth Meehan, eds., Uneasy Allies: British-German Relations and European Integration since 
1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 99–123. See also Patrick Salmon, “The United 
Kingdom and German Unification,” in Frederic Bozo et al., eds., Europe and the End of the 
Cold War: A Reappraisal (London: Routledge, 2008), 177–90; Yvonne Klein, “Obstructive or 
Promoting? British Views of German Unification, 1989/90,” German Politics 5, no. 3 (1996): 
404–31. For the Helsinki idea, see Kettenacker, “Britain,” 114. See also the pamphlet Gillian 
Staerk and Michael Kandiah, eds., Anglo-German Reunification (London: ICBH Witness Semi-
nar Programme, 2003).
5 Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion, 82.
6 Ibid., 87.
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At this time, as well as toward the end of the decade, she believed that the 
“German problem” was deeply linked to flaws in the German national character, 
which had developed partially due to Germany’s late unification in 1871. This 
had made Germany sway “unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt.”7 
The creation of a more integrated Europe, she was convinced, would not over-
come this dilemma but make matters worse, since Germany would undoubtedly 
dominate Western Europe. Germany’s economic interests, moreover, would make 
the country continue to look west but also increasingly toward the east, as it had 
always done in the past. It could be expected, Thatcher reasoned, that Germany 
was “thus by its very nature a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force in Eu-
rope.” She was deeply convinced that reunification would make Germany “sim-
ply too big and powerful to be just another player within Europe.” The “military 
and political engagement” of the United States on the European continent and 
close Anglo-American and Anglo-French relations were necessary, she believed, 
to contain and balance German power, “and nothing of the sort would be possible 
within a European super-state.”8 
Thatcher was not only deeply opposed to German reunification, she also nev-
er managed to find a bridge between her strong anti-European convictions and 
the importance with which the European project was seen on the continent. The 
statement quoted below from Thatcher’s memoirs depicts particularly well her 
simultaneous bafflement about the latter and her own thinking along very tradi-
tional foreign policy lines.
This desire among modern German politicians to merge their national identity in a wider Eu-
ropean one is understandable enough, but it presents great difficulties to self-conscious na-
tion-states in Europe. In effect, the Germans, because they are nervous of governing themselves, 
want to establish a European system in which no nation will govern itself. Such a system could 
be unstable in the long term and, because of Germany’s size and preponderance, is bound to be 
lop-sided. Obsession with a European Germany risks producing a German Europe.9 
Current literature on this topic reveals a certain re-evaluation of the attitude 
and role of the European actors in the process of German unification. This, in my 
view, has led to a more benign interpretation of the attitude and policy of both 
the French and the British foreign policy elite than is justified on the basis of the 
available documents and other primary and secondary sources.10 
7 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 791.
8 Ibid. See also the insightful memoirs of her Foreign Policy Advisor Percy Cradock, In Pursuit 
of British Interests, 110; Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion 81–87.
9 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 748.
10 For a benign re-interpretation of Mitterrand’s policy, see the otherwise excellent book by Fred-
eric Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2009); see also Frederic Bozo, “France, German unification and European integration,” 
in idem  et al., eds., Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal (London: Routledge, 
2008), 148–60.
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This chapter, however, is mostly concerned with Britain’s foreign policy in 
1989–90 and wishes to reassess this policy. This is because statements such as 
the following appear to distort the historical record: “Thatcher was not wholly 
opposed to German unity; the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] was not 
100 per cent in favour.”11 This chapter will demonstrate that the first part is en-
tirely mistaken, while the second part is perfectly correct.  It also is questionable 
whether “Britain’s policies on Germany were closely aligned with those of its 
allies.”12 It will be shown that at least until February–March 1990 this was clear-
ly not the case. It also confuses the issue when British foreign policy in 1989–90 
is justified as follows: “If the British expressed reservations they did not concern 
the principle but the timing of the process and the framework within which it was 
to take place.”13 In fact, the timing very much was identical with the principle. If 
Thatcher, as she said at one point, wanted to postpone and delay unification for 
ten to fifteen years (or even just for a few years), she essentially wished to prevent 
German unification for a considerable period of time. And this was exactly a 
continuation of the policy of the Western allies during the Cold War years, when 
the high-minded principle of German unification was never questioned although 
it was expected that unification would only occur far in the future. Moreover, 
once Gorbachev had left the political scene in the Soviet Union, it was by no 
means self-evident that his successor would also agree to let the GDR go its own 
way and merge with West Germany. In fact, this appeared to be questionable. 
Margaret Thatcher was well aware of all this.
Margaret Thatcher and the influence of World War II
Behind Thatcher’s deep mistrust of the German national character and her 
fears of the emergence of a fourth German Reich, there were profound personal 
and political convictions. These strongly held beliefs made Margaret Thatcher 
bold enough to do her best to prevent German unification, or at least try to delay 
the process as much as possible. Like many other problems in Anglo-German 
relations over the years, Thatcher’s mistrust dated back to the Second World 
War.14 
11 Salmon, “The United Kingdom and German Unification,” 188. This is a good article on the 
whole, but Salmon is one of the British Foreign Office’s most senior and respected historians 
and perhaps naturally he cannot approach the unification issue without a certain bias in favor of 
his employers, the British policy-making elite.
12  Ibid., 177.
13  Ibid.
14  For recent general accounts on British-German relations since 1945, see Larres with Meehan, 
eds., Uneasy Allies; Sabine Lee, Victory in Europe: Britain and Germany since 1945 (Harlow: 
Longman, 2001); Edward Foster and Peter Schmidt, Anglo-German Relations in security and 
defence: taking stock (London: RUSI, 1997).
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When war broke out, Margaret Roberts was almost fourteen years old. Due to 
the proximity of a munitions factory and an airfield run by the Royal Air Force, 
her home town Grantham in Lincolnshire in the English Midlands was the target 
of twenty-one raids by Hitler’s Luftwaffe. The town also suffered from recurring 
difficulties due to the lack of food and electricity supplies. Above all, however, 
it was her father’s patriotic stories, his deep Methodist faith and the excruciating 
narratives of Edith, a seventeen-year-old Jewish girl from Austria, that influenced 
Margaret highly. Edith was the daughter of friends in Nazi-occupied Vienna and 
she lived with the Roberts family for a short while in 1938. The girl told them 
about the painful living conditions of the Jewish population under the Nazis which 
she had herself experienced. Edith also referred to the terrible events in the camps 
of which she had heard. Both left a deep mark upon the future Prime Minister.15
This also influenced Margaret Thatcher’s thinking after the end of the war, the 
more so as almost a quarter of the voters in her later constituency in the London 
district of Finchley were of Jewish origin. Many of them had managed to flee 
Germany during the Nazi period. When Thatcher ran for the parliamentary seat 
of that constituency, she was repulsed by the openly anti-Semitic policy of the 
local Conservative Party. Her opposition to these prejudices was certainly influ-
enced by electoral tactics, but Thatcher’s personal convictions did not allow her 
to tolerate anti-Semitic sentiment. She was appalled, for instance, that in 1957 
many of the leading lights of the party had agreed with the decision of the Finch-
ley Golf Club to refuse membership to Jews.16 
After her election to parliament in the general election of October 1959, 
Thatcher studiously nursed the Jewish vote in her constituency. This continued 
when her enormous energy and inclination for hard work had helped her eliminate 
former prime minister Edward Heath as leader of the Conservative Party by 
means of a party political coup in February 1975. Even when she finally became 
head of government in 1979, Thatcher never forgot to look after the Jewish vote 
in her constituency in Finchley. A corollary of this was the new prime minister 
being very well informed about the situation in the Middle East; she always dis-
played great understanding for Israel’s policies. Disregarding the traditional 
pro-Arab tendencies of British foreign policy, Thatcher was the first British prime 
minister to pay Israel an official visit in 1986.17
Not surprisingly, throughout the 1980s Prime Minister Thatcher’s views on 
Germany were strongly influenced by the Holocaust and her experiences with her 
constituency. On top of this was her over-developed patriotism, her profound 
belief in a close Anglo-American “special relationship,” and the important role 
15 Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 26–32. See also John 
Campbell’s excellent biography, Margaret Thatcher, Vol.1: The Grocer’s Daughter (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2000), 38–39, and for her parents’ influence on her, see ibid., 16–31, 34ff.
16 See Thatcher, Path to Power, 98–99.
17 Ibid., 372–80; Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 509–12.
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which in her view Britain continued to play on the world scene. Thatcher’s con-
victions regarding the European integration process further fuelled her mistrust 
of the Germans, who seemed determined to build a federal European super-state. 
Only close economic cooperation between the European states on the basis of a 
Europe of sovereign nations was considered desirable by Thatcher. In this sense 
she was a Gaullist. At the same time her deep convictions about the sovereignty 
of the nation state made her firmly reject a federal European political union in 
any form that went beyond the idea of an economic Common Market.18 
While Thatcher’s anti-European convictions had always caused speculation 
and a great deal of concern among the other EC member states, by 1988 her 
hostility to and frustration with the EC Commission in Brussels had reached new 
heights.19 During her speech to the College of Bruges in Belgium on 20 Septem-
ber 1988, Thatcher made no secret of her sentiments. She explained in no uncer-
tain terms that her government had “not successfully rolled back the frontiers of 
the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at a European level, with a Eu-
ropean super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.”20  She lectured 
her pro-European audience that “the best way to build a successful European 
Community” consisted of “willing and active co-operation between independent 
sovereign states.” Thatcher emphasized that Europe must look outward to the 
Atlantic Community. The prime minister did not hesitate to admonish her listen-
ers to “let Europe be a family of nations” and relish “our national identity no less 
than our common European endeavour.”
It was the North Atlantic alliance that represented Thatcher’s ideal internation-
al organization. She tended to heap praise on NATO as, after all, NATO did not 
rest on a supranational foundation as did the EC. And instead of irritating Wash-
ington with competing trade and economic policies, the Alliance bound the Unit-
ed States to Europe in matters of security policy. Not surprisingly, in the UK the 
EC was regarded as of much lesser importance than the Atlantic alliance. Ever 
since Britain had joined the EEC in 1973, the country had nourished feelings of 
marginalization within the European Community. This did not help to create 
closer bonds with the other EC member states. During the 1980s Britain remained 
18 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, chapters 24–25.
19 Percy Cradock, Thatcher’s loyal foreign affairs advisor, differentiates persuasively between 
three stages in her anti-Europeanism: between 1979 and 1984 her relations with Brussels were 
poor and dominated by her battles over the Community budget and a British rebate; the second 
much more positive stage lasted from 1984 to 1987, when Thatcher supported both the comple-
tion of the Single Market and the Single European Act; the third particularly dark phase covered 
her last three years in office (1988–90) when she strongly opposed the Delors’ report on mone-
tary union and when there existed severe differences of view about Europe in Thatcher’s Cabinet 
and government. See Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, 125. See also Sharp, Thatcher’s 
Diplomacy, 141ff., 160ff.
20 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 744–45. For the full text of the speech, see http://www.marga-
retthatcher.org/document/107332 (accessed 3 June 2013). 
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an “awkward partner” within the EC. By contrast, within NATO Britain was able 
to play a superior role due to its nuclear status and its close cooperation with the 
United States.21
Fundamentally, Thatcher followed a Churchillian foreign policy which clung 
to the old concept of the necessity of a balance of power between the European 
great powers. A sub-heading introducing a brief but important section of her 
memoirs is entitled “The German Problem and the Balance of Power.”22 Thatch-
er’s foreign policy was always greatly focused on continuing the old friendship 
with the United States, not least as she got on very well with US president Ron-
ald Reagan. Thatcher and Reagan shared a common conservative outlook on the 
world’s major problems and a deep and profound anti-communism. They both 
also greatly believed in the desirability of unrestricted free enterprise and the 
substantial reduction of government interference in a country’s economic and 
social policies. The two politicians, and their spouses, managed to develop a 
genuine personal friendship.23 This occurred despite the fact that this highly in-
telligent and dynamic prime minister was confronted with a president whose, in 
Roy Jenkins’ words, “grasp of his marbles sometimes seems precarious.”24 Yet, 
as French president Mitterrand is said to have noted, “Mrs. Thatcher, who can be 
so tough when she talks to her European partners, is like a little girl of eight years 
old when she talks to the president of the United States. You have to cock your 
ear to hear, she’s really touching.”25
The close relations with Reagan survived a number of serious political dis-
putes. For instance Thatcher was not impressed when the Reagan administration 
initially withheld support for Britain’s position in the 1982 Falklands conflict. 
Eventually, however, the United States strongly supported Thatcher’s war.26 Rea-
gan’s unilateral disarmament deals with Gorbachev, which occurred without 
much consultation with the Europeans, also alarmed her a great deal. After all, 
the Americans hardly even bothered to consult Europe’s two nuclear powers, 
Britain and France. Thatcher feared a bilateral deal between the superpowers and 
the gradual withdrawal of America’s security umbrella from Europe. She always 
remained deeply convinced that the cultivation of bilateral links with the United 
21 See for example Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 
3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Larres with Meehan, eds., Uneasy Allies.
22 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 790.
23 See for example Nicholas Wapshott, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: a political mar-
riage (New York: Sentinel, 1997); Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (London: Bodley 
Head, 1990). 
24 Quoted in Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion, 66.
25 Quoted ibid., 95.
26 See Richard Thornton, Falklands Sting: Reagan, Thatcher, and Argentinia’s bomb (Washing-
ton, D.C. and London: Brassey’s, 1998); Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, 
The Signals of war: the Falklands conflict of 1982 (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 
1990).
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States was of crucial importance for the successful conduct of Britain’s foreign 
policy. “We must never again,” she proclaimed after having studied the disastrous 
Suez Crisis of 1956, “find ourselves on the opposite side to the United States in 
a major international crisis affecting Britain’s interests.”27
She was not amused, therefore, when during a visit to Mainz in late May 1989, 
new President George H.W. Bush, Reagan’s successor, referred to the West Ger-
mans as “partners in leadership.” This smacked of a downgrading of Britain’s 
jealously guarded “special relationship” with the United States, not least as pre-
viously Bush appears to have indicated to her that her influence in the White 
House might be less than under his predecessor.28 This did not go down well. 
Percy Cradock, Thatcher’s foreign policy advisor, is quite correct when he ob-
serves that Anglo-American relations under President Bush “remained very 
close.” However, “some of the special intimacy was lost and British influence 
declined from its high point. The principal factors were reduced East-West ten-
sion, the growing importance of Germany and the Bush Administration’s interest 
in European integration.”29 After all, at this point in time Anglo-German relations 
were strained. The brewing dispute over the modernization of short-range nucle-
ar missiles in Europe (SNF) had put the British and German leaders in opposing 
camps. True to form as Europe’s last cold warrior, Thatcher favored the modern-
ization of these so-called tactical nuclear missiles despite the internal and foreign 
policy consequences of Gorbachev’s reform policies and the rapidly changing 
nature of the East-West conflict, which could already be discerned.30 
The West German government led by Christian Democrat chancellor Helmut 
Kohl believed that the modernization of these expensive weapon systems, which 
directly targeted German territory, would waste resources and, above all, would 
pull the rug from under Gorbachev’s reform policies and give out the wrong 
signals. Kohl also had to take the strong anti-militaristic feelings of German 
public opinion and the country’s large peace movement into account (which un-
beknown to the West, received significant financial support from the East). Bonn 
favored NATO negotiations with the Soviets, above all, perhaps, to make the 
modernization of these weapons systems unnecessary. In contrast, London dis-
missively talked about the West Germans as having been seduced by Gorbachev’s 
charm offensive. Thatcher believed she had to toughen up the Kohl government. 
Chancellor Kohl, she feared, might well give in to the pressure coming from both 
“an always instinctively neutralist German public opinion” and “Gorbymania,” 
the German public’s enthusiasm for the reform and disarmament policies of the 
27 Quoted in Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, 53.
28 See Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 
1997), 389–90; see also Michael Mandelbaum, “The Bush Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 70, 
no. 1 (1990): 5–22, 8. 
29 Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, 201.
30 See for example Michael J. Turner, Britain’s International Role, 1970–1991 (Basingstoke: Pal-
grave, 2010), 128–30;  Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 771–2, 784–9. 
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dynamic Soviet leader.31 And indeed Gorbachev’s 1989 visit to the Federal Re-
public was a huge success; wherever he went he was enthusiastically received, 
almost like a rock star.32 Thatcher’s anti-communist position in the SNF matter 
was curious, since she usually went out of her way to support Gorbachev. In fact, 
she was greatly afraid that pushing for German reunification would undermine 
Gorbachev’s position in the USSR and lead to his downfall, which in turn would 
de-stabilize East-West relations. And for Thatcher international order and stabil-
ity took precedence over the introduction of democracy and, certainly, the estab-
lishment of German unity. Moreover, Thatcher felt rather possessive about Gor-
bachev and believed she had “discovered” him (if not “invented” him), since she 
had asked him to visit London before he had even become secretary general.33
During Thatcher’s visit to Deidesheim in late April 1989, Kohl’s hometown, 
the two of them discussed the SNF matter for two hours. But soon, “behind the 
stage-managed friendliness” of the meeting, their talks “became quite heated” 
and “acrimonious.”34 At an Anglo-German summit in Frankfurt a short while 
later, the tone was even worse. Kohl got rather “agitated” and “worked up” and 
shouted that “he did not need any lectures about NATO” from Thatcher.35 Anoth-
er few weeks passed before on 19 May Thatcher was forced to realize that the 
American policy had also shifted. In view of the winding down of the Cold War, 
the United States, as well as almost all other NATO countries, now favored SNF 
negotiations, although a “zero option” was to be excluded.36 
At the next NATO summit in late May 1989 Thatcher was “the odd man out”, 
as she saw it. And indeed, she was essentially the only head of government pres-
ent who was still arguing very much along traditional Cold War lines as if noth-
ing had happened.37 She never tired of emphasizing that the West needed to be 
in a much stronger position and pursue a policy of strength. This meant that re-
arming and modernizing were necessary prior to any negotiations with the Sovi-
ets.38 In the course of the summit Thatcher managed with great effort to make 
SNF negotiations conditional on the implementation of reductions in convention-
al forces by both military blocs, but she had basically lost the main argument. 
Negotiations about the short-range nuclear missiles in Europe would be proposed 
31 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 747.
32 See Kettenacker, “Britain,” 105–6. Gorbachev visited West Germany from 12 to 15 June 1989 
and was received with unprecedented popular enthusiasm. See Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 
1982–1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005), 885ff.; Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Dou-
bleday, 1995), 520–22. For a good account, see von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutschlands, 38ff.
33 Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, 200–1; see also Paul Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The 
Revival of British Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 214–15.
34 See Kettenacker, “Britain,” 104–05; Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 747, 786.
35 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 787.
36 Ibid., 788–89.
37 For Kohl’s view of the NATO meeting, see Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, 868ff.
38 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 788.
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to the Kremlin and a “zero” option could no longer be entirely excluded. Thatch-
er was greatly frustrated. She concluded that “the new American approach was 
to subordinate clear statements of intention about the alliance’s defense to the 
political sensibilities of the Germans. I did not think that this boded well.”39 
The prime minister was not reassured when President Bush told her during 
his subsequent visit to London that not only the Germans, but “we too were 
partners in leadership.”40 It was perfectly understandable that Thatcher was not 
impressed by this condescending statement, which took no heed of Britain’s much 
cherished “special relationship” with Washington. This greatly fanned Thatcher’s 
jealousy of and rivalry with the German leader for the ear of both the Americans 
and the Soviets. This came on top of all her other suspicions and mistrust. 
In his speech in Mainz in May 1989, Bush had also called for the removal of 
the Iron Curtain and explained that “we seek self-determination for all of Germany 
and all of Eastern Europe” to create a “Europe whole and free.”41 More direct ref-
erences to unification, however, had been removed from the draft of the speech by 
Brent Scowcroft, the president’s national security advisor and closest political 
confidant. Scowcroft had not thought it wise for the United States to overtake 
Chancellor Kohl on the fast lane with references to the German national question.42
Lack of support for Thatcher’s policies in 1989–90
Within a few months it became clear that Prime Minister Thatcher’s  policy, 
inspired by her deepest convictions, had failed to maintain the partition of Ger-
many and thereby the Cold War status quo. Essentially, three factors proved de-
cisive in this respect: 
1. The lack of support that Thatcher found for her position in the British public 
opinion and from British parliamentarians.
2. The much more far-sighted policy of the United States, which eventually was 
also adopted by France and the USSR. This greatly undermined Thatcher’s 
position.
3. Last but not least, the opposition of her foreign policy experts in the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office to their prime minister’s policy in the German 
unification question had a profound impact. However, this opposition was 
perhaps less pronounced than has been claimed in the years since Thatcher’s 
downfall.
In the following these three factors will be elaborated upon. 
39 Ibid., 789.
40 Ibid., 799.
41 See Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 83.
42 See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study 
in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 31, 93.
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British public opinion and the Houses of Parliament
By and large, public opinion in Britain was in favor of reunification. Despite 
a widespread mistrust of the Germans in large sectors of the population due to 
the experiences of the past, many Britons also had a great deal of understanding 
for the German desire to restore the unity of their nation. Impressed and astound-
ed by the opening of the Wall on 9 November 1989, a full 71 percent of polled 
Britons supported reunification. In spite of the prime minister’s anti-German 
warnings, on average an impressive 61 percent of the population in the United 
Kingdom welcomed reunification.43 Simultaneously, however, almost half of all 
Britons (predominantly from the older generation) nourished apprehensions re-
garding the economic potential of a reunified Germany. Many (in fact 53 percent) 
also feared the return of Fascist tendencies in German politics.44
A similar acquiescence to reunification with a simultaneous uneasiness over 
its consequences for Britain characterized the debates in the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords. The vast majority of British members of parliament 
(including a large number of older Members, who had been directly affected by 
the war) were convinced that a positive change in the political culture had taken 
place in the Federal Republic in the preceding decades. Most had no doubts about 
the well-anchored democratic character of the West German system. An impres-
sive majority of MPs also believed that the three Western allies’ repeated verbal 
assurances about their support for German unification during the last forty years 
should now be honored. Otherwise, Western credibility and friendly relations with 
the Germans would be put at risk.45 
The time was long gone that statements such as the one made by British for-
eign minister Selwyn Lloyd in the context of the June 1953 anti-communist up-
rising in the GDR were acceptable. “Everyone—Dr Adenauer, the Russians, the 
Americans, the French and ourselves—feel in our hearts that a divided Germany 
is safer for the time being. But none of us dare say so openly because of the effect 
on German public opinion. Therefore we all publicly support a united Germany, 
each on his own terms.”46 Yet, this had been stated almost forty years previously. 
And most of those mentioned by Lloyd had changed their minds in the mean-
time—except No. 10 Downing Street. Here the concerns of yesteryear continued 
to exist in almost undiluted form.
Whereas there was a major consensus among MPs concerning the necessity 
to have a unified Germany remain in NATO, an intensification of the European 
43 See for the polls and for a good analysis Klein, “Obstructive or Promoting?,” 422.
44 See Kettenacker, “Britain,” 103.
45 Klein, “Obstructive or Promoting?,” 417–21.
46 Lloyd to Churchill, PM/MS/53/224, 22 June 1953, in UK National Archives, FO371/103 665/
C1071/56. See also Klaus Larres, Churchill’s Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy 
(New Haven: Yale UP, 2002), 177–80.
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integration process was rejected. Only a small minority of British members of 
parliament were convinced that the expected huge economic strength of the new 
Germany could be neutralized by integrating the Germans even more closely into 
the European Community.47
Together with a reunified Germany remaining in NATO, which Thatcher 
strongly supported, the deepening of European integration by means of monetary 
union was precisely the instrument, however, that was seen as the solution in the 
West to make the re-creation of a united Germany acceptable. Both US president 
George H.W. Bush and French president Mitterrand supported this. In fact the 
idea had originated in France. West German chancellor Helmut Kohl was also in 
favor. This way, he believed, the danger of any potential destabilization of the 
postwar European order by German reunification would be removed and Germa-
ny’s neighbors would be greatly reassured. In principle, the European Monetary 
Union had already been agreed upon in June 1989 during the EC summit meeting 
in Madrid, but not much had happened since to realize this lofty goal apart from 
the plan to convene an intergovernmental conference some time in 1990.48 The 
dramatic developments in the second half of 1989 gave the EMU new impetus. 
The construction of a united Europe, including monetary union, was, according 
to EC Commission president Jacques Delors, a Frenchman, “the only satisfacto-
ry and acceptable response to the German question.”49
Accepting German unification: The US, France, and the Soviet Union
In the late 1980s, in the context of Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union, a 
number of position papers were written in Western capitals about the German 
Question and West Germany’s role within Western politics. Still, unification was 
only referred to in rather cautious and hypothetical terms, although the de-stabiliz-
ing developments in the GDR were watched carefully and not without concern.50 
The beginning of the end for the GDR
The first hole in the Iron Curtain appeared on 2 May 1989 when in the con-
text of its “preemptive course from above,”51 Hungary began to dismantle its 
frontier fences with Austria, without however opening the border. Fuelled by a 
47 Klein, “Obstructive or Promoting?,” 420–21, 432. 
48 See Michael J. Baun, “The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France and European 
Integration,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96), especially 608ff.
49 Ibid., 609.
50 See DBPO, xi–xii; also Salmon, “The UK and German Unification,” 180–81.
51 See Timothy Garton Ash. In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1993), 344.
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great deal of anger about the manipulation of the local elections in the GDR on 
7 May 1989 and the GDR government’s public support for China’s bloody 
crushing of the Tiananmen Square protests in June, public discontent about the 
poor and restrictive living conditions in East Germany became ever greater. 
Furthermore, during his visit to West Germany in June 1989, even Gorbachev 
had said in a speech “that it was the right of all peoples and states to determine 
freely their destiny” and that every state was fully entitled “to choose freely its 
own political and social system as well as unqualified adherence to the norms 
and principles of international law, especially respect for the right of peoples 
self-determination.”52 The Brezhnev Doctrine seemed to have been buried for 
good. Gorbachev had also hinted at the possibility of holding free elections in 
East Germany and dismantling the Wall if the circumstances that had created it 
were to disappear.53 
It was in August 1989 that events spiraled out of control for the old men who 
ruled the GDR. In early August the massive Monday demonstrations in Leipzig 
began. In late August a new Social Democratic Party was founded, and soon the 
civil rights groups “New Forum” and “Democracy Now” were set up. While many 
of the regular Monday protesters still hoped that the GDR would embark on a 
more reform-oriented course and could be stabilized again, an even greater num-
ber had given up and only desired to leave the GDR as quickly as possible. An 
increasing number of young people travelled to Hungary to camp near the border 
with Austria or began occupying the West German embassy in Budapest. Soon 
thousands of East Germans were refusing to leave the West German embassies 
in Prague and Warsaw. 
On 19 August Hungary allowed 600 East Germans to cross the border into 
Austria in the course of what was termed the “pan-European picnic.” Soon their 
place was taken by newly arrived young East Germans. Hungary clearly did not 
want to use force to honor the 1969 trade agreement with the GDR, which obliged 
Budapest to return refugees to the East German government. After a secret visit 
of the prime minister and foreign minister of Hungary to Bonn on 25 August, the 
Hungarian government opened the border to Austria. An East German delegation 
that had tried to negotiate with the East Germans was thrown out of the camp. 
The Kohl government offered substantial financial and economic aid to Hungary 
and from 11 September 1989, all East Germans camping at the Hungarian-Aus-
trian border were allowed to travel to the West.  Within three days, 15,000 East 
Germans had gone to West Germany. By the end of the month, 7,000 young East 
Germans were occupying the West German embassy in Prague and also clamor-
ing to go West. 
52 Quoted in Klaus Larres, “Germany in 1989: the Development of a Revolution,” in idem, ed., 
Germany since Unification: The Development of the Berlin Republic, 2n ed. (Basingstoke: Pal-
grave, 2001), 33–59, 45.
53 See ibid. 45–46. The following account is based on this article, 41ff.
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Eventually West German foreign minister Genscher succeeded in negotiating 
a deal with the GDR authorities. Erich Honecker, the East German leader, wished 
to avoid any further embarrassment before the GDR’s fortieth anniversary cele-
brations between 6 and 8 October. Honecker expected the visits of a great num-
ber of communist party leaders and heads of government, including Gorbachev. 
Honecker was suffering from cancer (though this wasn’t admitted) and had only 
returned to work on 25 September, after an absence of some two months; the old 
and weakened leader was clearly unprepared for what awaited him in his country, 
which seemed to have changed radically overnight.
The East Germans were promised exit visas for West Germany, although the 
GDR government insisted on the face-saving device that the trains had to cross 
GDR territory to enable East Berlin to give the emigrants documents that released 
them from their GDR citizenship. Soon the embassy in Prague was again filled 
to capacity with East Germans. And once again Genscher negotiated the same 
solution as before. But this time the procedure turned into a debacle. Hundreds 
of people tried to jump onto the trains and join the emigrants when the trains 
passed through. On 4 October more than 3,000 people waited for the passing train 
at the railway station in Dresden with the desire to jump onto the train. Fierce 
battles with the police ensued. Throughout the GDR’s anniversary celebrations a 
few days later, the protests continued, leading to pitched battles with the police.
During his visit to East Berlin Gorbachev was distinctly cool to Honecker, 
indicating indirectly that the latter’s time in power was coming to an end. This 
further encouraged the demonstrators in East Berlin and other East German cities. 
During the mass demonstrations in Leipzig on 9 October, which brought more 
than 70,000 people to the streets, the state did not intervene to end the protest as 
had been expected, although an overwhelming police force had been assembled. 
The passivity of the state encouraged further mass demonstrations. Faced with 
widespread civil unrest, just over a week later, on 18 October 1989, Honecker 
was forced to resign all his leadership positions by his Politburo colleagues. He 
was replaced as secretary general of the SED Central Committee by Egon Krenz, 
his heir apparent. Krenz, however, was generally regarded as an orthodox, weak 
and opportunistic politician. He was a poor choice. Another mass protest took 
place on 4 November. Five days later, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall was 
unexpectedly opened. It was an event that changed world history and sounded 
the death knell for both the GDR and soon also the Soviet Union itself.
On 18 November, just over a week after the opening of the Wall, a new coalition 
government led by Politburo member Hans Modrow took over the reigns of power 
in East Berlin. Modrow was generally regarded as a reform-minded and more 
flexible communist. He did not hesitate to refer to his interest in talks about a “union 
by treaty” with West Germany. Throughout November and December he propagat-
ed a simple confederation of the two German states and the continuation of a 
separate East German government. This was also the hope secretly entertained by 
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the British prime minister and the French president. On 7 December 1989 Egon 
Krenz, the last head of state of the GDR and SED party leader, resigned his posi-
tions. He was succeeded de facto by Prime Minister Hans Modrow who remained 
in charge of the GDR government until the first and last democratic elections in 
the GDR on 18 March 1990. Election day had been put forward from May in view 
of the economic collapse and the huge number of people leaving the GDR. How-
ever, already by the time of Krenz’s resignation in early December 1989 the course 
toward Germany unity had been set in motion, perhaps irreversibly so.54
The Four Powers
In the course of September and October 1989, in the face of the increasing 
disintegration of the East German state, German unity had become an ever more 
distinct possibility. Western politicians, however, were careful not to approach 
the issue too openly or too directly. West German politicians also held back. Still, 
all three Western allies made positive albeit cautious and vague references about 
their support for reunification. The US government approached the issue careful-
ly by means of a speech by Secretary of State James Baker on 16 October. Acting 
on the advice of Brent Scowcroft, Baker referred to “reconciliation” rather than 
“reunification.”55 This was interpreted as American backtracking by the media. 
Press reports also claimed that some Western countries were fearful about the 
likely emergence of a reunited and possibly neutralist Germany. A week later, on 
24 October, President George H.W. Bush gave an interview to the New York Times 
in which he attempted to squash any rumors about US doubts regarding German 
reliability.56 “I don’t share the concern that some European countries have about 
a reunified Germany,” he said. He was firmly convinced that “Germany’s com-
mitment to and recognition of the Alliance is unshakeable.”57 “With this inter-
view,” Zelikow and Rice write persuasively, “Bush showed sympathy for Euro-
pean concerns. But by taking the high road and reiterating support for German 
aspirations, he made it very difficult politically for any Western European leaders 
to give public voice to their private doubts and fears.”58
Already on 20 September 1989 during a visit to Bonn, new British foreign 
secretary John Major, who had only been in office since July, had also made a 
somewhat positive though vague remark with regard to the evolving situation in 
the GDR. He reiterated the position which the UK had held for the previous thirty 
years about the desirability of German self-determination. Major added, however, 
54 Ibid.
55 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 93.
56 See DBPO, xv. 
57 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 94.
58 Ibid.
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“that there is likely to be some way to go before reunification can become a prac-
tical proposition.”59 This was a rather diplomatic way of expressing Britain’s lack 
of enthusiasm about the developments in Germany. In the following weeks there 
were no major additional British announcements regarding the rapidly developing 
situation in the GDR. By late October and early November “Britain’s official silence 
on the subject was becoming conspicuous,” as the editors of the British volume of 
foreign-policy documents put it.60 
In fact only three days after John Major’s speech, Prime Minister Thatcher 
had made her position crystal clear, albeit in private. During a visit to Moscow 
on 23 September 1989 she asked Gorbachev to stop the tape recorders and the 
note takers from recording what she had to tell him. “We are very concerned 
about the processes taking place in Eastern Germany,” she began. She soon came 
to the crux of the problem.
The reunification of Germany is not in the interests of Britain and Western 
Europe. It might look different from public pronouncements, in official communi-
qué at NATO meetings, but it is not worth paying one’s attention to it. We do not 
want a united Germany. This would have led to a change to postwar borders and 
we can not allow that because such development would undermine the stability of 
the whole international situation and could endanger our security. In the same way, 
a destabilisation of Eastern Europe and breakdown of the Warsaw Pact are also not 
in our interests.”61
Margaret Thatcher sounded just like Selwyn Lloyd in 1953. At about the same 
time, one of Gorbachev’s closest advisors and speechwriters, Vadim Zagladin,62 was 
traveling in France and met with many French politicians, including President 
Mitterrand and his confidant Jacques Attali. “They all say in unison,” he reported 
back to Moscow, that “nobody wants a unified Germany.” Attali even “brought up 
the possibility of restoring a serious Soviet-French alliance, including military 
‘integration,’ but camouflaged as a joint use of armies to fight natural disasters.”63 
According to Zagladin, Attali was horrified at the thought of German unification 
and said at one point that he would go and live on Mars if unification occurred.64 
Gorbachev, however, seems to have been under no illusion regarding what the 
two Western leaders wanted him to do. As they could not speak out publicly against 
59 Mallaby (Bonn) to Major (London), 21 September 1989, in DBPO, 33.
60 See DBPO, xv.
61 Transcript produced from memory by Soviet note taker Anatoly Chernyaev of a conversation be-
tween Gorbachev and Thatcher, 23 September 1989. Published in Times Online, 10 September 
2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6829735.ece (accessed 3 June 2013). 
62 For a brief biographical sketch, see “Gorbachev’s aide Zagladin: when word is mightier than 
deed,” RIANOVOSTI, 22 November 2006, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20061122/55896229.html 
(accessed 3 June 2013).
63 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 94.
64 Ibid. For Jacques Attali’s views see also idem, Verbatim, Tome 3: Chronique des années 1988–
1991 (Paris: Fayard, 1995), especially 237ff.
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long-established NATO policy, it appeared to him that Thatcher and Mitterrand 
were attempting to maneuver Moscow into vetoing German unification or perhaps 
even to putting a stop to the destabilizing developments in East Germany by de-
ploying Russian tanks.65 To some extent this is confirmed by Helmut Kohl’s mem-
oirs, although at the time, he explains, he was not fully aware of the fact that the 
French and British leaders were hopeful that “Gorbachev would do the job for 
them.” Mitterrand and Thatcher were convinced that “Gorbachev would never 
accept a reunited Germany as a member of NATO,” Kohl writes.66
Decision time, however, came ever closer with the increasing strength of the 
protest movement in East Germany and the accelerating disintegration of the GDR. 
The continuing mass demonstrations on the streets of East Germany and, not least, 
an initiative by the West German chancellor proved to be decisive.
On 28 November 1989, in a speech to the Bundestag, Chancellor Kohl present-
ed a cautious Ten-Point blueprint for German unification, much of which he had 
drawn up himself. Neither the Western allies nor even his own foreign minister had 
been consulted. The US government had only received a copy of Kohl’s speech 
shortly before it was given and the US president had not yet read it. Paris, London, 
and Gorbachev had not received any advance notice and were less than pleased.67 
In the speech the chancellor expressed his view that “unity will come.” While in 
his fifth point he referred to the possible creation of confederate structures between 
the two German states, he declined to mention a timeframe. Instead he said cau-
tiously that “nobody knows how a reunified Germany will look.”68 Despite the 
guarded and carefully calibrated sentences, which did not refer explicitly to outright 
reunification, following Kohl’s speech reunification was very much on the interna-
tional agenda. No longer did it make sense for Western politicians to avoid talking 
about the issue and to refer to it only in an indirect and cryptic way.69
As for the United States, President Bush and most of his advisors recognized 
by early December 1989 that the course of events set in motion in the summer 
and fall of that year by the widespread protests of the East German population 
would unavoidably lead to German reunification. Instead of resisting this almost 
certain development and thereby antagonize the Germans without being in any 
65 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 94.For the hope that Gorbachev would issue a veto, see 
Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 792. 
66 Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, 956. See also Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland, 160, 162; 
Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einheit (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 59–60. Whether 
Gorbachev in turn relied on Thatcher and Mitterrand since he thought that they would refuse his 
agreement to reunification, as claimed by Rödder, 162, is however doubtful. 
67 See von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutschlands, 122ff, 136ff; this is also confirmed in the various 
memoirs of the major participants. 
68 For the speech see for example Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gransow, eds., Uniting Germa-
ny: Documents and Debates, 1944–1993 (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1994), 86–89. 
69 For a good analysis of Bonn’s policy towards the GDR (and to some extent toward the four allies), 
see Markus Driftmann, Die Bonner Deutschlandpolitik 1989/90 (Munster: Lit Verlag, 2005).
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way able to alter the result, Bush decided to gracefully bow to the inevitable. 
Already during a meeting with Thatcher at Camp David on 24 November, that 
is, before Kohl’s speech, he remained unconvinced by the prime minister’s argu-
ments that the West ought to do all it could to maintain the Cold War status quo 
to shore up Gorbachev’s ever more precarious domestic position in the Soviet 
Union. At this stage Bush’s national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, however, 
still displayed a certain amount of sympathy for Thatcher’s point of view.70 
A day after Kohl’s speech, on 29 November, Secretary of State Baker proposed 
four principles that should guide the international dimension of German unifica-
tion: self-determination for the Germans; an orderly evolutionary process; the 
inviolability of the European borders; and lastly and perhaps most importantly 
the continued membership of a united Germany in both NATO and the EC.71 Bush 
repeated these four principles at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brus-
sels on 4 December 1989.72 The United States thus made clear its firm intention 
to support German unification if these conditions were met. Thatcher concluded 
in exasperation that “there was nothing I could expect from the Americans as 
regards slowing down German reunification.”73 
It was obvious: by late November 1989 the Bush administration had clearly 
made up its mind to support German unification. Although Secretary of State 
Baker advised Kohl on 12 December to be a little more careful when dealing with 
the Soviets, the British, and the French,74 for Washington the ultimate outcome 
of the developments in the East that had started in the summer of 1989 were no 
longer in doubt. Already by mid-February 1990 this had led to the development 
of the Two Plus Four framework, as agreed by Western leaders at the Ottawa 
Open Skies conference, for negotiating the precise nature of German unification 
between the four World War II victors and the two German states.75
In the course of January 1990 the United States was joined in their pro-reuni-
fication policy by French President Mitterrand. Initially Mitterrand had attempt-
ed to prop up the GDR by, for instance, paying the disintegrating state an official 
state visit on 20 December and by expressing his interest in coordinated joint 
70 DBPO, xvi.
71 See Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland, 150.
72 DBPO, xvi.
73 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 795–96. For the United States and German unification, see 
above all the book by Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified; but also Robert D. Blackwill, “Deut-
sche Vereinigung und amerikanische Diplomatie,” Außenpolititk 45, no. 3 (1994): 211–225; 
Robert L. Hutchins, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War. An Insider’s Account of 
U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1997); Bush and Scowcroft, A 
World Transformed; James A Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 
1989–1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995); Wulf Schmiese, Fremde Freunde: Deutschland und die 
USA zwischen Mauerfall und Golfkrieg (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 2000).
74 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 209, 215. 
75 See Reinhard Müller, Der 2+4-Vertrag und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker (Frankfurt 
am Main: Peter Lang, 1997).
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Anglo-French attempts at preventing or at least delaying German unification.76 
Nonetheless, on 4 January 1990 Kohl and Mitterrand met at the French president’s 
country residence in the Gascony and Mitterrand told him that “if the Germans 
want unity, the French know they cannot prevent it.”77 In his memoirs Kohl even 
writes that already during the Franco-German summit on 2 and 3 November 1989 
(and thus before the fall of the Wall) Mitterrand referred to the necessity of further 
deepening the integration of the European continent and “in the course of our 
conversation François Mitterrand explicitly gave the green light for German uni-
fication, although during the next period he would pronounce a number of skep-
tical assessments.”78 Kohl continues by writing that “unfortunately he had been 
forced to conclude since then that Mitterrand pursued a game of deception” in 
the weeks after the bilateral Franco-German summit conference. 
The French president had clearly recognized that in all likelihood reunification 
could not be prevented (and he thus emphasized the need to embed Germany even 
more firmly than hitherto in European structures). The NATO allies, he realized, 
were also bound by their many pro-reunification declarations over the previous 
forty years. Nevertheless, he did not hesitate to commend the GDR, express his 
strong respect for Gorbachev, and secretly hope that Gorbachev would resolve 
the West’s reunification dilemma. He was realistic enough, however, to recognize 
that a formal anti-reunification entente with the British as desired by Downing 
Street would be counterproductive. During the EC summit conference on 8 and 
9 December in Strasbourg, Mitterrand and Thatcher met twice to consider a new 
entente between France, Britain, and perhaps even the Soviet Union.79 Yet Paris 
soon grasped how unrealistic it was to attempt going back to the alliance system 
of the years 1913 and 1938. It might also well have lasting negative consequenc-
es, it was reasoned in the Élysée Palace, if reunification did in fact occur after 
all, as was increasingly likely. In a meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher on 20 
January in Paris, Mitterrand told her extremely frankly that while both London 
and Paris might not like German reunification, they could do little to stop it. And 
if this were the case, they should remain silent and not attempt vainly to derail 
the process and its inevitable outcome.80 Although this did not stop him to con-
76 See Frederic Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2009), 139–43; also Tilo Schabert, Wie Weltgeschichte gemacht wird: Frank-
reich und die deutsche Einheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002).
77 DBPO, xix, n.31. For the West German memorandum on the conversation, see “Gespräch des 
Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Latche, 4. Januar 1990,” in Dokumente zur 
Deutschlandpolitik. Deutsche Einheit, 682–90.
78 Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990,  956.
79 Powell (Strasbourg) to Wall (FCO), 8 Dec. 1989, in DBPO, 162–66; see also Rödder, Deutsch-
land einig Vaterland, 157.
80 DBPO, xviii–xix. For the memorandum of the conversation, see Powell (London) to Wall (Lon-
don), 20 Jan. 1990, ibid., 215–19. See also Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and 
German Unification, 168–70.
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tinue making skeptical remarks, by mid-January 1990 Mitterrand had reluctantly 
accepted the inevitability of German reunification.
Thatcher, however, was not impressed. She had intended to put “some specif-
ic proposals” to Mitterrand “on how Britain and France could work together more 
closely.” Prior to her meeting with the French president she had admonished her 
Foreign Office “to work out our own ideas in rather more detail” regarding Ger-
man reunification. She had explained that “we should not simply regard this as 
inevitable and wait for events to overtake us.” Not least, she outlined, the Foreign 
Office “had to think through the consequences for Gorbachev: we did not want 
to lose the greater good of seeing his reforms succeed throughout the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe in order to satisfy a German wish for faster progress 
with reunification.”81 
But this was all academic once Mitterrand had made it clear that Franco-British 
cooperation to derail reunification was out of the question. Thatcher was furious 
when she recognized to her great dismay that Mitterrand had resigned himself to 
putting up with reunification in favor of attempting to move “ahead faster towards 
a federal Europe in order to tie down the German giant.”82 This was indeed Mitter-
rand’s objective as he had already explained to Gorbachev in early December 
1989.83 For him the German Question clearly needed to be transformed into a 
European question (and monetary union) before its resolution would be acceptable. 
The Europeanization of the German Question, of course, ran counter to Thatcher’s 
ideas. While the prime minister was strongly opposed to reunification, she neverthe-
less did not develop much of a coherent strategy to either prevent it or embed it into 
structures which would make a unified and enlarged Germany acceptable. Mitterrand, 
by contrast, was the only opponent to reunification who did develop a convincing 
strategic structure that looked well into the future.84 “Europe will be your revenge,” 
former West German chancellor Adenauer had told the severely shocked French 
prime minister after the British had suddenly halted the invasion of Egypt and the 
Suez canal in November of 1956. Adenauer may well have been right.85 
As far as the USSR was concerned, Gorbachev also seemed to be quite relaxed 
about the possibility of German unification and the disappearance of the GDR as 
an independent state.86 During a meeting with Bush on a ship off the coast of 
Malta on 2 and 3 December 1989, the two leaders formally declared the Cold 
War over. Yet during the subsequent weeks and months, Gorbachev appeared to 
retreat to a much more hard-line position regarding German unification.87 The 
81 Powell (No.10) to Wall (FCO), 10 Jan. 1990, in DBPO, 199–200.
82 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 798.
83 See Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland, 161.
84 Ibid. 
85 See Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, 134.
86 Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland, 151–52.
87 For Gorbachev’s policy, see also Ekkehard Kuhn, Gorbatschow und die deutsche Einheit. Aus-
sagen der wichtigsten russischen und deutschen Beteiligten (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993) and 
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more the GDR began to disintegrate, not least after the free East German elections 
on 18 March 1990 which brought a conservative-led coalition government under 
Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière to power in the GDR, and the more desperate 
the economic and financial woes of the Soviet Union grew, the higher Gor-
bachev’s price became. The Soviet leader also needed to pay more attention to 
his domestic audience. An increasing number of communist hard-liners viewed 
Gorbachev’s policies in a very critical light and were strongly opposed to giving 
up the spoils of war gained by having defeated Hitler. They were appalled at the 
idea of rescinding the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe by abandoning the GDR 
and allowing the creation of a reunified Germany. In the end this would lead to 
the failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev.88
Privately Gorbachev seems to have made up his mind as early as January 1990 
that German unification was unavoidable. On 30 January 1990, at a press con-
ference with visiting GDR Prime Minister Modrow, Gorbachev’s statement rec-
ognized, in the words of the British Foreign Office, “that unification will take 
place.”89 On 10 February 1990 Gorbachev told visiting Chancellor Kohl in Mos-
cow that he believed it was for the Germans in East and West to decide whether 
or not they wished to reunite. The Soviet Union would certainly respect their 
decision; it was up to the Germans themselves to select the timing and method 
for achieving it. Gorbachev, however, envisaged a united Germany to remain 
outside the two military blocs and to be equipped with only national forces for 
self-defense purposes.90 Despite Gorbachev’s reservations, in principle he had 
agreed to German unification. In the next few weeks Bonn would deliver to the 
Soviet Union meat and other foodstuff, clothes and many household goods worth 
more than 220 million deutsche mark. On the flight back from Moscow to Bonn, 
Kohl and his entourage opened champagne bottles. In his memoirs he used the 
subtitle “breakthrough” for the section about his visit to Moscow.91
Still, during the next few months Gorbachev stalled. In particular he wished 
to resolve the NATO question. But in the end, on 30 May 1990, during a visit to 
Washington, Gorbachev agreed with Bush that Germany had the right to decide 
which alliance it wished to join. The choices obviously included NATO.92 There 
the chapter by Wolfgang Mueller, “The USSR and the Reunification of Germany,” in this volu-
me, 321–53.
88 See Michael Gorbachev, The August Coup: Three Days that Shook the World (London: Harper-
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remained another issue however: Gorbachev wished to obtain as much financial 
aid as possible in return for agreeing to German unification. Negotiations with 
the West Germans had commenced in early May but, once again, the Soviets 
stalled since they wished to drive up the price. The final agreement was reached 
during a bilateral meeting between Gorbachev and Kohl in the Caucasus, at Gor-
bachev’s dacha, in mid-July 1990. Kohl and Gorbachev agreed on a sum of 12 
billion deutsche mark in addition to the food aid, financing of homes, and a vo-
cational retraining program for returning Soviet soldiers that the Germans had 
already promised to Moscow.93 After the Caucasus meeting, the Soviet Union no 
longer stood in the way of giving its agreement to German reunification, includ-
ing the membership of a reunited Germany in NATO. The Two Plus Four treaty 
was signed on 12 September 1990 in Moscow, and on 3 October the GDR joined 
West Germany under Article 23 of the West German Basic Law. 
Initially, therefore, it had been the United States that had taken the calculated 
decision to support the German reunification process. For both ideological and 
strategic political reasons, President Bush was convinced that this was the right 
policy to embark upon. Mitterrand and Gorbachev, as well as political leaders 
from countries like Poland, Italy and the Netherlands (as well as Israel), first had 
to overcome their deep reservations to this development before they were ready 
to join the United States.
For Thatcher, however, it was impossible to put her private suspicions aside. It 
did not help that she and Helmut Kohl never developed close personal relations. 
In fact, Thatcher and Kohl greatly disliked each other. Even when talking to the 
US president, the German chancellor tended to refer to the British prime minister 
as “that woman” and Bush was “uncomfortable” with Thatcher’s constant “dis-
missive references” to Kohl and also, in particular, to Foreign Minister Genscher.94 
In her memoirs Thatcher attests to the difficulties between herself and Kohl when 
she writes somewhat insincerely that “in fact, we did not get on at all badly.”95 
More importantly, throughout 1989–90 the prime minister’s thinking remained 
rigid and visionless. Her mind was imprisoned within a rather inflexible frame-
work of thought that was strongly influenced by both the Second World War, 
including the Holocaust, and Cold War parameters. At the same time, her lack of 
sympathy for and understanding of the European integration process and her 
faulty concept of British patriotism, including her longing for past glories of 
empire and world power, prevented her from consenting to the further develop-
ment of the EC into a genuine European Union that integrated an enlarged Ger-
many. Even Margaret Thatcher’s own foreign policy advisor, Percy Cradock, who 
was close to her personally, writes in his account of the Thatcher years that the 
prime minister 
93 See Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1990–94 (Munich: Droemer, 1997), 162–85. 
94 Alexander (NATO) to Wright (FCO), 18 Sep. 1989, in DBPO, 31–32. 
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had on the whole a poor view of foreigners, other than Anglo-Saxons, just as she had little time 
for European traditions or statesmen. This lack of imagination about the other side was a real 
defect. Too often it meant a one-dimensional policy, the assertion of British claims in a vacuum, 
with inevitable surprises and rebuffs when the other party failed to fit into our preconceptions. 
In a world in which we had long lost a dominant role and had increasingly to live by our wits, 
this was dangerous.96 
With these entirely different approaches among Western leaders, Bush reaped 
a renewal of the Germans’ deep thankfulness and pro-American attitude for his 
country. Gorbachev received considerable financial payments and enormous per-
sonal admiration, which continued after his retirement (at least in Germany and 
the Western world, much less so in Russia). Mitterrand’s price for French consent 
to German reunification consisted mainly in the reaffirmation of Kohl’s agree-
ment, already obtained in December 1989, to support the realization of European 
Monetary Union, including the creation of a European currency which Germany 
would adopt.97 It was generally believed at the time that this would lead to the 
end of German monetary domination in Europe. 
In contrast, Thatcher clung so long to a negative position, that she then had 
no option left but to retreat in view of the policy followed by the United States, 
France and the Soviet Union. This came close to a personal humiliation of the 
prime minster, since it appeared that she had made a last-minute U-turn. By this 
stage, moreover, the British prime minister had wasted a great deal of time and 
profoundly antagonized not only her American ally, but also the Germans and 
Chancellor Kohl. She therefore was unable to gain anything from her reluctant 
and belated agreement to German unification. Her ultimate agreement to and 
acceptance of German reunification evolved within the context of an internal 
British battle between Downing Street and the Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice about the core of British foreign policy in the German Question. 
Two different foreign policies: Downing Street vs. the Foreign Office?
It is commonly thought that it was only Thatcher and a very limited number 
of her loyal supporters, including her private secretary Charles Powell, who were 
strongly opposed to reunification. The Foreign Office diplomats, it is generally 
assumed, had a much more enlightened point of view and did their best to per-
suade the prime minister to give her agreement to German reunification.98 This 
is perhaps a somewhat oversimplified version. In fact both the prime minister and 
many Foreign Office officials viewed German unification skeptically. While 
96 Cradock, ibid., 21–22. See also in a similar vein, Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion, 100–1.
97 See Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification, 143–47.
98 See Salmon, “The United Kingdom and German Unification,” 177–90; also Klein, “Obstructive 
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Thatcher expressed her views bluntly and the officials were more diplomatic, 
nonetheless initially their point of view was not all that different. On 15 Septem-
ber 1989, for example, deputy ambassador Colin Munro wondered in his dispatch 
from the British embassy in East Berlin whether “the GDR can be preserved as 
a separate German state but with Western political, economic and social condi-
tions” or whether or not reunification was “unavoidable.”99 
In contrast to the prime minister, the British diplomatic officials, however, 
appear to have had a greater sense of realism. The Foreign Office diplomats re-
alized significantly earlier than the prime minister that resisting German reunifi-
cation made little sense. In a major Foreign Office draft memorandum on German 
reunification, dated 11 October 1989, it was argued that Britain, along “with 
others can exert some influence, [but] we cannot block reunification, if that is 
indeed the direction in which events lead.”100 While listing a number of disad-
vantages for the UK if such a result were to occur, the paper explained that “these 
aspects should not be exaggerated. They can be largely averted by good manage-
ment of any evolution towards reunification.” Moreover, “the advantages which 
could flow from reunification are considerable,” it was argued. It would clearly 
be a victory for Western values, would improve the West’s security, and would 
also strengthen the economic potential of the EC. The paper then presciently 
outlined why reunification was not to be feared but ought to be welcomed:
Much of the FRG’s surplus capital would be absorbed by the infrastructural projects that would 
be needed to bring the East up to West German standards, putting an end to the FRG’s chronic 
capital surplus and holding out the prospect of more balanced trade flows in the EC. The UK in-
dustry should also benefit from the opportunities offered (the FRG is already our second largest 
export market).
26. The UK’s best approach, therefore, is not to discourage reunification, but rather to exert 
influence over the speed and timing of any moves in that direction. Close contacts with the Ger-
mans at all levels, including the highest, will be a crucial element in this process. They will be 
particularly important if events in the GDR take a dramatic turn.101
However, the public utterances by the prime minister and her well-known private 
reservations about reunification soon put Britain in the unenviable position of being 
regarded once again as the “odd one out” among the Western allies. Still, in early 
November a good number of Foreign Office officials continued to hold the view 
that “our line on the German Question should be to stress the importance of self-de-
termination and go no further.”102 In the public imagination in Germany and else-
where in the Western world, British silence regarding the unfolding events in East 
99 Munro (East Berlin) to Ratford (FCO), 15 Sep. 1989, in DBPO, 30.
100 “Draft Paper on German Reunification” (WRL 020/4), 11 Oct. 1989, in DBPO, 50. This draft 
was then considerably revised and toned down. For the final version, dated 25 Oct. 1989, see 
ibid., 68–78.
101 “Draft Paper on German Reunification,” 11 Oct. 1989, ibid.
102 Synott (FCO) to Broomfield (FCO), 3 Nov. 1989, in DBPO, 56, note 5.
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Germany had convinced many observers in Germany and elsewhere that the British 
government was at best lukewarm about the possibility of the collapse of the GDR 
and German unification. The last formal but vague declaration concerning British 
support for Germany’s national aspirations had been Foreign Secretary John Ma-
jor’s circumspect statement during his visit to Bonn on 20 September. But the fall 
of the Berlin Wall on 9 November required a response. 
Ambassador Christopher Mallaby reported from Bonn that the “absence of 
any statement by a senior member of HMG” in response to the fall of the Wall, 
similar to those made by Mitterrand and Bush and Baker, “has been commented 
on here.”103 He believed that a British statement was highly desirable. Tellingly 
he emphasized in the memorandum to new Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd that 
“in our own interests” his statement should not “fall short in two respects: will-
ingness to accept reunification, if that is the way things go, and confidence in the 
Federal Government to conduct FRG policy in ways which are consonant with 
Western interests.” New Foreign Secretary Hurd, who had only been appointed 
to this position on 26 October 1989 in the course of a reshuffle of the government, 
took heed of Mallaby’s advice, at least to some extent. In an interview with the 
BBC World Service on 10 November, Hurd declared that he “would welcome 
unification based on free institutions.” The principle of German unity was not in 
doubt, he declared, “but the how and when,” he said, was “not on the immediate 
agenda.”104 This was a rather cautious statement. Together with Thatcher’s reser-
vations which became increasingly known, Hurd’s statement defined the British 
attitude toward German unification for both the international press and the West 
German government. After all, Hurd had used almost exactly the same words 
during a press conference in The Hague on 9 November and then again in a BBC 
radio interview in Bonn on 15 November.105
In the following two months the officials in the British Foreign Office were 
not only busy with following and analyzing the dramatic, confusing, and con-
stantly changing developments in the GDR, they were also paying attention to 
the reactions of Gorbachev, Paris, Washington, and not least the Kohl govern-
ment. They also had the unenviable task of attempting to persuade their own 
prime minister to adopt a more constructive and positive policy toward German 
reunification, which appeared to be ever more likely. The Foreign Office became 
increasingly aware that both the Germans and the American administration saw 
“our position as being outside the mainstream.” A Foreign Office paper written 
by John Fretwell explained it well:
The impression we create on this arises from the nuances rather than from the basic statement 
of our position. It is all right to insist on the need for prudence in handling the present dramatic 
developments in Europe, but we need to convey to the Germans that we too have a positive 
103 Mallaby (Bonn) to Hurd (FCO), 9 Nov. 1989, in DBPO, 98. 
104 Quoted in DBPO, Preface, xv.
105 See DBPO, 190, note 3.
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vision of what should emerge at the end of the day and what we are prepared to work for. […] 
If we do not start conveying this impression to the Germans soon […] they will conclude that 
we are fundamentally hostile to that sort of vision. They will be tempted increasingly to move 
ahead without us on these fundamental issues of European policy. We could ultimately impose a 
block, based on our position as one of the four Powers responsible for Germany and Berlin. But 
we should not count on carrying anyone else with us.106
The doubts and skepticism about reunification among the officials of the For-
eign Office, including the foreign secretary himself, gradually dissipated or be-
came considerably less pronounced. In particular, ever since Chancellor Kohl’s 
Ten-Point speech on 28 November, Hurd, as indeed most Foreign Office diplo-
mats, had clearly come around to accepting the inevitability of reunification. It 
was also obvious that this might occur a lot faster than had been predicted until 
then. The British as well as the other allies were skeptical when Kohl’s primary 
foreign policy advisor Horst Teltschik attempted to tone down the importance of 
the Ten-Point program by explaining that Kohl’s speech was meant “to put German 
unity at the end of a lengthy process and thus to head off calls for early unity.” 
Britain’s ambassador in Bonn, Mallaby, fully recognized that “Kohl’s decision to 
set out a program culminating in unity, without agreement of coalition partners or 
prior consultation with allies, is a sign of the speed with which the debate is mov-
ing.” He reported back to London that Kohl’s “vision of a lengthy process before 
unity” was achieved might well be soon overtaken “by other views.”107 
Mallaby regarded Kohl’s Ten-Point plan as a “major event” and a “landmark 
speech.” He told the Foreign Office back in London that “reunification in the form 
of a German federation is now clearly an aim of policy, though without a times-
cale.”108 Kohl’s speech, he wrote, “takes reunification out of the realms of aspiration 
and makes it the culmination and aim of a staged programme.”  The ambassador 
also noted that “it is helpful that Kohl has set no timescales and has linked his 
programme to wider European developments which will take considerable time.” 
The prime minister, however, was not amused. She read Mallaby’s telegram 
with a great deal of concern and noted in the margin, “Christopher Mallaby seems 
to welcome reunification,” implying that she herself did not.109 During the NATO 
summit of heads of government on 4 December 1989, Thatcher did not hesitate to 
say that reunification ought not to take place for ten to fifteen years. This was im-
mediately “quoted by German commentators as evidence of a negative and mis-
trustful British attitude,” as ambassador Mallaby put it.110 When at a private lun-
cheon organized by the right of center Centre for Policy Studies on 18 December, 
Conservative MP David Willets expressed the view that reunification was unstop-
106 Fretwell (FCO) to Wall (FCO), 29 Nov. 1989, in DPBO, 144.
107 Mallaby (Bonn) to Hurd (FCO), 28 Nov. 1989, in DBPO, 138.
108 Mallaby (Bonn) to Hurd (FCO), 29 Nov. 1989, in DBPO, 142–43.
109 DBPO, 143, note 3.
110 Mallaby (Bonn) to Hurd (FCO), 5 Jan. 1990, in DBPO, 190.
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pable “the PM threw up her hands in horror: ‘No, not at all,’” she shouted.111 Time 
and again she said in the course of the luncheon, “We’ve been through the war and 
we know perfectly well what the Germans are like […] and how national character 
doesn’t basically change.” Thatcher also did not hesitate to express her fairly racist 
and dogmatic view that “once a German, always a German.” “You can never trust 
them,” she said.112 George Urban, one of the participants at the luncheon, later wrote 
in his memoirs that “if allied governments knew just how narrow-minded, and in 
many ways xenophobic, MT has become, they would be even more disturbed than 
they are already.”113
There was indeed rising concern about the British standpoint. In early January 
Mallaby commented in a telegram to Foreign Secretary Hurd that in Germany the 
UK was “perceived […] as perhaps the least positive of the three Western Allies, 
and the least important.” To drive the point home, Mallaby wrote unambiguously 
that the UK had an image problem which was to a large extent its own fault:
I remain concerned that despite our consistent support for the principle of German unity through 
self-determination, the UK is perceived here as opposing, or at least wishing to brake, reunifica-
tion. The French, on the other hand, whose doubts seem if anything stronger than ours, manage 
to maintain a more positive public image […] The US are perceived as the most supportive of 
German aspirations even while laying down conditions for German unity.114
Once again Prime Minister Thatcher was not impressed by Mallaby’s analysis. 
She believed, according to a note drafted by her confidant and private secretary 
Charles Powell, dated 9 January, that Mallaby “showed a lack of understanding 
of our policy which she finds alarming. She would like to see any reply before 
it is sent.”115 
The rising tension within the government and the increasingly more desperate 
attempts by the Foreign Office to bring the prime minister to her senses in view 
of the damage done to Britain’s international standing by Thatcher’s inability to 
accept German reunification culminated in a seminar at Chequers on 27 January 
1990, after the prime minister’s return from her visit to Mitterrand in Paris. Al-
though the editors of the British volume of documents on German reunification 
write that “there was certainly no point at which Mrs. Thatcher explicitly accept-
ed defeat,”116 the Chequers seminar on “East-West relations and Germany” was 
important for persuading the prime minister to change her mind, however reluc-
tantly.117 Effectively the seminar at the prime minister’s country residence was a 
brainstorming session, attended by Thatcher and her most important foreign 
111 Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion, 102.
112 Ibid., 104–05.
113 Ibid., 113.
114 Mallaby (Bonn) to Hurd (FCO), 5 Jan. 1990, in DBPO, 190.
115 Powell (No.10) to Wall (FCO), 9 Jan. 1990, in DBPO, 195. 
116 DBPO, xviii.
117 For the proposed agenda and items to be covered, see DBPO, 180–82, 185–86, 192–94.
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policy advisors, both ministers and officials. Thatcher gradually and hesitantly 
gave her “assent” in principle to the proposition of German unification closely 
embedded within NATO and further European integration.118 In late January 1990, 
however, she still found “the overall picture very worrying” and was wondering 
whether she should fly to Washington to discuss matters with the US president. 
She thought that would somehow “convey a good political signal.”119 Moreover, 
some of her most strident anti-unification remarks were made in an interview 
with the Wall Street Journal on 25 January and on 12 February in the context of 
a speech to the Young Conservatives at the seaside resort Torquay.120
Still, it was on 6 February 1990, in a speech in the House of Commons, that the 
prime minister expressed the view for the first time that German reunification was 
on the cards.121 Although Thatcher was coming round to accepting the inevitable, 
she did not let go without a rearguard fight. In practice she continued to attempt to 
delay reunification by, for example, expressing concern about the future of NATO, 
Kohl’s hesitation to recognize the Western frontier of Poland, and also about the 
form and substance of the Two-Plus-Four framework. She convened another all-day 
seminar at Chequers on 24 March 1990. This time she assembled British and Amer-
ican historians to talk about the German character.122 The seminar became notorious 
due to the press being leaked a summary of the discussion written by her private 
secretary Charles Powell which grossly distorted the nature and conclusions of the 
discussions.123 “By coincidence or design,” as John Campbell writes, the memoran-
dum was leaked in July, in the same week as the Ridley affair broke.124 
In the leaked document Powell referred to the unchanged German national char-
acter with words like “aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, excessive 
exaggerations, inferiority complex, self-pity, sentimentality.” The actual talks had 
been much more positive. Historian Trevor Roper (Lord Dacre), for example, re-
118 See Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, 112; Alan Clark, Diaries (1983–1991) (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), 276–77. 
119 Powell (No.10) to Wall (FCO), 31 Jan. 1990, in DBPO, 233–34. See also Salmon, “The UK and 
German Unification,” 184–85.
120 See for example Salmon, ibid., 185.
121 See House of Commons Parliamentary Debates (H.C. Deb.), Vol.166, 757 (6 Feb. 1990) and 
1005–06 (8 Feb. 1990). This is pointed out by Kettenacker. “Britain,” 114 and n. 71. See also 
Teltschik, 329 Tage, 134.
122 Almost all of the participants have published their accounts about this meeting (though Thatcher 
herself remains silent in her memoirs), but the best, most detailed and most enlightening account 
can be found in Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion, 118ff.  See also Timothy Garton Ash, “The 
Chequers Affair,” New York Review of Books, 27 Sep. 1990, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/1990/sep/27/the-chequers-affair/ (accessed 3 Jun. 2013). 
123 Powell’s leaked memorandum can be found in Jarausch and Gransow, eds., Uniting Germany, 
129–31; and also in Harold James and Maria Stone, eds., When the Wall Came Down: Reactions 
to German Unification (New York: Routledge, 1992), 233–35.
124 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher 1, 635. It has been suspected that the Foreign Office was respon-
sible for leaking the document to discredit Downing Street.
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ferred to a “sea-change in German thinking” since World War II.125 He also wondered 
why “the government was so horrified now that the original postwar aim of Allied 
policy was being suddenly achieved. […] Why our apprehensions? How can we 
now possibly wish to put off or negate unification? We should rejoice, because we’ve 
won.”126 The prime minister, it appeared, “was a little taken aback” by this forceful 
reasoning.127 Still, during the seminar Thatcher did not “hide her cordial dislike of 
all things German […] aggravated by her distaste for the personality of Helmut Kohl 
[…] The contrast between herself as a visionary stateswoman with a world-view and 
Kohl the wurst-eating, corpulent, plodding Teuton, has a long history in MT’s imag-
ination,” George Urban, one of the participants, reported in his memoirs.128
While matters were moving rapidly ahead with the creation of economic and 
currency unity between the two German states on 2 July and the Caucasus meet-
ing between Kohl and Gorbachev in mid-July 1990, Britain was still regarded as 
being opposed to reunification. This was further confirmed by the unfortunate 
Ridley Affair. The affair commenced on 14 July 1990 when an interview was 
published that the Minister of Trade and Industry Nicholas Ridley had given to 
the conservative British weekly The Spectator. The minister, regarded as a Thatch-
er loyalist and close friend, explained in outspoken language that thanks to the 
financial policy of the Bundesbank the Germans were set to take over the lead-
ership of Europe with the envisaged economic and monetary union. The EC, he 
outlined, was “a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe. It has 
to be thwarted.” The French would follow them on this course like poodles with 
no will of their own. Only the British remained in a position to put a stop to 
German ambitions. Ridley did not hesitate to put Kohl and the EC Commission 
on the same level as Hitler when he pontificated about European integration. He 
said that he was “not against giving up sovereignty in principle, but not to this 
lot. You might just as well give it to Adolf Hitler, frankly.”129 
Regarding the future shape of postcommunist Europe Ridley explained that 
“it has always been Britain’s role to keep these various powers balanced, and 
never has it been more necessary than now, with Germany so uppity.” The inter-
view was accompanied by a cartoon of Ridley adding a Hitler moustache to a 
poster of Helmut Kohl. While this was not Ridley’s fault, it added to the bad taste 
the text of the interview left behind.130 




129 See Campbell, Margaret Thatcher 1, 635; Michael Seamark, “Margaret Thatcher feared reunit-
ed Germany would ‘make more ground than Hitler’” (review of DBPO volume), Mail online, 
11 September 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1212552/Secret-documents-re-
veal-Thatchers-fears-united-Germany-make-ground-Hitler.html (accessed 3 Jun. 2013).
130 Ibid.
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In spite of a few cautious attempts on Thatcher’s part to protect her minister 
from the indignant reactions to his declarations, he was eventually forced to re-
sign. Nevertheless it was generally suspected that Thatcher’s thinking still large-
ly agreed with the sentiments expressed by Ridley. Indeed already in the Specta-
tor issue of 14 July 1990 the magazine’s editor, Dominic Lawson, had comment-
ed that “Mr. Ridley’s confidence in expressing his views on the German threat 
must owe a little something to the knowledge that they are not significantly 
different from those of the prime minister [...] even though in public she is re-
quired not to be so indelicate as to draw comparisons between Herren Kohl and 
Hitler.”131 
Concluding remarks
Both the Ridley affair and the leakage of the Chequers seminar in March 
greatly damaged the embattled prime minister, who had become rather unpopular 
in the country at large due to the imposition of a community tax (or poll tax). It 
was well known that her Cabinet was deeply split over the new housing tax as 
well as over a large number of other serious issues. Rumors multiplied about an 
impending internal coup against the prime minister. This occurred in November 
1990 when Thatcher was unceremoniously ejected as leader of the Conservative 
Party and thus as prime minister. Her controversial opposition to German reuni-
fication and her inability to adopt a more constructive policy toward European 
integration played a large role in her downfall. Her attitudes appeared to defy 
common sense. By late 1990 both the country at large and the Conservative par-
ty grandees had realized that Thatcher’s foreign policy was orientated along the 
lines of Britain’s glorious past as an imperial world power, rather than along the 
more modest necessities of the present and future. Thatcher’s foreign policy, and 
in particular her German and European policies, were clearly damaging the coun-
try’s international standing. Germany was unified on 3 October 1990. Margaret 
Thatcher lost power on 28 November 1990. Just over a year later the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist. In her years in retirement the former prime minister became an 
embittered person who frequently attacked her successors from the sidelines. She 
clearly never forgave her party for having ousted her from power. While much 
feted in the United States as a distinguished statesperson, in fact Thatcher became 
ever more narrow-minded and developed an ever more vigorously anti-German 
and in particular anti-European frame of mind in her post-prime ministerial years.
131 Quoted in Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion, 99 n. 1.  Dominic Lawson was the son of former 
chancellor of the exchequer Nigel Lawson, who had fallen out with Thatcher over monetarist 
principles and resigned from the Cabinet in October 1989.
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FRANCE, THE EAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS 
AND THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was certainly the most import-
ant landmark in the succession of upheavals that occurred in the years from 1987 
to 1992, upheavals that significantly altered the balance of the international sys-
tem as it had gradually developed from 1945. It is clear that the shock wave 
following this event was also to have an impact on French diplomacy.
The attitude of the French government during this period has been examined 
from various viewpoints. Several recent publications are quite valuable in this 
analysis due to their use of French archives, i.e. first hand sources, which were 
not always used in earlier research.1 These works reveal French policy as having 
been more proactive than had been previously described.
1 Cf. Tilo Schabert, Wie Weltgeschichte gemacht wird. Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit 
(Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 2002); in English: How World Politics is Made: France and the Re-
unification of Germany (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009); Frédéric Bozo, Mit-
terrand, la diplomatie française et la fin de la guerre froide (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005); in 
English: Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification (Oxford and New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2009); Marion Delamarre, La politique allemande de François Mitterrand, 
1981–1995 (Paris: PHD Institut d’Etude politique de Paris, 2007); Georges Saunier, “A special 
relationship: Franco-German relations at the time of François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl,” in 
Carine Germond and Henning Türk, eds., A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe. 
From “Hereditary Enemies” to Partners (New York: Palgrave-McMillan, 2008), 235–47; 
idem, “Le tandem François Mitterrand-Helmut Kohl. Une gouvernance franco-allemande?,” 
in Wilfried Loth, ed., La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne (Brux-
elles: Bruylant, 2005), 239–54; Georges Saunier, “SSSR v mitterranovskoi diplomatii,” in Yu.I. 
Rubinskii and M. Ts. Arzakanyan, eds., Rossiya–Frantsiya 300 let osobykh otnoshenii (Mos-
cow: ROSIZO, 2010), 279–88. In this regard, it is important to mention the recent publication 
of a selection of documents from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning German 
unification. In their introduction, the editors, Maurice Vaïsse and Christian Wenkel, state that 
“myths die hard. From the time of the unification and until now, the idea of François Mitterrand 
being hostile or at least very reluctant vis-à-vis German unification is well established, while 
the archives, now open, do not confirm that.” Maurice Vaïsse and Christian Wenkel, La diplo-
matie française face à l’unification allemande (Paris: Tallandier, 2011), 29. This controversy 
still surrounds the issue. Indeed, unlike the books mentioned above, the recent work of Ulrich 
Lappenküper, which includes documents from the archives of the French presidency as well 
as pages from Jacques Attali’s book, supports the idea of a French diplomacy raising barriers 
between the two Germanys. See Ulrich Lappenküper, Mitterrand und Deutschland. Die enträt-
selte Sphinx (Munich: Oldenbourg 2011). Cf. Matthias Waechter, “Ulrich Lappenküper: Mitter-
rand and Germany”, Sehepunkte 12, no. 3 (2012), http://www.sehepunkte.de/2012/03/20486.
html (accessed 19 October 2012); Tilo Schabert, “Mitterrand and the Germans. Ulrich Lappen-
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Rather than attempting to delay a move toward German unification, Paris 
seems to have tried to reach a number of diplomatic goals in this period of im-
portant and rapid changes. The French were interested in guiding German uni-
fication, not stopping it.
This chapter will present, in four sections, the chronology of these goals, as 
well as their reasons and consequences. The analysis of this series of events will 
be based on French sources2 and will focus on the Franco-German dimension, 
which was a significant factor during this period.
The post-Yalta era and the return of the German Question 
(summer 1988 to autumn 1989)
As the post-Yalta era slowly emerged, the Franco-German relationship was 
multifaceted; it included not only political aspects, but also cultural, social, and 
economic ones. Both bilateral meetings and meetings within the framework of 
multilateral institutions were the basis of political relations, which involved 
senior administrative executives as well as political actors. These various forums 
for the Franco-German relationship had been more or less formally framed in 
the Élysée Treaty of 1963, which subsequently underwent several modifica-
tions.3
At the political level, the disagreements between the two countries were 
numerous, particularly in the years following the fall of the Wall. One might see 
the political function of the so-called Franco-German couple as having been the 
identification of dissent concerning upcoming issues and, as far as was possible, 
attempts to overcome them. This nearly permanent state of negotiation often 
called for political arbitrations. On the French side, the decision-making process 
involved many persons, in particular the staff at the Foreign Ministry on Quai 
d’Orsay and a few counselors at the president’s office in the Élysée palace. Most 
important decisions were made by the president, together with the minister of 
foreign affairs or other ministers as required by the topic at hand.
küper has worked on French policy regarding Germany since 1989,” in Die Welt, 23 June 2012, 
http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/literatur/article106998490/Mitterand-und-die-Deutschen.
html/ (accessed 19 October 2012).
2 In order to write this article, I have used several sources, including: private archives (advisors, 
ministers); Archives nationales de France, fonds 5AG4, boxes AH (35), CD (52, 67–68, 73–74, 
76, 177, 187, 189, 274, 304, 358, 360, 372, 384), EG (58–59, 60–61, 156, 204, 212–214), CDM 
(13, 33–36, 38–39, 43), 4160; Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), boxes 
6119–6125, 6135–36; Archives de l’Institut François Mitterrand (IFM), fonds service de presse, 
fonds discours; interviews (with advisors, ministers).
3 For a complete historical overview of the Franco-German relationship, see Georges-Henri Soutou, 
L’alliance incertaine: les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996 (Paris: Fa-
yard, 1996); and Germond and Türk , eds., A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe.
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The main motives behind these negotiations need to be noted, since they were 
the grounds upon which French diplomacy regarding the Federal Republic of 
Germany was based:
 – protection of specific interests (trade, cultural, etc.);
 – the context of the European Community and, more widely, the context of 
Europe as a whole;
 – the background of the Cold War and the French attitude toward the two su-
perpowers, the United States and the USSR;
 – French security and, more specifically, the autonomy of French nuclear de-
terrence policies;
 – the delicate balance of powers between the two countries, which was the 
result of economic competition, cooperation and partnership, including how 
Germany was perceived in France based on the history of Franco-German 
hostility, as well as Germany’s specific situation, including its partition, its 
supposed eastwards tropism, and its potential neutralism.
It is clear that for France, all of these elements had already begun to shift 
from the mid-1980s, especially from 1988, before being deeply altered by the 
fall of the Wall, the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and the prospect of German 
unification. In other words, the basis of the German Question changed.
Although the expression “German Question” was never clearly defined, it 
nevertheless was always high on the French diplomatic agenda. As mentioned 
above, the partition of Germany and the political consequences thereof long 
determined France’s Western Germany policy as a whole.
However, Germany’s partition was not a main concern when François Mit-
terrand came to power in the early 1980s. On the contrary, the issues debated at 
the meetings between Paris and Bonn had to do with East-West tensions, the 
integration of the European Community, or economic difficulties. It is true that 
on a few occasions, the French president and the German chancellor did raise 
the issue of German unification, but they kept their discussion to a theoretical 
analysis, since the division of Europe imposed its own structures.4
 – The consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 called for 
new considerations on the part of the French government. The effects of these 
considerations were felt as early as Mitterrand’s re-election to the presidency 
in 1988.5 Two aspects must he highlighted:
4 For example, at their first official meeting in Latche in October 1981, Mitterrand declared to 
Helmut Schmidt: “You’ll need time to achieve reunification, but it’s the course of history. It 
corresponds to objective and subjective realities. A generation will have to go by. The Soviet 
Union will weaken, which will be the case in fifteen years.” The German chancellor responded: 
“In my opinion, it will take much more time.” See Bozo, Mitterrand, la diplomatie française, 
33; Schabert, Mitterrand et la réunification allemande, 136.
5 See Bozo, Mitterrand, la diplomatie française, 94 –102; Saunier, “L’URSS dans la diplomatie 
mitterrandienne.”
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 – The will to renew a Franco-Soviet partnership. This meant supporting and 
encouraging Gorbachev’s policies to the degree that their positive effects 
could be seen in Paris;
 – Connected to the above, a desire to boost relations between France and East-
ern Europe, which materialized in state visits by Mitterrand to these countries 
as early as late 1988 and in 1989. All Eastern European countries were in-
volved, including the German Democratic Republic.
This new Eastern European policy was part of a wider political interest that 
was high on the French agenda: the deepening of integration within the Europe-
an Community. For Paris, two things were essential: the implementation of a 
monetary union (the EMU), and the establishment of European defense struc-
tures.
From the spring of 1988, owing to the changes occurring in Eastern Europe, 
the Quai d’Orsay as well as the Élysée began to engage in substantial reflections 
on how the post–Cold War world might be structured. In these reflections, the 
integration of the European Community played a central role, as integration 
seemed to be the means for overcoming the antagonisms of the continent. In an 
integrated Europe, of course, France would play a major role, along with its 
natural partner, West Germany. It was also foreseen that the end of the Cold War 
and of the division of Europe would force the question of German unification 
to evolve.6 Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that these changes were not 
expected to occur over a short-term period.
Because of the Eastern revolutions in the summer and autumn of 1989, French 
diplomacy renewed its interest in the potential unification of Germany.7 While 
this was primarily due to the events in Eastern Europe, it was also due to state-
ments by German and Soviet representatives. Mitterrand was interviewed on 
several occasions by journalists. His statement of 3 November 1989 reflects the 
trend of the thoughts in Paris perfectly:
I do not fear unification. […] History is moving forward. I accept it as it comes. I believe that 
the will for unification is proper for the Germans. If they want it and can manage it, France will 
adjust its policy in order to support European and French interests.8
6 In April 1989, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, head of the Center for Prevision and Analysis at the Quai 
d’Orsay, wrote a memo in which, especially considering the “apparent fluidity of the situation 
in the East,” he suggested a new direction for the Franco-German partnership and a redefinition 
of the common European ambition. But, he stated, “such clarification [would] immediately raise 
the question of German sovereignty and relations with the GDR.” He then called for a common 
policy toward East-European countries. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “La relation franco-allemande”, 
30 April 1989, in AMAE, Centre d’analyse et de prévision, 1988–1992, 111.
7 A good example of both Cold War and unification reflections can be found in the Quai d’Orsay’s 
papers. See, for example: Jacques Blot, “Réflexion sur la question allemande,” 30 October 1989, 
in Archives nationales, 5AG4, CD (177). See also the notes of the different Quai d’Orsay ser-
vices: ibid., 5AG4, CDM (33).
8 “Conférence de presse conjointe de Monsieur François Mitterrand, Président de la République, 
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On this occasion, the president was clear in his position that unification would 
have to be peaceful, democratic and European. The latter point was paramount. 
In his view, the upheavals in Eastern Europe would have to be supported by a 
deepening of European integration in the West.
The above statement of the French president can be augmented by a memo 
dated 18 October 1989 of Hubert Védrine, his diplomatic advisor, entitled “Re-
flections on the German Question.”9 Here Védrine states that: 
 – the legitimacy of German unification is incontestable;
 – it is not a French issue;
 – “the coming together of the two Germanys is inevitable”;
 – and that the final framework of this unification is unclear at the moment and 
could range from the liberalization of the border to the formation of a single 
state.
With these points in mind, he adds that “since it would be illogical to oppose 
this will, and since it is impossible to stop the coming together, we must go along 
with this move toward unity, if not toward unification.” Under these circum-
stances, Védrine supported the idea that France should be ready with supportive 
policies, which he outlined in the following terms: to keep the European con-
struction abreast with the unification in order to anchor “the FRG into the 
Twelve,” to realize the EMU, to unite Germany with both Eastern and Western 
Europe, to maintain a system of alliances, which he considered “stability fac-
tors,” and to maintain a proactive policy from all of Europe towards the Soviet 
Union, “so that the USSR does not feel deeply threatened” by these events. The 
final point proved vital in the period that followed.
A few days before the fall of the Berlin Wall, French authorities had already 
begun to discuss a possible unification of Germany. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the events about to occur in Berlin had been predicted in Paris. No 
one would have ventured the idea that Germany would be unified in less than a 
year.
French scenarios for the end of the Cold War and unification involved devel-
opments in which the agreement of the FRG was decisive.10 Nevertheless, the 
French government, which at that time chaired the EC, knew of its partner’s 
reticence on several points, notably the EMU. Thus, the main concern on the 
French diplomatic agenda, which was Community integration, required the Ger-
mans to make the necessary concessions. Early in November, the French gov-
ernment was relying on the Franco-German relationship to reach these results. 
The French were expecting that the EC would come first on the German agenda.
et du Chancelier Helmut Kohl, à l’issue des 54e consultations franco-allemandes à Bonn,” 2–3 
November 1989, in Archives IFM, fonds service de presse.
9 Hubert Védrine, “Réflexions sur la question allemande,” 18 October 1989, in Archives natio-
nales, 5AG4, CD (177).
10 Saunier, “A special relationship”, 239–40.
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Keeping the fall of the Berlin Wall under control 
(November 1989 to January 1990)
The events that occurred during the night of 9 to 10 November 1989 altered 
this scenario, and the French government and President Mitterrand had to react.
Without going into details, in this period French public opinion, both in the 
media and in political circles,11 might be described in two words: enthusiastic and 
anxious. There was enthusiasm regarding the return of freedom to Eastern Europe, 
particularly in the GDR. There was also enthusiasm regarding détente, which was 
hoped would last. And there was enthusiasm regarding the reunion of the German 
population, since the French took their friendship for granted. But at the same 
time there was fear regarding the upheavals, since their effects were unpredict-
able. It was clear that a future greater Germany would have a lasting impact on 
Europe and its relations. While specialists and policy makers remained optimistic 
about this latter point, they all called attention to a number of uncertainties:
 – What would be Germany’s priorities? Would it turn to the East? Would it be 
tempted by neutralism?
 – What would become of its Western commitments, such as those regarding 
NATO, the EEC or France?
 – What would be the final framework for unification, a single state or a confed-
eration? And how long would the timeframe be, short-term or mid-term?
 – At the end of these historical events, where would the Americans, Soviets, 
Europeans and the French themselves stand?
Most of the French political parties, both those in the government and in the 
opposition, with some variations, desired clear official statements on these issues, 
as well as on European commitments and alliances. At the same time, they want-
ed to remain positive about the developments in Germany. There was one excep-
tion: the radical opposition of the French Communist Party, which was clearly 
hostile toward unification and demanded the clear-cut opposition of the French 
government. This was a major factor: it must be remembered that at this time, 
the presidential majority relied on the support of the communists.
The first official French reactions shared the public opinion. The French for-
eign minister Roland Dumas’s statements in Parliament reflected a dichotomy of 
enthusiasm and concern.
On 10 November, Mitterrand talked to journalists in Copenhagen12 concerning 
the events of the previous night. He referred to “propitious events” that announce 
the end of the “Yalta order.” He also stated that the future European order re-
11 For the French public debate about the German unification, see Marie-Noëlle Brand Crémieux, 
Les Français face à la réunification allemande, automne 1989–automne 1990 (Paris: L’Harmat-
tan, 2004). I also refer here to Archives IFM, fonds presse.
12 “Conférence de presse de Monsieur François Mitterrand, Président de la République, lors de sa 
visite à Copenhague,” 10 November 1989, in Archives IFM, fonds service de presse.
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mained to be defined and realized. Regarding unification, he repeated his state-
ments of just a week earlier: “France expresses no reservations.” Nevertheless, 
he refused to see the events in Berlin as “an organic phenomenon that would 
entail immediate unification.” He declared that “a number of acts and some time 
will intervene [before one can talk about unification].”
As a matter of fact, the French government, as well as Mitterrand himself, 
wanted to remain cautious and pragmatic. Indeed, the events confirmed that “the 
time of unification had come.” But when? And what remained to be settled? French 
priorities lay elsewhere: the success of the European Council in Strasbourg, to be 
held in early December, during which decisions favoring the EMU were expected 
to be made.13 For Mitterrand and the French government, it was essential that the 
changes in Germany not intimidate the Kremlin, as this would result in Gorbachev’s 
position being weakened, a position that was reputed as being fragile.
However, Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan, announced on 28 No-
vember 1989, despite being wary, seemed to challenge the French caution.14 It is 
noteworthy that Paris was not informed in advance of Kohl’s initiative. At a time 
when Paris was examining the future of the Franco-German couple, the plan, 
which was not entirely clear, was met with reservations. If the preliminary con-
siderations of the chancellor are disregarded, the Ten Points overlooked the future 
of the Community completely, the Community only being referred to with regard 
to enlargement in the East. This was not, as has been mentioned above, the main 
objective of the French. The declaration also did not mention the issue of allianc-
es. While it did mention a future European balance of forces, it did not go into 
details. Finally, it did not mention the issue of borders, although this was to be-
come an important element in future negotiations. The chancellor asserted that 
“German policy is now committed to a new phase.”15 The French government 
wanted to know if this meant that all German policy would now be subjected to 
unification exigencies, disregarding other issues.
In the days following the chancellor’s announcement, the statements and de-
cisions of Mitterrand and his ministers focused on the following:
 – to make the French position clear—notably concerning the delicate issue of 
the Oder-Neisse border;
13 On the European priorities and the European Council of Strasbourg, see Archives nationales, 
5AG4, EG (58–59, 61), CDM (13). This was the reason for the decision to hold the “Diner de 
l’Élysée” on 18 November, before the European Council. This was a way to frame the German 
Question within the European context, but also to keep it from disturbing the European discussions 
in Strasbourg. On the “Diner de l’Élysée,” see Archives nationales, 5AG4, EG (52); interviews.
14 On the French reactions to the Ten-Point Plan, see Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de François 
Mitterrand (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 430. See also AMAE, Europe (6123, 6681); private archives; 
interviews.
15 “Déclaration du chancelier Helmut Kohl au sujet de la politique de l’Allemagne lors des débats 
budgétaires (Bonn-Bundestag, 28 November 1989),” Documents d’actualité internationale, 
no. 6, 106–108.
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 – to emphasize that German unification could only occur within a wider pro-
cess—a wider European process—which ultimately came down to looking for 
a way to thrust the German Question onto the international stage;
 – to reassure the Soviets.
All this was aimed at “donner du temps au temps,”16 in Mitterrand’s own 
words, in order to keep events under control and obtain the necessary commit-
ments from Bonn and Moscow, as well as all other involved countries. It is im-
portant to recall that this was a time in which the events both in Germany and 
Eastern Europe were exceptionally unpredictable. 
One point—a point that has been hotly debated since that time—must be 
emphasized. Nothing in diplomatic sources or in French public statements shows 
any attempt to stop German unification.17 On the contrary, unification was deemed 
inevitable, although no one knew the when and the how. France approved the 
successive moves forward, both within the contractual community and the project 
of “federal structures,” both of which the Ten Points had envisaged for binding 
the two German states together in the future until unification was achieved. Mit-
terrand—despite his real concerns about the pace of unification and the possibil-
ities for controlling it—reaffirmed on several occasions that France considered 
unification legitimate. But after the fall of the Wall, Mitterrand’s affirmations 
were aimed at keeping the issues raised by unification high on the agenda. This 
was the motivation for his visits to Kiev and the GDR.18
At the end of 1989, it seems that this strategy had borne some fruit:
 – France’s Western partners had also set conditions for unification;
 – the concerns of the Soviet Union had subsided, although it showed hostility 
toward any rash steps;
16 “Give time to time,” that is, do not rush and make the most of the time you are given. Mitterrand 
was well known for using this maxim.
17 The recent publication of the Thatcher–Mitterrand private talks—based on documents of Charles 
Powell and published by the Foreign Office—has not changed our point of view. As a matter 
of fact, Mitterrand repeated to the British prime minister that “we have to accept that there was 
a logic to reunification.” But, at the same time, these documents attest to the concerns of the 
French president. He said that “everything depended on the how and when, and on the reactions 
of the Soviet Union. Britain and France were arguing for caution. The trouble was that the 
West Germans did not want to hear this.” Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, and Stephen Robert 
Twigge, eds., Documents on British Policy Overseas III, vol. 7: German Unification 1989–1990 
(London: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 164–66, 215–19. The British papers about these talks are 
close to the French ones, which are already known; see for example Delamarre, La politique 
allemande de François Mitterrand, 46, 118. On this issue, see also Frédéric Bozo, “Thatcher’s 
European Delusions,” in Prospect, 30 November 2009 http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/
magazine/thatchers-european-delusions/ (accessed 19 October 2012). 
18 On Mitterrand’s trip to the GDR, see Christian Wenkel, Auf der Suche nach einem anderen 
Deutschland, Die Beziehungen Frankreichs zur DDR im Spannungsfeld von Perzeption und 
Diplomatie (Paris: Institut d’étude politique, 2008), 533 –50. See also the papers on the prepara-
tions for this trip: Archives nationales, 5AG4, CD (187).
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 – after the announcement of the Ten-Point Plan, the West German government 
displayed their caution by emphasizing the gradual character of the projected 
steps;
 – the debate concerning unification did not stop an agreement being made be-
tween France and the FRG on the EMU, which stood as a major success at 
the European Council in Strasbourg;
 – plans for a CSCE meeting, which would outline the future of all Europe, 
seemed well under way.
Paris was fully aware from the summer of 1989 that the situation in the GDR 
was deteriorating. But it still believed in the possibility of a mid-term develop-
ment, as confirmed by the talks that Mitterrand and Kohl held in Latche on 4 
January 1990, during which the German chancellor still mentioned a process that 
would last years.19
At this time, how did Paris envisage the timetable of future events? The president 
himself often mentioned publicly that “things move so fast, it is difficult to make 
predictions.”20 His advisors’ notes all mention the transitory character of the situa-
tion. However, in Paris, one was still thinking in terms of two or three years.21
Negotiating unification (January-October 1990)
As we have since seen, the timetable as imagined by the French, with unifi-
cation a mid-term process, was to be contradicted by events. By mid-January it 
became obvious that the unification process would be much faster. There were 
several signs supporting this:
 – the collapse of entire sectors of the GDR’s economy;
 – the increase in the number of demonstrations in the GDR;
 – the rescheduling of East German elections from May to March;
 – requests by the GDR for financial support from the FRG and the increase of 
joint projects;
 – the feeling that the Soviet Union had become aware that it could not stop 
unification, and that Gorbachev’s opposition was only temporary, or would in 
fact be used in future bargaining.22
19 On the 4 January meeting in Latche between Kohl and Mitterrand, see Delamarre, La politique 
allemande de François Mitterrand, 27–32, 47, 61, 80–82, 87–91, 145, 158.
20 The French president made this statement during a visit paid to the GDR. “Conférence de presse 
de Monsieur François Mitterrand, Président de la République, à l’issue de sa visite d’état en Ré-
publique démocratique allemande,” Berlin, 22 December 1989, in Archives IFM, fonds service de 
presse. On that visit and the French intentions, see Archives nationales 5AG4, CD (187), EG (204).
21 See, for example, the anonymous declarations of French advisors to the press during the visit of 
Mitterrand to Kiev on 6 December 1989. Archives IFM, fonds presse.
22 On these events, see Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
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It became clear that it had become too late to attempt to slow the pace of 
unification to a mid-term process. Nonetheless, it was necessary to ensure that 
French interests were taken into account. The Germans would have to make 
concrete decisions and not only verbal statements.
This diplomatic phase was to last from February 1990 until the following 
summer, when a climax was reached. Before analyzing the French position in 
detail, it is best to list chronologically the steps that were taken, as well as their 
underlying logic.23
With this acceleration of events, the French primarily feared unification being 
realized without an international framework in which France could advance its 
interests. It was therefore urgent to raise the process to an international level. 
Once this had been achieved, it would then be necessary to bring Germany and 
the Soviet Union to a negotiating table to discuss a number of issues.
The difficulties in the French position were the following:
 – How could France obtain the necessary concessions from the Germans without 
intimidating them at this crucial stage in their history, bearing in mind that 
German participation would be absolutely necessary in the future European 
order? This was particularly delicate because Bonn was reluctant to negotiate 
anything that might jeopardize its sovereignty, present or future.
 – How could concessions be obtained from the Soviets, while making sure that 
they would not feel isolated in the process?
 – How could France ensure that the unification process was accompanied by 
real progress regarding European integration, with the end of Germany’s par-
tition as part of a wider framework? Questions here included disarmament as 
well as the structure of the European Community.
As can be seen, in this phase of unification acceleration, the path for French 
diplomacy was quite narrow.
From February to April 1990, the French emphasized primarily the following:
A conference had to be summoned in which the four Allies of 1945 could agree on a diplomat-
ic settlement of the problems raised by German unification. Involving both German states, this 
was referred to as the Two Plus Four conference, as was suggested by the US administration 
based on a plan that had already been worked out in Paris political circles.24 An agreement 
reached by Kohl and Gorbachev on 10 February 1990 enabled the convening of such a confer-
ence. 
23 For the German unification talks discussed here, the author has used, in addition to the books 
mentioned above, the detailed account of Bertrand Dufourcq, who was the French negotiator 
and the head of the French delegation during the Two Plus Four negotiations. Bertrand Du-
fourcq, “2+4 ou la négociation atypique,” Politique étrangère 65, no. 2 (2000): 467–84, http://
www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/polit_0032-342x_2000_num_65_2_4952 
(last accessed 13 April 2010). His papers related to the talks have also been used: AMAE, Af-
faires stratégiques et désarmement (15–17); Archives nationales, 5AG4, CDM (34–36).
24 On the genesis of the conference from the French side, see, for example, Hubert Védrine, “Note 
pour le Président de la République,” 6 February 1990, in Archives nationales, 5AG4, EG (213).
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The French government had to make sure that definite commitments would be secured in the 
process, with legal writs by which all parties would have to abide. This process would have to 
be carried out at least as fast as the process of unifying the two German states.
This first stage ended more or less in April 1990, when the Quai d’Orsay and 
the Élysée judged their main objectives to have been reached. It remained to 
support West Germany in its approach toward the Soviet Union, and to make sure 
that the process was undertaken in accordance with the agreed decisions. On 22 
June 1990, Roland Dumas suggested that the final treaty be written down, in 
order to ensure that the conference taking place in Paris the next month, on 17 
July, would be a success.
In the course of these negotiations, the French had a number of concerns. The 
first was to ensure the democratic character of the self-determination of the Ger-
man people, which meant the freedom to vote in East Germany. The conditions 
and outcome of the East German elections on 18 March 1990 gave a clear signal 
on this point. In Paris, this was seen as another indication that unification would 
be undertaken quickly. Mitterrand’s response to the election results was: “Good 
luck Germany.”25 
The second concern regarded the peaceful character of the process. Paris 
wanted the Two Plus Four conference to deal with what it called the external 
issues of unification. The objective of the Quai d’Orsay was nothing less than to 
reach a global settlement for a unified Germany, a settlement that would leave 
no room for future political or judiciary claims. The following aspects had to be 
settled:
 – The future of international treaties involving the GDR and other countries;
 – Collective security measures that would guarantee peaceful unification (pro-
hibition of weapons of mass destruction [ABC weapons] in Germany, a lim-
itation on the size of the German military, etc.);
 – The end of quadripartite prerogatives (the status of Berlin, the 1951 Treaty of 
Paris, etc.);
 – The future of Soviet troops on East German territory;
 – The place of the future Germany in NATO, as well as within the European 
Community;
 – The future of French troops in Germany.
While these points were important, they were not a priority for France. For 
example, it was soon clear that the reunified Germany would not seek to acquire 
ABC weapons. And it also soon became clear that the West German decision to 
carry out unification by simply absorbing East Germany—in the end, a decision 
approved by the French—put an end to many legal issues.
25 In a message he sent to the Germans while dining with Václav Havel, who was in Paris at that 
time. “Allocution prononcée par Monsieur François Mitterrand, Président de la République, à 
l’occasion du dîner offert en l’honneur de Monsieur Vaclav Havel,” 19 March 1990, in Archives 
IFM, fonds service de presse. 
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The issues concerning military alliances were of course more tricky, but they 
also did not cause major difficulties, since it was commonly agreed in Paris at 
that time that the nature of these alliances was bound to evolve. Thus, although 
NATO membership of the future unified Germany was a prerequisite, the French 
government was able, without any difficulties, to support the various demilitariza-
tion projects in the ex-Eastern German territories.
Regarding collective security matters, the cornerstone for the French govern-
ment was the recognition by the reunified Germany of the Oder–Neisse border. 
The judiciary problems concerning the border are well known.26 In Paris—and 
particularly at the Élysée,27 where some leaflets from the German Christian Dem-
ocratic Union Party were circulated showing maps of Germany including former 
German territories in Poland28—the matter was carefully monitored. While Chan-
cellor Kohl always sought to reassure Mitterrand during their meetings that 
Germany would not claim these territories, his hesitation to make a public dec-
laration in this regard was a matter for concern.29 Paris felt it necessary to urge 
Bonn to clarify its position. For this reason, the French insisted on involving 
Poland at this stage in the negotiations, and to make sure that a border agreement 
was an integral part of the Two Plus Four Treaty. The French insistence on this 
point can certainly be seen as one reason for the chancellor’s actions in March–
April.30 It must be noted France did not suggest that the treaty be a written doc-
ument until the German parliaments had guaranteed that the border would be 
accepted.31
What was left at this stage was the issue of European unity. The French pri-
ority was to link the unification process with significant progress in the area of 
Community integration. German unification raised difficulties, which were soon 
identified in Paris as the following:
26 Jochen Abr. Frowein, “The Reunification of Germany,” The American Journal of International 
Law 86, no. 1 (1992): 155–57; Jochen Abr. Frowein, “Legal Problems of the German Ostpoli-
tik,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 23, no. 1 (1974): 105–26.
27 This particular issue has been described by Marion Delamarre as the feeling of “responsabilité 
historique” (historical responsibility) of the French president, a feeling that was confirmed by 
the private talks he had with several leaders, including Chancellor Kohl. Delamarre, La politique 
allemande de François Mitterrand, 50. 
28 Interviews with Roland Dumas, August 2000.
29 Indeed, the French authorities demanded a public statement from the chancellor, before the uni-
fication, as regard the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border. A statement that, from the French 
perspective, did not come easily.
30 Chancellor Kohl agreed in March with the adoption of a resolution on this issue in the Bunde-
stag. In April, substantial discussions began on the Oder-Neisse problem during the Two Plus 
Four negotiations. For a complete chronology on this point, see Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the 
Cold War, 222–33; Sarotte, 135–38.
31 On the Oder–Neisse issue and the French attitude, see Caroline de Margerie, “La Frontière Oder 
Neisse,” 27 August 1991, in Archives nationales, 5AG4, CDM (34). On the French–Polish talks 
on this issue, see Archives nationales, 5AG4 CD (358), CDM (34, 43).
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 – threats to the budgetary and political balance within the EEC;
 – questions about how to apply the acquis communautaire (the body of EEC 
laws) to the ex-GDR territories and how quickly;
 – how to ensure that the goal of a single market or the EMU was not delayed 
by the unification process.
In addition, the French government soon decided that the FRG should not be 
left alone to support the burden of unification, but that the EEC should play a role 
in the process. This would “Europeanize” the unification. Élisabeth Guigou, advi-
sor to the French president on European matters, wrote several memos in Febru-
ary–March 1990 on the subject of Europeanization.32 She emphasized the neces-
sity of linking the process of unification with an acceleration of European integra-
tion. According to her, this acceleration would not only allow immediate issues to 
be settled, it would also launch a new phase of integration. She believed that such 
acceleration could only occur if initiated by France and Germany, an initiative she 
therefore encouraged. This would stand as a test for Germany’s involvement in 
the Community. Its involvement had to be ambitious and not confined merely to 
the EMU. She called for a true European union and deeper political integration, 
something that the German chancellor had already claimed to desire.
This process, it is now acknowledged, began as early as March 1990, with its 
first concrete outcome being the sending on 18 April of the first Franco-German 
letter. This introduced a series of similar communiqués that were sent throughout 
the negotiations toward the Maastricht Treaty. On the German side, the intent of 
this initiative was to provide a clear signal for Germany’s commitment to the 
European Community. On the French side, the Mitterrand-Kohl communication 
addressed the EMU, but also the desire to build a genuine political union between 
the Community’s member states. Notably, this was to be achieved by working 
out a common foreign policy. This political initiative was confirmed by the close 
Franco-German cooperation at the European Councils of Dublin I and II in April 
and June 1990. Moreover, prior to the entry of ex-GDR territories into the EEC, 
the French proposals were to be applied: no Community projects were to be 
delayed, and the Community would play an active role in the unification process 
by means of its traditional intervention tools, such as structural funds. However, 
the acquis communautaire was not discussed on this occasion.
Thus, despite the repeated demands of France in the Two Plus Four process, 
the Franco-German couple managed to meet a joint agreement on the European 
re-launch. It was this second step—which was a priority for Paris, as has been 
mentioned above—that undoubtedly enabled political détente to be maintained. 
During this period of doubts and major upheavals, this was an absolute necessity.
In July 1990 there were again a few ups and downs before the Two Plus Four 
negotiations could be concluded. Before the finalization, the FRG had to be per-
32 On the European issues mentioned above, see Archives nationales, 5AG4, EG (212–214); inter-
views.
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suaded to commit itself to a number of points—for example, the renouncement 
of ABC weapons and the acceptance of the Oder–Neisse border—as written 
conditions prior to unification. However, a compromise was found for each of 
these points on the basis of French propositions. There were also last minute 
hesitations on the side of the Soviets. Here again, the French delegation acted as 
a catalyst, and one might say that the friendly relations between Roland Dumas 
and Hans Dietrich Genscher helped.33
Toward a new European balance?
The various treaties leading to German unification were signed and came into 
effect in the autumn of 1990. Paris considered its diplomacy to have been a suc-
cess. Indeed, the issues of the Oder–Neisse border and ABC weapons were set-
tled, and German unification had been linked to a European development process. 
It must be emphasized that nothing in the treaties obstructed a future Europe-
an defense policy. This point is of some significance and echoes the French 
global strategy regarding the future organization of the European continent. We 
shall look at this in some detail below in the conclusion.
In this period, which today all analysts see as having been historically mo-
mentous, Mitterrand was, as is usual in such circumstances, of two minds. As a 
political leader, he voiced his enthusiasm for the return of freedom in Eastern 
Europe and his hopes for the end of the Cold War. But as the president of the 
French Republic, he was primarily concerned with protecting French interests in 
a period that, in his view, was full of dangers. He stated this clearly to his close 
circle and during private talks: Europe was in the same situation as it had been 
in 1913. He was fully aware that the collapse of the Eastern bloc heralded the 
return of many disparate nations, a fact that was linked to many potential risks. 
As he underlined in his farewell speech before the European Parliament in 1994, 
to him “nationalism means war.”34
In this matter, the German Question was of course highly significant. A unified 
Germany would lie at the heart of the future Europe. But in the end, it was only 
ancillary. What mattered more was to quickly reach a new European balance, 
33 Bertrand Dufourcq has stated that in September 1990, in the last days of the Two Plus Four 
negotiations, the discussions could have failed over the question of the possibility, or not, of 
NATO forces training on the territories of the former GDR. Following final negotiations in 
plenary, Roland Dumas, who presided, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher then made a common plea 
for a solution that could finally be adopted even by the Soviets. On the final talks, see Dufourcq, 
“2+4 ou la négociation atypique”; interviews.
34 “Discours prononcé par Monsieur François Mitterrand, Président de la République, à l’occasion 
de la présentation du programme de la présidence française de l’Union européenne au Parlement 
européen. Strasbourg,” 17 January 1995, in Archives IFM, fonds service de presse.
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based on democracy on one hand, but also on institutional organizations of co-
operation and solidarity between the old nations of the continent.
This is why the importance bestowed on the Oder–Neisse border issue by the 
French president—as well as his entire diplomatic staff—was significant. Freez-
ing this border stopped a Pandora’s Box of European minorities from being 
opened. One might recall that the problem of the Oder–Neisse border was long 
a concern for Mitterrand: the fact that it would be an important factor in a unifi-
cation process was publicly voiced by Mitterrand as early as 1969.35
This is why the European Community was so important: It was to stabilize 
the future of Europe. However, to Mitterrand’s mind, the European Community, 
as well as the planned union, was not quite ready to expand to the Eastern Euro-
pean countries, insofar as they were not in a position to enforce the acquis com-
munautaire. Thus, on 31 December 1989 Mitterrand suggested that a European 
confederation be set up that would provide a formal framework for the relations 
between Eastern and Western states and ease their coming closer.36
This desire to stabilize the continent can also be seen in the relations between 
France and the Soviet Union becoming closer. It was of utmost importance at the 
Élysée that these events should, on no occasion, be presented as a victory of the 
West over the East. On the contrary: the Soviet Union—whose evolution under 
Gorbachev’s leadership was expected—should not feel threatened by the new 
European balance in the least. This was the reason for a series of comforting 
gestures towards Moscow during this period. These were then finalized by the 
conclusion of a new Franco-Soviet treaty of cooperation in late October 1990.37
To support the Soviet Union, it was crucial to break its isolation. In this, the 
French and the Germans finally acted together. As a matter of fact, Moscow held 
many keys to the situation, both for European organization as well as for German 
unification. Thus, from the summer of 1990, Paris and Bonn cooperated to pro-
vide significant financial support to the Soviet Union. In Bonn, this was done by 
providing payments and loans. For Paris, the primary goal was to demonstrate 
that the German unification process was basically a European process—as seen 
by the Community’s support—and not opposed to Soviet interests. It was for this 
reason that, during the 1990 Houston G7 Summit, Kohl and Mitterrand attempt-
ed to get support for the Soviet Union from the Western world as a whole. And 
in order to prevent a destabilization of the Kremlin at a crucial moment in these 
35 See for example his statement when he led the Convention des institutions républicaines, in 
Archives IFM, FM-001 (75); interviews.
36 On the European confederation project, see Frédéric Bozo, “The Failure of a Grand Design: 
Mitterrand’s European Confederation, 1989–1991,” Contemporary European History 17, no. 3 
(2008): 391–412.
37 On the French policy toward the USSR during that period, see Marie Pierre Rey, “Gorbatchev 
et la Maison commune européenne, une opportunité manquée?” La Lettre de l’Institut François 
Mitterrand, no. 19 (2007): 12–17. See also idem, “Europe is our Common Home: A Study of 
Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept,” Cold War History 4, no. 2 (2004): 33–66.
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negotiations, Paris and Bonn worked together to calm down the national inde-
pendence movement in Lithuania. In April 1990, a joint letter was sent to Vytau-
tas Landsbergis, the movement’s leader.
This desire to give a formal framework to future cooperation at a European 
level also influenced the French insistence on summoning a major Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting. Here again, the idea—
as in the case of the European confederation—was to create appropriate structures 
of cooperation necessary for the common security in the post–Cold War era. 
Paris had been working on this project since November 1989. At the start, this 
meant finding an institutional framework that was able to manage the unification 
process. But once the Two Plus Four conference was convened, the idea was to 
get the CSCE to agree on a genuine decree that would end the Cold War. This 
was to be the Paris Charter, which was adopted by the CSCE’s 35 members in 
November 1990. The objective of the Charter was, on one hand, to consecrate 
the democratic model as the only model of government and, on the other hand, 
to create a formal institution in the field of security that would render conflict 
impossible. In other words, the Paris Charter was to be a “détente” treaty paving 
the way for disarmament in a unified Europe.
One more aspect must be considered, namely France’s view38 of the future of 
NATO. One must recall that at this time, relations were excellent between Mit-
terrand and George H.W. Bush.39 Several meetings took place at the end of 1989 
and in early 1990. This does not mean, however, that there were no political 
differences.
To understand these differences, one must consider various factors. At first, 
Paris deemed the continuity of NATO necessary in this period of great transition 
in Europe. It was also thought that a unified Germany should set up a defense 
policy in a wider framework. Insofar as a general European defense strategy was 
only a plan at this stage, it was thought that Germany should remain part of 
NATO. Later Paris believed that the ending of the Cold War would lead the Unit-
ed States to distancing itself from Europe, which in turn would lead to the end 
of the guarantee offered by the alliance. The role of NATO could only evolve. In 
fact, the evolution of NATO was a key element in the negotiations of 1990. It 
was thought that the Soviet Union would be more willing to accept the changes 
occurring in the East, as well as German unification and the integration of West-
ern Europe, if at the same time the Atlantic alliance were to change its outlook.
The Bush administration let Paris know as early as spring 1990 that they were 
looking for a new thrust for NATO and asked Paris for advice. Very soon it ap-
peared that the US project was, in fact, a plan aimed at extending the NATO 
missions beyond their traditional field of competency. This was something that 
38 On the issue of NATO, see Frédéric Bozo, “‘Winners’ and ‘Losers’: France, the United States, 
and the End of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 5 (2009): 927–56.
39 See, for example, their private talks in late 1989, in Archives nationales, 5AG4, CD (74, 266).
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French diplomacy had always opposed. Paris was thus confronted with a problem: 
it was opposed to this US project, but at the same time was in favor of a revital-
ization of NATO. In fact, the French ambition was to introduce a reference to a 
future European defense structure within the formal framework of the alliance. 
Although, as mentioned above, the German unification treaties did not contain 
any clauses hindering such a structure in the future, in 1990 it was too early for 
this. The Quai d’Orsay saw that its other European partners were against any 
plans of this sort. Thus, this became an indecisive period with regard to NATO, 
in spite of a few aborted attempts at negotiation and the attempt at reinforcing 
the European defense, e.g. the talks for the Maastricht treaty.
To conclude, Mitterrand’s policies to deal with the revolutions of 1989 fol-
lowed a clear line, a line that unified and linked his various projects. He sought 
a unified Europe as well as a Europe that was self-supporting and based on in-
ternational institutions. But above all, he sought a Europe that was democratic 
and peaceful.
France, the East European Revolutions and the Reunification of Germany

a n T o n i o  v a r s o r i
ITALY, THE EAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, 
AND THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY, 1989–92
Despite the fact that two decades have elapsed since the outbreak of the “clean 
hands” scandal, it is still a difficult task to deal in a balanced way and with a 
historical perspective with the policies pursued by the Italian cabinets between 
the early 1980s and the early 1990s, the decade in Italy that was characterized by 
the so-called five-party coalition governments (pentapartito) and dominated by 
political personalities such as Bettino Craxi, Giulio Andreotti, Arnaldo Forlani, 
and Giovanni Spadolini. Studying Italy’s foreign policy in this period is not an 
exception to this murky picture. As far as public opinion in this period is con-
cerned, it seems that, after some first reactions to the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of communism, most Italians focused less on international affairs and 
more on the internal events that led to the setting up of the so-called Second 
Republic. While a certain amount of scholarly research has been begun by histo-
rians,1 such attempts face serious obstacles: on one hand, the almost complete 
lack of archival sources, and on the other, a sort of damnatio memoriae that ap-
pears to have affected most of the politicians who played a leading role in those 
years, especially the members of the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista 
Italiano) and the Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana). In the early 
1990s, members of both parties became the target of judges’ inquiries and wide-
spread hostility in the media, both press and television. This played an important 
role in destroying an entire political class.2
If one examines Italy’s foreign policy between the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the Maastricht Treaty—the period that marked the most dramatic changes in 
Europe in the second half of the twentieth century—one encounters similar dif-
ficulties as a historian: once again the lack of archival records in this regard is a 
major obstacle. This is still the case despite the fact that Andreotti published 
several volumes of memoirs a few years ago and Gianni De Michelis published 
a long interview in which one section deals with his experiences as foreign min-
1 See for example Ennio Di Nolfo, ed., La politica estera italiana degli anni Ottanta (Manduria: 
Lacaita, 2003); Simona Colarizi, Paolo Craveri, Silvio Pons, and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds., 
Gli anni Ottanta come storia (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004).
2 Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni, La cruna dell’ago. Craxi, il Partito socialista e la crisi 
della Repubblica (Rome, Bari: Laterza, 2005); Stefano Rolando, Una voce poco fa. Politica, 
comunicazione e media nella vicenda del Partito Socialista Italianodal 1976 al 1994 (Venice: 
Marsilio, 2009).
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ister between July 1989 and June 1992.3 However, in the last few years some new 
archival sources have become available, owing especially to the decision by 
former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to open his private archives to scholars.4
During the period from the early 1980s to the early 1990s Italy’s foreign pol-
icy actually experienced an unusual continuity. Giulio Andreotti was foreign 
minister from 1983 to 1989; when in late July 1989 the Christian Democrat 
leader became prime minister, he appointed Gianni De Michelis as head of the 
Farnesina, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Andreotti’s government would last 
until the eruption of the “clean hands” scandal in the late spring of 1992. Thus, 
it was Andreotti’s cabinet that dealt with all the relevant events of those years, 
including the fall of the Berlin Wall, the revolutions in East-Central Europe, 
German reunification, the negotiations that led to the Maastricht Treaty, the first 
Iraq war, the end of the Soviet Union, the implosion of Yugoslavia, etc. In spite 
of the fact that a number of other issues, including problems in the Middle East 
and US–USSR relations, played a relevant part in Italy’s international agenda, 
the dramatic events taking place on the European continent and the fact that the 
end of the Cold War was mainly a European affair gave the Italian political lead-
ership the quite obvious choice of focusing its attention on the nation’s attitude 
toward the new European balance emerging from the ruins of the communist 
system. This was also a consequence of the significant role the Italian Communist 
Party had played since the 1940s in the history of the Italian Republic.5 Together, 
Andreotti and De Michelis played an important role in shaping Italy’s foreign 
policy during this crucial decade. 
The well-known political figure of Prime Minister Andreotti characterized 
nearly half a century of Italian political history. He entered the Italian political 
scene in the immediate postwar period as an under-secretary in an early De Gas-
peri cabinet, then became one of the leading members of the Christian Democrats, 
and on several occasions he was Italy’s prime minister. It should be mentioned 
that he led a so-called national unity government between 1978 and 1979, a cab-
inet that was supported by the Italian Communist Party (PCI). It was this cabinet 
that had to face one of the most serious crises in Italian postwar history, the 
kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, a leading Christian Democrat who had 
3 Giulio Andreotti, De (prima) republica: ricordi (Milan: Rizzoli, 1996); Gianni De Michelis, La 
lunga ombra di Yalta. La specificità della politica italiana (Venice: Marsilio, 2003).
4 The Andreotti archives are kept at the Luigi Sturzo Institute in Rome. The author would like 
to thank Senator Giulio Andreotti for permission to examine his private papers, as well as the 
Luigi Sturzo Institute in Rome. In this connection, he would like to express his gratitude to Dr. 
Flavia Nardelli, former secretary general of the Sturzo Institute, and Dr. Luciana Devoti, chief 
archivist, for their precious help. Cf. Antonio Varsori, L’Italia e la fine della guerra fredda: La 
politica estera dei governi Andreotti 1989–1992 (Bologna: il Mulino, 2013).  
5 For an overview, see Lucio Caracciolo, “L’Italia alla ricerca di se stessa,” in Giovanni Sabba-
tucci and Vittorio Vidotto, eds., Storia d’Italia, vol. 6, L’Italia contemporanea (Rome, Bari: 
Laterza, 1999), 541–604.
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advocated the forming of the compromise with the communists. Later Andreotti 
was a leading member of the so-called five-party coalition, and during the second 
half of the 1980s, held the post of foreign minister in various governments. In 
1989 he was once again appointed prime minister.6 
De Michelis is perhaps less well known to the wider international public, but 
he held a significant role as well. When De Michelis became foreign minister, he 
was one of the leading representatives of the Italian Socialist Party of the Craxi 
era. De Michelis, a member of a distinguished Venetian family—his brother was 
long the owner of a flourishing publishing house—started his career as a scholar. 
He became an associate professor of chemistry at the University of Venice, but 
very early became involved in politics at a local level. He was an outstanding 
representative of the Socialist Party in the Veneto region, which between the 1970s 
and the 1980s emerged as one of the most economically dynamic and wealthiest 
areas in Italy.7 During the 1980s, De Michelis was the deputy-secretary of the 
Socialist Party, concurrently between 1980 and 1983 he was the minister for state 
industry, between 1983 and 1987 the minister of labor, and between 1988 and 1989 
deputy-prime minister. Two British political scientists, Kenneth Dyson and Kevin 
Featherstone, have sketched the following portrait: “De Michelis […] was an in-
telligent, loquacious bon vivant, liable to pursue grand political gestures [… he] 
was an unusually assertive foreign minister by the standards of his predecessors.”8
Dyson and Featherston, who have focused their attention on the creation of 
the European Monetary Union, are two of the very few foreign scholars to have 
dealt extensively with Italy’s foreign policy between the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the Maastricht Treaty, at least as far as the negotiations at the basis of the 
EMU are concerned. Most other foreign historians and witnesses have usually 
underrated Italy’s position in these years, also as far the European construction 
and the setting up of a post–Cold War European balance are concerned. A few 
examples can give an impression of this attitude. In his volume dealing with 
Mitterrand’s foreign policy, of Italian leaders, Hubert Vedrine quotes only And-
reotti, and that very few times.9 In Hans Stark’s study on Kohl’s European policy 
there is no reference to the Italian leaders with the exception of Emilio Colombo, 
mainly with regard to the Colombo-Genscher declaration.10 In her memoirs, as 
6 See Massimo Franco, Andreotti. La vita di un uomo politico, la storia di un’epoca (Milan: Mon-
dadori, 2010).
7 Carlo Fumian and Angelo Ventura, Storia del Veneto, vol. 2, Dal seicento a oggi (Rome, Bari: 
Laterza, 2004).
8 Kenneth Dyson and Keith Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 494.
9 Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de François Mitterrand. A l’Elysée 1981–1995 (Paris: Fayard, 
1996). The same under-evaluation is found in the memoirs by Roland Dumas, Affaires En-
trangéres, vol. 1, 1981–1987 (Paris: Fayard, 2007).
10 Hans Stark, Kohl, l’Allemagne et l’Europe. La politique d’intégration européenne de la Répub-
lique fédèrale 1982–1988 (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2004).
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far as the Maastricht Treaty negotiations are concerned, Margaret Thatcher only 
remembers Italy’s role in relation to the Rome European Council held in October 
1990, writing: “As always with the Italians, it was difficult throughout to distin-
guish confusion from guile, but plenty of both was evident.”11 In his detailed study 
on Mitterrand and the German reunification, based mainly on French archival 
sources, Frédéric Bozo makes some interesting remarks about Italy’s position, 
although in his analysis Rome’s policies seem to have played a minor role. With 
regard to De Michelis’ policies, Bozo has focused his attention on the joint An-
glo-Italian statement regarding the hypothesis of the close ties between the West-
ern European Union and NATO; in this connection the French author appears to 
regard this initiative as a failure that led to a closer French-German “rapproche-
ment.”12 Indeed, this widespread underrating of Italy’s international role is a 
common feature in most foreign scholars’ studies dealing with European affairs, 
at least with regard to the Cold War and the integration process. But this is a 
complex issue to which we will turn our attention in this paper’s conclusion.13
Italy’s early reactions to Europe’s changing balance
When the Andreotti government was appointed in late July 1989, a number of 
relevant changes were already taking place in the Soviet bloc, mainly as a con-
sequence of glasnost and perestroika but also due to the crisis of the Soviet 
system: In Poland the communist régime was trying to work out a compromise 
with the opposition. At the same time, thousands of East Germans were leaving 
to spend their holidays in Hungary, holidays that were going to become the first 
step in their escape to the West. Nevertheless, very few statesmen or political 
commentators were able to predict what was then to happen a few months later. 
In the Western political scenario, Italy was not an exception. 
On the occasion of a speech he gave at the Italian Parliament in July 1989, 
the new foreign minister De Michelis seems to have realized that relevant chang-
es were going to shape a new international balance, especially in Europe, and he 
tried to develop a broader view of Italy’s role in the international arena. He argued 
that Italy had always focused its attention on three geographical areas: Western 
Europe, East-Central Europe and the Mediterranean/Middle East. In the foreign 
minister’s interpretation, the Cold War had denied Italy the opportunity to devel-
op an effective policy toward East-Central Europe and there had been several 
obstacles to Italy’s Mediterranean ambitions. Thus, from the late 1940s onward 
11 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 765.
12 Fréderic Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande (Paris: Odile 
Jacob, 2005), 317–18.
13 On these aspects, see the introduction in Antonio Varsori, La Cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e 
l’integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010), 1–27.
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the only theater open to Italy’s initiatives was the Western European one, a fact 
that had mainly resulted in Italy’s deep involvement in the integration process. 
But in De Michelis’ opinion, the sudden dramatic developments that were taking 
place in the Soviet bloc were going to change the European balance and offer 
Italy a precious opportunity, especially in East-Central Europe.14 During the pre-
vious years, Italy had focused its attention on the possibility of closer relations 
with Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, a policy, however, that had raised a number of 
doubts and debates.15 The new foreign minister did not ignore Moscow’s position 
but he was eager to launch a new initiative. Also as a consequence of his political 
experience as a major local politician, De Michelis had already shown some in-
terest in creating relations with Italy’s northeastern neighbors. 
His first venture was a meeting in Venice with his Yugoslav colleague Budimir 
Lončar. A few months later there was follow-up meeting in Umag on the Istrian 
coast. On this occasion the two governments launched a plan to create a cooper-
ation agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia; this was to be a preliminary step 
towards a four-power (Italy, Yugoslavia, Austria and Hungary) organization. The 
quadrangolare was to promote political, economic and cultural cooperation, a 
plan aimed both at overcoming the division between East and West in the Adri-
atic region and at strengthening an already shaky Yugoslav state.16 In this context 
Italy was obviously a senior partner. Projects of this type were not new to Italian 
diplomacy.  Indeed, after the end of World War I, under both the Liberal govern-
ments and the Fascist régime, although in different ways, Italy had always aimed 
at becoming the leading power in the Adriatic and the Balkans. Such interests 
had been revived from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s owing mainly to the 
growing economic links between northeastern Italy and certain parts of Yugosla-
via and Austria. Despite these first steps, however, in the first months of the 
Andreotti government a more urgent question appeared that caused a quick shift 
in Italy’s attention: the sudden collapse of the German Democratic Republic.
Italy and German reunification: advocating the European solution
The changing balance in Europe was a quicker development than most poli-
ticians in both East and West had foreseen. In November the Western leaders were 
confronted with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the possibility of a quick German 
reunification. Almost immediately these developments were linked to the integra-
14 De Michelis, La lunga ombra, 94–95.
15 The Italian Ambassador to Moscow, Sergio Romano, resigned from his office as a consequence 
of disagreements with the De Mita government on Italy’s policy towards the Soviet Union. Ro-
mano had no confidence in Gorbachev’s ability to achieve his planned reforms.
16 Italian Foreign Ministry (Rome) to various Italian embassies, 16 November 1989, in Luigi Stur-
zo Institute (hereafter ILS), Andreotti Papers (hereafter AP), box 382, tel.
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tion process, since in the same period the European Community was dealing with 
Delors’ ambitious project of creating an economic and monetary union. The 
Italian government was also compelled to focus its attention on what was hap-
pening in Germany. At an early stage, Prime Minister Andreotti appeared to share 
the doubts and fears that were being nurtured in Paris and in London about the 
creation of a new powerful Germany that would be less interested in European 
construction and more attracted by its traditional Sonderweg. In a public speech 
a few years earlier, Andreotti had stated half-jokingly, half seriously, that he loved 
Germany so much, two German states were better than one. At that time this 
statement had raised a sharp reaction and harsh criticism on the part of the West 
German authorities and press.17 Although most likely meant primarily as a joke, 
it nonetheless mirrored the feelings in some Italian political and diplomatic cir-
cles. In the Italian decision-makers’ opinion, the postwar Western European 
balance had always been based on a cohesive group of four “big” countries that 
were roughly on equal footing, of which Italy felt it was one.18 Moreover, the 
legacy of the past had not been forgotten and thus it is not surprising that in 
December 1989, the Italian secret service sent a detailed memorandum to And-
reotti about the presence of pan-German and neo-Nazi movements in Germany 
as well as in certain East-Central European countries.19
In spite of these traditional fears, Italy’s political elite could not ignore the 
fact that in the Italian public opinion, the fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to be 
viewed as a very positive event and German reunification an almost obvious 
consequence.20 The Italian leadership realized very early that hindering Germa-
ny’s quick reunification would be an impossible task: the only choice that would 
safeguard Italy’s interests would be to create a close link between a reunified 
Germany and the existing Western structures, especially the Atlantic Alliance and 
the European Community. On 8–9 December 1989 there was a meeting of the 
leaders of the European Community in Strasbourg. On this occasion Chancellor 
Kohl pleaded for European support for his Ten-Point Plan, which aimed at a quick 
reunification. In De Michelis’ recollection of this episode, most of the European 
leaders seemed to oppose Kohl’s plan, but De Michelis and his diplomatic advi-
sor, Ambassador Silvio Fagiolo, suggested that Andreotti take a more flexible 
17 Ferraris (Bonn) to the Italian Foreign Ministry, strictly confidential, 14 September 1984, in ILS, 
AP, box 458, tel. no. 1518. The German state secretary for foreign affairs summoned the Italian 
ambassador and criticized Andreotti’s statement severely.
18 On Andreotti’s reaction to West Germany’s critical remarks, see letter Andreotti to Pertini, 17 
September 1984, in ILS, AP, box 458. Andreotti explained to the Italian president that he had only 
taken into consideration the existing situation, which stressed the existence of two German states.
19 Memorandum CESIS (Comitato Esecutivo per i servizi di informazione e di sicurezza) to And-
reotti, “Prospettive di riunificazione delle due Germanie: eventuali ritorni nazionalistici e pan-
germanici,” strictly confidential, 15 December 1989, in ILS, AP, box. 458.
20 On the relationship between Italy and Germany see Gian Enrico Rusconi, Germania Italia Eu-
ropa. Dallo stato di Potenza alla “potenza civile” (Turin: Einaudi, 2003).
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attitude and make a statement indicating that the European Community favored 
German reunification. This statement was very vague, but in De Michelis’ opin-
ion, it helped the German chancellor and prevailed over the tougher position of 
other European leaders, thus opening the way to Kohl’s reunification policy. It is 
difficult to argue whether this Italian initiative was indeed relevant, since other 
sources do not mention Andreotti’s role at the Paris meeting.21 Nonetheless, his 
position expressed Italy’s main goal as far as the issue of German reunification 
was concerned: overseeing the reunification process and linking Germany to the 
European Community and NATO. 
Despite Italy’s interest in being party to the negotiations on Germany’s future, 
however, from very early the issue of reunification was to involve only the four 
victorious powers of World War II (the United States, the USSR, Great Britain and 
France) together with the two German states. Thus, Italy’s ambitions seemed to 
have been utterly frustrated. De Michelis repeated Italy’s demands in February 
1990 on the occasion of the Open Skies conference held in Ottawa, but the German 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher replied curtly: “You are not part of the 
game.”22 Italy was thus excluded from the diplomatic process that would lead to 
Germany’s reunification as well as to the new European balance that emerged not 
only due to the fall of the Berlin Wall, but also as a consequence of the end of the 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe. However once again, as on several occa-
sions in the past, the European integration process and NATO—in particular, the 
bilateral link between Washington and Rome—offered Italy an opportunity to 
overcome its traditional weaknesses. In February, Andreotti met Kohl in Pisa and 
explained Italy’s position to the German chancellor; the West German reaction 
seemed quite forthcoming.23 Later there were a number of meetings between Ital-
ian diplomats and US representatives, whereby the latter appeared eager to reas-
sure the Italian government concerning Italy’s role in the new balance emerging 
in Europe, especially through Rome’s role in the Atlantic alliance.24
In spring 1990, Mitterrand and Kohl decided that a deepening of European 
political integration was the best way to achieve Germany’s reunification without 
too many fears being raised of a “fourth” German Reich. At the European Coun-
cil held in Dublin in April 1990, this goal was singled out by the EC-twelve. The 
political aspects of the integration process were clearly linked to Delors’ project 
on an economic and monetary union. In the Irish capital, Italy supported the 
acceleration of the integration process and the link between a deeper political 
21 See in general Bozo, Mitterand.
22 Bozo, Mitterand, 193.
23 Cossiga to Andreotti, 19 February 1990; and Andreotti to Cossiga, 19 February 1990, in ILS, AP, 
box 458.
24 Baker (Washington) to De Michelis, 20 February 1990; De Michelis to Baker, 24 February 1990 
and note by the Italian Foreign Ministry, 3 March 1990, secret, in ILS, AP, box 458. The US 
authorities appeared to be interested in involving Italy in some of NATO’s initiatives dealing 
with the process of German reunification.
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integration and the setting up of a monetary union.25 In this same period, the 
Italian Foreign Ministry was analyzing the dramatic events that were unfolding 
in East-Central Europe. Although the Italian authorities obviously welcomed the 
democratization process, they appeared worried that the changes in the European 
balance were moving ahead too rapidly, since they seemed very concerned about 
the Soviet Union’s reaction. Italy thought that in order to avoid too many suspi-
cions being raised in Moscow, a cautious policy based mainly on Western eco-
nomic and technical aid was the best solution to the problems related to the fall 
of communism in East-Central Europe.26
European integration and the fact that Italy was to chair the European Com-
munity during the second half of 1990 appeared to offer Italy a precious chance 
to recover its part in the game, especially as far German reunification was con-
cerned. Both in his book La lunga ombra di Yalta and in a number of articles, 
De Michelis has emphasized Italy’s ambitions, stressing that he was helped 
greatly in his task by a small team of experienced diplomats, including Silvio 
Fagiolo, Rocco Cangelosi and Pietro Calamia, who played important roles. At the 
Dublin European Council the Italian foreign minister advocated the convening of 
an intergovernmental conference to deal with the issue of political integration and 
stressed that it was important to achieve both the goal of a closer political union 
and of an economic and monetary union.27 The Italian authorities regarded prog-
ress in political integration a paramount goal, since in their opinion achieving this 
would avoid a group of leading nations, a “directorate,” being set up in the Eu-
ropean Community, something that would threaten Italy’s international position.28 
Nonetheless, while the political aspects of the integration process were very 
relevant to the Italian government, in the opinion of the Italian authorities econom-
ic issues were just as important as political ones. Despite internal problems, Italy 
was trying to be deeply involved in the strategies for realizing the EMU. In this 
connection a few Italian top officials, including Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, were 
cooperating closely with Jacques Delors in developing the European common cur-
rency project.29 The treasury minister, Guido Carli, and the governor of the Bank 
of Italy, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, also shared Delors’ views, and not only because of 
the EMU’s international significance. They hoped that the creation of the EMU 
would offer Italy the chance to force the political elites to implement healthier 
economic policies; in early 1990, as an example of Italy’s faith in these policies, 
25 See for example Note by the Italian Foreign Ministry to the President of the Council, 27 April 
1990, in ILS, AP, box 382.
26 Memorandum, Italian Foreign Ministry “Sviluppi nei paesi dell’Europa centro-orientale,” 18 
April 1990, in ILS, AP, box 382.
27 Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, Manuale della politica estera italiana 1947–1993 (Rome, Bari: Laterza, 
2003), 403.
28 See memorandum Guidi (Bonn) to De Michelis (Rome), 8 May 1990, in ILS, AP, box 458.
29 Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, La lunga via per l’euro (Bologna: il Mulino, 2004).
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the lira had joined the narrow band of the European Monetary System (EMS), a 
position similar to the one enjoyed by other stronger European currencies.30
During the Italian EC presidency in the second half of 1990 two important 
European Councils were held. The first was an extraordinary session convened 
in Rome in late October, the second was held in the Italian capital in December. 
During this period, Italy’s European policy was harshly criticized by a number 
of international commentators, especially in Britain, where The Economist stated 
that the Italian presidency was similar to a coach whose drivers were the Marx 
brothers. It was also criticized that at the October Council the various issues on 
the agenda had not been dealt with effectively enough or in detail. The British 
prime minister wrote that she was puzzled at the closing statement concerning 
the development of closer forms of political integration.31 Actually Italy’s strate-
gy was clear: it was Rome’s intention to intertwine political and economic inte-
gration closely, since this would peacefully solve the problem of the European 
role of a reunified Germany. At the same time the Italian government was well 
aware of both the difficulties and interests this held for Italy. In September, ac-
cording to De Michelis’ memoirs, he had a secret meeting with Delors at the 
Argentario, a Tuscan seaside resort. On this occasion, the two politicians sketched 
out the document that the Italian government then put forward at the Rome ex-
traordinary European Council. In De Michelis’ opinion, this document combined 
the two traditional approaches to the European construction: on one hand the 
federalist ideal, and on the other, intergovernmental pragmatism.32 Mitterrand’s 
and Kohl’s position at the Rome Council seemed to imply that Italy’s policy 
enjoyed the support of both Germany and France. Although any progress was 
impossible without Kohl’s and Mitterrand’s approval, Italy was able to play a role 
in the process, and the convening of these two intergovernmental conferences, 
the former on the political union, the latter on the EMU, can be regarded as an 
Italian political achievement. Moreover, this diplomatic success was achieved in 
the midst of a serious international crisis, namely, Kuwait’s invasion by Saddam 
Husein’s Iraq. This crisis caused serious difficulties to the Andreotti government 
due to widespread pacifist feelings in Italy, supported in part by the Holy See and 
Catholic circles and widely exploited by the former Communist Party.33
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to deal with Italy’s position at these two 
intergovernmental conferences in detail,34 so our attention will focus on a few 
30 On this issue, see Antonio Varsori, La Cenerentola, 353–74; see also Paolo Craveri, ed., Guido 
Carli senator e ministro del Tesoro 1983–1992 (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2009).
31 Thatcher, Downing Street, 764–67.
32 De Michelis, La lunga ombra, 141.
33 The Italian Government was also very worried about the economic consequences of the Gulf 
crisis; see note for the Minister by the Italian Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1990, in ILS, AP, box 
383. Thus, in the early stages they favored a diplomatic solution of the crisis.
34 For a detailed analysis of the two conferences, see Bozo, Mitterand; Colette Mazzucelli, France 
and Germany at Maastricht. Politics and Negotiations to create the European Union (New 
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major aspects. Despite what is usually stated, it is likely that Italy was more inter-
ested in the EMU negotiations, and thus the outcome of the political union con-
ference was also linked to these economic issues. De Michelis stated in an inter-
view that Andreotti and the Farnesina were aware of the importance of the EMU, 
not only for the Community’s and Europe’s future, but also for Italy’s internation-
al position as well as its economy in the post–Cold War European balance, a 
balance that would be dominated by a reunified Germany. Italy aimed at being 
recognized as a member of the “first division” in the future EMU, as this would 
be important from both a political standpoint and an economic one—the important 
lesson of Italy’s participation in the EMS in 1978 had not been forgotten in Rome.35 
But the Italian economic situation posed serious obstacles for achieving this goal. 
This is why Italy clearly favored forms of closer integration, that is, the creation 
of a common European currency and definite rules to be administered by a su-
pra-national body. Last but not least, the Italian leaders were aware that some 
European partners, in particular Germany, nurtured doubts concerning Italy’s role 
in a future EMU that would have the deutsche mark and the Bundesbank’s strict 
rules as its point of reference. Despite these difficulties, Andreotti and De Miche-
lis relied on the experience and prestige enjoyed by the treasury minister, Carli, 
and a group of technocrats tied to the Bank of Italy who were well known in in-
ternational financial circles (Ciampi, Padoa Schioppa, Draghi, etc.). 
Italy’s attention focused on the so-called convergence criteria.36 Italy was able 
to achieve a few goals: the convergence criteria were not part of the treaty, so the 
Community could interpret them without changing the treaty. These criteria of-
fered maneuvering room for economically weak countries. This included the 
public debt ratio not exceeding 60 percent of the GNP, whereby what mattered 
was progressing toward a decrease in debt, not achieving the final goal. Moreover, 
Italy played a role in singling out a definite date for the final implementation of 
the so-called stage three of the EMU,37 a decision that would tie the member 
states, especially Germany, to the implementation of the EMU and the creation 
of the euro. And finally, the “tier” system offered Italy further room for maneu-
vering, since it provided steps in the longer process. If a country was unable to 
reach the scheduled agenda of “stage two,” it would be possible to reach a favor-
able position later on. Obviously the Italian authorities were aware that they 
York, London: Garland, 1997); Stark, Kohl; Dyson and Featherstone, Road. With the exception 
of the two British authors in these volumes, there are few references to Italy’s position, although 
the attention is focussed on France and Germany, and, to a minor extent on Britain. A few im-
portant documents are available in AP. On Italy’s position, see Antonio Varsori, “The Andreotti 
Governments and the Maastricht Treaty: Between European Hopes and Domestic Constraints,” 
Journal of European Integration History 19, no. 1 (2013): 23–44. 
35 On this episode, see Varsori, La Cenerentola, 314–30.
36 As far as these aspects are concerned, see Dyson and Featherstone, Road; Padoa Schioppa, Lun-
ga via. See moreover Guido Carli, Cinquant’anni di vita italiana (Rome, Bari: Laterza, 1993).
37 See De Michelis, La lunga ombra.
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would have to deal with the country’s economic problems in the near future, but 
they hoped that, as had happened at the time of the EMS, the vincolo esterno 
(external obligations) would help the political elite and the Bank of Italy to con-
vince the public of the need for strict—and unpopular—economic policies.38
As far as the political union was concerned, De Michelis and Andreotti sup-
ported Italy’s traditional federalist approach. However, it is open to question 
whether on several occasions Italy merely paid lip service to federalist ideals, 
since they were useful for gaining a wider consensus in a political elite that was 
accustomed to debating grandiose—and vague—federalist projects. With regard 
to foreign policy, especially from the 1970s onwards when the PCI had accepted 
European federalism, faith in Spinelli’s federalism was the only common ground 
held by the various political parties in a country where foreign policy had always 
been a matter of sharp divisions and disparities. Furthermore, a supra-national 
approach in the political context had always been regarded by both Italian poli-
ticians and diplomats as an easy means for coping with the nation’s political 
weaknesses. Italy’s “opportunistic” approach to the issue of political integration 
is confirmed by De Michelis’ position on what was regarded one of the most 
difficult questions in the negotiations on political integration: foreign and secu-
rity policies. In his memoirs, Delors seems puzzled by the joint Anglo-Italian 
declaration released in October 1991, writing: “sans qu’on sache pourquoi, le 
ministre des Affaires Etrangères italien De Michelis s’était associé à Douglas 
Hurd pour proposer que les questions de défense et de sécurité soient un instru-
ment de l’Alliance Atlantique, destiné à la renforcer.”39 
While it is not necessary to discuss the success of this Italian diplomatic move 
in detail here, it should nonetheless be mentioned that this decision was consistent 
with Italy’s traditional foreign policy interests. The creation of a strong European 
defense instrument in the future European Union would mean a French-German 
leadership that was too strong. As has been stated above, De Michelis’ European 
policy was less federalist than is usually thought; Italy did not agree to a leadership 
in the Community that was too powerful. Close relations with the United States had 
always counterbalanced the French-German duo, the UK being the obvious link to 
the United States and NATO being the instrument through which Italy could achieve 
its aims. In this context, Italy’s declaration was an almost obvious move, especially 
since the Italian leaders could not ignore the influence that the future EU, typified 
by a reunified Germany, would exert in East-Central Europe. Last but not least, in 
the opinion of the Italian government, a strengthened NATO—and the presence of 
the United States—would better guarantee Europe’s security in the uncertain post–
Cold War balance, a balance that might likely be dominated by a too powerful 
38 On the vincolo esterno, see Roberto Gualtieri, “L’Europa come vincolo esterno,” in Piero Crav-
eri and Antonio Varsori, eds., L’Italia nella costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957–
1997) (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2009), 313–31.
39 Jacques Delors, Mémoirs (Paris: Plon, 2003), 366.
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Germany. When in February 1992 the EC-twelve signed the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Italian government was satisfied with the role the Italian delegates had played, and 
the final outcome was consistent with the nation’s political and economic interests.
The end of communism: War on Italy’s border
Between 1990 and 1991, Italy not only had to focus its attention on the Iraq 
war, but also on another serious political crisis, especially as it was taking place 
along its borders, namely, the crisis developing in Yugoslavia. As already men-
tioned above, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Italy tried to strengthen the already 
shaky Yugoslav republic through the so-called quadrangolare initiative. At the 
local level, this policy was backed by another initiative, the so-called AlpeAdria, 
a cooperation agreement involving various border regions.40 In 1990 De Miche-
lis continued these efforts by strongly supporting Ante Marković’s federal gov-
ernment. In this period Italy was aiming at saving some sort of Yugoslav unity, 
and supported the Yugoslav federal government taking a pro-Western and 
pro-Community stance. In an article published in 1994, De Michelis writes that 
Italy played a leading role in Europe’s policy towards Yugoslavia in 1990, and 
that its position enjoyed the full support of Germany.41 But he also seems to 
complain that the European Community paid little attention to the Yugoslav 
situation, focusing its attention, also as a consequence of Germany’s interests, 
on Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These three countries enjoyed almost 
immediate aid from the Community through the PHARE program. Indeed, Italy 
also supported these policies, since the Italian authorities believed it possible for 
the European Community to stabilize these former communist nations. 
For a period of time Italy’s policy toward Yugoslavia appeared successful, 
but in 1991 the Yugoslav economic situation worsened. Georg Meyr stated: 
“Italy and France strongly supported the Delors-Marković economic plan in 
Brussels, where it was not approved due to British opposition.”42 When that 
spring both Slovenia and Croatia marched toward full independence and hostil-
ities began between the Slovenian militia and the federal army, De Michelis 
became part of the so-called European troika (together with Jacques Poos from 
Luxembourg and Hans van den Broek from the Netherlands), which sought, at 
the Brioni conference, a diplomatic solution to the conflict. There, De Michelis 
was very active, hoping that an intervention of the Community would preserve 
some form of confederal bond between the various republics of former Yugosla-
40 See Georg Meyr, “Italy and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia up to the Recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia (1989–1992),” Journal of European Integration History 10, no. 1 (2004): 169–78.
41 Gianni De Michelis, “Così cercammo di impedire la guerra,” Limes, no. 1, 1994, 229–36.
42 Meyr, “Italy,” 172.
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via.43 The Italian foreign minister hoped to halt Slovenia’s and Croatia’s move 
toward full independence; he thus put pressure on both republics to refrain from 
making any major decisions. 
De Michelis’ position was not an easy one, since the Italian media, the political 
leaders of Italy’s northeastern regions, the Catholic world, and most of the popula-
tion favored a quick independence process. These groups perceived Slovenia and 
Croatia as Western democratic nations that were freeing themselves from Bel-
grade’s backward communist oppression. But Andreotti and De Michelis feared the 
obvious consequences: the danger of mass emigration. In August 1991 Italy was 
compelled to face an early wave of illegal immigrants, when about 20,000 Alba-
nians reached the Italian coast looking for a better future. In 1991 De Michelis 
launched the project of transforming the quadrangolare into a pentagonale. In 
September of the same year, a German-Italian meeting was held in Venice, where 
both De Michelis and Andreotti tried to convince the German delegates to take a 
cautious attitude towards the Yugoslav question. The same issue was debated at the 
Brussels European Council in December 1991. Nonetheless, while other delega-
tions still opposed this solution, Germany appeared determined to recognize the 
independence of both Slovenia and Croatia immediately, which left the situation in 
an apparent deadlock. In his memoirs, De Michelis states that it was the Italian 
delegation that found a compromise: The members of the Community would rec-
ognize the two republics, but this would be made public by the EC-twelve only on 
15 January 1992 as the outcome of a unanimous decision. 
De Michelis has tried to explain this radical change in Italy’s foreign policy: 
On one hand, the Italian government could no longer ignore the intensification 
of the public opinion in favor of the two republic’s full independence. On the 
other hand, the Italian foreign minister wanted to avoid revealing, on the morrow 
of the Maastricht Treaty, that there were serious disagreements between the EC-
twelve on an important foreign policy issue.44 Actually De Michelis and And-
reotti hoped that one month would be long enough to slow down the recognition 
process. We must also not forget that internal factors were playing a role in 
shaping Italy’s policy as well: The Andreotti government was becoming very 
weak, and the policy toward Slovenia and Croatia was closely linked to the 
strong autonomy sentiments emerging in northern Italy. Italy’s new policy was 
a means for appeasing the Northern League, which some Italian decision-makers 
feared would make claims based on the Yugoslav secessionist “model.” 
But as is well known, Germany did not wait until the date set in Brussels, 
recognizing Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence only a few days later. Short-
ly thereafter the Yugoslav army opened hostilities leading to a civil war that 
would last for nearly a decade, a war that involved Italy both directly and indi-
rectly.
43 See in general Joze Pirjevec, Le guerre jugoslave (Turin: Einaudi, 2001).
44 See De Michelis, La lunga ombra; Meyr, “Italy.”
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Conclusions
In February 1992, Italy signed the Maastricht Treaty. The same month, a mi-
nor Socialist politician and administrator was arrested in Milan by an almost 
unknown public prosecutor, Antonio Di Pietro. This episode was the beginning 
of the “clean hands” inquiry. In April the general elections were marked by a 
defeat for both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists; in northern Italy the 
true winner was the Northern League. The Andreotti government acquiesced. It 
was the beginning of the collapse of a political system that had ruled Italy for 
almost forty-five years.45 It seems paradoxical, but in the post–Cold War period 
it is significant that Italy, a Western European country, seemed to share the same 
fate as the former communist countries, namely, a crisis of its internal political 
system owing to the end of the Cold War.
This paper will not conclude, however, with what happened in Italian politics 
after 1992. Our attention has focused on Italy’s foreign policy as pursued by the 
Andreotti government in one of the most difficult and complex periods of Eu-
rope’s history, the period that witnessed the end of the Cold War, German reuni-
fication, a series of revolutions in East-Central Europe, and the emerging of both 
a new European balance and a different European role in the international context. 
To the Italian government’s credit, it is possible to list the following points:
-	 The Italian political elite and Italy’s diplomats clearly understood the impor-
tance of the events that were occurring and were able to target a number of 
goals that were consistent with Italy’s foreign policy experience as well as the 
country’s traditional interests.
-	 Regarding the radical transformations that were beginning to shape a new 
Europe, Italy considered it vital to back the reunification of Germany, but also 
to thwart the emerging of a German superpower that was no longer interested 
in its relationship to Europe’s traditional partners. To this end, strengthening 
the integration process, from both a political and an economic viewpoint, was 
Italy’s chief political goal.
-	 Economic integration, based on the creation of the EMU and a common Eu-
ropean currency, was a related goal, but this involved a number of serious risks 
due to the structural weaknesses that characterized the Italian economy. Con-
nected to this, the Italian government tried to attain some concessions that 
would allow the Italian authorities to cope, over time, with the country’s in-
ternal economic problems as well as the general public opinion.
-	 Regarding the dramatic situation in East-Central Europe, Italy felt itself com-
pelled to focus its attention on the Yugoslav crisis and, to a lesser extent, the 
situation in Albania. The most dangerous crises connected to the end of com-
munism were taking place along Italy’s border, bringing obvious threats both 
internationally and internally, especially the danger of a flow of illegal immi-
45 See in general Caracciolo, L’Italia.
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grants. In this connection, between 1989 and the second half of 1991, the 
Italian government attempted, by means of various initiatives, to hinder Yu-
goslavia’s implosion, although this position became more and more unpopular 
in the general Italian public opinion. De Michelis changed his mind only when 
he was convinced that there was no longer any possibility for diplomatic ma-
neuvering from either an internal or international standpoint.
It is clear that there were some serious shortcomings in Italy’s policy towards 
the changing European balance:
-	 The end of the Cold War in Europe and the reunification of Germany was the 
last stage in a long process that had started in the immediate postwar period; 
the role of the “Big Four” plus Germany was an almost obvious consequence 
of both the postwar situation and the entire Cold War period. History was still 
able to exert its influence. In this context Italy was a minor actor, also from a 
formal viewpoint.
-	 Within the integration process, it was possible for the Italian political elite 
only to postpone solutions to various serious problems. These were problems 
of an internal nature, namely, addressing Italy’s economic situation.
-	 As far as the Yugoslav question was concerned, while the Italian position was 
sound, Germany’s determination proved a too powerful factor. Moreover, in 
late 1991 the Andreotti government could no longer face the pressure of the 
Italian public opinion as well as that of the Holy See.
-	 The Italian political elite was unable to understand that Italy’s internal politi-
cal balance had also been tied to the Cold War. Once the Cold War was over, 
the policy of “clean hands” transformed itself into the collapse of the political 
system. No foreign policy can survive a crisis of the political system of which 
it is a part. There is some irony in the fact that, although the communist re-
gimes in East-Central Europe lost their external support due to changes in the 
international arena, the Italian Communist Party quickly transformed into the 
Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and would be the one party to survive 
internally.
Last but not least, a nation’s foreign policy is largely influenced by its inter-
national “image,” that is, how it is perceived by its international partners. This is 
something that the Italian political elite also often forgot. One of the consequenc-
es of this has been the failure of foreign actors—and sometimes of foreign his-
torians as well—to recognize the relevance of Italy’s foreign policy in this period.
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a r n o l d  s u P P a n 
AUSTRIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS IN  
EASTERN EUROPE, 1955–89
After the State Treaty of 1955, Austria not only succeeded in avoiding a re-run 
of its history, but managed in a surprisingly short space of time to repackage itself 
as a model Alpine democracy: neutral, prosperous and stable. In part this was due 
to the uncomfortable proximity of the Red Army, which withdrew in 1955 only 
a few dozen kilometers to the east—a reminder that Austria’s neighbors now 
included three communist states (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia). Due 
to the country’s vulnerable location it was prudent to pursue conciliatory and 
non-contentious policies both at home and abroad. The price Austria paid to get 
the occupation powers to leave was neutrality and high “reparations” to the So-
viets. However, neutrality also put Austria on a path of neutralism and pacifism 
in the world’s conflicts, producing from the mid-1960s an “island-of-the-blessed” 
mentality that still prevails today. At the same time, neutral Austria joined the 
Western European trajectory toward prosperity, consumerism and a “leisure-class 
society.” Yet neutrality arrested full political and economic integration into West-
ern Europe. “In addition, the Cold War assigned Austria an identity by associa-
tion—as Western, free, democratic—that it might have been hard put to generate 
from within.”1 Piotr C. Wandycz sums up what seems to be historical fact after 
1945: 
The Second World War, or rather its outcome, reversed the course of history of East Central Eu-
rope. Traditionally a borderland or a semi-periphery of the West, the region became a westward 
extension of the Soviet East [...] For the first time in history the Russian shadow fell not only on 
Poland but also on Hungary and Czechoslovakia.2
Nevertheless, due to Austria’s geopolitical situation between the blocs the 
foreign ministers after Karl Gruber, Leopold Figl and Bruno Kreisky, imposed an 
active “good neighbor policy” toward the adjacent communist states Yugoslavia, 
1 Tony Judt, Postwar, A History of Europe since 1945 (London: William Heinemann, 2005), 
261; Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der 
Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945-1955, 5th ed. (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005), 155–61, 537–48; 
Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Michael Gehler, eds., Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical 
Context (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 1–24; Wolfgang Mueller 
and Michael Portmann, eds., Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende (Vienna: Verlag der Österre-
ichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), 9–36.
2 Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom. A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages 
to the Present (London: Routledge, 1992), 236.
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Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and from the 1970s also toward Poland, East Ger-
many and Bulgaria. There were two events that fundamentally changed the atti-
tude of Austria and the Austrians toward Hungary and Czechoslovakia—and vice 
versa. And these changes strengthened the relationships between the populations 
and started to infiltrate the communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain: the role 
of Austria and the Austrians during the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and during 
the “Prague Spring” in 1968.3
The Hungarian Revolution
After demonstrations and protests on 23 October 1956 at the building of the 
national radio in Budapest, a spontaneous, genuine people’s uprising erupted. The 
police force and a part of the Hungarian army joined the uprising. The morally 
discredited party leadership asked Soviet army units stationed in the country to 
crush the “counterrevolutionary gangs” of “fascist reactionary elements.” On 28 
October, the Austrian government, led by Federal Chancellor Julius Raab, made a 
courageous appeal to the Soviet government to stop the military fight and to end 
the bloodshed. On 1 November, the new Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy 
informed the Soviet ambassador Yurii Andropov that Hungary was unilaterally 
renouncing its membership in the Warsaw Pact and declared Hungary a neutral 
country. But on the same day, the Soviet secretary general Nikita Khrushchev 
ordered “an initiative for restoring order in Hungary.” On the morning of 4 No-
vember, Soviet tanks attacked Budapest und crushed the Hungarian revolution.4 
At two emergency Special Sessions, held on 4 and 9 November 1956, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Resolutions 393 and 399 
with regard to Hungary. On 14 and 15 November 1956, the Austrian Government 
sent an aide-mémoire to twenty countries asking for immediate help for the Hun-
garian refugees. The proposals included:
-	 The swift absorption of refugees into the individual countries without prior 
investigation of their personal or financial status; in particular, families should 
not be separated and immigration not limited to only young and able persons.
-	 Sending financial aid to help Austria defray the costs emerging from the ex-
odus of Hungarian refugees. The handling of these funds, to be placed at the 
disposal of the Austrian government, was to be under the control of the Court 
of Audit.
3 Cf. Arnold Suppan, Wolfgang Mueller, eds., Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, 
Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold War and Détente, 1955–1989 (Vienna: LIT, 2009).
4 Ivan T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe 1955–1993. Detour from the periphery to the pe-
riphery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 121–26; László Kontler, A History of 
Hungary. Millenium in Central Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 424–30; Csa-
ba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in 
Documents (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002).
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-	 Sending various goods and necessities of all types, including clothes, etc. The 
Austrian Ministry of the Interior was to serve as the central depot for the 
delivery of these supplies.5
On 26 November 1956, the Austrian Ambassador Franz Matsch gave a state-
ment to the UN secretary general concerning the situation of Hungarian refugees 
in Austria:
Since the recent developments in Hungary started, approximately 83,000 new refugees have 
crossed the border. Although 20,000 of this number have been able to leave the country for new 
destinations in Europe or overseas, the rest, amounting to a total of 63,000, is still in Austria and 
is continuously augmented by an additional number of about 8,000 refugees coming to Austria 
every night. The majority of these new refugees are young people, women and children. They 
are coming from practically all parts of Hungary. New strata of the population seem to be affect-
ed increasingly. Austria, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, cannot 
and will not refuse anyone seeking asylum in her territory.6
The Austrian government, in cooperation with the Austrian people, undertook 
all possible efforts to accommodate these unfortunate people as quickly as pos-
sible. But Austria needed “generous, united and immediate help from other 
countries, because collecting points, reception centers, holiday homes and empty 
hotels, all available private housing facilities and even schools, are completely 
full.” Sixty-three camps and seven large reception centers were operated in 
Austria by the federal government. Matsch noted that not a single case of conta-
gious disease had occurred and that all refugees were in good health. He also 
noted that in the previous four weeks, Austria had already spent 120 million 
shillings, i.e. 4.8 million dollars, on refugees from Hungary. But the cost of 
maintaining the current number of Hungarian refugees in Austria for a period of 
six months was estimated at 600 million shillings or about 24 million dollars. 
Therefore, he requested other European countries to send trains directly to the 
Austro-Hungarian border to allow the immediate transportation of refugees to 
third countries.7
The welcome the Hungarian refugees received in Austria changed Austria’s 
image in Hungary, which had not always been positive as a consequence of 1849 
and the two world wars. From this point in time, the Austrian Schwager (brother-
in-law) and the Hungarian neighbor became a comfortable twosome. This positive 
5 Aide Mémoire Ambassador Matsch to Philippe de Seynes, UN Under-Secretary, 15 November 
1956, UN Archives, Social Matters: Relief and Rehabilitation, SO 534/32 Aut.
6 Statement Ambassador Matsch to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld, New York, No-
vember 26, 1956, UN Archives, Social Matters: Relief and Rehabilitation, SO 534/32 Aut. Am-
bassador Matsch underlined that 650,000 refugees had crossed the Austrian border since 1945. 
“While a large number of these 650,000 could be settled outside the country, 190,000 of them 
are still living in Austria, 36,000 of whom still being housed in camps.” I am grateful to Dr. 
Georg Kastner for providing me copies of these documents.
7 Ibid.
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atmosphere has persisted to the present day; according to opinion polls, the ad-
mission of Hungary into the European Union was supported by a majority of 
Austrians.8 
The “Prague Spring”
In the mid-1950s the Austrian economy outdistanced that of Czechoslovakia, 
which had formerly been much larger9—a development that would have been 
unthinkable in either 1918 or 1945. After the Czechoslovak economy entered a 
serious crisis around 1960, a group of experts from the Institute for Economics 
at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, under the leadership of Ota Šik, was 
given the task of drawing up plans for reform, plans that incorporated decentral-
ization and more market-orientation and individual responsibility of enterprises. 
Despite this, communist property affairs were not to be changed.10 
Relations between Austria and Czechoslovakia began to intensify. In May 
1963, the Czechoslovak author and literature historian Eduard Goldstücker or-
ganized an international Kafka Symposium at Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) with 
Austrian participation, while the Austrian Society of Literature (Österreichische 
Gesellschaft für Literatur) played host in Vienna to a number of Czech writers, 
including Václav Havel. Of greater immediate importance in the public sphere 
were the beginnings of collaboration between the Austrian and Czechoslovakian 
television stations and live broadcasts of the show “City Discussions” moderat-
ed by Helmut Zilk and Jiří Pelikán.  Most significant of all for relations was 
travel between the two countries. Whereas until 1963 only 47,000 Czechs had 
been to the West, by 1967 the number had climbed to 258,000. And Western 
foreigners—especially Germans and Austrians—suddenly began to fill Czecho-
slovak hotels and restaurants in Prague, Brno, Karlovy Vary and smaller towns. 
In joint university history seminars with Austrian colleagues, Czech and Slovak 
students clearly articulated their wish that their country leave the communist 
bloc and like Austria become neutral in the East-West conflict.11 
8 Michael Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 
2005), 1, 162–73.
9 Arnold Suppan, “Österreicher und Tschechen—missgünstige Nachbarn?,” Prague Papers on 
the History of International Relations (2006): 265–98; Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 
XV–XVI; Alice Teichova, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Tschechoslowakei 1918–1980 (Vienna: 
Böhlau, 1988); Hans Seidel, Österreichs Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg (Vienna: Manz, 2005).
10 Otakar Turek and Miloš Pick, “Die Wirtschaftsreformen der sechziger Jahre,” in Stefan Karner 
et al. eds., Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), 
133–40.
11 Arnold Suppan, Missgünstige Nachbarn. Geschichte und Perspektiven der nachbarschaftli-
chen Beziehungen zwischen Tschechien und Österreich (Vienna: Club Niederösterreich, 2005), 
68–69; Helmut Zilk, “Zum Beginn des ‘Prager Frühlings’: Die ‘Stadtgespräche Prag—Wien’,” 
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The “Manifest of 2000 Words,” written by Ludvík Vaculík and published on 
27 June 1968, was intended to be an account of the state of the country. It was 
addressed to workers, farmers, officials, scholars, artists and “all others.” The 
manifesto criticized the privileged class of functionaries who held power in the 
name of workers, power that was founded on their control of the party and the 
state apparatus. Signed by sixty-nine intellectuals, the manifesto created an enor-
mous sensation, also in Moscow. On 11 July 1968, Pravda was already talking 
of a “counterrevolutionary conspiracy.” The Austrian ambassador to Moscow sent 
secret warnings to Vienna.12 
The first written threat to the leadership in Prague by the Warsaw Pact came 
on 16 July. Bilateral summit meetings in Cierná nad Tisou and Bratislava ended 
tensely. On the night of 20–21 August 1968, some twenty-nine divisions with 
7,500 tanks and more than 1,000 aircraft of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, 
the German Democratic Republic (not troops from the People’s Army but police 
troops) and Bulgaria marched into Czechoslovakia. Between 80 and 200 deaths 
occurred. Some members of the Communist Party leadership were arrested and 
taken to Moscow, where they were forced to accept a joint protocol on the “nor-
malization” of the country. The pro-Russian sentiment of many Czechs, which 
went back to the nineteenth century and had been strengthened in both world 
wars, evaporated completely in this night of humiliation.13 
The Western world—despite having been warned by their secret services and 
diplomats—was taken completely by surprise. It could only watch from a distance 
and report on the events taking place. The Austrian broadcasting system played 
an important role in this regard. The Austrian government registered violations 
of Austrian airspace in the north and east and feared violations of the land border 
by tank columns advancing on Brno and Bratislava. Thus only very hesitant 
public statements were made by the government of the Austrian People’s Party 
(Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) under Federal Chancellor Josef Klaus. Nev-
ertheless, the Soviet ambassador to Austria protested the “anti-Soviet” position 
of the ORF (Österreichischer Rundfunk, the Austrian national public service 
broadcaster) and the Austrian press. Despite a warning by the Austrian Ministry 
of the Interior, the Austrian envoy in Prague, Rudolf Kirchschläger, later the 
president of Austria, issued tens of thousands of visas to Czechoslovak citizens. 
Some 150,000 people, mainly well-educated and young, left Czechoslovakia at 
in Stefan Karner et al. eds., Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968 (Cologne: 
Böhlau, 2008), 1089–93; see also Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik 1, 294–300.
12 “Die Stunde der Tschechen und Slowaken. Ludvík Vaculíks ‘Manifest der 2000 Worte’ als na-
tionale Rechenschaft,” Die Presse, 13–14 July 1968, 5.
13 Jan Pauer, Prag 1968. Der Einmarsch des Warschauer Paktes. Hintergründe, Planung, Durch-
führung (Bremen: Ed. Temmen, 1995); H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Rev-
olution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Michail Prozumenščikov, “Die Entschei-
dung im Politbüro der KPdSU,” in Stefan Karner et al. eds., Prager Frühling. Das internatio-
nale Krisenjahr 1968 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), 205–41.
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least temporarily. Thousands of others did not return from their vacations in Yu-
goslavia. The Western world readily admitted all refugees and integrated them in 
a variety of ways.14 
Yugoslavia
In the fall of 1974, the foreign ministries of Austria and Yugoslavia exchanged 
sharp notes concerning the Slovene minority question in the southern Austrian prov-
ince of Carinthia. An outside observer reading the newspaper would have had no 
reason to doubt a serious disruption of intra-state relations between the neighbors. 
But this was by no means the case. Despite the disagreement, the economic, social 
and cultural relations between Yugoslavia and Austria remained largely intact:
-	 Some 180,000 Yugoslav citizens continued to be employed in Austria as “guest 
workers.” 
-	 More than 600,000 Austrians continued to take their annual vacations on the 
Yugoslav Adriatic coast.
-	 Austrian exports of wood, paper, cattle, and machines to the Arabic world and 
overseas through the Yugoslav ports of Koper and Rijeka continued to in-
crease. 
-	 Cross-border traffic at the local level between Styria and Carinthia on one side 
and Slovenia on the other increased. 
-	 Bilateral cultural contacts became more frequent. These included exhibitions 
(“Trigon”), scholarly symposia (“Mogersdorf;” Yugoslav-Austrian historian 
symposia), concerts (“Styrian Fall”), and readings by poets.15 
Bilateral relations became less tense following a secret visit between Christ-
mas and New Year 1975 by Federal Chancellor Kreisky to Marshal Tito in Brdo 
near Kranj. And after the adoption of the Austrian nationalities’ law on 7 July 
1976, they clearly improved. Non-aligned Yugoslavia and neutral Austria also 
continued to work together at the level of the United Nations. 
14 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik 1, 341–52; Karl Peterlik, “Tausende Visa pro Tag ausgestellt,” 
in Stefan Karner et al. eds., Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968 (Cologne: 
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Austrian-East European relations in the 1970–80s 
East–West détente after 1970, in part a product of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 
gradually pushed the memory of the unhappy end to the “Prague Spring” into the 
background. And the seemingly all-powerful head of the Soviet Communist Par-
ty, Leonid Brezhnev, after whom the theory of the limited sovereignty of com-
munist states was named, regarded the Helsinki Agreement of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1 August 1975 as a guarantee of Soviet 
dominance in East-Central Europe. From 1976 the civil and cultural stagnation 
that had established itself in Czechoslovakia was called into question by the 
Czechoslovak civic initiative Charta 77. The movement was based on Basket 3 
of the Helsinki Agreement, a concession by Moscow to the West, and called for 
the upholding of basic civil rights. The protagonists Jan Patočka, Václav Havel, 
Jiří Hajek and Pavel Kohout were soon persecuted as alleged agents of the CIA, 
and samizdat publications were strictly suppressed. But Western radio and tele-
vision broadcasts, many from Austria, nevertheless reached behind the Iron Cur-
tain. In the area between České Budějovice, Brno and Bratislava, many antennas 
were aimed at the neighboring country to the south and west. The head of the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party, Gustáv Husák, build up an increasingly impos-
ing police regime with a heavily armed “people’s militia,” and began a new 
campaign against the Catholic Church that put quite a few priests into prison. The 
Soviet army, with its 70,000 soldiers a de facto occupying force, provided the 
background for these developments. Under such conditions, it was not possible 
for Charta 77 to become the mass movement that Solidarność (Solidarity) was 
later to become, although about one thousand persons participated, above all 
intellectuals from Prague and Brno. It nevertheless became a “moral challenge” 
to the cynicism of Czechoslovak officials, the apathy of the public, and the shal-
low materialism of both.16 
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the declaration of mar-
tial law in Poland in 1981, the communist regimes appeared cemented in place. 
Solidarność received little support from the Association of Austrian Trade Unions 
and Chancellor Kreisky remained as passive as Chancellor Klaus had been in 
1968. A new wave of political refugees, this time about 40,000 Poles, arrived in 
Austria. The reception of the Austrian population was not nearly as friendly as 
it had been in 1956 or 1968, and Austria also did not participate in the Western 
sanctions against the dictatorial regime of General Wojciech Jaruzelski.17 But the 
election of the Cracow archbishop, Karol Cardinal Wojtyła, as pope in the fall 
16 Ferdinand Seibt, “Deutsch-tschechischer Diskurs 1947–1999. Ein Lesedrama in sieben Akten,” 
Merkur—Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken 54 (2000): 216–30; Vilém Prečan, Die 
sieben Jahre von Prag, 1969–1976. Briefe und Dokumente aus der Zeit der “Normalisierung” 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1978).
17 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik 1, 483–88.
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1978 strengthened the Catholic population of Poland and influenced the mobi-
lization of grassroots Catholic movements also in Moravia, Slovakia and Hun-
gary.18 
Signs of change
Thus, in the mid-1980s the Austrian capital of Vienna was a “Western” city 
surrounded by Soviet “Eastern” Europe. For Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, 
Romanian, Bulgarian, Serb, Croat and Slovene intellectuals, Vienna stood for 
“Central Europe” (Mitteleuropa), an imagined community of cosmopolitan civil-
ity that Europeans had somehow mislaid in the course of the century. But for 
more than 150,000 guest-workers from Yugoslavia, Vienna and Austria stood for 
better living conditions. “In Communism’s dying years the city was to become a 
sort of listening post of liberty, a rejuvenated site of encounters and departures 
for eastern Europeans escaping West and Westerners building bridges to the 
East.”19 But Erhard Busek, until 1987 vice-mayor of Vienna and from April 1989, 
Austrian minister of science and research, frequently warned in those years about 
overstraining these bridges, since bridges were often windy places and they 
sometimes collapsed—as a major Viennese bridge over the Danube (the Reichs-
brücke) had done in 1976. Nevertheless, in 1989 Austria embodied all the slight-
ly self-satisfied attributes of postwar Western Europe: capitalist prosperity sup-
ported by a richly-endowed welfare state; social peace guaranteed by jobs and 
benefits liberally distributed through all the main social groups and political 
parties; external security assured by the implicit protection of the NATO nuclear 
umbrella—although Austria itself remained smugly “neutral.”20
Although more than half of the Austrian frontier ran along the Iron Curtain and 
its borders with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, the great majority of the 
Austrian population, including the intellectuals, did not really recognize what was 
happening in the annus mirabilis, the year 1989, not to mention 1987 or 1988. But 
today we know that there were several clear signs of the upcoming changes.
Yugoslavia
The events in Yugoslavia were the first sign. The Memorandum of the Serbi-
an Academy of Sciences, partly published in September 1986, openly introduced 
a program of a nationalistic Greater Serbia. Its principle of “all Serbs in one state” 
heralded the aggression in Yugoslavia against the federal units geographically 
18 Andrzej Paczkowski, Pół wieku dziejów Polski 1939–1989 (Warszawa: PWN, 1995), 441–48.
19 Judt, Postwar, 2.
20 Cf. Emil Brix and Erhard Busek, Projekt Mitteleuropa (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1986).
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separated from Serbia in which both ethnic Serbs and non-Serbian populations 
lived. The memorandum stirred wide opposition in Slovenia, not only in cultural 
circles, but also in certain economic circles that were critical of the state of the 
federal economy. The Yugoslav foreign debt had by then reached the enormous 
sum of 21 billion US dollars, the highest per capita debt in Eastern Europe. In 
the spring of 1987, a group of young intellectuals—predominantly anticommunist 
liberals and Catholics associated with the magazine Nova revija (New Review)—
published articles outlining a Slovene national program in which they demanded 
the introduction of political pluralism, democracy, a market economy and inde-
pendence for Slovenia in a possible Yugoslav confederation. Such views encoun-
tered opposition and condemnation everywhere in Yugoslavia. But the new lead-
ership of the Slovene Communists, after 1986 led by Milan Kučan, decided not 
to oppose these demands of the critical youth.21
In the spring of 1988, the Yugoslav army—at the time some 260,000 officers 
and soldiers—staged a show trial before a military court in Ljubljana against four 
Slovenes, three journalists from the magazine Mladina and one army cadet. They 
were accused of publishing the minutes of a meeting of the Central Committee 
of the Union of the Yugoslav Communists. But since the trial was conducted in 
the official language of the army, namely Serbo-Croatian, the trial had exactly 
the opposite effect of what was desired: the Slovenes united strongly behind a 
program of democratization and national independence. Even Admiral Branko 
Mamula, the Yugoslav defense minister at the time, later realized: “With my 
threats against the Slovene opposition, I did more for Slovene independence than 
anyone else.” In mid-1988, an abyss opened between Slovenia and Yugoslavia 
that could no longer be bridged. In 1990, one of the four prisoners, Janez Janša, 
became the minister of defense of the sovereign Republic of Slovenia and later 
even became prime minister.22 
In February 1989, a rally in Ljubljana organized jointly by the Slovene gov-
ernment and Slovene opposition parties condemned the political and police vi-
olence of the Serbian authorities in Kosovo and called for peace and coexistence. 
This Slovene stand was the trigger for Serbia to mount a major propaganda 
campaign against Slovenia. At a large rally in Ljubljana in May, the Slovene 
opposition parties adopted the “May Declaration”—in memory of the Slovene 
demand of autonomy in May 1917—for “a sovereign state of the Slovene nation” 
which would “as a sovereign state decide independently on its links with South 
Slav and other nations within the framework of a renewed Europe.” In spite of 
severe pressure and threats from Belgrade, in September the Slovene Parlia-
21 Janko Prunk, A Brief History of Slovenia (Ljubljana: Mihelač, 1994), 74–75; Peter Štih, Vas-
ko Simoniti, Peter Vodopivec, Slowenische Geschichte. Gesellschaft—Politik—Kultur (Graz: 
Leykam, 2008), 465–80; Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1995), 31–33.
22 Štih, Simoniti, Vodopivec, Slowenische Geschichte, 481–84; Silber, Little, Yugoslavia, 48–57.
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ment—still composed of members elected through the one-party system—re-
claimed the sovereign national rights it had ceded when the Yugoslav Federation 
was founded in 1945. At the end of November 1989, the Slovene and Croat 
governments banned the pan-Yugoslav rallies of the centralistic Greater Serbian 
forces that had been planned to take place in Ljubljana and Zagreb. By that time 
similar demonstrations had been held everywhere in Yugoslavia except in Slo-
venia and Croatia. Serbia and Montenegro reacted to the ban by breaking off all 
commercial trade with Slovenia. In January 1990, the Greater Serbia hegemon-
ic leanings prevailing in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia caused the 
members of the Slovene League of Communists to walk out of the fourteenth 
and last congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. Their 
Croat comrades followed.23 
The United States, the European Community and the Soviet Union were all 
interested in the further existence and unity of Yugoslavia. They did not com-
prehend what was happening in Yugoslavia or why. This was so despite demo-
cratic elections for the Slovene and Croat Parliaments being held in April and 
May 1990 and the victory of the non-communist parties in both republics, the 
Republic of Serbia illegally using foreign exchange holdings in the Yugoslav 
Federal Bank to finance the Serbian special forces, the Slovene–Croat proposal 
to form a Yugoslav confederation, and the clear results in the Slovene and Cro-
at plebiscites of December 1990 and May 1991 for independence. Yugoslavia’s 
Prime Minister Ante Marković, a Croat economist, succeeded in presenting 
himself to the world as a liberal economic reformer and even succeeded in elic-
iting a guarantee of new loans. US secretary of state James Baker warned the 
Slovene Kučan on one hand that the Helsinki Final Act recognized only peace-
ful self-determination, not secession by force; on the other hand, Baker warned 
the Serb Milošević that the United States would not tolerate the use of force to 
prevent declarations of independence. The Slovene and Croat decisions were 
supported only by Germany, above all Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and Austria, 
primarily Foreign Minister Alois Mock. The Serbian generals at the top of the 
Yugoslav military and their adherents in Yugoslavia’s diplomatic corps spoke 
loudly of a “fourth German Reich” (obviously including Austria!). It was de-
clared that the independent republics of Slovenia and Croatia were going to join 
this new “Reich” immediately. A number of international spectators still question 
whether the Western world would have accepted the Slovene and Croat decla-
rations of independence, both on 25 June 1991, if they had not already accepted 
German reunification. In any case, after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the 
collapse of the Warsaw pact, Yugoslavia had lost its strategic importance to 
Washington and Moscow.24 
23 Prunk, Slovenia, 75–78; Štih, Simoniti, Vodopivec, Slowenische Geschichte, 486–90.
24 Prunk, Slovenia, 78–81; Štih, Simoniti, Vodopivec, Slowenische Geschichte, 491–501; Silber 
and Little, Yugoslavia, 29, 147–53. 
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Hungary
The second group of signs occurred in Hungary. When János Kádár had his 
first audience with the new ruler in the Kremlin, Mikhail Gorbachev, he also 
referred to a new opposition in Hungary: 
There is an opposition in Hungary; a few social scientists, sociologists, representatives of the 
intelligentsia, writers. There are not many. They could be called an organized group in the sense 
that fifty or sixty occasionally meet. The West seeks them out, supports them […]. The question 
arises of what we are to do with them. We can take administrative measures against them only 
in the last resort, as we do not wish to give these people free publicity. Now and then we arrest 
opposition elements, confiscate their copying equipment, but if need be we can be harsher.25 
In Kádár’s estimation as well as that of his authorities, routine police harass-
ment did not count as harsh administrative measures. But György Aczél, Secretary 
of the Central Committee for cultural affairs, defined the boundaries between 
“prohibited” and “permitted.” Although diversity in literary, artistic and scholar-
ly trends, styles, tastes and moods was allowed, these elements of society re-
mained under state supervision.26
Nevertheless, the monopoly of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
(MSZMP) began to receive jolts in several areas:
– In 1986, the planned construction of a series of dams and a hydroelectric 
power station at the Czechoslovak-Hungarian section of the Danube between 
Gabčikovo and Nagymaros became the object of intensive political debate 
because of the predictably disastrous ecological consequences they would 
bring. The plan was finally abandoned. A protest march in October 1988 
against the construction of this hydroelectric system called attention to the 
communist system’s ecological exploitation.27
– According to data of the Hungarian Central Statistics Office, in 1987 1.9 
million people, or nearly 20 percent of the population, lived at or below the 
“social minimum” level. In the mid-1980s, the country ranked number one in 
international suicide statistics and second in the consumption of spirits and 
liquor. The disaffection of the general public was creeping, rather than burst-
ing, into Hungarian life.28
– Kádár, the one-time pioneer of reforms in the Soviet bloc, was deeply dis-
turbed by the aspirations of Gorbachev. In the broad segment of reformers in 
the party, rank-and-file expectations were raised by the “Gorbachev phenom-
25 György Gyarmati, “Hungary in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century,” in István György 
Tóth et al. eds., A Concise History of Hungary. The History of Hungary from the Early Middle 
Ages to the Present (Budapest: Corvina-Osiris, 2005), 614.  
26 Kontler, Hungary, 445–46. The historian Ferenc Glatz started to publish the magazine História 
in 1979.
27 Gyarmati, “Hungary,” 615; Kontler, Hungary, 465.
28 Kontler, Hungary, 458–59.
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enon.” In July 1987, Kádár decided to drop the long-serving Prime Minister 
György Lázár, replacing him with Károly Grósz, who was the most charac-
teristic representative of the new, technocratic type of cadres favoring the 
continuation of economic reforms without changing the political system. In 
addition to Grósz, the main reformers included Rezső Nyers, the father of the 
1968 economic reform, and Imre Pozsgay, whose commitment to reform, 
unlike that of the prime minister, extended to democratization as well.29
– On 5 and 6 March 1987, under the protection of Pozsgay, the secretary gen-
eral of the Patriotic Popular Front, a symposium and an exhibition entitled 
“300 years of living together—from the history of the German Hungarians” 
was held at the Houses of Parliament in Budapest. It was the first time since 
the expulsion of more than 200,000 German Hungarians in 1946 that this 
subject was officially discussed.30
– On 27 September 1987 the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was set up 
in Lakitelek, a village east of Kecskemét, in the presence of Pozsgay, the 
liberal democratic writer György Konrád, as well as the leading right-wing 
populist István Csurka. Its founding members were mainly men of letters and 
social scientists who spoke up in favor of the democratic Rechtsstaat, Hun-
garian national traditions, and in support of Hungarian minorities abroad. In 
the neighboring countries, the living conditions of the Hungarian minority in 
Yugoslavia, mainly in the Serbian Vojvodina and 430,000 strong (1981 cen-
sus), were comparatively the most favorable. In contrast, for the 1,670,000 
Hungarians in Romania (1981 census) a “national homogenization program” 
had drastically restricted education in this population’s mother tongue. Kádár 
had intervened unsuccessfully with Ceauşescu. In June 1988 a demonstration 
in Hungary on behalf of the Hungarian minority in Romania protested Ceauşes-
cu’s megalomaniac plan of destroying the historic network of Hungarian vil-
lages and towns in Transylvania. Finally, in Czechoslovakia, the 1968 law on 
the national minorities made no allowance for cultural autonomy, although 
580,000 Hungarians still lived in Slovakia.31
– On 22 May 1988, Kádár and another five members of the Politburo, the 
hard-liner’s “council of the aged,” were forced into retirement. Despite this, 
Pozsgay and Grósz, the new Party Secretary, could not stabilize the communist 
party (MSZMP). Deep generational and political divisions within the party 
and the obvious loss of confidence among the population could not be checked. 
From early 1988 a constant stream of new organizations began to be formed: 
29 Ibid., 460.
30 Wendelin Hambuch, ed., 300 Jahre Zusammenleben—Aus der Geschichte der Ungarn-
deutschen. Internationale Historikerkonferenz in Budapest (5.-6. März 1987), 2 vols. (Budapest, 
Tankönyvkiadó, 1988). I attended the opening with my friend Ferenc Glatz.
31 Ferenc Glatz, et al. eds., A magyarok krónikája (Budapest: Officina Nova, 1995), 758; Berend, 
Central and Eastern Europe, 271; Kontler, Hungary, 454–55.
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the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SZDSZ), etc. Even the so-called reform communists established weeklies and 
magazines. While these initiatives were confined to a few dozen individuals, 
they maintained contact with several hundred other sympathizers, among them 
intellectuals at research institutes, university departments and editorial offices, 
as well as within student circles. The authorities kept detailed information 
about the activities of this opposition and the groups linked to them.32
– Because Grósz was rapidly losing his credibility, in November 1988 he hand-
ed over his premiership to the young Miklós Németh, who turned out to be 
one of the engineers of transition. Németh received reinforcement through the 
successful maneuvering of Pozsgay, who broke with the interpretation of the 
events of 1956 as a “counter-revolution,” recognizing them instead as a “pop-
ular uprising” and a “fight for national independence.” The government quick-
ly laid a new law before Parliament concerning organizations, and in January 
1989 the right to form political parties was proclaimed. In March an opposition 
round table was formed by the more important parties: MDF, SZDSZ, FI-
DESZ, the Social Democratic Party, the Independent Smallholders, Agricul-
tural Workers and Bourgeois Party, the Hungarian People’s Party and the 
Christian Democratic People’s Party. In a cabinet reshuffle in May 1989, most 
positions held by followers of Grósz were refilled by pragmatic reformers such 
as Németh himself, and the government became an institutional regulator of 
transformation. Németh’s main efforts were to ensure that the outlines of a 
new and workable framework had been created before the old system of in-
stitutions was completely dismantled. The government introduced radical re-
forms, including advances toward privatization and a subsequent market econ-
omy. The first month of the “revolution by discussion” ended with the cere-
monial reburial of Imre Nagy, together with his fellow martyrs, on 16 June 
1989. An estimated 300,000 Hungarians lined the streets, with millions more 
watching the proceedings live on television. Among the speakers at the grave-
side was Viktor Orbán, the youthful leader of the Young Democrats, who could 
not help noting that some of the communists present at Nagy’s reburial were 
the same people who, just a few years earlier, had so strenuously decried the 
very revolution whose praises they were now singing. By the end of June, the 
first secretary had to be content with being only one member of a quartet: he 
was joined by Németh, Pozsgay and Nyers at the head of the party.33
– In June 1989, the Iron Curtain was opened a crack: the Hungarian foreign 
minister, Gyula Horn, and his Austrian colleague, Alois Mock, cut the barbed 
wire separating western Hungary from the Austrian province of Burgenland. 
The Austrian minister of science and research, Erhard Busek, concluded agree-
32 Kontler, Hungary, 461–62.
33 Glatz, A magyarok krónikája, 777–79; Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 274–75; Kontler, 
Hungary, 466; Gyarmati, “Hungary,” 614–17; Judt, Postwar, 610.
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ments on German-language teachers and scholarships with the Hungarian 
minister of education Ferenc Glatz. In August 1989, some six hundred East 
Germans used an Austro-Hungarian “border picnic” near Sopron (Ödenburg), 
organized by Otto von Habsburg’s Pan-European Union, to flee to Austria. 
The picnic was secretly tolerated by the Hungarian government. Events picked 
up speed when, on 10 September, the Hungarian government authorized the 
departure via Austria of tens of thousands East German vacationers hoping to 
flee to West Germany. This wider opening of the Iron Curtain was negotiated 
with the West German Chancellor Kohl and tolerated by Moscow, but caused 
a diplomatic clash with East Berlin. In a later interview, Prime Minister 
Németh stated that the Hungarian government used this event as a ballon 
d’essai to test the Soviet reaction. The Austrian government was informed 
about the decision very late. When at midnight on 10–11 September, the Hun-
garian-Austrian border was opened for the East German citizens, it was broad-
cast live on Austrian, German and Hungarian television. Euphoric young 
refugees were interviewed and the celebratory mood was obvious. Radio Free 
Europe and Voice of America covered the event, which enabled the people of 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia and other bloc countries to learn of the breath-
taking mass exodus.34
– Between June and September 1989, representatives of the MSZMP, the Op-
position Round Table, the Patriotic Popular Front and the trade unions reached 
an agreement on creating the legal and political conditions for the transition 
to multi-party democracy and the rule of law. The fourteenth congress of the 
MSZMP in early October 1989 also proved to be the last. While the new 
players in political life were primarily concentrating on rearranging pow-
er-sharing, the members of the collapsing Communist Party—only 50,000 of 
the 700,000 members of the old party became members of the newly formed 
Hungarian Socialist Party—had the necessary information for appropriating 
state property. This was a process that was only in its beginning stages. With-
in the framework of the so-called pre-privatization transactions, they became 
the proprietors, company directors and managers of societies, limited compa-
nies and holdings that soon began to mushroom.35
– On 23 October 1989, Hungary was transformed from a “People’s Republic” 
of the Soviet type to a “Republic.” The novelty of the Hungarian exit from 
communism was that it was conducted by the communists themselves. Two 
weeks before the elections on 25 March 1990, Gyula Horn and his Soviet 
34 István Horváth, Die Sonne ging in Ungarn auf. Erinnerungen an eine besondere Freundschaft 
(Munich: Universitas, 2000), 251–334; Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 282; Andreas 
Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer. September 1989—Ungarn öffnet die Grenze (Vienna: 
Zsolnay, 2009); Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik 2, 588–93; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
19 August 2009.
35 Gyarmati, “Hungary,” 618–19.
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colleague Eduard Shevardnadze signed an international agreement for the 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops that had been stationed in Hungary for the 
previous forty-five years. In the autumn of 1990, a well-attended discussion 
between leading intellectuals was held at Eötvös Lóránd University in Buda-
pest to answer the question “Did we see it coming?” “It”, of course, referred 
to the course of events in 1989. The consensus of the participants and the 
audience was unanimously negative: “It” had been unforeseeable almost until 
it was actually happening.36
Czechoslovakia
The third set of signs that were overlooked occurred in Czechoslovakia. What 
was the basic difference between the Polish Solidarność or the Czechoslovak 
Charta 77 movements, on one hand, and Hungarian reform-from-within on the 
other? Did the first two merely oppose the regime while the latter simply collab-
orated? In fact, the line distinguishing these different developments was not so 
marked. “This line,” stated Václav Havel, “runs de facto through each person, for 
everyone in his or her own way is both a victim and a supporter of the system.”37
When in 1988 the Czechoslovak foreign minister Bohuslav Chňoupek re-
ceived his Austrian colleague Alois Mock at Bratislava castle, he stated with a 
resigned gesture toward the nearby border with Austria that neither would prob-
ably live to see it opened.38 He recalled that before 1938, as a child in Engerau 
(Petržalka, today a southern suburb of Bratislava), he had played soccer with boys 
from Kittsee in northeastern Burgenland, not far from the Austro-Czechoslovak 
border. Despite this pessimism, Austrian construction firms began building mod-
ern hotels in Prague soon thereafter. Thousands of locals were astonished at the 
capitalist industriousness of the “Austrians” working on weekends. They did not 
know, of course, that many were Yugoslav “guest workers” and thus, the Austri-
an model remained attractive. 
In both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, communist rule rested uneasily on the 
silent memory of a stolen past. When in Czechoslovakia Gustav Husák, in pow-
er since 1969, resigned as secretary general of the party in 1987—remaining state 
president—he was replaced by the younger Miloš Jakeš, best known for his 
prominent role in the mass “purges” of the early 1970s. Thanks to the brutally 
efficient management of these purges, most of the country’s intelligentsia, from 
playwrights to historians, had been removed not merely from their jobs but also 
from public visibility. Havel’s own civic organization, Charta 77, gained fewer 
than two thousand signatories from a population of fifteen million. Nonetheless, 
36 Kontler, Hungary, 469; Glatz, A magyarok krónikája, 787; Judt, Postwar, 610.
37 Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 272.
38 This detail was related to me by Alois Mock after his retirement as foreign minister.
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to bolster its citizens’ mood communist Czechoslovakia tried to mimic certain 
aspects of Western consumer society—notably television programming and pop-
ular leisure pursuits. There were signs of change already in 1988, when a petition 
for greater religious freedom was signed by half a million people. And on 28 
October 1988, the seventieth anniversary of the founding of independent Czecho-
slovakia, 10,000 people went onto the streets of Prague. After similar demonstra-
tions on 21 August 1988, many demonstrators were arrested as were Havel and 
thirteen other Charta 77 activists in January 1989. All in all, as late as the summer 
of 1989 there was a clear lack of reform intentions on the part of the party chiefs 
as well as an absence of any effective opposition.39
On the other hand, the new relations of Moscow to Washington and Bonn, as 
well as internal developments in the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary were 
creating uncertainty among the leaders in Prague. But neither the leaderships in 
Warsaw and Budapest nor in East Berlin and Prague were aware of what Alek-
sandr Yakovlev, a member of the Soviet Politburo, told the West German minis-
ter Kurt Biedenkopf in February 1989. In Biedenkopf’s words: 
they [the Soviets] could not continue to support their satellite countries. They would then seek 
ways of pulling back these supports, and look for some exit options, or some resolution, because 
they were becoming too expensive. Their weakness was coinciding with the will of the people 
to be free.40
An aging and frightened Husák regime and its perplexed but hopeful popula-
tion watched the broadcasts of the collapse of Honecker’s Germany. The rather 
apathetic Czech and Slovak masses who had turned their backs on politics during 
the twenty Husák years, trying instead to “cultivate their own garden,” were 
suddenly mobilized. With the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, the 
fate of the communist regime in Prague finally became clear. Although as late as 
15 November some old communist cadres warned the West not to intervene, the 
whole world was waiting for what would happen.41 
Rather surprisingly, the end was triggered by a student demonstration on 17 
November to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Hitler’s closing Czech universities 
and schools of higher learning. The demonstrations started with ceremonies held 
that afternoon at Charles University’s campus in Prague’s New Town in memory 
of ten students the Nazi regime had killed fifty years earlier in connection with 
anti-protectorate demonstrations. Now, in 1989, when nearly 15,000 demonstra-
tors began to chant anti-communist slogans, Czech police forces surrounded the 
demonstrators and brutally attacked them. The rumor that one of the students had 
been killed was also encouraged. This false report provoked the students to huge 
protests, supported by their parents and soon even by many workers. Western 
39 Judt, Postwar, 616–17.; Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 283.
40 Kurt Biedenkopf, “Will Europe Stay Together?,” IWMpost, no. 100 (January–March 2009): 14. 
41 Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 283.
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journalists placed their cameras at the front of the crowd. Václav Havel returned 
from virtual house arrest in rural northern Bohemia on 19 November, whereupon 
he established the Civic Forum (Občanské Forum) with friends at a Prague theater 
and practically overnight became the focal point of the opposition movement. A 
group led by the historian Petr Pithart drew up the “Programmatic Principles of 
the Civic Forum”: 1: Rule of law; 2: Free elections; 3: Social justice; 4: A clean 
environment; 5: An educated people; 6: Prosperity; 7: Return to Europe.42
Within a week, the entire Presidium of the Communist Party resigned. After 
a second week and some negotiations, Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec resigned. 
And after a third week, President Husák appointed a new government with a 
majority of non-communist ministers—and then he resigned as well. The new 
prime minister, Marían Čalfa, was still a party member, but Jiří Dienstbier of 
Charta 77 became foreign minister, the Catholic lawyer of the Slovak Public 
Against Violence (VPN), Jan Čarnogurský, was named deputy prime minister, 
and Vladimír Kusý of the Civic Forum became information minister. Alexander 
Dubček tried to replace Husák as president, but because he still spoke of a 
Czechoslovak path to socialism, Dubček was considered unfit for this office. He 
was thus elected chairman of the Federal Assembly. The crowds in the streets of 
Prague demanded: “Havel na hrad!” (Havel to the Castle). Indeed, on 29 Decem-
ber 1989 a communist assembly elected Havel president of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic.43 
Austria temporarily suspended visa requirements for Czechoslovak citizens, 
first until 17 December and then until the end of 1989. The citizens of Břeclav 
(Lundenburg) undertook a symbolically profound reconfiguration of spatial rela-
tionships by forming a human chain to the Austrian village of Reintal, a mere 
eight kilometers away, as part of a “Hands to Europe” event. Perhaps the grand-
est “mission” of all involved 150,000 citizens who set out from Bratislava on 10 
December 1989. Following arrangements that had been made in advance by 
Public Against Violence (VPN) activists, most walked through Austrian customs 
and then proceeded happily along the Austrian bank of the Danube toward the 
small town of Hainburg, some fifteen kilometers away. On 9 and 10 December 
alone, a quarter million Czechs and Slovaks visited Austria; 100,000 of them went 
to Vienna. The city of Vienna invited Czechoslovak citizens to visit its museums 
free of charge and the Austrian railway company offered them discounts in order 
to do so. So many citizens wanted to travel to Austria that Czech and Slovak 
financial institutions ran out of banknotes for them. The organized border cross-
42 Václav Havel, Fassen Sie sich bitte kurz. Gedanken und Erinnerungen zu Fragen von Karel 
Hvížďala (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2007); Judt, Postwar, 618–19; Beáta Blehová, “Michail Gorbačev 
und der Fall des Kommunismus in der Tschechoslowakei,” in Wolfgang Mueller and Michael 
Portmann, eds., Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), 349–367.
43 Jan Rychlík, Rozpad Československa. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1989–1992 (Bratislava: AEP, 
2002), 67–90; Judt, Postwar, 618–20.
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ings as well as these individual excursions to Vienna were an appropriation of 
previously forbidden public space.44
On 17 December 1989, the new Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiří Dienst-
bier and his Austrian colleague Mock symbolically opened the Iron Curtain by 
cutting the barbed wire between Austria and Czechoslovakia south of Znojmo 
(Znaim). With the Iron Curtain’s fall, Austria’s position on the periphery of the 
West was suddenly re-transformed into a central European position. The dramat-
ic events in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991 finally allowed Austria to 
join the European Community.45
44 James Krapfl, “A Big Bang of Signifiers. Nineteen Eighty-Nine and the Theory of Revolution,” 
paper presented at the conference “1989 Revolutions: Roots, Courses, and Legacies,” Stanford 
University, 14–15 March 2008.
45 Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, “Austria and Europe, 1923–2000. A Study in Ambiva-
lence,” in Rolf Steininger, Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, eds., Austria in the Twentieth 
Century (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2002), 294–320; Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik 2, 
605–56.
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M i c h a e l  g e h l e r
AUSTRIA, THE REVOLUTIONS, AND THE 
UNIFICATION OF GERMANY 
The historical significance of the year 1989 was global; it was a year in which 
the entire world changed dramatically.1 This chapter deals with the perceptions 
and reactions of Austrian actors (I) to the revolutionary changes that occurred in 
Central and Eastern Europe in 1989–90. This will first be examined in relation 
to the events in Poland (II.1), and then to the dramatic events at the Hungarian 
border, especially the Austrian reaction to the resulting wave of East German 
refugees (II.2). Next to be analyzed will be the Austrian reaction to the revolu-
tionary events in the GDR (II.3), to the developments in Czechoslovakia (II.4) 
and, briefly, to the events in Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (II.5). The final 
sections will describe how the role of the Warsaw Pact (III) and of transnational 
party cooperation (IV) was evaluated, as well as the attitude of the general Aus-
trian population toward the events that were occurring (V).
I. Austrian actors and contexts
In addition to the Austrian chancellor Franz Vranitzky (social democrat, SPÖ), 
the key persons involved were the vice-chancellor and foreign minister Alois 
Mock (Christian-democrat, ÖVP), and Vienna’s deputy mayor Erhard Busek 
(ÖVP), who later became minister of science. The characters, temperaments and 
interests of these three men could not have been more different. In 1989, the 
foreign policy of Austria’s large coalition government was focused on the con-
clusion of the CSCE follow-up conference, the negotiations held in Vienna on 
confidence and security-building measures, and Austria’s application for EU 
membership.2 In a dynamic, multi-leveled system, there were three contexts in 
which Austria’s perceptions and reactions developed:
-	 In the multilateral setting of the meetings and exchange of experiences that were 
part of the framework of the CSCE follow-up process in Vienna (1986–89);
-	 In the bilateral context of diplomatic and political contacts with representatives 
from Central and Eastern Europe through visits, meetings and direct commu-
nication;
-	 In the transnational context of networking and party cooperation.
1 Pierre Grosser, 1989. L’année où le monde a basculé (Paris: Perrin, 2009).
2 Michael Gehler, Österreichs Weg in die Europäische Union (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2009).
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How did Austria’s protagonists see Central and Eastern Europe? The vantage 
point from which Vranitzky surveyed the Central Eastern European region was 
pragmatic and quite different from that of Busek, as Vranitzky himself admitted:
There were several efforts called “Central Europe cooperation.” I attempted to do this at the 
bilateral level with the various governments—out of necessity already before the Velvet Revo-
lution, and then, of course, afterwards. Erhard Busek was an important trendsetter because of his 
contacts with “dissidents” during the communist period, not a few of whom “afterwards” held 
and still hold important functions.3
Vranitzky’s practical approach, as well as the priority he gave to the EC, was 
also recognized in other countries. The German journalist Theo Sommer wrote 
in this regard:
Vranitzky was rather suspicious of abstract temptations such as the imaginary concept of “Cen-
tral Europe” or the Italian construction of a “Pentagonal,” at least as a political project. This was 
“absolutely not an alternative or substitute for the EC,” as he stated tersely. He approached the 
candidacy in Brussels from two directions. On one side: “... that after the internal market has 
been established, it is necessary for us to be part of it.” And on the other side: “... that we can 
make an important contribution to the process of European integration.”4
In his memoirs, Vranitzky does not give the events of 1989–90 a particularly 
prominent position; the central role is held by domestic politics. For him, Central 
and Eastern Europe was a geographic term not connected to politics, despite the 
fact that the region had a definite socio-cultural dimension. As he stated:
I do not consider Central Europe a political entity or a political project—even less do I believe 
in the mythical concept of Central Europe. That is too connected to a longing for the good old 
days, good old days that were not particularly good. Central Europe is a geographical term for 
me. In its framework, certain regional collaborations can certainly be conveniently carried out; 
nonetheless, it does not represent an alternative to the project of Western European integration.5
But Vranitzky had an international outlook; he was far from being focused 
only on the West:
In this sense, European thinking goes far beyond what Brussels currently represents. I would 
add that a culturally comprehensive understanding of Europe should not be focused entirely 
on the West. It would be shortsighted to ignore the creative potential of Eastern Europe, be it 
3 Personal written communication from Franz Vranitzky to the author, 5 June 2008, 3. Cf. Armin 
Thurnher and Franz Vranitzky, Franz Vranitzky im Gespräch mit Armin Thurnher (Frankfurt am 
Main: Eichborn, 1992), 75; see also Erhard Busek, “Der strategische Vorteil der Österreicher ge-
genüber den Deutschen liegt in der Mentalität,” in Michael Gehler and Imke Scharlemann, eds., 
Zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie. Erfahrungen in Mittelost- und Südosteuropa. Hildesheimer 
Europagespräche II (Hildesheim: Olms, 2013), 457–97.
4 Direct citations in the quotation added by Theo Sommer, “Österreich, Deutschland und darüber 
hinaus,” in Edi Keck, Karl Krammer, Heinz Lederer, Andreas Mailath-Pokorny, and Oliver Rat-
hkolb, eds., Die ersten 10 Jahre: Franz Vranitzky (Vienna: D & R, [1996]), 146–55, 152.
5 Vranitzky and Thurner, Franz Vranitzky im Gespräch, 86.
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intentionally or due to oversight. It is not befitting for us in the West to be arrogant. We should 
also try to learn from the East.6
Unlike Mock, Vranitzky’s relations with the EC were temperate. Mock was 
“passionate defender,” whereas Vranitzky was considered a “mild advocate.” As 
stated by an Austrian journalist:
The reasoning of the chancellor was refreshingly different from that of his foreign minister. For 
Mock, participating in the large market is nearly a religious goal, but it is also an act of grace 
that he must request from his party colleagues. In contrast, Vranitzky notes that if Austria partic-
ipates, it will not only be the large market that has something to offer. Austria will function as a 
bridge; it is an interesting market and ideal for cooperative ventures.7
For Mock, who considered himself obliged to follow Chancellor Josef Klaus’ 
“Ostpolitik” of the 1960s—when Austrian foreign minister Bruno Kreisky and 
Lujo Tončić-Sorinj first visited Budapest, Bucharest and Warsaw—the speed of 
the political upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989–90 was surprising. 
Nonetheless, both Mock and Vranitzky quickly realized the significance of the 
reform movements and followed them carefully, despite the fact that Mock had 
a much stronger historical and emotional attachment to Central and Eastern Eu-
rope than did the chancellor.
Mock did not overemphasize the principle of non-interference in internal af-
fairs, and had made various overtures to dissidents. When he visited Bohuslav 
Chňoupek, the Czech foreign minister, in Prague in July 1987, Mock was the first 
Western foreign minister to request to see the dissident Václav Havel. Already in 
1969, when he was the minister of education, Mock had nominated Havel for the 
Austrian State Prize for European Literature. And during his visit to Moscow in 
September 1988, Mock met Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov. At the CSCE fol-
low-up conference in Vienna, there were bilateral talks with the foreign ministers 
George Shultz, Eduard Shevardnadze, Geoffrey Howe and Hans-Dietrich Gen-
scher. After the arrest of Havel on 21 February 1989, Mock took the opportunity 
to use the CSCE machinery for inspecting questions of human rights. Then, 
during his visit to Prague from 7 to 8 March 1990, he met the new Czech presi-
dent Havel and Cardinal František Tomášek. And when visiting Budapest on 14 
March, he took part in the renaming of the “Street of the People’s Republic” to 
“Andrássy Street.” In the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Andrássy had been the 
minister for foreign affairs from 1871 to 1879.8
With regard to Austria’s multilateral foreign policy and to developing specif-
ic plans for the Central European region, Mock and Vranitzky had common goals. 
They both supported the Quadragonale regional project (Austria, Hungary, Italy 
6 Ibid., 49.
7 Paul Fritz, “Klare Worte,” in Neue Zeitung, 7 November 1987.
8 Martin Eichtinger and Helmut Wohnout, Alois Mock: Ein Politiker schreibt Geschichte (Vienna: 
Styria, 2008), 191–97.
440
and Yugoslavia) at a meeting from 11 to 12 November 1989 in Budapest, and 
from May 1990, the Pentagonal (the same group together with the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic).9
Whereas Vranitzky’s international outlook was directed toward the West,10 
Busek was clearly focused on Central and Eastern Europe. He made contacts of 
varying intensity almost single-handedly, establishing close relationships with 
political dissidents and opposition groups, as for example in Hungary with József 
Antall of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), and to a lesser degree with 
Viktor Orbán from the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), which initially 
held a center-left position. He did the same with Václav Klaus of the Czechoslo-
vak Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Busek’s contacts aimed in part at “old” 
Christian-democratic parties, which had been subjected to communist control and 
coopted in coalitions with the communists. These parties were having to expend 
a great deal of effort to break away from the past and their connections to the 
communists by means of the National Front. A distinction must be made between 
Busek’s relations to the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement of Jan Čar-
nogurský (KDH) and to Mikulás Dzurinda’s faction, the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition (SDK). Relations with Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Poland were problem-
atic, since he refused to let his group join the conservative anti-communist Chris-
tian European Democrat Union (EDU) supported by Mock and Busek. The 
connections of Busek were based less on the political network of the EDU and 
more on personal contacts with dissidents.11 
II. Austria’s foreign policy and diplomacy—perceptions of the events 
of 1989
1. Poland
On 17 January 1989, Mock mentioned in passing at the final Vienna CSCE 
meeting that Austro-Polish relations were “very good.” On the same occasion, 
Polish foreign minister Andrzej Olechowski acclaimed the conclusion of the 
CSCE follow-up meeting as a historic event, and stated that Austria had played 
9 Emil Brix, “Die Mitteleuropapolitik von Österreich und Italien im Revolutionsjahr 1989,” in 
Michael Gehler and Maddalena Guiotto, eds., Italy, Austria and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many: A Triangle Relationship: Mutual Relations and Perceptions from 1945/49 to the Present 
(Vienna: Böhlau, 2012), 455–67, 459.
10 Michael Gehler, “Paving Austria’s Way to Brussels: Chancellor Franz Vranitzky (1986–1997): A 
Banker, Social Democrat and Pragmatic European Leader,” in Journal of European Integration 
History 18, no. 2 (2012): 159–82, 165–70.
11 Communication from Erhard Busek to the author, 26 October 2007; see also Esther Schollum, 
“Die Europäische Demokratische Union (EDU) und der Demokratisierungsprozeß in Ost-, Mit-
tel- und Südosteuropa,” in Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik (1991): 491–523, 491–93.
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a significant role in its positive outcome. For Warsaw, the CSCE process was one 
of its “most important foreign policy issues.” Poland was “very interested” in 
having a good relationship with Austria “at all levels.”12 The extent of the Polish 
debt constituted the country’s largest economic and political problem. In order to 
have time for internal consolidation, several years of leniency were requested. 
Agreements for long-term debt repayment were seen as a viable option. Poland 
sought a bilateral connection to the EC, as had Hungary. From the Polish per-
spective, the “friendly voice of Austria” could “help a lot.” Olechowski assured 
Mock that the leader of the military government of Poland, General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, was undertaking the “greatest possible efforts” to “integrate, in the 
internal transformations,” not only the important Catholic Church, but also the 
trade union movement Solidarity and its leader Lech Wałęsa. Poland was search-
ing for a pluralistic means of operation for both the unions and public life. After 
Poland, Hungary and the USSR, it was only a matter of time for transformations 
to take place in the other socialist countries in Europe, Olechowski argued. Mock 
considered the political transformations in Eastern Europe “very significant.” He 
recommended “striking the right balance,” and referred to the negotiations that 
had begun concerning the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe 
(CFE). He also asked the Polish authorities to speed up renovations on the Aus-
trian Cultural Institute in Warsaw.13
2. Hungary and its border with Austria
Vranitzky met the new Hungarian prime minister Miklós Németh for the first 
time on 13 February 1989. As part of delegation meetings, the two men met 
privately at the Hungarian Nagycenk Palace as well as in the town of Rust on 
Austrian territory to discuss their bilateral relations and respective economic and 
political positions. Németh spoke of a “second reform era” in Hungary, a process 
that had begun in 1986 when it was recognized that economic reforms were no 
longer feasible within the old political structures.14 For this reason, since May 
1988 the aim had been to accelerate the separation of party and state, to establish 
12 Amtsvermerk “Beziehungen Österreich-Polen; Gespräch HVK-AM Olechowski am Rande des 
Wiener KSZE-Abschlusstreffens, 17 January 1989,” 23 January 1989, in Bundesministerium 
für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten (BMEIA), GZl. 750.04/46-II.3/89. After 
applying for special permission, I was allowed early access to diplomatic records at the Austrian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the events in Central and Eastern Europe 1985–91. A vol-
ume of documents and a monograph are forthcoming. I would like to thank Ambassadors Fritz 
Bauer and Franz Wunderbaldinger, as well as Ministerialrat Gottfried Loibl for their support in 
this project.
13 Ibid. 
14 Resuméprotokoll, Sucharipa m. p., “Österreich-Ungarn; Grenztreffen HBK-MP Nemeth (13 
February 1989),” 14 February 1989, in BMEIA, GZ. 222.18.22/12-II.3/89.
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democracy and the rule of law, to form an “entirely new political system,” and 
to rapidly create the conditions for a market economy to develop by means of 
laws regarding banking, tax reforms and corporate bodies. According to Németh, 
both the population and the party had become divided into two camps due to the 
question of which direction to move: toward establishing a multiparty system or 
pluralism in the context of a single-party system. As part of the Central Commit-
tee meeting of 10–11 February 1989, the party had taken the initiative to create 
a multi-party system within the socialist context, so that various parties could 
compete with different agendas. The seeds for new parties existed, and it was 
expected that some would actually be established in the coming year. With regard 
to the issue of how the events of 1956 should be defined, the Central Committee 
had reached a compromise. While the events had had the character of a popular 
uprising, towards the end, they were declared to be similar to a counter-revolution. 
According to Németh, this “verdict decision” had been taken to prevent the par-
ty from being torn apart and to avoid the need for punishing particular individu-
als. It was hoped that the party and the people would see the events in the same 
way. Németh gave Vranitzky the impression that Hungary was “aware” of its 
great responsibility as the pioneer of political reform in the socialist world. In-
deed, in Hungary political competition was emerging for which no one was 
prepared. Thus the Central Committee was planning for the needed transition 
period. It was likely that a coalition government would form in Hungary. Németh 
raised the issue of work permits for Hungarian workers in Austria, and Vranitzky 
replied by assuring him that solutions would be found. Despite critical voices, 
Németh said that his government supported holding a joint world exhibition to-
gether with Austria. Combined planning and implementation of joint ventures in 
the auto and rail industries, as well as joint efforts in securing (external) funding 
were considered essential. In private conversations, in some cases also in the 
presence of Johann Sipötz, the governor of Austria’s easternmost province Bur-
genland, and his deputy, Franz Sauerzopf, it was agreed to construct new border 
and railway crossings at Pamhagen and Fertörakos/Mörbisch. It was also decided 
that the possibility of creating a duty-free zone in Sopron should be examined, a 
proposal that was to be made more concrete at the next meeting. Vranitzky de-
clared his firm intention of maintaining Austria’s neutrality if it were to become 
a member of the EC. Notwithstanding Austria’s efforts in this direction, its “ex-
cellent relations with Hungary would not be neglected.” Németh announced that 
the physical barriers at the border would be completely dismantled by 1991. The 
increasing organizational and technical cooperation between the two countries 
would also involve new obligations.15
15 Ibid. Cf.  Maximilian Graf, “Die Welt blickt auf das Burgenland 1989 - Die Grenze wird zum 
Abbild der Veränderung,” in Maximilian Graf, Alexander Lass and Karlo Ruzicic-Kessler, eds., 
Das Burgenland als internationale Grenzregion im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Neue Welt, 
2012), 135–79.
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In March Hungary joined the United Nations Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, entering into force on 12 June. The dismantling of the Hungar-
ian border barricades had already begun on 2 May 1989.16 The “cutting” of the 
Iron Curtain by Alois Mock and Gyula Horn on 27 June actually only involved 
last remnants of the barbed wire fences as most of them had already been re-
moved, and so in fact the whole action was staged for the media. Nonetheless, 
the television images of the events that were broadcast subsequently stimulated 
the largest exodus of GDR citizens since the construction of the Berlin Wall in 
1961. 
At a breakfast meeting the previous day, the two foreign ministers had dis-
cussed European integration and Hungary’s participation. Horn thought that in-
tegration had come about for “objective reasons.”17 He was worried about the 
possibility of being isolated from the EC. Hungary sought an agreement on 
preferential tariffs with the EC like the one held by Yugoslavia and hoped, in due 
course, to have a “true free trade agreement.” Before this could happen, the Hun-
garian economic system had to be liberalized and the forint had to be made 
convertible. At the same time, Hungary desired an intensification of its coopera-
tion with EFTA, whereby it imagined a joint declaration like the one that had 
been concluded by EFTA with Yugoslavia. Horn suggested to Mock that a special 
EFTA fund for Hungary be created to the order of 80 to 100 million dollars. While 
this would not repair the Hungarian economy, it would give many companies new 
momentum. With regard to the Council of Europe, Hungary indicated that it was 
satisfied with having come closer and was “not impatient” for full membership. 
Mock agreed to support Hungary’s rapprochement with EFTA politically. He 
raised the question of whether a large fund for all reform-minded Eastern Euro-
pean states could be created. Horn stressed that in principle Hungary saw Austria’s 
anticipated membership in the EC in a positive light. Hungary’s concern lay with 
preserving the special quality of its bilateral relations with Austria. Mock pointed 
out that Austria’s European policy rested on two pillars: its participation in West 
European integration (EU, EFTA, and the Council of Europe) and its neighbor-
hood policy. With regard to the current state of the EC and its foreseeable devel-
opment, he saw no reason for Hungarian concern. Horn made  it clear that pros-
pects for an agreement being passed on the disarmament issue had never been 
more positive, “but the devil is in the detail.” As an example, he mentioned 
problems about the air forces (“not everything can be solved in one go”). In any 
event, a new political impetus was needed. This could be accomplished by a joint 
16 Andreas Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer. September 1989—Ungarn öffnet die Grenze (Vi-
enna: Paul Zsolnay, 2009), 87–104; 154–99. Cf. John Lewis Gaddis, Der Kalte Krieg. Eine neue 
Geschichte (Munich: Siedler, 2007), 302–3; Bernd Stöver, Der Kalte Krieg. Geschichte eines 
radikalen Zeitalters 1947–1991 (Munich: Beck, 2007), 443; Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Endspiel. 
Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR (Munich: Beck, 2009), 346.
17 Amtsvermerk Schmid m. p., “Off. Besuch von AM Horn; Gespräche mit HBM, 26 June 1989; 
Internationale Themen,” 28 June 1989, in BMEIA, GZ. 222.18.23/25-II.SL/89.
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declaration being made at the higher levels of government, best that autumn. 
Mock agreed and repeated Shevardnadze’s proposal for holding a meeting of 
heads of state. He explained the useful role of the “neutral and nonaligned (N + 
N) states,” which were currently practicing restraint. Despite difficulties of inter-
nal consensus, they were always available as mediators in crisis situations. Horn 
did not wish to dramatize the fact that there had been a lack of agreement con-
cerning a final document at the CSCE Paris meeting. The principle of consensus 
should not be abandoned, despite the fact that it also had disadvantages, such as 
allowing one or two countries to prevent decisions from being made (a reference 
to Romania made by the Hungarian foreign minister). Horn pointed to the major 
importance of the 13 June 1989 joint statement of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the USSR, which confirmed the right of self-determination for all 
peoples,18 including the Germans. Mock underlined the “leap forward” that had 
been accomplished by the Vienna CSCE Final Document. This meant that it had 
been predictable that little more than the “human dimension” could have been 
achieved at the Paris meeting. It was probable that in Copenhagen there would 
also be no major progress, this being reserved by the Soviet Union for the Mos-
cow meeting in 1991. Horn described the Warsaw Pact as being in a process of 
defining itself. It was not collapsing, despite tendencies to that effect. The re-
form-minded members were dependent on one another and had to strengthen their 
cooperation. The political objectives of the Pact had to be identified. Hungary 
was seeking modernization, not disintegration. In the future, the pact would have 
to coordinate its defense policy, whereby an extensive restructuring would also 
have to include a change in the balance between cooperative and national military 
forces, to define a basic approach toward international issues, and should also 
safeguard the sovereignty of member states in domestic affairs, bilateral issues, 
as well as national interests with regard to third countries and matters of integra-
tion. It was planned to discuss these issues at the Warsaw Pact meeting to be held 
in Bucharest in early July. While the pact had never been a monolithic alliance, 
now any impressions of the like were also disappearing. The internal situation of 
individual countries (for example, Romania) was inconsistent with the general 
easing of pressure. The restructuring efforts at the national level were leading to 
18 Information Sucharipa “BRD-Sowjetunion; Gemeinsame Erklärung,” 15 June 1989, in BMEIA, 
GZ. 225.01.01/17-II.3/89. See also “Achtung des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker,” in Bul-
letin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der deutschen Bundesregierung, no. 61, 15 June 1989, 
542–44, 542; “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Generalsekretär Gorbatschow Bonn,” 
12 June 1989; “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Generalsekretär Gorbatschow Bonn,” 
13 June 1989; “Delegationsgespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Generalsekretär Gorbatsch-
ow Bonn,” 13 June 1989, in Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann, eds., Dokumente zur 
Deutschlandpolitik. Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 
1989/90 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998), 276–99; and Andreas Hilger, ed., Diplomatie für die 
deutsche Einheit. Dokumente des Auswärtigen Amts zu den deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen 
1989/90 (Munich: Oldenbourg,  2011).
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tensions with those countries that did not accept pluralism. The problem was that 
“conservatives” were questioning the legitimacy of the new structures, as was 
happening between Czechoslovakia and Hungary.19
Mock outlined the basic Austrian position concerning the reform efforts:
-	 the respective states were to make sovereign decisions;
-	 Austria aimed to react in a differentiated manner: as far as possible, it was 
supporting the reforms in Poland, Hungary and the USSR, but where neces-
sary, it was showing clear restraint, as for example with Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany and Romania;
-	 Austrian support should not cause any inconvenience, whereby Mock stated 
that he would be grateful for any suggestions;
-	 the opening of Eastern Europe would not lessen  the role of Austria, but widen 
its possibilities;
-	 the budding developments would diminish the differences between the sys-
tems, reducing tensions and bringing peace and stability to Europe;
-	 Austria’s neutrality enabled it to make a competent contribution to the current 
events.
Due to the developments, it would become possible to leave the phase of 
“peaceful coexistence,” which might be followed by a period of “wider cooper-
ation.” In the long term, this might lead to a third phase, that of a “Common 
European Home.”20 Here, Mock was referring to the slogans of Khrushchev and 
Gorbachev, seeing them as a possibility for dynamic development.
The reactions of the Warsaw Pact countries to the crackdown on the democ-
racy movement in China on 4 June 1989 and the reburial of Imre Nagy in Buda-
pest were watched closely by the Austrians and aptly interpreted. There was “a 
striking disagreement among the statements,”21 which on one hand documented 
the crumbling of the monolithic character of the Warsaw Pact, and on the other, 
the emergence of two camps. 
Poland and Hungary expressed dismay at the events in China. The Foreign 
Policy Committee of the Hungarian Parliament expressed its deep alarm.22 The 
Council of Ministers spoke of international responsibility in terms of human 
rights. The Polish dissident Adam Michnik argued that the events in Poland and 
China were an expression of the decline of political power. The Polish media 
considered Nagy’s interment to be the end of Stalinism in Hungary. The GDR, 
Romania and Czechoslovakia disapproved of the Nagy interment. No represen-
19 Amtsvermerk Schmid m. p., “Off. Besuch von AM Horn; Gespräche mit HBM, 26 June 1989; 
Internationale Themen,” 28 June 1989, in BMEIA, GZ. 222.18.23/25-II.SL/89.
20 Ibid.
21 Sucharipa m. p., “Reaktionen der kommunistischen Staaten Europas auf das Nagy-Begräbnis,” 
21 June 1989, in BMEIA, GZ. 222.03.00/36-II.3/89.
22 Sucharipa m. p.,“Reaktionen der WP-Staaten auf die Ereignisse in China und das Nagy-Begräb-
nis als Gradmesser für den Stand der eingetretenen Diversifizierung,” Vienna, 14 July 1989, in 
BMEIA, GZl. 33.03.00/172-II.3/89.
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tative of the Romanian government took part in the funeral rites; the Hungarian 
ambassador in Bucharest was summoned before the Romanian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and handed a memorandum of protest. The general secretary of the 
Czechoslovak Central Committee Jan Fojtik criticized “certain circles in the 
West,” which saw the Nagy interment as the symbolic burial of socialism in 
Hungary. The official East German news agency ADN opined that the celebration 
expressed the enmity between the Hungarian Communist Party and that of the 
Soviet Union. Led by the GDR, the response of these three states (GDR, CSSR, 
and Romania) and Bulgaria to the events in China was also unanimous, although 
the reaction of the CSSR was less severe. The army’s intervention was declared 
as having been necessary in order to eliminate “errors” and “to fight a count-
er-revolutionary rebellion.” In the GDR, the Church criticized the official position 
of the party and state with regard to the “Chinese solution.” In Bulgaria, despite 
restraint with regard to Nagy’s interment, the demonstrations in China were ap-
praised as a “counter-revolutionary rebellion.” The Soviet Union took a middle 
position in both cases; both liberal and orthodox opinions were expressed, where-
by in the case of the Nagy interment, a remarkable effort at objectivity could be 
detected. The Congress of People’s Deputies adopted a balanced resolution re-
garding the events in China, mentioning the use of troops and casualties, but also 
presenting the view that it was an internal matter and that no rash or hasty con-
clusions should be drawn. Other than a commentary in Pravda, which drew a 
comparison between the military deployment on Tiananmen Square and the 
fighting in Tbilisi and Fergana, what was published was only the official Chinese 
version, reproduced without comment. Gorbachev emphasized the need to find 
appropriate political solutions.23
The Pan-European Picnic, which was held on 19 August in the border region 
on Hungarian soil under the patronage of Otto von Habsburg together with Hun-
garian reform communists such as Imre Pozsgay, had the character of being a 
signal or a test, especially with regard to Gorbachev’s reaction. But the picnic 
was not the decisive factor in Hungary’s willingness to officially open the border, 
another event was much more critical: In the night of 21 to 22 August, the East 
German citizen Kurt-Werner Schulz was shot dead during a scuffle with a Hun-
garian border guard. A bullet is said to have been released from the officer’s 
submachine gun. The incident took place on Austrian territory in the Lutzmanns-
burg district. After the Hungarian authorities notified Austria, a border commis-
sion was immediately convened to clarify the case. Mock expressed his regrets 
about the incident.24 A few days later there was another fatality. After a success-
ful escape to the West, a forty-year-old East German died of a heart attack. The 
transfer of the body was undertaken by the German Red Cross. The autopsy re-
vealed that the man had been healthy, but had died of exhaustion. He had endured 
23 Ibid.
24 APA Report 0263 5 AI, 22 August 1989.
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five days without food in a Budapest church so that he could meet his West 
German fiancée.25 Many years later, Németh acknowledged in a television inter-
view that these fatal incidents, especially the death of the GDR citizen Schulz, 
were the crucial events that triggered Hungary’s explicit willingness to open the 
border. Németh’s closest advisors had brought it to his attention that because of 
the “aggressive” behavior of the East German refugees, he would have to bear 
the responsibility for more incidents and fatalities.26 But while an internal decision 
had been made, it had, of course, not been settled at the highest levels between 
Budapest, Bonn and Vienna.
The East German refugees crept through corn fields, waded through swamps, 
swam across Lake Neusiedl, crawled over fields and used any hiding place they 
could find at the Hungarian-Austrian border. They left their cars, “Trabis” and 
even more valuable Wartburgs, back in Hungary. According to the West German 
ambassador in Vienna, Count Dietrich Brühl, “the hour of Burgenland,” Austria’s 
easternmost province, had struck. Without the Burgenlanders’ “inestimable help 
for the Germans from the GDR,” the exodus would never have grown to the 
extent it did before the border was opened. This help ranged from assistance 
during the escape and first aid in the homes along the border, to providing infor-
mation about where buses to the embassy stood or families letting exhausted 
refugees stay with them for longer periods of time. Mayors of the smallest vil-
lages at the Hungarian border opened aid facilities in gymnasiums and similar 
buildings.27 
Medical care and ointments were needed for sunburns and babies suffering 
from innumerable mosquito bites. Donations were ready: from toys, diapers, 
clothes, food and medicine, to body care products, including shower gel, un-
known in the GDR. The rooms of the German embassy were crowded with 
people. There were not enough rooms in simple hotels. The mayor of Vienna, 
Helmut Zilk, provided rooms in hostels. The Austrian Red Cross, the Maltese 
Order relief agency, and several parishes in Vienna took in refugees and helped.28
By allowing the departure of refugees who had sought refuge in the West 
German embassy in Budapest, the Hungarian government infringed on the rules 
25 APA Report 0117 5 AI, 28 August 1989.
26 ORF ZIB 2 Report, 19 August 2009.
27 Report by former ambassador Dietrich Graf von Brühl, “Flucht in die Freiheit. Die Flüchtlings-
bewegung aus Ungarn im Jahre 1989,” 3 with an accompanying letter to the author dated 20 
November 2005. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Ambassador von Brühl (†) for the 
permission to use this report, as well as for the many conversations we had. See also Dietrich 
Graf von Brühl, “Deutsche Erfahrungen mit Österreich,” in Michael Gehler and Ingrid Böhler, 
eds., Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich: Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land 1945/49 bis zur Gegenwart. Festschrift für Rolf Steininger zum 65. Geburtstag (Innsbruck: 
Studienverlag, 2007), 579–84; Jens Schöne, The Peaceful Revolution. Berlin 1989/90 - The Path 
to German Unity (Berlin: Story Verlag, 2009), 53–69, 54–61; Interview with Countess Maria 
Octavia von Brühl, 26 February 2013 in Vienna; Graf, Lass, Ruzicic-Kessler, Das Burgenland.
28 Brühl, “Flucht in die Freiheit,” 4.
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of the Warsaw Pact. For the first time, East German citizens were allowed to leave 
Hungary to West Germany without permission of the GDR government. Until 
then, they had always been forced to return to their hometowns in the GDR, where 
at best they were released to the Federal Republic in the West after paying a large 
bribe to the government. The unimpeded group exodus of refugees from the 
embassy was new.29
A comprehensive solution for the refugees living in camps, however, required 
high-level talks. On Friday, 25 August, one day after the arrival of the refugees 
from the Budapest embassy in Austria, Németh and Horn met at Gymnich Castle 
near Bonn for secret talks with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher.30 When discussing the East German citizens in Hungary 
seeking to escape to the West, Németh stated that deportation of the refugees back 
to East Germany was out of the question, and added: “We are opening the border. 
If there is no military or political power from outside that forces us to act differ-
ently, we will keep the border open for East Germans.” The departure of the 
refugees was to take place until mid-September 1989.31
On 21 August, Genscher had already declared in an interview that no one in 
the GDR was being encouraged to leave the home. But anyone who did come 
had to be helped. In the same breath, he confided that he had turned to his “best 
people” to ensure that there would be help. He mentioned the former government 
spokesperson and foreign secretary Jürgen Sudhoff, his highest officials, and his 
former chief of cabinet Michael Jansen. To organize help, Sudhoff went to Bu-
dapest several times, and Jansen to Budapest and Vienna. Jansen was the main 
person responsible for organizing aid in Austria. He saw to it that Ambassador 
Brühl, who as a precaution had left “on vacation” to Tyrol, was brought back to 
duty. Brühl returned to Vienna the same day. On 25 August, Jansen was in Vien-
na to get a transit “green light” from Mock. Austrian approval was granted im-
mediately. Between 28 August and 10 September, important details were clarified 
with the head of the Foreign Ministry’s consular section, Ambassador Erik Nettel, 
29 Ibid., 7.
30 On this conversation, see Genscher’s memorandum, 25 August 1989, in Küsters and Hofmann, 
eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, 377–80. The memorandum, how-
ever, contains no mention of the opening of the Hungarian border to East German refugees, but 
only recounts the difficult economic situation in Hungary, as had been reported by Prime Min-
ister Németh; although he does not mention Austria’s and Mock’s role when opening the Aus-
tro-Hungarian boarder, see also Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland. Die Geschichte 
der Wiedervereinigung (Munich: Beck, 2009), 72–75; Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine 
politische Biographie (Munich: dva, 2012), 526.  In contrast to Rödder and Schwarz, see Gros-
ser, 1989. L’année où le monde a basculé, 44–45; Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 350–51, 377. 
31 Ibid. At the end of the statement was a hidden message to the refugees. See also, Helmut Kohl, 
Erinnerungen 1982–1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005), 921–23; concerning Bonn’s instrumental-
ization of the GDR refugee problem and the intensified reform process in Central Europe, see 
Janusz Sawczuk, Turbulentes 1989. Genese der deutschen Einheit (Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang, 2011), 174–206.
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and his deputy, Erich Kussbach, and an agreement was reached. Brühl recalls: “It 
was a pleasant conversation. The goal was clear. The road had to be paved. But 
it was not as easy as it sounds today. For example, a treaty with the German 
Democratic Republic obligated Austria to allow entry to persons arriving from 
East Germany only if they had a visa.”32 The main problem was how to organize 
the transit journey. The Austrian government maintained the decision it had al-
ready made with regard to the embassy refugees from Budapest: The Austrian 
Red Cross was commissioned with the task to make it clear that the activities 
were providing humanitarian aid. Using private buses and not the state railways 
(ÖBB) was practical for preserving neutrality. A combination of train-bus or even 
only trains was ruled out since the big camps in Hungary were not near railway 
stations. In addition, the number of refugees was too large. Reloading so many 
refugees twice was not feasible. The bulk of the refugees were therefore to be 
transported by bus to the German border via three major routes, along which the 
Red Cross had set up aid and support stations. The border crossings to Germany 
were Passau and Freilassing.33
Each Trabbi driver who could identify him- or herself as a citizen of the GDR 
at the Austro-Hungarian border was given 700 Austrian shillings by Red Cross 
workers at the aid stations, enough to buy the gasoline needed to reach the Ger-
man border. The Red Cross also prepared maps that showed the routes through 
Austria. The problem of the Austria-GDR visa agreement was regulated with a 
flexible “Austrian solution” by the government in Vienna: a loose piece of paper 
with a visa stamp was inserted into the identification papers of each East German 
refugee. Only the refugee’s name was recorded, whereupon entry was authorized. 
The insert was then removed at the German border. This satisfied the visa agree-
ment. Bonn had relayed the message to the West German embassy in Vienna that 
“money does not matter.” The expenses incurred by the Red Cross were refund-
ed.34
On 10–11 September, the border was opened for free crossing. Kohl had been 
made aware of this date by 4 September, as a result of an agreement between his 
advisor Horst Teltschik and the Hungarian prime minister. Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher was in the loop as of 7 September at the latest, after Horn 
had informed employees of the German Foreign Ministry in Budapest. Bonn had 
provided substantial financial guarantees, thus making Hungary more inclined to 
follow through. On 12 September, the paralyzed SED Politburo belatedly dis-
cussed countermeasures in East Berlin that had been hectically developed by the 
32 Brühl, “Flucht in die Freiheit,” 7.
33 Ibid., 8; Michael Jansen, “Vielleicht sah Genscher mit der Deutschen Einheit seine Mission 
nach achtzehn Jahren als Außenminister als erfüllt an,” in Michael Gehler and Hinnerk Meyer, 
eds., Deutschland, der Westen und der europäische Parlamentarismus. Hildesheimer Europag-
espräche I  (Hildesheim: Olms, 2012), 148–72, 169–70.
34 Brühl, “Flucht in die Freiheit,” 9.
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Stasi, but it had neither political arguments nor concrete means of exerting pres-
sure with respect to Budapest. The idea of recalling the ambassador was dropped. 
Initially, not even a decision to increase controls on GDR tourists going to Hun-
gary was made. In a protest note, East Berlin demanded that Budapest immedi-
ately reverse the opening of the border, which was promptly rejected. Hungary 
referred to article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the clau-
sula rebus sic stantibus (the fundamental change of circumstances).35 
During these days and weeks, the USSR remained neutral in the bilateral 
conflict between East Berlin and Budapest, while the triangle of Bonn-Vien-
na-Budapest coordinated with each other and organized the transfer of thousands 
of East Germans to the West, thus driving another wedge into the uncertain states 
of the Eastern bloc. Standing opposed to the reform-oriented Poles and Hungar-
ians was the communist-orthodox triangle of East Berlin-Prague-Bucharest.
In the period from 10 July to 13 November, the German embassy in Vienna di-
rectly furnished about 15,000 refugees with money, tickets and identity cards. In 
addition, from 11 September, at least 5,000 people were provided 700 Austrian 
schillings for gasoline by the Red Cross. More than 20,000 refugees crossed Austria 
to Germany in Red Cross buses or drove from Hungary, so that the wave of refugees 
who were counted numbered some 40,000 people. This does not include the many 
who were brought by West German tourists from Hungary, or were picked up di-
rectly at the Austro-Hungarian border by West German relatives. Thus, a total of up 
to 50,000 refugees chose to travel to West Germany through Austria in the summer 
and fall of 1989. The costs to the German embassy in the fiscal year 1989, including 
daily allowances, in some cases hotel rooms, tickets, the expenses for buses and 
general care, were around 3.8 million DM. The Red Cross was refunded around 1.5 
million DM, and thus the total was about 5.2 million DM.36 The German-Austri-
an-Hungarian cooperation, which, whether unwittingly or consciously, further ag-
gravated the erosion of the SED regime, was thus not particularly expensive.
For both sides, policy concerning the media was a balancing act from the begin-
ning. On one hand, as Brühl has emphasized, “Without the photo of the two foreign 
ministers cutting the barbed wire, which went around the world, and the reaction of 
the East Germans who were willing to flee, the rapid collapse of socialism in its 
communist form [would have been] unthinkable.” The media’s “daily drumming,” 
35 On the backgrounds and developments see Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer, 170–230. No 
reference to these forms of German-Austrian-Hungarian cooperation during the summer of 1989 
is made in Ines Lehmann, Die Außenpolitik der DDR 1989/90. Eine dokumentierte Rekonstruk-
tion (Baden-Baden: Nomos,  2011). On Kohl’s foreign and European policy, see Günter Buch-
stab and Hans-Otto Kleinmann, eds., Helmut Kohl. Berichte zur Lage 1989–1998. Der Kanzler 
und Parteivorsitzende im Bundesvorstand der CDU Deutschlands (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2012), 
XXXII–XXXVI, XL–XLIII, 12–14, 38–39 as well as the documents: 9 October 1989, 11–17; 6 
November 1989, 36; 15 November 1989, 37–39, 43–48, 27 November 1989, 52–59; 15 January 
1990, 71–75; 11 June 1990, 145–50.
36 Brühl, “Flucht in die Freiheit,” 10–11.
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its reports on the growing numbers of people eager to flee, fed the public pressure 
on politicians to help. Without the influence of the media, the events of the summer 
of 1989 would have been unimaginable. But information about the refugees still had 
to be muted. If a refugee appeared in front of a television camera, this could trigger 
retaliations against relatives who still lived in the GDR. For Brühl it is clear: 
If the information about the death strip being eradicated had not spread so quickly, especially the 
extremely popular image of the two foreign ministers cutting the barbed wire fence on 27 June 
1989, the movement of refugees probably would not have been so rapid.37 
Bonn praised Vienna, and Austria’s policy received gratitude and approval. 
Kohl personally thanked the citizens of Burgenland. The Austrian Federal Chan-
cellery on Ballhausplatz registered the West German reaction: it was “admonish-
ing stubborn patience,” it continued to talk about the integration of the West and 
its active participation in the European unification process, and it held “relieved 
gratitude” for confidence statements from its allies such as US president Bush.38
The position of the United States from the view of the diplomatic reports and 
evaluations of the political situation by the Austrian Foreign Ministry Foreign 
Ministry shows that what was involved was essentially the continuation and 
safeguarding of the Western security policy, the guarantee of the peaceful reform 
process in Central and Eastern Europe, and the support of the policies of Mikhail 
Gorbachev. In spite of different positions (Henry Kissinger doubted the continu-
ous logical development of the line pushed by Gorbachev from Lenin’s Decree 
on Peace to the idea of a “Common European Home”), one thing was totally clear 
for Washington: the CSCE process was to be strengthened and the human rights 
situation in Central and Eastern Europe was to improve. The Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987 was adopted, becoming a foreign policy 
success of US president Ronald Reagan. Austria’s geopolitical situation was 
viewed by US military and security strategists as a weak point (literally a “night-
mare”) for the defense of Western Europe.39 Nevertheless, US deputy secretary 
of state Lawrence Eagleburger assessed Austria’s knowledge of and experience 
with Central and Eastern Europe for the State Department as “valuable.” On the 
other hand, he evaluated proposals for the neutralization of Germany (such as in 
the Modrow Plan of 1990) to be “very dangerous.”40 
37 Ibid., 11–12, quote here 12; see also Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einigung 
(Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 39
38 Report Loibl, Austrian embassy Bonn, to Austrian MFA, “BRD; Regierungserklärung des 
Bundeskanzlers zur Lage der Nation im geteilten Deutschland, 8 November 1989,” 10 Novem-
ber 1989, in Archive of the Austrian embassy Bonn Zl. 21.56.02/2-A/89.
39 Report Plattner, “Einige Aspekte der Sicherheitspolitik des Westens (Lage zu Jahresbeginn 
1988),” 2 February 1988, in BMEIA, GZ. 703/1-II.1/88. 
40 Quotation from Information Vukovich, “Österreichisch-amerikanische KSZE-Konsultationen 
Washington, 2 February 1990,” 7 February 1990, in BMEIA, GZ. 807.30/39-II.7/90; also in this 
respect: Aktenvermerk Prohaska, “Besuch des stv. amerikanischen AM Eagleburger in Wien 
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Austria itself welcomed the rapprochement between the superpowers (with 
regard to the disarmament of conventional weapons systems and the elimination 
of nuclear weapons) and also wished to see these measures extended to cultural 
and economic areas. Against the background of the new reduction of tensions, 
Vienna wanted to present its function as a bridge between East and West through 
its neutrality, which for the most part still remained untouched.
3. The events in the GDR
The virulence of the German question and the rapidly implemented German 
unification did not come as a surprise only for Austrian diplomats and politicians, 
but also for the public. At the beginning of September 1989, Austria’s ambassa-
dors in East Berlin, Franz Wunderbaldinger, and in Bonn, Friedrich Bauer, were 
“unanimously convinced that talk about [reunification] was not to be taken seri-
ously.” 41 According to Bauer, “No one who was politically accountable” would 
seek such a thing. “Almost everyone would accept the two countries side by side. 
The maximum goal of a ‘Germany policy,’ supported by almost all political par-
ties, would only be to increase the existing contacts between the two states at all 
levels.” Wunderbaldinger made  it clear “that in the GDR, too, there is no great 
pressure to make radical changes. It is not expected that there will be a sudden 
upsurge and change of direction. Because, on the whole, the state is functioning, 
it is also accepted by the population.”42 
Ambassador Thomas Nowotny, who sat in the home office, was doubtful about 
all this: “There is evidence of a fundamental change in the political climate of 
the two German states.” He was referring to a debate between historians in the 
Federal Republic, in which “Germany’s war guilt” had been “put into perspec-
tive,” and to the issue of the Polish-German border. “East German nationalism” 
probably did not exist; at best, there was a feeling of certain local ties. The pop-
ulation had grown accustomed to certain convenient things such as job security 
and cheap basic food and housing, but these were not enough to create an iden-
tity. In the future, reunification was very much on the political agenda of both 
German states, and the Western European countries could not formally object to 
it. “Of course nobody” outside Germany actually wanted the two Germanys to 
“reunify” by applying their right to self-determination, a principle recognized 
(23. bis 25.2.) Besuch bei HBM, Round Table-Gespräch; AV,” 5 March 1990, in BMEIA, GZ. 
224.18.13./2-II.9/90.
41 The following quotes are from the report of Ambassador Nowotny, “Das Gespenst der deutschen 
Wiedervereinigung,” , 19 September 1989, in the Archives of the former Austrian embas-
sy Bonn, GZ. 22.17.01/4-II.6/89. A copy is in the possession of the author. See also Michael 
Gehler, “Österreich, die DDR und die Einheit Deutschlands 1989/90,” in Zeitschrift für Ges-




internationally by all countries, “but this fear is not articulated in so many words. 
One is very aware that an open stand against reunification would only strengthen 
the extreme nationalist forces in the Federal Republic. In this question there is 
no open political dialogue with the FRG—only mute, unacknowledged fear.” 
Nowotny left no doubt about what he described as an eerie scenario: “For the 
[current] structures, reunification would certainly be a huge shock.” According 
to his sophisticated analysis, however, in the event that reunification was realized, 
it would not be very dramatic and even less harmful: Not only was the population 
growth in the Federal Republic low or even negative, economically it was “much 
less dynamic than either it itself or other European countries commonly believe.” 
One had to start from the premise that if the present-day East Germany were to 
be reunified, it could not be brought to the economic level of the Federal Repub-
lic immediately. For a number of reasons, Nowotny did not consider German 
neutrality to be a mandatory prerequisite or result of the German states merging: 
He cited a statement that Khrushchev had made to Kreisky in an earlier decade, 
whereby neutrality was an appropriate status for smaller states, but inapplicable 
for those that held a significant role in international relations due to their own 
weight. Nowotny continued: Neutralization of the current Federal Republic would 
weaken the Western defense alliance to the degree that it would become “insub-
stantial.” Under its European policy, France was aiming at strengthening the 
Federal Republic’s Western ties so that they would be “de facto indissoluble.” 
Nowotny considered it more likely that the result would be an (enlarged) Feder-
al Republic that was part of the Western defense alliance, rather than a reunified 
Germany that was neutral, whereby this would involve a military shift that was 
apparently detrimental to the East. This, however, would be “less extensive” than 
one might initially expect. The Austrian diplomat summed this up in a realistic 
and far-sighted manner:
Despite lip-service to “self-determination,” no European state today desires German “reunifi-
cation.” However, the fear of such a reunification could become a very destabilizing element in 
European politics, despite the fact that it cannot prevent reunification. Whether this reunification 
actually occurs is, of course, uncertain. But whatever happens, it cannot be ruled out. In any 
case, developments have occurred in both German states that make such a reunification more 
likely today than it was two or three years ago. A reunified Germany cannot and should not 
be neutral or neutralized. But if at least [sic!] the western part of the reunified Germany were 
to continue to be part of NATO, and the entire state of Germany remain integrated [into] the 
EC, then the generally feared threat of a newly formed military and economically dominant 
super-power would not arise.43
43 Ibid. Nowotny was obviously responding to the idea of neutralizing Eastern Europe, which had 
been reintroduced and circulating in the US media; see Irving Kristol, “Why not Neutralize 
Eastern Europe?,” in International Herald Tribune, 13 September 1989. See also Christiane 
Lemke, Die Ursachen des Umbruchs 1989. Politische Sozialisation in der ehemaligen DDR 
(Darmstadt: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991), 276–78; Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in 
Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989, Geschichte der 
Deutschen Einheit 1 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998), 479–83; Werner Weidenfeld, Peter M. Wagner and 
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For Austrian diplomacy and politics, the fall of the Berlin Wall came as a com-
plete surprise. In the first weeks and months after 9 November, German reunifica-
tion was not expected. It was a taboo subject. The enthusiasm and joy about the 
unexpected events in the East were held in check at Ballhausplatz.44 Bauer has 
summarized the attitude in Vienna as follows: “We did not campaign against reuni-
fication, nor did we specifically welcome it at a certain point in time.”45
For this reason, in October and November 1989, the Austrian government ad-
opted a wait-and-see attitude that subsequently leaned clearly toward the status quo. 
Its approach was mainly that of politically correct neutrality. Vranitzky tried to be 
generous regarding the process of reforms in the GDR, but at the same time also 
to contribute to the normalization and stabilization of the East German transitional 
regime, and thus of the existing state of affairs. In the financial sphere, ties were to 
become closer, and the policy of economic bilateralism that had already been fol-
lowed until then was to be intensified. On 24 November 1989, Vranitzky was the 
first Western state guest to visit the new East German head of government, Hans 
Modrow. During the visit, Austria’s chancellor also paid his respects to the GDR 
opposition and met the governing mayor of Berlin, Walter Momper.46
In his Ten-Point Plan of 28 November, German chancellor Kohl then suggested a 
confederation of the two German states.47 He had to suppress his annoyance concern-
ing the “East-West Fund” that had been initiated by Vranitzky and the Austrian 
minister of finance Ferdinand Lacina. The five billion shillings (about 710 million 
DM) that Austria had introduced into the discussion that week needn’t have worried 
Bonn, because it was also planned to use the money for Poland, not only the GDR. 
But according to Bauer, Kohl was more fearful “that the Austrian proposal might 
become the nucleus of a larger Western European support action” for the GDR regime, 
especially since a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was 
in the making. Vranitzky had put in a bid for its seat to be in Vienna. In the end, 
London’s bid was accepted. Apparently, Modrow’s request for 15 billion DM in fi-
nancial assistance during his visit in February 1990 to Bonn was gruffly rejected by 
Kohl. The goal of the Austrian initiative had been to effect a smooth transition from 
a planned economy to a market economy over the mid-term period, as well as being 
a means for stabilizing and improving Austrian market economic competitiveness.48
Elke Bruck, Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit. Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90, Geschichte 
der Deutschen Einheit 4 (Stuttgart: DVA 1998), 300–45. On the German historians’ dispute, see 
Jürgen Elvert, “Erdmann-Debatte und Historikerstreit. Zwei Historikerkontroversen im Vergle-
ich”, in Gehler and Böhler, Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich, 454–67.
44 This is the unanimous verdict of the two ambassadors Bauer and Wunderbaldinger, who were 
concurrently the representatives in East Berlin and Bonn. Interviews with the two ambassadors 
in Vienna, 4 May 2007.
45 Interview with Ambassador Friedrich Bauer, 4 May 2007.
46 Gehler, “Österreich, die DDR und die Einheit Deutschlands 1989/90,” 430–35.
47 Weidenfeld, Wagner, Bruck, Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit, 97–110.
48 Letter from Ambassador Friedrich Bauer to the author, July 2007.
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On 26 January 1990, GDR prime minister Modrow, accompanied by foreign 
minister Oskar Fischer, the minister for foreign trade Gerhard Beil and tourism 
minister Bruno Benthien, stopped in Vienna during a visit to Austria. On this 
occasion it was decided to temporarily suspend visa requirements as of 1 February. 
Vranitzky pledged rapid support for the reforms in Eastern Europe. Austria would 
be ill advised to wait for the consolidation of democracy in the East, before de-
ciding to help. When working together it was focusing on “specific projects” and 
“not spectacular conferences.” Negotiations were also held with Austrian transport 
minister Rudolf Streicher and minister of economy Wolfgang Schüssel.49
Only during the visit of the newly elected, non-communist East German prime 
minister Lothar de Maizière to Vienna on 25 July 1990 was the reunification of 
the two German states appraised by Vranitzky as being “an event of greatest 
political significance that embodies, like no other, the victory over the division 
of Europe, and, at the same time, that allows a viable peace settlement to replace 
the decade-long confrontation between the two blocs.”50
On 30 July 1990, Mock spoke at the International Diplomatic Seminar at 
Klessheim Palace near Salzburg on the topic “Central and Eastern Europe on the 
road to parliamentary democracy and a social market economy.” He stressed the 
importance of the transition, and honored the achievements of Gorbachev, with-
out whom the changes in Central and Eastern Europe would not have been pos-
sible. Through his “new thinking” it had become possible for communism to 
change into a system of parliamentary democracy and market economy.51
In contrast to the Austrian Federal Chancellery, the early reaction of the Aus-
trian Foreign Ministry to the events in Germany had been very positive. Mock 
supported, openly and straightforwardly, the program of Kohl, which amounted 
to an all-German solution as part of the Western alliance. Through the course of 
January 1990, the growing untenability of the political situation in the GDR had 
become visible, although Vranitzky still wanted to give the Modrow government 
a chance.52
In the end, Austria did not serve as a neutral model for a united Germany. It also 
distanced itself from becoming a mediator. On one hand, it did not want to put a 
49 Gehler, “Österreich, die DDR und die Einheit Deutschlands 1989/90,” 437–43.
50 See the chronology of 25 July 1990, in Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Internationale Politik 
1990 (1991): 146, as well as the Document 10, declaration of the Austrian chancelor Dr. Franz 
Vranitzky on the occasion of German unification on 3 October 1990, Vienna, in Österreichische 
außenpolitische Dokumentation. Texte und Dokumente (November 1990): 51–52.
51 Ibid., 147; Aleksandr Galkin and Anatolij Tschernjajew, eds., Michail Gorbatschow und die deut-
sche Frage. Sowjetische Dokumente 1986–1991 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011), xxxiii–xxxiv.
52 Michael Gehler, “Eine Außenpolitik der Anpassung an veränderte Verhältnisse: Österreich und 
die Vereinigung Bundesrepublik Deutschland-DDR 1989/90,” in Michael Gehler and Ingrid 
Böhler, eds., Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich: Österreich und die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1945/49 bis zur Gegenwart. Festschrift für Rolf Steininger zum 65. Geburtstag 
(Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2007), 493–530, 506–11.
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strain on its ambitions for joining the EU, and on the other hand, it was interested 
in the revision of certain clauses of the 1955 State Treaty, for which the Soviet 
Union’s consent was still needed. In February–March 1990, the Austrian chancellor 
adapted his policies, especially in the wake of Modrow’s recall from office by the 
first free parliamentary elections in the GDR on 18 March, to the changing circum-
stances and finally expressed his support for German reunification.53
Until then, Vranitzky had followed the line of François Mitterrand and Mar-
garet Thatcher in the question of German unity, whereby the survival of the GDR 
was initially considered not only possible, but also desirable.54 He then changed 
his course for lack of a better alternative, after realizing the futility of this idea 
given the GDR’s massive debt.
In his speech to the Austrian National Assembly on 15 March 1990, Mock 
responded to the dramatic developments that had occurred in the recent months 
in the GDR. Since the beginning of the year, more than 100,000 East Germans 
had immigrated to West Germany. “The moment the apparatus of repression broke 
its stride and Soviet troops were no longer available as a control factor, the arti-
ficiality of the state structures in the GDR was revealed with a bang.” 55 With 
regard to the unification of the two German states on the basis of their right to 
self-determination, in the minds and hearts of the people it seems to be “a matter 
that has already been decided.” Mock continued: “For us, as members of the 
European international community, it is important that this process of reunifica-
tion is based on democracy, that existing borders and treaties are respected, and 
that the results of the Helsinki Process are also considered.” The reform process-
es in Poland and Hungary, which had started even before the revolutionary de-
velopments, had intensified in a peaceful manner, although this did not mean that 
all difficulties had been overcome. During a meeting with President Jaruzelski in 
Geneva, which took place on the periphery of the session of the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission, Mock reassured him that “Austria is prepared to 
support the reforms in Poland to the best of its abilities.” Mock visited Hungary 
twice, where he gained the impression “that this country is already quite far along 
the road to parliamentary democracy and a social market economy.”56 
53 Ibid., 512–15.
54 Valérie Guérin-Sendelbach, Frankreich und das vereinigte Deutschland. Interessen und Per-
zeptionen im Spannungsfeld (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1999); Tilo Schabert, Wie Welt-
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Austria was participating in aid operations and support measures. It was also 
playing a role in debit relief programs. The former communist dictatorships had 
debts in Austria of 190 billion shillings. In a televised press meeting on 25 No-
vember 1990, Mock agreed to several 100 million shillings of Austrian loans, 
with direct binding to other Austrian payments. In particular it was considered 
important to restructure the debt of Poland, which had “the most difficult situa-
tion.”57
4. The changes in the CSSR
The first official visit since 1981 of a Czechoslovak head of government to 
Austria took place on 24–25 October 1989. For Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, 
this was also his first visit to the West. The long delay for this official visit to 
Austria made it evident that from the Austrian viewpoint, bilateral relations with 
Czechoslovakia were not as deep-rooted or close as those with Hungary. Adamec’s 
visit left the impression in Vienna that the government in Prague had decided on 
a policy of cautiously becoming more open and of pursuing matters that Austria 
considered important. A sign of this had already been seen by a number of hu-
manitarian cases being resolved before the visit. This indicated Prague’s willing-
ness to introduce a series of other measures that would make it easier for the 
citizens of both countries to cross the border. But one key Austrian request, a 
reduction in visa fees, did not appear on the list of measures proposed by Adamec. 
It seemed that the CSSR either could not or did not want to relinquish this source 
of foreign currency earnings, especially when tourism was increasing. When 
questioned later, the former Czechoslovak ambassador to Vienna Marek Venuta 
agreed that this had been the case. Environmental issues were presented as one 
of the Czechoslovak government’s biggest concerns. Vienna was expecting 
Czechoslovakia to build more nuclear power plants. Adamec repeated that 
Czechoslovakia was very interested in intensifying its economic relations with 
Austria. There were opportunities for this particularly in the area of environmen-
tal technology. According to Vienna’s appraisal of the situation, Prague was aware 
of its need for socio-political change, particularly in light of the incipient reform 
developments in the GDR and the possibility of an impending isolation, which 
sparked serious concern. But any attempts at other political forces gaining polit-
ical participation were still rigidly tied to the communist party’s grasp on its 
governing role, and thus from the outset were severely limited. This was unequiv-
ocally expressed by Adamec during his Vienna visit: There would be “dialogue 
with ‘independent groups’ only if they do not place the existing system in ques-
57 Transcript of the “Pressestunde” with Mock on 25 November 1990, Greinert, m. p., Runderlass 
an alle Österreichischen Berufsvertretungsbehörden und Kulturinstitute, 28 November 1990, in 
BMEIA, Zl. 800.55.07/55-I.3/90.
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tion.” 58 In October 1989, the course had been set  in Prague for a careful and yet 
perceptible intensification of Austro-Czechoslovak relations. But the CSCE hu-
man rights stipulations continued to be a limiting factor from Vienna’s point of 
view, while in Prague they were perceived by many communists as annoying.
A few weeks later, Mock concluded in retrospect that the developments in 
Czechoslovakia had been “less dramatic” than those in the GDR. Because of the 
sudden feeling of political isolation, the local leadership yielded “relatively rap-
idly to the pressure of the powerful demonstrations, especially after 17 Novem-
ber.”59 The rigid functionaries heading the communist party were soon replaced 
by leaders ready for power-sharing. With the election of former dissident Václav 
Havel as president, “an unambiguous signal [was] set in the direction of democ-
ratization.” During Mock’s visits to Prague and Bratislava in March 1990, he was 
able to “perceive this change clearly.” Just as Mock had initiated the first stage 
of the CSCE human rights control mechanism when Havel had been arrested the 
previous year, Mock intervened on 25 October 1989 for the release of Jan Čar-
nogurský, who was imprisoned in Bratislava. A few weeks later Čarnogurský had 
become part of the government as the first deputy to the prime minister. Mock 
made  it clear “that today at the top of the Czechoslovak state are people with 
whom we are closely connected because of our natural solidarity in difficult 
times.”60
5. The changes in Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia
Especially dramatic were the developments in Romania, which coincided with the 
Christmas holidays. Hundreds of people died in chaotic conditions during the struggle 
for freedom.61 Vienna was informed about the continuing miserable supply situation 
and the violation of human rights. The government’s position could only be sustained 
by the security forces. Although a few individuals could be considered part of an 
opposition, their efforts were ineffective. The federal government in Vienna had ap-
plied the CSCE human dimension mechanism (levels 1 and 3) according to the Vi-
enna follow-up meeting.62 As stressed by Mock, Austria could also be proud “that it 
had the courage to call on the United Nations Security Council to deal with the situ-
58 Record entry, Sucharipa m. p., “CSSR; offizieller Besuch Ministerpräsident Adamecʼ; Gesam-
teindruck,” 30 October 1989, in BMEIA, GZ. 35.18.09/36-II.3/89.
59 Report Valentin Inzko, “‘Der Wandel in Europa als Herausforderung für Österreich,ʼ Rede 
des Herrn Bundesministers im Nationalrat, 15 March 1990,” 16 March 1990, in BMEIA, Zl. 
700.17.15/149-I.3/90.
60 Ibid.
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2nd ed. (Munich: Piper, 1990), 82–131.
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ation in Romania.”63 However, the Security Council was blocked by Chinese and 
Soviet vetoes. As soon as the tide had turned in Romania after the bloody overthrow 
of Nicolae Ceausescu, Austria and its population distinguished themselves, as Mock 
notes, “through a huge wave of aid and solidarity that was internationally recognized.”
The reform efforts in Bulgaria were judged in Vienna as being “art for art’s 
sake.” At the first signs of pluralistic impulses, repressive forms could immedi-
ately be seen. Austria served as a transit country for Turkish-Islamic minorities.64 
While the developments in Bulgaria were still largely dominated by the commu-
nist party, although excesses toward the country’s Islamic ethnic minority had 
subsided (Sofia had initiated a brutal Bulgarization and assimilation policy against 
the Turkish population which led to a mass exodus), Mock let it be known that 
the developments in Yugoslavia gave “cause to a certain degree of concern.” Old 
nationalistic and ethnic divisions that were thought to have been overcome threat-
ened to erupt again. The foreign minister, however, was swayed by the idea “that 
Yugoslavia is strong enough to cope with these problems politically and to solve 
them step by step in the course of the democratization process.”65 He was mis-
taken. Hungary’s foreign minister Horn had informed the Ballhausplatz about 
“Hungary’s great concern” already in March 1989: “Milošević is pursuing a 
neo-Stalinist model that is even more dangerous when seen in a nationalist-Ser-
bian framework. This can lead to unforeseeable consequences.”66
In the 1990s, Europe was to experience three new conflicts in the Balkans (in 
1991–92, the federal government and army of Yugoslavia against Slovenia and 
Croatia who had declared independency; 1992–95, a civil war in Bosnia-Herze-
govina with Serbian and Croatian intervention; and in 1999, the Kosovo war 
between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians with NATO intervention). Until 1945 there 
had been four wars in the Balkans (in 1912, 1913, 1914–18, and 1941–45), and 
thus in the twentieth century the area saw a total of seven wars. 
III. The Warsaw Pact in transition and other trends 
in Central and Eastern Europe
In Austria’s assessment (based on Yugoslav and Hungarian sources), the meet-
ing of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest on 7 and 8 July 198967 was marked 
63 Speech Mock, “Der Wandel in Europa als Herausforderung für Österreich,” 15 March 1990.
64 Information, Sucharipa m. p., “Osteuropa; aktuelle Lagebeurteilung,” 8 June 1989, in BMEIA, 
GZ. 713/6-II.3/89.
65 Speech Mock, “Der Wandel in Europa als Herausforderung für Österreich,” 15 March 1990.
66 Record entry, Sucharipa m. p., “Entwicklungen in Osteuropa; Gespräch des HGS mit Sta-
atssekretär Horn,” 20 March 1989, in BMEIA, GZ. 502.16.03/19-II.3/89.
67 Records of the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Bucharest, 7–8 July 1989, in Vo-
jtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw 
Pact 1955–1991 (Budapest: CEU Press, 2005), 644–54.
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by a “new atmosphere” that allowed “genuine consultations” of the type held 
between equals. The Pact was in the process of evolving into something similar 
to a political alliance. The Hungarian foreign minister considered three aspects 
worth mentioning: There was no resistance to Gorbachev’s disarmament propos-
als, or even misgivings. Perestroika was deliberate and the Brezhnev Doctrine 
had been “suspended.” And a clear division had emerged between the socialist 
states with regard to their willingness to reform: On one side were the “hardlin-
ers,” to which Horn counted not only the GDR and Romania, but also Bulgaria, 
to the surprise of Vienna. The progressive states were considered the USSR, 
Hungary and Poland. The CSSR’s low-key stance did not allow an opinion to be 
formed. According to information provided by Yugoslavia, bilateral issues were 
discussed in Bucharest, but not within the framework of the Pact’s conference, 
but at a concomitant meeting of the party leaders. Ceausescu made  serious re-
proaches against Hungary, but was “held back” by other party leaders. Todor 
Zhivkov requested support in Bulgaria’s conflict with Turkey, but it was pointed 
out to him that he could hardly expect support from his partners now, after hav-
ing neither informed nor consulted them with regard to his unilateral handling of 
his country’s dispute with Ankara (due to the repressive measures Bulgaria had 
taken against its Turkish minority).68
In December 1989, Vienna considered the general trends in Central and East-
ern Europe to be the following: Most of the Warsaw Pact countries were pursuing 
courses of reform from which “positive regeneration effects” would develop. 
Pragmatically, shifts were occurring in the limits Moscow regarded tolerable in 
the satellite states’ transformation processes. Membership in the Pact was “still a 
conditio sine qua non.” The northern states in the Pact’s territory (Poland and the 
GDR) had a different strategic importance than the southern area (Bulgaria and 
Hungary). Stronger aspirations for neutrality were seen in Hungary. It was also 
noted that there were separatist tendencies in the Baltic Soviet republics, which 
would dangerously boost the opposition to Gorbachev in the Soviet bureaucratic 
and military apparatus. Vienna considered it best if the West practiced restraint. 
The transformation of the Warsaw Pact into a (defensive) military alliance that 
no longer had the authority to intervene in internal affairs was seen by the ma-
jority of the member states as the goal.69
The foreign ministers’ meeting in Warsaw 26–27 October, the first Warsaw 
Pact meeting without a communist chair, went well. With the increasing equality 
of the member states’ rights on foreign policy issues, the need was seen for im-
proved coordination through the establishment of a permanent (political) Warsaw 
Pact secretariat. Vienna recommended that the West encourage these develop-
68 Report, Austrian embassy Belgrad, “Zum Warschauer Pakt-Gipfel in Bukarest (7–8 July 1989),” 
Zl. 395-RES/89, 2 August 1989, in BMEIA, Zl. 701.03/14 and 16-II.3/89.
69 Report Abteilung II.3, “Osteuropa. Generelle Tendenzen,” Zl. 350-RES/89, 13 December 1989, 
in BMEIA, Zl. 713/78-II.3/89 (642li).
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ments, also during the  Vienna CSCE negotiations. Moreover, the Austrian chan-
cellery was watching the desperate Soviet attempts to create a more efficient 
basis for CMEA cooperation. Vienna thought it very unlikely that this would 
happen, due to the attractiveness of the European Community as well as EFTA. 
Austrian foreign policymakers were aware that the West had the great task of 
economically assisting the East European states and cautiously binding them 
institutionally (Council of Europe, EFTA, EC). EFTA could not take on the func-
tion of a waiting room, and therefore the EC and EFTA had to act in tandem. 
Western economic support had to be reform-oriented (“structural reform consis-
tency”). At the Ballhausplatz it was accurately recognized that economic struc-
tural reforms represented “a bigger problem” than had been previously thought. 
The process would be happening for the first time in history under the worst 
possible conditions: debt burden, poor infrastructure, obsolete institutions. Then 
again, the generally high educational level of the Eastern population was noted. 
If the economic reforms failed in the medium-term, it was feared that the politi-
cal reforms would be threatened. The possibility of these countries tipping toward 
nationalist right-wing governments or military regimes could not be ruled out. A 
return to the old communist rule in the Warsaw Pact countries was considered 
possible only if a concurrent revolution occurred in Moscow. At the Ballhausplatz, 
the central issue was therefore considered the continued existence of the Soviet 
course of reforms. Despite Gorbachev’s apparently strong political position, in-
creasing signs were already noted in December 1989 that the gap between the 
accelerated political change and the slow economic reforms would become dan-
gerous. Washington also thought this to be the case. With the rapid changes in 
East Germany and the reaction of West Germany, pan-European issues were 
being faced. From the Austrian viewpoint, these were to be addressed “calmly.” 
With regard to the question of (re-)unification, the right to self-determination was 
emphasized, which Austria supported unconditionally. According to the Ballhaus-
platz, it was “self-evident that this also applied to the people of both German 
states.” Nonetheless, any reorganization of the German-German relationship 
should be done in a manner that neither endangered the process of détente and 
peace in Europe, nor created questions regarding the inviolability of the postwar 
borders for the neighboring countries.70
IV. Transnational party cooperation
To date, the role of transnational party cooperation has received scant attention 
in connection with the changes in Central and Eastern Europe. While the social 
democrats and socialists were noticeably reserved—which had not only to do 
with the fundamental question of assessing existing socialism and its future, but 
70 Ibid.
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also repercussions concerning the value of its ideology and politics—Christian 
democratic and conservative party representatives were noticeably more active.
Already years before the dramatic events of 1989–90, the party representatives 
who had joined together in the aforementioned European Democrat Union (EDU) 
had registered that changes were emerging in the so-called Eastern bloc. The EDU 
perceived itself as a kind of “Anti-Communist International” (Eichtinger and 
Wohnout), with numerous contacts to dissident groups. Mock saw a new era 
opening with General Secretary Gorbachev. As he pointed out in September 1988 
at the EDU party-leaders conference in Rhodes, “Nevertheless one thing is cer-
tain: a wind of change is blowing also in Eastern Europe.” He did not consider 
Gorbachev a revolutionary; he was rather a reformer who was not aspiring to 
change the communist system, but to improve it. At the EDU steering committee 
in Stockholm on 30 June 1989, it was decided to support the democratization 
processes as well as the “like-minded” parties. Gabor Roszik, the first freely 
elected opposition member of the Hungarian Parliament who had won his seat in 
a by-election, was a guest at the second EDU parliamentary conference in Anta-
lya from 24 to 26 August 1989. Mock saw the EDU as having the “assignment” 
of developing new parties in Central and Eastern Europe. To explore the political 
field, fact finding missions were conducted in Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Romania 
and Bulgaria.71
Relatively early, on 13 November 1989 at a meeting of delegates to the EDU 
held in the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Sankt Augustin near Bonn, a clear com-
mitment to “German reunification” was made. Four days after the opening of the 
Berlin Wall the European Committee of the EDU 
congratulated Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his government on the developments in 
inner-German relations. The form insistence on the Basic Law and its implication by the CDU/
CSU contributed to this success just as much as their adherence to the principle, unlike the SPD, 
not to enter into friendly relations with the SED, the communist party, which bears the responsi-
bility for the old regime of terror. Only a few weeks ago the SPD still tried to conduct top-level 
talks with the SED, thus stabilizing this party.
The EDU welcomes and supports the courageous and far-sighted attitude of Chancellor Kohl to 
respond to the crisis in the GDR with a broad offer of aid, if those in power initiate a process of 
democratization.
The Committee will support Chancellor Kohl and his government in all further steps that lead 
to peaceful development as well as to more freedom and democracy in the GDR. The EDU 
supports the desire of the Germans to complete the unity of Germany in freedom and peace in 
exercising the right of self-determination.72
71 Eichtinger and Wohnout, Alois Mock, 152–55. The author would also like to thank Helmut 
Wohnout for providing a copy of his manuscript of the article “Österreichs Außenminister Alois 
Mock, Deutschland und Europa,” which he presented at the History Department at the Univer-
sity of Hildesheim in the fall/winter semester of 2010–11.
72 28th Meeting of the EDU Committee on “European Structures - European Policy” in St. Au-
gustin/Bonn, 13 November 1989, in Archiv des Karl von Vogelsang-Instituts, Vienna (AKvVI), 
Michael Gehler
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The EDU Committee then also adopted the declaration under the heading “For 
a united Europe in peace and freedom” and expressed its clear support of the 
federal government’s demand for Germany’s reunification as well as pointing out 
its continued integration in the West (and consequently its disapproval of neutral-
ity or neutralization for a united Germany):
The EDU welcomes and supports the peaceful development toward more freedom and democ-
racy in the GDR. It reconfirms the desire of the Germans to complete the unity of Germany in 
peace and freedom in exercising their right of self-determination. [...] The attractiveness of West-
ern European integration has had a positive influence on developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Therefore the economic and political unification of the European Community must be 
strengthened further. This is a prerequisite for political evolution in Germany. The three Western 
powers, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, continue to have treaty 
obligations and political commitments with regard to Germany. Likewise, the member states of 
the European Community and the EC itself are called upon to implement such a policy.73
On 30 and 31 August 1990, the EDU accepted the membership of the first 
new democratic parties in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Hungarian Chris-
tian democrat József Antall became the EDU’s vice president. This development 
was mainly due to the efforts of ÖVP politicians, including Erhard Busek and 
Andreas Khol, but especially Alois Mock, who served from 1979 to 1998 as the 
chairman of the EDU.74
V. The reaction of the Austrian population
In May 1990, the Ballhausplatz became aware that in the Austrian population 
interest in foreign policy had increased. On one hand, this had to do with the 
events in Central and Eastern Europe; on the other, it had developed out of the 
deliberations regarding how to define Austria’s relationship with the EC. Based 
on a survey conducted by the Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft, it had 
emerged that almost a third of the Austrian population was “very” interested in 
foreign policy issues, twice as many as those who were “very” interested in do-
mestic policy.75 
Materialbestand EDU 1989–90, EDU/1989/1705 rev 14-11-1989. Dr. Hannes Schönner kindly 
allowed the author preliminary access to this and the following document. 
73 Declaration “For a united Europe in peace and freedom” of the EDU meeting in St. Augustin/
Bonn, 13 November 1989, ibid., EDU/1989/1700 rev, 14-11-1989. See also Hans Stark, Helmut 
Kohl. L’Allemagne et l’Europe. La politique d’intégration européenne de la République fédérale 
1982–1998 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 145–57.
74 Eichtinger and Wohnout, Mock, 155.
75 Report Nowotny, “Interesse für Außenpolitik stark gestiegen und liegt nun weit über dem Interes-
se für Innenpolitik,” 4 May 1990, sent to the Austrian embassies, in BMEIA, GZ. 502.02.01/68-
II.6/90.
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Of 2,000 Austrians surveyed by two Austrian marketing research companies 
Fessel + GfK (Institut für Marktforschung) and the Institut für Empirische So-
zialforschung (IFES) in the period between November 1990 and January 1991, 
87% responded to the question of how they saw Germany’s unification with 
“rather positively,” in contrast to 10% who responded with “quite negatively.” 
The largest number of negative responses were from members of the Green Par-
ty, with nearly 20%. Interestingly, over 10% of the right-wing Freedom Party 
(FPÖ) also expressed a negative reaction. In this context, the answer to whether 
or not Austria should become part of the unified Germany was also quite reveal-
ing. Altogether, 92% responded with no to this question, and only 6% said yes. 
Nonetheless, 10% of those who had FPÖ leanings were for a merger, while Green 
Party members had the largest number against, with 95%.76
As to the general question of the expected impact of unification, the most 
frequent responses were unspecified consequences for business and industry 
(32%), an increase in tourists from former East Germany (12%), problems with 
immigrants to Austria (8%), and greater market opportunities and trade growth 
(7%). Nearly two-thirds were worried by the fact that approximately 60% of the 
Austrian companies acquired by foreigners in recent years were in German hands. 
This was because Austria’s economic dependence on the Federal Republic was 
already quite high. If Germany were reunified, 19% believed that there would be 
a revival of “Anschluss thinking” in Austria, whereas 77% disagreed.77 On one 
hand, this data confirmed Austria’s strong support of German unification, but on 
the other hand, it also showed Austria’s mature sense of identity and the stable 
perception of the Austrian nation, to which the Austrian foreign policy and the 
diplomacy of the Ballhausplatz during the previous decades had contributed sig-
nificantly. Ideas of Greater Germany belonged to the past.
VI. Conclusion
Austria responded early and positively to the reform efforts in the states of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Its strongest sympathies were for the changes in 
Hungary, as well as for those in Poland, albeit to a lesser degree. The reaction to 
the developments in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria ranged from skepti-
cal to disapproving. The end of the GDR had an entirely different impact and was 
to change the situation dramatically. The collapse of the communist dictatorship 
was received in Vienna with mixed feelings. While Vranitzky’s attitude toward a 
reform-minded GDR was open, well-disposed and even friendly, Mock clearly 
76 Gehler, “Eine Außenpolitik der Anpassung”, 522.
77 Hanspeter Neuhold, “Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung und ihre Folgen,” in idem and Paul Luif, 
eds., Das Außenpolitische Bewußtsein der Österreicher: Aktuelle internationale Probleme im 
Spiegel der Meinungsforschung (Vienna: Braumüller, 1992), 35–36, 241, 244.
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sided with Kohl’s policy. Dissent within the coalition was unmistakable. The 
differing attitudes of the Austrian government leaders toward the German devel-
opments were also due to their different lines regarding the EC. Mock’s course 
was focusing on accession to the EC, whereby he was relying on West German 
support, just as he had also expressed his early support for Kohl’s Germany pol-
icy. Vranitzky moved thoughtfully and carefully with regard to Austria’s applica-
tion for EC membership, at all times emphasizing and upholding the govern-
ment’s policy of neutrality. This resulted in his more economic-pragmatic ap-
proach to the reform movements in Central and Eastern Europe, while Mock’s 
position was more strongly based on anti-communist—that is, ideological—as 
well humanitarian and cultural-political motives. In the second half of the 1980s, 
the ÖVP, with Busek and Mock, was more focused on Central and Eastern Europe 
than the SPÖ under Vranitzky. With the exception of the rapid onset of the Ger-
man unification movement, which surprised all who were involved (except for 
Thomas Nowotny), it is amazing how accurately the changes in the other states 
were assessed.
To conclude, five aspects should be established:
1. Vienna was accurate in its assessment of the actual interdependence and mu-
tual interaction between glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union and the 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe.
2. Gorbachev’s key role in the reform processes and the further opening of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe was recognized by Vienna early: Whether the devel-
opments stood or fell was dependent on him. This is why the stability of the 
Gorbachev regime was accorded a top priority. In this regard, Austria’s foreign 
policy moved completely in line with that of the West.
3. The reform movements in Central and Eastern Europe were judged realisti-
cally with regard to their significance and stage of development. The differ-
ence between the pioneering role of Poland and Hungary and the slower 
headway in Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania was eval-
uated reliably and with fine distinctions.
4. The fact that the German question might result in a significant shift of power 
in Central Europe was perfectly clear in Vienna. The diplomats at the Ball-
hausplatz did not follow the changes in East Germany only by waiting and 
sitting still, but with a sense of urgency and concern. The fall of the GDR was 
different than the changes occurring in Hungary and Poland. While Vranitzky 
tried to moderate and Mock acted in a pronounced pro-unification manner, 
Busek remained silent.
5. The CSCE offered an important stabilizing and conciliatory framework into 
which the dramatic upheavals could be placed. This was also the consensus 
among all twelve EU member states. Austria’s mediation services within the 
CSCE follow-up process and Vienna as a meeting place had a positive impact 
on the further developments.
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The only decisive way for Austria to intervene politically in the course of the 
events just before the fall of the Berlin Wall was through the symbolic cutting of 
the Iron Curtain and the assistance and support it gave to fleeing East German 
citizens. The Austro-Hungarian prologue in the summer of 1989 was decisive for 
the extreme speed of the developments in Germany that autumn. The decision to 
reunify Germany and to free the Central and Eastern part of the continent from 
communist dictatorship as well as Soviet oppression and involve it in the medium 
and long-term European integration project was the result of a “glorious moment 
of diplomacy.”78 The decisions were not only made in Vienna, but in Moscow, 
Washington, Bonn, and later in Brussels within the framework of NATO and the 
EU.
78 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Sternstunde der Diplomatie. Die deutsche Einheit und 




d i e T e r  s e g e r T
SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATIONS  
IN EASTERN EUROPE AFTER 1989 AND THEIR 
PRECONDITIONS 
“Systemic change” is used to describe the complex change of all basic insti-
tutions in any given society.1 In 1989, the distinctive and multifaceted institution-
al system in Eastern Europe—European state socialism—began to change into 
another system that was very different, a system that might be described as 
“democratic and welfare capitalism.” This chapter will only deal with those 
transformation processes within the sphere of politics, economy, and culture that 
had an influence on the systemic change as a whole. The expression “societal 
transformations or changes” will be used in the same sense as “systemic change.”
Secondly, “societal transformation” will be used in its narrower sense, name-
ly, to indicate the process of changes in the social status of members of a given 
society, in this case caused by the East European societies’ transformation from 
state socialism to capitalism. The main tendency of societal transformation usu-
ally consists in large-scale differentiation in social relations. One goal of state 
socialism was to equalize people’s social status. Notwithstanding certain coun-
tertendencies,2 when compared to other types of societies this was attempted by 
state socialism’s ruling politics favoring blue collar workers and farmers, as well 
as its measures against the former upper classes. No study of the societal chang-
es in Eastern Europe overlooks the fact that the transformative changes involved 
1 On this issue, see the proceedings of the series of conferences in the 1990s convened by a study 
group of the same name in Germany. The German title was “Systemwechsel” (systemic change). 
The initiator of these conferences was Wolfgang Merkel. To a great degree, in the German 
scholarly community the respective discussions have supported the paradigm of “transition to 
democracy.” Wolfgang Merkel et al., ed., Systemwechsel 1: Theorien, Ansätze und Konzepte 
der Transitionsforschung (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996 ); Systemwechsel 2: Die Institutio-
nalisierung der Demokratie (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996); Systemwechsel 3: Parteien im 
Transformationsprozeß (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997); Systemwechsel 4: Die Rolle von 
Verbänden im Transformationsprozeß (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1999); Systemwechsel 5: 
Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation (Opladen: Leske & Budrich 2000). 
2 As stated by Iván Szelényi in a paper written in 2002: “State socialism was not an egalitarian 
society and people under socialism tended to be rather poor. Commentators after the fall of 
socialism often falsely describe socialism as an egalitarian society. This it was not: neither in its 
ideology, nor in its practice.” Gail Kligman and Iván Szelényi, “Poverty and Social Structure 
in Transitional Societies,” paper presented at the Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung 
(Berlin 2002), 7.
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a sharp increase of social inequality after 1989, with clear groups of winners and 
losers3 distinguishable within the respective countries. 
As a result of the systemic changes after 1989, processes of economic decline 
occurred in all of the former East bloc countries. In the first period of transfor-
mation, an economic slump appeared in the region, although its severity varied. 
Apparently there are winners and losers at the level of entire societies as well. 
Thirdly, the social and political changes in Eastern Europe are clearly inter-
connected. At their intersection, enormous political conflicts have emerged. These 
originated from expectations raised in 1989 that were frustrated in the ensuing 
years. This phenomenon can be seen in many opinion polls. The systemic change 
was both a success story and a big disappointment.4 
It is unclear how to assess these widespread sentiments on a theoretical basis. 
Some sociologists foresaw these problems already at the outset of the transfor-
mation—the ambivalent results came as no surprise for them. Claus Offe coined 
the well-known expression “dilemma of simultaneousness.”5 Although in gener-
al his apprehensions did not materialize—nowhere did the losers in the transition 
resort to an uprising—he was quite accurate in forecasting deep social tensions 
as a result of the systemic change. The frustrated hopes and the interweaving of 
politics and economics will be the focus of the analysis below.
The source of the crisis in 1989 
In contrast to the political science mainstream, anthropologists never pre-
sumed that the East European societies would experience the abrupt disruption 
in their development that occurred in 1989. Anthropologists have generally 
3 Several opinion polls have been conducted that have underlined this. To provide only one exam-
ple: In the 2001 EU Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) poll, it is stated that the social 
situation of pensioners in ten EU candidate countries had worsened during the previous five years, 
whereas the situation of managers and younger people typically became better. http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/cceb/2001/cceb20011_en.pdf (accessed 18 July 2009), 15.
4 János Kornai, “The Great Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. Successes and Disap-
pointment,” Economics of Transition 14, no. 2 (2006): 204–44; Ivan T. Berend, “Social Shock 
in Transforming Central and Eastern Europe,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40, no. 
3 (2007): 269–80.
5 Claus Offe, “Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in 
Osteuropa,”Merkur 45, no. 4 (1991): 279–92. Wiesenthal described this dilemma in the following 
way: “The dilemma theorem maintains that an unavoidable blockade of the reform process would 
result—or that tremendous costs of transaction were to be incurred—when crucial decisions over 
the allocation of property rights had to be made after the introduction of universal suffrage and re-
sponsive democratic governments.” Helmuth Wiesenthal, “The ‘Dilemma of Simultaneity’ Revis-
ited,” paper for the international conference “Thirty Years of the Third Wave of Democratization: 
Paradigms, Lessons, and Perspectives” (Social Science Research Center Berlin WZB, December 
2004),  http://www.hwiesenthal.de/downloads/no_dilemma.pdf (accessed 28 May 2013), 3.
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stressed social constancy, the “inevitable continuity of everyday life.”6 The ev-
eryday life of average people will be the main topic and source of this paper. Like 
social phenomena in a broader sense, people’s expectations and their social rou-
tines do not change from one day to the next, at least in the opinion of anthro-
pologists. Change of this kind needs much more time.
In the last two decades, the persuasive power of this argument has grown. It 
has also become clear that the events of 1989 did not emerge out of nowhere, but 
were merely a deeper cut in a longer process of social transformation in the re-
spective societies. When seen from the perspective of continuity, the capitalism 
of Eastern Europe today is a post-socialist capitalism that was already developing 
during the “late socialism” period.7 
Behind the façade of changing political and economic phenomena, a great deal 
of continuity exists. One can better understand East European societies before 
and after 1989 if they are seen as backward societies, at the periphery of the West, 
that were striving for the richer and more successful social order of their western 
neighbors. In this sense, even state socialism might be understood as an attempt 
(albeit failed) of modernizing backward societies.8 If seen in this light, the “sys-
temic change” of 1989 was not the victory of a good political principle (democ-
racy) over a poor one (dictatorship), but was the outcome of a competition be-
tween two social and economic orders that had started at least two decades before 
the breakdown of state socialism. 
There is no doubt that the starting point of this breakdown was the continual-
ly deepening structural crisis of state socialism. The question arises as to which 
subsystem crises contributed to this final outcome. The economy was perhaps the 
most important area of struggle. Without a doubt, the state-socialist command 
economy was less efficient than its Western counterpart, the social market econ-
omy, as János Kornai has shown.9 Several points contributed to this failure: One 
major aspect was the inability of command economies to launch any kind of 
intensive growth. They were also unable to fully realize the possibilities of the 
information revolution. Also, the costs of running a welfare state exceeded eco-
6 Chris Hann, Caroline Humphrey, and Kathrine Verdery, “Einleitung. Der Postsozialismus als 
Gegenstand ethnologischer Forschung, in Christopher Hann, ed., Postsozialismus: Transforma-
tionsprozesse in Europa und Asien aus ethnologischer Perspektive (Frankfurt am Main: Cam-
pus, 2002), 11–49, 16.
7 Dieter Segert, “Postsozialismus-Spätsozialismus-Staatssozialismus: Grundlinien und Grundbe-
griffe einer politikwissenschaftlichen Postsozialismus-Forschung,” in idem, ed., Postsozialis-
mus. Hinterlassenschaften des Staatssozialismus und neue Kapitalismen in Europa (Vienna: 
Braumüller, 2007), 1–23, 11–15.
8 On this point, see Dieter Segert, Die Grenzen Osteuropas—1918, 1945, 1989—Drei Versuche 
im Westen anzukommen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2002), and idem, “Der Staatssozialismus 
war mehr als nur ein politisches Herrschaftsverhältnis. Anmerkungen zu einem theoretischen 
Defizit des Totalitarismuskonzepts,” Bohemia 49, no. 2 (2009): 420–28. 
9 János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
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nomic capacity, and from the mid-1970s, the amount of external debt had rapid-
ly increased. And the most important internal reason for the inefficiency of these 
states’ economies was the failure of the economic reforms that had been intro-
duced during the 1960s.10 
In 1992, Kornai did not see any chance for a successful change of state so-
cialism. In his view, the respective systems were unalterable, mainly due to their 
economies. This can be seen in his use of the term “perfection” for characterizing 
the changes that occurred after the death of Stalin. But Kornai’s conviction that 
the classic interconnection of state party power, state property and command 
economy could not move toward a more efficient economy has been disproved 
by the fact that Chinese state socialism experienced successful reforms from the 
end of the 1970s.11 And even the history of Soviet state socialism provides some 
arguments against his hypothesis. From the mid-1950s, in many areas of politics, 
state socialism as a whole was changing in a number of countries at different 
speeds. Within the seemingly monolithic order, a tangible diversity had emerged.
To understand the starting point more deeply, as well as the frustration about 
the systemic change that occurred, it is important to see how the other side, the 
Western market economies, also changed. Especially from the perspective of the 
current world financial crisis (more than twenty years after 1989), it becomes 
apparent how much also changed within the Western system during the same 
period. The social order that succeeded state socialism is not Western capitalism 
of 1989, but an earlier stage in capitalism’s development. In order to appreciate 
this aspect, one must go back several decades, indeed to the 1930s. As a result 
of the world financial crisis of 1929, classical capitalism changed dramatically in 
the direction of more state intervention being undertaken to stimulate and coor-
dinate economic growth and more attention being devoted to securing the welfare 
of the broad masses. It continued to change due to the resulting shift in authori-
tarian governments in most parts of Europe, and then as a result of World War II. 
Following 1945, a kind of socially negotiated state capitalism emerged in the 
West. In addition to internal causes, these changes were also a reaction to the 
social promises of state socialism. Classical capitalism in the West was challenged 
by the utopia of a fair economic and social order, not by the actual form that state 
socialism had acquired. 
10 Probably the most critical event was the crushing of the reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968 by 
five Warsaw-Pact states. Deep reforms of the economic system would have had been a necessary 
precondition for fundamental changes in the direction of democratization to occur in that coun-
try’s political policy. To explain the failure of state-socialist reforms, one must also consider the 
failed attempt of reforms in Yugoslavia. In that case, even the liberalization of politics did not 
suffice to create a functioning socialist market economy. 
11 For a comparison of the two transformations, see, for example, Rüdiger Frank and Dieter Segert, 
“Postsozialismus in Ostasien und Osteuropa? Grundlagen eines Vergleichs,” in Dieter Segert, 
ed., Postsozialismus. Hinterlassenschaften des Staatssozialismus und neue Kapitalismen in Eu-
ropa (Vienna: Braumüller, 2007), 123–58.
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State socialism shifted in response to this socially concerted capitalism, since 
the latter not only had an efficient economy, it also realized a high degree of equal 
opportunities for the average citizen and represented real democratic participa-
tion. During the “late socialism” period, this type of capitalism gradually became 
the general model, not only for the population as a whole, but also for some of 
the power elites. In the decades before 1989, this fostered a paradigm change 
toward “consumer socialism” in state-socialist politics.12 
To sum up these thoughts, the events of 1989 cannot merely be understood as 
the collapse of dictatorships, but also, in the battle for the hearts and minds of 
the population, as an about-face of the Eastern “authoritarian welfare state.” 
This thesis is also based on the clearly visible element of continuity in the 
changes that took place before and after 1989. It also explains why post-socialist 
capitalism could emerge so easily from the ruins of state socialism. Having emerged 
as a counter-model to Western economic and social life, state socialism adapted 
step by step to its competitor. By introducing a broader use of money, loans and 
taxes as economic instruments, Eastern national economies were opened to world 
markets that were dominated by Western economic actors. The economic self-reli-
ance (autarchy) of the Eastern regional economic system was weakened. In order 
to support technical modernization, machines were imported from the West, where-
by a number of Eastern bloc states took out loans from Western banks. With the 
high interest rates at the end of the 1970s, this led to disastrous consequences. 
Several countries (Hungary, Poland and to some degree the GDR) accrued high 
debts and began to have payment difficulties at the beginning of the 1980s. Some 
countries searched for a way out by applying for membership in (Western domi-
nated) international financial organizations like the International Monetary Fund. 
In 1982 Hungary became a member of the IMF, and four years later, Poland.13 
12 See Dietrich Staritz, Geschichte der DDR, rev. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996). Boyer 
has proposed the thesis that there were two types of “welfare state” that competed against one 
another. Christoph Boyer, “Zwischen Pfadabhängigkeit und Zäsur: ost- und westeuropäische 
Sozialstaaten seit den siebziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., Das 
Ende der Zuversicht? Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2008), 103–19. In my view, Dalos has misinterpreted this clear tendency as having merely been 
a kind of prevention on the part of party leaders to avoid political or social conflicts. György 
Dalos, Der Vorhang geht auf—das Ende der Diktaturen in Osteuropa (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung, 2009). As a result of this strategic change, at least in East Central Europe, 
the most important political aim became the immediate social improvement of the population’s 
day to day life, rather than the aim of future amelioration (and the communist “bright future”). 
In the case of the GDR, the influence of competition with the neighbouring FRG (and its social 
regime) was clearly visible. In many cases, the social policies of the SED leadership were in di-
rect reaction to the political announcements of their Western counterparts, such as, for example, 
the introduction of shorter working weeks and Saturday as a regular free day.
13 See James M. Boughton, Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979–1989 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2001), chapter 19, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2001/
ch19.pdf (accessed 16 July 2009).
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In late socialism, even incentives for work were borrowed from the other side. 
From the beginning of state socialism, there had been few incentives for the 
population to work diligently. Ideology and enthusiasm were not enough to foster 
performance and discipline. For this reason, incentives for individual or team 
work had to be found. Competitive wages were introduced in more and more 
work places, and more consumer goods began to be produced. The one-sided 
orientation of the planned economy toward producing investment goods began to 
shift. Though delayed in comparison to the West, the consumer trend in Eastern 
Europe was similar, with most households owning a television set, refrigerator, 
washing machine and, in the end, a private car. A holiday abroad became obtain-
able for more and more people in East Central Europe. In some countries, pur-
chasing private flats became an official policy. 
From the beginning of the 1970s, life gradually changed in many East bloc 
countries. The goal was no longer the communist future, but a present that was 
envisaged to some extent as an idealized form of Western society. The emergence 
of a mirror world in the East was accompanied by the rise of Western currencies as 
a second type of money in the state-socialist countries.14 This could not be realized 
without support from the side of the political leadership. Due to the opening of their 
finances to world markets, state-socialist governments badly needed Western cur-
rency. Official policy aimed at exploiting this grey currency flow, and thus special 
shops were opened in which the population could buy Western goods with Western 
currency. Shops that had formerly been exclusively for diplomats and foreign tour-
ists were now open for anyone who had Western currency at their disposal. In the 
GDR, this enterprise was called “Intershop,” in the Czech Republic it was “TUSEX.” 
These examples illustrate the common trends in late socialism that created the 
cultural preconditions for systemic change. Long before the real end, the value 
model of a “consumer society” had gained the upper hand over the model of a 
communist lifestyle. An additional sign for this was the fact that the supply systems 
of the ruling elite in Eastern Europe mainly circulated goods from Western markets.15 
The coming systemic change was also prepared by another social process. In 
classical socialism, there were no private economic enterprises and consequent-
ly, no private entrepreneurs.16 In late socialism, new social groups emerged that 
14 There are various estimates concerning the number of Western DM that were in circulation in 
the GDR. If measured by black market rates, the circulation of Western DM within the entire 
cash flow of the GDR rose from 1.4 percent in 1974 to 13.3 percent in 1988. André Steiner, 
“Zwischen Konsumversprechen und Innovationszwang. Zum wirtschaftlichen Niedergang der 
DDR,” in Konrad Jarausch and Martin Sabrow, eds., Weg in den Untergang. Der innere Zerfall 
der DDR (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 153–92, 168. 
15 In fact, in the years before 1989 the highest ranks of political elites in the GDR bought a great 
deal of consumer goods directly from West Berlin. Thomas Kunze, Staatschef a.D. Die letzten 
Jahre des Erich Honecker (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2001), 58–59.
16 The absence of private property was based on the Marxian model of a post-capitalist economy. 
The abolition of private property was the most important aim of this model. Karl Marx and 
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undertook activities very similar to private entrepreneurship. In the process of 
economic experiments, private enterprises were even allowed again in the Sovi-
et Union—notwithstanding the fact that the official term for them was “cooper-
atives.” A relevant law was passed in 1988. It was in this kind of company that 
many later oligarchs learned their first lessons about market economics. For 
example, Mikhail Khodorkovsky first directed a private company of the Kom-
somol and in 1988 founded a private bank. In Hungary, the class of private 
entrepreneurs emerged in a different way: In the second half of the 1980s it 
became possible to rent the machines and infrastructure of state companies for 
private use. In this legal parallel economy, private assets were amassed that laid 
the groundwork for the class of Hungarian capitalists to emerge in the 1990s. 
Here too, the familiarity with market economies collected in these years was 
important. In some countries, including Hungary and Poland, the main institu-
tions of a market economy financial system were already established in the last 
years of the old order. 
The strongest manifestation of the fact that state socialism had prepared itself 
for capitalism was surely the fact that in some countries the legislation for the 
systemic change was instigated by members of the former elite. In Hungary the 
new constitution was written by the last state-socialist government and ratified 
by the old parliament in the autumn of 1989. In Poland, too, economic reforms 
were initiated by the last government before 1989, whereby a process of privat-
ization had already begun prior to the negotiations with the opposition (at the 
so-called round-table talks). Another aspect indicating this is the fact that both 
countries became members of the IMF, as mentioned above. 
To sum up my conclusions: The systemic change of 1989 was possible because 
capitalist elements had been silently growing within the fold of state socialism. 
Certain actors, social relations, competences and expectations had already emerged 
in the earlier system. The dramatic institutional changes that then took place could 
only happen due to this foundation.17 In particular, the crisis of the “authoritarian 
welfare state” was one of the most important preconditions of the changes that 
occurred. 
Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in Selected Works 1 (Moscow: Prog-
ress, 1969), 98–137, here the final theses of chapter 2, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch02.htm (accessed 13 May 2013). 
17 This social continuity has also been stressed by those scholars who have analyzed the specific 
interweaving of formal and informal institutions before, during and after the systemic change. 
Notwithstanding the radical changes within the formal social institutions, certain social prac-
tices were maintained. One important trend in the political systems was the metamorphosis of 
informal into formal power positions. Cf. among others, Gerd Meyer, ed., Formal Institutions 
and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine 
(Opladen: Barbara Budrich, 2008), esp. the chapter by Kerstin Zimmer, “Formal Institutions and 
Informal Politics in Ukraine,” 267–313. 
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Economic transformation and social change in the narrower sense
After 1989, economic output declined dramatically, especially in industrial 
manufacturing. This slump has been called the “transformation recession” (see 
Table 1). The reasons for this turndown were manifold. First was the dissolution 
of the former common regional markets such as the CMEA, as well as the inner 
markets of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation. Second, changes in the 
coordination of directives (from state planning to a free market) caused difficul-
ties. Third, in many companies the technical level of production was low. 
Table 1: Transformation recessions in Eastern Europe 1989–2008 
Country Years of GDP decline Year of most 
drastic decline 
Decline Year of return to 1989 
GDP per capita levels
Albania 1990–92, 1997 1991 28% 1999–2000
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
n.d. First year of re-
covering: 1996
2008 only 85%
Bulgaria 1990–93, 1996–97 1991 11.7% 2006
Croatia 1989–93 (war); 1999 1991 21.1% 2005
Czech Rep. 1990–92, 1997–98 1991 11.6% 2000 
Estonia 1990–94 1992 14.2% 2002
Hungary 1990–93 1991 11.9% 1999–2000 
Latvia 1991–93, 1995 1992 34.9% 2005
Lithuania 1990–94 1992 21.3% 2005
Poland 1990–91 1990 11.6% 1995–96
Romania 1989–92, 1997–99 1991 12.9% 2004
Russia 1990–96 1992 14.8% 2007
Serbia 1990–93, 1999 (war) 1993 30.8% 2008 only 73%
Slovakia 1990–93 1991 15.9% 1999
Slovenia 1989–91 1991 8.9% 1997
Ukraine 1990–99 1994 22.9% 2008 only 72%
Sources of data: Kornai, “The Great Transformation,” 213; Alex Melzer, “12 Jahre Ostzusammen-
arbeit, Evaluation 2003/4, vol. 1: Die Transition und ihr Schatten,” (Bern: Direktion für Entwick-
lung und Zusammenarbeit der Schweiz und Staatssekretariat der Wirtschaft, 2003), 89; Hermann 
Clement et al., “Wachstum in schwierigem Umfeld: Wirtschaftslage und Reformprozesse in Ost-
mittel- und Südosteuropa sowie der Ukraine 2001/2002,” Working Paper 242 (Munich: Osteuropa-
Institut, 2002), iv; EBDR, “Countries,” http://www.ebrd.com/pages/country.shtml (accessed 28 
May 2013).
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Table 2: Inflation rate (increase of consumer prices in percent) (yearly averages)
Country 1990–91 1992 1995 2000 2008
























23.0 28.2 10.0 6.0
Latvia n.d. 951.2 (1992)
109.2 (1993)
25.0 2.6 15.3








43 27.8 10.1 4.2



















Slovakia 115 (1991) 207 (1992)
32.9 (1993)
13.5 8.9 5.5







Source: EBDR, “Countries,” http://www.ebrd.com/pages/country.shtml (accessed 28 May 2013); 
Eurostat, Eurostat Jahrbuch 2008, Lebensbedingungen und Wohlfahrt http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/portal/page/portal/publications/eurostat_yearbook (accessed 9 July 2009), 137, 242. Underlined 
are years with inflation rates of 100 percent or more.
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The ensuing reforms then led to declines in production as well as in the size 
of the work force. In general, the GDP declined by between one fourth and one 
third, and in extreme cases it was even reduced by half. On average, it took a 
decade to return to the starting production levels of 1989. 
The social consequences of this radical re-orientation in the economic system 
can be expressed in figures. First and foremost, in almost all states (with the 
exception of the GDR) there was a large rise in consumer prices (see Table 2). 
In some states, inflation lasted for several years, in others there was not a single 
price peak but several. Particularly high inflation was experienced in the succes-
sor states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. There was also long lasting infla-
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Table 3: Unemployment rates in Eastern Europe after 1989 (percent)
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Albania 9.5 10.2 16.8 14.7
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
n.d. n.d. 39.6 44.5
Bulgaria 1.6 13.7 16.4 [9.4] 12.1 [6.0] 5.6 [2.9]
Croatia 13.2 (1991) 14.5 15.7 12.3 8.4
Czech Re-
public
0.7 4.0  8.3 [4.4] 7.5 [4.4] 5.4 [2.2]
Estonia 3.7 (1992) 9.7 13.6 7.9 5.5
Hungary 1.4 10.2 6.4 [3.1] 7.3 [3.2] 7.8 [3.6]
Latvia 3.9 (1992) 18.1 13.1  8.7 7.5
Lithuania 1.3 (1992) 17.5 16.4  8.3 5.8
Poland  6.5 14.9 15.1 [7.4] 17.6 
[10.3]
7.1 [2.4]
Romania  3.0 (1991)  9.5  7.1  5.9 5.8
Russia  5.3 (1992)  9.2 10.2  7.6 7.7
Serbia 23.8 (1992) 24.2 24.4 31.7 
(2004)
Slovakia  1.2 13.1 18.0 [11.3] 15.3 
[11.7]
9.5 [6.6]
Slovenia  7.3 (1991)  7.4  6.6  7.2 4.4
Ukraine  0.2 (1992)  0.3  4.2  2.9
Source: EBDR, “Countries”, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/country.shtml (accessed 28 May 2013); 
Eurostat, Eurostat Jahrbuch 2008, 260; Russlandanalysen 182, 8 May 2009, 9. Underlined are 
unemployment rates above 15 percent; in square brackets: long-term unemployment.
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tion in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. The financial assets of the pop-
ulations in these countries were essentially liquidated. Only in the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia and Hungary was inflation moderate. 
A major hardship in everyday life was the escalation of unemployment. In the 
former economic order, the position of workers was strong because of shortages 
in the workforce. The phenomenon of unemployment had only been experienced 
to a minor degree in Yugoslavia, and then during the final years of state socialism 
in Hungary and Poland. In all other countries, unemployment was new experi-
ence. Unemployment levels were different in the various countries. 
While these data are striking, they only allow approximations to be made 
concerning the intensity of social problems. It should be considered that the size 
of the working population also dropped significantly. On the average, the labor 
force participation rate of the new EU member states fell by 17 percent between 
1989 and 2003. In Estonia, Hungary and Latvia, the size of the workforce fell by 
up to 25 percent of former levels.18 Certain social groups were particularly ex-
cluded from the new workforce: older generations of employees, women in 
general, industrial workers from large enterprises with outdated machines, and 
employees from former agrarian cooperatives. 
Another side effect of the systemic change was rising social inequality. This 
can be measured in part by the Gini index of incomes (see Figure 1). Different 
levels of inequality were experienced in the various countries. The most homo-
geneous were the countries of East Central Europe (with the exception of Poland). 
The most unequal in the group of countries in question was Russia, with levels 
near those of the United States. And in Russia, inner disparities are also the most 
18 Kornai, “The Great Transformation,” 230.
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Figure 1: Gini coefficient for selected countries (in the year 2000)
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html 
(accessed 8 July 2009).
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visible: incomes in the “two capitals” (Moscow, St. Petersburg) became much 
higher than in the rest of the country. 
The phenomenon of higher income levels in the capital city is a feature that 
can be found in other countries of the region as well. Based on data from 2005, 
in the new EU-member states, country capitals often had a GDP per capita that 
was higher than the EU-27 average, while regions in national peripheries were 
far below average. For example, income levels in Slovakia’s capital of Bratislava 
were 150% of the EU average, while regions in the eastern part of the country 
were 50% below average. Incomes in Prague were similar to those in Bratislava, 
while the figures in Central Moravia lay at 70% of the EU norm. In Bucharest 
incomes were 75% of the EU average, while in the northwestern part of the 
country, incomes were 25% thereof. This process of economic segmentation has 
been underway since 2000.19
Direct effect of political changes on everyday life
 
In the beginning, the political changes in Eastern Europe clearly brought an 
enormous benefit for the majority of the population: political freedom. The chang-
es were therefore met with enthusiasm. In the first years political participation 
was high, although Poland was an exception: turnout was already quite low in 
the elections of June 1989, and as a rule, in later parliamentary elections less than 
half of the eligible voters participated. In most other countries, participation in 
the first few elections after 1989 was high. But this engagement later declined 
and election turnout also decreased.20 
Decreasing willingness to participate in elections had various causes, one 
being ambivalence about the new system. The political elites were the winners 
in the transformation process, but most voters were not in this group. The new 
apparatuses of the post-communist states provided many attractive posts for pol-
iticians, diplomats and higher administrative employees, but the economic dete-
rioration caused by the decay of the common and domestic markets and political 
tensions between the neighboring states led to the quality of daily life diminish-
ing for the majority of the population. 
Another direct outcome was the stress suffered by the ethnic minorities in all 
of the states in question. The strengthening of the national consciousness of the 
leading ethnic group in each state was often detrimental to their minorities. Sharp 
19 Eurostat, Eurostat Jahrbuch der Regionen 2008, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_
OFFPUB/KS-HA-08-001/EN/KS-HA-08-001-EN.PDF (accessed 16 July 2009), 42. Cf. also 
the data of Kornai, “The Great Transformation,” 229: from 1989 to 2004, in the new EU member 
states economic segmentation expanded on average at 29 percent. Economic segmentation grew 
at an even higher rate in the Baltic states and Slovakia. 




conflicts emerged between majority populations and minorities in the post-Yugo-
slav countries (especially when a minority represented the main ethnic group in 
a neighboring country), in Slovakia between the Hungarian minority and the 
Slovak majority, in Bulgaria between Bulgarians and Turks, and in the three 
Baltic republics between the Baltic peoples and Russians. In addition, explicit 
discrimination and even a racist discourse against the Roma population developed 
in many East European countries, especially those in the southeast.21
The dissolution of multiethnic federations resulted in violence, military force, 
and—in the case of Yugoslavia—open wars. This caused new types of migratory 
movement: If the majority of a new emerging state was that of an ethnic minori-
ty somewhere else, migration in that direction of the new state occurred. In 
Croatia, for example, the number of Serbs declined by 65% between 1989 and 
2002.22 Similar substantial population shifts involved the emigration of Russians 
from former Soviet republics to Russia: About 3 million Russians migrated from 
Ukraine, where the number of ethnic Russians declined by 27%. In Lithuania, 
36% of the ethnic Russian citizens left, and Estonia and Latvia lost between 20% 
and 25% of their ethnic Russian population (between 100,000 and 200,000 peo-
ple).23 A huge number of ethnically German and Jewish people from Russia and 
Ukraine migrated to the West (to Germany, Israel or other states): between 1989 
and 2003 more than 1.2 million people from Russia and 250,000 from Ukraine.24 
In addition to migration that was directly politically induced, another type also 
developed: workers in the new Eastern market economies who had become un-
employed left to look for work in Western, Southern and Northern European 
countries. After the Iron Curtain between East and West was eliminated after 
1989, from some areas there was an explosion of labor migration to the West. 
For example, one third of the Albanian population emigrated. Between 1989 and 
2003, the net migration from Bulgaria was about 8 percent, and from Romania it 
was about 6 percent.25 According to estimates, in 2002 approximately 2.5 million 
Romanians were migrant laborers, working especially in Southern Europe.26 In 
1995, there were approximately 900,000 Poles abroad, and by the end of 2006, 
21 As, for example, the politics of the Hungarian political party Jobbik (Movement for a Better 
Hungary), the Slovak National Party SNS (Slovenská národná strana), and Ataka in Bulgaria. 
While these three examples represent marginal parties, in Slovakia the SNS succeeded in be-
coming a coalition member between 2006 and 2010. In addition to extremist or openly racist 
parties, there are also individual politicians from politically center parties who express extremist 
positions. An example is Jiří Čunek, who was the head of Czech Christian Democrats between 
2006 and 2009 and a minister in the national government. 
22 See Ali Mansoor and Bryce Quillin, eds., Migration and Remittances. Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union (Washington: EBDR/World Bank, 2007), 120. 
23 Ibid., 118. 
24 Ibid., 122.
25 Ibid., 33. 
26 Cf. “Studie: Angst vor EU-Neulingen unbegründet,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 6 Feb. 2008, in 
which an ECAS (European Citizen Action Service) study is quoted. 
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this number had increased to approximately 2 million. Many Poles took on short-
term employment, including approximately 300,000 seasonal farm workers in 
Germany, but also several thousand Polish doctors and nurses working in the UK 
and Ireland.27 The remittances from migrants to their home countries have been 
an important economic factor for some states.
Changes in the everyday life 
With regard to changes in spatial perspectives after 1989, in the mid-1980s 
there had already been some movement among intellectuals toward ideas such as 
the “Central Europe” debate of Kundera, Konrád and others, whereby intellectu-
als in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia pointed to the fact that their native 
countries were “really” in the middle of Europe. It is possible to see this debate 
as an attempt to question the political divisions that had existed since the end of 
World War II.28 For many decades, the Iron Curtain had blocked the West’s view 
of Eastern Europe and the people living under state socialism had become accus-
tomed to looking toward Moscow to see if changes were possible. For the intel-
lectuals involved in this debate, it was important to get rid of the East stigma. 
According to them, East Central Europe was nothing other than an “unfavorably 
situated part of the West.”29 After 1989, this mental viewpoint then became real-
ity. The accession of these countries to NATO and the EU represented the polit-
ical culmination of this change of space. 
Social time also changed fundamentally in Eastern Europe. After 1989, the 
pace of life began to move much faster. For the individual, life became more 
intense and less predictable. And the speed of change also accelerated. The 
amount of time left for leisure and activities with friends and acquaintances 
dropped considerably. As society became more dynamic, one could climb much 
higher than had been possible within the state-socialist system, but one could also 
fall deeper. As competition for success grew, so did the stress for those subjected 
to this acceleration. Particularly in the first decade, growing migration resulted 
in a large number of moves. This affected the basic rhythm of these people’s 
everyday lives and also changed the lives of those who remained at home. The 
27 Pawel Kaczmarczyk, “Arbeitsmigration und polnischer Arbeitsmarkt” (Berlin: Progressives 
Zentrum, n.d.), http://www.progressives-zentrum.org/media/file/16.Kaczmarczyk.pdf (accessed 
10 July 2009), 5–7. Since that time nearly half of the million East Europeans who had migrat-
ed—among them also many Poles—had returned to their home countries. “Viele Polen verlas-
sen Großbritannien wieder. Migranten kehren zurück,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 May 
2009, http://www.faz.net/print/Politik/Migranten-kehren-zurueck (accessed 10 July 2009). 
28 Segert, Die Grenzen, 13.
29 Kundera has been paraphrazed by François Bondy. Martin Schulze-Wessel, “Die Mitte liegt 
westwärts. Mitteleuropa in der tschechischen Diskussion,” Bohemia 29, no. 2 (1988): 325–44, 
329–30. See also Segert, Die Grenzen, 13.
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change in time rhythms was connected in many ways to the basic changes in the 
economy. In the business world, the importance of competition and individual 
initiative grew. People experienced the new feeling of being superfluous. This 
was a shock especially for many workers in industry and the service trades. Pre-
viously there had been shortages in these areas and so such workers had felt 
needed.
The state-socialist societies were societies of workers. They were character-
ized by high employment rates. Almost all women held jobs. Belonging to a 
workers’ society also meant that work and its success established the social 
standing of the individual. At the same time, however, workers were not strictly 
supervised. Overseeing individual work performance was not particularly devel-
oped. After 1989, many things changed in these respects. The average employ-
ment rate sank clearly; there was high unemployment, in some regions affecting 
more than half the population. Rates of unemployment were significantly higher 
than in the EU-15; in some years, such as 2003, they were even twice as high.30
When describing the entirety of the systemic change after 1989 and its impact 
on the daily lives of the population, one should not be too categorical. For people 
whose entrepreneurial spirit had been subjected to tough restrictions before 1989, 
a better time had now come. Increased performance on the job was better recog-
nized in the new market economy and compensated. Those who had managed to 
keep their job or get work in privatized enterprises had a distinct advantage over 
others. The biggest winners were those who worked in the financial sector. One 
of the most important economic changes in everyday life was the transition from 
a society lacking in goods to a consumer society with an abundance of commod-
ities. Not only did the supply of consumer products change, but consumer pur-
chasing behavior was also transformed. Lines outside shops largely disappeared. 
The private exchange of hoarded consumer goods that were in short supply lost 
its previous significance. And in addition to the rich world of abundant consum-
er goods came the possibility of travel anywhere in the world. The old ideology 
of connecting “communism” with “abundance” had developed into a real abun-
dance of goods under capitalism. Shopping nearly became a civic duty.
Also culturally there were many changes for many people. Initially, aggressive 
advertising and the roar of products being recommended were unfamiliar and 
perhaps even exciting. The questionable aspects of this were impressively shown 
in the Czech film Česky Sen (“Czech Dream,” 2006). The inhabitants of Eastern 
Europe had now become part of a consumer society in which everything revolved 
around money, and happiness was to be achieved through the consumption of 
goods. But the consumer surplus was only real for the winners in the system 
change. Only they had enough money to afford the abundance. Others had to live 
with their old cars, furniture and other things from the period before 1989. And 
they stayed at home because they could not afford vacations in the wide world. 
30 Kornai, “The Great Transformation,” 231.
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A basic indicator of the changes that had occurred in both the business world 
and everyday life was the rise of money being considered a standard of personal 
prestige. Although money had had an economic function in the state-socialist 
societies, it had somehow held a marginal position in people’s lifestyle. Fulfilling 
the socialist plan and cultivating a variety of “connections” were more important 
for the economic and personal success of the individual. But in late state social-
ism, private financial wealth had already become an important measure of suc-
cess, and after 1989, wealth became the primary measure of a person’s value. 
While in the eyes of the public, the rapidly acquired wealth of some was not 
without a moral shadow, this was not really important. Indeed, in earlier capital-
ist eras it was not different, as one can read in the novels of Charles Dickens and 
Victor Hugo. The rise of the new rich made  the poverty of the majority sudden-
ly extremely visible. Many who had been previously satisfied with their poor 
social situation could now see the growing social differences and became more 
and more dissatisfied.
The political and economic transformation also created fundamentally differ-
ent conditions for crime. The crime rate increased significantly everywhere.31 This 
certainly had to do with the fact that, with the increased importance of money 
and property, the rewards for crime became greater. The rise of the consumer 
society and the increasing differences in wealth made  burglaries more profitable. 
The rising crime rates added to the feeling of insecurity in the population.
In addition to labor and consumption, housing also changed. On one hand, the 
proportion of home ownership increased dramatically in many countries—today, 
in almost all East European countries more people are homeowners than in the 
old EU member states. Home ownership is especially high in the Baltic states, 
Hungary and Slovakia, where it represents 75 percent or more of all homes and 
apartments.32 This was because these governments wanted to sell apartments to 
reduce their fixed investments; it represented a social policy objective. And it was 
also a trend of the times. More privatization of public property was undertaken 
in the 1990s than had ever occurred in Europe before. However, for those who 
continued to rent, the situation also clearly changed. Rents increased significant-
ly. Previously, in most countries less than 10 percent of one’s income was spent 
on rent. With the market regulating housing prices and rents, the proportion of 
money spent on housing costs increased more than threefold. In the capitals this 
was sometimes even higher. 
And finally, a radical restructuring of the welfare state occurred. Health care 
and pension systems were extensively reformed. Funding was transferred from 
the state to health insurance companies. In the majority of new EU member states, 
considerably less is spent on social welfare when compared to most of the old 
31 On average in the eight new EU member states, by two and half times. Kornai, “The Great 
Transformation,” 231.
32 See Eurostat Jahrbuch 2008, 234.
Dieter Segert
485Societal Transformations in Eastern Europe after 1989 and their Preconditions
member states.33 In 2004, such services in the Nordic countries lay between 27% 
and 33% of the GDP, and in the UK, Italy, France and Germany between 26% 
and 31%; in comparison, the Baltic states spent about 13%, Slovakia 17%, the 
Czech Republic 20%, and Hungary 21%.34 In all EU countries, social transfers 
are provided to ensure that the number of people who are at the risk of poverty 
is significantly reduced; in 2005, the old EU member states reduced this group 
from 26% to 16% of the population. In some of the new EU member states, 
however, because of lower social transfers, this group dropped to a significantly 
lesser degree, as for example in the Baltic states, where after social transfers this 
group was still 18% to 21% of the population.35 The social situation experienced 
other changes due to social transfers being reduced, such as retirement age. Giv-
en the sharp reduction in birth rates, all societies clearly began to age quickly, 
and thus, the existing practice of relatively low retirement age was also found to 
be no longer affordable. The retirement age has gradually been raised, and in 
Central and Southeastern Europe is now similar to that in the old EU member 
states.
Among the new welfare state institutions that were previously unknown in 
most countries are employment offices. But unemployment in East European 
countries means something different than in the old EU countries. To take the 
Polish example: there, the unemployed receive low financial support for half a 
year; after that they receive no more government help. Thus in the 1990s, many 
Poles left the labor market and went into early retirement or applied for disabil-
ity benefits. Between 1989 and 1999, the number of pensioners in Poland rose 
from 6.9 to 9.45 million, about a quarter of the population. In addition, about 5 
million people were registered as being disabled. Since the average pension is 
very low, the number of people with incomes below the social minimum in-
creased between 1989 and 1996 from 15 percent to 47 percent. The situation 
was similar in Bulgaria. Here in the early 1990s, 9 percent of the population 
went into early retirement. As in Poland, pensioners now make up about a quar-
ter of the population.36 The large number of retirees, however, also has something 
to do with the demographic trend after 1989 toward an increase of the elderly 
and a decrease in birth rates. In Romania, for example, the total fertility rate 
dropped from 2.6 (1970–75) to 1.3 (2000–5); in Poland it fell during the same 
period from 2.3 to 1.3, in the Czech Republic from 2.2 to 1.2.37 In contrast, life 
expectancy developed in various ways. While it declined in Russia and some 
33 Social welfare includes health care benefits, including continued pay in the case of illness, ben-
efits for families, the sick, the handicapped, and for the unemployed, pensions, etc. Ibid., 236.
34 Ibid., 238.
35 Ibid., 224.
36 Sabine Riedel, “Arbeitslosigkeit in der erweiterten EU,” SWP-Studie/S40 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, 2003), 12, 17. 
37 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2003, http://hdr.undp.org/
en/reports/global/hdr2003/chapters (accessed 16 July 2009), 250–51.
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other post-Soviet societies (Soviet Union 1987: 70 years, Russia 2000: 67 years), 
and stayed the same in Southeastern Europe, since 1989 it has risen by about 2 
years in Central Europe.38
Frustrations about the social outcome and their political consequences
Both the broader population and the elites faced the systemic change in East-
ern Europe with high expectations. The willingness to support the political chang-
es of 1989 was supported by hopes of a brighter future. There was a widespread 
assumption that by introducing democracy and market economies, it would soon 
be possible to have the same living standards as in Western Europe. In short, the 
revolutions of 1989 took their legitimacy not only from the expectations of po-
litical freedom, but also due to the assumption that quickly adjusting the economy 
would result in living conditions similar to those in the West. 
In the meantime, it has become clear that the process of economic assimilation, 
even in the new EU member states, would take much longer than originally 
thought. According to János Kornai, it will take the eight Central European coun-
tries that became EU members in 2004 about 55 years for them to reach the 
average economic level of the old EU states—and that only if the current growth 
tempo does not change.39 
It is because of this that the systemic change, nearly twenty years after it began, 
is generally appraised negatively—with the exception of Albania—at least with 
regard to personal financial status and that of one’s own family (see Table 4). 
The results of the systemic change are also evaluated positively in former East 
Germany. According to the “Social Report 2008,” 39 percent of those polled 
regarded themselves as winners in the German unification (the specifically Ger-
man path of systemic change), for 28 percent profits and losses were balanced, 
and only 29 percent felt themselves as having lost. The latter were mainly the 
unemployed or low-income earners.40
38 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1990, http://hdr.undp.org/
en/reports/global/hdr1990/chapters (accessed 16 July 2009), 129, 131; HDR 2003, 262–63.
39 Kornai, “The Great Transformation,” 238.
40 Sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungszentrum Berlin-Brandenburg im Auftrag des Bundesver-
bandes der Volkssolidarität (verantwortlich Rainhard Liebscher), “Sozialreport 2008: Daten 
und Fakten zur sozialen Lage in den neuen Bundesländern,” (Berlin, Dezember 2008), http://
www.sfz-ev.de/Publikationen/Sozialreport/SR_2008/SR2008.pdf (accessed 18 July 2009), 49. 
Similar results are found in Jörg Jacobs, Tücken der Demokratie: Antisystemeinstellungen und 
ihre Determinanten in sieben post-kommunistischen Transformationsländern (Wiesbaden: VS-
Verlag 2004), 206, based on a survey conducted in 2000. Here, however, the current general 
economic situation of individual households was being assessed. The situation in Eastern Ger-
many and the Czech Republic was generally considered to be positive, in Poland the sides were 
balanced, and in other countries (Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) the assessment was 
predominantly negative.
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Table 4: Self-evaluation of family economic situation in 2007 as compared to 1989 (percent)
Country Relative decline Relative improvement
Albania 32.9 44.4

















Source: “Pessimismus führt zu Reformstillstand,” Die Presse, 29 Nov. 2007, 25. 
The Human Development Reports (HDR) since 1989 have also stressed the 
ambivalent social development of the region. In the HDR 1997, for example, it 
is stated that poverty in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet region had increased 
significantly since 1990. In the same period, the opposite trend was seen in East 
Asia.41 
In general, these social developments also had political consequences. In the 
first years of transition, the fact that expectations were not being fulfilled was not 
perceived as negative. The hope prevailed that the deterioration of material living 
standards represented only a temporary phase, a short valley of tears. However, 
after the accession of ten countries to the EU in 2004 and 2007, it finally became 
clear that this was a longer term social situation. For those who could be consid-
41 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1997, http://hdr.undp.org/
en/reports/global/hdr1997/chapters (accessed 16 July 2009), 4. 
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ered the losers in the transition, there is hardly any hope that the situation will 
change. This has created a social gap between the winners and losers. An attempt 
is being made to fill this gap by political means. 
This end result has had an impact on how political developments have been 
assessed. In early 2003, a year before the first eight former East bloc states be-
came members of the EU, satisfaction with national democracy was much lower 
than in the original EU member states. While in the EU-15, about 60% of the 
respondents were very or fairly satisfied, the proportion in the eight new member 
states lay at about 30%, in fact, in Romania it was only 23% and in Bulgaria 
15%.42 The next spring, this low level fell even further, with only 24% of the 
population expressing satisfaction. In Poland, those who were very or at least 
fairly satisfied decreased from 24% to 16%, in Hungary from 42% to 31%. How-
ever, by the autumn of 2007 the level of satisfaction in the ten new member states 
had increased again slightly, on average to 39% (with the percentage who were 
satisfied in the old member states at 68%).43 In Poland, the group of those who 
were very or fairly satisfied with national democracy lay at 48%, in Romania it 
had risen to 36%; Hungary displayed the lowest levels, with only 24% satisfied.44 
This is associated with low confidence in the key institutions of democracy. Trust 
in political institutions is low; indeed, it is much lower than in the old EU mem-
ber states. As seen in a Eurobarometer survey of the year 2004, on average 
confidence not only in parliaments, but also in political parties was less than half 
of that in the EU-15. The comparison of confidence in political parties was 7% 
vs. 16%, and in parliaments 16% vs. 35%.45
Regarding political stability, the new member states also differ significantly 
from the old, in this case for the worse: In the entire period since 1989, voter 
42 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003, no. 2 (Fall 2003), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opin-
ion/archives/cceb/2003/2003.2_full_report_final.pdf (accessed 18 July 2009), 20. Satisfaction 
within the population is linked to social groups: about 40 percent of managers, students and 
young people are satisfied, whereas the retired (24 percent), unemployed (26 percent) and peo-
ple with limited education (34 percent) are much less satisfied. Ibid.
43 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004, no. 1 Annexes (Spring 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/cceb2004.1anx.pdf (accessed 18 July 2009), B–79.
44 Eurobarometer 68 (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf 
(accessed 18 July 2009), 87. Until fall 2012 the figures changed only slightly, 48 percent of 
Poles remain satisfied, in Romania the respective figure was 13 percent (now the lowest level 
of satisfaction in the region, in Hungary it was 29 percent. Eurobarometer 78 (2012), http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_anx_en.pdf (assessed 29 May 2013), 74.
45 Eurobarometer 61 (2004), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.pdf 
(accessed 18 July 2009), 10. In the spring of 2008, the situation was a little better, but not by 
much. In Poland, confidence had risen to 7% (it had been 3%), in the Czech Republic 11% of 
respondents trusted the political parties, 9% in Hungary, 11% in Slovakia and 13% in Slovenia. 
In the same poll, the percentage of citizens who trusted their parliaments were the following: 
12% in Bulgaria, 16% in Poland and the Czech Republic, 15% in Hungary, 22% in Slovenia, and 
in Romania, 31%. Eurobarometer 69 (2008), Appendices, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
archives/eb/eb69/eb69_annexes.pdf (accessed 18 July 2009).
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unpredictability is significantly higher here than in the “old democracies.” In most 
elections in Eastern Europe—with a few exceptions—the current government is 
voted out of office, and thus, governments remain at best a single term in office. 
These aspects have determined the populist momentum that characterizes the 
current situation in political terms. The results of social change in Eastern Europe 
have favored a policy of socially unrealistic promises before elections and politics 
that are centered on individuals. Thus the political class has tried to bridge the 
gap that has developed since 1989 between itself and the majority of the popu-
lation. Linked to this are the pointed political conflicts and a certain instability 
even in the countries in the heart of East Central Europe.46 Two decades after the 
pessimistic forecasts of sociologists like Claus Offe concerning the systemic 
changes in East Europe, it seems as if these might still take place. But this is only 
one of many possible directions, and it can be countered politically.
46 Dieter Segert, “Parteiendemokratie in der Krise. Gründe und Grundlagen in Ostmitteleuropa,” 
Osteuropa 58, no. 1 (2008): 49–62.

l i l i a n a  d e y a n o v a
REMEMBERING REVOLUTIONS: THE PUBLIC 
MEMORY OF 1989 IN BULGARIA
What meanings has 1989, the annus mirabilis,1 as characterized in Ralf 
Dahrendorf’s Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe, acquired for Bulgarians? 
The aim of this chapter is not to explain what happened in this year and why, but 
to describe “the year 1989” in the coordinates of memory. Or rather the different 
“1989s” in different collective memories. Also of interest is how this symbolic 
year—whose commemoration, like any, homogenizes contradictory experienc-
es—is already beginning to free itself from and elude the memories of eyewit-
nesses and becoming an object of history. This history is unclear and complex, 
however, since during over the past twenty years, opposing groups have tried to 
make their specific memories of 1989 universal and official by stigmatizing and 
marginalizing the memories of other groups. This is a process that in recent years 
has resulted in resolutions and laws regulating the memory of past events. One 
of the most discussed is Resolution 1481 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe dated 25 January 2006, “The Necessity of an International 
Condemnation of the Crimes of Totalitarian Regimes.” The logic of this resolution 
will be considered in the last section of this chapter. 
The analysis here is based on discourse analysis of various types of narratives 
concerning 1989, including media reports, high school textbooks, electoral plat-
forms of political parties, diverse theoretical interpretations, etc. A diachronic 
view of two decades of narratives linked to 1989 enables us to see various ten-
dencies, such as the exhaustion of the symbolic energy of “the 1989 revolution” 
or “the Change,” as experienced in the form of increasing disappointment. It is 
also possible to see three distinct phases of memory: these can be tentatively 
categorized as trauma (generated by the memory of communism becoming a 
traumatic syndrome), nostalgia, and laws on memory (the regulation of the mem-
ory of communism by laws regarding memory, lois mémorielles).
1 Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Transac-
tion Publishers, 2004), 7. See also Vladimir Tismaneanu, Revolutions of 1989. Rewriting His-
tories (London: Routledge, 1999); Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East Europe and 
East German Experience (Cambridge: MTT, 1997); Andrew Arato, “Interpreting 1989,” Social 
research 60, no. 3 (1993): 609–46; Nadège Ragaru, “Apprivoiser les transformations postcom-
munistes en Bulgarie: la fabrique du politique (1989–2004)” (PhD diss., IEP, Paris, 2005.); 
Katherine Verdery, What was socialism and what comes next? (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996).
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The year 1989 as representing events and as a symbol
The year 1989 was long and overloaded with events. On one of the first days 
of the year, 9 January, the Bulgarian State Council issued Decree 56, which in-
troduced corporate organization as a basic form of entrepreneurship. This released 
the economy from state control and contributed to it becoming market based. It 
also eased the conversion after 1989 of political capital—the capital of the former 
nomenklatura—into economic capital.2 Then from May to August 1989, several 
hundred thousand Bulgarian Turks moved to Turkey (four years after they had 
been forced to change their Muslim names, one of the greatest crimes of the 
Bulgarian communist government). 
This chapter, however, focuses on 1989 as the beginning of the postcommunist 
era in Bulgaria, although as quickly becomes clear, the beginning of the new era 
did not fall on a particular day. While the Bulgarian symbolic counterpart of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the Bulgarian beginning or “genesis,” has long been con-
sidered 10 November 1989, this date has become more and more contested as 
years go by. It was on 10 November, at a plenum of the Central Committee of 
the Bulgarian Communist Party, that Todor Zhivkov, who had held the role of 
dictator in Bulgaria for many decades, was forced to resign. This resulted in a 
massive feeling of irreversible change, of the end of the epoch that had begun on 
9 September 1944 (which had long been celebrated as the date of the “Communist 
Revolution”). This generated real euphoria. However, one can perhaps speak of 
euphoria only with regard to those first few hours and days, when there was a 
shared feeling of a revolutionary turning of the tides.3 The first large rally of the 
opposition, on 18 November, took place not on the Party Square, where the fes-
tive communist marches had taken place (which were no longer obligatory or had 
been cancelled), but in front of St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral. Today, the 
opinion is increasingly heard that 18 November should be designated as “the day 
of the fall of communism”4 and be the date this is commemorated.5 But there was 
2 George Mink, Jean-Charles Szurek, La Grande Conversion. Le destin des communistes dans 
l’Europe Centrale (Paris: Seuil, 1999); Deyan Deyanov, “The Economy of Shortage and the 
Network Revolution (Rethinking 1989),” Sociological Problems 28 (2006): 372–87; see also 
the articles by Ivan Tchalakov and Andrey Bundjulov on networks before and after 1989 in the 
same issue.
3 See, for instance the memories uploaded in 2009 on various websites (bghep.co.uk; “20 years 
later” etc.): “On 10 November, I was a seventh form schoolboy… We, the students of Class 
7b, touched history;” “For me, communism was over that morning, one could take a breath.” 
Cf. Dimitar Ludjev, Revolutsiata v Balgaria 1989–1991, vol. 1, “Nejnata revolutsia” i neinoto 
vreme (Sofia: Ivan Bogorov Publishers, 2008).
4 I refer to the letter of Lubima Yordanova to Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, 2 November 2009, 
https://bg.fanopic.com. See also http://forums.ec.europa.eu.
5 On the difference between “commemoration” and “celebration” and a date as a “memory site,” 
“realm of memory” (lieux de mémoire), see Pierre Nora, ed., Les lieux de mémoire, 3 vols. (Par-
is: Gallimard, 1984–93).
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another key event in the history of the opposition even before 10 November: the 
march organized by the Ekoglasnost movement on 3 November 1989 to submit 
a petition to the Parliament against a governmental power plant project on the 
Maritsa and Mesta rivers. While collecting signatures for the petition at the end 
of October, a number of Ekoglasnost activists were beaten and others arrested by 
the People’s Militia. This spurred a major international reaction. Thus, today some 
propose 3 November, the day of the largest demonstration against the socialist 
power that had been held until that time, as the first day of the postcommunist 
era. And according to yet others, it should be 7 December, the day when the 
various opposition movements united and created the political formation called 
the Union of Democratic Forces (Sayuz na demokratichnite sili, SDS), which 
subsequently long remained the main opponent of the Bulgarian Communist/
Socialist Party in electoral struggles. And another key date for the consolidation 
of the anti-communist opposition was 14 December 1989.6 On that day, a “living 
chain” that gathered around the National Assembly to demand academic autono-
my joined other protest movements, demanding the abrogation of Article One of 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, upon which the governing 
role of the Communist Party was built. A fact often forgotten today, however, is 
that on the previous day one of the plenums of the Communist Party had request-
ed the convocation of a Party Congress to do just that: abrogate the anachronistic 
article. Year one of the revolution then ended with the Parliament’s decision of 
29 December to restore the Muslim names of Bulgarian citizens with Turkish 
ethnicity, citizens who formed one-tenth of the population. This occurred after 
their mass mobilization in late December and round-the-clock demonstrations 
near the Parliament building.7
6 Historian Mihail Gruev has defended the thesis that precisely 14 December, the “day of the birth 
of our civil society,” must be the date on which to celebrate the anniversary of “1989” in Bulgar-
ia. See his contribution to the conference dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the beginning 
of the changes, organized in St. Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia on 14 December 2009 by 
historians Iskra Baeva and Dimitar Ludjev. See more on the conference debates in Theodora 
Georgieva, “20 Years Later, Eyewitnesses and Commentators,” Kultura 25 December 2009, p. 
3. There are also other ideas about the when the actual “date” should be, e.g. 13 October 1991 
when the anti-communist opposition finally won the parliamentary elections. It is well known 
that Bulgaria was the only country in which the first democratic elections after 1989 were won 
by the communist party, albeit under the new name Socialist Party.
7 For a systematic chronicle of the events, see Evgenia Kalinova and Iskra Baeva, Balgarskite 
prehodi 1939–2002 (Sofia: Prozorets 2005); Nadège Ragaru, “Apprivoiser les transformations 
postcommunistes en Bulgarie: la fabrique du politique (1989–2004),” Vol. 2 (PhD diss., Paris: 
IEP, 2005); a detailed history of the events is found in Ludjev, Revolutsiata. It is not possible 
here to enumerate all of the initial larger dissident formations. To mention a few, the Public 
Committee for the Ecological Protection of the Town of Rousse was established on 8 March 
1988, the earlier Independent Association for the Protection of Human Rights (IAPHR) was 
established on 16 January 1988, and the independent trade union Podkrepa was created. The 
Club in Support of Glasnost and Restructuring held an important role. It was “an informal 
association,” a “discussion club,” but the leadership of the Communist Party qualified it as “a 
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Conceptualization of the “change in 1989”
I will not deal here with the theories about the definition of socialism or the 
subsequent period, ideologically called the “transition from totalitarianism to 
democracy” (which is also the name of the mandatory lessons taught today in 
the history curricula of Bulgarian high schools). My task is another one: to de-
scribe the different waves of how 1989 as well as socialism/totalitarianism/
communism has since been remembered.
The year 1989 initiated a radical transformation of institutions and elites. It 
was a year in which old institutions were no longer legitimate but the new ones 
had not yet become so. Collective memory is a means for legitimizing in times 
when there is a shortage of legitimacy (“the more conspicuous the defects of 
legitimacy, the more important the appeal to memory becomes”8). A comprehen-
sive analysis would, of course, show how the stages of dissolution of the old 
regime, the institutions and symbols of the socialist state, have had an influence 
on how “the long farewell to communism” has been represented and, corre-
spondingly, how the narratives that interest us have developed.
There are a number of conceptualizations of “the change” that are important 
to this analysis. One of the first in Bulgaria, and also one of the most interesting, 
is that of the sociologist Georgi Dimitrov. According to him (in explicit disagree-
ment with Dahrendorf), the notion of “the revolutions in Eastern Europe (REE)” 
is a myth and must be deconstructed in order to “expand our public horizon in 
reference to which to organize our civil behaviours.”9 While the concept of 
“revolution” was politically effective when it emerged, it later became obsolete. 
If one continues to chant “democracy has no alternative,” we cannot understand 
a social transition in which there is “a blatant discrepancy between certain pub-
lic expectations and the facts of the political process.”10 The cliché of the “rev-
olutions in Eastern Europe (REE)” homogenizes “Eastern Europe” and ignores 
 
parallel structure in opposition to the party.” Ludjev, Revolutsiata, 58. A differentiated analysis 
would demonstrate the contradictory memories of the glorious dissident years as well as the 
struggle of these groups to be recognized as “the most important dissident formation.” A very 
important conflict in the postcommunist public sphere is that between perestroika dissidents 
(who some call “infiltrated communists”) and the “real anti-communists,” as for example the 
IAPHR considers itself. I refer to an interview with Freddy Foscolo in the newspaper Glasove, 
17 December 2009. These last groups were not invited to the meeting held on 19 January at the 
French embassy between President Mitterrand and Bulgarian dissidents, the so-called Mitter-
rand breakfast. Its anniversary in 2009 was celebrated by a large conference.
8 Alain Brossat, Sonia Combe et al., Mémoires en bataille. Histoire et mémoires en URSS et en 
Europe de l’Est. (Paris: Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, 1992). 
This thesis has been explicitly mentioned by Jean-Charles Sczurek.
9 Georgi Dimitrov, Balgaria v orbitite na modernizatsiata (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo Sv. 
Kliment Ohridski, 1995), 185.
10 Ibid., 185
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the other processes in the reality after 1989 that were the result of long-term 
national differences. The separate national cases are “incommensurable.” Thus, 
in Hungary or the Czech Republic, the events can be viewed as “processes of 
political normalization after a successful modernization,” while in Bulgaria or 
Russia, the processes have in fact been generated by “another crisis,” a series of 
failed attempts to modernize. “En bloc thinking legitimates the presumption of 
the revolutionarity of the ongoing processes.”11 Timothy Garton Ash’s neologism 
“refolution” also highlights the forms rather than the character of the processes. 
For the majority of Western observers, the processes that took place did look 
like a “revolution,” “an optimistic label” that “provides emotional and concep-
tual comfort.” Its function is to normalize the international situation.12 
The internal point of view is equally non-analytic. The strategists and the 
leaders of the restructuring “have an interest in heroizing their work.” Most 
political leaders have not been “representatives of well-structured citizen inter-
ests” and have had no way of legitimizing their rise to power other than by an 
“external heroization of their civil contribution” to the revolution.13 And ordinary 
citizens have been persuaded that the problem of leaving socialist society, which 
really could no longer exist, could have been resolved merely by an unprece-
dented mobilization and self-negation; thus ordinary citizens also continue to 
believe in this symbolic myth. Since the different groups seem to be talking 
about the same thing, the unstable foundations upon which this myth is built 
have remained unnoticed for a long time.
However, it seems to me that what became clear in the first days was that the 
different participants were not “talking about the same thing,” and indeed they 
did not want to. This is why even today some remember 1989 as a year that 
revived the aborted 1968 events in Bulgaria and the desire for “socialism with 
a human face.”14 Others remember the year as having accelerated the end of the 
“communist yoke” and the violence this yoke had generated (for these, the be-
ginning of the end was 14 December 1989). What a third group remembers about 
1989 are the rallies and demonstrations demanding the restoration of Muslim 
names, which the communist power had forbidden and replaced with Bulgarian 
ones. A fourth group remembers the year as when they finally could legalize 
their private businesses, a fifth as the year Batman came to the cinemas, and for 




14 In 1968 dissidents in Bulgaria were a very small group without influence. Although there were 
quite a few intellectuals who advocated the reform of socialism (a “socialism with a human 
face”), and although there was mass dissatisfaction with the participation of Bulgarian troops in 
the crushing of the “Prague Spring,” dissent remained fragmented in Bulgaria, with no publicly 
visible civil actions.
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Quite a few researchers have stressed “the dividing nature of the founding 
myth” of the revolution.15 The historian Nadège Ragaru has emphasized one 
extremely important idiosyncrasy of the post-1989 processes, namely, disappoint-
ment. This remains poorly understood in transitological and other theories, where-
by postcommunist transformations move (albeit at different speeds and with 
different amounts of success) from the institutional and legal chaos caused by the 
change of regime to a gradual stabilization in political and other types of institu-
tions and organizations. But in Bulgaria, such processes of “stabilization-banali-
zation-consolidation” did not take place. As Ragaru, author of one of the most 
interesting “Western” studies of the Bulgarian postcommunist period, has written, 
the transformations were “not because there was democratic dysfunctionality,” a 
shortage of democracy. Rather the social actors “had to manage the challenges 
of the present.” And the context of that present was the great social transformation 
of the Western institutions of classical modernity, of the “globalization of the 
forms of economic organization, of an increased geographical mobility.”16
But as I mentioned above, my object in this text is not the memories of schol-
ars doing research on 1989 and post-1989,”17 but is the collective memory of 
Bulgaria.18
15 Ragaru, “Apprivoiser.” See also Peter-Emil Mitev, Izbori ’91 (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo, 
1993).
16 Ragaru, “Apprivoiser,” 751–62.
17 In this text, I will also not deal with methodological issues as, e.g., “the truth of memory” of 
eyewitnesses. Since the classic book by Jean N. Cru, who analysed falsity in the memories of 
witnesses of World War I, there is abundant literature on this question. More on the issue of 
historical evidence can be found in François Hartog, Evidences de l’histoire. Ce que voient les 
historiens. (Paris: Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 1999).
18 For a systematization of certain debates on the study of collective memory and of Bulgarian stud-
ies, see Roumen Daskalov, Ot Stambolov do Jivkov (Sofia: Gutenberg, 2009); Liliana Deyanova, 
Ochertaniata na multchanieto. Istoricheska sotsiologia na kolektivnata pamet (Sofia: Critique and 
Humanism, 2009); Ulf Brunnbauer, ed., (Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe 
after Socialism, Studies on South East Europe 4 (Münster: Lit, 2004). Many scholars in Bulgaria 
are working on the problem of the collective memory of communism, including Daniela Koleva, 
Kristina Popova, Peter Vodenicharov, Ivan Elenkov, Ilya Iliev, Snejana Dimitrova, Ivaylo Dichev, 
Krassimira Daskalova, Rayna Gavrilova, Rositsa Gencheva, Tchavdar Marinov and many oth-
ers. Recently, the enormous project at Ivaylo Zneploski’s Institute for Studies of the Recent Past 
(presented on the website http://minaloto.org) has seen a great deal of publication activity. Alex-
ander Kiossev is the leader of several projects concerning the memory of communism, including 
one of the first in Bulgaria, “Construction and deconstruction of the symbolic world of Com-
munism.” Within the international project of Maria Todorova and Stefan Troebst, “Remembering 
Communism” (see the site www.rememberingcommunism.org), Petya Kabakchieva has studied 
the memory of social inequalities, Mila Mineva the “nostalgia for the Soc,” Albena Hranova the 
“loan-memory” of the youngest generation, Vanya Petrova postcommunist films, Iskra Baeva and 
Evgenia Kalinova the memory of the “Revival Process” 1984–89 as well of the files of the polit-
ical police, and Tanya Boneva the memory of ethnographic archives. Mihail Gruev and Aleksey 
Kalionski are also doing research on the memory of the “Revival Process” of 1984–89. See also 
some of project’s research as presented in Maria Todorova, ed., Remembering Communism: Gen-
Liliana Deyanova
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The memory of 1989 as a memory of 9 September 1944
Many of the narratives about 1989, especially in the initial traumatic phase 
after the dissolution of the official memory of communism (the memory that was 
merged with the memory of the party state), were related to the memory of a 
fundamental event in modern Bulgarian history: 9 September 1944. The memory 
of “the Ninth of September” (a popular uprising or anti-fascist revolution for 
some, a coup d’état mounted with the Red Army’s help for others) is a demarca-
tion line that divides the Bulgarian people into two large and almost ethnic-like 
groups: communists and anti-communists (“fascists”), executioners and victims, 
true Bulgarians and traitors, patriots and agents, us and them, red and blue (blue 
being the symbol of the anti-communist opposition). This memory—also associ-
ated with the memory of the so-called People’s Court, which condemned 2,700 
“enemies of the people” to death in 1945—has created a deep national trauma 
and syndrome (similar to Henry Rousso’s “Vichy syndrome”19). Following the 
collapse of the official memory of communism, the public sphere was dominated 
by two opposing narratives about communism and the nation’s history. These 
were used by the political elites for political purposes. Each group favored its 
own account and strove to universalize its own memory. Historians found it dif-
ficult to neutralize and assess these accounts, to create a hierarchy within the huge 
mass of testimonies that was accumulating, and to secure them a place in the 
public sphere, not a new oblivion. It was difficult to integrate the memory of 
communism into contemporary experience, to use it as a mechanism that regu-
lates—to quote Tzvetan Todorov—people’s ability to manage the present. And it 
was difficult for historians to identify the collective aspects of the Bulgarian 
situation; it was easier to limit themselves to the idea of its uniqueness.20
res of Representation (New York: Social Sciences Research Council, 2010). One of the authors has 
taken part in a project that has created a special site for the memory of communism: www.spomen-
iteni.org. Within the framework of two different projects, G. Gospodinov, together with Yana Gen-
ova, produced the Inventory Book of Socialism (Sofia: Prozorets, 2006). Blagovest Nyagulov and 
Antoaneta Zapryanova are examining the memory of Bulgarian historians. Since as early as 1990, 
the Institute for Critical Social Studies has been examining the memory of communism—in histo-
ry textbooks, in the political public domain, etc.—and is currently working on a project to create 
a “Virtual Museum of Socialism.” Nikolai Vukov has done a systematic study of the destruction 
of monuments after the communist era. Daniela Koleva has systematized biographic and autobio-
graphic publications on socialism in Ivaylo Znepolski, ed., Istoria na Narodna Republika Bulgaria 
(Sofia: IIBM Siela, 2009). One of these is the project of Vera Mutafchieva, Antonina Jeliazkova 
and others entitled History Populated with People. The Institute for Advanced Study is working 
on several projects concerning historical and collective memory (https://www.cas.bg; the site also 
contains an important bibliography of Bulgarian postcommunist studies).
19 Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy (Paris: Seuil, 1990); Jeffrey K. Olick, “What Does It Mean 
to Normalize the Past?” Social Science History 22, no. 4 (1998).
20 Tzvetan Todorov, Les abus de la mémoire (Paris: Arléa—Le Seuil, 1995); Olick, “Normalize”; 
Marie-Claire Lavabre, “L’histoire de la mémoire—sociologie de la mémoire,” in Bogumil Jew-
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In one of the studies undertaken at the Institute for Critical Social Studies,21 
it was examined how landmark events, places and persons in Bulgaria’s history 
since the liberation from Ottoman rule (1878) had been presented in the postcom-
munist public sphere. Articles about historical events and relevant references were 
compared in two opposing newspapers: Douma, the daily of the former commu-
nist party, and Demokratsiya, the daily of the united opposition (the two main 
political formations, which—in the post-1989 period—were supported by four-
fifths of the total electorate). Examined was how these two factions, the “red” 
and the “blue,” referred to “Bulgaria” and what they considered “the common 
places of national memory.” The divide in national identity as civic identity (in 
contrast to ethnic identity) proved so deep that it was not only reflected in events 
which by definition had opposing significance (e.g., the People’s Court), but also 
more in consensual events, events with a great unifying potential for the nation, 
such as the Jews on Bulgarian territory having been saved from deportation during 
World War II.
In the extensive disputes about the “communist genocide” or, more precisely, 
about which of the two genocides—the Gulag or Auschwitz—was larger in scale 
and “more horrible,” it was in fact easy to discern an eliminatory logic: In the 
narratives of communists and anti-communists, respectively, the testimonies of 
victims were disqualified as “lies,” and the testimonies of the executioners were 
considered invalid (insofar as they were extracted by violent means or fabricated 
by their accusers). “Executioners” and “victims” exchange places in the accounts 
of the two main parties to the dispute, but the logic they have followed is the 
same. It is strongly reminiscent of the logic of “classical negationists:”22 every 
eyewitness testimony of a Jewish survivor is proclaimed to be a lie; all confes-
sions of Nazi witnesses on trial are eliminated on the assumption that they were 
made under threats. It is, however, not only testimonies about the Holocaust that 
carry this danger.
How does today’s “ordinary negationism” work and why has it become pos-
sible? It is especially visible at the start of the anti-communist revolution, when 
communist monuments were destroyed and history was rewritten (a time, as was 
often stated, in which “the past was becoming more and more unpredictable”). It 
siewicki, ed., Travail de mémoire et d’oubli dans les sociétés postcommunistes (Bucharest: 
Editura universitatii din Bucuresti, 2006), 30–45; François Hartog, Jaques Revel, Les usages 
politiques du passé (Paris: EHESS, 2001).
21 Maya Grekova, Liliana Deyanova, Milena Yakimova et al., Natsionalnata identichnost v situat-
sia na kriza: istoritcheski resursi (Sofia: Minerva, 1977). Another important source for my anal-
ysis here is the research done at the same Institute as found in Deyan Deyanov, ed., Prenapisvan-
eto na istoriata v utchebnitsite za gimnaziite (Sofia: MONT, 1995).
22 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Les assassins de la mémoire (Paris: Seuil 1995); Emmy Barouh, Histo-
ry and Memory. Bulgaria facing the Holocaust (Sofia: LIK & Open Society, 2003). See also 
Bogumil Jewsiewicki, ed., Travail de mémoire et d’oubli dans les sociétés postcommunistes 
(Bucharest: Editura universitatii din Bucuresti, 2006).
Liliana Deyanova
499
has also been revived at every new social crisis. The memory of communism is 
a basic resource; even today it is used politically by the political elites. Nonethe-
less, this moving force in the postcommunist struggle has lost its centrality. 
Ideological politics have been replaced by pragmatics and, as the renowned po-
litical analyst Ivan Krastev puts it, the elites and parties of the transition have 
become invalid and out of place.23
The debate concerning “the two dates,” i.e. 1944 and 1989, was revived on 
the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of Bulgarian com-
munism/socialism in 1944. The opposition MPs, during the parliamentary ses-
sion, proposed a special “Declaration on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary 
of 9 September 1944.” They contested “the right of this party and its electorate,” 
of “a party that wants to look nice to those people who feel nostalgia about com-
munism” to “glorify this historical period while ignoring the fact that the demo-
cratic world has univocally condemned Nazism and communism.”24 The decla-
ration against nostalgia for “totalitarian symbols” was contested by the leftist MPs 
and, in the end, was not adopted. The right to memory also presumes the recog-
nition of the right to nostalgia.
After the initial euphoria, the dreams and the construction in 1990 (after a 
defeat in the first free parliamentary elections) of the “Town of Truth,” a tent 
camp built by anti-communist demonstrators in the city center of Sofia after the 
elections in June 1990, after festivities such as the event “Say Goodbye to Com-
munism,” whose participants solemnly burnt personal communist-era objects, it 
became evident that some sites of memory had also become sites of nostalgia. I 
believe, however, that many of the incidents being interpreted as “nostalgia for 
communism” do not, in fact, reveal a real desire for communism to return. In this 
sense, the conclusions of empirical studies like the New Eurobarometer 2001, 
establishing “increasing levels of nostalgia” in ten postcommunist countries and 
the respective threat of “non-democratic values,” seem quite problematic.25 A 
detailed analysis must include a particular nostalgia’s contextualization. Such 
“meaning-seeking machines” demonstrate various expressions of longing for the 
past, such as the recently built monument to the last communist leader, Todor 
23 Ivan Krastev, “The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 4 
(2007): 56–63. On this, see “the end of the ‘ideological politics’” on the website of the Media 
Democracy Foundation, Sofia. In my analysis, this reflects the modifications to the “the image 
of the enemy” during the “transition” period until the elections of 2009. And then again, the 
election-winning representative of the right-centrist formation GERB did not miss the chance to 
say that he dedicated his victory to his grandfather, who was “killed like a dog on 9 September 
1944 by the communists.” http://www.fmd.bg/?p=4597 (accessed 9 January 2014).
24 See the stenogram of the plenary session of the 39th National Assembly of 9 September 2004, 
http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ns/1/ID/1066 (accessed 9 January 2014).
25 Joakim Ekman and Jonas Linde, “Communist Nostalgia and the Consolidation of Democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 21, no. 3 
(2005): 354–75, 354.
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Zhivkov, the club of the friends of the Moskvich car, and the mass showings of 
the twenty-six episodes of the first Bulgarian socialist “Eastern movie,” On Every 
Kilometer, which glorifies the communist anti-fascist resistance. 
A rarely mentioned cause and form of nostalgia is related to the fact that the 
communist society was also a modernization project, a product based on the 
logic of modernity itself. According to Reinhart Koselleck, communist society is 
based on a “horizon of expectation,” hope that is a narrative of progress or a 
“future past,” a future that illuminates the past by giving it a new perspective.26 
This kind of nostalgia is also familiar in democratic countries—nostalgia for 
perspectiveness as perceiving mankind developing into a certain, better future in 
an era of global modernity, an era, as has been expressed by Jean-François Ly-
otard, that is seeing the “decline of meta-narratives” and “nostalgia for nostal-
gia.”27 It is an era that is seeing the end of the welfare state, in which insecurity 
is structurally produced and an “imperative of urgency” dominates. A symptom 
of this type of nostalgia is “galloping patrimonialization.”28
The anniversaries of 1989
Two decades after the revolutions in Eastern Europe, solemn commemorations 
have become less energetic or have almost disappeared and the events themselves 
have increasingly lost the designation of “revolution.” But in 1997, this term and 
hope for change were still alive. By then inflation had reached 300 percent and 
the governing party, the former Communist Party which had been renamed Bul-
garian Socialist Party, experienced a radical legitimacy crisis. The “January pro-
test movement” of 1997 were called a “new revolution,” a “second revolution,” 
a “second chance for civil society,” and the “beginning of a new chronology.” 
Ragaru, who wrote one of the most interesting analyses of this five-week “pres-
26 Reinhart Koselleck, Le futur passé (Paris: EHESS, 1990).
27 Jean-François Lyotard, La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir (Paris: Minuit, 1979)
28 For patrimonialization as a symptom of a new “régime of historicity,” see François Hartog, 
Régimes d’hitoricité (Paris: Seuil, 2002). On the commercialization of the public sphere and 
the emergence of images (e.g. in advertisements) from “the good old times,” see Mila Mine-
va’s article “Communism reloaded,” which was published as part of the project “Remembering 
communism” directed by Maria Todorova and Stefan Troebst. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/log-
browse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Soz-u-Kult&month=0809&week=c&msg=Z1yboPD4dSLFWym-
CZShdNA&user=&pw= (accessed 15 July 2013). According to Mineva, new pop-cultural rep-
ertoires of remembering have started to emerge since 2000. They are a popular form of criti-
quing the present: by remembering socialism positively, people are expressing their hopes for 
the utopias of a better world. For a comparative perspective on nostalgia, see Dragos Petrescu, 
“History in transitional counter-memory, and nostalgia,” within the same project. See also the 
contributions to the colloquium that took place in September 2005 in Berlin at the Marc Bloch 
Institute entitled “La nostalgie de l‘époque communiste: émergence d’une nouvelle mémoire 
collective en Europe de l’Est.”
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sure of the street” and crisis of institutions and parties, has examined its stages 
and the causes for this revived will to change. The “January events” were ex-
pressing the desire for the anti-communist opposition to embody “the European 
future of Bulgaria,” the desire to denounce the false changes and artificial re-
forms, and the desire for a final condemnation of the “criminal Bulgarian Social-
ist Party.”29
But the twentieth anniversary of 1989 was not celebrated with fireworks and 
fanfare in Bulgaria. According to the communist newspaper Douma, mentioned 
above, “twenty years after the fall of the Wall, most people are unhappy with 
capitalism.”30 According to its opponents, the Demokratsiya newspaper, “you 
cannot celebrate something that did not happen or was a failure,” and “commu-
nists are still here.”31 The liberal press published a study conducted by the Alfa 
Research sociological agency entitled “Twenty years after the changes, Bulgari-
ans hesitate as to when they lived better.”32 Many publications were dedicated to 
the festivities in Berlin, where “freedom was being celebrated.” But as both 
Western and Bulgarian analysts of the post-1989 events stated, “Bulgaria is not 
celebrating.” And while there were actually quite a number of jubilee events and 
publications in Bulgaria, they were as fragmented as the memory of 1989 itself. 
Moreover they were not, and had little chance to be, visible publically—with a 
few exceptions, as for example the exhibition “Without a Trace” on the Belene 
labor camp 1949–59, organized by the private Institute for the Studies of the 
Recent Past and solemnly opened on 10 November, together with an internation-
al conference organized by the same Institute. The memory of communism had 
become split into pieces.33 
29 Increasingly called “the BSP mafia.” This desire can also be seen in events such as the mock 
funeral march for the Party, enacted by the students of the Theater Academy, as well as in a 
renewed romanticism symbolic of 1989 but also of the Bulgarian national revival of the 19th 
century. See “1989 in 1997” in Nadège Ragaru, Le temps feuilleté du changement. Essais sur 
la Bulgarie post-socialiste (Sofia: Critique & Humanism Publishing House, 2010); see also the 
revolutionary slogans published by the Bulgarian Student Protest Union, of which some are 
included in Lubima Yordanova, Ot lumpena do grajdanina (Sofia: Bulteks, 1997).
30 Douma, 10 November 1990.
31 Demokratsiya , 10 November 1990.
32 Published in Kapital, 13 November 2009. According to this survey, 78.2% said that health care 
was better under socialism; only 12.2% responded that it was better in 2009. This is also the 
case with other indicators: according to 48.3% (vs. 26.2%) education was not better in 2009. 
The ratio was reversed in only three indicators: the diversity of commodities, freedom of speech, 
and leisure and travel. On Bulgarian National TV, it was possible to watch dialogs such as the 
following: Reporter: “What do you know about 10 November?” Student girl: “Almost nothing.” 
Reporter: “Haven’t you been told about it?” Student girl: “No.” Student boy: “As far as I know, 
they say this is the date of transition […] when the Communist Party lost power.” Another stu-
dent boy: “That was when reforms were undertaken in Bulgaria; it changed from totalitarianism, 
or something like that, into democracy.”
33 Cf. Alexander Kiossev’s project “Beyond Hatred, Beyond Nostalgia,” a mini festival of the 
socialist past; see also the special issue: Alexander Kiossev, ed., “The Living Archive of a Fes-
Remembering Revolutions: The Public Memory of 1989 in Bulgaria
502
My research comparing the events and their tenth and other round anniversa-
ries is outlined in the following survey.
One year after 1989
On 10 November 1990 the communists joyfully celebrated “the pivotal date 
of the newest political history”34 and “the day when the change began.” For these 
changes, “the Bulgarian Communist Party played a historical role […] without 
its effort to destroy the totalitarian system, our development would have had 
another fate.” It is stated that “the Party has distanced itself from its mistakes,” 
which is why the leader of the communists says that “we must take the offen-
sive—for democracy and civil peace, against violence and neo-fascism.” On the 
next day, 11 November, many photos and other material are published of a rally 
organized by the Supreme Council and the City Council of the Bulgarian Com-
munist Party in Sofia. It is described as “a meeting of many thousands celebrat-
ing the birthday of democracy,” whereby “they are demonstrating their resolution 
to continue with change.” 
But in the same issue of the communist newspaper Douma, we also find many 
stories and photos of counter-rallies and anti-communist protests, which were 
frequent at that time. Here one sees faces of people who suffered from “alterna-
tive [anti-communist] action,” as from a “violent blue fans gang.” The latter was 
a metaphor for anti-communism; actually no such gang ever existed. Some com-
munists condemn the “incompetent voluntarism” of the former party leader— 
“the dictator”— Todor Zhivkov. (“10 November is the date on which our party 
found the strength to break once and forever with the dictatorship and the per-
sonal regime”35). Slogans such as “we bring the future” and “democracy for ev-
eryone” are used. 
On 10 November, Demokratsiya, the daily of the anti-communist opposition, 
notes the date without enthusiasm: “One year from the start of the Big ‘Change’” 
(placing the word “change” between ironic quotation marks).36 Memories of 
persons close to Zhivkov and the communist circles are published. The desire is 
strong to keep the memory of “the crimes of communism” alive (because “while 
tival,” Piron 2 (2009); cf. also the conference “1989. The Divided Year. Literature as a Political 
Construction of Transition,” organized by Plamen Dojnov and Mihail Nedeltchev at the New 
Bulgarian University. See also the important series of articles on the anniversary of 1989 in 
Kultura, and the festival of critical documentary films from the socialist period, “Despite: at the 
verge of changes” (Bulgarian publishers of human & social sciences, National Cinematheque 
and others). See also Maria Todorova, “Daring to remember Bulgaria pre-1989,” Guardian, 9 
November 2009.
34 Douma, 10 November 1990; Douma, 11 November 1990.
35 Ibid.
36 Demokratsiya , 10 November 1990.
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communism is going, communists are staying”). The sites of “communist con-
centration camps” are sought and the memories of witnesses are published.
The communists were opposed to the opposition’s alleged desire to take over 
power completely. “Yesterday the opposition demanded absolute power in a series 
of rallies” is the announcement about a national strike that then lasted thirty-sev-
en days, revealing the high degree of political tension at that time.37
Ten years after 1989
In 1999 the anti-communist opposition was in power and the changes that had 
begun on 10 November 1989 were described differently. The most glaring state-
ment is the front-page title in Douma reading “No Reform or Transition in Bul-
garia.” Debates at the conference “Ten Years after the Tenth,” organized by the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, are quoted. The decline of the country and the misery 
of its citizens are described against the background of the hope for freedom that 
had momentarily sparked.38 Douma’s editorial board invites the ambassadors of 
Russia and the United States to discuss “the place of Bulgaria in the contemporary 
world.”
Concurrently, Demokratsiya writes about freedom: “Germany, ten years with-
out the Wall.” It recalls the will of the ordinary citizens: “If they had not demand-
ed the change […] then those who invent stories of their own heroism would have 
continued to speak happily.” On the same day, the front page of the newspaper 
carries the article “The archives about 10 November have been hidden.” The head 
of the General Department of Archives confesses to the absence of twenty-six 
archival items that would have been important for understanding the history of 
“10 November 1989.” The decisions of the Politburo of the Communist Party are 
missing, as well as records of other key decisions, as for example of the inter-
vention of Bulgarian troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Against the opinion that 
the actors of 1989 were “heroes,” it is argued that 10 November was an internal 
Party coup: “a perfunctory change of the First One,” “a palace coup endorsed by 
Moscow.”39
The “coup” thesis is also taken up by some textbook authors. After a period 
of confusion immediately following 1989 and the impossibility to “teach” the 
previous period (which is why it was automatically deleted from the history cur-
ricula40), 1989 was gradually thematicized. It became mandatory to call these 
37 Douma, 11 November 1990.
38 Douma, 10 November 1999.
39 Demokratsiya  10 November 1999.
40 See the Instruction of the Ministry of Public Education of 1990 entitled “Some changes in the 
content and organization of the educational work from the first to the eleventh forms.” Copy in 
the author’s possession. 
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lessons “From totalitarianism to democracy.” Textbooks explain that “the crisis 
of socialism became especially conspicuous in the mid-1980s,” but removing 
Zhivkov from power “was done by political figures from the highest circles of 
the party and the state in the form of palace coup.”41 It can be read that “the 
Berlin Wall finally fell down, Zhivkov was deposed, and Bulgaria took the road 
of democracy.” According to the same authors, the Bulgarian opposition was 
different from that in the Central European countries: it “was born in early 1988 
and stopped unexpectedly after ‘the change on the Tenth.’”
Another textbook explains that the problems of communism were mainly due 
to Todor Zhivkov (who was “an impostor and opportunist”) and the fact that 
establishing diplomatic relations with the EC was so late (in 1988) because of 
“the ideological burden of the ruling communists.”42 Other textbooks analyze the 
struggle between the two main views of “the destruction of the old system”: either 
as a rebuilding (perestroika) under the guidance of the Communist Party or as a 
“radical transformation of the society” after the fall of communists’ monopoly.43 
As mentioned above, the subject “The Bulgarian transition to democracy” be-
comes a mandatory part of the curriculum and a separate topic in new textbooks.
The laws on “the memory of communism”
There have been many attempts to pass laws on “the memory of communism.” 
These include the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
Resolution 1481 (2006) on “the need for international condemnation of crimes 
of totalitarian communist regimes.” Also in Bulgaria, for the past two decades 
different groups have been trying to assert their memory as being “the true mem-
ory of communism” and to control textbooks, monuments, museums and the 
media. In other words, they are attempting to acquire a monopoly over the legit-
imate symbolism of the era and the interpretations of the common sites of the 
memory of “communism.” In the following I will describe several attempts at 
creating memory laws.44
On 30 March 2000, the Bulgarian Parliament discussed the Act Declaring the 
Criminal Nature of the Communist Regime in Bulgaria, and a month later it was 
passed. The Act was the final result of a series of attempts to pass decommuni-
zation and lustration laws in Bulgaria. The positive decision on the Act was 
41 Iskra Baeva, Ivan Ilchev et al., Istoria i tsivilizatsia za 11 klas (Sofia: Planeta, 2001), 148.
42 Ivan Lazarov, Istoria i tsivilizatsia za 11 klas (VelikoTurnovo: Slovo, 2001), 163.
43 Alexander Nikolov, Mitko Delev, et al., Istoria i tsivilizatsia za 11 klas (Sofia: Prosveta, 2002), 
422, 425.
44 For the logic of the so-called lois mémorielles, see Pierre Nora, Françoise Chandernagor, Liberté 
pour l’histoire (Paris: CNRS Edition, 2008), as well the debates between the French historian 
Gerard Noiriel and the Comité de vigilance face aux usages politiques de l’histoire.
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predestined by the parliamentary majority of the anti-communist Union of Dem-
ocratic Forces (Sayuz na demokratichnite sili, SDS). 
The socialists called the Act “insane.” Georgi Parvanov, a historian and so-
cialist MP at the time (and later president of Bulgaria) wrote an article in which 
he repeated (unrevised) the post-1989 arguments of the Left. He pointed out that 
the USSR was part of an anti-Nazi coalition; that before 1944 there had also been 
crimes, killings and foreign troops in Bulgaria; that the current Bulgarian GDP 
is lower than before 1989 and that many families “have forgotten the taste of 
meat products,” while under socialism seventy-eight kilograms of meat products 
were consumed per capita each year; that Bulgaria had been the world’s largest 
producer of cigarettes and second largest producer of nitrogen fertilizers; in short, 
that “we” (the socialists) would not allow “the distortion of the truth about the 
past” and “the rewriting of history post factum.”45 Conversely, the SDS daily, 
Demokratsiya, congratulated itself on the fact that communism had been out-
lawed, emphasizing once again that Bulgaria had done the least of all ex-com-
munist countries concerning decommunization. They pointed out that Bulgaria 
was the only country where “the debate with the communists has not been re-
corded in any document” because the communists in Bulgaria are “even worse 
than those in Romania.”46 
As always, “Europe” was also invoked in the arguments. According to the 
BSP elites, a law like this was “a death sentence for a parliament that is heading 
for the EU.” And according to the SDS elites, “EU membership itself is the con-
temporary dimension of anti-communism.”47
At the same time, other parliamentary panels and committees discussed vari-
ous proposals for creating an Institute of National Memory. In some drafts, the 
Institute of National Memory is even called the Institute for Studies on the Crimes 
of Communism. This is why the SDS proposed that 50 percent of the members 
of the Institute be appointed by the Union of the Repressed People in Bulgaria 
after 9 September 1944, and the rest by the Supreme Judicial Council and the 
National Assembly. Item 6 of Article 28 of this draft defines a main task of the 
future Institute as “the formation of proposals on history curricula that will be 
made available to the Ministry of Education.”
A typical lustration law is the Act of Provisionally Introducing Certain Addi-
tional Qualifications for Senior Members of Scientific Institutions and the High-
45 Douma, 31 March 2000.
46 Demokratsiya, 31 March 2000.
47 For more on this topic, see Liliana Deyanova, “Des condamnations locales du communisme à la 
Condamnation internationale de janvier 2006 (les guerres des élites bulgares pour le monopole 
de la mémoire du communisme),” in Bogumil Jewsiewicki and Erika Nimis, eds., Expérience 
et mémoire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008), 193–213. I am also using interviews with historians and 
other researchers on communism within my project “How do Bulgarian Historians Remember 
Communism?” This project is part of the international comparative study “Remembering Com-
munism” often mentioned here. 
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er Certifying Commission of 9 December 1992 (known as the Panev Act after 
the SDS MP who proposed it). On 21 October 1998 the Bulgarian Parliament 
passed a Public Administration Act that contained lustration provisions. The then 
president, Petar Stoyanov, used his right of veto and returned the Act to further 
debate. On 30 July 1997 the National Assembly passed, again with an SDS ma-
jority, a law on declassifying state security files. While at the time the law was 
revoked, by December 2006 Bulgaria had received a law regarding secret police 
files and a commission had been formed for granting access to them. The fixation 
on secret police files, conspiracy paradigms and “a clean past” have proven to be 
central issues in the debates about the memory of communism.
The above-mentioned PACE Resolution 1481 of 25 January 2006 on “the need 
for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes” is 
rightly considered the culmination of the attempts to condemn communism. And 
calls for a “Nuremberg Trial” of communism are becoming louder. In the first 
variant of the resolution, it is said—and this opinion seems to be voiced ever 
more frequently in Bulgaria as well—that “the communist regime was even more 
perverse than the Nazi regime.”48 But the attempts of the European People’s 
Party/Christian Democrats to promote this idea (together with Resolution 1481, 
which was the result of a long and skillful lobbying campaign of the Party) in a 
document called “Recommendation to the Council of Ministers” failed to win the 
necessary two-thirds majority. This means that this sentence will not yet be in-
cluded in the history textbooks of the member countries concerned. But the 
problem of the official memory of “communism,” of the effort of particular 
groups to make their memory of “this regime” official, to turn it into a juridical 
law, a moral norm and even into a scholarly truth with the help of “their histori-
ans,” remains unresolved. While in 2006 the PACE resolution was not approved 
by the Bulgarian Parliament, it did pass in 2009. Soon thereafter, on 19 Novem-
ber 2009, the Bulgarian Parliament also approved the European Parliament Res-
olution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism of 2 April 2009 (proclaiming 
23 August a “Day of Remembrance of the Crimes and Victims of the National 
Socialist, Communist and All Other Totalitarian Regimes”).
The Bulgarian participation in both the initiative and adoption of PACE Res-
olution 1481 was not insignificant. According to the account of Bulgarian politi-
cian Lachezar Toshev, after a 2003 rally in Bulgaria to remember the people who 
had been repressed in the labor camp on Belene (Persin) Island, the initial text 
of the resolution was planned and written in Bulgaria, whereupon it was taken to 
Strasbourg, debated, revised and registered as a document to be put to the vote. 
In the name of this cause, a special website, Decommunization, was created in 
48 PACE Draft Resolution, 16 December 2005, http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.





Bulgaria, and a conference was organized in Koprivshtitsa on “The International 
Condemnation of Communism—the Initiative of the European People’s Party—
The Bulgarian Perspective.” Also presented there on 24 September 2004 was a 
newly founded institute.49
While the new institute for the study of the crimes of communism and the 
proposals for establishing an Institute for National Memory became the object of 
debate, this did not enter the public discourse. Some researchers see these kinds 
of institutes not as scholarly institutions, but rather associate them with the former 
“institutes for propaganda.” Others, however, are convinced that these institutes 
provide the long-desired chance of “guaranteeing the freedom of scholarly re-
search” and an objective reading of history, which used to be obstructed by the 
“communist nomenklatura.”
Conclusion
The main question that has guided this account of the memory of 1989 (which, 
as in every narrative, is a question of construction, this construction being made 
from a position both scholarly and popular) has been how in Bulgaria the con-
tradictory experience of communism and the various conflicting interpretations 
that clash in the public sphere are represented in the memories of ordinary citizens 
as well as of researchers on communism. The modern public space of history 
presupposes equal access to different interpretations. Indeed, to use the term of 
Pierre Nora, the modern public space of history consists of lieux de mémoire, 
“common places of memory.” But these places belong to no one; the “common 
places of memory” are not necessarily “places of common memory.” In the bat-
tle of conflicting interpretations this is, by definition, what is at stake: the possi-
bility for a state, “Europe,” or various groups to assert a symbolic monopoly on 
a particular interpretation.
This is why it is essential to critically analyze the above-mentioned resolutions 
and memory laws that want to present “the truth about communism” as well as 
the research institutes whose goal is “to unify the memory of the times of com-
munism,” and thus, also the memory of the year 1989.
49 See the collection of official speeches and political messages as well as many documental stud-
ies [Vassil Stanilov, ed.], Memory for Tomorrow (Sofia: Rabotilnitsa za Knijnina Publishers, 
2005), which was presented to the PACE. Cf. [Luchezar Toshev et al.], Istoriata na edin docu-
ment: 1481/2006 (Sofia: Rabotilnitsa za Knijnina Publishers, 2006).     
Remembering Revolutions: The Public Memory of 1989 in Bulgaria
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THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989 AND THE 
“ARCHIVAL REVOLUTION” IN THE USSR
It is generally assumed that the “archival revolution” in Russia took place in 
the year 1991 when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was dis-
solved and the Soviet regime opened the doors to scores of archives (mainly of 
the party), making millions of previously inaccessible documents available to the 
general public. To a great extent this is true, but it must not be forgotten that these 
fundamental changes—the political upheavals themselves and the new access to 
the archives—were determined by events of earlier years. The year 1989, which 
became a turning point not only for Eastern Europe but for the world as a whole, 
was also in many ways symbolic and significant with respect to the fate of So-
viet archives and the documents contained within them.
At the end of the 1980s, when perestroika started to be implemented in the 
Soviet Union followed by most of the communist states of Europe, a situation 
arose that in Trotskyesque terms might be referred to as a new kind of “crisis of 
opposites.” On one hand there were half-hearted and inconsistent economic trans-
formations, unsuccessful reforms of the unwieldy national party structures and a 
sharp decline in the standard of living. On the other hand a politics of transpar-
ency was unquestionably successful, which led to a rapidly developing political 
awareness in the population, an increase in nationalism and an end to fear of 
government authority. Further developments in these two directions could only 
lead either to an end of the existing regimes or attempts to “reestablish socialist 
legitimacy” by means of brute force. The revolutions of 1989 demonstrated that 
Eastern Europe chose the first of these options,1 but they also triggered a deep-
ening and irreversible development of transformational processes in the Soviet 
Union itself, essentially determining the future of the country that had embodied 
“the victory of socialism.”
When considering the links between the events in Eastern Europe and the “ar-
chival revolution” in the Soviet Union, it is worth pondering for a moment the two 
basic features of so-called closed (both in the literal and figurative sense of the 
word) institutions such as the party archives. Characteristic of Soviet perestroika 
were diametrically opposed tendencies appearing in all spheres of public life. This 
was also true with regard to the archival sector. Here the new principles of glasnost 
and democracy clashed directly with the same party’s aim of maximum secrecy 
1 Although the course of events was somewhat different in some Warsaw Pact countries (the GDR 
and Romania, for instance), this did not prevent the collapse of the regimes there as well.
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regarding party and Soviet government documents. During the year 1989, which 
saw not only the revolutionary upheavals in Europe but also political battles at the 
first congresses of the People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union, which were closely 
observed by the entire country, both tendencies were reinforced. This led to inev-
itable confrontations. Against this background, a “crisis of opposites” also devel-
oped that was of a specifically archival nature. On one hand, under the changing 
social political conditions it became practically impossible, even dangerous, for 
the authorities to maintain a policy of “closed archives.” On the other hand, it was 
just as dangerous to open the archives: the Kremlin could not avoid being aware 
of the role the assertions of the opposition regarding various episodes in the past 
(e.g., the Katyń massacre, the crushing of the Hungarian uprising and the “Prague 
Spring”) were having on the revolutions in Eastern Europe. Under these condi-
tions the year 1989 was unique in its divisive character. The archival fortifications, 
which until that time had seemed to protect the bulk of historical documents of 
the CPSU and the Soviet Union from curious eyes, began to be washed out, in one 
part due to official decisions, in another, unauthorized activities. 
Another issue concerns the changes that took place at that time with regard to 
the party archives themselves and the documents contained within them. Today, 
more than twenty years later, this is of course already a part of history which is 
documented with highly significant and interesting historical material. The for-
mer archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU, today the Russian State 
Archives for Contemporary History,2 stored documents of the highest party and 
federal structures of the Soviet Union. These determined the internal and external 
policies not only of the Soviet state, but to a large extent also of the countries that 
were at that time part of the European communist camp.
The relations between the Soviet Union and its European satellites contained 
a number of “skeletons in the closet” that leaders of the communist states were 
loath to dwell upon. Accordingly, documents relating to these unpleasant episodes 
remained locked “with seven seals” in Moscow’s archives. The democratic pro-
cesses developing in the countries of Eastern Europe in the second half of the 
1980s increasingly forced the leaders of the “brother parties” to demonstrate their 
independence from Moscow. In their struggle to stay in power, they sometimes 
attempted to adopt the popular demands of the opposition, especially its desire 
for the Soviet Union to reveal documents relating to the “blank spaces” in their 
common history. This was considered the least risky concession to their political 
opponents. But when Moscow’s protégés were forced to leave the political arena, 
the new leaders who took their place demanded even more forcefully, almost cat-
egorically, the release of relevant documents by the Soviet regime. 
2 The generally accepted reference to “the former archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU” 
is not entirely accurate: RGANI, at the time of its formation in 1991 called the Center of Storage 
of Contemporary Documents, was in fact formed from a number of archives that were operating 
in various divisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
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The demands that were most repeated and widespread concerned the fate of 
compatriots who had been repressed in the Soviet Union during the Stalin years. To 
a great extent these demands were prompted by the Soviet leadership itself, which 
in 1987 had instituted a “Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of 
the CPSU for the Expanded Study of Materials Related to Repression Taking Place 
during the Period between 1930 and 1940 and at the Beginning of the 1950s.”3 Due 
to tendencies toward more transparency and openness, the attempts by some lead-
ers in the Soviet Communist Party to conceal the activities of this committee were 
doomed to failure from the outset. While a process of reconciliation was relatively 
easy for Soviet citizens, the situation for former “cominternists” and political emi-
grants from other countries (who represented the bulk of the politically repressed) 
was extraordinarily difficult. Many of them had not only been party or political fig-
ures, but had carried out “special” assignments for Soviet intelligence organs or law 
enforcement agencies. From the current perspective, some of the activities they had 
undertaken before being declared “enemies of the people” and which—under the 
earlier political structures—were clearly based on the principles of the struggle to 
establish “a dictatorship of the proletariat” could generate widely varying reactions 
from the general public. The question was much more than finding documents; it 
was a question of taking extreme caution in their declassification. 
In earlier years the Central Committee (CC) had received similar inquiries, but 
they were of an individual nature and the information that was released was confiden-
tially passed to “friends” (i.e. communists) along secret channels. From 1989, how-
ever, inquiries began cascading upon Moscow and information about these inquiries 
was being widely circulated by authorities in the countries of their origin. In February 
1989, from Bulgaria alone, requests were directed to the CPSU Central Committee 
to provide data on more than 1,000 Bulgarian political emigrants who had been vic-
tims of repression by the Soviet regime.4 The Hungarians, the Czechs and the Poles 
followed suit. Almost all inquiries were accompanied by the urgent appeal to “remit 
a response as soon as possible,” with the standard rationale being the need for “aid in 
coping with the growing public unrest.” In the USSR, an effort was made to respond 
to the requests despite the immense difficulties posed by the huge volume of corre-
spondence. In mid-1989 the KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained to 
the Central Committee that their staffs were not capable of coping with the deluge of 
inquiries, much less deliver them within the deadlines demanded.5 
3 Decree, CPSU Politburo, “Ob obrazovanii Komissii Politbyuro TsK KPSS po doplonitel’nomu 
izucheniyu materialov, svyazannykh s repressiyam, imevshimi mesto v period 1930–1940 i na-
chala 1950-kh godov,” 28 September 1987, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei 
Istorii (hereafter RGANI), f. 3, op. 103, d. 96, l. 3.
4 Documents of the Committee for Party Control regarding the rehabilitation of Bulgarian victims 
of Stalinist repression, February–November 1989, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 102, d. 750, l. 1–374.
5 Memorandum, deputy head of the CPSU International Department, V. Musatov, on the presen-
tation to the Hungarian Socialist Party of several lists of repressed Hungarian political émigrés, 
29 June 1990, in RGANI, f. 3, op. 103, d. 687, l. 1.
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Another important aspect of the opening of Soviet archives as influenced by 
the developments in Eastern Europe was the attention given by several countries 
to the tragic period in their histories that was associated with Soviet military in-
tervention. Of major interest was the insurrection in Hungary in 1956 and the 
“Prague Spring” of 1968. In fact, in these countries truly open discussion about 
these events only began with the onset of the struggles for power. In the case of 
the “Prague Spring,” Moscow itself was an instigator of these discussions. At the 
behest of the CPSU Central Committee, in mid-1989 the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences prepared an analytical dossier called “From the Prague Spring of 1969 to 
the Perestroika of Today,” which contained translations of numerous twenty-year-
old documents from Czechoslovak and German sources that had never before 
been published in the Soviet Union.6 Although it was common practice to classify 
such documents, the dossier was not even accorded the status “for official use 
only,” meaning that any member of the CC apparatus could read it. In December 
1989 the leaders of Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union (four of the 
five countries that had taken part in the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968) 
declared that handling the matter this way was inappropriate.7 Nonetheless, a few 
months later the secretary of the Central Committee, Valentin Kuptsov, suggested 
to the director of general affairs of the Communist Party, Valerii Boldin, that the 
communist leaders who had joined the opposition in Czechoslovakia should be 
granted access to Politburo documents regarding the “Prague Spring.” Kuptsov 
argued that “there is no way to avoid disclosure of the archives relating to the 
‘Prague Spring’ and that it is probably better that the CPSU gradually undertake 
this task itself, beginning with the ‘more benign’ material. Now it is possible for 
the party to benefit from disclosures of this type; later it will be too late.”8
The situation in Hungary was different: until the final day of the Soviet Union’s 
existence, the Soviet leadership continued to consider the Hungarian revolution 
of 1956 “an anti-communist fascist coup.” For this reason Moscow reacted with 
great displeasure when the leaders of the Hungarian communist party, under pres-
sure from the opposition, agreed in 1989 to ceremoniously inter the remains of 
executed participants of the 1956 uprising, above all Imre Nagy, on Hero’s Square 
in the center of Budapest. Even more displeasing to the Soviet Union was the 
decision of the new—no longer communist—Hungarian parliament to declare the 
first day of the Hungarian uprising, 23 October, a national holiday and to ask the 
6 Analytical dossier, Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, “Ot prazhskoi vesny 
to sovremennoi perestroike,” in RGANI, f. 5, op. 102, d. 166–69. In particular, the dossier con-
tained basic information about the “Prague Spring” that was completely unknown in the Soviet 
Union, such as “the programmed activities of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Com-
munist Party” or an appeal to the Czechoslovak opposition of “2000 words,” among others.
7 Pravda, 6 December 1990. 
8 Report, CC Secretariat, regarding the disclosure of CPSU archival materials about the events in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 to the associates of the CPSU International Department, 13 February 
1991, in RGANI, f. 89, op. 11, d. 76, l. 6.
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Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to condemn their 1956 military intervention. 
The CPSU Central Committee issued an order to its staff for foreign affairs “to 
acquaint themselves with the material in the archives of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee on the decision to send Soviet forces to Hungary and other aspects of the 
Hungarian crisis of 1956 and prepare an assessment of the respective documents 
for the Izvestiya TsK KPSS [Newsletter of the CC CPSU].” 9 However, it was 
apparently not possible to find documents in the archives that justified the Soviet 
military intervention in Hungary. An assessment was never published in the Izves-
tiya TsK KPSS, which, like the Central Committee itself, ceased to exist in August 
1991.
Nevertheless the Soviet leadership began to open its archives in response to 
requests from Hungary. The result of this in Budapest, however, was not as might 
have been expected. At the same time Imre Nagy was being praised in Budapest as 
“fighter against Stalinism” and “as an honest and principled advocate of democra-
cy and the fundamental renewal of socialism,” documents from the 1930s and 40s 
were being released in Moscow revealing that when in Soviet emigration, Nagy 
had been an active and voluntary agent of the Soviet NKVD and had contributed 
significantly to the repression of foreign communists.10 At the request of the KGB, 
the Politburo of the CPSU decided to dispatch these documents to the general 
secretary of the Hungarian communist party, Károly Grósz, for use in his struggle 
with the opposition. Grósz, however, either did not have the will to exploit the 
documents for this purpose or simply was unable to do so. 
While in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, archival documents concerning the 
Soviet military interventions in their countries were of primary concern, Poland, 
which had been close to similar intrusions more than once, had a different interest 
at the end of the 1980s. Warsaw insisted ever more forcefully that Moscow release 
documents relating to the mass execution in 1940 of Polish prisoners of war in 
Katyń. Without addressing the details of the Katyń massacre, which has recently 
been the object of much attention in professional literature, it should be noted that 
this issue dominated Russian-Polish relations in 1989–90. Poland was one of the 
first countries in the “communist brotherhood” where the communists lost power, 
this happening already in the summer of 1989. This created a major change in the 
situation concerning Katyń. Until then, the Polish researchers and public officials 
who were members of the joint Soviet-Polish Commission for the Study of the 
History of the Relations between Both Countries had adamantly yet diplomati-
cally called for the Soviets to acknowledge that detained Poles had been executed 
by members of the NKVD and to declassify Soviet documents relating to this 
issue. But from autumn 1989, the demands became ultimatums that resonated 
9 Report, CC Secretariat regarding the study of archival materials on the events in Hungary in 
1956, n.d., in RGANI, f. 89, op. 11, d. 23, l. 1.
10 Report on the agent “Volodya” (Imre Nágy), copy, June 1941, in RGANI, f. 89, op. 45, d. 82, ll. 
1–3.
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at the highest levels of the government. The Polish members of the commission 
threatened to dissolve the commission if the Soviet authorities did not produce 
comprehensive information on the Katyń massacre.
Paradoxically, the Soviet members of the commission had no reliable informa-
tion about the existence or absence of materials on Katyń. At the same time they 
had to defend the official Soviet line, a line that due to Western publications of 
ever more documents had become openly untenable. The chairman of the Soviet 
part of the commission, Georgii Smirnov, attempted in vain to convince the Soviet 
leadership “that under the present circumstances the only alternative is to open the 
archives to Soviet and Polish historians.” Gorbachev was fully aware of where 
the main documents confirming that the massacre had been committed by Soviet 
forces in 1940 were being kept. Nonetheless, he persistently continued to give 
orders, among others, that arrangements be made to find “conclusive evidence” 
and to organize “further research and study into archival materials” relating to the 
matter. In light of subsequent revelations that the Soviet leader had held “sealed 
packet no. 1” in his hands with documents relating to the Katyń massacre already 
at the beginning of 1989 at the very latest, it becomes quite clear why the CPSU 
general secretary, in his public appearances at the time, so assiduously avoided 
meetings and interviews with Polish journalists.
In their discussions with colleagues from abroad, the history of the Katyń mas-
sacre was by far not the only topic that left Soviet historians vulnerable due to their 
lack of access to documents in domestic archives. At the time even more attention 
was being devoted to the release of documents and classified appendices relating to 
the Soviet-German pact of 1939 (the Hitler-Stalin Pact). The fiftieth anniversary of 
the event occurred in the midst of the revolutions in the countries of Eastern Europe 
as well as during a growing wave of resolve in the Baltic nations to secede from 
the Soviet Union. Calls to find and release documents in Soviet archives grew ever 
louder, not only from Poland, the first victim of the Soviet-German agreement, but 
also from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and even from Moscow itself. More cautious 
Soviet historians, such as for instance the director of the Institute for Global History 
of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, academician Aleksandr Chubar’yan, suggested 
to the Soviet government to publish an article in a professional journal elucidating 
the Soviet-German agreement of 1939 and its “secret protocol.” He observed that 
“the article would not serve as recognition of the protocol’s authenticity, rather sole-
ly as a scholarly interpretation of questions raised in the document.”11
Other researchers explicitly demanded party leaders to open “secret” archi-
val documents, arguing that this was the only means by which they could con-
vincingly debate with their opponents. Many historians criticized authorities not 
11 Memorandum, deputy head of the CPSU Department for Science and Research Institutions, V. 
Ryabov, and material of the Institute of Global History of the USSR Academy of Sciences re-
garding the Soviet-German agreement of 23 August 1939, 28 August 1988, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 
101, d. 361, l. 40.
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only for concealing documents, but for causing a disastrous delay in assessing the 
developing situation: “The Central Committee and its ancillary agencies are los-
ing their grasp on reality.”12 As a result the information from the archives placed 
at the disposal of the Commission for the Political and Legal Evaluation of the 
Soviet-German Treaty of 1939, which was created at the Congress of People’s 
Deputies of the Soviet Union, was far from complete. The conclusions of the 
commission were extremely contradictory and late: they appeared after the whole 
world—especially the Baltic states—had loudly commemorated the anniversary 
of the events of 1939. When Soviet historians attempted to “beat the clock” with 
a film on the August event using documents obtained by the commission, the plan 
was categorically prohibited by the higher party authorities. Despite gradually los-
ing control of the situation in the country, leaders of the party clung to old attitudes 
and kept reiterating: “How can one give the commission the materials? They are 
being prepared for the Congress of the People’s Deputies.”13
Within the CPSU there were attempts to demonstrate that the proclaimed trans-
parency and openness in Soviet society also extended to historical source mate-
rial. At the nineteenth all-union party conference held in 1988, some of the most 
important tasks for democratizing the society included demands for ensuring the 
right of individual citizens to receive complete and accurate information on any 
question not related to state or official classified data, as well as regulating the use 
of archival materials and expanding access to them.14 Based on a Politburo deci-
sion, from 1989 onwards the CPSU Central Committee began to publish a new 
journal,15 the above-mentioned Izvestiya TsK KPSS. In addition to reports on the 
current activities of the party, the journal included information about matters such 
as the activities of its various divisions, and also published answers to readers’ 
questions. There was also a section called “from the archives of the CPSU.”
Given the times, against a backdrop of total secrecy of the party archives, this 
was clearly a step forward, although in reality this contribution to “expanded ac-
cess to party documents” was quite modest. The archival materials published in 
the Izvestiya TsK KPSS related mainly to the period of the 1920s–40s, carefully 
skirting numerous “dubious” episodes in the history of the party. They dealt al-
most exclusively with the inner workings of the party or the domestic activity of 
12 Minutes of the meeting of the CPSU Politburo member V.A. Medvedev with historians and 
social scientists, 3 October 1989, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 102, d. 163, l. 21.
13 Ibid.
14 Report, head of the CPSU Department for Ideology, A. Kapto, and head of the CPSU General 
Department, V. Boldin, regarding the problem of open access  to the party archives for citizens, 
2 April 1990, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 103, d. 991, l. 51.
15 In fact, it was not a completely new edition: from May 1919 a journal had been published with 
the name Izvestiya TsK VKP(B), in whose pages documents of higher Party organs reporting 
on current activity appeared. Later the journal was renamed Partiinoe stroitel’stvo (from 1946: 
Partiinaya zhisn’). Here only information on the activities of local Party organizations and their 
Party-building experiences was published.
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the CPSU. The “hottest” document of postwar history was the publication of the 
text of Khrushchev’s secret speech at the twentieth congress of the CPSU about 
the Stalin personality cult—a speech that for thirty years had been well known 
to the entire world except for the Soviet Union itself. The presentation of these 
publications in the journal was in many ways peculiar: a few were equipped with 
a scholarly apparatus noting that the documents were kept in the Central Party 
Archive (CPA) of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU Central Com-
mittee, an archive that was nearly inaccessible to most citizens. But most of the 
material lacked any information about its origin. 
In order to satisfy at least some of historians’ “hunger” for information from hith-
erto secret archival materials and to demonstrate the success of its democratization 
and glasnost policies, the Soviet party leadership decided to intensify the declassifi-
cation of documents in state custody. As mandated by the Central Committee on 3 
December 1986, the state archives of the USSR began actively to remove existing 
restrictions to researchers on access to collections of the USSR state archives and to 
transfer classified material to open storage. The head of the main archive administra-
tion of the USSR, Fedor Vaganov, reported to the CPSU Central Committee that on 
the first of January 1989, the state archives of the country made more that 5.5 million 
files available for open access and that the work on this process was continuing.16
Archivists and historians, however, encountered a very serious and even in-
tractable problem. The most interesting and important archival documents were 
kept in the archives of governmental agencies whose administrators had no inter-
est in transferring them to state storage, nor in declassifying them, much less in 
making them available for research. This went as far as archivists being forced 
to suspend their work on preparing numerous volumes of documents because, 
despite the decisions of higher party organs, the archivists of governmental agen-
cies refused to make materials stored in their archives available, even if they con-
cerned “innocuous” matters such as “Industry and the Working Class of the USSR 
in the years 1946 to 1975.” Needless to say, acquiring archival documents from 
governmental agencies with the aim of publishing on foreign policy affairs was a 
hopeless cause. This was well known to the Soviet leadership, but they chose to 
create the impression that the issue was a moot point. At a meeting of historians 
and social scientists at the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party 
in October of 1989, CC Secretary Vadim Medvedev displayed surprise when he 
heard that all governmental agencies were keeping their archival documents un-
der wraps: “Which governmental agencies? You mean all agencies including the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR? And the Central Committee?”17
16 Memorandum, head of the Main Archival Administration of the USSR, F.M. Vaganov, to the 
CPSU Central Committee, regarding the declassification of archival documents, 14 April 1989, 
in RGANI, f. 5, op. 102, d. 164, l. 12.
17 Minutes of the meeting of the Politburo member V.A. Medvedev with historians and social sci-
entists, 3 October 1989, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 102, d. 163, l. 56.
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Apparently at least this party leader “didn’t know” that all requests of Soviet 
historians for access to archives relating to the past of the Soviet Communist Par-
ty received the following stereotypical answer: “The issue of access to requested 
documents is the purview of the respective governing bodies of the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet Communist Party.”18 Moreover, when in October of 1989 the 
director of the Administration for Protection of Printed Classified State Secrets, 
Vladimir Boldyrev, brought forward an initiative that “authorization for the re-
lease of secret and restricted for publication documents of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU […] can be obtained from the General Department of the Central 
Committee,” he was corrected by the Old Square (i.e. the Central Committee 
headquarters) that this could be done “not by the General Department of the Cen-
tral Committee, but only by the leading organs of the Central Committee of the 
party, the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPSU.”19 Under such conditions a 
significant general disclosure of party documents was hardly likely.
Regular calls of party leaders for more “openness,” and their criticism of those 
agencies not willing to declassify their documents looked increasingly incompre-
hensible in the face of the actions of the Central Committee itself in this respect. 
Thus it happened that on 20 September 1989 the Politburo finally approved the 
resolution “On raising the level of information regarding the events of the years 
1939 to 1941,” by which the Foreign Ministry of the USSR was to expedite the 
publication of the respective volumes in the series Documents on the Foreign 
Policy of the USSR. The attempts, however, of the Foreign Ministry to acquire 
meaningful documents for this period from the Archives of the Central Committee 
of the party (above all transcripts of conversations between Stalin and Molotov 
with representatives of Germany and other Western countries) were unsuccessful. 
Equally unsuccessful were requests of the CPSU Central Committee to represen-
tatives of the KGB20 and the efforts of the editorial collective of the Institute for 
Marxism-Leninism working on a ten-volume edition of the history of World War 
II. The scholars of the collective received only scattered documents, with material 
from official archives of party leaders and the government as well as documents 
18 See for instance Memorandum, head of the Institute of Military History at the USSR Ministry 
of Defense, D.A. Volkogonov, to the CPSU Central Committee, requesting permission to read 
CPSU archival documents, 13 March 1989, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 102, d. 992, l. 4.
19 Memorandum, Main Administration for the Protection of State Secrets, with a resolution by CC 
secretary V.I. Boldin, regarding the publication of secret documents and CPSU materials in the 
public press, 19 October 1989, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 102, d. 992, l. 50.
20 A KGB request for documents from the archives of the Central Committee for the set referred 
to as “Soviet military counter-intelligence (May 1945–May 1954)” received the following re-
sponse from the main office of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party: A review 
of the requested documents has shown that they neither “contain data of the activities of military 
counter-intelligence,” nor “relate in general to specific questions of operational activity.” Memo-
randum, KGB to CPSU Central Committee, regarding the publication of a volume of documents 
on the activities of military counter-espionage organs, 6 November 1990, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 
103, d. 992, l. 82.
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from the so-called special folders remaining inaccessible.21 In addition the prepa-
rations for publishing materials related to the fourteenth congress of the CPSU 
and the regular edition of the complete works of Lenin were stalled. Indeed, while 
the first edition had become a victim of ideological and political dissension among 
its authors, to publish the new one-hundred-volume Leniniana, the party firstly 
had insufficient resources and secondly the work’s publication involved real risks: 
“If the publication does not have a large number of subscribers, this will be active-
ly used by opponents of Leninism for political purposes.”22 
Along with the struggle to open party archives, Soviet archivists and historians 
of this period had another serious concern: the contents of the federal archives. At 
the end of the 1980s, federal archives began to be transferred from all of the soviet 
republics, with the exception of Russia and Ukraine, to the regional Ministries 
of Justice. Archivists were not convinced by assurances of the Central Commit-
tee that “the scientific-methodological management of the archives in the union 
republics will remain in the hands of the central archive of the Soviet Union.”23 
They remembered only too well the unfortunate times when the Soviet archives 
were controlled by organs of the NKVD. Attempts to secure the adoption of a law 
regarding the federal archive collection of the Soviet Union that would regulate 
all aspects of the archives’ activities (including the declassification of documents 
at certain times and their release by authorities to federal storage) vanished in the 
nomenklatura-bureaucratic quagmire. 
Events in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s accelerated the disintegrating 
forces in the Soviet Union. This was also reflected in the situation concerning 
archival documents. Many republics began demanding the transfer of documents 
“representing their historical interests” to their own archives and their own su-
pervision. Such initiatives, many of which, it should be noted, never became law, 
posed a real threat of once unified archival collections being torn apart. Another 
rapidly spreading phenomenon that could be observed in this period was the effort 
to “privatize” archives and their collections. This process quickly gained momen-
tum both at the government policy level and with the general public. In the year 
1990 the Lithuanian parliament passed legislation to transfer the ownership of 
21 Report, CPSU Institute for Marxism-Leninism, on problems in preparing a 10-volume series on 
the history of the Great Patriotic War, November 1990, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 103, d. 992, l. 76. 
Still one more paradox of the Soviet system of Party archives: The Institute of Marxism-Lenin-
ism of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was responsible for the administration of the 
central Party archive, tried unsuccessfully to convince higher Party officials to give them at least 
rudimentary information about the documents kept in the General Department of the Central 
Committee.
22 Memorandum, head of the CPSU Department for Ideology, A. Kapto, on the preparation of the 
sixth edition of the complete works of V.I. Lenin, 11 October 1990, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 103, d. 
303, l. 97.
23 Report, CPSU departments, regarding the memorandum of the head of the Main Archival Ad-
ministration, F.M. Vaganov, on the situation in Soviet archives, 8 June 1988, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 
101, d. 360, l. 42.
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a building containing documents pertaining to the local communist party. The 
prime minister of Lithuania, Kazimira Prunskiene, even appealed to Gorbachev 
to resolve this issue.24 After Vilnius similar propositions began to appear in other 
republics. The CPSU Central Committee attempted to declare such actions illegal 
by citing recently enacted normative provisions of the Soviet Union regarding 
property rights,25 but it was clear that stopping this process of “usurping” party ar-
chives was becoming increasingly difficult. In the same period, commercial enter-
prises emerged that provided Russian, but mainly foreign researchers information 
services regarding documents in archival collections in the Soviet Union. 
With the exception of a few Soviet leaders, who repeated their mantra that the 
developments in the countries of Eastern Europe were not a model for the Soviet 
Union, which would construct its own individual destiny, there was a growing 
general awareness that the Soviet Union could avoid neither economic reform and 
free markets, nor multiple political parties and free elections. The experiences of 
the former communist camp countries, where the shifts in political structures were 
resulting in changes in all spheres of life, including wide-scale access to archives, 
graphically demonstrated that power over archival information meant both a huge 
advantage in the struggle for political power and—a good source of hard cash.
Obviously, the CPSU Central Committee understood this, and it was therefore 
to be expected that the “archive mania” at the end of the 1980s and the beginning 
of the 1990s did not go unnoticed within higher party structures. With the cre-
ation of the office of President of the Soviet Union and election (or elevation) of 
the CPSU general secretary, Gorbachev, to this office, the dissection of the party 
archives and the documents contained within them began. While to a great extent 
this was arbitrary, the most valuable documents were transferred to the presiden-
tial archives. From 1989 intensive, albeit incomplete, work began at the Central 
Committee to prepare a new “order for the use of documents from party archives” 
and “regulations concerning the use of documents in the archival collections of 
the CPSU.”26 But as it turned out, those carrying out these preparations saw the 
future of the archival legacy of the party in a different light. Actually the project 
initiated by the Institute for the Theory and History of Socialism (as the Institute 
24 Report, deputy head of the CPSU General Department, P. Laptev, “Ob otvete na pis’mo 
prem’er-ministra Litovskoi Respubliki K. Prunskene po voprosu ob archive Kompartii Litvy,” 
October 1990, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 103, d. 991, l. 107.
25 Only in 1990 were measures taken with respect to this question: the Law “On ownership in the 
Soviet Union” (6 March 1990), the Decree of the president of the Soviet Union “On measures 
to protect the inviolability of the right to ownership in the Soviet Union” (10 October 1990), 
and the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union “On measures to 
protect private property in the Soviet Union on the territory of the Lithuanian Socialist Repub-
lic” (27 March 1990). None of these measures, however, had the power of authority under the 
conditions as they were developing.
26 Report, CPSU General Department, regarding the CPSU archival holdings, 5 August 1991, in 
RGANI, f. 89, op. 20, d. 76, l. 2.
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of Marxism-Leninism began to call itself in 1991) for “regulations regarding the 
archival collection of the CPSU” was an attempt to secure the Institute’s monop-
oly of control and use not only of documents in the Central Party Archive, but 
of all archives related to the party. But even before the Central Committee of the 
CPSU ceased to exist and the doors of the party archives were thrown open to 
researchers, a number of “most trusted” scholars had begun to work on classified 
documents from the party archives with the permission of high party leaders. Lat-
er, after the demise of the party and the Soviet Union, some of these researchers 
actually began to sell copies of these documents abroad. 
It should be noted that the structuring and development of party archives in 
the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s was strongly influenced not only by 
processes taking place within the country, but also within the party itself. The 
transformation of the social and political situation and the accompanying changes 
in public life forced improvements to be made in higher party structures. Demo-
cratic processes affecting the party during this period led to a certain amount of 
streamlining of party filing activity, whereby the number of documents entering 
the archival departments of the Central Committee was reduced. Certain elements 
of transparency (if such a term can even be used in association with the archives 
of the Central Committee of the party at the time) became apparent in less material 
being designated as classified. Earlier this designation had been almost automati-
cally applied to any document produced at the CC headquarters or directed there 
from external sources. This less restrictive practice, of course, was not applicable 
to documents of the Politburo or the Secretariat of the Central Committee, nor 
for materials relating to foreign relations, but nevertheless at the end of the 1980s 
more and more documents began to appear without this limiting and intimidating 
designation. This fact, combined with the general decline in the level of secrecy 
of party documents (even during the tensest moments of the upheavals in Eastern 
Europe materials were designated “confidential” as opposed to “secret” or “top 
secret”), marked an important step towards shredding the shroud of party secrets 
covering the archives of the Central Committee.
The archives of the Central Committee were also seriously affected by at-
tempts to rid the CC apparatus of redundant elements in order to turn it into a 
more dynamic, flexible and effective operation. The end of 1988 saw the most 
ambitious reorganization of the CC apparatus in its entire history, resulting in 
only eight departments remaining. These oversaw all aspects of public life in the 
country. What is more, while most of the former departments of the Central Com-
mittee were consolidated or merged, there were also some that “died a natural 
death.” One of these, in light of the ongoing revolutionary upheavals in Eastern 
Europe, was the Department for Relations with the Communist and Workers’ 
Parties of Socialist Countries: it simply disappeared from the Central Committee 
apparatus, together with the disappearance of communist structures in the major-
ity of these countries. 
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The number of sections, however, soon began to grow again. This was a result 
of departments being needed to deal with new matters the CPSU Central Com-
mittee now had to address, including policies concerning nationalities, relations 
with public political organizations, legislative initiatives and legal issues. These 
new departments became the focus of a huge number of documents concerning 
some of the most pressing issues facing the country: the tragedy at Chernobyl, 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the activities of public organizations such 
as “Memorial,” “For a Democratic Union,” “The Socialist Initiative,” and “We 
Remember.” One set of documents contained material concerning events that the 
party leaders would have considered nightmarish two or three years earlier. These 
included the “de-partying” of constituent republics and public organizations, ref-
erendums on preserving the Soviet Union, and elections for the president of the 
Russian Federation. 
The fundamental political changes at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 
90s triggered changes in the contents of the documents being stored in the archive 
of the CPSU Central Committee. A line was drawn below the entire complex of 
historical documents of those organizations that, with the collapse of the commu-
nist camp, also ceased to exist. The collections of the Central Committee archive 
filled with the final documents on the International Conferences of Communist 
and Workers’ Parties, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and 
the Warsaw Pact. In general there was a reduction in the number of international 
material (especially those relating to the former communist camp) and, converse-
ly, an increase in the proportion of documents relating to domestic affairs. The 
increase in the number of analytical reports as well as current and future progno-
ses on the possible development of the situation both in the Soviet Union and the 
countries of Eastern Europe was remarkable. (The range of views expressed in the 
latter were extremely wide—from assertions that these nations would still remain 
within the sphere of Soviet foreign policy to the conviction the these countries 
would soon be absorbed into the West.)
Evidence of how these prognoses influenced the Soviet party leaders in their 
decisions or references to leading figures in the country (as was so characteristic 
in earlier periods, with features such as underlining, editorial comments, and notes 
in the margins) is essentially missing from the documents in the archive. In fact 
from the last years of its existence the archive of the Central Committee must be 
viewed from a very broad range of perspectives. For more than ten years, until the 
turn of the century, RGANI staff worked on reviewing and processing the remain-
ing documents of the Central Committee that were referred to as “archival loose 
ends,” that is, documents, most of them dating from 1985 to 1991, which were in a 
fragmented and unordered state (often entirely unrelated to one another) and came 
from different departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU apparatus. 
 Regarding the documents from the end of the 1980s as they relate to the rev-
olutionary upheavals in the countries of Eastern Europe, a familiarity with the 
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contents of these documents reveals less about the course of these events than 
about the CPSU leadership’s reaction to them. The two examples of documents 
cited below demonstrate how inconsistent, contradictory and incoherent policy 
was in Moscow when dealing with regimes that had only recently been their allies.
When the first communist regimes began to collapse, the Soviet Central Com-
mittee initially still attempted to implement immediate measures to take care of 
their “friends” in a difficult moment and to provide them full support. Resolutions 
to this end were enacted that aimed at creating a framework for major activities 
of the CPSU in some of the relevant countries. The first of these resolutions was 
passed on 28 September 1989 and was called “Regarding the situation in Poland, 
possible forms of its further development and prospects for Soviet-Polish rela-
tions.” In the long list of measures designed at supporting Polish communists as 
well as preparing agreements with the new Polish government, there were points 
dealing with exchanges of opinions on the basis of historical documents concern-
ing “de-Stalinization of Soviet-Polish relations, and their general improvement.”27
With a notable delay, a comparable document relating to Czechoslovakia ap-
peared. Its contents were brief, but nevertheless in addition to a promise of sup-
port to the demoralized representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 
a reference was made to “forming a Soviet-Czechoslovak commission of party 
historians to study current problems in the relations between the two countries and 
their parties.”28 The resolutions mentioned here remained solely on paper, and for 
the rest of the countries involved, resolutions of this type were never taken. The 
contents of the resolution regarding Czechoslovakia even contained a provision to 
assist the Czechoslovak Communist Party to acquire paper “essential for the un-
interrupted publication of the newspaper Rudé právo.” Two months later the deci-
sion was in effect rescinded by the ideology section of the CPSU Central Commit-
tee, which commented that “in connection with the severe crisis and the scarcity 
of paper,” aid to the Czechoslovak communists “does not seem possible.”29
A second episode demonstrating the processes in the Soviet leadership in the 
1980s and 90s also regarded the Czechoslovak Communist Party. A report about a 
CPSU delegation visit to the CSSR in 1990 mentions a complaint of Czechoslova-
kian communists concerning the Soviet embassy in Prague: after the Communist 
27 Decree, CPSU Politburo, “Ob obstanovke v Pol’she, vozmozhnykh variantakh ee razvitiya, 
perspektivakh sovetsko-pol’skikh otnoshenii,” 28 September 1989, in RGANI, f. 89, op. 9, d. 
33, l. 5.
28 Decree, CPSU Politburo, “O nekotorykh merakh po usilieniyu politico-ideologicheskogo vli-
yaniya na Chekhoslovakiyu,” 23 April 1990, in RGANI, f. 89, op. 9, d. 124, l. 2. The Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia lost power in November of 1989 and the resolution of the CPSU Polit-
buro “On certain measures to strengthen political-ideological influence on Czechoslovakia” was 
not adopted until 23 April 1990.
29 Memorandum, deputy head of the CPSU Department for Ideology, A. Degtyarev, on the impos-
sibility to provide the Czechoslovak communist party with paper, 23 May 1990, in RGANI, f. 5, 
op. 103, d. 310, l. 55.
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Party of Czechoslovakia had lost its governing power, the Soviet ambassador had 
not participated in a single conference with party leaders and instead had actively 
participated in meetings with representatives of the right-wing Civic Forum. The 
following short exchange that ensued between Soviet leaders concerning the com-
plaint is instructive:
The deputy general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, V. A. Ivashko: “Comrade 
V.M. Falin, it would not be a bad idea to have a conversation with our ambassador: ambassadors’ 
heads at times can begin to spin.” 
Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party: 
“Vladimir Antonovich, ambassadors fulfill confidential orders of the leadership of the Foreign 
Ministry […]. The difference is that intelligent ambassadors are very cautious and others de-par-
tyize to the utmost.” 
V. Ivashko: “Comrade G. I. Yanaev. It is clear that we must talk with the leadership at the For-
eign Ministry about all of the problems that have built up.” 
Vice-President of the Soviet Union, G. I. Yanaev: “This conversation will take place without 
fail.”30 
In concluding it should be noted that twenty years ago these documents did 
not, and could not, become subject to glasnost. Now, together with many analo-
gous materials, they have become generally accessible. They are priceless histor-
ical sources of the Russian Federation that tell us of our recent past. This is one 
of the results of the revolutions of 1989: a more open path to the study of a 
historical legacy that was long hidden behind a double Iron Curtain of party se-
crecy—from the world community as well as from the USSR’s own citizens.
30 Notes of CPSU Politburo members regarding a report of CC secretary V. Kuptsov on his trip to 
Czechoslovakia, 26 October 1990, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 103, d. 346, ll. 11–12.
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NATO ENLARGEMENT IN THE BEGINNING: AN 
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
The process that led to the enlargement of NATO following the end of the 
Cold War was relatively transparent and well documented, particularly the deci-
sion-making process in the United States. It was covered in detail by news reports 
as well as official documents, including administration speeches, congressional-
ly-mandated reports and hearings. Most of these are readily available on line. 
Following the initial stage of enlargement in the 1990s, participants in the process 
produced detailed accounts of the interactions among US officials.1 In addition, 
Jeffrey Simon, a government analyst working at the National Defense University, 
produced a series of studies and reports in the 1990s and into the 2000s assessing 
the qualifications of prospective candidates and the performance of new members. 
The presidential papers of George H.W. Bush and William Clinton provide yet 
more insights into the environment in which enlargement moved ahead. This 
article is based in part on the author’s participation in the process of Congressio-
nal oversight and decision-making. In retrospect, there seem to be very few stones 
from the period that have been left unturned concerning US participation in the 
NATO enlargement process, and thus the main research questions here instead 
relate to how the greatly expanded membership might affect the long-term future 
of the alliance.
The setting for NATO enlargement
For many Americans, inviting new democracies to join the Western alliance 
seemed a natural step when the revolutions of 1989 led to the end of the Warsaw 
Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This was especially the case for 
those countries that had been less-than-willing members of the Warsaw Pact. 
However, at the same time, for others it seemed counterintuitive. After all, the 
framework for international relations had been dominated and, indeed, stabilized 
by the two-alliance standoff in Europe. For some observers, that stability seemed 
more important than the opportunities for independence and democratization to 
which the revolutions had given birth. As a consequence, the years between 1989 
1 Two of the most notable among these are James Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The U.S. 
Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), and Ronald 
Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
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and the first phase of NATO enlargement saw a political struggle within the 
United States as well as conflicts in the broader alliance concerning how best to 
approach the new opportunities and challenges.
In the early 1990s, the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe began 
lobbying for NATO membership. Reactions in the alliance were mixed. The 
United Kingdom worried that adding these newly liberated states might water 
down the alliance. France was reluctant because it feared enlargement would give 
NATO too prominent a role in the future composition of Europe. Germany, how-
ever, saw enlargement increasingly as a way of moving away from the front lines 
in Europe, since enlargement would provide a buffer zone between it and Russia. 
These mixed emotions were matched by divided opinion in the United States. 
This initially led to an intricate ballet, in which the would-be members stepped 
anxiously toward NATO’s door, while on the other side of the slightly ajar open-
ing, the NATO members tried to postpone difficult decisions by offering cooper-
ation with all aspirants, as well as with the great skeptic, Russia.2
As with any transformative historical development, the process of NATO 
enlargement had an important “pre-history.” Particularly after adopting the Har-
mel Report in 1967 which advocated embarking on détente, NATO governments 
actively sought to promote dialogue and cooperation with the Soviet Union and 
its Warsaw Pact allies. The goal was to try to overcome the East–West division 
in Europe and reduce the risk of war. This commitment to détente led the allies 
in 1972 to join with the Warsaw Pact and other European countries to begin 
preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
and to open East–West talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 
in 1973. It also provided the underlying political rationale for negotiations with 
Moscow on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF), which opened in 1985.
The CSCE, originally proposed by the Soviet Union primarily to win recognition 
of the European status quo, was used by the West to promote human rights and 
other fundamental principles that should govern the behavior of states, both in re-
lation with their own peoples and with other states. The Helsinki Process, as the 
CSCE forum was called, was widely credited with legitimizing human rights groups 
in Eastern Europe and weakening the hold of communist regimes on those coun-
tries. The CSCE process also included negotiations on confidence-building and 
stabilizing measures. In 1986, these talks resulted in an agreement signed in Stock-
holm, Sweden, on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament.
The MBFR talks, after many years of stalemate, were converted into negoti-
ations on Conventional Forces in Europe, which yielded an agreement limiting 
conventional armaments and forces in Europe just as the Cold War was ending 
in 1990. And the INF negotiations resulted in an agreement to eliminate Interme-
diate Range Nuclear Forces from Europe in 1987.
2 Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to 
Obama (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 130–34.
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NATO’s active pursuit of détente through arms control negotiations and securi-
ty cooperation initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated that the allies were 
prepared to take diplomatic steps to reduce the chance of war, even if Warsaw Pact 
military strength required NATO to maintain a credible defense and deterrence 
posture. Some political conservatives in the United States doubted the relevance or 
utility of NATO’s détente role, seeing its usefulness mainly as a palliative for the 
European left. At the same time, some on the left in Europe saw this role as a po-
litical sham, designed for show but not likely to help overcome Europe’s division.
Seen at some distance more than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, 
it appears that a combination of allied détente, deterrence, and defense policies 
contributed to the events that culminated in the end of the Cold War, the disso-
lution of the Warsaw Pact, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. During this 
time, public opinion in Europe and in the United States considered the Harmel 
formula to provide a sufficiently broad rationale for NATO to sustain its alliance, 
even if the formula was not highly valued by those on the political extremes on 
either side of the Atlantic.
In the first years of the post-Cold War period, it was therefore not a desperate 
or illogical step for the NATO allies to adapt a new version of the Harmel concept 
to address the radically new circumstances that had emerged in just a matter of 
months. In so doing, the NATO allies began a process of engineering another 
fundamental adjustment to the transatlantic bargain: extending the bargain’s reach 
to include potentially all of democratic Europe.
One of the first needs was to adapt the CSCE, shaped as it was by Cold War 
conditions, to the new circumstances in Europe. The CSCE had played an im-
portant role in the Cold War, helping regulate relations among European states 
and also keeping up a human rights critique of Soviet and East European com-
munist regimes. The Helsinki Final Act, signed by 35 European states including 
the United States, Canada, the USSR, and most communist regimes of Eastern 
Europe in 1975, was not legally binding on the participants. But the Final Act 
provided the “rules of the road” for interstate relations in Europe and constructive 
guidelines for the development of democracy in all European countries.
At a summit meeting in London on 6 July 1990, NATO leaders agreed that 
the CSCE should be strengthened as one of the critical supports for European 
peace and stability. NATO reasserted this opinion at its summit in Rome on 7 and 
8 November 1991. As an important token of NATO’s intentions, a North Atlantic 
Council meeting on 4 June 1992 in Oslo, Norway, agreed that, on a case-by-case 
basis, NATO would support peacekeeping operations initiated by the CSCE. 
Subsequently, NATO called for strengthening the CSCE’s ability to prevent con-
flicts, manage crises, and settle disputes peacefully.3
3 See, for example, NATO’s 1994 Brussels Summit Declaration, 11 January 1994, http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/SID-73364D74-3144351F/natolive/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=pressre-
lease (accessed 30 April 2013). 
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The key to the CSCE’s ability to take on an expanded operational mandate 
was resources. As a “process,” the CSCE had only an ad hoc structure that was 
not capable of supporting a more ambitious role. On 5 and 6 December 1994, a 
CSCE summit meeting in Budapest, Hungary, agreed to turn this process into an 
organization, with the result that the name was changed to the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The decision was made to provide 
staff and financial resources so that the OSCE could send missions into Europe-
an nations to mediate disputes, monitor elections, and conduct other activities 
designed to prevent conflict.4
By the end of the 1990s, NATO and the OSCE were working hand in hand to 
deal with potential threats to peace. In Bosnia, the OSCE played a critical role in 
helping to establish a process of free elections and respect for human rights. 
NATO provided the military backing that was required to give such efforts a 
chance to succeed. OSCE monitors and mediators played important roles in help-
ing resolve conflicts and build democracy from Abkhazia and Tajikistan to South 
Ossetia and Ukraine. The relationship between NATO and the OSCE became one 
of the key ingredients in an evolving cooperative European security system.
In 1990, negotiations aimed at cutting non-nuclear forces in Europe, which 
had begun as the MBFR talks in 1973, concluded with the Treaty on Convention-
al Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). This landmark agreement produced reductions 
and controls on non-nuclear military forces, from the Atlantic Ocean in the west 
to the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union. The CFE Treaty of 19 November 1990 
is the most comprehensive, legally binding agreement on conventional arms 
control ever produced. Its goal was to reduce imbalances in the numbers of ma-
jor conventional weapon systems in Europe in order to eliminate the potential for 
surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations.
Perhaps the CFE Treaty’s most important accomplishment is its contribution to 
transparency, as it makes military establishments and forces more visible to other 
states. The treaty’s required declarations of information and inspection procedures 
help reduce concern about the intentions and capabilities of neighboring states. In 
this new system, it has become much more difficult to hide military capabilities.
Emerging candidates for NATO membership
As democratic governments stepped out from the shadow of communism in 
Eastern and Central Europe, many of the new democracies sought membership 
in NATO as one of their main national goals. The NATO countries approached 
them carefully, offering the new democracies friendship and cooperation but not, 
initially, membership.
4 CSCE Budapest Summit Document 1994, 5–6 December 1994, http://www.osce.org/
mc/39554?download=true (accessed 30 April 2013).
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In July 1991, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, leaving NATO standing but still 
in need of greater clarity concerning its future relationship with former members 
of the Pact. NATO took the first formal step in the Rome Declaration of Novem-
ber 1991, which invited former Warsaw Pact members to join in a more structured 
relationship of “consultation and cooperation on political and security issues.”5 
They created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and invited the 
foreign ministers of the former Pact countries to the first meeting of the new 
council on 20 December 1991. When the Soviet Union was dissolved in the same 
month, the NATO countries immediately invited Russia to join the NACC, and 
Russia became one of its founding members.
The main goal of the NACC was to serve as a forum for dialogue between 
NATO members and non-member states on a wide range of security topics.6 
Sixteen NATO members, twenty-two former Warsaw Pact members, and former 
Soviet republics participated in the new body. The NACC represented a major 
statement of intent by the allies. They were asserting, in effect, that NATO was 
not going to remain an exclusive club. Although at that point the allies were re-
luctant to envision offering NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact members, 
the creation of the NACC opened the door to that prospect later. East European 
leaders who wanted their countries to join NATO saw the NACC as totally inad-
equate for their needs, but they accepted the first move and immediately began 
working for more.7
The NACC was essentially the brainchild of US president George H.W. Bush’s 
administration. President Bush and his foreign policy team had played a major 
role in the process of negotiating German reunification and ensuring that a unit-
ed Germany would remain a member of NATO.8 German reunification in effect 
5 NATO Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, 8 November 1991, http://www.nato.int/
docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm (accessed 30 April 2013).
6 David Yost has documented the fact that France was the only NATO ally to have serious res-
ervations about the NACC. According to Yost, “The French had two preoccupations in this 
regard: resisting the tendency to give more substantial content to NACC activities, which might 
increasingly compete with those of the CSCE and maintaining coherence with the Alliance par-
ticipation policy they had pursued since 1966.” It is also evident that France’s socialist president 
François Mitterrand did not want to strengthen NATO’s position in post–Cold War Europe at a 
time when other options might better suit French preferences. See David S. Yost, NATO Trans-
formed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 95–96.
7 In the fall of 1990, on the occasion of one my lectures at the NATO College in Rome, I served 
on a panel with a West European security expert and a Polish professor to discuss the future of 
NATO. The Polish panelist urged that the NATO countries take Polish pleas seriously, while the 
West European judged that the question of membership in NATO was many years away from 
serious consideration. Sympathetic to the Polish case, the best I could do was to suggest that 
Poland be patient and that the logic of their case would bring them through.
8 Cf. the chapter by Philip Zelikow, “US Strategic Planning in 1989–90,” in this volume, 283–
306.
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represented the first expansion of NATO in the post-Cold War era, as well as the 
first since Spain had been admitted in 1982. In addition, President Bush made a 
major contribution to the process of winding down the Cold War by declaring 
substantial unilateral US reductions in its short-range nuclear forces. At the same 
time, Bush developed and maintained a sympathetic working relationship with 
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian president Boris Yeltsin, helping 
support the transition to a post-communist political system in the USSR and 
Russia after the Soviet Union was dissolved.
In 1990, neither the Bush administration nor any of the European allies were 
prepared to signal public acceptance of the possibility that countries that had just 
left the Warsaw Pact might soon become members of NATO. After all, in 1990 
the question was whether NATO was still necessary, not whether its membership 
should be expanded. Moreover, most European governments, as well as President 
Bush, were focused primarily on how to ensure that the transition in the Soviet 
Union, and then in Russia, would confirm the end of the Cold War and not lead 
to a new one.
Toward the end of the Bush presidency, senior administration officials never-
theless began acknowledging that the desires of East European governments to 
join NATO were indeed legitimate. Late in 1992, after Bill Clinton had beaten 
George Bush in the presidential elections, both Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney and Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger suggested that the process 
of opening up NATO that had begun with the NACC could lead toward NATO 
membership for some NACC partners.9
The Clinton administration was to bring new and dramatic developments to 
the process of NATO outreach. While the Bush administration had put the process 
on track, it had not had time to move beyond the relatively limited and “easy” 
NACC initiative.
From partnership toward membership
When President Bill Clinton came to office in January 1993, the administration 
did not have a clear line on the issue of NATO enlargement. Its top priority was 
the economy, following the political rhetoric (“It’s the economy, stupid!”) that 
had helped pave Clinton’s way to the presidency. In the administration’s first year, 
Europe was seen mainly as a problem: the source of economic competition for 
the United States and the locale for a bloody conflict in Bosnia that would not 
go away. However, one of the important rituals for any new US president is the 
first NATO summit. Officials in charge of preparations for President Clinton’s 
9 Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 18. Goldgeier’s account of the enlargement decision-making 
process in the Clinton administration is an insightful look at the US decisions that led to the 
entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the alliance.
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inaugural NATO summit, scheduled for 10–11 January 1994, were not of one 
mind on NATO’s future in general, nor on enlargement in particular.
One high-level National Security Council staffer, Jenonne Walker, had written 
in 1990 that the United States should pull all its troops out of Europe as an in-
centive for the Soviet Union to withdraw from Eastern Europe.10 This official was 
skeptical that the Clinton administration should promote NATO enlargement, and 
she had the task of chairing the initial inter-departmental review of the issue. 
Strobe Talbott, a close personal friend of the president and leading Russian expert 
at the Department of State, was concerned that moving too quickly on enlarge-
ment would sour prospects for reform in Russia.
At the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and his top officials, includ-
ing Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Kruzel, were skeptical that the 
United States and NATO should take on the potential burdens of preparing coun-
tries that were far from meeting NATO military standards for NATO membership. 
However, as James M. Goldgeier has documented, two key officials leaned in 
favor of enlargement: National Security Adviser Tony Lake and President Clinton 
himself.11
Bill Clinton had not spent much time or energy on foreign policy issues in his 
campaign, but one of his campaign themes had emphasized that US foreign pol-
icy should be focused on “enlarging” the democratic and free-market area in the 
post-Cold War world. Both he and Lake apparently came to believe that NATO 
enlargement would directly serve this end. This approach made Clinton ripe for 
the message from the new democracies in central Europe. It was a message that 
he heard loud and clear when he met with several Central European leaders, in-
cluding Poland’s Lech Wałesa and the Czech Republic’s Vaclav Havel, at the 
opening of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., on 21 April 
1993. Clinton subsequently reflected on the meeting, saying, “When they came 
here a few weeks ago for the Holocaust dedication, every one of those presidents 
said that their number one priority was to get into NATO. They know it will 
provide a security umbrella for the people who are members.”12
From the Holocaust Memorial meetings on, Clinton had an emotional as well 
as philosophical predisposition toward enlarging NATO.13 Even if other admin-
istration officials favoring enlargement had geostrategic rationales for the move, 
such as hedging against future Russian power and ensuring continued US prom-
10 Jenonne Walker, “U.S., Soviet Troops: Pull Them All Out,” New York Times, 18 March 1990, 
E19.
11 Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 23–24. Goldgeier reports that at the first meeting of the in-
ter-agency working group formed to prepare for Clinton’s first NATO summit in January 1994, 
“Walker announced that there were two people in the White House who thought NATO expan-
sion was a good idea—Bill Clinton and Tony Lake.”
12 William J. Clinton, “Press Conference,” 17 June 1993, The American Presidency Project, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46708 (accessed 24 April 2013).
13 Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 20.
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inence in European security affairs, it was the value-based rationale that would 
tip the balance in convincing the public and members of the US Congress that 
NATO enlargement was in US interests.
Even while official policy largely favored deferring a decision on enlargement 
at the January 1994 summit, some administration officials and others outside the 
administration were putting together a case for moving ahead. In an assessment 
for Congress at the end of 1992, I noted the logic of the case for enlargement, 
writing, 
How can the existing members of Western institutions, who have throughout the Cold War tout-
ed the Western system, now deny participation in the system to countries that choose democracy, 
to convert to free market economic systems, respect human rights, and pursue peaceful relations 
with their neighbors? This suggests the need for creative and flexible attitudes toward countries 
making credible efforts to meet the criteria for membership.14 
And in a statement to a special committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in 
January 1993, I further added that “Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
deserve serious consideration for NATO membership in the near future.”15
In Europe, German Minister of Defense Volker Rühe became the official most 
outspoken as a proponent of enlargement.16 Early in 1993, he organized a small 
conference of US and European experts to provide ammunition in support of his 
position on Europe’s future. (At the time, Rühe was considered not only a leading 
official expert on defense, but also a potential candidate for the chancellorship.) 
14 Late in 1992, within constraints imposed by the Congressional Research Service mandate to 
produce “objective and non-partisan” analyses, I anticipated the issue facing the new adminis-
tration: “The goals of supporting democracy, the development of free market economies, and 
the observance of human rights probably will be served best by an inclusive rather than an ex-
clusive approach to participation in components of a new European security system. In spite of 
the complications involved, inclusion may have to be the rule; exclusion the exception.” Stanley 
R. Sloan, “The Future of US-European Security Cooperation” (Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress 92-901, Washington, D.C., 4 December 1992), 2–3. 
15 In a statement to the North Atlantic Assembly Presidential Task Force on America and Europe, 
on 21 January 1993, I carried the point to its logical conclusion, arguing at that early date for an 
approach that eventually became US policy: “Full membership in specific institutions, such as 
NATO, should be based on the desire and demonstrated ability of countries to adopt the norms 
and obligations of membership. Not all former members of the Warsaw Pact may be able to meet 
such standards in the near future. But can the allies in good conscience deny participation in 
their security system to countries that have overthrown communist dictatorships and committed 
themselves to a democratic future? This suggests, in practical terms, that Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic deserve serious consideration for NATO membership in the near future. 
Clearly, taking such a step would require that the NATO countries reassure Russia and other 
non-NATO European states that growing membership in the alliance will help create conditions 
of stability and peace that will support their own attempts to become constructive participants 
in the international community.” Stanley R. Sloan, “Trends and Transitions in U.S.-European 
Security Cooperation” (Statement before the North Atlantic Assembly Presidential Task Force 
on America and Europe, Washington, D.C., 21 January 1993).
16 Gebhard Schweigler, “A Wider Atlantic?,” Foreign Policy, no. 126 (2001): 88.
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The conference (in which this author participated) was held outside Bonn, Ger-
many. It provided some of the foundations for Rühe’s enlargement position.17
To augment his resources, Rühe contracted the services of a team from the 
well-respected US think tank Rand. The Rand analysts—Ronald Asmus, Richard 
Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee—had been developing an advocacy of enlarge-
ment based on work they were doing under a contract with the US Army and Air 
Force. In June 1993, Rühe and the Rand analysts were joined by Republican 
Senator Richard Lugar (Indiana), who became the most forceful of US official 
proponents of enlargement, arguing for early consideration of the membership 
desires of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
The Rand team published a major statement of the case for enlargement in the 
fall of 1993, providing a key reference point for the coming enlargement debate.18 
Senator Lugar remained a strong supporter of NATO and of enlargement, even 
though his cool relationship with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
Jesse Helms prevented Lugar from playing a formal role in the process.
These proponents of enlargement were in a minority in Europe as well as in the 
United States, but they were not alone. While most of the US foreign policy bureau-
cracy was working on finessing the enlargement issue at the January 1994 summit, 
others, including Lynn Davis, undersecretary for arms control and international se-
curity affairs, and two key staffers on the Department of State policy planning 
staff—Stephen Flanagan and Hans Binnendijk—were developing the case for mov-
ing enlargement ahead. Both Flanagan and Binnendijk had leaned forward on en-
largement in the early 1990s, and Davis had close ties to the work of the Rand team.
However, the ship of state changes directions slowly. While US policy gener-
ally supported developing ties to the new democracies, the more difficult and 
demanding enlargement issue continued to be deferred.
As the administration prepared for President Clinton’s first NATO summit 
meeting, a cautious approach dominated. Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
observed that NATO enlargement, while possible at a later date, was currently 
“not on the agenda.” Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, with his focus on 
facilitating Russia’s transition to democracy and free markets, reinforced the 
secretary’s cautious inclinations. Meanwhile, US civilian and military officials 
were searching for a concept to serve as the centerpiece for NATO outreach ac-
tivities. The concept that developed in collaboration between General John Sha-
likashvili (the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe), his staff, and senior Penta-
gon officials (particularly Deputy Secretary of Defense Joseph Kruzel),19 was 
17 The invitation to me and others suggested that the session was designed as an off-the-record 
opportunity to think and talk prospectively about transatlantic security issues.
18 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,” For-
eign Affairs 72, no. 4 (1993): 28–40.
19 Kruzel, a central and creative participant in NATO policy formulation in the early Clinton years, 
Col. Nelson Drew, the main architect of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, and respected 
career diplomat Robert Frasure, who played a key role in the process leading to the peace accord 
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premised on the need for aspiring members to meet certain political and military 
criteria before being considered for membership. The second assumption was that 
NATO should help such countries become producers, not just consumers, of se-
curity. The end result of this thinking was the proposal for the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP).
Cooperation prepares ground for enlargement
The PfP concept was a policymaker’s dream. It signaled to those who aspired 
to NATO membership that they had been heard. It made no commitment, how-
ever, concerning the future. Perhaps its most crucial benefit was that it bought 
time. It avoided destabilizing relations with Russia at a perilous moment in that 
country’s post-Soviet development. It (temporarily) bridged differences between 
those in the US administration who favored enlargement and those who were 
skeptical. The PfP initiative also served some practical needs. Countries that 
wanted to join NATO could not expect to do so until they had begun to scrap old 
Warsaw Pact military systems and habits, while adapting to those of NATO. 
Partnership would provide a channel for US and other NATO assistance to aspir-
ing members. The PfP would also serve as a vehicle for aspirants to make con-
tributions to NATO’s new role as a regional peacekeeping instrument, potential-
ly spreading the burden among NATO and non-NATO countries.
On the negative side, the PfP was clearly not the end of the story. The Central 
European democracies recognized that, although active engagement in the PfP was 
essential to their longer-term goal of NATO membership, it could also serve as a 
long-term excuse for NATO to postpone serious consideration of their membership 
objective (hence the occasionally heard derogatory references to the PfP as the 
“Policy for Postponement”). In addition, experience would come to show that under 
PfP scrutiny of a nation’s defense reforms and modernization, shortcomings could 
not be as easily hidden from their publics, nor from NATO members.
In any case, at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels from 10 to 11 January 
1994, allied leaders endorsed the PfP program, giving countries that wished to 
develop a detailed cooperative relationship with NATO the opportunity to do so.20 
The program would provide the possibility for non-member military leaders and 
forces to interact with and learn from NATO militaries. This created a formal 
framework for the development of NATO military outreach activities and, con-
currently, began to shape a new mission for NATO military forces.
The PfP was destined to become a successful program in its own right, help-
ing reform regimes in Central and Eastern Europe to accelerate the process of 
in Bosnia, all lost their lives when the vehicle in which they were riding plunged off a dirt road 
outside Sarajevo. 
20 NATO 1994 Brussels Summit Declaration, 11 January 1994. 
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democratization, as well as to become NATO compatible. Because these countries 
were at a variety of stages of political, economic, and military evolution, US and 
allied officials knew that a program of association with NATO would have to be 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate such diversity. The NACC already had pro-
vided a forum in which such countries could discuss military security issues with 
NATO allies. The PfP added a way for individual countries to tailor their rela-
tionship with NATO to meet their national needs and circumstances.
The PfP sought initially to promote greater transparency in national defense 
planning and budgeting as a way of building confidence in the peaceful intentions 
of all participants. It also aimed to encourage effective democratic control of 
defense forces: to help develop each partner as a potential contributor to NA-
TO-led peacekeeping, search-and-rescue, or humanitarian missions, and to en-
hance the ability of partners’ military forces to operate together with NATO units. 
Each partner was invited to identify the extent and intensity of cooperation it 
wished to develop, within the broader agenda of the program.
In mid-1997, the allies decided to add some new and important elements to 
the PfP agenda to “enhance” the program. When the Clinton administration pro-
posed the PfP, it had been unable to decide what to do with the NACC, even 
though logically it could have served as a communal consultative forum to com-
plement the more individualized partnership program. NATO officials observed 
that the Clinton administration, perhaps due to a “not invented here” attitude, 
wanted to ensure that the focus was on the PfP, not on the NACC, which Clinton 
officials saw as a Bush administration initiative.21 The PfP and the NACC exist-
ed in parallel but mostly separate worlds until the Clinton administration proposed 
replacing the NACC with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The 
EAPC was formally established by the foreign ministers of NATO and partner 
nations at a meeting in Sintra, Portugal, held in May 1997.
Also at Sintra, the allies gave their partners a much stronger role in develop-
ing and deciding on PfP programs. They created the concept of partnership 
“cells,” or units made up of partner military and civilian officials working hand-
in-hand with NATO international and member-state officials. A special Partner-
ship Coordination Cell was established in Mons, Belgium, where NATO’s top 
European command is located, to coordinate activities directly with the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe and his staff. Through the new Planning and Review 
Process, partner countries that were making contributions to NATO operations, 
such as those in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, could participate more active-
ly in planning and overseeing the carrying out of such operations. As a result of 
these changes, the PfP became an important part of the evolving cooperative 
European security system, even if it was seen as a transitional device by many 
of its participants.
21 Off-the-record interviews with the author.
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Both allies and partners alike came to regard the EAPC as an important token 
of NATO’s commitment to openness and cooperation, as well as to extending the 
benefits of peace and stability to all European nations. However, given the large 
EAPC membership, formal meetings consisted largely of set-piece statements by 
participating governments. This provided an opportunity for participants to put 
their national positions on the record, but hardly a chance for discussion and 
dialogue. As with many other international organizations, opportunities for dis-
cussion and dialogue became part of “corridor” conversations and informal meet-
ings on the margins of the scheduled EAPC sessions. 
In recognition of their special significance and unique circumstances, two 
countries—Russia and Ukraine—were given additional opportunities for partner-
ship and dialogue with NATO. As noted above, when the Soviet Union was 
dissolved in December 1991, the NATO countries set the goal of developing a 
partnership with Russia, the primary successor state to the former Soviet Union. 
Russia became a founding member of the NACC, and the partnership became 
more formal when Russia and NATO agreed in June 1994 to develop a “broad, 
enhanced dialogue and cooperation.”22
Despite the generally positive development of Russia-NATO cooperation in 
the 1990s, the issue of NATO enlargement seriously troubled the relationship. In 
response to the strong desires of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe 
to join NATO, the allies agreed in December 1994 to study the “why and how” 
of NATO enlargement. Most Russians viewed this and subsequent steps toward 
enlargement as a threat to Russian prestige, or at least as NATO rubbing salt, so 
to speak, in Russia’s open wounds.
Russia’s negative attitude toward NATO enlargement reflected feelings about 
the alliance that had been reinforced by four decades of Soviet propaganda. Even 
many sophisticated Russians found it difficult to understand the fundamental 
differences between NATO, a voluntary alliance among independent countries, 
and the Warsaw Pact, where membership was imposed by the Soviet Union. 
Expansion of NATO’s role and membership meant that US power and influence 
would stretch ever closer to Russia’s borders, displacing what had been Soviet/
Russian zones of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Some Russian officials 
believed that when Moscow agreed to facilitate German reunification, the Soviet 
Union had been promised that NATO would not expand up to its borders—a claim 
rejected by Bush administration officials who represented the United States in the 
negotiations.23 The Russian perception may help explain Moscow’s strong reac-
tion to NATO’s enlargement plans. The bottom line, of course, was that even if 
22 NATO produced the Partnership for Peace Framework Document (available at: http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24469.htm?mode=pressrelease) in January 1994. Russia 
signed the document on 22 June 1994.
23 Yost, NATO Transformed, 133–34. Cf. the chapter by Wolfgang Mueller, “The USSR and the 
Reunification of Germany,” in this volume, 321–53.
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the negotiations had led the Russians to such a conclusion, no such commitment 
had ever been formally made.
In the mid-1990s, the NATO allies decided that it was important to respond 
to the enthusiastic desire of the new democracies to join NATO while at the same 
time trying to overcome Russian opposition with a cooperative embrace. NATO’s 
attempt to reassure the Russians took several forms. The NATO allies pledged 
that they had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons 
on the territory of new members. They also said that they planned no permanent, 
substantial deployments of NATO soldiers in any new member states. Perhaps 
most importantly, the allies authorized NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to 
act on behalf of the member states to negotiate a more permanent cooperative 
relationship with Russia. These negotiations, guided by Strobe Talbott and other 
US officials, resulted in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. This document was signed 
in Paris in May 1997, just before NATO announced its decision to invite three 
former Warsaw Pact nations to join NATO.
The Founding Act set a large agenda of topics on which NATO and Russia 
would attempt to collaborate.24 It created a Permanent Joint Council (NATO na-
tions plus Russia) as a framework for continuing consultations. Creating this 
channel for communications was an important step, but there were limits on its 
effectiveness. From the beginning, there was a tension between the Russian desire 
to use the forum to “participate” in NATO decision making, while the NATO 
allies sought to ensure that the Permanent Joint Council remained a place for 
consultations rather than co-decision making. This would change in 2001, when, 
following the terrorist attacks on the United States and evident Russian support 
for the war on terrorism, NATO and Russia moved toward a new relationship that 
was to give Russia a “vote” on those issues that NATO decided to handle jointly 
with Moscow.
NATO’s relationship with Ukraine began and has continued in an entirely 
different manner than that with Russia. As the next most significant independent 
country that had formerly been a Soviet republic, Ukraine gave up the nuclear 
weapons deployed on its territory by the Soviet Union in return for Western fi-
nancial assistance and the tacit promise of acceptance into the Western commu-
nity of nations. By the mid-1990s, many in the Ukraine elite quietly aspired to 
eventual membership in both NATO and the European Union (EU). However, 
political divisions in the country called for a cautious approach. Ukraine did not 
ask to be considered for NATO membership, but strongly supported the process 
of NATO enlargement. The NATO allies responded to Ukraine’s aspirations at 
their summit meeting in Madrid on 8 July 1997, agreeing with Ukraine on a 
24 See the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the 
Russian Federation signed in Paris, 27 May 1997, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_
texts_25468.htm (accessed 30 April 2013). 
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Ukraine-NATO Charter on Distinctive Partnership. This established an intensified 
consultative and cooperative relationship between NATO and Ukraine.25
In subsequent years, Russia has worked hard to ensure its future political and 
economic influence in Ukraine, leaving Ukraine’s future orientation and role in 
Europe open to question.
The enlargement process
NATO has expended considerable time and energy developing or supporting 
a variety of cooperative security arrangements in its relations with non-members. 
It is, however, the membership track of NATO’s outreach program that has gen-
erated the greatest controversy. Although the January 1994 Brussels summit de-
ferred decisions on enlargement and put the PfP forward as an outreach vehicle, 
the allies did agree to keep the membership door open.
The drafters in 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty anticipated that other Europe-
an states might subsequently wish to join the alliance. The Treaty’s Article 10 says 
that the allies may, “by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a 
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”26 The original twelve members 
were, over the years, joined by Greece and Turkey, Germany, and then Spain.
At the NATO summit meeting held in Brussels on 10–11 January 1994, allied 
leaders said that the commitment in Article 10 would be honored, and that NA-
TO’s door would be opened to qualified candidates. The allies began a study in 
December 1994 of the “why and how” of NATO enlargement. More importantly, 
President Clinton left the Brussels summit apparently ready to move on to the 
next step, even as those who favored a go-slow approach were reassured that the 
PfP would buy time and defer tough decisions on enlargement.
On a visit to Warsaw in July 1994, in an interview with Polish television, 
Clinton pushed the issue further down the road, saying, 
I want to make it clear that, in my view, NATO will be expanded, that it should be expanded, 
and that it should be expanded as a way of strengthening security and not conditioned on events 
in any other country or some new threat arising to NATO. […] I think that a timetable should be 
developed, but I can’t do that alone.27
Clinton’s comments affirmed that NATO should be enlarged because it was 
the right thing to do. The Warsaw remarks were taken by pro-enlargement offi-
cials in Washington as a green light to move ahead. According to Goldgeier, a 
25 For an excellent collection of analyses of Ukraine’s role in European security, see David E. Al-
bright and Semyen J. Appatov, Ukraine and European Security (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999).
26 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 24 April 2013). 
27 Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 68.
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number of factors combined to get enlargement on track inside the US adminis-
tration. These included the appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Euro-
pean and Canadian affairs of Richard Holbrooke, who had become an enlarge-
ment believer during his time as US ambassador to Germany, the shift of Strobe 
Talbott from enlargement skeptic to enlargement supporter, and the appointment 
of several enlargement enthusiasts to key positions on the National Security 
Council staff. Alexander (Sandy) Vershbow, for example, was to direct European 
affairs, and Daniel Fried began to cover Central and Eastern European policy. 
While the Pentagon remained largely skeptical, administration policy began mov-
ing slowly but surely toward an active enlargement approach.28
Meanwhile, the oppositional Republicans took control of the US House of 
Representatives in the fall 1994 mid-term elections. The new leaders of the House 
brought with them a “Contract with America,” which listed their policy priorities. 
Perhaps the only priority on which Clinton and the Republicans could agree was 
the Contract’s advocacy of NATO enlargement. The Contract’s enlargement po-
sition suggested that despite disparate motives, NATO enlargement might enjoy 
a fairly wide bipartisan base of support in Congress.
In Brussels, the necessary NATO work on enlargement moved ahead. In 
September 1995, the allies released the “Study on NATO Enlargement,” which 
explained why enlargement was warranted.29 It also drew up a road map that 
was to be followed by countries seeking membership on their way to the open 
door. The report said that enlargement would support NATO’s broader goal of 
enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, 
and would support the process of democratization and the establishment of mar-
ket economic systems in candidate countries. The report also proposed that en-
largement would threaten no one, because NATO would remain a defensive 
alliance whose fundamental purpose was to preserve peace and provide security 
to its members.
With regard to the “how” of enlargement, the allies established a framework 
of principles to follow, which included the requirement that new members assume 
all the rights and responsibilities of current members and accept the policies and 
procedures in effect at the time of their entry. No country was to enter with the 
goal of closing the door behind it, that is, using its vote as a member to block 
other candidates. Countries were to resolve ethnic disputes or external territorial 
disputes before joining NATO, and candidates were to be able to contribute to 
the missions of the alliance. Additionally, no country outside the alliance (e.g., 
Russia) would have the right to interfere with the process. In this area, the report 
drew on a set of principles that had been articulated earlier in 1995 by Secretary 
of Defense William Perry (which had become known as the “Perry Principles”), 
28 Ibid., 69–70.
29 NATO, “Study on NATO Enlargement” (Brussels: NATO, 1995). 
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and on further enlargement analyses by the Rand team of Asmus, Kugler, and 
Larrabee under their contract with the German Ministry of Defense.30
The NATO allies made clear that one of the key factors influencing readiness 
for membership would be an applicant country’s ability to work within NATO’s 
Integrated Command Structure. NATO military leaders were expected to help 
applicant countries prepare themselves to become effective military contributors 
to the alliance, adding another important task to NATO’s military mission profile. 
During 1996–97, NATO officials conducted intensified dialogues with twelve 
countries that had expressed an active interest in NATO membership. The can-
didacies of all countries were thoroughly examined from a wide range of per-
spectives. It was clear, however, that the United States would play the decisive 
role in the question of whom to invite for the first round of enlargement.
Bringing new members into the alliance constitutes an “amendment” to the 
North Atlantic Treaty and, as such, must be ratified by all NATO members. All 
in all, NATO enlargement had not been a major issue in Congress, but to the 
extent that there was interest, there was sustained bipartisan support for NATO 
and for bringing in new members.31 This support included the passage of the 
NATO Participation Act of 1994 (Title II of P.L. 103-447),32 which backed NATO 
enlargement as a way to encourage the development of democratic institutions 
and free-market structures in the new democracies. The low-intensity but fairly 
consistent support was a good foundation for collaboration between the White 
House and the Senate, a collaboration that was to be critical for eventually rat-
ifying any enlargement decision.
In 1996, the private, nonprofit Committee to Expand NATO was established 
to support the enlargement cause. This group, which involved an impressive 
collection of corporate leaders, former civilian officials, and retired senior mil-
itary officers, largely from the ranks of the Republican Party, actively courted 
congressional support for enlargement and played a major role in the lobbying 
effort on behalf of the initiative over the next two years. As well, 1996 was a 
presidential election year in the United States, but once again, foreign policy 
was not a big issue in the campaign.
On the issue of NATO enlargement, President Clinton and his Republican 
opponent, Senator Robert Dole, mainly competed to be seen as the strongest 
supporter of enlargement. Dole criticized the president for being too attentive to 
30 Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 94–95.
31 At the time, I was the leading NATO expert at the Congressional Research Service and a source 
for Congress of objective and nonpartisan analysis on NATO issues. When the NATO Observer 
Group was established in the Senate to manage the process of NATO enlargement, I was asked 
to serve as an adviser to this group, as well as to be the Congressional Research Service liaison 
on NATO enlargement issues to both the Senate Observer Group and the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.
32 See the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-447), http://www.fas.org/man/nato/
congress/1997/csce_nato/part09.htm (accessed 30 April 2013). 
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Russia’s views: Clinton had worked hard to reassure Russian president Boris 
Yeltsin that legitimate Russian interests would not be threatened, despite keeping 
the process of enlargement moving ahead. Dole’s criticism, however, had almost 
no political impact, and most observers saw very little difference between the 
Republican and Democratic positions on the issue. It was yet another sign of the 
bipartisan nature of support for bringing new members into NATO, although it 
certainly did not guarantee that the approach taken by the president and the al-
liance would win the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate.
The election campaign provided an opportunity for the administration to 
move ahead decisively. President Yeltsin had survived his reelection campaign 
in July 1996 and was no longer in imminent danger of being destabilized by the 
US position on enlargement. In September 1996, Clinton called for a NATO 
summit in 1997 to name the first post-Cold War candidates for NATO member-
ship. In October 1996, Clinton told an audience in Detroit that “by 1999, NATO’s 
fiftieth anniversary and ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first group 
of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members of NATO.”33
The prominent use of the enlargement issue during Clinton’s campaign visits 
to the Midwest—home to many Central European immigrant communities—was 
subsequently cited by opponents of enlargement in the United States and by 
skeptics in Europe as evidence that the US position was driven primarily by 
domestic politics. The history of administration policy, as documented by 
Goldgeier and observed personally by me, suggests a different conclusion. The 
president’s commitment to enlargement grew much more fundamentally out of 
his acceptance of, and belief in, fairly basic Wilsonian principles of internation-
al relations: promoting peace and stability through inclusive and cooperative 
relations among democratic states. Ethnic communities in the United States 
provided important support for both the president and the issue. Had enlargement 
not made sense in terms of basic US values and interests, it would have withered 
on the vine, despite the enthusiasm of Polish and other Central European lobby 
groups.
By the end of 1996 and Clinton’s successful reelection effort, collaboration 
between the White House and Congress had become more serious. The White 
House was fully aware that if the Senate felt it had not participated directly in 
the enlargement process, the issue could fail to gain the required two-thirds 
majority. This could occur even if two-thirds of the Senate leaned toward en-
largement, as appeared to be the case. The administration was sensitive to the 
fact that President Woodrow Wilson had failed to win US involvement in the 
League of Nations because he had not made an effort to get Senate support. The 
Clinton administration therefore followed President Harry Truman’s strategy for 
Senate consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948–49, a strategy that 
33 William J. Clinton, “Remarks by the President to the People of Detroit,” 22 October 1996, http://
www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.htm (accessed 23 April 2013).
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brought key senators into the process early enough to win their commitment but 
not too early to complicate the policymaking process prematurely.
As the White House began developing working relationships with critical 
Capitol Hill staff, a related but more immediate question arose: To decide which 
countries should be invited when the NATO “enlargement” summit convened in 
Madrid, Spain, on 8 July 1997. There was virtually unanimous agreement in the 
administration and among the European allies that the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland would be invited. Only Poland would add significantly to the military 
strength of the alliance. These three probably could, however, be sold to the 
Senate as strategically important and politically acceptable.
From Germany’s point of view, these three countries satisfied its desire to 
move away from the “front lines” in Central Europe. Being surrounded by NATO 
members would give Germany a political and military buffer between it and 
Russia. The United Kingdom preferred to keep the package as small as possible, 
not being a big fan of the process of enlargement in any case, and concerned that 
too rapid or large an increase in membership would weaken the alliance. How-
ever, France, Italy, and some other allies wanted to give enlargement a southern 
focus as well, and they thus favored including Slovenia and Romania in the first 
tranche.
Several members of the Senate, led by Senator Joseph Biden (Democrat, Del-
aware), ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
and Senator William V. Roth Jr. (Republican, Delaware), favored the inclusion of 
Slovenia—a small former Yugoslav republic—to create a land bridge between 
existing NATO territory (Italy) and Hungary. The Clinton administration decided 
that, despite the senatorial sentiments for Slovenia, the core package of three 
candidates would be a sufficient challenge for the process of ratification in the 
United States, as well as for absorption by the alliance.
Romania, with an important geostrategic position in Southeastern Europe and 
with substantial military forces, lagged far behind the three core candidates in 
political and economic development. Slovenia could be kept as a given for the 
next round. The administration came to an internal consensus on putting just three 
candidates forward. Even though intensive discussions had been held at NATO 
and among NATO allies in preparation for the Madrid meeting, the US choice of 
three and only three was publicly revealed in a Pentagon press briefing by Sec-
retary of Defense William Cohen in mid-June. Cohen’s suggestion that, as far as 
the US government was concerned, the case was closed by the White House, 
implied that a NATO decision had been made before NATO consultations had in 
fact been completed.34
The way the United States appeared to close the door to further discussion 
stunned the allies and was instantly interpreted by the French and others as just 
34 Philip Shenon, “U.S., Defying NATO Allies, Insists NATO Limit Expansion to 3,” New York 
Times, 13 June 1997, A6.
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one more sign of hegemonic US behavior. The United States had always been 
“first among equals” in NATO, where decisions are taken by consensus but where 
US preferences almost always carried the day. Nonetheless, the allies resented 
the cavalier US approach to the consultation process. The challenge for the Clin-
ton administration and for administrations before and after was how to be a he-
gemon without acting like one. The administration had now made the mistake of 
acting like one.
The Madrid meeting endorsed the US preference, but not without significant 
grumbling by French president Jacques Chirac and others. The allies found much 
to complain about, including the fact that the United States wanted seats in the 
session for US senators who had been brought along with the US summit dele-
gation to help ensure a favorable ratification process. At Madrid, to help smooth 
the many feathers ruffled by US actions, other candidate states were encouraged 
to continue to work toward eventual membership by following the guidelines laid 
out in the “Study on NATO Enlargement,” and to develop bilateral cooperation 
with NATO through the PfP program.35
The allies reaffirmed their commitment to the open-door policy, in which all 
European countries meeting the conditions of Article 10 and the guidelines of the 
study could be considered for eventual membership. The next task for NATO was 
to negotiate the terms of entry with the candidate states. The Clinton administra-
tion, however, had its own challenging task: to convince at least two-thirds of the 
members of the Senate that NATO enlargement was in US interests.
The administration had already begun preparing the ground. A respected for-
mer Clinton White House aide and expert on congressional–executive relations, 
Jeremy Rosner, was brought back to serve as coordinator of the ratification pro-
cess with both a State Department position and staff, as well as the status of 
special adviser to the president. The administration had been wise to include 
senators in the Madrid delegation, but now the serious lobbying work would 
begin.
In the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by a politically 
conservative Jesse Helms, would have primary jurisdiction over the legislation, 
with the Senate Committee on Armed Services also playing an important adviso-
ry role. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (Republican, Missouri) had already 
created the Senate NATO Observer Group, chaired by Senators Biden and Roth, 
designed to help manage the process in support of the Senate’s advice and consent 
role.
In the summer of 1997, even though it appeared that Rosner and his admin-
istration team were starting with a good core of support in the Senate, it became 
clear that they would need a strong lobbying effort to ensure final victory. In the 
course of a luncheon meeting in August hosted by a Scandinavian embassy offi-
35 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, 8 July 1997, http://www.nato.
int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm (accessed 30 April 2013). 
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cer, Rosner and I had a few moments to discuss his challenge. I said that I pre-
sumed that President Clinton would be personally involved in the lobbying effort. 
Rosner assured me that, in the coming months, the president would invite senators 
to the White House for dinners and private meetings that were focused on lining 
up the required votes.
However, despite the fact that Clinton had played an important part in getting 
NATO enlargement on the US and NATO agenda, the fall of 1997 and spring of 
1998 found him increasingly caught up in impeachment proceedings against him 
in Congress. He never conducted the lobbying dinners and meetings Rosner had 
reasonably expected. At the numerous official events marking various stages of 
the ratification process, the president was present and involved, but one had to 
wonder whether his mind was not on other problems.
Opponents of enlargement in the United States, indeed until the Senate vote 
on 30 April 1998, complained that the issue had not been given the kind of seri-
ous attention that was warranted by such an important national commitment. It 
is true that the issue was not particularly exciting for the public at large. Public 
opinion polls showed broad, but somewhat shallow support for enlargement. The 
positive numbers seemed to reflect the public’s positive image of NATO and of 
the idea that the US approach to international cooperation should be inclusive. 
However, a large percentage of those queried in polls showed a lack of basic 
knowledge about what was going on. For example, a large number of respondents 
in some polls believed that Russia was already a NATO member.36
The debate that raged on opinion and editorial pages of major American news-
papers was largely conducted among the academic and policy elite and was not 
of great interest to the American public. Indeed, most foreign policy issues, such 
as NATO enlargement, are debated and decided largely by the elite public. The 
public at large is moved to action and involvement only by more headline-making 
events, particularly those with imminent life-or-death consequences.
In the deliberative body that had to debate and decide the issue, however, there 
was a thorough and serious process of consideration37 in keeping with the Senate’s 
role as a “partner” to the transatlantic bargain. Despite the president’s “absence” 
36 See, for example, the results of polls conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and 
the Press, which found that support for enlargement, ran more than three to one in favor (63 
percent for, 18 percent opposed); however, only 10 percent of the public could identify even 
one of the potential new members. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, America’s 
Place in the World II, 19 October 1997, http://people-press.org/report/102/americas-place-in-
the-world-ii (accessed 24 April 2013). 
37 A partial record of Senate activities related to NATO enlargement, along with the Foreign Re-
lations Committee’s Resolution of Ratification and the separate views of the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence can be found in US Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, “Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession 
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic” (105th Congress, 2nd session, Exec. Report 105-
14, 6 March 1998). 
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from the process,38 the work of the NATO Observer Group moved into high gear, 
in close collaboration with the administration. The process relied heavily on 
teamwork between Rosner and key Senate staffers, particularly Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee staffer Steve Biegen, Ian Brzezinski, who worked for Sen-
ator Roth, and Michael Haltzel, who worked for Senator Biden. Other staffers, 
including Ken Myers of Senator Lugar’s staff and David Stevens, who worked 
for Senator Jon Kyl (Republican, Arizona), played key roles in the period leading 
up to the Senate debate.
The Senate NATO Observer Group, almost completely out of public view, 
organized a steady stream of classified and unclassified briefings and meetings 
in the course of 1997–98. Some of these sessions were intended largely for ad-
ministration officials to communicate information to Senate staff. Others provid-
ed opportunities for members to meet with senior NATO-nation military officials. 
One critical session of the NATO Observer Group brought senators together with 
the foreign ministers of the candidate countries. The meeting appeared to be a 
turning point for at least one senator who had been skeptical about enlargement. 
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (Republican, Texas) had profound concerns about 
the plan and examined the issue carefully, asking her staff, with the help of the 
Congressional Research Service, to research a number of enlargement issues. At 
the session with the candidate country foreign ministers, however, it became clear 
to this observer that Senator Hutchison’s feeling of respect and admiration for the 
accomplishments of the three new democracies would likely bring her into the 
“yea” column. It did.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a series of public hearings 
in October and November 1997 in which both supporters and opponents of en-
largement were invited to address the committee.39 Proponents and critics of 
enlargement in the Senate had their staffs investigate the major issues, whereby 
a wide range of outside experts were called in to brief senators and staff, and 
Congressional Research Service analysts were engaged in hundreds of hours of 
support. One of the most sensitive challenges for Jeremy Rosner and other ad-
ministration officials was to hold together a coalition of Senate supporters and 
potential supporters who were motivated by substantially different assumptions 
and objectives.
Supporters ranged from conservative Republicans to liberal Democrats. Senator 
Helms and a few other conservative Republican senators saw NATO enlargement 
first and foremost as an insurance policy against a resurgent Russia once again 
laying claim to the sovereignty of Central and East European states. Helms was 
particularly interested in how the administration saw the future of NATO-Russia 
38 This aspect of the ratification process went completely unnoted in Goldgeier’s otherwise excel-
lent account of NATO enlargement decision making.
39 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “The Debate on NATO Enlargement” (105th Con-
gress, 1st session, 7, 9, 22, 28, and 30 Oct. and 5 Nov. 1997, S. Hrg. 105-285). 
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relations. In the process of introducing Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at the 
committee’s first enlargement hearing, Helms cautioned, “NATO’s relations with 
Russia must be restrained by the reality that Russia’s future commitment to peace 
and democracy, as of this date, is far from certain. In fact, I confess a fear that the 
United States’ overture toward Russia may have already gone a bit far.”40
In addition, many senators had not agreed to the “new NATO” (in which 
members cooperated to deal with new security challenges, including peace oper-
ations in the Balkans), and still believed that the “old NATO” (focused primarily 
on Article 5, the commitment to assist a fellow member that has come under 
attack) was what was still needed. On the other hand, some senators found the 
old NATO to be of decreasing relevance and were more interested in the idea of 
increasing the number of democratic states that could help deal with new securi-
ty challenges in and beyond Europe. Others (e.g., Senator Barbara Mikulski, 
Democrat, Maryland) were motivated most strongly by the fact that Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary had thrown off communism and committed them-
selves to a democratic path. How, such proponents asked, could they be denied 
membership in the Western system, of which NATO was a core part?
The Senate opponents of enlargement were also very diverse, both politically 
and philosophically. Senator John Warner (Republican, Virginia) became one of 
the most severe critics of enlargement. He believed that too many members would 
make it impossible to manage the alliance, dooming it to future irrelevance since 
timely consensual decisions with nineteen-plus members would be very difficult 
to make. Senator Warner’s attempt to impose a formal pause on the enlargement 
process was rejected, but a number of senators who had voted for enlargement 
voted with Warner in favor of a pause. Some forty-one senators voted for the 
Warner amendment, enough to block a two-thirds majority of the Senate for the 
next candidate(s) if they were all to vote against.
The most strongly committed enlargement opponent, Senator John Ashcroft 
(Republican, Missouri), simply believed that the United States was already over-
burdened and that NATO enlargement would perpetuate a responsibility that had 
long ago outlived its utility. Among the opponents, Ashcroft’s position came 
closest to representing a neo-isolationist stance. His perspective related in part to 
concerns about the potential cost of NATO enlargement. At one point, it seemed 
that the question of cost would become the most difficult issue in the Senate 
debate. However, conflicting and confusing estimates of the cost blurred the issue 
and made it a virtual non-factor in the final debate. Ashcroft’s attempt to amend 
the resolution of ratification to mandate a narrow interpretation of NATO’s future 
mission was defeated through deft parliamentary procedures on the Senate floor. 
Instead, the Senate passed an amendment offered by Senator Jon Kyl (Republican, 
Arizona) that affirmed the continuing importance of NATO’s collective defense 
role, allowing that NATO was now useful in non-Article 5 missions as well.
40 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “The Debate on NATO Enlargement,” 2.
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The other main school of thought motivating opponents of enlargement was 
concern about its impact on relations with Russia. From the other side of the po-
litical spectrum, George Kennan, the highly respected Russia expert who played 
a major role in developing the US containment strategy toward the Soviet Union, 
opined41 that NATO enlargement would be a disaster for U.S.-Russian relations. 
Some members, including Senators Paul Wellstone (Democrat, Minnesota) and 
Patrick Leahy (Democrat, Vermont), were to cast their votes against enlargement 
largely on the basis of Kennan’s warning.42 Another opponent, Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan (Democrat, New York), argued that the European Union, not 
NATO, should take the lead in including the new democracies in Western institu-
tions. After several abortive attempts to organize a debate and final vote in the 
Senate, Senator Lott devoted the entire day of 30 April to the enlargement issue. 
The opponents, led by Senators Warner, Robert Smith (Republican, New Hamp-
shire), Moynihan, Ashcroft, and Wellstone, put on a strong show of their concerns. 
As Senator Helms was not well, Senator Biden managed the bill for the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee with single-minded energy and enthusiasm that left 
some of his democratic colleagues standing impatiently, waiting to be given the 
floor. Several senators made impressive contributions to the advocate’s side, in-
cluding Mikulski, Joseph Lieberman (Democrat, Connecticut), and Gordon Smith 
(Republican, Oregon). The decisive vote was taken late that evening. At the urging 
of Senator Robert Byrd (Democrat, West Virginia), in his role as the unofficial 
guardian of the procedures and practices of the Senate, all senators took their seats 
and then rose when called to deliver their vote. Byrd suggested that the
Senate would make a much better impression [… if senators would] learn to sit in their seats to 
answer the rollcall [… rather than] what we have been accustomed to seeing down here in the 
well, which looks like the floor of a stock market.43 
The Senate, seated with the decorum requested by Senator Byrd, voted eighty 
to nineteen to give the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification of the member-
ship of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in NATO. The missing vote 
was that of Senator Kyl, an enlargement supporter who had left Washington on 
an official overseas trip a few hours before the vote was taken, reassured that his 
side would win by a clear margin. 
41 George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” New York Times, 5 February 1997, A23.
42 Following one Senate NATO Observer Group session in the weeks before the Senate vote, Well-
stone engaged me in a discussion about the Russia issue. I attempted to provide a balanced 
perspective, but suggested that Kennan’s prediction was probably exaggerated. It was clear from 
that discussion, however, that Wellstone’s vote probably would be with the enlargement oppo-
nents.
43 Even though the Standing Order of the Senate says that “votes shall be cast from assigned desk,” 
roll-call votes are routinely taken with senators walking into the chamber and milling about the 
clerk’s desk until their names are called. Byrd’s comments can be found in Congressional Re-
cord (105th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 April 1998), S3906.
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Although enlargement supporters managed to beat back all potential “killer” 
amendments, the number of votes garnished by Senator Warner’s proposed 
“pause” in the enlargement process reflected an important sentiment. Few en-
largement advocates were anxious to take on a new round in the near future. Even 
Jeremy Rosner, who had dedicated so much time and energy to NATO enlarge-
ment, judged that the system would not be able to support another round until the 
first candidates had demonstrated their successful entry into the NATO system.44
Some enlargement proponents, however, thought it important to keep the 
process moving ahead. The first package had left aside Slovenia, a small but 
relatively attractive candidate. Senator William V. Roth Jr., one of the leading 
forces behind the enlargement process, argued that the process should “be care-
fully paced, not paused.” In a special report for the North Atlantic Assembly (now 
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) in September 1998, for which the present 
author was rapporteur, Roth proposed that when the allies met in Washington in 
1999 to celebrate NATO’s fiftieth anniversary, “Slovenia should be invited to 
begin negotiations aimed at accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. In addition to 
reflecting Slovenia’s preparedness for membership, the invitation would demon-
strate that the enlargement door remained open without overloading the enlarge-
ment process.”45 Senator Roth’s advocacy was considered by and had some 
supporters in the Clinton administration. But the administration ultimately decid-
ed that it was too early to move ahead with new candidates. That step was left 
for the next US administration to handle.
The European allies were relieved that the United States did not want to push 
ahead immediately with another round of enlargement. The strongest European 
proponent of enlargement, Germany, had accomplished its main objectives with 
the accession of the first three candidates. As it no longer stood on NATO’s front 
lines looking east, it no longer displayed such great enthusiasm for the enlarge-
ment process. Most of the other allies did not look forward to negotiating the next 
round, in which the potential candidates would likely include one or more of the 
three Baltic states: former Soviet republics whose NATO membership was strong-
ly opposed by Moscow.
At the fiftieth-anniversary NATO summit in Washington from 23 to 25 April 
1999, all aspiring candidates for NATO membership were given some cause for 
hope, even though Slovenia was left standing outside the door. The leaders 
pledged that “NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to 
further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the 
Euro-Atlantic area.”46 The allies created the Membership Action Plan (MAP), 
which promised cooperation beyond the possibilities in the PfP and, perhaps more 
44 Discussion with the author, May 1998.
45 William V. Roth Jr., NATO in the 21st Century (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, 1998), 53.
46 Washington Summit Communique, “An Alliance for the 21st Century,” 24 April 1999, http://
www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm (accessed 30 April 2013). 
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important, feedback from NATO concerning their progress toward membership. 
Nine aspirants—Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slova-
kia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia—initially signed 
up for the program. These nine were promised that NATO would formally review 
the enlargement process again no later than 2002.
According to NATO, “The MAP gives substance to NATO’s commitment to 
keep its door open. However, participation in the MAP does not guarantee future 
membership, nor does the Plan consist simply of a checklist for aspiring countries 
to fulfill.”47 What MAP did do, however, was to provide “concrete feedback and 
advice from NATO to aspiring countries on their own preparations directed at 
achieving future membership.” The MAP did not substitute for full participation 
in NATO’s PfP Planning and Review Process, which, in NATO’s view, was “es-
sential because it allows aspirant countries to develop interoperability with NATO 
forces and to prepare their force structures and capabilities for possible future 
membership.”48
In 2000, with the United States preparing to elect its next president, the man 
who would make the next critical decisions on enlargement, the nine candidate 
states joined together in support of a “big bang” approach to enlargement. Meet-
ing in Vilnius, Lithuania, on 18–19 May 2000, the nine foreign ministers pledged 
that their countries would work for entry into NATO in 2002 as a group, rather 
than compete against each other for a favored position. Both major presidential 
candidates in the United States, Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor 
George W. Bush, sent letters of support to the session.49
With his close victory in the November 2000 election, it was Bush who would 
take on the challenge of leading the alliance toward its enlargement decision. In 
a speech in Warsaw on 15 June 2001, President George W. Bush outlined his 
vision of a Europe “whole, free, and at peace,” and said that all new European 
democracies, “from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between,” should 
be able to join European institutions, especially NATO.50 Bush’s declaration 
opened the way for a large second enlargement round, one that might have been 
expected to be controversial, but which turned out to be far less contentious than 
the first one.
Prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, political interest in and sup-
port for NATO’s second enlargement round could not be compared to that for the 
first round. President Bush said that his administration was a strong supporter of 
47 See for example, NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO 
2001), 65. Cf. http://www.opsroom.org/documents/handbook.pdf (accessed 30 April 2013). 
48 NATO, “NATO’s Membership Action Plan,” NATO on-line-library fact sheet (Brussels: NATO, 
2000), http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042451.htm (accessed 30 April 2013).
49 William Drozdiak, “9 NATO Candidates Pledge to Join in a ‘Big Bang’ Bid,” International 
Herald Tribune, 20–21 May 2000, 1.
50 President Bush Speech in Warsaw, CNN.com./World, 15 June 2001, http://archives.cnn.
com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/15/bush.warsaw.trans/index.html (accessed 30 April 2013).
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enlargement, but the administration had no eager European partner on this issue. 
Germany, the key European architect of the first round, had less of a strategic 
stake in the next stages and, until late in 2001, had been reluctant to upset Mos-
cow. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, some observers 
questioned the wisdom of moving ahead with NATO enlargement. However, 
within a few months of the attacks it appeared that a consensus was growing in 
favor of a major enlargement initiative, when allied leaders meet in the Czech 
Republic in November 2002.
In Prague, a “big bang” enlargement process was initiated. During the Bush 
administration’s two terms, seven additional countries joined NATO. In 2004, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became 
members. In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined the alliance, while Macedonia was 
left invited but standing outside the door, pending a resolution of its differences 
with Greece over the country’s legal name.
With these states coming on board, the enlargement process seemed to be 
nearing its end. Ukraine and Georgia were waiting in the wings, Serbia remained 
somewhat defiant, and other states remained “partners” of various sorts. The 
question of NATO membership for Europe’s former neutrals who are already 
members of the European Union (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) remains 
open, and is probably dependent on the quality of future US leadership and Rus-
sian tendencies toward old Soviet behavior.
Postlude and consequences
The NATO enlargement process has been “successful” in helping bring new 
European democracies into the Euro-Atlantic community. It has become a normal, 
but not guaranteed, step for the countries that have joined NATO subsequently to 
become members of the European Union, completing their integration into the 
community. However, the process has left unanswered a number of questions 
concerning the future of European security, and concerning NATO in that future.
One question is whether shortcomings in military reform and defense improve-
ments of the new members suggest that leverage on candidate states disappears 
when they become members.
If countries that do not fully meet the military guidelines for membership laid 
out in the NATO enlargement study51 are nonetheless invited to join, does this 
51 In 2001, a Rand Corporation study evaluated the qualifications of potential candidates and pro-
duced the following conclusions: “Of the MAP states, Slovenia and Slovakia largely meet the 
criteria outlined by NATO [in the 1995 “Study on NATO Enlargement”] and their accession pos-
es no major strategic problems for NATO. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are advanced in terms 
of meeting NATO’s preconditions, but the strategic ramifications of their accession [vis-à-vis 
Russia] loom large. Bulgaria and Romania have the opposite problem of being unable to meet 
NATO’s preconditions, even though the strategic implications of their accession are not prob-
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imply that NATO is becoming “more political,” making military capabilities of 
potential members less relevant?
Has the increase in members had any discernible effect on NATO’s deci-
sion-making ability? Is there a magic number beyond which NATO’s consen-
sus-based deliberative process will become unworkable? Has that number already 
been surpassed?
To what extent can the tendencies toward authoritarian rule in Russia be 
blamed on NATO enlargement? Russian officials have used NATO’s expanding 
membership as justification for its foreign and domestic policies, but to what 
extent are those policies driven by other factors, primarily related to the perceived 
need to hold Russia together? What are the likely consequences for relations with 
Russia of various possible enlargement scenarios?
How will further enlargement interact with other policy initiatives; for exam-
ple, attempts by the United States and NATO to develop a collaborative approach 
with Moscow on nuclear missile reductions and ballistic missile defenses?
Will enlargement be linked in any way to the process of further reforms with-
in NATO to make it more relevant in the struggle against international terrorism?
In spite of such questions, the consequences of the decisions taken in the 1990s 
concerning NATO enlargement, from an American perspective, appear largely 
positive so far. The dual NATO/EU enlargement process has stimulated reform 
and democratization in former Soviet bloc states and republics. As former mem-
bers of the Warsaw Pact have joined NATO, they have become strong supporters 
of the transatlantic link, and have moved toward and became members of the 
European Union.
The leadership in Moscow, seeking to solidify control and keep Russia from 
coming apart at the seams, has complained about NATO enlargement and its 
consequences loudly and frequently. The bottom line in the analysis of the NATO–
Russia relationship is that enlargement has troubled but not destroyed a cooper-
ative relationship between the alliance and Russia: it did not lead to a “new cold 
war.” Political developments in Russia—unconnected to NATO’s enlargement 
process—have turned out to be far more important to the relationship than the 
addition of former Warsaw Pact allies and the Baltic republics to the alliance.
lematic. Macedonia and Albania are least advanced in meeting NATO’s preconditions and their 
prospects for membership are distinctly long term. Of the European Union members currently 
not in NATO, Austria is in a good position to join if it chooses to do so. To a lesser extent, so is 
Sweden. Finnish membership, however, would entail some difficulties because of the strategic 
cost it would impose on NATO [also with regard to relations with Russia].  Thomas S. Szayna, 
“NATO Enlargement 2000–2015: Implications for Defense Planning,” Rand Research Brief 62 
(Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2001). The brief summarizes the analysis complet-
ed by Szayna in NATO Enlargement 2000–2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense 
Planning and Shaping (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2001). See also Jeffrey Simon, 
Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Na-
tional Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2001).
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Russia’s future nonetheless remains critically important to the NATO allies. 
Neither the United States nor any European ally wishes to see Russia re-emerge 
as a challenge to Europe’s peace and stability. NATO policies have therefore for 
the most part been designed to invite Russia’s constructive involvement in Euro-
pean and global security affairs, while at the same time critiquing Moscow’s 
recent tendencies to reverse the process of democratization and liberalization that 
began under Gorbachev.
Moreover, NATO has not been brought down by the process of enlargement 
and can still function as a framework for coordinating responses to the security 
needs of its members. This will remain true as long as the allies—individually 
and collectively, and most importantly the United States—continue to believe that 
such cooperation is in their best interests. The biggest challenge to alliance mem-
bers, old and new, is therefore not Russia, nor even terrorism, Afghanistan, Pa-
kistan, Iraq, Iran or the Middle East more generally, but rather that of maintaining 
sufficient transatlantic cohesion to deal with these and other issues effectively.
Stanley R. Sloan
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EU ENLARGEMENT, 1989–2009
On 1 May 2004 at a historic, if understated, signing ceremony in Dublin, the 
European Union (EU) formally recognized the accession to the Union of ten new 
states. These were the Mediterranean ‘micro’ states of Cyprus and Malta, and 
eight new members from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)—the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia—which, 
for more than fifty years, had been cut off from the European integration process 
by virtue of their geopolitical imprisonment behind the Iron Curtain. The eastern 
enlargement was completed via the “coda enlargement,” with the accessions of 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. At that point the EU completed its extraordinary 
and cumulative geographic sweep: the first enlargement in 1973 had been “west” 
(UK, Ireland and Denmark), the emphasis in the 1980s was on the “south” (Spain, 
Portugal and Greece); in the 1990s the Union had expanded “north” (Finland, 
Sweden and Austria).1 
The history of European integration has been one of successive and successful 
enlargement rounds; “widening” has proved as potent a force as “deepening” in 
determining how the European Union has evolved as a postnational interstate and 
supra-state zone of peace and relative prosperity. For more than three decades 
after World War II, the Cold War stood in the way of the realization of the oft-stat-
ed ambition to unite “east” and “west” in a single European constellation of states. 
But with the demise of the Soviet Union and the loosening of its postwar grip on 
its Central and Eastern European satellite states in the wake of 1989’s so-called 
geopolitical earthquake, Jean Monnet’s ambition of a European construction 
stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals suddenly seemed possible. Thereafter, 
enlargement quickly made its way to the top of the European Union’s political 
agenda. Two decades later the EU has applied the successful model of “Europe-
anization East” in negotiating with states in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Thus 
a process which was instituted in the aftermath of the dramatic events that defined 
the 1989 revolutions and had brought the EU population up to 500 million people 
now sought to consolidate democracy and European integration in Europe’s most 
fragile and contested political space.
This chapter analyzes the European Union’s enlargement process in the two 
decades that followed the annus mirabilis of 1989. The revolutions opened up the 
1 I do not include the accession of the old East Germany (GDR), which formally acceded to the 
EU after its absorption into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1991. This is considered 
a purely domestic matter. I treat the 2007 “coda” accessions of Bulgaria and Romania as part of 
the eastern enlargement round.
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possibility of a vast and voluntary framework of economic and political integration 
extending to a genuinely pan-European scale. At the center of this historic project 
the European Union initially demonstrated great hesitation in response to what 
Jacques Delors termed the “acceleration of history,” but gradually found its stride 
as the European Commission assumed responsibility for the practical implementa-
tion of, if not a utopian “Return to Europe” by “Yalta Europe,” then a process 
whereby gradual “catch-up” could be pursued and adaptation of CEE states to 
existing legal and procedural norms of the European Union could be achieved. 
A rather hesitant and ungenerous response
For the Central and East European states emerging from the shadow of the 
Soviet monolith, the central aspiration was clear: a “Return to Europe”; the Eu-
rope from which, it was frequently asserted, these states had been forcibly sepa-
rated for over four decades.2 The new CEE governments from the beginning 
framed their endeavors and aspirations with explicit reference to the core values 
of the European integration.3 They sought freedom, prosperity, and a secure place 
in the international community of nation states, and especially within European 
organizations. Opinion polls in the newly independent states pointed to massive 
popular support for “joining Europe.”4 For the European Union, however, the 
aftermath to the peaceful revolutions would produce a period of intrinsic ques-
tioning, firstly, of what the term “European” actually meant, and, more pragmat-
ically, how the Community might respond to the CEE states’ stated desire for 
membership of the club. For the first time, Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, 
which simply stated that “any European State can apply” for membership of the 
Community, began to be seriously scrutinized.5
Even at this early stage, however, a division between EC/EU “drivers” (advo-
cates) and “brakemen” (obstructionists) was in evidence. On one side British 
prime minister Margaret Thatcher unashamedly made the case for an EC com-
mitment to enlarge. The question of what motivated her advocacy is usually 
answered with the assertion that she saw a wider Europe as a tool for slowing 
down the integration process and forestalling, if not derailing, any moves to em-
brace federalism. It was undoubtedly the case, however, that she also admired the 
2 The “Return to Europe” quickly emerged as the central foundational pillar upon which mem-
bership bids by the CEE states were framed around. The “Return” has been the subject of an 
exhaustive range of academic analysis. Iver B. Neumann, “European Identity, EU Expansion, 
and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus,” Alternatives 23, no. 3 (1998): 397–416.
3 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, “Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?,” 
in Helen and William Wallace, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 427–60, 433.
4 See, for example: “Poll finds yearning to join Community,” The European, 30 November 1990.
5 “EC dilemma over Eastern Europe,” Guardian, 10 April 1990.
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CEE states for overthrowing communism and embracing the dual freedom of the 
market and the ballot box. At the Aspen Institute in Colorado on 5 August 1990 
she called for a pan-European “Magna Carta.”6 Her foreign minister Douglas 
Hurd was equally supportive, as was John Major once he became prime minister.7 
For some European leaders, however, the idea of a speedy enlargement was just 
too big a leap of either the imagination or the purse strings. French president 
François Mitterrand, for example, declared in Prague that it would be several 
decades before the CEE states could become members of the Community.8 The 
European Commission for its part took a middle path at this time, urging closer 
links but seeking to deflect the question of membership.9 Later the Commission 
would become a key institutional driver of the process, whilst attending to the 
concerns of member states about one or other area of policy. This division be-
tween “drivers” and “brakemen” was one that would characterize enlargement 
politics for long periods to come. 
The atmosphere was captured in the European Council’s declarations at the 
Strasbourg summit in December 1989 where it specifically acknowledged a “spe-
cial responsibility” for Central and Eastern Europe and suggested that the Com-
munity was the only point of reference of significance for the CEE states.10 This 
was despite the fact that the revolutions had caught the Community off guard. 
For the EU this was as much a question of adjusting the cognitive and ideation-
al, as well as the physical and geopolitical map of Europe. EU policy, according 
to Sedelmeier and Wallace, was characterized at this time by, amongst other 
things, hyperactivity, enthusiastic pledges of support, and consensus that the EU 
should play a leading role in the transformation process in CEE, even if it was 
unclear what this might involve.11 
It seems instructive, however, that despite the soaring rhetoric from EU lead-
ers, there emerged nothing like a Marshall Plan for Central and Eastern Europe. 
6 “Thatcher urges closer EC ties with East bloc nations,” Financial Times, 15 November 1989; 
“Thatcher seeks commitment on EC entry for Eastern Europe,” Financial Times, 6 August 1990; 
“Thatcher defies EC over East bloc members,” Independent on Sunday, 12 August 1990.
7 See, for example: “Hurd pushes for EU expansion,” Guardian, 1 May 1995; “Major promises 
to help Poland join the twelve,” Independent, 27 May 1992. Major visited Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland between 26 and 28 May 1992 and pledged support for early entry to the 
Community.
8 “Eastern Europe ‘threatens to destabilise EC’,” Financial Times, 7 November 1990. On Mitter-
rand’s position see Jean-Marc Trouille, “France, Germany and the Eastwards Expansion of the 
EU: Towards a Common Ostpolitik,” in Hilary and Mike Ingham, eds., EU Expansion to the 
East (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2002), 50–64. On differences between Thatcher and Mitterrand, see 
“Umpteen ways to spell Europe,” Independent, 22 September 1990.
9 “Delors frames EC ‘Ostpolitik’,” Independent, 16 November 1989; “Brussels urges wider links 
with East bloc,” Financial Times, 2 February 1990.
10 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Strasbourg European Council, Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Communities, EC 12 (1989).
11  Sedelmeier and Wallace, “Eastern Enlargement,” 432.
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Indeed EU funding levels to CEE in the two decades that followed compared very 
unfavorably even with the “poorest of the rich” within the EU—Ireland, Portugal, 
Greece and Spain. The Delors Package of 1988 had significantly expanded the 
existing redistributive arrangements in favor of these countries; similar pressure 
during the Maastricht negotiations yielded the Cohesion Fund, which provided 
further more targeted financial assistance. Cross national comparison of aid fig-
ures between “insiders” and “outsiders” demonstrates the extent to which EU 
policy favored these existing members. In 1992, for example, the four poorer, 
peripheral EU countries received fifteen times more per capita aid subvention 
than did the CEE countries.12 Ten years later the gap had narrowed but was still 
very significant. Poland would receive €67 per capita, Hungary €49, Slovenia 
€41, and the Czech Republic €29 in the period up to the end of the 2006 financial 
framework. By contrast, in 2000, Greece received €437 per capita, while Ireland 
got €418, Spain €216 and Portugal €211. Further, it was stipulated that aid to 
individual CEE states was not to exceed the imposed “absorption capacity” figure 
of 4 percent of GDP. This threshold was set much lower than had been the case 
in previous enlargement rounds. It is little wonder that the CEE states gazed 
wistfully at the Cohesion states and their very generous levels of EU support.13 
The point is further put in perspective when one considers that Ireland, al-
though already by 2000 one of the richest states in the Union, was still in receipt 
of almost six times more aid than was envisaged for Poland. Between 1989 and 
1999 regional aid to Ireland amounted to approximately 3 percent of GDP per 
annum; in some years the receipts amounted to in excess of 5 percent of GDP, a 
supranational transfer of wealth unprecedented in European history.14 To further 
emphasize the lack of support offered CEE, a comparison can be offered with 
German transfers to its eastern Länder after unification: in 1993, these amounted 
to $5900 per capita.15 In the decade after unification, net fiscal transfers from the 
German Federal Government to the former East Germany amounted to some 1.2 
trillion DM. This figure amounted to ten times what the EU allocated in aid to 
all the CEE candidate countries put together in the run up to accession in 2004. 
The impression of the CEE countries remaining the poor relations is difficult to 
refute and is reflected in the opinion of some that the Oder-Neisse line quickly 
transmuted into a new and lasting economic divide, separating Europe’s haves 
and have-nots.16 
12 Helmut Leipold, “The Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: Opportunities and Obsta-
cles,” Aussenpolitik 46, no. 2 (1995): 126–35, 131.
13 The figures are cited by Heather Grabbe, “The Copenhagen Deal for Enlargement,” Briefing 
Note (London: Centre for European Reform, December 2002).
14 John O’Brennan, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2006). 
The financial figures are assessed in chapter 2, “1989 and Beyond.”
15 Economist, 17 June 1995.
16 Arnulf Baring, Germany’s New Position in Eastern Europe: Problems and Perspectives (Ox-
ford: Berg, 1996), 68.
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Ivan T. Berend showed that had the Marshall Plan been emulated for Central 
and Eastern Europe, even on a limited basis, with, for example, a Western con-
tribution of only one half of one percent of GDP, this would have yielded up to 
$100 billion annually for reconstruction and transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe. If one shifts the focus to EU aid alone, in 2004 the combined EU-15 
GDP amounted to over €9 trillion. A Marshall-style financial aid program would 
have delivered approximately €90 billion per year to CEE. Even a contribution 
of one half of one percent of EU GDP would have yielded a figure of €45 billion 
annually for a limited period. The total package of financial aid, however, amount-
ed to only €40.8 billion (2004–06). But given that the new member states would 
also contribute something approaching €15 billion to the budget, the net figure 
was reduced to about €25 billion. The Commission thus suggested a net cost for 
ten countries over three years of just €10.3 billion per annum, which amounted 
to just one-thousandth of EU GDP.17 This was by any estimation a pale imitation 
of the Marshall Plan.
This hesitant and rather ungenerous response to CEE on the EU’s part was 
predicated on a number of factors. Firstly, the Union’s self-absorption for most 
of the twenty years after 1989 stands out. Perry Andersen argues that, paradoxi-
cally, the demise of communism acted to the disadvantage of the CEE associated 
countries because it triggered an intensification of Western European integration 
efforts.18 Indeed in this interpretation, Maastricht is singularly identified as the 
quid-pro-quo for German unification: the assurance of a united Germany’s re-
newed commitment to its EU partners and the European integration system. 
Suspicion of German hegemonic or aggrandizing intent was not slow in materi-
alizing. Eastward enlargement, it was widely thought, would economically and 
geopolitically benefit Germany much more than any other EU member state. 
Thus, fear of the putative German giant caused some of the present member states 
to steer enlargement along the “slow lane.” The gradual realization, on the part 
of EU leaders, of the daunting institutional and policy implications of enlargement 
also encouraged caution and inertia. Analysis of the micro implications of en-
largement was provided by a wide range of commentators and by the European 
Commission and European Parliament.19 The shadow of enlargement thus hov-
ered over every major internal EU debate from the early 1990s onwards. 
For the CEE states this meant that, at precisely the moment of their return to 
the mainstream European interstate arena, they were effectively locked out of the 
central political processes that would shape the future Europe. Their absence from 
17 Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: the European Councils on Brussels and Copen-
hagen 2002, European Council Commentary 2, no. 1, (Brussels: EuroComment. 2004), 299. 
18 See Independent, 29 January 1996. 
19 See, for example, Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph E. Francois, and Ricardo Portes, “The Costs and 
Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the EU and Central Europe,” Economic Policy 
24, (April 1997): 125–76; Karen Hendersen, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe 
and the European Union, (London: University of London Press, 1999).
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the Maastricht and Amsterdam constitutional negotiations, for example, was 
striking.20 Exclusively the incumbent members would determine the shape of the 
new European compact without any input from the Central and Eastern Europe-
an states. Throughout that period, growing concern about the direction of EU 
policy towards Central and Eastern Europe manifested itself on a regular basis. 
Indeed, a European Commission official was quoted as saying: “The level of 
seriousness about enlargement is not minimal, it simply does not exist.”21 The 
initial euphoria of 1989 then soon gave way to muted resignation as the EU found 
that its response to the emerging democracies became increasingly affected by 
the economic and political vicissitudes of both EU and global politics. 
A second problem arose from the impact of a Europe-wide recession on the 
member states, and—later—the deflationary policies employed in many countries 
in order to conform to the European Monetary Union (EMU) convergence criteria. 
Budget deficits, increased unemployment and attendant social strain resulted in the 
subordination of enlargement to domestic policy issues in many member states 
throughout the mid-1990s. Sclerotic growth and a fiscal climate governed by rela-
tive austerity rendered it more difficult to respond with imagination and generosity 
to the extraordinary economic and social “gaps” in CEE. One might also at this 
point cite the existential fears which existed in some member states about the emer-
gent competitive threat from CEE in important industries such as motor manufac-
turing and electronics: notions of solidarity and “we-ness” often gave way to nar-
rowly-based EU sectoral interests, intent on maintaining competitive advantage.
A third issue emerged in the logistical problems encountered by the Commis-
sion in its efforts to coordinate aid programs for the CEE states. Dependent on 
outside expertise, and handicapped by a severe lack of resources, the Commission 
soon ran into implementation difficulties and voluble criticism. Sedelmeier and 
Wallace assert that the EU found it easier to devise ad hoc policy than to design 
a more balanced and rounded approach. This was a common charge, though 
mostly leveled with the benefit of hindsight and with little regard to the problems 
relating to speed, timing, and staff and expertise shortages.22 In addition rivalries 
within the Commission—principally between Directorate General (DG) I and 
Directorates General III (industry) and VI (agriculture)—and within national 
administrations (typically the Foreign Ministry against sectoral ministries) con-
tributed to the problems of coordination and implementation in the early stages 
of the enlargement process. Sedelmeier and Wallace presented this as a “macro/
meso” divide among policy makers, with macro policy makers (usually located 
20 “Absent friends frozen out of unity talks,” Guardian, 7 December 1991; “Eastern Europe keeps 
half an eye on the EC,” Financial Times, 12 December 1991.
21 Quoted by Lionel Barber, “Brussels keeps shut the gates to the East,” Financial Times, 16 No-
vember 1995. 
22 Sedelmeier and Wallace, “Eastern Enlargement,” 435. See also Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Sectoral 
Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access, and Alliances in a Composite Polity,” Journal 
of European Public Policy 9, no.4 (2002): 627–49, 627–34.
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within the foreign ministries of national administrations) typically taking the long 
term view and being more sympathetic to the CEE concerns, while meso policy 
makers (usually to be found in sectoral ministries) engaged in narrowly-consti-
tuted short-termism and were very susceptible to the claims of special interests 
in their own domestic economic spheres. Even within DG I there was significant 
division along similar lines.23 Thus at both the horizontal and vertical levels 
within the EU, opposition to, or at least different forms of obstructionism toward, 
enlargement came over time to characterize a process that had been instituted 
with such utopian fanfare in 1990. 
The enlargement “canon” within EU studies
If the 1989 revolutions launched a continental scale institutional re-engineer-
ing of Europe, it seems clear that eastern enlargement also catalyzed a renaissance 
in scholarship on and interest in EU external affairs. In conjunction with a deep-
ening of intra-EU cooperation in the external relations field heralded by the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) provisions of the Maastricht Trea-
ty, the geopolitical re-calibration set in motion by 1989 provided a dynamic of 
its own within the world of scholarship: from Fukuyama’s End of History thesis 
to Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, to declarations of the return of Realism 
by John Mearsheimer and others, almost every geopolitical question of the 1990s 
revolved around security re-alignments within and beyond the EU and the “new 
Europe”; enlargement studies developed an identity of its own within the world 
of scholarship, whilst also drawing upon and adding new dimensions to existing 
literatures within International Relations (IR) and the ever-more diverse smorgas-
bord that was European Integration Studies. This section assesses the literature 
on enlargement and what each element contributed both to this “enlargement 
canon” and what one might call the (looser and more recognizable) political 
history of the enlarged and enlarging Europe. We can divide this political history 
into three separate sections: how the external impacted on the internal (institu-
tional and policy domain within the EU), the economic dimension of enlargement, 
and the geopolitical phenomena associated with expansion. Each section is ex-
plored via the literature which emerged to help define and shape the “enlargement 
canon.” Finally, a specifically theoretical literature is analyzed from the perspec-
tive of rational institutionalism on the one hand and social constructivist and 
normative understandings of enlargement on the other. The spirited debate be-
tween these two “camps” to some extent reflected polarized conceptions of what 
kind of EU emerged from the 1989 revolutions and the fundamental dynamics of 
the unfolding continental-scale framework of institutional and policy interaction 
taking shape under the aegis of Brussels.
23 Sedelmeier and Wallace, “Eastern Enlargement,” 439.
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The external and the internal
In the first place we can trace the internal European Union debates on eastern 
enlargement and thus both the political history of the accession process and the 
institutional division of labor as it played out in Brussels and in member state 
capitals. From the beginning of the period of internal debate, which we can iden-
tify as coinciding with the European Council meeting at Copenhagen in June 
1993, which produced a (rather loose and ambiguous) set of membership criteria 
for candidate states to work toward as they engaged in different degrees of reform 
of their domestic economic and political structures, the serious nature of the in-
stitutional and policy challenges facing the Union was underlined by both official 
documentation and scholarly analysis that clearly marked out this enlargement as 
historically unique in scope and scale. Two types of approach in particular stand 
out: those that focused on the complex re-calibration of EU institutions which 
would have to accompany a “big bang” accession process, and the myriad policy 
challenges thrown up by expansion, most especially those of agriculture and re-
gional funding (the policy areas which accounted for approximately 85 percent 
of EU spending). Such studies revolved largely around in depth empirical work 
on institutional and policy change and also sought to outline the gradual devel-
opment of EU relations with the CEE states. Of particular importance here are 
the contributions of EU “insiders” such as Graham Avery, Fraser Cameron, Anna 
Michalski and Peter Ludlow, all of whom worked in different periods for the 
European Commission, and whose work contains valuable accounts of the inter-
nal EU deliberation on enlargement and especially the inter-institutional context 
in which the actors, interests and identities at play within the regime of enlarge-
ment politics was played out. 24 These works allow us to peer into the EU structure 
of power and how it responded to and itself was changed by the great challenges 
of enlargement to the east. The clash between “drivers” and “brakemen” emerg-
es as a consistent theme of insider accounts and can be traced right up to (and 
even beyond) the successful conclusion of negotiations at Copenhagen in Decem-
ber 2002.
The enlargement of such a complex and multifaceted international entity nec-
essarily entails an important internal institutional dimension. Enlargement arises 
out of specific forms of institutionalized cooperation and subsequently produces 
a reconfiguration of those institutionalized norms, practices and structures: thus 
24 Graham Avery, “The Enlargement Negotiations” in Fraser Cameron, ed., The Future of Europe: 
Integration and Enlargement (New York: Routledge, 2004), 35–62; Graham Avery and Fraser 
Cameron, Enlarging the European Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998); Michael 
J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement, (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: the 
European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 2002, European Council Commentary 2, no. 
1, (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004); George Vassiliou, ed., The Accession Story: the EU from 15 
to 25, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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the myriad (and frequently contested) modes of “internalization” of the external 
by insiders constitute an important locus of analysis for scholars of enlargement 
politics. Enlargement is a policy domain which involves each of the main EU 
institutions in a distinctive way. This was clearly reflected in the institutional 
division of labor laid down in the treaties, which would govern CEE accession 
decisions:
Any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a 
member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimous-
ly after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, 
which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustment to the treaties on which the Union is founded, 
which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States 
and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.25
Thus the formal hierarchy of power with respect to an enlargement decision 
appears very clear: the Council, consisting of representatives of the member state 
governments, takes the decision, having consulted the Commission. The decision 
seems then to be purely a matter for the member states operating in an intergov-
ernmental mode. But a more substantive contextual analysis of Article 49, in-
formed by an understanding of how the EU system works (and has evolved) in 
practice, reveals a more complicated and nuanced picture of the decision-making 
process. The European Commission effectively acts as principal interlocutor with 
the candidate states and has an important influence on both the content and shape 
of the process as it develops. The treaty articles also bestow an important role on 
the European Parliament, in that no accession decision can be taken without the 
Parliament’s assent.26 And, in the final instance, the outcome of the process rests 
on the ratification procedures in both the acceding states and the member states. 
All of this suggests that it is quite wrong to identify the Council as the only EU 
actor that counts in the process. 
The eastern enlargement is particularly noteworthy for the way in which the 
European Commission carved out a distinct institutional and political role for itself 
within enlargement politics. The Commission’s influence flowed principally from 
two sources. The first was its formal power to initiate policy proposals, which 
helped it to set and shape the enlargement policy agenda. Although, as in the gen-
eral integration framework, as a rational actor, it sought to anticipate, incorporate 
25 Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Consolidated Treaties, 2012. Article 6 (1) 
(Ex Article F) effectively codified the Copenhagen criteria for membership of the Union. It 
reads: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member 
States.” 
26 This procedure is now known as “Consent” after changes introduced through the Lisbon Treaty, 
enacted in December 2009.
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and adjust for the specific concerns of member states (and increasingly the Euro-
pean Parliament EP), it often found itself to be (almost by default) the sole policy 
entrepreneur and thus the most active, visible and best placed EU institutional 
actor within the enlargement process. It is important to understand that much of 
this particular dynamic evolved out of the early response by the EU to events in 
CEE in the early 1990s. Facing the challenge of managing relations with the new 
democracies and the imperative of moving quickly and decisively to embed the 
democratic transitions taking place in CEE, the EU very quickly became dependent 
on the Commission for both political leadership and policy advice. It was the Com-
mission which took responsibility for managing the initial aid programs for CEE 
such as PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Reconstructing their Econo-
mies) and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development), produced the official Opinions on the ability of the candidate states 
to meet the criteria for membership, and oversaw the screening process, that is, the 
analysis of efforts by candidate states to transpose and implement the acquis com-
munautaire into their bodies of domestic law. Even in the latter stage of negotiations 
in 2001–02, where the member states were (in theory) in the ascendancy and the 
Presidency played a crucial role, the Commission continued to cajole, deliberate, 
and persuade both insiders and outsiders of the merits of its “community-centered” 
enlargement strategy and thus to put aside narrow partisan interests. 
The experience of eastern enlargement also demonstrates that where formal 
prerogatives were absent, the Commission used what developed as “customary 
enlargement practice” to carve out a substantive informal agenda-setting role for 
itself outside of the formal treaty structure, framing policy problems and urging 
consensus where difficulties arose. Individual commissioners such as Günter 
Verheugen and Olli Rehn very often acted as political entrepreneurs, and proved 
themselves both proactive and integral to enlargement outcomes. In its policy 
documents and public pronouncements, the Commission frequently resorted to a 
specific normative enlargement discourse, deploying a series of moral arguments 
in its efforts to accelerate the negotiation process. The Regular Reports on can-
didate state progress, for example, just as they stressed the importance of enlarge-
ment as a vehicle for securing EU values across Europe, also presented eastern 
enlargement as one with “an unprecedented moral dimension.” The speeches of 
Romano Prodi and Günter Verheugen in particular were studded with references 
to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland as “an integral part of Europe,” or 
part of the “extended family of European nations.”27 Jacques Delors similarly, in 
retrospect, presented enlargement as an act of historical and moral justice: 
27 See, for example, Prodi’s 2001 speech to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The title is in-
dicative of the “drivers” inclusive approach—“Bringing the Family Together.” Romano Prodi, 
“Bringing the Family Together,” Speech to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Speech/01/158, 
Budapest, 4 April 2001, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-01-158_en.pdf (accessed 
16 July 2013). 
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Active peace is not the “peace of cemeteries” we experienced during the Cold War. We must not 
forget that we West Europeans found ourselves on the right side of the line drawn by the Yalta 
agreement and that our East European relatives were less fortunate. I consider we have a debt 
toward them from a historical point of view.28
At the broader institutional level, the Commission, through its capacity build-
ing and compliance functions within the process, was (and remains) the EU in-
stitutional actor closest to the candidate states throughout the process, providing 
advice and pragmatic engagement, urging broader and deeper transposition (and 
internalization) of EU norms, and actively socializing candidate state public rep-
resentatives into EU practice. Viewed by the candidate states as ever-demanding 
and frequently unreasonable in its insistence on full and unconditional implemen-
tation of the acquis, viewed by the member states as frequently too accommodat-
ing of candidate state preferences, the Commission often tread a thin line between 
bureaucratic process manager and political entrepreneur, between agent of the 
member states and separately constituted political actor. And although it might 
seem decidedly unfashionable to describe what is sometimes misidentified as the 
“Brussels Bureaucracy” as the unsung hero of the enlargement process, much of 
the evidence suggests that this is exactly how the Commission emerges from 
eastern enlargement. In its engagement with the candidate states, imaginative 
framing of policy proposals within the EU, and not inconsiderable diplomatic 
skill in pushing the sometimes reluctant member states toward completion of the 
negotiations, the Commission performed the type of role which, if indeed un-
glamorous and hidden from the European public, was  integral to consolidating 
the gains of the 1989 revolutions. It is thus quite inarguable that the Commission 
acted as the primary internal EU “driver” or “motor” of the eastern enlargement 
process. 
The economic dimension of enlargement
Given the scale of the devastated economic landscape in the east, and the 
nature of the restructuring of the industrial base which took shape in CEE after 
1989, the economic dimension of the enlargement process took on a highly sig-
nificant importance for both insiders and outsiders. EU member states were 
fearful of new competitive threats emerging from the ashes of the moribund so-
cialist economies, whilst in CEE the most common complaints related to EU 
obstructionism on market access and difficulties in adopting costly single market 
legislation. The obvious weaknesses of postcommunist legal systems and public 
administration rendered doubtful the capacity of many CEE states to compete 
effectively in the single market. Thus a primary focus of the Commission as 
28 Jacques Delors, “An Ambitious Vision for the Enlarged Union,” Speech delivered to the “Notre 
Europe” Conference, Brussels, 21 January 2002.
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accession drew closer was that of market oriented juridical and administrative 
transposition of EU law and compliance with EU rules.
Whilst some approaches to the economic dimension of eastern enlargement 
focused on the nature of productivity growth and capital and investment flows 
into Central and Eastern Europe, the prospect of enlargement also compelled the 
EU to focus on extending its existing framework of regional and structural fund-
ing while also reforming key policy areas such as agriculture.29 Perhaps the most 
influential of the academic contributions was that of Alan Mayhew, whose Rec-
reating Europe analyzed the political economy of eastern enlargement and 
bridged the divide between academic analysis and policy-making and between 
inside and outside perspectives.30 Similarly, Richard E. Baldwin’s work sought 
to combine analysis of the costs and benefits of enlargement for both insiders 
and outsiders 31 
Enlargement promised gains for both incumbents and applicants, though 
considerably more for the latter than the former, and spread very unevenly 
amongst the member states. The scale of the economic challenge was also evi-
dent in the fact that the level of economic development of the CEE countries, 
measured by GDP per capita was not just significantly below that of existing 
members, but in a majority of cases, much lower than any previously successful 
entrant to the EU. Income per head in 2002 ranged from 60 percent in the case 
of Slovenia to as low as 30 percent for Poland and 25 percent for Bulgaria and 
Romania.32 Enlargement clearly implied a re-balancing of EU regional policy in 
favor of the poorer, less developed and infrastructurally deficient states to the 
east: subvention would have to be found to underpin new motorways, airports, 
ports and sewage systems, whilst high levels of unemployment, at least outside 
most capital cities, compelled investment in human resources and re-training. 
Although it is now clear that the new member states have received substantially 
less than did earlier, poorer entrants such as Ireland and Greece, what is remark-
able is that disputes about redistribution did not come to dominate the enlarge-
ment agenda. CEE leaders seemed to understand that economic renewal would 
come mainly from within and from adaptation to the established market system, 
29 Baldwin, Francois, and Portes, “The Costs”; Fritz Breuss “Macroeconomic Effects of EU En-
largement for Old and New Members,” WIFO Working Papers 143/2001 (Vienna: Austrian 
Institute of Economic Research, 2001); Terry Caslin and Laszlo Czaban, “Economic transfor-
mation in CEE” in Mike Manin, ed., Pushing Back the Boundaries: The European Union and 
Central and Eastern Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 70–98.
30 Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); idem, “The 
Financial and Budgetary Impact of Enlargement and Accession,” SEI Working Paper No.65 
(Brighton; Sussex European Institute, 2003).
31 Richard E. Baldwin, Toward an Integrated Europe (London: Centre for Economic Policy Re-
form, 1994).
32 Nikos Baltas, “The Economy of the European Union,” in Neil Nugent, ed., European Union 
Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 146–57.
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and not from the EU as a rich external benefactor. And indeed trade between the 
“old” and “new” member states tripled in the decade prior to 2008, from around 
€150 billion to €450 billion.33
By far the most important policy area to come under scrutiny, however, was 
that of agriculture, which despite the professed urgency which often accompanied 
official pronouncements on the need for reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), managed to survive more or less intact (and thus unreformed) 
until very late in the negotiation process. The fear of extending the financial 
largesse of the CAP to Poland and Romania, to identify those candidate states 
most dependent on agriculture, motivated a stream of policy proposals centered 
on reform and sustainable adaptation on both sides.34 And whilst the new member 
states in CEE would not benefit nearly to the same extent from CAP as earlier 
entrants such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the eventual regime that would 
emerge at least provided a much more secure footing for transition in the coun-
tryside than might otherwise have been available. But even after securing the 
partial extension of CAP after 2004, the new eastern members could not avert the 
familiar “flight from the land” which had so characterized the experience of both 
earlier entrants and established producer countries alike. 
The geopolitical dimension of enlargement
Enlargement both developed out of and encouraged new thinking about key 
geopolitical and security considerations, sometimes linked to the parallel process 
of NATO expansion, and also complicated the search for consensus on the EU’s 
emerging security and defense policies.35 From the outset geopolitical issues 
featured strongly in the calculus of EU leaders. Enlargement increased both the 
size of the EU population and the territory it covers by a significant degree (about 
one third in each case). In terms of area that meant the European Union now 
stretched from the Atlantic in the west to within miles of St. Petersburg in the 
east, and after 2007, to the Black Sea coast in the southeast. Enlargement thus 
brought with it new dangers and new geopolitical opportunities for the Union. 
Some saw it as a vehicle for turning the EU into a global geopolitical power that 
would match the EU’s power in the economic realm. But other commentators 
feared the messy entanglements that might arise from moving EU borders to an 
eastern geopolitical space which remained contested and fragile, and where bor-
33 European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010–2011,” Communica-
tion from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM (2010) 660 final, 
Brussels, 9 November 2010. 
34 Mayhew, Recreating Europe.
35 John O’Brennan, “Bringing Geopolitics back in: Exploring the Security Dimension of the 2004 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, 
no. 1 (March 2006): 155–69. 
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der demarcations were both physically porous and, potentially, catalysts of inter-
ethnic conflict. Enlargement gradually threw open the question of where Europe’s 
eastern and southeastern borders might lie. Although Russia was much more 
suspicious of NATO enlargement eastward, in time the EU also got drawn into a 
more tense relationship with Russia, mainly because of the tensions provoked by 
new borders and disputes such as that over Kaliningrad. While eastern enlarge-
ment may have been a vehicle for containing both Russian power and the conse-
quences of Russian state weakness, EU policy toward Russia was both assertive 
and conciliatory. 
Eastern enlargement helped stabilize and then normalize interstate relations in 
Eastern Europe and ensure a peaceful transition from communism to European 
integration. Security considerations were especially important in both moving the 
enlargement process forward at critical junctures and also changing the contours 
of enlargement in specific ways. The Kosovo war of 1999 especially stood out 
in this regard. Kosovo was a warning shot to the EU about the dangers of exclud-
ing the Balkans from the integration process. This not only accelerated the east-
ern enlargement process, it also produced a much more sure-footed and concrete 
EU model for the integration of the Balkans. The same political–institutional mix 
employed for eastern enlargement began to be deployed in Southeast Europe also, 
thus ensuring that analysis of EU relations with the states of the Western Balkans 
and Turkey proceeded from a starting point of “learning lessons from” the eastern 
enlargement.36 Geopolitical factors certainly counted in the timing and nature of 
enlargement policy-making, even if they were frequently superseded by econom-
ic and normative considerations on the part of the EU. 
Theoretical approaches to enlargement
In the years after 1989, as the integration of Europe gathered pace, a theoretical 
literature began to develop; this drew on two juxtaposed bodies of thought from 
the subdiscipline of International Relations (IR), and conceptualized eastern en-
largement from those perspectives. Rationalist scholars argued that enlargement 
proceeded from a materialist and utilitarian understanding on the part of both in-
ternal and external actors; the main motivation of the key actors lay in concerns 
about securing both economic and security benefits from expansion. In contrast, 
36 Othon Anastaskis, “The EU’s Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a More 
Pragmatic Approach,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 8, no. 4 (2008): 365–77; Da-
vid Phinnemore, “From Negotiations to Accession: Lessons from the 2007 Enlargement,” Per-
spectives on European Politics and Society 10, no. 2 (2009): 240–52; John O’ Brennan, “The 
EU in the Western Balkans: Statebuilding as Empire? A Rejoinder to Professor David Chandler,” 
Global Society 22, no. 4 (2008): 507–18; Arolda Elbasani “EU Enlargement in the Western Bal-
kans: Strategies of Borrowing and Inventing,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 10, 
no. 3 (2008): 293–307. 
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scholars approaching the phenomenon from a normative perspective argued that 
enlargement emerged out of common and shared norms, principles and understand-
ings of what the European integration process represented and the natural right of 
all European states to participate in the unique institutional and policy-making 
structures as full and equal members. Where rationalist scholars highlighted so-
called “logics of consequentiality” which allegedly governed enlargement deci-
sion-making, sociologically-grounded scholars instead argued for “logics of appro-
priateness” as the key cognitive templates which informed and guided the behavior 
of decision-makers. This disciplinary clash was both a product of and contributed 
significantly to the rationalist/constructivist divide which had come to define a large 
part of the academic conversation on EU public policy-making.
On one side of the theoretical divide a rationalist literature grew up around 
the study of the constitutional and institutional dimensions of the enlargement 
process. The study of national decision-making and supranational bargaining 
which accompanied specific aspects of the eastern enlargement framework drew 
attention to a part of the process which was at least as important as the (largely 
asymmetric) inside-outside bargaining between the EU and the candidate states.37 
In particular, scholars sought to determine the likely impact of enlargement on 
EU decision-making by focusing on changes to the rules governing the use of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) within the Council and the general costs of 
institutional adaptation. Perhaps the most important theoretical template for ana-
lyzing enlargement from a rationalist perspective was Andrew Moravscik’s The 
Choice for Europe, which offered a view of the European integration process as 
one characterized by intergovernmental bargaining and dominated by the power-
ful economic interests of the larger member states. The Choice for Europe had 
very little to say about eastern enlargement (or indeed any previous enlargement 
of the EU), but in other contributions, Moravscik applied his liberal intergovern-
mentalist framework to argue that enlargement did not fundamentally re-order 
any of the important features of the integration process and that the EU bargain-
ing which accompanied the enlargement process resulted in typical compromises 
which protected the structural interests of the larger member states whilst buying 
off potential losers with compensatory “side payments.”38
37 Stefanie Balier and Gerald Schneider, “The Power of Legislative Hot Air: Informal Rules and 
the Enlargement Debate in the European Parliament,” Journal of Legislative Studies 6, no. 2 
(2000): 19–44; Bernard Steunenberg, ed., Widening the European Union (London: Routledge, 
2001).
38 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Ana Va-
chudova, “National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement,” East European Politics and 
Society 17, no. 1 (2003): 42–57; Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Ana Vachudova, “Preferences, 
Power and Equilibrium: the Causes and Consequences of EU Enlargement,” in Frank Schim-
melfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier,  eds., The Politics of the European Union Enlargement: theo-
retical approaches (London: Routledge, 2005), 198–212. 
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On the other side of the theoretical divide, constructivist scholars highlighted 
the importance of ideas, identity, and social interaction within the eastern enlarge-
ment process. This literature, although itself increasingly diverse, sought to high-
light the normative importance of different features of the process, and especial-
ly the cumulative and net effects of CEE exposure to EU norms and values in 
multiple and cross-cutting arenas of mutual activity.39 One school of thought 
focused on EU motivations for enlargement deriving from a sense of historical 
obligation, such as “uniting Europe,” or “undoing the historical injury wrought 
on the CEE states at Yalta.” Other approaches analyzed eastern enlargement from 
different identity perspectives and sought to determine whether enlargement prac-
tice produced identity transformation.40 
This debate revolved in particular around the role and impact of the EU’s 
conditionality regime on candidate states. The effort to bridge the divide between 
the rationalist and normative camps was led by Swiss scholar Frank Schim-
melfennig. His work became by far the most cited work on enlargement; it sought 
to contribute to existing debates on the nature of European integration and the 
EU as an external actor. 41 As the enlargement process developed and measure-
ment of EU “successes” and “failures” became possible, a growing number of 
scholars sought to analyze the use of various types of conditionality, especially 
political conditionality, by the EU, as scholars sought to determine the extent to 
which Central and Eastern Europe was becoming (alternatively) “Europeanized,” 
“modernized,” and “democratized” through the enlargement process.42 And under 
what conditions could the EU really make a difference in penetrating the domes-
39 See John O’Brennan, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006).
40 Ivan T. Berend, “The Further Enlargement of the European Union in a Historical Perspective,” 
European Review 7, no. 2 (1999): 175–81; Neumann, “European Identity,” 397–416; Ulrich 
Sedelmeier, “EU Enlargement, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy: Identity 
Formation through Policy Practice,” EUI Working Papers, RSC 2003/13 (San Domenico: Euro-
pean University Institute, 2003).
41 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhe-
torical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 
55, no. 1 (2001): 47–80; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by Condi-
tionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal 
of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (August 2004): 661–79; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca and London: Cor-
nell University Press, 2005); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,  eds., The Politics.
42 Marise Cremona, ed., The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, “Enlargement, Institution Building and the EU’s Admin-
istrative Capacity,” West European Politics 25, no. 4 (2002): 171–90; Marc Maresceau, “The 
EU Pre-Accession Strategies: a Political and Legal Analysis,” in Marc Maresceau and Erwan 
Lannon, eds., The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 3–28. 
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tic realm of governance in candidate states?43 The conditionality debate juxta-
posed those who saw EU policy as efficient and transformative against more 
skeptical voices which argued for the minimal impact of conditionality on the 
domestic politics of candidate states. In a particularly nuanced and widely-read 
study, Milada Ana Vachudova emphasized the promise of membership as the key 
facilitator of real adaptation to EU norms and for rule-following in advance of 
accession.44 Similarly, in a systematic study of international networks, Beate 
Sissenich argued that the transposition of EU rules through enlargement was to 
say the least very uneven. Rule transfer depended on many factors, including 
underlying patterns of cultural accommodation and the congruence of local inter-
ests with EU norms. Sissenich especially identified the domestic arena in candi-
date states, where EU rules would sometimes be contested quite robustly and 
where the capacity to implement the EU acquis was frequently lacking.45 EU rule 
transfer was also analyzed under the rubric of existing literatures on democrati-
zation and democratic transitions. The EU’s role as an “agent of democratization” 
in its immediate neighborhood and beyond provoked important arguments about 
the nature of EU democracy promotion and its effects in candidate states and 
(post eastern enlargement) in neighboring states.46 In particular this theoretical 
analysis drew on the existing EU-centered “Europeanization” literature, and 
would produce an important mutation of this strain of theory in a specific ap-
proach termed “Europeanization East.” Thus the empirical work on “European-
ization” patterns was accompanied by much more sustained theoretical attempts 
to measure and analyze the exact degrees of “Europeanization” to be found 
within the enlargement process.47
43 Tim Haughton, “When does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Pro-
cess in Central and Eastern Europe,” Political Studies Review 5, no. 2 (2007): 233–46. Cf., for 
example, Dimitrova, “Enlargement”; Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, ed., Driven to Change: the Eu-
ropean Union’s Enlargement viewed from the East (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2004).
44 Milada Ana Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and 
Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
45 Beate Sissenich, Building States without Society: European Union Enlargement and the Trans-
fer of EU Social Policy to Poland and Hungary (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2007).
46 Richard Youngs, “European Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On,” European For-
eign Affairs Review 6, no. 3 (2001): 355–73; Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU 
Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); 
Richard Rose, “Evaluating Democratic Governance: a Bottom-Up Approach to European Union 
Enlargement,” Democratization 15, no. 2 (April 2008): 251–71. 
47 Heather Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Pro-
cess,” in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, eds., The Politics of Europeanization (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 303–31; eadem, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europe-
anization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006); 
Dimitri Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic 
Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004): 619–39.
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Conclusions
Enlargement, as Desmond Dinan reminds us, “has been a central and qua-
si-permanent element in the EU’s history.”48 The first set of new members (UK, 
Denmark and Ireland) had hardly been assimilated when the second set (Greece, 
Spain and Portugal) applied to join. Similarly, the Community was still assimi-
lating the second set when the third set of ultimately successful applicants (Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden) requested accession. There followed the absorption of the 
old GDR, and, in the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions and after a protracted 
period of sometimes very heated negotiations, the “Return to Europe” of the ten 
CEE states that emerged from the annus mirabilis of peaceful transition.
It seems clear in retrospect that from early on in the emerging dispensation, 
enlargement cast a clear and discernible shadow over every important aspect of 
internal and external EU activity. Thus even if the eastern enlargement differed 
significantly from previous rounds in terms of scale and diversity, academic lit-
erature and political commentary continued to focus on the established preoccu-
pation with widening and deepening. The questions related to the “finalité” of 
integration were of course intimately connected with the EU’s ambitions for 
further widening. This is because, as Jan Zielonka has reminded us, one cannot 
study the question of enlargement without reference to that of more or less inte-
gration, or at least the impact of enlargement on the process of integration.49 Now 
that the EU is negotiating with the states of the Western Balkans and Turkey, this 
relationship between widening and deepening is back on the political agenda and 
many of the polarizations familiar from the eastern enlargement process have 
returned to structure conversations about the future of Europe.
Looking back it also seems clear that there was nothing inevitable about the 
outcome of negotiations: the 1989 revolutions did not in and of themselves con-
stitute anything but a necessary condition—a starting point if you will—for the 
successful realization of the dream of a voluntarily embraced system of intra-Eu-
ropean integration. The recurring clashes between national interests and the col-
lective interest of “Europe” that characterized the negotiations, both on the “in-
side-outside” level and amongst insiders, brought a familiar element of the exist-
ing integration framework into the EU-CEE relationship, and represented a good 
training ground for “doing business” within a post-accession context. If indeed 
the early idealism that flowed from the 1989 revolutions was diminished rather 
rapidly by the slow progress on negotiations, this was counterbalanced by Poland, 
Hungary, and other states learning to play the game of both interstate negotiations 
48 Desmond Dinan, “The Commission and Enlargement,” in John Redmond and Glenda Rosen-
thal, eds., The Expanding European Union: Past, Present and Future (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1998), 17–40, 20.
49 Jan Zielonka, “Ambiguity as a Remedy for the EU’s Eastward Enlargement,” Cambridge Re-
view of International Affairs 12, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1998): 14–29, 15.
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and supra-state institutional politics. The successful adaptation to existing EU 
modes of decision-making can be demonstrated in the smooth functioning of 
those (enlarged) institutional structures after 2004: those who argued that enlarge-
ment would lead to chronic institutional failures have been proved very wrong.
In the final analysis one should acknowledge the asymmetric nature of this 
analysis: it remains far too early to make judgments about how eastern enlarge-
ment has changed the European Union and the existing integration process. The 
accession of Croatia as the EU’s twenty-eight member state on 1 July 2013 sug-
gested a continuing capacity for incorporating new states, even if patterns of 
“enlargement fatigue” threw into doubt further enlargement within the Western 
Balkans.50 It is much easier to analyze the micro-impact of the EU on Central and 
Eastern Europe than to offer judgments about the European Union that has 
evolved out of the 1989 revolutions. Rather, this chapter has focused on the dif-
ferent elements of the enlargement process that quickly took shape after 1989 and 
how each of these elements triggered diverse conversations about the nature of 
the evolving EU. Enlargement may have been completed successfully in 2004 
and 2007, but the process remains a partial and incomplete one, both in the geo-
graphic and normative senses. The current Europe-wide academic and political 
preoccupation with democratic deficits of one variety or another, and the obvious 
shortcomings of the EU as a welfare-enhancing entity on the one hand or global 
geopolitical force on the other may have led to a failure to properly appreciate 
the nature of the European achievement in consolidating the gains of the “1989 
moment.” The EU may be bureaucratically cumbersome and politically enigmat-
ic, but in supervising a framework for the renewal of meaningful pan-European 
interstate cooperation, not to mention the reconstitution of the democratic impulse 
across the continent, it may have contributed in some small way to making 1989 
at least as important a historical juncture as 1789 and 1848 in the rich tapestry 
of the European collective experience.
50 John O’Brennan, “Will Europe End in Croatia?,” Project Syndicate, 30 June 2013, http://www.
project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-consequences-of-the-eu-s-enlargement-fatigue-by-john-
o-brennan (accessed 17 July 2013). 
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h o r s T  M ö l l e r
EPOCHAL CHANGES, 1989–91
The term “Wende” (German for “turnaround”) was first coined by East Ger-
man communist leader Egon Krenz; the term has since prevailed in everyday 
speech—at least in the new federal states of Germany (die neuen Bundesländer; 
the GDR areas re-established as states in 1990)—for denoting the political chang-
es that took place in Europe from 1989 to 1991. Rarely has a world-revolution-
izing process such as the collapse of the communist dictatorships in this period 
and the resulting global political change been connected with such an easygoing, 
non-descriptive term. Its use seems even stranger if one is reminded that the same 
term was used during the 1982 change of government in West Germany, when 
there was also talk of a Wende, with Helmut Kohl asserting his intention to bring 
about a “geistig-moralische Wende” (a mental/spiritual-moral turnaround). If the 
term Wende is appropriate for such a process, then it is clearly inappropriate for 
the epochal caesura of 1989–91, especially since other democratic changes in the 
German government, for instance the change from a grand coalition to a so-
cial-liberal coalition in 1969, have been characterized by the much more weighty 
word “Machtwechsel” (change of power).
I.
Historical-political language is revealing; in this case, it reveals the surprising 
inability of many contemporaries to grasp the historical magnitude of the events 
they have lived through. Historians experience this time and again: being a con-
temporary is anything but a source of historical understanding. On the other hand, 
the use of appropriate terminology is a means for comprehension. I thus consid-
er the term “revolution” more appropriate for describing epochal upheaval. I 
venture to state this, even though each of the modern revolutions—in England in 
1688, in North America in 1776, in France in 1789, in many European states in 
1848–49, in Russia in 1917 as well as in Germany and Austria in 1918–19—had 
their own particular causes and followed different courses.
Historiography and sociology have provided many definitions and interpreta-
tions regarding the phenomenon of modern revolutions. Formal criteria are deci-
sive in this context, not fuzzy political or ethical assessments that make revolution 
a dream for some and a nightmare for others. Part of the formal characteristics of 
a historical-sociological definition of revolution is the interruption of political and 
social development, including the destruction of the existing political and consti-
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tutional system—in this sense revolutions are always “illegal.” This is so because 
they question the legitimacy of the existing state and call for a new legality to re-
place it. Successful revolutions then face the problem of gaining the respect of the 
population for the newly created order by making it seem legitimate, and the order 
of the ancien régime illegitimate. This is usually a long-term process, the success 
of which ultimately also depends on the economic performance of new policies 
designed to improve the material situation of the population.
In addition to these medium- and long-term components of successful revolu-
tions, the immediate victory is a change of the political system and culture. This 
also always entails a change of elites, although this change does not necessarily 
have to be absolute; indeed, a new revolutionary ruling elite can contain members 
of earlier functional elites. Examples during the French Revolution of 1789 in-
clude Count Mirabeau or the former bishop Talleyrand. If a change of system and 
elites does not occur, as for instance in the case of the revolutions in the states of 
the German Confederacy in 1848–49, the revolution does not have an immediate 
success. Nonetheless, such revolutions may have medium- or long-term repercus-
sions. For example, despite the lack of success in 1848–49, the essential topics 
and goals of the constitutional debates of the German Paulskirche constitutional 
assembly in Frankfurt remained on the agenda of German politics, and it did not 
even take a generation for them to be realized by Bismarck in 1871, albeit not by 
means of a revolution.
Usually revolutions consist of or are at least connected to prolonged, both 
temporally and procedurally, transformation processes, since social structural 
change cannot be implemented in single, individual actions. This is already clear 
by the fact that revolutionary eruptions are preceded by ongoing crises of vary-
ing lengths. Usually the exchange of political elites also takes place unevenly; 
only rarely does the first tier of revolutionary elites remain in power permanently. 
While the statement, the revolution “devours its own children,”1 need not be un-
derstood in a literal or murderous sense, in general it is accurate.
The question thus arises whether a revolution must necessarily be violent or 
require victims. While revolutionary systemic changes are often violent, this is not 
always the case. There were different patterns even between the various “revolu-
tions” in Eastern and East Central Europe that occurred from 1989 to 1991, seen 
for instance in the different courses taken by the revolutions in the GDR and in 
Romania.
It is more difficult to define content. For instance, is a fundamental change of 
the economic order characteristic of revolutions, as suggested by Marxist rev-
olutionary theory? The answer is no, since this was neither the case during the 
American Revolution of 1776, nor during the German Revolution of 1918–19. 
Nonetheless, it is true for the 1989–91 revolutions. And still more difficult is to 
answer the question whether large-scale national revolutions inevitably result in 
1 Georg Büchner, Dantons Tod (1835), act I.
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a fundamental change of the international system. While the rationale behind na-
tional revolutions generally does not aim at this goal, nonetheless revolutions in 
large states almost always exert a lasting influence on international policy. While 
this was not true for the English Revolution of 1688, which was primarily a con-
stitutional revolution in a single country, it was certainly true for the American 
Revolution of 1776 and even more so for the French Revolution, which between 
1789 and 1815 turned the entire European state system of the ancien régime up-
side-down. Also in the case of the Russian October Revolution of 1917 this oc-
curred, although here the effects of this type were more indirect and long-term. 
Also the overthrowing of the communist dictatorships from 1989 proved to be not 
just a chain of national revolutions, but was connected to the end of the Cold War 
and of the bipolarization of the world, thus becoming a fundamental revolution of 
the international system and the postwar world order that had been created from 
1945.
There is much to suggest that the epochal caesura of 1989–91 has changed or 
altered our idea of revolutions in general. This concept will be examined in the 
present article.
The events of 1989–91 have shown contemporaneous historians the degree to 
which errors can be made: one only knows the history of something if one knows 
how it ends. Before 1989, it was not known that communism would fall, that the 
structures of the postwar era would change, that Germany would be reunited—
any statements regarding these topics remained hypothetical. Many errors in the 
assessment of the GDR, not only by politicians and journalists, but also by schol-
ars, stemmed from the fact that they were basing their ideas on an unknown fu-
ture. Many supposed “experts” not only misjudged the true character of the GDR 
regime and its economic weaknesses, they also trusted manipulated statistics and 
ultimately underestimated the discontent of the population. Simultaneously, they 
overestimated the potential for development within the communist dictatorships. 
They thus proved to be poor diagnosticians as well as illusionary prognosticators. 
Today we know that reformist communism never had a chance in Europe. We 
should therefore be cognizant of the fact that we, too, do not know the end of the 
history of which we are the contemporaries.
What conclusions can be drawn from these considerations? Epochal caesuras 
such as the one in 1989–91 change perspectives, not just our perspective of the 
future, but also our perspective of the past. Complex historical structures and sit-
uations are never as univocal as they often appear to contemporaries; their layers 
can be exposed only gradually, with increasing distance and historical experience.
Some well-known examples can demonstrate this: The over-simplistic inter-
pretation of 8 May 1945 as the day of “Liberation”—as celebrated since about 
1985 by politicians, journalists and large segments of the German population—
exhibits a limitation not only in the West-German perspective, but also the Ger-
man viewpoint as a whole. Many Poles consider 27 January 1945 merely the date 
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of the liberation of Auschwitz; only 1989 was the year of liberation for the entire 
country. Thus the end of World War II is not so much put into a different perspec-
tive by the caesura of 1989–91, it becomes a clearer one. For most contemporar-
ies, an adequate historical appraisal and a degree of insight only become possible 
after some time has passed. As is true for the year 1949—the year that the division 
of Germany gained constitutional, albeit not international legal structure—a tele-
ological interpretation would also not do justice to 1989–91.
After 1945, the division of Germany, Europe, and the world deepened increas-
ingly. The longer it lasted, the less an end to the division was considered possible. 
And yet the signs that the world would not remain the same increased during the 
1970s, and still more during the 1980s. Evidence of this can be seen in the fol-
lowing:
-	 The CSCE conferences of the 1970s, with the famous “Basket III” of the Hel-
sinki Final Act of 1975, which put pressure on the Eastern bloc states in the 
area of human and civil rights; the regimes seemed to have underestimated the 
repercussions of these treaties at home.
-	 NATO’s Double-Track Decision in December 1979, which forced the Soviet 
Union to modernize and increase its economic output;
-	 Solidarność in Poland;
-	 Problems with different rising nationalistic interests and increasing pressure 
toward reform in the Soviet Union, leading to Gorbachev’s glasnost and per-
estroika in the mid-1980s: as recognized already by Alexis de Tocqueville, 
the most dangerous moment for a bad system of government is the moment 
reforms are begun.
-	 The dissolution of Yugoslavia, which, in hindsight, began soon after Tito’s 
death in 1980.
History was accelerating. When events piled up in 1989–91, history changed 
its rhythm.
II.
The collapse of the communist dictatorships in Europe did not only end an 
era of totalitarian ideologies in Europe; their demise also demonstrated the failure 
of hopes for the future founded on historico-philosophical concepts, and the col-
lapse of utopian counter-proposals for society and economies. The brief attempts 
to revive Lenin as a focus for communist hopes of salvation after the final 
de-masking of Stalin as a mass-murdering dictator, already begun in 1956 at the 
twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by Khrushchev, 
never had a chance: Lenin was seen as the originator of the Bolshevist system of 




In Western Europe, the weak attempts of self-immunization—attempts to cir-
cumvent the historical experience and to construct an “ideal,” and thus true, so-
cialism to replace the now indefensible “real” socialism—remained limited to 
a few intellectual circles. Such constructions, which reduce the world to a mere 
idea, are indeed unshakable; there are simply some premises that will always suit 
theory, but never work in practice.
III.
Since 1989–91 it is once again possible to compare, in an unbiased manner, 
the communist and National Socialist dictatorships, as well as the common ele-
ments in these regimes’ totalitarian rule. As a by-product of the Cold War, for 
more than two decades a comparative analysis of totalitarian rule was dismissed 
by the majority of historians and political scientists working in their respective 
fields, as well as large sections of the general public. Comparing dictatorships 
was considered “right wing,” but it is unclear why this was so. Today, compari-
sons are even made by those who, before 1989, considered the mere question of 
whether there were any similarities objectionable.
Stalin, who, like Mussolini, gained power in 1922, and Hitler, who achieved 
it in 1933, are now recognized as the twentieth century’s two poles of personified 
inhumanity. This is based on the terrorist techniques of their rule, their unscrupu-
lousness, the degree and atrociousness of their crimes, and finally their striving for 
hegemony charged with ideological fanaticism and personality cults. Flanked by 
these two figures, the states of Central and Eastern Europe were crushed. Indeed, 
the comparison still stands, despite the differences between Stalin’s cautious for-
eign policy and Hitler’s “all or nothing” mentality, which became apparent when 
National Socialist Germany broke the Hitler-Stalin Pact in June 1941 by attacking 
the Soviet Union and waging an unprecedented war of ideological and racist anni-
hilation to eradicate Bolshevism and subjugate the entire country to gain so-called 
Lebensraum, space to live, in Eastern Europe.
The comparison also does not weaken in view of the fact that the two dicta-
torships exhibited antithetic and hostile ideologies, or that their respective crimes 
were different regarding motives and victims. These facts do not cancel the anal-
ogy of dictatorial rule and their historical reciprocity. Of course, these insights do 
not allow their acts to be relativized in an ethical sense or allowed an apologia in 
the political sense. Neither dictatorship justifies the other, despite their compli-
cated interconnection: cooperating for a period of time but then mortal enemies. 
Rather, there are two levels of reasoning.
Comparing these has repeatedly led to controversy. By relying on reciprocal cau-
sality and the respective specific conditions of the genesis periods, a comparative 
interpretation proceeds historiographically: it “historicizes” its object of inquiry. 
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For political–moral reasons stemming from the present, the opposing position fears 
historicizing comparisons of this sort, falsely believing that they equalize the two 
sides and thus, (in some way) are hazardous for the national educational narrative: 
they are not interested in historical “understanding” (although this in no way means 
exculpation), classification, and analysis. In contrast, the critics of comparison con-
sider it necessary to continually invocate Germany’s Nazi past to prevent a “sup-
pression” of the past in the collective consciousness of the present—which would of 
course not only be politically problematic, but morally reprehensible.
Naturally, suppression is the antipode of any historiographical examination of 
the past, inasmuch there is no debate. It is just as irrefutable that in the Federal 
Republic of Germany democracy was developed as a learning process focusing on 
the past. Maintaining an awareness of its historical legacy has stabilized democ-
racy in Germany, immunized it against nationalism, and eased the Federal Repub-
lic’s European path. However, this has simultaneously required the much herald-
ed— yet oft ridiculed and nevertheless fundamental—anti-totalitarian consensus 
of all the democratic parties of the early Federal Republic. Still, the following 
holds true: while historiography provides insights that must be used for political 
education today, this form of learning is always an indirect process. In a way, it is 
a by-product. Like all forms of scholarly enquiry, historiography must focus on its 
subject—which lies in the past and not in the present.
Once again it becomes clear that the struggle between totalitarian dictator-
ships and liberal democracies upholding the rule of law, which characterized the 
twentieth century in Europe, was not decided in 1945, but only in 1989–91. With 
regard to contemporary history, this enhances our understanding decisively. How-
ever, as part of this new understanding, Germany must transcend its egocentrism. 
The problem of historical legacy has a different meaning for Germany than for 
its neighbors. To be more exact: The Germans have to deal responsibly with the 
experience of two, albeit different, dictatorships during the twentieth century.
The neighboring states that, until 1945, were victims of Nazi Germany then 
lived for the next forty-five years—that is, for a generation and a half—in a collec-
tive state of presuming their innocence with regard to their own postwar history. 
Their democracy and rule of law will also remain wanting if they do not face their 
own history objectively. I do not refer here only to acts toward German minorities, 
but also to the consequences of the communist dictatorships in the areas of domes-
tic, social, moral and economic policy. The fact that these other questions remain 
open is, for instance, demonstrated by the ever recurring discussions about the 
Beneš decrees in the Czech Republic. All in all, mass expulsions, including those 
of the Germans, have been recognized as a trait of the twentieth century. Even if 
their historical consequences have been overcome, they remain a historical topic 
that is repeatedly revived. But it will not be endlessly possible to divide up history 




Thus, since 1989–91 the different national pasts have become relevant again, 
sometimes in an intensified form. The collapse of communism has also made it 
possible to properly analyze its historical assessment and its role in Europe and the 
world, not only because many sources have become accessible, but also because 
we know how it ended. Le passé d’une illusion (The Passing of an Illusion) is the 
fitting title of a book published in 1995 by the great French historian François 
Furet,2 who himself changed from being a communist to being a liberal after the 
Soviet repression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. Furet could only write 
this work about twentieth century communism after its collapse and after seeing 
the devastation it caused. This is also true of The Black Book of Communism, 
edited by Stéphane Courtois, which, despite some shortcomings, has its merits.3 
It is indicative that, while such publications enjoyed great success in Germany, 
comparable works of this sort were not written there.
IV.
Until 1989, the division of Germany seemed to be a clear consequence of the 
barbarism spread by the Nazi dictatorship across Europe, its defeat in World War 
II, as well as the subsequent ideological partition of the world into spheres of 
influence. The fundamental opposition during the twentieth century between 
democracy and despotism seemed to be firmly installed on German soil. The 
fissure went right through the nation itself; Germany’s central position in Europe 
was dissolved into a bisection and its resulting Western and Eastern integration. 
The two constituent states ended all German Sonderwege—the German “special 
path” that had struck dread into its European neighbors—through their integration 
into the opposing blocs.
The historians who had prematurely tossed the concept of nation and nation 
state onto the ash heap of history were shown the opposite by the ethnic conflicts 
of the 1980s, and then by the events following 1989. Although the reunified Ger-
many has not restored the traditional nation state due to its being embedded in 
Europe, it is also not a post-nation state, something we became accustomed to 
during the period of two German states. Obviously this question requires deeper 
consideration.
The suppression of the right to self-determination for dozens of different peo-
ples for seventy years by Bolshevik rule in the Soviet Union was obviously in-
capable of permanently suppressing these various nationalities. In the Balkans, a 
2 François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
3 Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek and 
Jean-Louis Margolin, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
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situation surprisingly analogous to the period just before World War I returned. 
Two states emerged from the territory of former Czechoslovakia. And efforts to 
achieve autonomy are also still being observed in Western democracies, some-
times even as forms of terrorism such as in the Spanish Basque Country.
Obviously most of the diverse models tested in the twentieth century to solve 
nationality problems have failed: This is true for historically developed forms of 
organization such as the multiethnic Habsburg Monarchy, for new political forma-
tions such as the multiethnic state of Czechoslovakia in the inter-war period and 
after 1945, as well as for the Versailles system since 1919. It is just as true for the 
Soviet repression of peoples and countries—in which internationalist socialism 
sometimes combined with Russian imperialism—as for the racist Lebensraum 
politics of the Nazi regime, with its enslavement of entire peoples. Obviously 
since the 1980s we are seeing a situation of re-nationalization, especially within 
the Soviet Union as well as its successor and former satellite states.
V.
We have reached the point where we should move from discussing the mixture 
between problems of the past and those of the present and future, as treated above, 
and instead to examine the main concrete results of the caesura of 1989–91.
Can the domestic and foreign policy of the peoples and new states that liberated 
themselves from the Soviet grip and communist domination be discerned? While 
the national movements since the nineteenth century usually involved a symbio-
sis of national emancipation, increasing constitutionalization, parliamentarization 
and finally democratization of government, thus connecting nation building with 
modernization, today this type of symbiosis is evident in only some of the former 
Eastern bloc states and Soviet republics. National emancipation from Soviet hege-
mony did not necessarily bring about equal rights for minorities. The restoration 
of the smaller states did not inevitably entail a thorough democratization, which 
has been a general weakness of many newly established states, as for instance Be-
larus or Ukraine, or solve the complex problems in the Caucasus region, of which 
Chechnya is only the best-known example. In this context, it is unclear whether 
smaller minorities possess the necessary energy to achieve viable statehood.
In other words: Large regions are far from being consolidated. The destabili-
zation of domestic and foreign policy caused by the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union generated developments that have not yet been concluded.
In contrast, the democratization of state and society has progressed much 
more decisively in the East Central European states that are not a part of the 
CIS, although former communists in reform-socialist successor parties have tak-
en political office surprisingly often. Paradoxically, they have usually striven to 
implement a free market and thus, an anti-socialist economic system. As have 
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the Germans, they have discovered that cleaning up forty-five years of debris 
will take at least a generation. Indeed, during communist rule many states did not 
even manage to clear away all of the damage of the war. The continued activity of 
persons involved in the final reformist phases of individual communist regimes 
has not necessarily meant that they have continued their political aims through 
other means. Hungary and, in a complex manner, Poland are examples of this. 
In contrast, the first years of newly independent Slovakia under Vladimír Mečiar 
present a counterexample. In any case, just as in Germany after the war, the suc-
cessful setting up of a democracy takes time: The Weimar Republic offers a pre-
monitory example of just how complicated it is to combine systemic change with 
fast solutions to fundamental problems, and this together with a difficult legacy. 
The effects of the transformations accompanying the 1989–91 path from dicta-
torship to democracy are also quite clear, and not just in the area of the economy, 
where liberalization has led to profound social consequences. The introduction 
of democracy was awaited with great expectations by the people, expectations 
that often could not be fulfilled, or fulfilled fast enough. And the replacement of 
political elites was neither dependable nor frictionless. Changing collective men-
talities takes decades at least. In these countries, a democratic political culture 
still needs time to develop.
VI.
In the 1980s, opposing tendencies regarding international cooperation could 
be observed in the West and East. In the East, the forced collaboration under 
Soviet hegemony began to revert to re-nationalization and disintegration, a pro-
cess that accelerated from 1990. In the West, however, the trend was toward in-
ternationalization and (West-)European integration, as had been initially estab-
lished in the ECSC and the Rome Treaties of the 1950s.
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, a number of East Central European 
states sought closer connections to the West. This was manifest by the accession 
to NATO by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, as well as later 
further enlargements, resulting in the current 28 members and 25 security partner-
ships. The NATO-Russia Council was created in 1997 as a permanent consultation 
forum, despite setbacks such as the Russia-Georgia War and the debate about 
the deployment of US missile defense in Poland. This security forum is indeed 
remarkable if compared to the Cold War and the confrontation between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact. Today NATO is the only remaining military alliance left 
in Europe. Its main power, the United States, has become the only world power, 
although this has been weakened by the war in Iraq, the long-term US military 




The role of NATO has changed. It is no longer the purely defensive alliance it 
was when founded in 1949 and which it remained for more than forty years. Tak-
ing part, from 1994, in UN combat operations in the former Yugoslavia involved 
security duties that were not provoked by an attack on one of NATO’s members In 
this context, the involvement of the German military has also been based on fun-
damental changes: during the first Iraq War in January–February 1991, the mere 
thought of military participation by the recently reunified Germany met fierce 
internal opposition.
VII.
The caesura of 1989–91 was not just a sea change in the area of security pol-
icy, but also in the areas of economy and financial policy, as well as for human 
rights and national self-determination.
The reunification of Germany did not only result in a fundamental change for 
its constellation of domestic and foreign policies. The reunification process ex-
pressed an almost revolutionary solution to the German Question” a debate that 
had led to military conflict through the centuries. The reunification in 1989–90 
used only peaceful and diplomatic means; it did not take place in opposition to 
neighboring states, but rather sought their agreement (even if this was sometimes 
quite difficult). Thus, it occurred within a European context. It was one of the 
most outstanding achievements of Euro-Atlantic politics and, especially, of for-
mer Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. For a long time in European history, a unit-
ed Germany did not traumatize its neighbors: reunification was not achieved only 
on the German stage, but on the European and world stage, with decisive support 
from the United States.
The remaining open questions of 1945 regarding international law and power 
structures were conclusively resolved. I will name only a few examples: the peace 
treaty which had been lacking between 1945 and 1990 was achieved in the Two 
Plus Four Agreement; the international recognition of the Oder-Neisse border was 
ratified in 1990; and the withdrawal of Soviet/Russian troops from Germany as 
well as its Eastern neighbors was regulated. 
This process opened up a number of possibilities for the future, not only for 
the Germans, but also for the former states of the Warsaw Pact. The principles 
of popular sovereignty, national internal and external independence, as well as 
human and civil rights were now not merely acknowledged abstractly, but imple-
mented in practice. The end of the division of Germany, of Europe, and the world 
hastened the European Monetary Union, which had been planned from the end of 
the 1980s. The Union was now backed by the debates concerning German reunifi-
cation and European integration, and was particularly supported by Helmut Kohl 
and François Mitterrand. There is no question that the ratified measures were es-
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sential steps toward European integration, including the step-by-step introduction 
of the Euro from 1998, the accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden to the union, 
as well as the 1985 Schengen Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, and finally the 
above-mentioned Eastern Enlargement of the European Union in 2004.
In this process, Austria has served as a link to Central and South-Eastern Eu-
rope due to its Habsburg tradition, elements of which, while part of the distant 
past, have proven recoverable. But there are questions that remain open. For ex-
ample, notwithstanding the Lisbon Treaty, which provided a constitutional basis 
for the European Union, can its 27 member states (2012) function together, de-
spite their wide political, economic and cultural differences? And how well will 
the monetary union function if national budget policies in the Euro zone do not 
follow the required guidelines?
Conclusion
The epochal changes of 1989–91 clearly led toward a globalization of the 
financial markets and the world economy. The consequences of this cannot yet 
be fathomed. In any case, the jolt of the recent global financial crisis has once 
again demonstrated the degree to which national economic policy is losing its 
influence. Also unclear is how these changes have affected the self-perception of 
democratic societies, since they no longer define themselves in opposition to 
dictatorships. Rather, they will have to reflect more on their own fundamental 
values.
The European coordination of its various governments’ foreign policies is still 
wanting, a need that in recent years has even increased. Once again, this shows 
that even the traditional core states of the European Union, between one another, 
no longer have roles that are defined as clearly as they were during the Cold War. 
This also involves new efforts needed for defining the European role of Germa-
ny. Undoubtedly, this transformation process also holds risks to political stability. 
Here, the fatal experiences of the interwar period can serve as a warning: at that 
time, the unsuccessful transformations of the political systems in most of the in-
dividual states in Europe led to the destruction of many recently founded democ-
racies.
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1989: AMBIVALENT REVOLUTIONS  
WITH DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS  
AND CONSEQUENCES
Revolutionary actors and events—revolutionary effects and results
To begin this volume, Andrei Grachev focuses on one of the most influential 
figures in history of the revolutionary events in 1989 in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE): Mikhail Gorbachev. Although he was an ambivalent revolutionary, 
he tried to bring the “old thinking” to an end and made the emergence of “new 
thinkers” possible. One year after his taking power, an evolution of “new think-
ing” started—also as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe. His revolutionary 
foreign policy produced not only revolutionary events, but also the successful 
“Velvet Revolutions” in the CEE countries. In addition, it changed the system of 
international relations. Grachev raises the question of whether this “unusual pol-
itician” was “a dilettante statesman, an idealist, or a visionary.” To a certain ex-
tent, all of these descriptions may be accurate. Indeed, Gorbachev’s policy was 
based on a well-calculated intention of replacing the old balance of power with 
a new one. This was to be achieved through strengthening international organi-
zations and gradual transferring national sovereignty to the United Nations. While 
Gorbachev was not able to transform all former enemies into new partners during 
his seven years in power, Grachev underlines the positive results of the revolu-
tionary policies he introduced. First, Gorbachev left behind a more or less peace-
fully dismantled totalitarian system and a new Russia in the international arena. 
Although Gorbachev did not encourage the opening of the Iron Curtain, he tol-
erated it and agreed with Germany’s unification after the country’s more than 
forty years of division. Also, his name is connected with a disarmament process 
that slowed down and ultimately stopped the arms race. Grachev argues that 
Gorbachev’s “new political thinking” was not so different than George H.W. 
Bush’s vision of an emerging “new world order.” If Grachev is correct in his 
belief that Gorbachev also contributed to globalization, this would give him the 
status of a world revolutionary such as Lenin or Stalin. In any case, it seems clear 
that he created highly controversial new realities due to the ambivalence of his 
policies. When conflicts of interest arose, including his own political survival, he 
changed positions and chose principles. During Gorbachev’s time in power, it 
was not possible for the concept of “new political thinking” to be successful 
because the structural realities in Soviet Russia were too strong. Nonetheless, his 
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ideas were highly relevant. They enabled revolutionary processes to begin that 
were peaceful and non-violent.
Klaus Bachmann analyzes the situation in Poland before and after 1989. He 
argues that the round table talks and June elections of 1989 constituted milestones 
in Poland’s shift to democratic structures and rule. But bargaining had already 
started months before the round table was established. The Catholic Church was 
also involved in these talks from the very beginning. While the “self-limiting 
revolution” had been put to an end by Jaruzelski’s introduction of martial law 
in December 1981—without legal basis and violating human rights—in the end, 
de-legalizing and prohibiting the Solidarity trade union was counterproductive: it 
led to a well-organized clandestine underground movement developing, a move-
ment that, due to its decentralization, was more difficult to control than the public 
dissent activities that had taken place earlier. 
Bachmann also examines the international environment, the various disputes 
concerning the causes and reasons for Poland’s transition, the key actors and their 
goals, internal constraints and external influences, and short-term as well as long-
term consequences. 
While Poland served as an icebreaker with regard to the ensuing revolutionary 
events—especially those in Hungary, but also in East Germany—the road to the 
first free elections in the still Soviet bloc country was long and stony. Bachmann 
makes it clear that several influential pre-revolutionary events took place in Po-
land in the decades before 1981. Revolution and transition were two sides of the 
same coin; they must be seen as a single entity. Although the Polish revolution 
was spontaneous, peaceful and successful, the ensuing transition was negotiat-
ed and contained contradictions, failures, paradoxes and setbacks. To better un-
derstand these events, Bachmann recommends examining archives in Moscow, 
Washington, Bonn, Paris and London. A comparative approach of this sort will not 
only provide more details, but also a general overview.
Andreas Oplatka describes the process of events in Hungary, a process that had 
begun with the country’s defeat in 1956. In the second half of the 1980s, compro-
mises were found and in 1989, a political transition was achieved through a nego-
tiated revolution. In response, János Kádár stepped down and the Soviet leader-
ship remained silent. Gorbachev assured Prime Minister Németh on 3 March 1989 
that there would be “no new 1956” as long as he was in power. The Kremlin also 
agreed to negotiations concerning the withdrawal of troops from Hungary, and in 
November 1989 removed nuclear warheads from Hungarian soil. Moscow did not 
protest the rehabilitation of Hungarian revolutionaries, the round table talks, or 
Hungary’s decision to eradicate the Iron Curtain and open its western border for 
East German refugees. While he opposed the introduction of a multiparty system 
in Hungary, Gorbachev did not take any measures to hinder it. 
Oplatka raises several critical questions that have long remained unanswered: 
Who were the main actors in the political changes of 1989? Who fought at the 
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front line—reform-communists or dissidents and the opposition? Was it a revolu-
tion, an evolution or a transformation? Was there public pressure or did the popu-
lation remain passive? The author reflects upon whether the notion of “revolution 
from above” would be more appropriate when describing the Hungarian events 
of 1989. He remains unable to answer the question of when the Hungarian com-
munists recognized that giving up socialism and transforming the economy into 
a Western-style democratic market system had become unavoidable. There are 
indications that the coming changes were visible in the second half of the 1980s, 
at the latest at the beginning of 1989, when opposition groups and critical intellec-
tuals began to be more active. Since the 1970s, the majority of the population as 
well as the opposition had accepted Kádár’s “goulash communism.” While free-
dom remained restricted, living conditions, albeit modest, were satisfactory. In the 
second half of the 1980s the economy declined, which changed the public opinion 
and delegitimized the communist rulers. A large majority of the population began 
to desire that the system be replaced. The opposition succeeded in mobilizing the 
masses, which took part in demonstrations and campaigned political issues such 
as the role of the Hungarian minority in Romania or the rehabilitation of the 1956 
Hungarian revolution.
Peter Vámos compares the perceptions, reactions and consequences of the rev-
olutionary events in Central and Eastern Europe, the Chinese student opposition 
movement, and the Tiananmen Square “incident” in Beijing. According to this 
author, 1989 was not only a critical moment with regard to political developments 
in China, but was also a turning point for Sino–East European relations. In the 
1980s, China and the CEE socialist states faced similar problems, and comparable 
reform processes had been begun in both regions. Their parallel structures can 
serve as a point of reference. While these reforms contributed to a process of nor-
malizing relations, in the end they led to totally different political results: the CEE 
countries experienced peaceful and bloodless revolutions, while protest move-
ments in China were violently suppressed. The developments in China strength-
ened the anti-socialist movements in the CEE countries, while the developments 
in CEE states alarmed the Chinese communist leaders. In the end the Chinese gov-
ernment took brutal action against organized opposition groups in its country. The 
bloodless events in the CEE states were also a result of the bloody developments 
in China. In China, the harsh oppression of the student rally in Tiananmen Square 
prevented a revolution from below and also influenced a policy of reforms from 
above. But as a consequence of the political changes in the CEE states, Sino–East 
European bilateral relations collapsed. 
After the bloody events of 4 June 1989, in order to regain acceptance and legit-
imacy for the still existing totalitarian system, the Chinese communist government 
proposed a political offensive of reform policies. This began with a three-year pol-
icy of opening to the world, after which a reform process could start. In the early 
1990s, the Chinese communist regime achieved economic growth, reestablished 
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its relations abroad, strengthened its influence worldwide, and was able to control 
inflation tendencies. Since the 1990s, China has experienced unprecedented eco-
nomic growth and become the world’s second largest economy. 
Hans Hermann Hertle describes the East German developments in the period 
between the “October Revolution” and the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 Novem-
ber 1989. To better understand these revolutionary events, Hertle refers to Pierre 
Bourdieu and his analysis of the effect of the media on historical events, whereby 
historical acts and structures are juxtaposed in order to find causalities and mo-
ments of interaction. The official opening of the Hungarian-Austrian border for 
East German refugees on 11 September is seen by Hertle, in the sense of Bour-
dieu, as a “critical event,” as is the decisive Monday demonstration in Leipzig on 
9 October, which saw tens of thousands of protesters and was the starting point 
and symbol of the East Germans’ “October Revolution.” The reporting on TV of 
these events enhanced the effect of both. Hungary’s “hole in the wall” (Oplatka) 
demonstrated the weakness and loss of power of the SED regime. As the exodus 
grew, protests in the GDR against the government exploded. 
Since 1961 the Berlin Wall had guaranteed the existence of the GDR. The 
opening of the border and the fall of the Wall were not planned by the SED lead-
ers. According to Hertle, these revolutionary events were caused largely by the 
media, which also changed their course. In the three weeks after 9 November, 
the number of demonstrations did not decrease. The result was the involuntary 
self-dissolution of the GDR’s political system. Hertle also describes the irony of 
the fact that the SED leaders had realized the state’s bankruptcy already weeks 
before the revolution had begun and that, without West Germany’s help, the GDR 
would not survive. Indeed, the East German communist politicians were ahead 
of their own people. Hertle considers it a tragedy that the opposition dreamed of 
a new socialist GDR without knowing the details of its debts and deficits, while 
the majority of the population claimed the right of self-determination and Ger-
many’s unity. Many civil rights activists marginalized themselves because of this 
contradiction. It was important for ordinary East Germans that the West German 
chancellor Helmut Kohl advocated German reunification. But the main reason for 
the success of the revolutionary events was Gorbachev’s policy of wait and see. 
If he had ordered a military intervention, this would have contradicted his “new 
thinking.” This was something Honecker ignored. He had not learned the lesson 
that Brezhnev had taught him in 1970: that the GDR could not exist without the 
power and support of the USSR.
Jiří Suk investigates Czechoslovakia before and after 1989, whereby he an-
alyzes the background of this crucial year as well as the results and changes it 
brought. The most critical moment until that time for the Czechoslovak commu-
nist system had been the “Prague Spring” in 1968, during which a “palace revolu-
tion” changed into a reform movement aimed at creating “socialism with a human 
face.” A number of previously suppressed civil rights groups formed a new civic 
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society, whereby they gained full freedom of speech, openly criticized the terror 
of the 1950s, and delegitimized the communist party. The intervention of the War-
saw Pact put an end to this reform movement, and no Prague summer followed. 
The resulting dictatorship led to a political, mental and moral depression in 
Czechoslovakia. In the 1970s, more than 500,000 members were expelled from 
the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and persecuted. The economy was marked 
by constant shortages of consumer goods. By the second half of the 1980s, the 
oppressive system could not compete economically with the Western capitalist 
system, nor could it convince its own people of its legitimacy. 
The violent suppression of a peaceful student demonstration on 17 November 
1989 by police forces in Prague provoked resistance and strikes the next day by 
artists and intellectuals. Opposition movements and parties were organized. The 
Adamec government launched discussions with the opposition, but the conces-
sions it offered had come too late. On 10 December, a new federal government 
was appointed and Gustáv Husák resigned as state president. The former dissident 
Václáv Havel became the new elected president. However, his nomination caused 
problems with the Slovaks, who wanted Alexander Dubček as president, since he 
was a political symbol of 1968. 
In Czechoslovakia a double revolution took place: a Czech one and a Slovaki-
an one. Both revolutions took place within a specific national framework and thus, 
they must be seen as weakened, half revolutions that led to the nation’s division. A 
small and temporary compromise was reached by Dubček being elected chairman 
of the Federal Assembly. But a later round table resulted in a division of power 
that involved political fragmentation and conflicts. A fight against the communist 
past began, but attempts at creating a “Czech road to capitalism” as a way to solve 
the chaotic political structures failed. 
Slovakia, guided by Vladmir Mečiar’s national-populist coalition, separated 
from the Czech Republic, which was represented by a center-right coalition head-
ed by Václáv Klaus. The “Velvet Revolution” changed the communist regimes 
into democratically elected governments in both Prague and Bratislava. The na-
tional separation into the Czech and Slovak Republics was decided by the political 
leaders of both sides.
With regard to Yugoslavia, Florian Bieber and Armina Galijaš argue that 
here a revolution did not occur. When Josip Broz Tito, president for life since 
1963, died in 1980, the country’s leadership was passed to an eight-member ro-
tating presidency filled by representatives of Yugoslavia’s six republics and two 
autonomous provinces. During the 1980s, demonstrations and protests had started 
against Belgrade, but they were also directed against the republics and provinces. 
The main cause of dissatisfaction was the worsening economic situation, growing 
unemployment, decreasing living standards, and exploding inflation. 
The two authors show that the failed revolution in Yugoslavia must be seen in 
a global context and from the viewpoint of the changed international arena. The 
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coming to power of Gorbachev, the beginning of perestroika and glasnost, as well 
as the end of the Cold War in Europe contributed to Yugoslavia losing its strategic 
position and political significance. The period of distancing itself from both blocs 
and representing the neutral and non-aligned states, which Yugoslavia had done 
since 1961, was over in the early 1990s. 
In the late 1980s, the focus of Western diplomatic circles and political observ-
ers as well as the media was concentrated on the CEE states. When the Yugoslav 
federal republic began to collapse, the leaders of the various republics tried to 
establish new coalitions and alliances with other countries: Slovenia and Croatia 
leaned toward Austria and Western Europe, whereas Serbia tried to get support 
from the USSR. Although external relations had little impact on the domestic de-
velopments, some people thought the dissolution of Yugoslavia was the result of 
foreign players. In the summer of 1991, the situation escalated. The United States 
and, to some extent, the European Community initially backed a democratic and 
unified Yugoslavia. But from the domestic perspective there was no central leader 
who could establish such a course (with the exception perhaps of Prime Minister 
Ante Marković). The CEE countries were occupied with their own issues and the 
Western European countries and the United States remained passive observers, 
showing no willingness to intervene. 
In the 1980s, Yugoslavia lacked a strong bond with the USSR, and its ear-
lier close links with the communist CEE members had also weakened. But the 
changing international environment did not have as much impact on Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution as its domestic financial problems; the economic crisis led to problems 
of legitimacy for the communist rule. The system was unable to reform itself or 
address economic underdevelopment and regional inequalities. Furthermore, once 
the war-time generation of communists began to pass away in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, political loyalties toward Belgrade became less enthusiastic and the 
federal structures weakened. National grievances and demands for political and 
economic reforms were directed toward the republics and not the federal state. 
Political opposition and pluralism emerged within the republics and also between 
the leaderships of the various republics. However, the transition from single party 
rule to a multiparty system was different from republic to republic. Each sought 
the choice of becoming autonomous, which led to separation. Cultural, ethnic 
and religious conflicts contributed to the resulting civil war, which saw ethnical 
cleansing, persecutions and mass murder. It was a process that destroyed any pro-
ductive effects and constructive options that the revolutionary events of the late 
1980s had brought.
Ulf Brunnbauer analyzes the end of the communist system in Bulgaria, which 
was also the product of a legitimacy crisis: economic problems and the alienation 
of Bulgaria’s youth and labor forces played an important role. In the late 1980s, 
the socialist party started to reduce its visibility in order to extract itself from pub-
lic criticism. Already in the summer of 1987 it gave more maneuvering room to 
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state authorities and enterprises. It increased the autonomy of companies, allowed 
more self-management of workers, and supported decentralization. These mea-
sures were designed to reduce the alienation of workers and increase their will to 
push productivity. But the reforms came too late; since the party did not give up 
its power, in the end its reforms were unsuccessful. Many planned reforms were 
not implemented and those of decentralization were later revoked. Attempts at the 
beginning of 1989 at economic liberalization were not realized. 
Brunnbauer describes the “Bulgarian pseudo-perestroika,” which involved 
growing administrative chaos and a regime that was unable to organize any suc-
cessful political changes. Its reform measures had no real chance of implemen-
tation because the population reacted hesitantly and skeptically. Resignation and 
doubt were so strong that only a small minority were interested in taking part in 
the reform programs. Bulgaria’s society had disintegrated to such a degree that la-
bor discipline decreased still further and labor turnover increased more and more. 
Since doubts were larger than hopes, people withdrew into their private lives. 
The First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Todor Zhivkov even stated 
that the population had lost confidence in the party and that no one wished to get 
involved in the proclaimed political changes.
According to Brunnbauer, Bulgaria experienced “a half-baked reform” which 
exposed the self-created deficits of the system. The new party slogans “individual 
initiative,” “self-management,” “rule of law,” “democracy,” and “human rights” 
made the weaknesses of the system more obvious than ever and revealed the fail-
ings of the old and long-used communist propaganda. Although democracy and a 
market economy were propagated, increasing the expectations of the citizens, the 
communist party maintained its power. Thus, public disappointment became still 
higher, undermining the party’s leading role. Brunnbauer argues that at the end 
of the 1980s, the question was no longer whether communist rule would end, but 
when and how. Its weak performance and the breakdown of the economy led to 
the political collapse. The conclusion seems clear: In Bulgaria a revolution did not 
arise from below, but was due to the failed reforms from above.
Anneli Ute Gabanyi focuses on Romania’s “incomplete and unfinished rev-
olution.” She starts and ends with the collective memories of earlier uprisings. 
She also describes the attempts of restructuring in the Soviet bloc, the impact 
on Romania of the world economic crises, its loss of Western support and the 
emergence of domestic opposition. Gabanyi also offers a chronology of the rev-
olutionary events and the details of the Romanian “revolution.” The popular up-
rising against Ceauşescu cost many lives: over 1,000 civilians, officers and army 
conscripts were killed and over 4,000 persons injured. Still many more died after 
22 December, when Ceauşescu was taken out of Bucharest and arrested. Gabanyi 
informs the reader that the vast majority of Romanians today believe these later 
victims died in vain, since the anti-communist people’s uprising had been “stolen” 
or “diverted.” 
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The still unclear background of the violent events following the capture of 
Ceauşescu continues to influence the state’s course of political, social and eco-
nomic transformation until today. Gabanyi argues that those who seized power 
after December 1989 did everything they could to prevent the investigation, pros-
ecution and condemnation of those who were responsible for the bloody events. 
Thousands of people were investigated, but most were released or pardoned. 
A group of people around Ion Iliescu seized power in a military coup d’état 
following a popular uprising in Timişoara. They stayed in power for a long time. 
According to Gabanyi, although some of them were responsible for the blood-
shed, they escaped conviction. Representatives of the victims put pressure on the 
new government to prosecute those responsible, but the judiciary, acting on po-
litical orders, delayed prosecution in the cases of high-level functionaries. Doc-
uments were confiscated, such as the files on the Ceauşescu trial, were destroyed 
or forged, or are still being held by military or civilian prosecutors’ offices. 
Gabanyi argues that to a greater degree than the other CEE revolutions, the 
Romanian revolution was supported by electronic media and Western radio sta-
tions broadcasting to Romania, above all Radio Free Europe, which was very 
popular. This contributed to an anti-regime mobilization that delegitimized 
Ceauşescu’s position and popularized regime dissidents from the 1980s. When 
the broadcasting time of local radios and TV stations was reduced, listeners and 
viewers turned to the radio and TV stations of the Soviet Union and other neigh-
boring communist countries like Hungary. Soon after the departure of Ceauşes-
cu from Bucharest, the national television station took over the role of Western 
broadcasting. Gabanyi speaks of a “tele-revolution,” which in the end seems to 
have been a mixture of a popular uprising and a coup d’état. Thus, the events in 
Bulgaria can also be understood as an incomplete revolution.
Karsten Brüggemann describes the revolutions in the Soviet Union’s Baltic 
republics, which when compared to the above “revolutions” in the CEE countries 
had a different profile and style. The Baltic “singing revolution” can be charac-
terized by an extraordinarily high degree of youth engagement. Decisive was a 
collective consciousness of the past (such as memories of the secret protocol of 
the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 and the Soviet occupation in 1940) as well as the 
existence of a kind of independent Baltic culture. This youth engagement grew 
into a mass movement in the streets that was visible by all. For some time the 
new Soviet leadership hesitated to intervene militarily, since this would have 
risked violating its new image. Nonetheless Lithuania’s declaration of indepen-
dence on 11 Mach 1990 provoked negative feelings in Moscow. Also the West-
ern powers were less than euphoric, fearing the destabilization of Gorbachev’s 
position. But while the Baltic revolutionary changes were initially peaceful, they 
escalated into bloody confrontations in January 1991 when Soviet leaders decid-




The erosion process of the USSR seems to have started in Poland at the be-
ginning of the 1980s, moving on to Hungary and the GDR, but the collapse of 
the Soviet Union was not only caused by the economic and political decline of 
these countries. The mass demonstrations in the Soviet republics of Estonia, Lat-
via and Lithuania constituted a new dimension; they were a decisive threat for 
the Soviet empire’s cohesion. The Baltic states changed from being annexed and 
controlled districts at the empire’s periphery into being a subversive and separatist 
region. But they should not be seen as unique cases. Their claim for emancipation 
and independence from the USSR in 1988–89 not only demonstrated the lack of 
attractiveness of socialism, it was also an expression of Russian “imperial over-
stretch.” According to Estonian social scientists, the “singing revolution” reached 
“mythological” dimensions in 1988 and reached an “ideological point” in 1989, 
a first phase that made historical rebirth possible and produced euphoria and op-
timism about the political future. These societal-ideological changes of 1988–89 
preceded the actual political changes, which took place in 1991 parallel to the 
dissolution of the USSR.
International context, external influences, perceptions and reactions
Norman M. Naimark sheds light on the role of the superpowers in the events 
in the CEE states. While the British prime minister and the French state president 
wanted the USSR to prevent Germany’s unity, the general secretary of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union wanted the Western powers and the German 
chancellor to restrain the Americans from “interfering” in the CEE countries, 
although according to Naimark this was “pretty much the last thing on Washing-
ton’s mind.” The main concern of the US administration and George H.W. Bush 
was maintaining Gorbachev’s reform policies as well as the political status quo 
in Europe. 
The wait-and-see attitude of the superpowers continued even when the CEE 
countries and the East Germans claimed their self-determination. When Hunga-
ry pulled down its barriers to Austria, enabling East Germans to escape to West 
Germany, Moscow treated this as an affair that only concerned Hungary, the GDR 
and the FRG. When Polish communists made a power sharing deal with Solidar-
ity, round table discussions that contributed to the erosion of communism, this 
happened without Soviet interference. Neither Moscow nor Washington stopped 
Kohl’s moves toward German unification. In his summary, Naimark speaks of the 
“self-induced paralysis of the superpowers.” This helped East German protesters 
and West German political decision makers bring the postwar order in Germany 
to an end.
Concerning the outcome of the revolutionary events, Naimark considers Gor-
bachev’s role a decisive one. In the second half of the 1980s, his assurances that 
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the CEE countries could make their own decisions supported the resulting politi-
cal changes. Perestroika encouraged the opposition movements to articulate their 
claims. While it seems that Gorbachev did not have a policy concerning Germany, 
he nonetheless opposed the old “conservative” foreign policies such as the Brezh-
nev Doctrine. Due to various special interests, the superpowers kept an observer 
position and did not interfere. Naimark reflects that the congratulations they gave 
themselves about “1989” were “mostly about what they did not do rather than 
what they did.”
Ella Zadorozhnyuk examines the causes and effects of the Soviet Union’s pol-
icy with regard to the revolutions of 1989–90. According to this author, at the end 
of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the events in the USSR and in the so-
called satellite countries were reciprocal. She argues that the interaction between 
these events was causal; one event was often the consequence of another. When 
Gorbachev’s reform policies were announced, people in the CEE countries started 
to consider comparable options, including alternatives to single-party structures. 
In turn, these political reactions affected Soviet Union policy. The revolution-
ary tendencies in the CEE countries stimulated by perestroika led to questions 
also being raised about the one-party structure in the USSR. Many of the CEE 
countries’ political options were adopted in the USSR. In the end, the process of 
transformation in the socialist states also occurred in the USSR, resulting in its 
dissolution in 1991.
Philip Zelikow, the US foreign policy and security advisor during the George 
W.H. Bush administration, discusses the strategic planning of the United States 
during this period. Discussing “the generation of 1988,” including Ronald Rea-
gan, George Shultz, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Margaret Thatcher, despite hav-
ing some differences, together with other experts they believed the Cold War had 
ended in 1988. This makes sense if one takes the INF Treaty and the START talks 
into account. Zelikow relates a chronology that began with European arms control 
agenda in 1987–88, a period of transition from June to November 1989, and a 
phase of rapid changes from November 1989 to November 1990.When in De-
cember 1989 President George W. H. Bush assured the Europeans that US troops 
would remain in Europe as long as their presence was desired, he also frankly as-
serted that the United States would remain “a European power.” Europe’s leaders 
had nothing against such reassurances. 
The outcome was improved relations with the USSR and China, as well as the 
United Nations Security Council organizing international solidarity against the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The positive developments in Europe during 1989/90 
influenced Bush’s dealing with Saddam Hussein in 1991. In the end, US diploma-
cy reached goals that were more than President Truman’s containment doctrine 
had been able to achieve after 1947 and better than the Bush administration had 
expected: Russian influence in Europe was contained, US influence in Europe 
increased, and NATO stood at the border of the Russian Federation.
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Alexander von Plato begins by discussing international politics until Decem-
ber 1989, continues by examining the policy of non-military interference, turns to 
Gorbachev’s vacillating reactions, and concludes by describing the various Euro-
pean reactions to German reunification. Thatcher rejected reunification with the 
argument that it could threaten Gorbachev’s position. Mitterrand reacted differ-
ently: he feared that reunification would weaken the process of European integra-
tion and thus encouraged a monetary union that absorbed the Deutschmark. 
At the February 1990 Open Skies conference in Ottawa, the international con-
ditions for reunification were presented. The fact that they were excluded from 
these negotiations angered the Italian and Dutch foreign ministers: the conference 
only involved the four victorious powers of World War II and the two German 
states. The Two Plus Four Agreement was signed on 12 September 1990. Von Pla-
to argues that the role of Baltic republics has been underestimated by scholars. In 
Politburo protocols, the Lithuanian Question was on the agenda more often than 
the German Question. After German unification, all of the CEE countries desired 
safeguards against the Soviet Union and Germany. Only NATO, with its new ca-
pacities, seemed to protect them from these perceived dangers. The transatlantic 
alliance remained the main factor of the United States in Europe. Mitterrand ex-
pressed hopes that European integration would reduce the influence of the United 
States and Russia in Europe, especially with regard to military questions. But the 
CEE governments thought NATO offered them a guarantee of security. 
Gorbachev’s road toward German unity can be divided into three steps: 1) the 
retrospective approval of opening the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989; 2) his 
consent, expressed in January–February 1990, with the two Germanys’ right for 
self-determination regarding possible unification; 3) his acquiescence in May–
July 1990 with Germany’s right for self-determination regarding a free choice 
of alliances. Wolfgang Mueller argues that the Soviet leader made each of these 
decisions separately, a procedure that made each step easier to accept and, thus, 
influenced a final outcome that at the beginning had hardly been thinkable. He 
demonstrates that the Soviet leadership communicated acceptance of the German 
right of self-determination with regard to German unification ten days earlier than 
hitherto thought, namely on 20 January 1990, in a conversation between the Sovi-
et and the East German foreign ministers.
Klaus Larres presents Margaret Thatcher’s attitude toward Germany. He first 
describes her experiences as a child during World War II and then turns to the 
growing lack of support for her policies in 1989–90. Here, the author focuses 
on British public opinion and the houses of parliament, the four powers, and the 
beginning of the end for the GDR. Larres raises the question of whether Downing 
Street and the Foreign Office pursued two different foreign policies. The prime 
minister had become unpopular in her own country because of the imposition of 
community taxes. In addition, the Ridley affair and the leakage of the Chequers 
seminar in March 1990 damaged her image. As consequence of an internal party 
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coup in November 1990, Thatcher had to give up her leadership of the conserva-
tives and leave her prime minister office. Her strict opposition to Germany’s uni-
fication and European integration further contributed to her downfall. Thatcher’s 
conservative, immobile and narrow-minded policies concerning Germany and 
Europe also weakened the international position of Britain. The end of her career 
can be seen as a political tragedy: the anti-German Thatcher became a victim of 
Germany and its unification. Two months later she lost her power entirely. After 
retiring she attacked her successors from time to time and never forgave her party 
for its unceremonious farewell. 
Georges Saunier focuses on the post-Yalta era and its different phases: the re-
emergence of the German Question (from summer 1988 to autumn 1989); the at-
tempts to keep the consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall under control (from 
November 1989 to January 1990); the period of unification negotiations (from 
January to October 1990); and the debates concerning a new European balance 
after autumn 1990. 
From the summer of 1989, French politicians realized that the GDR system 
was eroding, but they still believed in an evolutionary development with a mid-
term perspective. In talks in Latche on 4 January 1990, Mitterrand heard from 
Kohl that German unification would be a process taking years. 
Paris decided that Bonn should not pursue a unification policy alone; the EC 
should play an important role and the process should be “Europeanized.” Elisa-
beth Guigou, advisor to Mitterrand, emphasized the need of linking unification 
with the deepening of European integration. It would allow immediate issues to 
be settled, but would also launch a new integration phase. According to Saunier, 
the 1990 Charter of Paris was a “détente treaty” that paved the way for disarma-
ment in a unified Europe. In view of future transatlantic relations, Paris considered 
NATO stability necessary in this period of European transition and thus, that Ger-
many should remain part of NATO. The evolution of NATO was a key element 
in the 1990 negotiations, with US policy aiming at its expansion. This was some-
thing France had opposed in former times and thus Paris was confronted with a 
dilemma. But due to the circumstances, France had to favor the revitalization of 
NATO. French policy therefore tried to introduce a reference to a future European 
defense structure within the formal framework of the alliance, although the Ger-
man unification treaties did not contain any clauses providing such structures. In 
1990 it was too early for such concepts. The Quai d’Orsay had to accept that the 
other European partners were against any plans of this kind. Therefore NATO’s 
development remained undecided. Mitterrand’s policy followed a clear line that 
combined his own projects. Unified Germany was to be part of a unified Europe 
that was based on international agreements and organizations.
Antonio Varsori shows that Italy’s political elite and diplomats understood the 
importance of the events in the CEE countries. They backed the reunification of 
Germany, but wanted to prevent a German superpower that was no longer interest-
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ed in its traditional relations with his European partners. Rome’s primary foreign 
policy goal was to implement the integration process from both a political and an 
economic perspective. The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was 
an additional goal, but involved dangers because of Italy’s weak economy. 
After 1990 Rome felt itself compelled to pay more attention to the Yugosla-
vian crisis than to the events in the CEE states. In order to avoid a large flow of 
immigrants, between 1989 and 1991 Italy tried to prevent Yugoslavia’s breakup, 
although this policy was not popular in the general public opinion. Independent 
of Giulio Andreotti’s reservations against German reunification, Varsori makes 
it clear that in the Two Plus Four negotiations, Italy was, against its will, only a 
“minor actor.” Through Europe’s integration, Italian politicians tried to influence 
the decisions being made, but due to the country’s weak economy these attempts 
were limited. 
Italy signed the Treaty of Maastricht on February 1992. Soon after this the 
Andreotti government resigned and the entire Italian political system collapsed. 
Its power of almost forty-five years had also come as a result of the Cold War. 
When the East-West conflict came to an end in Europe, the “clean hands” policy 
caused an implosion of Italy’s political system. Despite the CEE socialist regimes’ 
loss of power, the Italian Communist Party became the Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra (PDS) and survived.
Arnold Suppan presents a survey of the relations between Austria and its 
neighbors in the CEE states and the Balkans from the signing of the Austrian State 
Treaty in 1955 until the end of the Cold War. He points out that Austrian public 
opinion—especially in Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland—was divided: liv-
ing next to Iron Curtain produced an “island-of-the-blessed” mentality, but at the 
same time Austrian had joined the Western European trajectory towards prosperi-
ty, consumerism and a “leisure-class society.” Nevertheless, due to Austria’s geo-
political situation between the blocs, the foreign ministers Karl Gruber, Leopold 
Figl and Bruno Kreisky insisted on an active “good neighbor policy” towards the 
adjacent communist states Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and from 
the 1970s also toward Poland, the GDR and Bulgaria. But the bloody suppres-
sion of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the “Prague Spring” in 1968 forced 
concrete reactions; the Austrian government as well the public helped hundred 
thousands of refugees from these two countries. From 1952, relations with Tito’s 
Yugoslavia improved and from the 1960s became relatively close due to Yugoslav 
“guest-workers” coming to Austrian and increased tourism on the Adriatic coast. 
Even the minority question in Carinthia did not disturb the excellent contacts 
between Vienna and Belgrade. Astonishingly, Poland’s Solidarity movement re-
ceived little support from the Association of Austrian Trade Unions or Chancellor 
Kreisky, despite the fact that a new wave of political refugees arrived in Austria. 
But the election of the Cracow archbishop, Karol Wojtyła, as pope in the fall of 
1978 was supported by Vienna’s archbishop Franz König. 
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Thus, in the mid-1980s, the Austrian capital of Vienna was a “Western” city 
surrounded by Soviet “Eastern” Europe. For Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, 
Romanian, Bulgarian, Serb, Croat and Slovene intellectuals, Vienna stood for 
“Central Europe” (Mitteleuropa), an imagined community of cosmopolitan civili-
ty that Europeans had somehow mislaid in the course of the century. Nevertheless, 
a great majority of the Austrian people, including the intellectuals, did not really 
recognize what was going on in the late 1980s in its neighborhood. They did not 
see the significance of the new nationalism movements in Serbia (from 1986), 
in Slovenia (from 1988) and in Croatia (from 1989), the increasing conflicts in 
Kosovo, and the fractures within the Union of the Yugoslav communists (in Janu-
ary 1990). They were also not aware of how important the reform processes with-
in the Hungarian communist leadership (from 1987) had become, including the 
resignation of Kádár in 1988 and the opening of the Iron Curtain, first in Decem-
ber 1988 for Hungarians, in August 1989 for some six-hundred East Germans at 
the Austro-Hungarian “border picnic,” and then at midnight on 10–11 September 
for tens of thousands East German vacationers fleeing to West Germany. There is 
no doubt today that this mass exodus was the starting point of the disintegration of 
the communist regimes in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Immediately after 
the “Velvet Revolution” in Prague, Austria also opened its border to Czechoslo-
vakia. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Austria’s role at the periphery of the West 
was suddenly transformed into a position in the center of Europe. 
Michael Gehler shows that Austria responded early and positively to the re-
form efforts in the CEE countries. Its strongest sympathies were for the changes 
in Hungary. In contrast, the rapid end of East Germany was not expected and had 
an entirely different impact, with the positive climate shifting quickly. Diplomats 
at the Ballhausplatz did not follow the changes in East Germany merely by wait-
ing and sitting still, but with a sense of urgency and concern; the end of the SED 
regime was perceived with surprise and mixed feelings. While the reaction of 
Austrian chancellor Franz Vranitzky toward a reform-oriented GDR was positive, 
his foreign minister Alois Mock backed Bonn’s policy of a quick solution to the 
German Question in the sense of unification. The differing positions were also 
due to different approaches toward Brussels. Mock’s course focused on accession 
to the EC, whereby he relied on the support of West Germany. Vranitzky moved 
more cautiously with regard to Austria’s EC membership. While Vranitzky’s at-
titude toward the CEE states was based on state decisions and the status quo, 
Mock was oriented toward humanitarian and cultural aspects, despite his being 
an anti-communist hardliner. Vienna was accurate in its assessment of the inter-
dependence and mutual interaction between glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet 
Union and the changes in the CEE countries, recognizing early Gorbachev’s key 
role in the reform processes and the further opening of the CEE countries. That 
is why the stability of Gorbachev’s government was seen as a top priority. In this 
regard, Austria’s foreign policy was parallel to that of the Western powers. The 
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reform movements in the CEE countries were see realistically, with the differenc-
es between the pioneering role of Poland and Hungary and the slower political 
changes in Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania being evaluat-
ed reliably. The perception of the latter developments ranged from skepticism to 
disapproval. The CSCE-succession process in Vienna (1986–89) offered an im-
portant stabilizing and conciliatory framework into which the dramatic upheavals 
could be placed. The key way that Austria intervened politically in the course of 
the events just before the fall of the Berlin Wall was through the symbolic cutting 
of the Iron Curtain and the assistance and support it gave to fleeing East German 
citizens. The Austro-Hungarian prologue in the summer of 1989 was decisive for 
the extreme speed the developments in Germany took that autumn. 
The aftermath and consequences
Dieter Segert analyzes the societal transformations in CEE states after 1989 
and their preconditions. Despite changing political and economic conditions, “a 
great deal of continuity” still exists. The CEE societies were seen as backward 
societies on the periphery of the West that were trying to gain the richer and more 
successful social order of their Western neighbors. State socialism is characterized 
by Segert as having been an attempt to modernize these backward societies. But 
he has no doubt that the starting point of political breakdown was the deep on-
going crisis of state socialism from the mid-1970s. The systemic changes of 1989 
took place because elements of capitalism had silently been placed into the fold 
of state socialism. Following 1989, economic output declined significantly, espe-
cially in industrial manufacturing. Segert calls this development a “transformation 
recession.” Ensuing reforms also contributed to production decreases. The social 
consequences of these political changes were a rise in consumer prices and infla-
tion, as was experienced for example in the successor states of former Yugoslavia 
and of the Soviet Union. The size of the working population dropped dramatical-
ly as well, which has resulted in rising social inequality. In most CEE countries, 
political participation in the first few elections after 1989 was high, but later this 
engagement declined and election turnouts decreased remarkably. Also social 
time changed fundamentally in the CEE countries. After 1989 the pace of life 
began to move faster and faster, with living conditions for the individual becom-
ing more intense and less predictable. A radical restructuring of the welfare state 
occurred, with health care and pension systems massively changed. It has become 
clear that the process of economic adaptation and integration of the new member 
states into the EU will take much longer than was originally expected. With regard 
to political stability, the new member states differ from the older ones. Since 1989 
voter unpredictability has grown, becoming even more widespread than in the 
“old” Western democracies.
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Liliana Deyanova explores the different ways and different waves of how 1989 
and communism have since been remembered in Bulgaria, a country where re-
formed communists managed to stay in power after 1989. Whereas the two main 
political groups in the country have tried to make their specific interpretations of 
1989 universal by marginalizing the memories of the other, their readings have not 
remained unchanged, as a review of party media coverage in 1990, 1999, 2004 and 
2009 reveals. What was celebrated by communists in 1990 as starting point for great 
reforms was later criticized by them as beginning of capitalism. Anti-communists 
were and remained skeptical about the success of 1989 in Bulgaria but used the 
occasions to denounce the crimes of communism. The division of memory regards 
not only 1989, but also September 1944, an anti-fascist revolution for some, a coup 
d’état mounted with Soviet help for anti-communists. Deyanova makes it clear that 
the “common places of memory” are not necessarily “places of common memory.” 
She believes, however, that many of the incidents being interpreted as “nostalgia for 
communism” do not, in fact, reveal a real desire for communism to return but rather 
indicate what Jean-François Lyotard has called “nostalgia for nostalgia.”
Mikhail Prozumenshchikov shows that the revolutions of 1989 also caused 
an “archival revolution” in the USSR, with documents becoming accessible that 
enable new revelations about contemporary history. Studying history with these 
open archives makes it possible to discover secrets that were hidden for a long 
time behind a “double Iron Curtain,” first of the country and second behind the 
party secrecy. These secrets were not only hidden from the outside world, but also 
from the USSR’s own citizens.
Stanley R. Sloan focuses on NATO’s expansion from the American perspective. 
First he examines the setting for NATO enlargement, then discusses the emerging 
candidates for NATO membership, the process from partnership to membership 
and cooperation that has prepared the ground for enlargement, and in conclusion, 
the consequences of this expansion. Sloan considers NATO enlargement a success 
story. A small enlargement around 1999 was followed by a second bigger one in 
2004, which represented a geopolitical and geostrategic revolution in the CEE 
states. Germany was the key European architect of the first round, followed by 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The decision in favor of a major “big 
bang” enlargement was made when the leaders of the NATO member states met in 
Prague in November 2002. During the administration of George W. Bush, in 2004 
seven additional countries became members of NATO: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. In 2009 Albania and Croatia joined 
the alliance. Macedonia remains invited but still stands outside because of its dif-
ferences with Greece over the country’s official name. Ukraine and Georgia are 
still waiting, Serbia remains defiant and other states have the status of “partners” 
of various kinds. The question of NATO membership of Europe’s non-aligned and 
neutral countries, like Austria, Finland and Sweden (which became members of 
the EU in 1995), is still open. 
Michael Gehler
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According to Sloan, NATO enlargement was “successful” because it brought 
new democracies into the Euro-Atlantic partnership. But he concedes that the 
process has left a number of unanswered questions concerning the future of Eu-
ropean security with regard to relations with Russia. Sloan draws our attention 
to the point that Russian officials have used NATO’s expansion toward the east 
as justification for its own foreign and domestic policies. The NATO and EU 
enlargement processes have caused a double revolution: they have stimulated 
first a new consciousness of European security and secondly the democratization 
of former Soviet bloc states and republics. Joining NATO has been followed by 
active EU integration: as former Warsaw Pact members have joined the alliance, 
they have become strong supporters of the transatlantic community within the 
EU. NATO-enlargement has troubled but not destroyed relations with Russia. 
In this context, Sloan refutes that NATO enlargement has led to a “new Cold 
War.” Sloan argues that political developments in Russia that are unconnected 
to NATO’s enlargement process have turned out to be far more important to its 
relations with Europe than the acceptance of former Warsaw Pact allies and the 
Baltic republics by the transatlantic alliance. Moreover NATO functions as a 
framework for coordinating responses to the defense and security needs of its 
new members.
John O’Brennan analyzes the EU’s enlargement. In general, enlargement “has 
been a central and quasi-permanent element in the EU’s history,” an accurate 
statement of Desmond Dinan. Enlargement to the east was accompanied with 
rather hesitant and grudging responses by the old members. O’Brennan continues 
by focusing on the external and internal enlargement “canon” within EU studies, 
the economic and geopolitical dimensions, as well as theoretical approaches to 
EU enlargement. The first round of new members—UK, Denmark and Ireland (in 
1973)—had hardly been assimilated when the second round followed and Greece 
(in 1981) and Spain and Portugal (in 1986) joined the community. Following the 
absorption of the old GDR (in 1990), the third round was negotiated quickly, with 
Austria, Finland and Sweden joining (in 1995), this causing nearly no problems. 
EU enlargement continued in 2004, with EFTA states and the “return to Europe” 
(“big bang” enlargement) of ten CEE countries, which was combined with their 
peaceful transitions. 
O’Brennan makes it clear that there was and is an ongoing process of unfin-
ished enlargement, with accessions of new member states taking place although 
the assimilation of older members remains non-consolidated. But the enlargement 
to the east has differed significantly from previous rounds in terms of size, scale 
and diversity. 
1989 was also a starting point for changes in the West, especially for the trans-
formation of the EC into the EU, with the events of this year contributing to a 
revolution within the old European Community. The Maastricht Union Treaty was 
an outcome of 1989 as well as a response to the unification of Germany. 
1989: Ambivalent Revolutions with Different Backgrounds and Consequences
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The EU’s eastern enlargement has been connected with democratization, Eu-
ropeanization and modernization. But following the initial political changes, eu-
phoria and idealism disappeared and disappointment and a new realism took their 
place. This was a consequence of expectations that were too high, as well as the 
challenges of inner-state and inter-state supra-national negotiations. With regard 
to new candidates from the Western Balkans, the controversies and struggles con-
cerning widening the EU are back on the political agenda.
The establishment of new institutional structures shows that there has been 
successful adaptation of existing EU modes of decision making, but the process 
has remained partial and incomplete in both a geographic and normative sense. 
The democratic shortcomings of the CEE countries and of the EU itself have 
made it difficult to progress more quickly. The EU was and is confronted with a 
double challenge: on one hand being a welfare boosting entity and on the other, a 
global geopolitical power. It has not been possible to reach both goals at the same 
time, which has led to the failure of consolidating the gains of the “1989 moment.” 
O’Brennan concludes with the critical yet reflective remarks: 
The EU may be bureaucratically cumbersome and politically enigmatic, but in supervising a 
framework for the renewal of meaningful pan-European interstate cooperation, not to mention 
the reconstitution of the democratic impulse across the continent, it may have contributed in 
some small way to making 1989 at least as important a historical juncture as 1789 and 1848 in 
the rich tapestry of the European collective experience.
Michael Gehler
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1975 
August 1: At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, leaders of 35 countries—
all the European countries except for Albania, plus the United States and Canada—sign the 
Helsinki Accords, in which European frontiers are declared inviolable and key principles con-
cerning human rights, security, and cooperation are agreed upon.
October 1: Treaty of Osimo between Italy and Yugoslavia: final agreement on the issue of Trieste 
through the bilateral recognition of the previous zone boundaries as state boundaries (Zone A 
to Italy, Zone B to Yugoslavia); bilateral assurances of minority rights.
1976 
February 24: Under the leadership of General Secretay Leonid I. Brezhnev, the 25th Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) takes place in Moscow; 103 delegations 
from 96 countries take part. 
May 24: The Archbishop of Esztergom, Hungary, László Lékai, is appointed cardinal.
July 18: The “Kiev,” the first Soviet aircraft carrier, passes through the Turkish Straits and joins the 
Soviet Mediterranean fleet.
September 23: After worker uprisings in Warsaw and Łódź, Jacek Kuroń founds the Workers’ De-
fense Committee (KOR).
November 15–17: During an official visit to Belgrade, the general secretary of the CPSU Leonid I. 
Brezhnev and the Soviet foreign minister Andrei A. Gromyko again assure Tito of his right to 
follow his own path to socialism.
December 29: In its new constitution, Albania declares itself a “Socialist People’s Republic.”
1977 
January 1: The Charter 77 Declaration is published in Czechoslovakia. Signed by over 200 citi-
zens (among them Jan Patočka, Jiří Hájek and Václav Havel), it calls on the communist regime 
to honor its commitments to international human rights accords. 
January 6-7: Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Romania regarding 
family reunion of Transylvanian Saxons and Banat Swabians; the FRG agrees to a payment 
per emigrant based on their education; beginnning of 370,000 ethnic Germans emigrating from 
Romania.
May 24: The Archbishop of Prague, František Tomášek, is appointed cardinal.
 After the opening of the Đerdap power plant I on the Danube at the Iron Gate between Yugo-
slavia and Romania in 1972, in 1977 the planning of Đerdap II started.
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September 16: Hungarian and Slovakian prime ministers György Lázár and Lubomír Štrougal sign an 
agreement in Budapest to construct a hydroelectric power plant between Gabčikovo and Nagymaros.
October 4–March 8, 1978: CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade.
1978 
January 6: The Holy Crown of Hungary and other Hungarian coronation regalia, which had been put 
into American hands in Upper Austria in May 1945, are returned by the United States to Hunga-
ry; the Crown of Saint Stephen is later put on display in the Hungarian Parliament.
July 7: China discontinues economic and military aid to Albania.
October 16: The Archbishop of Cracow, Cardinal Karol Wojtyła, the first non-Italian pope to be 
elected since 1522, assumes the papal throne as John Paul II.
1979 
June 2–10: Pope John Paul II takes his first trip to Poland and is received enthusiastically by the 
population.
June 7–10: First direct elections of 410 members to the European Parliament.
June 18: US president Jimmy Carter and CPSU general secretary Brezhnev sign the SALT II arma-
ment control agreement in Vienna.
December 10: The native Albanian Mother Teresa of Calcutta is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
December 12: The NATO Double-Track Decision calls on the USSR to remove its newly deployed 
SS-20 missiles.
December 24: Soviet troops invade Afghanistan; communist rule is restored under Babrak Kar-
mal; President Carter announces sanctions.
1980 
May 4: Death of Marshal Tito in Ljubljana; more than 100 heads of state and government from 
all over the world take part in the state funeral in Belgrade, at their head Brezhnev and US vice 
president Walter Mondale.
July 19: Start of the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow; the United States and 63 other countries 
boycott the games because of the war in Afghanistan.
August 14–31: Strikes in the Gdańsk shipyards in Poland lead to emergence of the independent 
Solidarity labor movement (Solidarność), under the leadership of the worker Lech Wałęsa; the 
movement demands reforms and soon has 10 million members.
November 8: Opening of the 300-kilometer long highway between Prague and Bratislava.
1981 
January 1: Greece joins the European Economic Community (EEC); it is the first time that a larger 
Orthodox population is part of the hitherto largely Catholic-Protestant community.
January 20: Ronald Reagan is inaugurated president of the United States.
March 11: In the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, student protests begin at the University of 
Priština; the protests soon spread to the general Albanian population. Serbian police and army 
take action against striking Albanian miners.
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May 13: The Turkish extremist Ali Agça—possibly supported by Eastern secret services—commits 
an assasination attempt on Pope John Paul II in St. Peter’s Square in Rome and wounds him 
critically. 
May 26: Death of the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński; Bishop Józef Glemp becomes 
his successor.
December 13: Communist Party leader and Prime Minister of Poland General Wojciech Jaru-
zelski imposes martial law and has leading Solidarity activists arrested. In the 1990s, it is re-
vealed that there had been a Warsaw Pact intervention plan, as is presented to a Polish-Russian 
commission.
1982 
January 4: The EEC foreign ministers condemn the imposition of martial law in Poland.
October 1: Constructive vote of no confidence against FRG chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD); 
after the formation of the Christian-Liberal coalition, CDU chairman Helmut Kohl is elected 
by the Bundestag as his successor.
November 10: Death of Brezhnev; his successor as general secretary of the CPSU is KGB chief 
Yurii V. Andropov, who promotes Mikhail S. Gorbachev.
1983 
January 20: In the Bonn Bundestag, President Mitterrand discusses the deployment of US medi-
um-range missiles in Western Europe.
February 4–16: In a letter to Chancellor Kohl, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) State 
Council president Erich Honecker proposes joint support of the Swedish prime minister Olof 
Palme’s initiative to establish a nuclear-free zone in Europe; in the letter of response Kohl 
rejects the Swedish initiative.
March 23: President Reagan denounces the USSR as an “evil empire” and announces the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI), also called the “star wars” program, a space-based missile defense 
system.
June 19: The European Council signs the “Solemn Declaration on European Union” in Stuttgart.
June 16–23: Second visit of the Pope to Poland.
June 29: On the initiative of the Bavarian minister president Franz Josef Strauss (CSU), the West 
German federal government guarantees a loan of one billion DM to the GDR. 
July 4–7: State visit of Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to Moscow.
July 24–27: Private trip of Minister President Strauss to the GDR; meeting with Honecker.
September 15: Honecker receives the governing mayor of West Berlin, Richard von Weizsäcker 
(CDU), in East Berlin.
October 5: The Polish labor leader Wałęsa receives the Nobel Peace Prize.
October 23: Large demonstrations in Western Europe against the deployment of cruise missiles.
November 22: In accordance with the NATO Double-Track Decision of 1979, the German Bundestag 
approves the deployment of new US medium-range missiles, with 286 votes for and 226 against.
1984 
January 20–22: After negotiations with the GDR government agencies, six GDR citizens who had 
requested political asylum at the US embassy in East Berlin are allowed to leave for West Berlin.
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February 11: CPSU general secretary Andropov dies in Moscow; Konstantin U. Chernenko becomes 
his successor.
February 13: Meeting Kohl–Honecker on the sidelines of the funeral of Andropov in Moscow.
April 9: The “Luxembourg Declaration,” regarding the creation of a single European economic area, 
is concluded on the occasion of a joint EC and EFTA ministerial meeting.
May 23: The German Federal Assembly elects Richard von Weizsäcker as president of the FRG by 
a large majority of votes.
May 26: Opening in Romania of Danube–Black Sea Canal, under construction since 1949.
July 25: The chief of the FRG Chancellery announces the approval of a loan of 950 million DM to 
the GDR.
September 22: Mitterrand and Kohl shake hands at the Douaumont cemetery in Verdun.
October 19: Kidnapping and murder of Polish priest Jerzy Popiełuszko by the Polish secret police.
December 31: In 1984 the GDR issued an unusual number of exit permits: 40,900 (in comparison 
1983: 11,300).
1985 
January 7: The French socialist Jacques Delors becomes president of the EC Commission.
January 20: Reagan begins his second term as US president.
March 11: Mikhail S. Gorbachev is named general secretary of the CPSU after the death of 
Konstantin U. Chernenko.
March 18: On the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Evangelical Church in the FRG 
and the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR publish a common “Word for Peace.”
April 23: Convening of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the official launch of the 
policy of perestroika (“restructuring” of the economic and political system).
April 11: Death of the Albanian state and party leader Enver Hoxha.
May 8: On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, the G-7 heads 
of state and government adopt a solemn declaration: “We deplore the division of Europe. With 
our commitment to the ideals of peace, freedom and democracy, we aim through peaceful means 
to break down the barriers that have emerged within Europe.”
May 22: The 30th anniversary summit of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) in Warsaw renews 
the treaty for twenty years.
June 16: At a meeting of the Landsmannschaft Schlesien in Hanover, Chancellor Kohl affirms the 
inviolability of frontiers.
June 29: Eduard Shevardnadze is appointed Soviet foreign minister.
Summer: Protests of Hungarian environmentalists begin against the construction of the Czechoslovak–
Hungarian power plant Gabčikovo-Nagymaros; after years of fierce debates—also between the Bu-
dapest and Prague governments—in the end only the Gabčikovo side is built on Slovakian territory.
July 7: Approximately 100,000 faithful commemorate the 1,100th anniversary of the death of St. 
Methodius in Moravian Velehrad.
August 25: The state of war, which had existed since 1940 between Greece and Albania, is ended; 
Greece waives its claims to Northern Epirus.
October 21–23: At a session of the WPO Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in Sofia, Gor-
bachev discusses the prospects for integration in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), as well as the state of affairs of the international communist movement.
November 21–23: The first Gorbachev–Reagan summit is held in Geneva; they agree in principle 
to a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons. The most important result of the summit, 
however, is the two leaders establishing a personal relationship and discussing common interests 
with regard to abolishing nuclear weapons.
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1986 
January 1: Portugal and Spain join the EEC.
January 15: Gorbachev announces the Program for Comprehensive Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 
by the Year 2000.
February 25–March 6: The 27th Congress of the CPSU takes place.
February 28: Swedish prime minister Olof Palme is murdered in Stockholm by a still unidentified 
assassin; Kohl and Honecker meet at the funeral.
April 26: The Chernobyl nuclear disaster occurs, demonstrating the potential effects of a nuclear 
war to Kremlin leaders and their allies. The incident is made known only by Swedish control 
stations in the West; radioactive clouds drift across Belarus and the Baltic states, and—after a 
change of the wind—over Ukraine, the northern Balkans and as far as Austria.
June 13: The Soviet Poliburo discusses the economic crisis and the need of the communist countries 
to receive loans from the West.
July 1: Gorbachev attends the 10th Congress of the PUWP in Warsaw and meets PUWP leader Wo-
jciech Jaruzelski.
August 19: The Central Committee passes a resolution allowing 20 ministries and the 70 largest 
enterprises of the USSR to establish direct contacts with foreign partners and to create joint 
ventures.
September 11: Greece and Bulgaria conclude a non-aggression pact.
September 24–25: The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts publishes a “Memorandum on the 
current social issues in our country,” triggering sharp protests among Slovene and Croat intellec-
tuals; the “Memorandum” is the ideological basis of Slobodan Milošević’s Greater Serbia plan. 
October 11–13: The second Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik, at which they come close 
to an agreement on abolishing all strategic offensive weapons. However, they fall short of agree-
ing because of Reagan’s insistence on keeping the SDI and Gorbachev’s inability to compromise 
on SDI research and testing.
November 4: Third CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.
November 10–11: At a meeting of the heads of CMEA countries in Moscow, a frank discussion takes 
place about the general economic crisis, failed efforts at integration within the CMEA, and the 
need for serious economic reform.
December 23: Physicist Andrei Sakharov is allowed to return to Moscow from internal exile in Gorky.
1987 
January 6: According to statistics of the GDR Foreign Ministry, 573,000 GDR citizens were given 
permission to visit the FRG in 1986 “due to urgent family matters.”
January 29: The Soviet Politburo discusses the results of a recent conference in Warsaw of Central 
Committee secretaries from communist countries. Members point to the growing pro-Western 
orientation in Eastern Europe.
February 10: The USSR announces that 140 individuals convicted of subversive activities had been 
pardoned.
February 19: Reagan lifts economic sanctions on Poland.
March 5–6: Under the patronage of Minister of State Imre Pozsgay, an international conference of 
historians takes place in Budapest’s Parliament as well as an exhibition on the 300-year history 
of Germans in Hungary. For the first time, documents and photos of the 1945/46 expulsion and 
deportation of Germans from Hungary are shown in public.
March 15: In Budapest, up to 2,000 demonstrators mark the anniversary of the 1848 uprising against 
Habsburg rule and call for more democracy in Hungary.
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March 28: Poland announces price increases of between 10% and 100% on basic foodstuffs, ciga-
rettes, fuel, alcohol, transportation, and postal services.
March 28–April 1: British prime minister Margaret Thatcher visits Moscow. Her critical views 
on Soviet human rights violations and continued military involvement in Afghanistan are given 
full coverage in the Soviet media.
April 9: Gorbachev visits Prague to meet with CPC leader Gustáv Husák.
April 13–16: US secretary of state George Shultz arrives in Moscow to negotiate on arms control. 
He meets Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai I. 
Ryzhkov.
April 14: Turkey applies for EU membership.
April 24: At Kosovo Polje, Slobodan Milošević witnesses a staged fight between Serbian demon-
strators and ethnic Albanian policemen which he then exploits to begin a wave of nationalist 
agitation on television.
May 25: Gorbachev visits Romania and holds a speech explaining the reform process in the Soviet 
Union.
May 28–30: Eluding vaunted Soviet air defenses, West German peace activist Matthias Rust lands 
a small private plane on Moscow’s Red Square. USSR Defense Minister Sergei L. Sokolov is 
fired and replaced by Dmitrii T. Yazov. The chief of Soviet air defenses and other generals are 
also replaced, reportedly as a result of the Rust incident.
June 8: Pope John Paul II visits Poland.
June 12: On the occasion of the 750th anniversary of the founding of Berlin, US president Reagan 
visits Berlin and appeals to Gorbachev: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”
Early summer: Slovenian intellectuals present a national program in the Ljubljana newspaper Nova 
revija and declare sovereignty a necessary condition for a people to become a nation; the rock 
group Laibach provokes the national communists.
June 25: Hungary announces the appointments of Károly Grósz as prime minister.
June 26: The Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists meets in Belgrade to dis-
cuss problems in Kosovo.
July 28: In a speech to the Central Committee Plenum in Sofia, Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov calls 
for a reduction of the Communist Party’s role in the government and the economy.
September 1: Official Visit of Erich Honecker to the FRG: Signing of agreements on cooperation 
in the fields of science and technology, environmental protection and protection against radia-
tion; Honecker visits his hometown Neunkirchen in Saarland.
September 17: Shevardnadze and Shultz agree in principle on the elimination of INF missiles.
October 5: A state of energy emergency is declared in Romania.
October 23: Shultz meets with Gorbachev in Moscow to discuss INF issues.
November 2: At a celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Gorbachev 
denounces Stalin’s legacy, defends perestroika, and announces his intention to seek a strategic 
arms agreement with the United States.
November 11: At Gorbachev’s request, the Moscow Party Committee removes Boris Yeltsin as first 
secretary.
November 15: Several thousand industrial workers riot in Braşov, Romania, over mandated pay 
cuts.
November 15: A general wage freeze and price increases are implemented in Yugoslavia, setting off 
a buying panic that devalues the Yugoslav currency.
December 7–10: At the Washington summit, Reagan and Gorbachev sign the INF treaty, mandat-
ing the removal of 2,611 intermediate-range missilies from Europe.
December 17: Miloš Jakeš succeeds Husák as general secetary of the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party (KSČ).
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1988 
January 11: Kohl releases official figures provided by Honecker for travel in 1987, according to 
which there were 5,062,914 visits from the GDR to the FGR.
January 11: Gorbachev agrees with Jakeš that there is no reason to reassess the events of 1968, including 
the Soviet-led intervention. He adds that the attempt by supporters of the “Prague Spring” to present 
themselves as the “legal heirs of Soviet perestroika is nothing other than an attack on our perestroika.”
February 1: Prices on about half of Polish goods and services are raised by 27%; the price of gas and 
electricity increases by 100% and coal by 200%; thousands protest in Warsaw and Gdańsk. The 
foreign debt of Poland rises to $38.5 billion ($1,030 per capita), that of Hungary to $18 billion 
($1,820 per capita).
February 8: Gorbachev announces on national television a plan to withdraw troops from Afghan-
istan beginning 15 May 1988 and ending 15 February 1989. 
February 11–12: The European Council in Brussels adopts the “Delors Package” concerning refor-
mations of the financing system, including the Common Agricultural Policy and the doubling of 
the structural funds of the EU.
February 29: Bulgaria holds regional and municipal elections that allow more than one candidate 
per position for the first time.
March 10: At a Politburo meeting, Gorbachev announces that the USSR will provide 41 billion 
rubles annual assistance to communist countries and trade partners around the world, including 
27 billion rubles to Cuba.
March 13: Sovetskaya Rossiya publishes the “Nina Andreyeva letter,” which attacks perestroika in 
language borrowed from the speeches of Andrei Zhdanov. The Politburo holds an intense dis-
cussion about the letter as well as about glasnost. A split forms between radical reformers and 
those who are more cautious.
April 14: The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan are signed, calling on the USSR to remove half of its 
forces by 15 August 1988 and the rest by 15 February 1989.
April 25–27: Thousands of Polish workers, including those in the shipyards in Gdańsk, strike with 
the demand for higher wages.
May 20: At the conference of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, General-Secretary János 
Kádár is removed from office and replaced by Károly Grósz. 
May 26: The Evangelical Church of the FGR and the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the 
GDR release a “Joint Statement” on the 50th anniversary of the pogrom against German Jews on 
9 November 1938.
May 27–29: Private trip of Chancellor Kohl to the GDR, where he visits the cities of Erfurt, Gotha, 
Weimar, Dresden, Gera and Saalfeld.
May 29–June 1: The Gorbachev–Reagan summit takes place in Moscow.
May 31–July 18: Arrest of three Slovenian jounalists from the magazine Mladina and a non-com-
missioned officer of the Yugoslav National Army for alleged theft of secret military documents; 
the process conducted in Serbo-Croatian by a military court in Ljubljana provokes fierce 
resistance in the Slovenian general public (“Committee for the Protection of Human Rights”); 
among the sentenced is the later Defense Minister and Prime Minister Janez Janša.
June: Many official and private protests in Hungary as well as in Western Europe against Ceauşes-
cu’s plan to destroy Transylvanian villages.
June 16: A commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the execution of the former Hungarian prime 
minister Imre Nagy and his associates is forcibly broken up by the police.
June 28: In his address to the 19th All-Union Conference of the Communist Party, Gorbachev calls 
for a restructuring of the government and the creation of a strong president chosen by a more 
representative legislature that replaces the Supreme Soviet.
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July 11: Gorbachev visits Poland. At a dinner with the Polish party leadership, he gives a detailed 
description of his “Common European Home” idea.
July 28: Millennial anniversary of the Baptism of Kievan Rus’, celebrations in Moscow, Kiev/Kyiv 
and other cities; many older churches and some monasteries are reopened.
July 30: The Yugoslav government orders an end to the recent demonstrations by minority ethnic Serbs 
in Kosovo, who claim mistreatment by the region’s Albanian ethnic majority.
From early July: Milošević supporters begin mass demonstrations in Novi Sad, using yogurt cups as 
weapons (“Yogurt Revolution”); on 5 October they force the political leadership of Vojvodina to 
resign; the former party leadership in Montenegro is also replaced by Milošević supporters.
August 31: Solidarity leader Wałęsa meets Interior Minister General Czesław Kiszczak; after the meet-
ing he urges to end nationwide strikes.
September 11: In the Soviet Republic of Estonia, 300,000 people demonstrate for independence.
September 14: West German Federal Chancellery chief Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) and the Head of 
Commercial Coordination (CoCo), Alexander Schalk-Golodkowski, agree on new rules for transit 
trade and an increase in the transit fees from 525 million DM a year to 860 million DM. 
September 30: The CC CPSU Plenum implements radical structural and personnel changes in the 
Central Committee: Gorbachev replaces Gromyko as president; Vadim A. Medvedev takes over 
responsibility for ideology and propaganda; Anatolii F. Dobrynin is retired as CC secretary in 
charge of foreign affairs and replaced by Aleksandr S. Yakovlev; Viktor M. Chebrikov is replaced 
by Vladimir A. Kryuchkov as head of the KGB. 
October 24–27: Kohl visits the Soviet Union with a large delegation of business representatives. 
In autumn: In Hungary, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SZDSZ) are formed.
November 8: George H.W. Bush is elected president of the United States.
November: More than 100,000 Albanians in Priština protest against two party leaders being arrested.
November 24: The Central Committee of the Socialist Worker’ Party in Hungary names Miklós 
Németh as head of government, replacing General Secretary Grósz.
December 7: In a landmark speech at the United Nations in New York, Gorbachev announces plans 
to reduce the Soviet military by 500,000 troops and endorses the “common interests of man-
kind” as the basis for Soviet foreign policy. Afterwards, Gorbachev lunches with Reagan and 
president-elect Bush at Governors Island in New York Harbor.
1989 
January 11: The Hungarian Parliament votes to allow freedom of association and assembly.
January 15: A demonstration in Prague commemorates the 20th anniversary of the student protest-sui-
cides following the 1968 invasion. Police break up the protest and arrest demonstrators, among 
them Václav Havel.
January 17: Delors proposes a European Economic Area (EEA) between the EC and EFTA to the 
European Parliament.
January 22: Speaking on ABC television news, Bush’s security adviser Brent Scowcroft states: “I 
think the Cold War is not over.”
January 24: At a Politburo meeting, Gorbachev instructs Yakovlev, the head of the Politburo’s Interna-
tional Commission, to conduct “a situational analysis” of Eastern Europe with think tank scholars.
January 28: Imre Pozsgay, a member of the Hungarian Politburo, calls for the reappraisal of the 1956 
revolt.
Between January and March: Albanian miners strike in Trepča; after the introduction of martial law 
in Kosovo there are numerous deaths in armed clashes; the Albanian-dominated Communist 
Party leadership of Kosovo is removed from office.
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February 6: In an attempt to escape from East Berlin to the West, 20-year-old Chris Gueffroy is 
shot.
February 6: “Roundtable” talks begin between the Polish government and representatives of Soli-
darity as well as the Catholic Church.
February 10–11: The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party agrees to a multi-party system.
February 28: At the inaugural meeting of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Zagreb, the 
historian Franjo Tuđman is elected chairman.
March: The new Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic, a Croatian, attempts as the last reformer 
to hold together the Yugoslav state by means of a market economy and pluralist democracy; the 
foreign debt already amounts to $22 billion ($1,000 per capita).
March 7: Baker receives Shevardnadze at the US ambassadorial residence in Vienna for their first 
private meeting. He tells the Soviet minister: “We really hope that you succeed.”
March 26: Elections take place to the new Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies. Boris N. Yeltsin 
wins the Moscow at large seat with 89% of the vote.
April 5: The Polish government and Solidarity reach an agreement on political and economic re-
forms, including the holding of elections in the summer and the restructuring of the Parliament. 
On 7 April, the government and Solidarity sign roundtable accords.
April 6: In a private meeting in London with Thatcher, Gorbachev denounces Bush’s “pause” as 
“intolerable.” Thatcher urges patience but immediately sends a message to Bush describing 
how upset Gorbachev is.
April 9: Soviet troops kill 20 Georgian demonstrators in the capital city of Tbilisi. In response to 
critics in the Politburo, Gorbachev claims he did not know about the decision to deploy troops, 
blaming it on the Georgian party leadership.
April 12: Ceauşescu announces that his country’s foreign debt has been paid ahead of schedule.
April 25: One thousand Soviet tanks leave Hungary.
May 2: Hungary begins to dismantle the “Iron Curtain” at its border with Austria.
May 8: Milošević is elected by the Serbian Parliament as the new president of Serbia; soon 
thereafter he abolishes the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and begins to mobilize the Serbs 
in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia.
May: Strikes and demonstrations begin in Bulgarian Turkish communities against the campaign of 
Bulgarianisation that had been underway since 1984. 
The “May Declaration” of opposition Slovenian politicians demands an independent Slovenian 
state.
May 11: The CPSU Politburo discusses a proposal by the Politburo commission on the situation in 
the Baltic republics. Gorbachev emphasizes that “force does not help in this business.”
May 15–18: Gorbachev visits China for the first Sino–Soviet summit in 30 years and announces 
the “normalization” of relations.
May 20–21: Bulgarian authorities put an end to protests against the government’s policy of forced 
assimilation. Over 100 ethnic Turks are killed.
May 25–June 9: The new Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies meets for the first time and elects 
Gorbachev as president.
May 31: Bush appeals for “an undivided Europe” in a speech in Mainz.
June 4: Solidarity wins a decisive victory in partially free parliamentary elections. The union 
wins 99 of 100 seats in the Senate and 160 of 161 available seats in the 460-seat Sejm.
June 4: Chinese government troops crush pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 
Bejing with armored vehicles, killing hundreds.
June 13: The Hungarian “Roundtable” talks begin. 
June: At the request of the new Minister of Culture Ferenc Glatz, the government reinstates an eight-
year high school curriculum. Russian is abolished as the first foreign language being taught; 
from the school year 1989/90, English, German, French, Italian and Spanish are also offered.
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June 12–15: State visit of Gorbachev to Bonn. In a joint statement, Kohl and Gorbachev call for 
“understanding, trust and partnership as the basis for neighborly relations and the reconcilia-
tion between peoples.” Also: “War must not be a political means.” 
June 16: Imre Nagy is ceremonially re-interred in Budapest. First public appearance of the student 
functionary Viktor Orbán, who later is to become Hungarian prime minister between 1998 and 
2002, and from 2010.
June 19: START negotiations resume in Geneva.
June 22: The Hungarian CC reorganizes the leadership of the party, creating a four-member Presid-
ium consisting of Grósz, Pozsgay, Németh and Nyers.
June 27: The foreign ministers Gyula Horn and Alois Mock symbolically cut the last remnants of 
the “Iron Curtain” at the Hungarian-Austrian border.
June: Shevardnadze visits Budapest and tells the Hungarian leaders: “Do what you think is best 
to preserve the position of the party.”
June 28: Mass rally of nearly one million Serbs in Kosovo Polje on the occasion of the 600th 
anniversary of the battle against the Ottomans in 1389; Milošević is the keynote speaker.
July: Strikes in the Donbas region with political and financial demands.
July 1: Speaking on Soviet television, Gorbachev warns of ethnic conflict breaking out in the 
USSR.
July 6: Addressing the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Gorbachev states that the USSR will 
not block reforms in Eastern Europe and will promote comprehensive European political and 
economic integration within the framework of a “common European home.”
July 7: In Bucharest, Gorbachev speaks to Warsaw Pact leaders and seems to accept the changes 
in Poland and Hungary. Ceauşescu openly complains about “disunity” within the alliance. The 
member states of the Warsaw Pact revoke the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine limiting the sovereignty 
of socialist states.
July 9–13: Bush is hailed by crowds in Poland and Hungary. However, his cautious speech-
es, designed not to offend the Soviets, are later the subject of criticism. Speaking before the 
Polish Parliament, Bush pledges US$100 million in aid to support the development of private 
enterprise. Bush also meets with Wałęsa in Gdańsk. Meeting privately with Grósz, Nyers and 
Németh in Budapest, Bush tells the party leaders that he does not want to force them to “choose 
between East and West.”
July 19: Jaruzelski is elected president of Poland.
July 22: The Lithuanian Parliament declares the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltics illegal.
August 16: Yakovlev holds a press conference to denounce “unequivocally” the 1939 Nazi-Soviet 
Pact, which led to the annexation of the Baltics. However, he states that the Soviet government 
still considers the Baltics a part of the USSR and will resist any attempt to separate them from 
the Union.
Summer: Due to further Bulgarian repression, over 300,000 Turks leave Bulgaria; Turkey closes 
its boarders temporarily.
July–August: More and more East German citizens traveling on holiday to Poland, the CSSR and 
Hungary flee in a roundabout way to the FRG. The chief of the German Federal Chancellery 
Rudolf Seiters (CDU) appeals to GDR citizens who wish to emigrate not to go through the 
diplomatic missions in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest.
August 19: “Picnic” of the “Pan-European” movement (president: Otto von Habsburg) at the Hun-
garian-Austrian border near Sopron and the joint “border walk”; 661 GDR citizens use the 
opportunity to flee to Austria.
August 21: The Catholic writer and journalist Tadeusz Mazowiecki becomes the first non-commu-
nist Polish prime minister since 1947.
September 8–10: Rukh–the Ukraine nationalist movement–holds its constituent congress in 
Kiev and displays the banned blue-and-yellow flag of independent Ukraine.
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September 10: After ten thousands of East Germans have gathered in Hungarian refugee camps at 
the end of August/beginning of September, the Hungarian government—after negotiating with 
Bonn and Moscow—announces that they will no longer prevent East German citizens from 
crossing Hungary’s border into Austria, a move that eventually makes it possible for 50,000 
East Germans to reach the FRG.
September 22–23: Shevardnadze and Baker meet at the latter’s ranch in Wyoming. They discuss 
START, chemical weapons, regional conflicts, and independence movements in the USSR.
September 23: The Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet makes Azeri the official language of the Republic, 
reasserts sovereignty over Nagorno–Karabakh, and reaffirms Azerbaijan’s right to secession 
from the USSR. 
September 30: After negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin, approximately 7,000 GDR citizens 
who had taken refuge in FRG embassies—more than 6,000 in Prague and more than 800 in 
Warsaw—obtain permission to emigrate by train through the GDR to the FRG.
October 4: The GDR halts free entry into Czechoslovakia.
October 6–7: Honecker’s speech celebrating the 40th anniversary of the GDR: The GDR was to pass 
into the new millenium with confidence because “socialism” belongs to “the future.” Gorbachev 
points out that the profound changes to come would spare no country: “Those who come late are 
punished by life.” Gorbachev later tells aides that Honecker “can’t stay in control” and must go. 
October 6–9: The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party is dissolved and it is decided to establish the 
Hungarian Socialist Party. In the previous weeks the communist workers’ militia and the party 
cells had already been dissolved in the defense and interior ministries.
October 9: Over 70,000 East Germans demonstrate against their government in Leipzig. Local com-
munist leaders refuse to disperse the marchers.
October 12: The Polish government announces new anti-inflation measures and promises the “full 
introduction of market mechanisms and institutions” in 1990–91.
October 17: Honecker is forced to resign both as general secretary and head of state. He is replaced 
by Egon Krenz, the former security chief and the youngest member of the Politburo.
October 21: Between 200,000 and 300,000 East Germans demonstrate against the government in 
Leipzig.
October 23: Hungary adopts a new constitution permitting a multiparty system, scheduling elections 
for 1990 and changing the country’s name to the Republic of Hungary.
October 28: About 10,000 protesters gather in Wenceslas Square in Prague to mark the 71st anni-
versary of the formation of Czechoslovakia. Riot police storm the crowd and arrest 355 dem-
onstrators.
October 30: Founding of the “Democratic Awakening” party by Rainer Eppelmann and Angela 
Merkel.
October 31: Faced with growing economic problems, Krenz authorizes secret meetings with the 
FRG to obtain emergency loans in exchange for specific liberalization of travel between the two 
Germanys.
November 1: Gorbachev meets Krenz at the Kremlin and calls on him to speed up reforms and to 
open borders in order to “avoid an explosion.” 
November 4: A crowd of 500,000 East Germans demonstrates for democracy in East Berlin.
November 6–7: The draft of a new DDR Travel Act as announced by the government is rejected 
by the responsible People’s Chamber Committee; the GDR government under Prime Minister 
Willy Stoph resigns.
November 8: Resignation of the SED Politburo. Hans Modrow, the SED leader in Dresden, is named 
the new premier of the GDR. An overwhelming majority of the German Bundestag speaks out in 
favor of guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse border.
November 9: Following discussions in the new SED Politburo, Günter Schabowski announces at a 
press conference the immediate opening of the East German border: the unexpected fall of the 
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Berlin Wall. Berliners from both sides cross through the eight check points, and begin to chip 
away at the concrete and steel barrier.
November 10: Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party from 1954 and 
president from 1971, is deposed and replaced by Petar Mladenov.
November 11–12: Meeting of the foreign ministers of Italy, Yugoslavia, Austria and Hungary to 
form a “Quadragonale” to enhance economic and political cooperation in the Danube-Adriatic 
region; in May 1990, this group expands into a “Pentagonale” with Czechoslovakia.
November 17: Protests in Prague and Bratislava to commemorate the closing of Czech universi-
ties and colleges by Hitler in November 1939; in Prague demonstrators are beaten by security 
forces; the rumor about the death of a protester triggers further demonstrations, which in the next 
days are joined by many workers and other citizens. 
November 19–21: The Civic Forum is formed in Prague as an umbrella opposition organization. 
In Bratislava, the Public Against Violence movement is formed (VPN). Mass demonstrations 
take place in Prague’s Wenceslas Square. A closed-door meeting is held between Czechoslovak 
Premier Adamec and the leaders of the Civic Forum. Václav Havel later announces that Adamec 
promised not to impose martial law and to investigate charges of brutality by the security forces. 
November 21: Prime Minister Németh has to announce to the Hungarian Parliament that Hungary’s 
foreign debt would amount to 20 billion US$ by the end of the year.
November 24: Jakeš and the rest of the Czechoslovak Politburo and Secretariat resign their party 
posts.
November 27: General strike throughout Czechoslovakia against the power monopoly of the Com-
munist Party.
November 28: In the Bundestag Federal Chancellor Kohl unveils his “10-point plan to overcome 
the division of Germany and Europe”: By means of a contractual community between East 
and West Germany and the establishment of confederal structures, the unification of the two 
German states is to be achieved.
November 30: At a speech in Rome, Gorbachev calls for a “common European home.”
December 1: Serbia imposes a trade embargo on Slovenia.
December 1: Pope John Paul II receives Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his wife Raisa at the Vatican.
December 2–3: The Malta summit takes place. Gorbachev attempts to convince Bush to accept 
his idea of the gradual transformation of Eastern Europe with the close cooperation of the su-
perpowers in order to prevent instability. The US president states that he will not “jump on the 
wall,” but puts pressure on the Soviet leader not to apply force with regard to regional conflicts. 
In the final communiqué, Gorbachev suggests recognizing the importance of common democrat-
ic values rather than Western ideals.
December 3: The East German Politburo resigns, including Krenz.
December 4: Gorbachev meets leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow. Bulgaria is 
represented by Mladenov; Czechoslovakia by Urbánek; East Germany by Krenz and Modrow; 
Hungary by Nyers; Poland by Mazowiecki; Romania by Ceauşescu. They issue a condemnation 
of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, although Ceauşescu refuses to sign. 
December 4: NATO Summit in Brussels. Bush outlines four principles for German unity: 1. The 
Germans’ right to self-determination; 2. the existence of obligations of the FRG to NATO; 3. the 
peaceful and gradual development of the association; 4. the validity of the Helsinki Final Act in 
the question of the German border.
December 5: Visit of West German Foreign Minister Genscher to Moscow: Gorbachev and Shevard-
nadze strictly reject Kohl’s 10-point plan.
December 6: Gorbachev receives Mitterrand in Kiev where they discuss the changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe.
December 7: At a “round table” in East Berlin, with the participation of the five governing parties 
and several new groups, 6 May 1990 is agreed upon as the date for free elections in the GDR.
617Chronology of the Political Events in Central, East and South Europe
December 9: Gregor Gysi replaces Krenz as the GDR’s communist leader.
December 8–9: European Council in Strasbourg: Thatcher and Mitterrand are against German unifi-
cation; only the Spanish socialist prime minister Felipe Gonzáles supports Kohl. Nonetheless, it is 
decided to convene an intergovernmental conference on the creation of an economic and monetary 
union, and to establish a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in London.
December 10: Husák, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 1968 to December 1987 
and president from May 1975, resigns the presidency.
December 11: When at the request of the USSR a meeting between the ambassadors of the four 
former occupying powers takes place for the first time in 18 years in the Allied Control Council 
building in West Berlin, both German governments protest.
December 13: Twenty-four Western nations announce a 1 billion US$ emergency fund to support 
Poland’s economy.
December 15–17: Special Congress of the East CDU, which argues against socialism and for Ger-
man unity; Lothar de Maizière is chairman.
December 15–17: In Timişoara, Hungarians and Romanians defend Pastor László Tökés against the 
Romanian police. Romanian security forces fire on demonstrators. 
December 18: The European Community and the Soviet Union sign a ten-year trade agreement.
December 19: In a speech to the Policy Committee of the European Parliament, Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Shevardnadze clarifies Soviet thoughts on German reunification in seven points.
December 19–20: Modrow and Kohl meet in Dresden and argue for a “contractual arrange-
ment”; demonstrations are held in Dresden for German unity and in East Berlin for the preser-
vation of the GDR.
December 20–22: State visit by Mitterrand to East Berlin: He urges the GDR to respect the existing 
realities and borders, especially those with Poland.
December 21–25: After a speech in Bucharest’s main square, a pro-Ceauşescu demonstration in Bu-
charest turns into an anti-Ceauşescu demonstration. The Romanian dictator flees in a helicopter. 
The National Salvation Front declares itself the new government. The Soviets hail the over-
throw of Ceauşescu as reflecting “the will of the Romanian people.” Provisional Romanian 
leader Ion Iliescu declares himself in favor of reformed socialism. Ceauşescu and his wife Elena 
are executed after a hasty trial before a military tribunal.
December 28: The Czechoslovak Parliament elects Alexander Dubček, the CPC leader since 1968, 
as speaker of the Federal Assembly. 
December 29: The Czechoslovak Parliament elects Havel as Czechoslovakia’s new president.
December 29: The new Bulgarian government under Peter Mladenov recognizes equal rights for all 
Muslims and Turks.
December 1989–January 1990: Anti-government unrest in Shkodra in Northern Albania.
December 31: New Year’s speech by Kohl: Europe should not “end at the Elbe”; “Germany is our 
fatherland—Europe our future!”
1990
January 4: Meeting Kohl–Mitterrand: attempt to win the support of France for German unification 
by connecting such support to the European integration process.
January 17: In front of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, EC Commission president Jacques Delors 
states that East Germany is a special case; if East Germany desires, it should have a place in the EC.
January 22: “Human Chain” across Ukraine.
January 23: After all of their reform proposals are voted down by the Serbian leadership majority, 
Slovenian and Croatian delegates quit the last Congress of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia in Belgrade; the united Party is thereby dissolved.
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January: After the dissolution of the Polish Workers’ Party, Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcero-
wicz begins a drastic economic reform program.
January 28: Due to increased waves of emigration to the FRG, the election date for the GDR 
People’s Chamber is advanced to 18 March.
January 29: US secretary of state James Baker and UK foreign secretary Douglas Hurd agree on a 
six-party mechanism (“Two-plus-Four”) to resolve the external aspects of German unification, 
whereby the two German states and the Four Powers are to have equal rights in their negotia-
tions with each other.
January 31: In his Tutzing speech Genscher calls for “no expansion of NATO’s military structures 
into the territory of the GDR.”
February 1: Modrow presents his concept, “For Germany, united fatherland”: Contract Communi-
ty–Confederacy–Unification. 
February 5–8: In Bonn, Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski stresses the need for Po-
land’s western border to be guaranteed.
February 6: On a flight to Moscow, Baker lands in Shannon, Ireland, where he seeks the approval of 
French foreign minister Roland Dumas for the six-party mechanism.
February 7–9: Baker lobbies for the six-party mechanism in Moscow.
February 10: Gorbachev receives Kohl in Moscow and states: “It is for the Germans to determine 
the timing and the path of their unification.”
February 12–14: “Open Sky” conference in Ottawa: On the sidelines of the conference of 23 
NATO and WPO states, the Two-plus-Four mechanism is decided upon as a framework for 
German unification.
February 15: During a visit to Bonn, Modrow—supported by the GDR “round table”—calls for a 
“solidarity contribution” of 15 billion DM for the GDR; this is rejected by Kohl.
February 24–25: Bush receives Kohl at Camp David: Both agree that Soviet agreement to an 
all-German NATO membership would ultimately be a question of the price.
February 27: The Polish prime minister Mazowiecki demands the initialling of a German–Polish 
border treaty before German unification.
March 2: Kohl links a German–Polish border treaty with the relenquishing of Poland’s demands 
for reparations from Germany, as well as regulations on the rights of the German minority in 
Poland.
March 5–6: Gorbachev receives Modrow in Moscow and requests support in the question of prop-
erty; Gorbachev rejects the NATO membership of a united Germany.
March 8: Resolution of the Bundestag on the western frontier of Poland: “As soon as possible after 
the elections in the GDR, the two freely elected German parliaments and governments [should] 
make a similar declaration” that would uphold the renunciation of German territorial claims.
March 9: During a state visit to Paris, Mazowiecki demands a partial inclusion of Poland into the 
“Two-plus-Four” process; Mitterrand expresses his support in view of Polish security interests.
March 10: Hungarian–Soviet agreement on the removal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary by 
the end of June 1991.
March 14: Two-plus-Four Officials Meeting in Bonn: agreement on limiting the topics to be dealt 
with. The Soviet Union calls for a peace treaty for Germany, which is, however, rejected by the 
other delegations.
March 15: Gorbachev is elected president of the USSR.
March 18: First free elections for the People’s Chamber of the GDR: The Alliance for Germany 
(CDU, DSU, DA) receives 48.1%, SPD 21.8%, the PDS only 16.3%; on 12 April, Lothar de 
Maizière (CDU) is elected prime minister of the GDR.
March 19: Bloody clashes in Tirgu Mureş (Marosvásárhely, Neumarkt) in Transylvania between 
supporters of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania and the Vatra Românească, an ul-
tra-nationalist Romanian grouping.
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March 29–30: Thatcher receives Kohl for talks in Cambridge.
March/June: Lithuania declares its independence; economic blockade by the USSR; Lithuania sus-
pends its declaration of independence and the USSR lifts the blockade.
April: The USSR admits responsibility for the 1940 Katyń massacre against Polish officers.
April 6: Meeting Baker–Shevardnadze; the latter explains that the USSR is still against NATO 
membership for a unified Germany, but that he could imagine solutions other than a neutral 
Germany.
March 25–April 8: The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) wins the first free parliamentary 
elections in Hungary since 1947, gaining more votes than the Free Democrats (SZDSZ), the 
Smallholders’ Party, the Socialist Party and the Young Democrats (FIDESZ); on 23 May, the 
historian József Antall (MDF) becomes the new prime minister of a coalition government with 
the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats.
April 13: Bush and Thatcher meet each other in the Bermudas.
April 20: The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is renamed the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
April 21: EC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Dublin: Adoption of a policy for the integration of East 
Germany into the EC.
April 8–22: In the first free elections in Slovenia since 1927, the non-communist coalition DEMOS 
(Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Peasant Party) wins, ahead of the League of Commu-
nists–Party of Democratic Renewal (ZKS-SDP), the League of Socialist Youth–Liberal Party 
(ZSMS-LS) and the Socialist Federation of the Working People (SZDL); the historian Lojze 
Peterle (Christian Democrat) becomes the new prime minister; the former Communist Party 
leader Milan Kučan is elected the new president of Slovenia.
April 24: Kohl and de Maizière meet each other in Bonn and agree on an economic, monetary and 
social union beginning on 1 July 1990.
April 28: De Maizière and Foreign Minister Markus Meckel (SPD) travel to Moscow. Gorbachev: 
“A united Germany may not be a member of NATO.”
April 28: Summit of the European Council in Dublin: The EC members make a clear commitment 
to German unity.
April 30: Two-plus-Four Officials Meeting in Berlin: the USSR and the GDR are not willing to 
forego discussing military-political issues.
April 22–23/May 6–7: In the first free parliamentary elections in Croatia since 1927, the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) wins, ahead of the League of Communists of Croatia–Party of Demo-
cratic Changes (SKH-SDP), as well as several small parties; the historian Franjo Tuđman (HDZ) 
becomes the new prime minister; by the end of May 1990 he is already president of Croatia.
May 5: Two-plus-Four Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Bonn; it is agreed to discuss the follow-
ing topics: 1. the border issue, 2. political-military issues, 3. Berlin, 4. a final settlement under 
international law. A consensus is reached that a peace treaty will not be concluded and that 
Poland will be invited to the third meeting of foreign ministers.
May 8: Estonia declares its independence.
May 16: The Yugoslav National Army begins disarming the territorial defense forces in Croatia and 
Slovenia; in Slovenia, this is only partially successful.
May 18: Baker presents a plan in Moscow to ease the USSR’s acceptance of German unification.
May 20: In the parliamentary elections in Romania the National Salvation Front (FSN), a suc-
cessor organization of the Communist Party, wins two-thirds of the votes and mandates, ahead 
of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) and the National Liberal Party 
(PNL).
May 23: At a meeting in Geneva of Genscher–Shevardnadze, the basis for the USSR consenting to 
the Germans’ free alliance choice is addressed.
May 25: Gorbachev receives Mitterrand in Moscow and suggests a special role of Germany in a 
completely reformed NATO (similar to the status of France).
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May 30–June 3: Bush receives Gorbachev for consultations at Camp David: A consensus is 
reached on the basic elements of START 1 Treaty; there is no consensus on the issue of the 
alliance membership of a united Germany.
June 5–8: Bush receives Kohl: Both explain that a united Germany in NATO does not constitute 
a threat to the USSR.
June 6–8: WPO Conference: Antall proposes that the Warsaw Pact be dissolved. The Political 
Consultative Committee declares that “the ideological enemy has been overcome.”
June 7–8: NATO foreign ministers meeting in Turnberry: Bush’s “nine-point offer” to the USSR; 
NATO extends the WPO “the hand of friendship.”
June 8: Gorbachev receives Thatcher in Moscow.
June 8–9: Parliamentary elections in the Czechoslovak Federal Republic: In the Czech part of the 
country, the Citizens’ Forum wins 53.2% of the vote, the KSČ 13.5%, the Christian and Demo-
cratic Union 8.7%, and the Movement for Self-governing Democracy 7.9%; in the Slovak part 
of the country, Public Against Violence wins 32.5% of the vote, the Christian Democratic Move-
ment 19%, the KSČ 13.8%, the Slovak National Party 11%, and the Magyar Christian Democratic 
Movement 8.6%; Marian Čalfa, who had left the KSČ, is appointed by Havel as prime minister.
June 10–17: The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the successor to the Communist Party, wins 
the parliamentary elections, the absolute majority of seats, ahead of the Union of Democratic 
Forces (SDS), the Bulgarian National Farmers’ Federation (BZNS) and the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms (DPS).
June 21: Both German parliaments adopt a joint resolution on Poland’s western border, which is 
notified the next day by the two German governments. Poland retreats from their demand for 
initialling a border treaty before unification.
June 22: Second Two-plus-Four Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Berlin: The Soviet Union pres-
ents an overall design for a peace treaty that provides for a transitional period of five years, the 
double membership of Germany in NATO and the WPO, and an overall military strength of 
250,000 soldiers. When the other foreign ministers reject these proposals, Shevardnadze states 
that Germany should receive full sovereignty at the CSCE Summit Meeting in November 1990.
June 25–26: The EC Summit of Heads of State or Government in Dublin schedules a governmental 
conference for December 1990 to discuss how to achieve an economic and monetary union as 
well as the political union of the EC.
July 1: The state treaty between the FRG and the GDR on the economic, monetary and social 
union comes into force. The Deutsche Mark becomes the official currency in the GDR.
July 5–6: NATO Summit of Heads of State or Government in London: Willingness of NATO to 
cooperate with the WPO; idea of a “declaration of ending the enemy relationship” between the 
alliances.
July 6: After a video reveals that Bulgarian prime minister Mladenov still wanted to use tanks 
against demonstrators in December 1989, he is replaced by Zhelev. 
Early July: Riots in Tirana; 5,000 Albanians seek refuge in foreign embassies.
July 9–11: World Economic Summit of the G-7 states in Houston, Texas. Financial assistance 
proposed to the USSR is refused.
July 1–13: 28th Congress of the CPSU: Despite sharp criticism Gorbachev is upheld as General 
Secretary on 10 July.
July 15–16: Gorbachev and Shevardnadze receive Kohl and Genscher in Moscow and in 
Zheleznovodsk in the Caucasus. In an “eight-point statement” the main questions with regard 
to the Two-plus-Four process are clarified: 1. United Germany is to include the FRG, the GDR 
and Berlin; 2. When unified, Germany is to receive full sovereignty; 3. Germany will be allowed 
to freely choose membership in either alliance; 4. Germany will conclude an agreement with 
the USSR concerning troops staying and leaving which provides for the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops within 3 to 4 years; 5. There will be no expansion of the NATO military structures onto 
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GDR territory; 6. The troops of the three Western powers are to remain in Berlin as long as 
Soviet troops remain on GDR territory; 7. At the Vienna negotiations on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, the German Federal Republic is to commit itself to reducing its armed forces 
to 370,000 troops; 8. United Germany is to waive manufacturing, possessing or being able to 
obtain weapons of mass destruction.
July 16: Verkhovna Rada adopts a resolution proclaiming Ukraine’s sovereignty.
July 17: Third Two-plus-Four Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris: Skubiszewski agrees to a 
German–Polish Border Treaty after unification has been completed.
August 2: The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq causes new tensions between the United States and the 
USSR.
August 3: The poet Arpád Göncz is elected president of the Hungarian Republic.
August 16–17: In Moscow, Genscher demands that Shevardnadze suspend the four-power rights 
before the ratification of the Two-plus-Four documents.
August 17: The “Log Revolution” starts in the Krajina—a Serb majority area along the Croa-
tian-Bosnian border between Petrinja and Knin; Serb militia raids the weapon depots of the 
Croatian police.
August 23: The People’s Chamber of the GDR decides to complete the accession of the GDR to the 
Federal Republic on 3 October 1990.
September 8: Meeting Bush–Gorbachev in Helsinki. They discuss the Two-plus-Four negotiations, 
the CSCE conference in Paris, and the annexation of Kuwait.
September 12: Fourth Two-plus-Four Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow: 45 years after 
the “London Protocol,” the quadripartite rights and responsibilities are replaced by the “Treaty 
on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany.”
September 13: Signing of an agreement on good neighborliness, partnership and cooperation be-
tween the German Federal Republic and the USSR.
September 27–28: The Treaty between FRG and GDR is suspended through an exchange of notes 
and is to be annuled after the Two-plus-Four Treaty comes into force on 15 March 1991.
October 1–2: At the sidelines of the CSCE Foreign Ministers’ Conference in New York, the rights 
and responsibilities of the quadripartite are suspended.
October 3: “Day of German Unity”: in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law, the five states 
of the GDR and East Berlin join the Federal Republic of Germany; as part of the FRG, they also 
become members of the EC and NATO.
October 5: Ratification of the Two-plus-Four Treaty in the Bundestag.
October 10: Ratification of the Two-plus-Four Treaty in the US Senate.
November 11: In the cathedral of Shkodër (Shkodra), Albania, thousands of faithful take part in the 
first public Catholic mass since 1967.
November 14: Initialling of the German–Polish Border Treaty in Warsaw: Germany and Poland 
recognize the Oder–Neisse line as their common border.
November 16: In the parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of Mus-
lims (SDA, 31.5%), Serbs (SDS, 26.1%) and Croats (HDZ, 16.0%) vote for their respective 
national party, while the Communist Party receives only 12.3% of the vote; the chairman of the 
SDA, Alija Izetbegovic becomes the president of the Republic.
November 19–21: CSCE Summit of Heads of State or Government in Paris: The 34 states of the 
CSCE initial the CSCE Treaty; the institutionalization of the CSCE is anchored in the “Charter 
of Paris”; the final communiqué declares that the division of Europe is ended.
November 27/ December 7: Wałęsa wins the presidential elections against Mazowiecki and the 
unknown candidate Stanisław Tyminski.
December 7: In the parliamentary elections in Serbia, the Socialist Party of Milošević wins 193 
of 250 seats, followed by the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Democratic Party and the 
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina.
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December 23: In a referendum in Slovenia (election turnout: 94%), 88% of the electorate vote for 
independence.
1991 
January 11-13: Soviet forces kill 19 civilians in a crackdown at Vilnius.
February 15: In Visegrád in Hungary, presidents Havel and Wałęsa and the Hungarian prime min-
ister Antall sign a declaration on cooperation between the three states; with the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993, the troika expands to a quadruple  alliance.
February 22: The Warsaw Pact member states decide to dissolve the military structure on 1 April 
1991 and thus, the obligation of mutual assistance.
March 4: Ratification of the Two-plus-Four Treaty in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
March 9: President Milošević orders the Yugoslav National Army break up demonstrations in Bel-
grade of the Serbian opposition.
March 12–15: The Yugoslav state presidency rejects the Serbian request to impose martial law in 
Yugoslavia.
March 15: The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany comes into force. 
End of March: Presidents Milošević and Tuđman hold secret negotiations in Karadjordjevo (Vojvo-
dina) about a possible division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
April 1: Anullment of the Warsaw Pact.
Beginning of April: A rebellion of Serbian militias begins in the Plitvice Lakes district of Western 
Croatia; the Croatian government responds with the establishment of a “National Guard.”
April 29: Albania removes the term “socialist” from its national name.
Beginning of May: Croatian policemen stumble upon a Serbian ambush in Borovo Selo near Vuko-
var and are shot.
May 17–18: The foreign ministers of the “pentagonal” states and Poland meet in Bologna and de-
clare that the peoples of Yugoslavia have the right to decide on their future.
May 19: In a referendum in Croatia, 94% of the electorate vote for independence.
May 29: Pope John Paul II appoints the Bishop of Nitra, Ján Chryzostom Korec, cardinal.
June 12: Boris Yeltsin becomes the president of Russia.
June 17: Initialling of the Polish–German Treaty of Good Neighborship and Friendly Coope-
ration: recognition of the Oder–Neisse border; acknowledgment of minority rights of Polish 
Germans (Upper Silesia).
June 19: The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is completed.
June 21: US secretary of state Baker visits Belgrade and speaks in favor of Yugoslav unity; however, 
its preservation should not be imposed by force of arms. Colleagues of Tuđman learn of Yugo-
slav National Army plans to attack and inform Tuđman and Kučan.
June 25: As had been agreed, Slovenia and Croatia declare their independence simultaneously.
June 27: Without the unanimous decision of the Yugoslav state presidency, the Yugoslav National 
Army begins a military deployment against Slovenia and tries to close the borders to Italy and 
Austria as well as the airport in Ljubljana; the Yugoslav National Army is surprised by the armed 
resistance of the Slovene territorial defense, which leads the latter to a partial success; 67 fatalities.
July 8: A troika of three EC foreign ministers on the island of Brioni mediates a cease-fire based on 
a three-month suspension of Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence.
July 18: The Yugoslav state presidency decides to withdraw the Yugoslav National Army from Slo-
venia; the troops are moved to Croatia and Bosnia.
August 26: The Croatian village of Kijevo in the Krajina is destroyed by the Yugoslav National Army.
August 18–27: After an unsuccessful coup attempt against Gorbachev by the Soviet vice-president 
and the KGB chief, in succession the republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Be-
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larus and Moldova declare independence, as do the three Transcaucasian and the five Central 
Asian republics.
September 14: The Croatian National Guard begins to besiege all Yugoslav National Army barracks 
in Croatia and to interrupt their electricity, water and food supplies, as well as the telephone 
lines; a number of garrisons surrender and hand over their weapons.
September 19: Supported by Serbian militias, the Yugoslav National Army moves from Srem and 
attacks Vukovar; after extensive destruction of the city, the siege ends on 18 November with the 
surrender of the Croatian forces.
September 25: The UN imposes an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, which is aimed at preventing a 
civil war, but gives an advantage to the Yugoslav National Army.
September 26–30: In a referendum in Kosovo, in which the Serbian and Montenegrin population do 
not vote, the vast majority of Albanians are for secession from Yugoslavia.
October 1: Supported by Montenegrin militia and with Montenegrin warships, the Yugoslav Na-
tional Army begins an attack on Dubrovnik, which leads to the destruction of many hotels and 
yachts; the historic old town survives the bombing without major damage.
October 15: With the votes of Muslim and Croat deputies, the parliament in Sarajevo declares the 
sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the session is boycotted by Serbian 
representatives.
October 21: Completion of the political negotiations on an EEA Agreement between the twelve EC 
and the seven EFTA countries.
October: After parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, for the first time since September 1944, a 
government is formed in which no communists participate.
November 7–9: The Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia fails because Lord Carrington’s “Ar-
rangements for a General Settlement” (union of sovereign republics, no unilateral changes of 
borders; wide range of minority rights) is rejected, above all by Milošević; an EC summit in 
Rome imposes an oil and trade embargo on all Yugoslav republics.
November 20: Macedonian declaration of independence; recognized by the UN on 4 August 
1993.
November 22: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia conclude association contracts with the EC.
December 1: Ukraine becomes an independent state; Leonid M. Kravchuk is elected president.
December 7-8: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Treaty signed by Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus; Ukraine’s Parliament never ratifies the treaty.
December 9–11: The EU Heads of State and Government agree at a summit in Maastricht on the 
Treaty on European Union (EU), which establishes Economic and Monetary Union, Political 
Union, Common Security and Foreign Policy.
December 16: The EC decides to recognize those Yugoslav republics that meet the criteria of the 
Badinter Commission; Genscher demands the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on 15 Jan-
uary 1992.
December 21: In Almaty, 11 of the 15 Soviet republics decide on the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
December 23: The FRG unilaterally recognizes the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Cro-
atia.
1992 
January 3: UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance mediates a cease-fire in Croatia.
January 15: The European Union, the United States, and another 20 countries (including 
Austria) recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.
February 7: Signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht.
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February 21: The UN approves the deployment of 14,000 UN troops to Croatia; the first UN soldiers 
arrive on 1 April and over the course of April the Yugoslav National Army gives up those parts 
of Croatia they occupy; Serb artillery attacks on Dubrovnik, Zadar, Karlovac and Osijek also 
begin to ease off.
February 29–March 3: After a referendum boycotted by Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs, President 
Izetbegovic proclaims the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina; first serious unrest in Sa-
rajevo.
April 6–7: The EU and the United States recognize the independent state of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The Serbian community calls for a “Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”
April 27: The Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro establish the new Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, which consists of Serbia (including Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro.
Spring and summer: supported by the now split Yugoslav National Army and the Serbian govern-
ment, Serbian troops conquer about 70% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, drive out 
the majority of the more than two million Muslims and hundreds of thousands of Croats from 
their homes (“ethnic cleansing”), murder tens of thousands, also in concentration camps, and 
destroy historic buildings in many cities, especially Catholic churches and mosques.
May 31: The UN Security Council imposes a full trade embargo against Serbia and Montenegro 
and stops all flights; due to numerous violations of the embargo—especially via the Danube 
and the Adriatic—Western warships start to control vessel traffic; however, fuel and weapons 
smuggling across the land routes from Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia continues 
largely unhindered.
May: The UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) established.
June 5–6: Parliamentary elections in the Czechoslovak Federal Republic: In Bohemia and 
Moravia, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) wins, in Slovakia, the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS). Already on 8 June, the two party leaders Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar 
begin negotiations in Villa Tugendhat in Brno. After several weeks of negotiations, both sides 
agree on the federation being dissolved on 1 January 1993.
July 21: In Moscow, the presidents of Russia and Moldova sign a peace agreement on the Dniester 
region; the region remains part of Moldova, but the rights of Russian and Ukrainian minorities 
are guaranteed.
August 25–28: The London Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia, in which 40 states par-
ticipate following the invitation of the UN and the EU, agrees on humanitarian aid for prisoners 
and displaced and trapped civilians (for instance, in Sarajevo), but fails in terms of a future 
solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
September 17: After stock market speculation (also by George Soros), the British pound and the 
Italian lira are eliminated from the European monetary system.
September 22: After the disclosure of war crimes in Serbian detention camps and mass systematic 
rape of Muslim women and girls by Serbian soldiers (cf. Mazowiecki report), the UN repeals 
the membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
October 25: First fighting between Croat and Muslim units in Prozor in Central Bosnia.
November 3: Bill Clinton is elected president of the United States.
December 11–12: Denmark, which on 2 June had voted by a narrow margin against the Treaty of 
Maastricht, is granted exemption from the EU Treaty by the heads of state and government of 
the European Community. 
December 20: Milošević wins the presidential election in Serbia against the “Yugoslav” prime min-
ister Milan Panić; in the parliamentary elections, the Milošević Socialists remain ahead of the 
nationalists of Vojislav Šešelj and opposition groups.
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1993 
January 1: The Maastricht Treaty comes into effect: All 12 members of the EU agree to introduce 
a common currency, drop all trade barriers, and accept a common defence and foreign policy.
January 1: Czechoslovakia splits into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Therewith the Czecho-
slovak Republic, which was established on 28 October 1918, ceases to exist.
January: The UN and EU mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen present a peace plan that provides 
for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into cantons based on ethnic majorities.
February 1: Beginning of EC accession negotiations with Austria, Sweden and Finland.
February 15: Michal Kováč is elected the first president of the Slovak Republic.
April 5: Beginning of EC accession negotiations with Norway.
April: President Yeltsin survives a referendum on his government and crushes a rebellion in the 
Supreme Soviet.
May 25: UN Security Council establishes the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTFY) in The Hague.
May: While the Vance-Owen plan is signed in Athens by the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan 
Karadžić, it is, however, rejected by the parliament of the Bosnian Serbs.
June 21–22: In Copenhagen, the European Council decides on principles and criteria for including 
the Central and Eastern European countries.
November 1: Following a decision by the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe on the compat-
ibility of the Treaty on European Union with the Basic Law, the Maastricht Treaty enters into 
force.
November 9: In a bitter battle for Mostar, Bosnian Croat units destroy the 16th-century Ottoman 
bridge over the Neretva; only ten years later it is rebuilt by a Turkish company with EU funds.
December: A new constitution is adopted in Russia and a new Duma elected.
1994 
January 1: The EEA enters into force: free movement of people, goods, capital and services be-
comes available for 372 million Europeans.
January 10-11: NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program with neutral and former Warsaw-Pact 
member states is launched. Subsequently, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia join the PfP and, 
later, NATO. Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, 
Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan join 
the PfP.
February 5: A grenade fired by Serb besiegers on the Sarajevo marketplace kills 69 people and 
wounds over 200; a few days later, NATO places an ultimatum on Bosnian Serbs, threating 
to bomb if they do not withdraw their heavy weapons around Sarajevo; after the mediation of 
Russia, the Bosnian Serbs accept.
March 2: Through the mediation of the United States, Croatia and Bosnian Muslims sign an agree-
ment on a Croatian-Muslim Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
March 30: Sweden, Finland, Norway and Austria sign the negotiation packets for accession treaties.
April 1: Hungary applies for EC membership.
April 8: Poland applies for EC membership.
May 4: The European Parliament approves the accession of the “neutrals” (Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Austria) with 374 “yes”, 24 “no” votes and 61 abstentions. 
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June 12: In a referendum held in Austria, 66.6% vote in favor of joining the EU.
July 15: After parliamentary elections in Hungary, Gyula Horn from the Socialist Party forms a 
coalition government with the Liberals. 
Summer: The “contact group” (the United States, Russia, France, Britain, Germany) designs a new 
partition plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to which the Bosnian Serbs would have to 
return about 20% of the occupied territory; they refuse.
October 16: In a referendum held in Finland, 57% vote in favor of joining the EU.
November 13: In a referendum held in Sweden, 52.2% vote in favor of joining the EU.
November 27–28: In a referendum in Norway, 52.2% vote against joining the EU.
November: The attempt of the Bosnian army to break through the blockade of Bihać fails; the United 
States calls for bombing against the Bosnian Serbs; France and the UK are against it.
22 December: The Executive Committee of the Schengen States in Bonn decides to put the agree-
ment on the abolition of border controls into force on 26 March 1995. 
December: Russian forces invade the breakaway republic of Chechnya.
1995 
January 1: Austria, Finland and Sweden become members of the European Union.
March 26: With the Schengen Agreement coming into force, personal checks are no longer carried 
out between Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Spain and Portugal.
Beginning of May: Croatian forces reconquer Serbian-occupied Western Slavonia (“Operation 
Blijesak”) and force the Serbian forces to withdraw to Bosnia.
June 12: Signing of EU Association Agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Between June and December: Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria apply for 
EU membership.
Beginning of July: The far superior Bosnian Serb forces, under the command of General Ratko 
Mladić, occupy the Muslim enclave and UN safe area of Srebrenica, which is protected only 
by a small Dutch detachment; after the evacuation of the women and children, on 11–12 July 
some 7,500 Muslim men are shot in the surrounding woods. Despite being intensively sought 
and accused of genocide, Mladić is not arrested until 2011, when he is extradited to The Hague.
Early August: Croatian troops begin a concentric attack on the “Independent Republic of Krajina” 
(Operation “Oluja”) and force the vast majority of the approximately 200,000 Serbs to flee to 
northern Bosnia; Milošević takes no countermeasures.
August 28: Another artillery attack by Bosnian Serb forces on the Sarajevo marketplace kills or 
wounds about 100 civilians. In the next days, at the request of UNPROFOR, NATO begins 
targeted air strikes against Bosnian Serb military bases and artillery positions.
September 20: The NATO air strikes force the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table.
November 21: After lengthy negotiations between Izetbegović, Milošević and Tuđman at the US air 
force base in Dayton, Ohio, the United States—with the support of Russia, Britain, France and 
Germany—force a preliminary peace which is then formally signed in Paris on 14 December 
1995.
November: NATO-led forces, including US troops, are created to oversee the implementation of 
the settlement; the UN War Crimes Tribunal indicts Bosnian Serb leaders, including President 
Radovan Karadžić, for genocide and crimes against humanity.
November 28: The Hungarian Parliament allows the temporary stationing of US troops in Southern 
Hungary so they can intervene in the former Yugoslavia; the first units land in Taszár already 
on 9 December.
December 15–16: At a meeting in Madrid, the European Council chooses the name “EURO” for the 
future European currency and decides on its introduction in 2002.
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1996 
From January: IFOR troops are stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
January 17: The Czech Republic applies for EU membership.
February 28: Despite the war in Chechnya, Russia becomes member of the Council of Europe.
June 10: Slovenia applies for EU membership.
September 16: Hungarian–Romanian Basic Treaty.
December 6: In Geneva, the South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) is formed between 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and 
Hungary. Its director is former Austrian vice chancellor Erhard Busek.
December 19: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland join the Schengen Agreement.
December 20: Beginning of the SFOR mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina (which continues until 
20 June 1998), in which 31,000 soldiers from 33 countries participate: 8,000 from the United 
States, 5,000 from the UK, 3,000 from Germany, 2,500 from France, 1,900 from Italy, 1,400 
from Spain, 1,350 from the Netherlands, and 1,200 from Canada.
1997 
June 16–17: The EU Heads of State and Government adopt the Treaty of Amsterdam, which is to 
enter into force on 1 May 1999.
July 8–9: In Madrid, the NATO heads of state and government decide to invite Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary for membership negotiations.
July 9: Nationalist riots in the Macedonian cities of Gostivar and Tetovo.
October 5/19: Milo Đukanović wins the presidential elections in Montenegro.
December 12–13: In Luxembourg, the European Council decides to start accession negotiations 
with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus.
December 16: In Brussels, the foreign ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary sign 
the Act of Accession of their countries to NATO; the ratification process is then completed on 
2 December 1998.
1998 
From the end of February: Human rights violations in Kosovo increase, as do armed conflicts, acts 
of retaliation and expulsions.
May 2–3: At a special meeting the European Council, the countries participating in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) are decided upon: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (the UK, Greece, Sweden and 
Denmark are not included) are to become part of the EMU on 1 January 1999; the EU Commis-
sion and the European Monetary Institute determine the conditions for fixing binding conversion 
rates for the euro; the European Central Bank (ECB) is founded and the Dutchman Wim Duisen-
berg is elected its first president.
July 8: Following parliamentary elections in Hungary, Viktor Orbán forms a moderate-right coali-
tion government (with the FIDESZ-MPP, MDF, Smallholders).
October 27: Gerhard Schröder becomes the German chancellor.




January 1: Start of the Economic and Monetary Union; the euro is officially introduced as the unit 
of account.
February 6–23: Representatives of Serbia and of Kosovo Albanians are invited by the Contact 
Group (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, Italy) to the castle of 
Rambouillet near Paris for negotiations; Milošević refuses to sign the contract, but it is signed 
by Hashim Thaci, the political leader of the UÇK.
February 22: Bulgaria recognizes the autonomy of the Macedonian language.
March 12: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary become full NATO members. 
March 24–26: The European Council adopts the “Agenda 2000” at a special summit in Berlin; Ro-
mano Prodi is appointed the new Commission president.
March 24: After increases from the beginning of March Kosovo Albanians being expelled, NATO 
begins—without a mandate from the UN Security Council—“air strikes” against military 
and civilian targets throughout Serbia; not only are barracks and oil storage tanks destroyed, 
but also several bridges across the Danube as well as the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; at the 
beginning of June, Milošević gives in and withdraws the Serbian forces from Kosovo; after the 
cessation of hostilities on 10 June, most of the nearly 800,000 Albanians who had been expelled 
or fled to Albania and Macedonia return back to their towns and villages in Kosovo.
May 29: The mayor of Košice, Rudolf Schuster, a native Carpathian German, is elected president 
of Slovakia.
June 3–4: In Cologne, the European Council adopts a common strategy regarding Russia, and dec-
larations on Kosovo. The former NATO secretary general Javier Solana is appointed the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; in addition, the European 
Employment Pact is adopted.
June 12–13: NATO troops (KFOR) enter Kosovo, in accordance with UN Security Council resolu-
tion 1244.
July 30: In Sarajevo, 27 heads of state and government decide on the “Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe”; the German Bodo Hombach is appointed special coordinator; the Austrian 
Erhard Busek becomes his successor in 2002.
October 15–16: At a special meeting of the European Council in Tampere, the creation of an EU-
wide area of  justice for fundamental rights is adopted.
December 10–11: In Helsinki, the European Council decides to begin accession negotiations with 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia in the spring of 2000; Turkey re-
ceives candidate status. The EU also decides to establish rapid reaction forces by 2003.
December 11: Death of Croatian president Tuđman in Zagreb.
December 31: Boris Yeltsin steps down as president of the Russian Federation.
2000 
January 3: In Croatian parliamentary elections, the Social Democrats and Social Liberals obtain the 
absolute majority; the 1989 party leader of the Croatian communists, Ivica Račan, becomes the 
new prime minister.
January 31: Joint declaration of the 14 EU member states to impose sanctions if a government 
with the participation of the FPÖ (chairman Jörg Haider) is established in Austria.
February 4: In Austria, after the failure of SPÖ–ÖVP coalition negotiations, President Thomas Klestil 
is forced to swear in an ÖVP–FPÖ government led by Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel; massive 
national and international political protests; the 14 EU countries, under the leadership of Germany, 
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France, Portugal and Belgium, put sanctions into force; the United States, Russia, Switzerland and 
Hungary hold back.
February 7: Stjepan (Stipe) Mesić, the last chairman of the Yugoslav state presidency in 1991 and until 
1994 a close associate of Tuđman, wins the Croatian presidential election. 
February 14: Opening of the EU Intergovernmental Conference in Lisbon, which by December 
2000 is to provide a basis for institutional reforms.
February 26: Vladimir V. Putin is elected president of the Russian Federation.
March 12: Pope John Paul II prays for forgiveness at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem.
September 13: After a report by a Finnish-German-British panel, the bilateral EU 14 sanctions 
against Austria are revoked.
September 28: The majority of the Danish population decides against joining the euro zone.
October 7: The opposition candidate and lawyer Vojislav Koštunica wins the Serbian presidential elec-
tions; when Milošević again refuses to recognize the election results, mass protests start in Belgrade; 
Koštunica also receives foreign support; the Milošević era ends and Koštunica becomes president.
October 28: In municipal elections in Kosovo, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under Ibra-
him Rugova is the strongest political force; the demand for independence from Serbia is raised by 
all Kosovo Albanian parties, but is rejected internationally.
November 7: George W. Bush is elected president of the United States.
December 6–11: The EU summit in Nice foresees comprehensive changes in institutional rules (ballot 
evaluation, majority decisions), as well as a future EU with 27 member states. A draft of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights is solemnly proclaimed.
2001 
January 1: On the recommendation of the EU Commission, Greece becomes the 12th member of the 
euro zone.
January 25: The leading candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), German-educated 
philosopher Zoran Đinđić, becomes the prime minister of the first non-socialist Serbian govern-
ment.
March 23–24: In Stockholm, the European Council makes concrete decisions on the implementation of 
economic reforms, employment and education policies, as well as E-commerce.
May 4–9: In Athens, Pope John Paul II apologizes for the crimes commited by the crusaders on Or-
thodox Christians.
June 15–16: Mass protests by opponents of the EU and globalization accompany the European Council 
meetings in Gothenburg. Nonetheless, the EU heads of state and government state that the enlarge-
ment process is “irreversible” and for the first time declare 2004 as the year of accession.
June 28: Milošević is extradited to the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.
September 11: Terrorist attacks by hijacked airliners on the World Trade Center in New York and the 
Pentagon in Washington by Islamic fundamentalists of the Al Qaeda terrorist group, headed by 
Osama bin Laden, cause more than 3,000 deaths, resulting in horror around the world and solidar-
ity with the United States.
December 15: The EU summit in Laeken, Belgium, issues an official order to form a “Convention on 
the Future of Europe.”
2002
January 1: First introduction of euro banknotes; the single European currency becomes legal tender 
in 12 EU countries.
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May 27: Following parliamentary elections in Hungary, Péter Medgyessy forms a Socialist–Liberal 
coalition government.
September 17: US president George W. Bush describes the American claim to a conventional or nu-
clear first strike (“preemptive strike”) against “rogue states” and the “axis of evil” in the world.
October 10: The Hungarian poet Imre Kertész receives the Nobel Prize in Literature.
October 28: The President of the Constitutional Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, presents the 
draft of a future Constitution for Europe to the European Parliament.
December 13: The EU summit in Copenhagen decides on EU enlargement with ten new members; 
their accession is to take place on 1 May 2004. Despite criticism and warnings, priority is given 
to politics rather than economic and institutional problems.
2003 
January 18: Serbian prime minister Đinđić calls for a soon start of negotiations on the final status 
of Kosovo; he initially encounters rebuffs not only from Belgrade and Priština, but also from 
Washington and Brussels.
February 4: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is renamed Serbia and Montenegro. 
March 8: Positive referendum (about 53%) in Malta for accession to the EU.
March 12: Prime Minister Đinđić is shot in the courtyard of his official residence in Belgrade by a 
hired killer.
March 20: Without a mandate by the UN Security Council, the United States and Great Britain 
begin a war against Iraq; France and Germany hold back.
March 23: Referendum on Slovenia’s future membership in the EU, about 90% of the voters are for 
the EU.
April 12: Referendum on Hungary’s future membership in the EU, about 84% of the voters are for 
the EU.
May 10–11: Positive Referendum on Lithuania’s future membership in the EU.
May 16–17: Positive Referendum on Slovakia’s future membership in the EU.
June 7–8: Positive Referendum on Poland’s future membership in the EU.
June 15–16: Positive Referendum on the future membership of the Czech Republic in the EU. 
June 20–22: At the EU summit in Thessaloniki the possibility of EU accession for the Balkans is 
endorsed, although only after they meet a number of specific conditions; accessions can take place 
according to the “regatta” principle, i.e. each country individually, if it has fulfilled these conditions. 
In addition, convention president Giscard d’Estaing presents the draft of a European constitution.
September 10–14: Visit of the Pope John Paul II to Slovakia, his 102nd and final trip abroad; large 
mass in Petržalka (Engerau) at the Slovak-Austrian border.
September 14: Positive referendum on Estonia’s future membership in the EU.
September 20: Positive referendum on Latvia’s future membership in the EU.
December 12–13: The summit of EU leaders in Brussels fails to adopt the draft of the EU Consti-
tutional Treaty; outwardly this seems to have to do with the weight of votes in the Council of 27, 
the background reasons are more complex.
2004 
March 29: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia become full mem-
bers of  NATO.
May 1: (Greek-)Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia become full members of the EU. Apart from the special cases of Swit-
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zerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland—this leaves only the Eastern European countries 
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) and the Balkans (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia) outside the EU; Romania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey—in the majority a non-European country—have submitted appli-
cations for membership.
June 18–19: After months of discussion, the EU leaders in Brussels under the Irish council presiden-
cy reach an agreement on a new EU constitution.
December: In the so-called “Orange Revolution,” Ukrainians protest against fraud in the presiden-
tial elections in favor of Viktor Yanukovych. In a re-vote, pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko, who 
had been poisoned a few months earlier, is elected. He chooses Yulya Tymoshenko as prime 
minister.
2005 
January 24: US president Bush and Russian president Vladimir V. Putin meet in Bratislava Castle.
April 19: Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, a native Bavarian, is elected the new pope and takes the 
name Benedict XVI. 
October 3: After difficult discussions concerning various terms and conditions for accession negoti-
ations—in which Britain campaigned in particular for Turkey, Austria for Croatia—the Europe-
an Union decides to begin accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia.
November 22: Angela Merkel (CDU), who grew up in the GDR as a pastor’s daughter, is elected 
chancellor of the FRG.
2006
March 11: Milošević is found dead in his UN war crimes tribunal prison cell in The Hague.
June 3: Montenegro declares its independence.
July 4: After parliamentary elections in Slovakia, Róbert Fico (Direction Social Democracy, SMER) 
forms a new government.
September 10: The Socialist Party of Prime Minister Milo Đukanović wins the parliamentary elec-
tions in Montenegro.
2007 
January 1: Bulgaria and Romania become members of the European Union. 
May 6: Nicolas Sarkozy becomes president of France.
December 13: Treaty of Lisbon amends the Maastricht Treaty. 
December 21: Slovenia and Hungary become members of the Schengen Area.
2008
February 18: Declaration of independence of the former Autonomous Republic of Kosovo/Koso-
va.
April 3: NATO invites Albania and Croatia to join the organization.
August 8-15: War between Georgia und Russia.
October 7: The EU ministers of finance conclude guarantees for savings accounts.
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2009
April 1: Albania and Croatia become full members of NATO.
September 1: Commemoration on Westerplatte next to Gdańsk to mark the 70th anniversary of the 
beginning of World War II in the presence of Polish president Lech Kaczynski, the Polish prime min-
ister Donald Tusk, German chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian prime minister Vladimir V. Putin.
2010 
April 7: Meeting Putin–Tusk in Katyń to commemorate the murder in the spring of 1940 of some 
26,000 Polish officers, officials, police officers, landowners, etc. 
April 10: The plane carrying Polish President Kaczyński, who was also travelling to Katyń for the 
commemoration, crashes with 96 passengers—among them Polish members of parliament, bish-
ops, generals and relatives of the victims.
May 9: Military parade on Red Square in Moscow to mark the 65th anniversary of the end of 
World War II in Europe, with the participation of US, British, French and Polish soldiers and 
in the presence of Russian President Medvedev, German Chancellor Merkel, Polish President 
Komorowski and Czech President Klaus.
2011
December 9: “Fiscal pact” of the Euro members. 
2013 
July 1: Croatia becomes the 28th member of the European Union.
November: EU association agreements with Georgia and Moldova are signed. 
November 21: Demonstrations on Kyiv’s Maidan against President Viktor Yanukovych’s hesitation 
towards signing a similar agreement with the EU begin.
2014
February 21-22: After violent clashes on the so-called “Euro-Maidan”, Yanukovych and opposition 
leaders agree on new elections and a return to the 2004 Constitution. Yanukovych flees to Rus-
sia; the Ukrainian Parliament votes him out of office.
February-March: Russian special troops without insignia take control of the Crimea. After a quick 
referendum regarding the Ukrainian peninsula, which is later declared invalid by the UN Gener-
al Assembly, the Crimea is incorporated into the Russian Federation.
April-July: Russian-speaking separatists and Russian citizens seize control of Eastern Ukraine and de-
clare the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Battles between separatist and Ukrainian forces 
start. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights accuses pro-Russian forces of 
having subjected the eastern Ukrainian population to “a reign of intimidation and terror,” resulting 
in “hundreds of abductions with many victims tortured” and killed. The destruction of Malaysia Air-
lines flight MH17 near Donetsk kills 298 people, with evidence indicating that pro-Russian separat-
ists fired a surface-to-air missile at what they probably thought was a Ukrainian military aircraft. The 
EU and the United States accuse Russia of supporting the separatists and impose economic sanctions. 
Michael Gehler and Arnold Suppan
633Chronology of the Political Events in Central, East and South Europe
Selected Bibliography
Benz, Wolfgang et al., Deutschland seit 1945. Entwicklungen in der Bundesrepublik und in der 
DDR. Chronik–Dokumente–Bilder (Munich: Moos & Partner, 1990). 
Berend, Ivan T., Central and Eastern Europe 1944–1993. Detour from the Periphery to the Periph-
ery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Beschloss, Michael R. and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels (Boston: Little, Brown and Com-
pany, 1993). 
Buchvaldek, Miroslav et al., eds., Československé dějiny v datech (Prague: Svododa, 1986).
Clewing, Konrad and Oliver Jens Schmitt eds., Geschichte Südosteuropas. Vom frühen Mittelalter 
bis zur Gegenwart (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2011).
Hyland, William G., The Foreign Affairs Chronology of World Events: 1978–1991, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992).
Garton Ash, Timothy, Ein Jahrhundert wird abgewählt. Aus den Zentren Mitteleuropas 1980–1990 
(Munich and Vienna: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1990).
Gehler, Michael, Europa. Ideen–Institutionen–Vereinigung, 2nd ed. (Munich: Olzog, 2010).
Glatz, Ferenc, et al. eds., A magyarok krónikája (Budapest: Officina Nova, 1995).
Grafe, Roman, Die Grenze durch Deutschland. Eine Chronik von 1945 bis 1990 (Berlin: Siedler, 
2002).
Hertle, Hans–Hermann, Chronik des Mauerfalls: Die dramatischen Ereignisse um den 9. November 
1989 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1996).
Hildermeier, Manfred, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991. Entstehung und Niedergang des 
ersten sozialistischen Staates (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998).
Hoensch, Jörg K., Geschichte Böhmens. Von der slavischen Landnahme bis zur Gegenwart, 3rd ed. 
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 1997).
Hoensch, Jörg K., Geschichte Polens, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: utb, 1998).
Honzák, František, Miroslav Londák and Vlasta Jaksicsová eds., Dejiny Slovenska. Dátumy, udalos-
ti, osobnosti  (Bratislava–Prague: Slovart, 2007). 
Hösch, Edgar and Hans-Jürgen Grabmüller, Daten der sowjetischen Geschichte. Von 1917 bis zur 
Gegenwart (Munich: dtv, 1981).
Hösch, Edgar, Geschichte der Balkanländer (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988).
Howard, Michael and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century (Ox-
ford—New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Judt, Tony, Postwar, A History of Europe since 1945 (London: William Heinemann, 2005).
Kappeler, Andreas, Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1994).
Kontler, László, A History of Hungary. Millenium in Central Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2002).
Korte, Karl–Rudolf, Geschichte der Deutschen Einheit 1: Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls 
Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998). 
Lévesque, Jacques, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1997).
Malcolm, Noel, Bosnia. A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1994).
Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo. A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998). 
Mannová, Elena, ed., A Concise History of Slovakia (Bratislava: Historický ústav SAV, 2000).
Mueller, Wolfgang and Michael Portmann, eds., Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende (Vienna: Ver-
lag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007). 
Pop, Ioan-Aurel and Ioan Bolovan, eds., History of Romania. Compendium (Cluj–Napoca: Roma-
nian Cultural Institute, 2006).
Rothschild, Joseph and Nancy M. Wingfield, Return to Diversity. A Political History of East Central 
Europe Since World War II, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
634
Savranskaya, Svetlana, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History: The 
Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest and New York: Central European 
University Press, 2010).
Schmitt, Oliver Jens, Kosovo. Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft (Vienna, Co-
logne and Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2008).
Silber, Laura and Alan Little, Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 1995).
Štih, Peter, Vasko Simoniti, and Peter Vodopivec, Slowenische Geschichte. Gesellschaft – Politik – 
Kultur (Graz: Leykam, 2008).
Sundhaussen, Holm, Geschichte Serbiens, 19.–21. Jahrhundert (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar: 
Böhlau Verlag, 2007).
Suppan, Arnold, Hitler – Beneš – Tito: Konflikt, Krieg und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteu-
ropa (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2014).
Tomasevich, Jozo, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
Tóth, István György, ed., A Concise History of Hungary. The History of Hungary from the Early 
Middle Ages to the Present (Budapest: Corvina/Osiris, 2005).
Treptow, Kurt W., ed., A History of Romania (Iaşi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1996).
Villepin, Dominique de, ed., Histoire de la diplomatie française (Paris: Perrin, 2005). 
Weidenfeld, Werner, Peter Wagner, and Elke Bruck, Geschichte der deutschen Einheit 4: Außenpoli-
tik für die deutsche Einheit: Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1998).
Michael Gehler and Arnold Suppan
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ablaev, Denis M., Mezhregional’naya deputatskaya gruppa: stanovlenie, razvitie i itogi (Moscow: 
Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi oblastnoi universitet, 2008).
Adams, Bradley, “Buying Time: Consumption and Political Legitimization in Late Communist 
Czechoslovakia,” in Vladimir Tismaneanu and Bogdan C. Iacob, eds., The End and the Be-
ginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2009), 399–421.
Adamski, Władysław, Krzysztof Jasiewicz, Lena Kolarska–Bobińska, Andrzej Rychard, and Ed-
ward Wnuk–Lipiński, eds., Polacy 88. Dynamika konfliktu a szanse reform. Raport z badania 
“Sprawy Polaków ‘87” (Warsaw: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii. Polska Akademia Nauk, 1989).
Adomeit, Hannes, “Gorbachev and German Unification,” in Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus, 
eds., The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse, rev. ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 465–92.
Adomeit, Hannes, “Gorbachev’s consent to united Germany’s membership of NATO,” in Frédéric 
Bozo, Marie–Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., Europe and the End of the 
Cold War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 107–18.
Adomeit, Hannes, Imperial Overstretch. Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Baden–Baden: Nomos, 1998).
Akhtamzyan, A. A., Ob’’edinenie Germanii: Obstoyatel’stva i posledstviya (Moscow: MGIMO, 
2008).
Albright, David E. and Semyen J. Appatov, Ukraine and European Security (New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 1999).
Altrichter, Helmut, ed., Gegen Erinnerung. Geschichte als politisches Argument im Transformati-
onsprozeß Ost–, Ostmittel– und Südosteuropas (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006).
Ant, Jüri, ed., Kaks algust. Eesti Vabariik, 1920 ja 1990 aastad. Eesti Vabariik—80 (Tallinn: Eesti 
Riigiarhiiv, 1998).
Antal, Endre, “Land– und Forstwirtschaft,” in Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, ed., Südosteuropa–Hand-
buch, Ungarn (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 354–82.
Antoszewski, Andrzej, ed., Demokratyzacja w III Rzeczypospolitej (Wrocław: Wyd. Uniwersytetu 
Wrocławskiego, 2000).
Anušauskas, Arvydas, ed., The Anti–Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States (Vilnius: DuKa, 1999).
Applebaum, Ann, “After the Wall fell,” The Washington Post, 9 November 2009, http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2009-11-09/opinions/36902759_1_berlin-wall-invisible-walls-east-berlin 
(accessed 25 October 2013).
Applebaum, Ann, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe (London: Allen Lane, 2012). 
Arumäe, Heino, “Noch einmal zum sowjetisch–deutschen Nichtangriffspakt,” in Erwin Oberländer, 
ed., Der Hitler–Stalin–Pakt 1939. Das Ende Ostmitteleuropas? (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 
1989), 114–24.
Arvydas, Anušauskas, and Česlovas Bauza, Lietuvos suvereniteto atkūrimas. 1988–1991 metais 
(Vilnius: Diemedzio Leidykla, 2000).
Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,” Foreign 
Affairs 72, no. 4 (1993): 28–40.
Attali, Jacques, Verbatim III: Chronique des années 1988–1991 (Paris: Fayard, 1998).
Auer, Stefan, “Violence and the End of Revolution After 1989,” Thesis Eleven 97, no. 1 (2009): 6–25.
636 Bibliography
Bachmann, Klaus, Polens Uhren gehen anders. Warschau vor der Osterweiterung der EU (Leipzig 
and Stuttgart: Hohenheim Verlag, 2001).
Bachmann, Klaus, Repression, Protest, Toleranz. Wertewandel und Vergangenheitsbewältigung in 
Polen nach 1956 (Dresden and Wrocław: Atut, Neisse Verlag, 2010).
Baeva, Iskra, and Stefan Troebst, eds., Vademecum. Contemporary History Bulgaria (Berlin and 
Sofia: Stiftung Aufarbeitung der SED–Diktatur, 2007).
Bailes, Alyson J. K., “China and Eastern Europe: A Judgement on the ‘Socialist Community’,” The 
Pacific Review 3, no. 3 (1990): 222–42.
Baker III, James A. and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and 
Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995).
Balík, Stanislav and Jiří Hanuš, Katolická církev v Československu 1945–1989 (Brno: Centrum pro 
demokracii a kulturu, 2007).
Banac, Ivo, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1992).
Banchoff, Thomas, “German Policy towards the European Union: The Effects of Historical Memo-
ry,” German Politics 6, no. 1 (1997): 60–76.
Baráth, Magdolna and János M. Rainer, eds., Gorbacsov tárgyalásai magyar vezetőkkel: doku-
mentumok az egykori SZKP és MSZMP archívumaiból 1985–1991 (Budapest: 1956–os Intézet, 
2000).
Barša, Pavel, Václav Bělohradský, Michael Hauser, Václav Magid, Petr Schnur, Ondřej Slačálek, 
Tereza Stöckelová, Martin Škabraha and Mirek Vodrážka, Kritika depolitizovaného rozumu: 
Úvahy (nejen) o nové normalizaci (Prague: Grimmus, 2010).
Batūra, Roman, ed., Siekiant nepriklausomybės. Lietuvos sąjūdžio spauda. 1988–1991 m. (Vilnius: 
Valstybės Žinios, 2005).
Baum, Richard, “The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, 
ed., The Politics of China, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 340–471.
Baun, Michael, A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lan-
ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
Beissinger, Mark R., Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. A Tidal Approach 
to the Study of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Béja, Jean–Philippe and Merle Goldman, “The Impact of the June 4th Massacre on the pro–Democ-
racy Movement,” China Perspectives, no. 2 (2009): 18–28.
Békés, Csaba, Európából Európába. Magyarország konfliktusok kereszttüzében, 1945–1990 (Buda-
pest: Gondolat, 2004).
Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in 
Documents (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002).
Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, Melinda Kalmár, Zoltán Ripp and Miklós Vörös, eds., Political 
Transition in Hungary, 1989–1990: A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology 
of Events (Washington and Budapest: National Security Archive, Cold War History Research 
Center and 1956 Institute, 1999).
Bělohradský, Václav, Společnost nevolnosti: Eseje z pozdější doby (Prague: Sociologické naklada-
telství, 2007).
Benoît, Challand, “1989, Contested Memories and the Shifting Cognitive Maps of Europe,” Euro-
pean Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 3 (2009): 397–408.
Benovska–Săbkova, Milena, Politicheski prehod i vsekidnevna kultura (Sofia: Prof. M. Drinov, 
2001).
Benz, Wolfgang et al., Deutschland seit 1945. Entwicklungen in der Bundesrepublik und in der 
DDR. Chronik–Dokumente–Bilder (Munich: Moos & Partner, 1990).
Berend, Ivan T., Central and Eastern Europe 1955–1993. Detour from the periphery to the periph-
ery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Bernhard, Michael. “The Revolutions of 1989,” Angelaki. 15, no. 3 (2010): 109–22.
637Bibliography
Beschloss, Michael R. and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels (Boston: Little, Brown and Com-
pany, 1993).
Beschloss, Michael R. and Strobe Talbott, Auf höchster Ebene: Das Ende des Kalten Krieges und 
die Geheimdiplomatie der Supermächte 1989–1991 (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1993).
Bichniewicz, Michał and Piotr M. Rudnicki, Czas na zmiany. Z Jarosławiem Kaczyńskim rozmawiają 
Michał Bichniewicz i Piotr M. Rudnicki (Warszawa: Ed. Spotkania, 1992).
Biedenkopf, Kurt, “Will Europe Stay Together?” IWMpost, no. 100 (January–March 2009): 14.
Biermann, Rafael, Zwischen Kreml und Kanzleramt: Wie Moskau mit der deutschen Einheit rang 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997).
Bischof, Günter, Anton Pelinka and Michael Gehler, eds., Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical 
Context (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006).
Blackplait, Tony and Cat Bloomfield, Eesti punk 1976–1990. Anarhia ENSV–s (Tallinn: Varrak, 
2009).
Blanton, Thomas, “US Policy and the Revolutions of 1989,” in Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas 
Blanton and Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of Hiostory: The Peaceful End of the Cold 
War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 49–98.
Blanton, Thomas, “When did the Cold War End?” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 
10 (1998): 183–91.
Blehová, Beáta, “Michail Gorbačev und der Fall des Kommunismus in der Tschechoslowakei,” in 
Wolfgang Mueller and Michael Portmann, eds., Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende (Vienna: 
Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), 349–67.
Blūzma, Valdis, ed., Latvijas valsts atjaunošana. 1986–1993 (Rīga: LU žurnāla “Latvijas Vēsture” 
fonds, 1998).
Bobinski, Krzysztof, “1989, a year of peaceful change: the Polish experience” European View 8, no. 
2 (2009): 195–201.
Bollinger, Stefan, 1989 – eine abgebrochene Revolution: verbaute Wege nicht nur zu einer besseren 
DDR? (Berlin: Trafo, 1999).
Bonnin, Michel, “The Chinese Communist Party and June 4th: Or how to get out of it and get away 
with it,” China Perspectives, no. 2 (2009): 52–61.
Borhi, László, “Magyarország kötelessége a Varsói szerzödésben maradni—az 1989–es átmenet 
nemzetközi összefüggései magyar források tükrében,” Külügyi Szemle, No. 2–3 (2007), 255–72.
Borodziej, Włodzimierz and Andrzej Garlicki, “Od redaktorów,” in Włodzimierz Borodziej and An-
drzej Garlicki, eds., Okrągły Stół: dokumenty i materiały vol. 2. (Warszawa: Zapol, 2004), 6–40.
Borodziej, Włodzimierz, Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2010).
Bourdieu, Pierre, Homo academicus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988).
Boyer, Christoph, “‘1989’ und die Wege dorthin,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 59, no. 1 
(2011): 101–18.
Bozo, Frédéric, “‘Winners’ and ‘Losers’: France, the United States, and the End of the Cold War,” 
Diplomatic History 33, no. 5 (2009): 927–56.
Bozo, Frédéric, “The Failure of a Grand Design: Mitterrand’s European Confederation, 1989–1991,” 
Contemporary European History 17, no. 3 (2008): 391–412.
Bozo, Frédéric, Mitterrand, la diplomatie française et la fin de la guerre froide (Paris: Odile Jacob, 
2005).
Bozo, Frédéric, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froid et l’unification allemande. De Yalta à Maas-
tricht (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005).
Bozo, Frédéric, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification (Oxford and New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2009).
Brand–Crémieux, Marie–Noëlle, Les Français face à la réunification allemande, automne 1989–
automne 1990 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004).
Brazauskas, Algirdas, Scheidung vom Kreml (Vilnius: Danielius, 1993).
638
Brettin, Michael, Das Scheitern eines unfreiwilligen Experiments. Die sowjetische Nationalitä-
tenpolitik in der „Perestrojka“ (1985/87–1991) dargestellt am Beispiel Estlands (Hamburg: 
Dr. Kovač, 1996).
Bristow, John A., The Bulgarian Economy in Transition (Cheltenhem: Elgar, 1996).
Brix, Emil and Erhard Busek, Projekt Mitteleuropa (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1986).
Brown, Archie, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).
Brown, Archie, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Brown, J.F., Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1991).
Bruck, Elke, François Mitterrands Deutschlandbild – Perzeption und Politik im Spannungsfeld 
deutschland–, europa– und sicherheitspolitischer Entscheidungen 1989–1992 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2003).
Brüggemann, Karsten, “Russia and the Baltic Countries: Recent Russian–language literature 
(Review Essay),” Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 10, no. 4 (2009): 
935–56.
Brühl, Dietrich Graf von, “Deutsche Erfahrungen mit Österreich,” in Michael Gehler and Ingrid 
Böhler, eds., Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich. Österreich und die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1945/49 bis zur Gegenwart. Festschrift für Rolf Steininger zum 65. Geburtstag 
(Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2007), 579–84.
Brunnbauer, Ulf, “Making Bulgarians Socialist. The Fatherland Front in Communist Bulgaria, 
1944–89,” East European Politics and Societies 22, no. 1 (2008): 44–79.
Brunnbauer, Ulf, “Surviving Post–Socialism. The First Decade of Transformation in Bulgaria,” 
Sociologija 43, no. 1 (2001): 1–26.
Brunnbauer, Ulf, Die sozialistische Lebensweise. Ideologie, Politik und Alltag in Bulgarien, 
1944–1989 (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar: Böhlau, 2007).
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Das gescheiterte Experiment. Der Untergang des kommunistischen Sys-
tems (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1989).
Büchner, Georg, Dantons Tod (Frankfurt am Main: [s.n.], 1835).
Buchvaldek, Miroslav et alii (eds.), Československé dějiny v datech (Prague: Svododa, 1986).
Buckley, Mary, “The Multifaceted External Soviet Role in Processes towards Unanticipated Rev-
olutions,” in Kevin McDermott and Mattew Stibbe, eds., The 1989 Revolutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe: From Communism to Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2013), 33–72.
Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1999).
Carrère d’Encausse, Hélène, Risse im roten Imperium. Das Nationalitätenproblem in der Sowjet-
union (Vienna: Molden, 1979).
Castex, Michel, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990).
Čepaitis, Virgilijus, Su Sąjūdžiu už Lietuvą. Nuo 1988.06.03. iki 1990.03.11. (Vilnius: Tvermė, 
2007).
Cesereanu, Ruxandra, Decembrie ’89. Deconstrucţia unei revoluţii (Bucharest: Polirom, 2009).
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Cherniaev, Anatolii, “Gorbachev and the Reunification of Germany: Personal Recollections,” in 
Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1991: A Retrospective (London: Cass, 
1994), 158–69.
Cherniaev, Anatolii, “The Unification of Germany: Political Mechanisms and Psychological Ste-
reotypes,” Russian Politics and Law 36, no. 4 (1998): 23–38.




Chernyaev, A., V. Medvedev and G. Shakhnazarov, eds., V Politbyuro TsK KPSS… Po zapisam 
Anatoliya Chernyaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiya Shakhnazarova (1985–1991) (Moscow: 
Alpina Bizness Buks, 2006).
Chinoy, Mike, China Live (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
Ciobanu, Monica, “Communist regimes, legitimacy and the transition to democracy in Eastern Eu-
rope,” Nationalities Papers 38, no. 1 (2010): 3–21.
Clemens, Walter C., “Culture and Symbols as Tools of Resistance,” Journal of Baltic Studies 40, 
no. 2 (2009): 169–77.
Clemens, Walter C., Baltic Independence and Russian Empire (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
Clemens, Walter C., The Baltic Transformed. Complexity Theory and European Security (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
Clewing, Konrad and Oliver Jens Schmitt, eds., Geschichte Südosteuropas. Vom frühen Mittelalter 
bis zur Gegenwart (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2011).
Constantinescu, Emil, Adevărul despre România (1989–2004) (Bucharest: Editura Universalia, 
2004).
Costigliola, Frank, “An Arm Around the Shoulder: The United States, NATO and German Unifica-
tion, 1989–1990,” Contemporary European History 3, no. 1 (1994): 87–110.
Courtois, Stephane, Nicolas Werth, Jean–Louis Panné, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek and 
Jean–Louis Margolin, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
Crampton, R.J., Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After, 2nd edition (London: Rout-
ledge, 1997).
Crampton, Richard, Bulgaria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Crane, Keith and K.C. Yeh, Economic Reform and the Military in Poland, Hungary and China 
(Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand, 1991).
Creed, Gerald W., Domesticating Revolution. From Socialist Reform to Ambivalent Transition in a 
Bulgarian Village (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania University Press, 1998).
Creed, Gerald, “The politics of agriculture: identity and socialist sentiment in Bulgaria,” Slavic 
Review 54, no. 4 (1995): 843–68.
Creuzberger, Stefan, Willy Brandt und Michail Gorbatschow: Bemühungen um eine zweite “neue 
Ostpolitik” (Berlin: BeBra, 2014).
Crouch, Colin, Post-democracy (Malden: Polity, 2004).
Curtis, Glenn E., ed., Bulgaria: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 
1992).
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Osęka, Piotr, “Okrągły Stół. Taktyki negocjacyjne władzy i opozycji,” in Włodzimierz Borodziej and 
Andrzej Garlicki, Okrągły Stół: dokumenty i materiały vol. 1. (Warszawa: Zapol, 2004), 5–22.
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Żakowski, Jacek, Rok 1989. Bronisław Geremek opowiada, Jacek Żakowski pyta (Warszawa: Agora 
SA, Polityka Spółdzielnia Pracy, 1990).
Zaremba, Marcin, Komunizm, legitymizacji, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy 
komunistycznej w Polsce (Warszawa: Trio, 2005).
Želev, Želju, V goliamata politika (Sofia: Trud, 1998).
Zelikow, Philip and Condoleezza Rice, Sternstunde der Diplomatie. Die deutsche Einheit und das 
Ende der Spaltung Europas, 2nd ed. (Munich: Propyläen, 2001).
Zelikow, Philip D., “The Suicide of the East? 1989 and the Fall of Communism,” Foreign Affairs 
88, no. 6 (2009): 130–140.
Zelikow, Philipp and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
Zetterberg, Seppo, Eesti ajalugu (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2009).
Zhao, Dingxin, The Power of Tiananmen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
Zilk, Helmut, “Zum Beginn des ‘Prager Frühlings’: Die ‘Stadtgespräche Prag—Wien’,” in Ste-
fan Karner et al. eds., Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968 (Cologne: Böhlau, 
2008), 1089–93.
Znepolski, Ivan, ed., NRB. Ot nachaloto do kraia (Sofia: IIBM, 2011).
Zubkova, Elena Yu., “Vlast’ i razvitie ėtnokonfliktnoi situatsii v SSSR 1953–1985 gody,” Otechest-
vennaya istoriya, no. 4 (2004): 3–32.
Zubkova, Elena Yu., Pribaltika i Kreml’ 1940–1953 (Moscow: ROSSPĖN, 2008).
Zubok, Vladislav, “Die Krisen Gorbatschows und die Vereinigung Deutschlands,” in Hans Hermann 
Hertle, Konrad Jarausch, and Christoph Kleßmann, eds., Mauerbau und Mauerfall (Berlin: Ch. 
Links, 2002), 245–69.
Zubok, Vladislav, “German Unification from the Soviet (Russian) Perspective,” in Kiron Skinner, 
ed., Turning Points in Ending the Cold War (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008), 255–72.
Zubok, Vladislav, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
Bibliography
665Bibliography
Zybertowicz, Andrzej and Radosław Sojak, eds., Transformacja podszyta przemocą: o niefor-
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